KOL KINUYE CHAPTER ONE Chapter One “Misfirtaft Ifa person wishes to deprive himself of the benefit of a particular object, he can make it forbidden tohimself Biblically by means of a7}, neder (pl. nedarim ). This isa typeof vow, recognized by the ‘Torah as binding, that imparts a prohibited status to an article. For example, ifa person says, “The benefit ofthis ‘bread is forbidden to me,” he has effected aneder under which the bread is indeed forbidden to him Biblically. The ‘Torah states in this rogard: rivy? Pom xyv7"b99 79357? XY, he shall not desecrate his word; according to whatever eames from: his mouth shall he do "A vower may render either his own or his fellow’s property forbidden to himsel He can also employ a neder to prohibit his own property to others, but not to prohibit another person's property to anyone besides himself "A full neder declaration consists of a statement such as, ‘This bread is forbidden to me,” or, “This bread is like an offering to me.” However, there are alternative formulas through which one oun invoke a neder. These are the “equivalent terms” for nedarim and “partial declarations” of nedarim.'! The Mishnah discusses these formulas. The Mishnah also touches upon alternative formulas for other Biblically binding declarations, such as oaths: ‘rye m2 m2 59 — All equivalent terms for nedarim are effective like genuine nedarim,“' omy ‘rene — and for charamim are effective like genuine eharamim," niyraa niviawi ~ and for oaths are NEDARIM 2a! NOTES |. Numbers 20:3 This is one catogory of neder, and is the category that is the focus of our tractate, There is, however, an additional way in tmhich an article ean be affected by a neder If person designates his personal object for Temple use, or his animal as an offering, itis ‘tutomatically consecrated by virtue of his declaration, which bas the ftatus of a neder. Nedarim in the latter category are Known as "77 [PrzR, vou of consecration. These are discussed in Seder Kodashim. ‘The nedarim that are the subject of this tractate are known a8 "77 ‘yor, vows of prohibition (Ran; see General Introduction for further 7 — where [the Tanna} does not teach the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding all of these subjects" pray 93 xyW wim — and the context of nedarim, sbiab unt — where he does teach the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding all of these subjects? ‘The Gemara answers: spr aa SND AYA TT DID ~ Since the laws ofaneder and anoath are written together in the Torah," pnyn "3p ~ [the Tanna] teaches the principle of “equivalent terms” regarding these two subjects together in our Mishnah, even though the subject of our tractate is primarily nedarim; "3m pn9n‘aNT 3) srbia) — and once he taught this principle regarding two subjects, he taught it regarding all [the other subjects] to which it applies, as wel, ‘The Gemara counters: ‘pra72 ang nisnay nwn3 13M) — Then let (the Tanna] teach the principle of equivalent terms for oaths immediately after that of equivalent terms for nedarim! Why does he interrupt with ‘equivalent terms for charamim? ‘The Gemara responds: bry KINT "MNS — Since he taught the principle regarding nedarim, ry xyory9nVa7 — which is a case of someone's prohibiting an article upon himself") smayq v2 x3n — he immediately taught it also regarding charamim, —19n%7 ‘by nye — which is similarly a case of someone's probibiting CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM. anarticle upon himself — yay »piex} — to the exclusion of oaths, _xy8q yo mee) TwxR7 — which is a case of one’s prohibiting himself from an article. ‘The Gemara turns to another difficulty inthe Mishnah: yng nn — [The Tanna] opens with the law of equivalent terms, D771 uD 59 ~ stating, “ALL EQUIVALENT TERMS FOR [NEDARIM are effective like genuine nedarim,” nm wp — and he then illustrates the law of partial declarations, 1x7 aang 7ym TaN — stating, “ONE WHO SAYS 1AM VOWED FROM ‘¥0U ete." He proceeds to explain equivalent terms only in alter Mishnah, on 10a! Why does he not first illustrate the law of equivalent terms, with which he began? 1) — And further- more, ‘epx ni — [the Tanna] apparently forgot to mention the law of partial declarations! How can he explain this law without ever having taught it? ‘The Gemara responds to the latter question: 3 "7m — [The Tanna] does deal with {partial declara- tons], tape °37} 790% MOM) — and itis as if [the Mishnal text] is deficient, and this is how it should read: 3 53 BYES BITS — ALL EQUIVALENT TERMS FOR NEDARIM ARE cffetive LIKE genuine NEDARIM, BYYyRD EY AIM) — AND all PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEDARIM ARE effective LIKE full [NEDARIM, On this note the Tanna proceeds to illustrate the law of partial declarations. ‘The Gemara reiterates its first question: xyna pra wri) — But let [the Tanna] illustrate the equi- ‘valent terms frst, since ths is the law he taught first!" — ? — ‘The Gemara responds: xg wipe kod Pv proyy wT — It is the method of the ‘Tanna that the most recently mentioned [subject] is the one NOTES 1 The opening Mishnah of Tractate Nazir states: All equivalent terms for nezirus are [efetve] lke [genuine vows off nezirus. It doesnot add that this also applies to nedarim, charamim and oaths (Ran). 2, Numbers 80:3 reads: yay vaya iK 9 TH THD OX Ifa man vows a nneder to Hashem or swears an oath ete. (Ran). 3, The text of a neder is “This object is forbidden to me for consump- tion” (Ran), 4, [The text of cheirem is “This objet is cheirem to me."] 5."The text of an oath is “I swear that will not eat this food” (Ran), ‘The textual difference between the declaration of a neder [or cheirem| and thet of an oath i indicative ofa fundamental difference Detween their prohibitions. A neder by definition takes effect on an object [xypn] ~ it causes the benefit of a specific objet to bocome prohibited [to cither one individual or all people). An oath, on the other hhand, takes hold on a person [x23] — it eausos the person to become ‘prohibited from performing certain act that he swore to avoid [orto ‘become obligated to perform an act that he swore to dol. For this reason, nedarim ean take effect only on tangible items, whereas oaths ‘an take effect even regarding intangible things. For example, if one says, “Let sleep be konam to me today,” he has not effected a neder, since sloop is intangible. If he wishes to make an effective neder regarding slep, he must say, “Let my eyes be Ronam rogarding sleep today” — thereby effectuating the ner upon a tangible item (the eyes) and rendering his eyes forbidden to him with reepectto the benefit of sleep, By contrast, an oath in the style of “I swear that Iwill not sleep today” — without any mention of the eyes — docs take effect; the person becomes hound by it to refrain from sleeping that day (Gemara 18b with Ran; Ramban to Numbers 20:3). (Similarly, one who says, "I ‘swoar that I will endeavor to sleep today” is obligated to abide by his ‘ath, since he placed this commitment upon his person. However, there {sno such thing as aneder that one will do something since a neder (i.e 1 vow of prohibition) can take effect only upon an object (Ran to 8, second yawn kom 7" see Cheshek Shlomo).] CCharamim are similar to nedarim in that they take effect on objects rather than people. Therefore, the Mishnah mentions the law of charamim before digressing to oaths. It mentions nezirus after oaths, however, because nesirus is similar to an oath insofar as the vow renders the person a nazir (see Rosh; cf Shitah Mokubetzes). [For = fuller discussion of whether nezirus takes hold on the person (21) ce the object [xyon], ee Teshuvas Moharit §58-54 and Teshuvos Acne: Miluim $15,22. Seo slso Ranbi in Shitah Mekubetzes to 17a, Rita to ‘Shevuos 22b, and the wealth of sources cited hy Binayim LaMishoo: ‘This matter is elaborated below, 17H note 13.) [Since itis evident from our Gemara that nedarim are expressed differently than oaths, numerous commentators infer that if someone declares a neder with language appropriate to an oath, oF vice vers, is rneder or oath is ineffective. That is Fone says, “T am hereby bound br ‘anader not to eat this bread” (ie. he declared his person bound by tbe rneder), or, “This bread is forbidden to me by an oath” (Le. he declare? the object prohibited by the oath, his words have no effect (Rabiei=s Chananel et al, cited by Ran). Others maintain that although these declarations do not fit into the categories of the basic neder or os: they are effective under the law of “partial declarations.” Since tbe person intended to effect a neder (or eath) and made a statement that conveys his intent, the statement is considered s.yad, and the neder (ex oath) takes effct despite the deficiency ofits wording (Ramban, citat bby Ran; see Tosafo to 18h x77" and to Shevuos 25a12 77" see Further Yorch Dech 206:5 with Beur HaGra $17). 6. The elucidation fellows Ran and Tosofos, though Ron's text x slighty different here. See also Rosh. (Rosh notes that throughout the ‘Talmud this type of question is typically phrased as wr2py 731 19 "= — “Who mentioned partial delarations?” However, Rosh commen: pop er 199, The language of (Tractate Nedarim is unconventional ‘See the General Introduction for discussion of this phenomenon. 7. Le. even according to your explanation that the Mishnah text ix deficient, its opening clause deals with equivalent terms and its seco ‘clause with partial declarations, You did not propose that the Tens ‘meant to teach the law of partial declarations before that of equivales: ‘terms, since you concede its unlikely that he omitted something fro= ‘the very beginning of his text! Now, since the Tanna taught equivalens terms frst, e should have illustrated them first (Ran, Tosa). 8. Literally: the one he (just) let.2b? KOL KINUYEL he explains first. Thus, we commonly find that where two subjects are discussed — such as in our Mishnah — the last to be mentioned is the first to be illustrated. [As evidence that this style is typical, the Gemara cites three precedents: ante — Aswelearned inthe Mishnah:!" pxmparpp*To m3 pir» — WITH WHAT MAY WE KINDLE the Sabbath lights, AND (WITH WHAT MAY WE NOT KINDLE them? "a ppioyp Px — WE MAY NOT KINDLE WITH efe. The Mishnah responds first to the latter question! prove px 31 panto ma — We learned in a ‘second Mishnahs"* WITH WHAT MAY WE INSULATE hot foods for the Sabbath, AND WITH WHAT MAY WE NOT INSULATE them?" xs Ap [IDI — WE MAY NOT INSULATE WITH ete. Here, too, the ‘Mishnah responds first to the latter question, —rasy mW 7199, rgb mys 7931 — We learned in a third Mishnah! wera WHAT accessories MAY A WOMAN GO OUT on the Sabbath, AND WITH WHAT accessories MAY SHE NOT GO OUT"! Tyx xx xb — AWOMAN MAYNoT GoOUT WITH etc, Thus, we have three instances in which the Mishnah expands first on the most recently mentioned subject. Our Mishnah conforms with this approach Understanding this as meaning that the Mishnah always follows this approach, the Gemara counters xyrna wipe xb mney xp 53} — Now, is it correct that wherever [the Mishnah] opens with one law and then mentions nother, it does not explain the opening law first, but begins CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM — Why, we learned in the Mishnah" orga pot wt — THERE ARE relatives WHO both INHERIT AND BEQUEATH, —poynze xb) pont — relatives who INHERIT BUT DO NOTBEQUEATH...2 omy pont is) — THESE INHERIT AND ‘BEQUEATEH etc. Thus, the Mishnah explains the first law first! ‘The Gemara cites another such instance: rath niwpy) Fe AMM w — We learned in the Mish- nabs"! THERE ARE women WHO ARE PERMITTED TO THEIR HUS. [BANDS BUT FORBIDDEN TO THEIR YEVAMIN,"") yyva3¥9 mtn Trova niwex) — women who are PERMITTED TO THEIR YF- ‘VAMIN BUT FORBIDDEN TO THEIR HUSBANDS...” Atinme YX) Tras nto yous) — THESE ARE PERMITTED TO THEIR [HUSBANDS AND FORBIDDEN TO THEIR YBVAMIN etc. Here, too, the Mishnah explains the first law first! A third such instance: nyabn pew ninyy w» — We learned in the Mishnab:*"'THERE ARE minchah offerings THAT REQUIRE both OIL, AND LEVONAHE aah x’ pov — minchah offerings that require OM. BUTNOT LE. vowatt..2 nyain tow nny x9) — THESE REQUIRE both On. AND LiVONAM ete. Again, the Mishnah explain the first law first! ‘A fourth such instance: ‘pan nip pay mTgaT mia wr — We learned in the Mishnah:* ‘THERE ARE offerings THAT REQUIRE BRINGING NEAR the Altar BUT DO NOT REQUIRE WAVING") mga x) AUN — offerings ‘that require WAVING BUT NOT BRINGING NEAR... AIA YX) NOTES 8. Shabbos 200. 10. The Rabbis ordained thatthe wicks used for the Sabbath lights must bbe of material that holds flame well, and the fuel must be of a variety that is easly absorbed by a wick ‘The purpose of these criteria is to fensure a steady flame. The Rabbis were concerned that ifthe lame flickered one might inadvertently tit the lamp to improve its light, thereby performing the forbidden labor of kindling on the Sabbath (Shabbos 2ia with Rashi). UL Ibid 47 12, It is permitted to insulate a pot of hot food before the Sabbath by enclosing it in a substance that maintains its heat, but not in a substance that adds heat to it. The Rabbis prohibited insulating with ‘Substances that add heat, lest one come to insulate a pat with hot ash mixed with live coals, which could lead to his raking the eoals onthe Sabbath to make them burn better, thereby performing the labor of ‘indling (Shabbos 34). 138. id. 57a, 14, The Mishnah refers to accessories worn as ornaments (jewelry) ‘The Rabbis prohibited women from going out on the Sabbath while ‘wearing certain accessories, due to the concern that a woman might remove one of them inthe strwot in order to show i to her friend, and thon unwittingly transgress the prohibition agnint carrying something four amas in the publie domain (Rashi a lo.) 15, Bava Basra 108. 16. Le. there are certain sets of relatives whose relationships are such that each one stands to inherit the other, should that other die. For each of these sets, then, it ean be said that one of the relatives “Sinberite” and vith respect to the other: “A” inherits the possessions of “B" if “B" dies first, and “A” bequeaths his possessions to'"B" if “A” dos first. However, there are certain people who inherit the estatas of specific relatives, but do not bequeath any inheritance to those relatives ifthe dio frst (Rashbam ad lo.).A father and son are in the first category; each inherits the other. A son is in the second category towards his mother; he inherits her if she des first, but does not bequeath his property to her if he dies fist (Ran, from Mishnah ibid). [The Mishnah continues that there are also relatives: who bequeath but do not inherit (eg. a mother towards her son), and rulatives who neither inherit nor bequeath (og. maternal brothers).] 17, Yevamos 84a, 18, Yeoamin isthe plural form of yavam, io. brother-in-law. The Torah ‘commands (Deuteronomy 25:5) that if man dies childless his paternal ‘brother shal take the widow in a marriage known as yibum, or perform. the procedure of chalitzck (“removing the shoe"). The surviving brother (the widow's brotherinaw) upon whom the obligation -yibum fll is called the yavar. The Mishnah teaches that there = certain women who are permitted in marriage to their husbands but forbidden to their yeoarin, For example, an ordinary Kohen may mary ‘a widow, but the Kohen Gadol may not. Ifthe Koen Gadol’s brother ‘married a widow and ded childless [or he married any woman and diez leaving her a widow], the woman was permittod to her husband but is forbidden to her yauam ~ the Kohen Gadol (Ran, from Mishnah iba see Roshi there) 19. For example, ifthe Kohon Gadol marries a widow (illegally) and he dies childless, leaving her to his brother who isan ordinary Kahen, ¢h= widow was forbidden to her husband but is permitted to her yavam (an, from Mishnah ibid). [The Mishnah goes on to state that there a> also omen who are forbidden to both their husbands and the _yevamtn (eg. a Kohen Gadol marries a widow and dies, and is sucoeedez ‘as Kohen Gado hy his brother), and women who are permitted to bo their husbands and their yevamin (ie. ordinary wives).] 20, Menachos 59a 21. A standard minchah offering consists of meal mixed with oi ‘wpped with levonah (frankincense). The minchah ean either be offere2 as flour, or fred in a shallow or deep pan, or baked in an oven (== {rom Mishnah iid), 22. The libation minchah [t°>93 nn] that one brings asthe obligator> ‘accompaniment to an oleh oF shelamim offering requires oil but a= levonah (Ran, from Mishnah ibid). [The Mishnah goes onto teach that there are also minchah offerings that require levonah but not oi, the panim bread (259 59) placed on the Table each Sabbath; en ‘minchak offerings that require nether oil nor Jevonah, e.g. the Te= Loaves (or73 "offered onthe festival of Shavuos.] 23, Menachos 60a 24, The Torah states in regard to & minchah offering (Leviticus 6:7 ‘The cons of Aaron shall bring it near before Hashem, tothe front of Altar. Tse Gemara (Sofah 14b) explains this as meaning that ee ‘minchak should be brought to the southwestern corner of the Alter before its service is performed. [The Mishnah (Menachos ibid.) teashox explicitly that all standard minchah offerings are in this category However, Ran here inexplicably singles out the minchah brought b> specific kind of sinnor who cannot afford the standard animal cha: Rashash insists that this i a copyit's error} In regard to various other offerings (eg. parts ofthe personal she ‘mim, segments ofthe metzora’s purification offering, and bikkurim —2b? KOL KINUYEI 1nW20 — THESE REQUIRE BRINGING NEAR but not waving ete In this Mishnah, too, the frst law is explained frst! ‘Afift such instance: ia) to5 py rim? Wa3 wr — We learned in the Mishnah* THERE 15 a Grstbom who is considered a AECHOR REGARDING [INHERITANCE BUT NOT considered a NECHOR REGARDING redemp- tion from A KOHEN, Ana) 3133 px) 139 71393 — one who is considered A BECHOR REGARDING redemption from A KOHEN RUT NT considered A BECHOR REGARDING INHERITANCE...®° YIP) m2 "933 py rmsd 33 — WHICH IS THE ONE WHOIS considered |ABECHOR REGARDING INHERITANCE BUTNOT considered ARECHOR REGARDING redemption from A KOHEN? Again, the fist law is explained first! Thus, we have five instances in which the Mishnalb deviates from the style of “ast mentioned, first explained,” — ? — (CHAPTER ONE ‘The Gemara respon mp rwny7 own phn — In those instances, because there are ‘many clauses in each Mishnah for (the Tanna to explain .xprng napy xin7 B7pB — he explains the one that he opened ‘with first, and proceeds in order.” ‘The Gemara finds a case where this explanation does not fit- yyy mpc meat ayn 7mn3 793 x) — But there is the Mishnah that states: WITH WHAT accessories MAY AN ANIMAL GO OUTSIDE fon the Sabbath AND WITH WHAT accessories MAY IT NOT Go oursine! —xyns x57 — which does not contain many clauses, but only the two just mentioned, pg xx v3npy — yet in his explanation {the Tanna] teaches first: CAMEL MAY Go our ete. Thus, we see that even a Mishnah containing only two clauses may explain the opening subject frst. ~ 2 — NOTES see Leviticus 7:90, 412; Deuteronomy 26:4 with Rashi), the Torah requires “waving.” That is, the Koben places his hands under the owner's hands, and they lift the offering and wave it in the different directions (Ran; eee Menachos 61a) ‘Thus, there are some offerings that require “bringing near” but not “waving,” and some offerings that require waving” but not “bringing near.” (The Mishnah goes onto teach that there are also offerings that require both bringing near and waving (eg. the Omer), and offerings ‘that require neither bringing near nor waving (eg. the libation ‘minchah that accompanies an olah or ehelamim).) 25, Bechoros 46a, 26, Aman’s firstborn son receives a double portion of inheritance upon the father’s death (Deuteronamy 21:17). woman's Gratborn son must be redeemed from a Kohen forthe sum of five selaim (Exodus 18:13, ‘Numbers 18:16). If 2 man marries a woran who has ehildren from a previous marriage and she bears him a firstborn son, that son is ‘bechor in regard to inheritance (since he i hs father's frsthorn), but not in regard to requiring redemption (since he is not the mother's firstborn). Conversely, if @ man who has a child from a previous marriage marries a childless woman and she gives birth to a soa, that ‘son is @bechor in regard to redemption but notin regard to inheritance (an on 3a; see Ran and Mishnah ibid. for further examples) [The Mishnah goes on to teach that there is alo a firstborn who = bechor in oth respects (ie. one who isthe firstborn to both parents — see Mishnah there, 47b, and a firstborn who isnot a bechor in ei respect (Le. one born by Caesarean section.) 27, Bach ofthe five cited Mishnayos dseusses four different cetezome (Rosh). (Inthe first Mishnab, for example, it states, “There aze thom ‘who inherit and bequeath, those who inkerit but do not bequeath, cam who bequeath but do not inherit, and those who neither inher: so Dequesth.”] Ifthe Tanna hed explained them in the reverse order Se would have invited confusion! Therefore, he chose to fellow the orser = ‘which he listed them originally. Where this reason does not sozie however (i.e. where there are only two entegories), the Tanna sie follows the style of “last mentioned, fist explained" (Ran on 2a) 28. Shabbos 51D. 29, Le. which accessories are considered the animal's “apparel” (ex = collar), and which are considered ‘a burden” (eg. a saddle; see Soe ‘5. The owner ofan animal may not allow itto carry a burden = se ppublie domain on the Sabbath, beeause he is commanded not to k= = perform melachah ie. any act that is classified as labor, and earrynee burden in the pubic domain is a melachah (Rashi ad loc).KOL KINUYEL ‘The Gemara concedes and revises its explanation of the order followed by our Mishnah: sxgnyt in xb — Rather, the Tanna is not particular about the order of his explanation. xy’n3 nop] x3 Wipe PIT — Sometimes he explains that subject with which he opened first, —xy°73 W 9p p'>HT xITD PHT — and sometimes itis the most recently mentioned subject that he explains first." In our Mishnah, he chooses to explain first the subject that he mentioned last, and as we have seen this is not unusual ‘The Gemare offers an alternative explanation for our Mishnab, ‘ecording to which the Tanna had a specific reason for explaining partial declarations first" ere 173%) — Or, if you prefer, say: nm) — Regarding partial declarations, xv772 [INE] THX — since [thelr effectiveness] is derived through an exposition of Scripture ‘and would not otherwise be obvious, xe™3 Tin} wage ~ [the ‘Tanna} explains them first.” ‘The Gemara counters: 2xyrra pay nap — Then let [the Tanna] open the Mishnah by actually teaching this one (tho law of partial declarations) first"! — 2 — png — In opening his presenta ‘hich is a self-evident Biblical concept, and teaches about them first") xwyTe md penAcy AY WIRE TIM — but then, in clarifying the laws, he explains first partial declarations, which he derives through an exposition." ‘The Gemara analyzes this answer in light ofa dispute below, on 10a, as to the nature of the equivalent terms, which are listed in ‘the Mishnah there: CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 3a! ‘oxy pe) xIUT — This fits well according to the one who said that | ya Bm33 pw puns — the equivalent terms are actually foreign-language terms for vows." It is indeed self evident, according to this opinion, that nedarim ean be effected through equivalentterns. 7937109 xox — But according to the one who said that v3 17 nia) oman yay Mg THY — the equivalent terms are expressions that the Sages conceived for ‘people to vow with,® "wynab agrx ven — what is there to say? ‘The effectiveness ofthese termsis less obvious than that of partial declarations, as these are Rabbinical innovations whereas the validity of partial declarations is atleast derived through Serip- tural exposition!" Accordingly, the Tanna should have taught the law of partial declarations first. ~ ? — ‘Unable to rebut this argument, the Gemara responds: nim vung % — Does [the Mishnah] actually teach the law of partial declarations explicitly? It does not! xp "yon 1x) ny mena — Rather, do you not consider [its text] deficient ‘and insert on your own the clause regarding partial declara- tions? You dot nv um» erp — Accordingly, you should also advance and teach the clause regarding partial declara- tions before that of equivalent terms." Thus, the text of the ‘Mishnah will reed as follows: mura 5) oryH9 BR AIT 52 bevys Ben: — “All partial declarations of nedarim are effective like full nedarim, and all equivalent terms for rnedarim are effective like genuine nedarim. nt. y3 3) yvany veiey — And these are examples of partial declara- tions: One who says to his fellow, ‘I am vowed from you’ ete. ‘opp nap Dap PD 1 1b) — And these are equivalent terms: zkonam, konach and konas.” Thus, the Mishnah teaches the base law of partial dedarations first, and also explains this law first. NOTES 1 Tho reason the Tanna alternates his style is to demonstrate that one ‘may teach in either fashion, asthe dictum (Job 16:5) samy 173m, you shall choose the language ofthe clever, isnot applicable regarding This matter (Ran), 2 The Gemara does not retract the concession that the Tanna alternates his style arbitrarily, as that point has been proven by the ‘arlier citation of various stylistically disparate Mishnayos. However, ‘the Gemara suggests that in our case there isa specific reason why the ‘Tanna chose the order that he did (Ran). 43. (The exposition upon which the law of yadas is ted is cited below] Unlike the law of yados, however, the law of kimuyim is el-evident on the bass of loge; there is no need for a Scriptural exposition (see note 5). Since the law that yados are effective is more novel than the law that ‘hinuyim are effective, the Tanna gives precedence to its clarifiation (an below m2 arp 77, gee also Yeuamos 2b) 4. The emended text ofthe Mishnah reads: “All equivalent terms for nedarim are effective like nedarim, and all partial declarations of rnedarim are effective like nedarim.” Thus, the basi law of kina is ‘taught before the hasi law of yadas (see 2b note 7). But ince the latter ‘more novel, the Tanna should have presented even the basic law of -yados ~ and not merely its explanation — before that of kinuyim! 5, Noexposition is neded forthe law ofkinuyim, since itis obvious that znedarim can be made in any language (Tosafos y="; Ran to 277 ‘5, cited therein note 3). Its the style of the Tanna to begin with the ‘most obvious laws and then proceed tothe more novel ones (Ran). (This is the general Mishnaic style of wy 1 x9, not only this but even that. [The Gemara employs the term “Biblical” to connote the fundamen- tal nature of the concept of kimuyim, but actually, the law of yados also Biblical Ibis, however, more novel than the law of kinuyim bocause it could not be derived without Scriptural exegesis (Rashash; see Ran ‘bid. and Gemara below).} 6 [After stating the basic laws in ascending order of novelty, the Tanna, explains first the one most in need of clarification. The style of discussing the most novel law frst applies to explanation rather than presentation} Literally: foreigners’ terms. 8. As the Gemara on 10a explains this opinion, the Sages sought to ‘eliminate the use ofthe word horban (offering) in vows [eg “Let this be like a horban to me”, because vowing in this style would lead people to say “Rorban to God,” in. sccordance with the common Seriptural expression (eg. Leviticus 12). This in turn could lead to someone's saying “to God” and omitting horban, thus expressing the Name in vain! The Sages therefor coined the alternative terms konam, konach and konas, in the expectation that people using these expressions would not say “to God” (Ran, Fash. 8. Although once the Sagas composed those kinuyim they are effective Biblically (see 2a note 4, the fact of their effectiveness is a greater novelty than that of the effectiveness of yados [since they could not hhave been effective without the Sages’ creating them) (Ram) 10, The Gemara is foreed to retract its initial assumption that the ‘Tanna would nat have onitted something from the very beginning of his text (soe 2b note 1). It concedes that, according to the opinion that the kinuyim were composed by the Sages, we must explain our Mishnah as being deficient atthe very beginning (Ran; see note 12), 1. (This last clause represents the teaching ofthe Mishnah on 10a.) 12, The Gemara has retreated from its assertion that the more novel law is explained first. Rather, it states, the explanatory part of the Mishnah follows the same order asthe introductory part. The laws are introduced in ascending onder of novelty — first yedos (which are derived through exegesis: and then hinuyim (which Were composed by the Sages) — and are explained in the same order. Howover, this applies only according tothe opinion that the kinuyin swore composed by the Sages, According to the opinion that they are {reign language terms, the previous explanation stands: The Tanna introduced the of Rinuyim first because this law is the more obvious one, but he explained the law of yados first because it is the more novel one. Thus, it emerges that although all agree with the statement that our Tanna had a specific reason for explaining the law of yados first, there is disagreement as to what his reason was (Ran).KOL KINUYEI Having stated that the law of partial declarations is derived through an exposition of Scripture, the Gemara pursues the source: aynp xp°7 nisy — And where isthe law of partial declarations written? ny smn My 1 THe bp YD... WIR, — Serip- ture states: A man ... who shall dissociate himself by vowing @ neder as a nazir to abstain for [the sake off Hashem." en) — And it was taught in a Baraisa: "wn? 13, ~ The phrase AS A NAZIR TO ABSTAIN comes AMIN "AMD niwy’ MND — TO MAKE EQUIVALENT TERMS FOR NEZiUS effective LIKE genuine vows of NRZIRUS, nvvw3> AIIM NET — AND to ‘make PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEZIRUS effective LIKE full vows of eziRUs."*) rma xpie% Ps — THAVE thus far derived the law of partial declarations ONLY REGARDING Uke vow of WBZIRUS. yaa EMER — FROM WHERE do I derive it REGARDING other Neparun? ‘Wolo “Twin — (SCRIPTURE} THEREFORE STATES: inant 3 7 TYRES. «WHR, — AMAN. WHO SHALL DISSOCIATE HIMSELF BY VOWING A NEDER AS A NAZIR TO ABSTAIN [FOR/THESAKE OF/HASHEM, YY} NI WPD — By stating “a neder as @ nazir,” (SCRIPTURE] COMPARES NEZIRUS TO other [NEDARIM, — nYMyp BYTE — AND other NEDARIM TO NEZIRUS."® ‘The hekeish teaches: nvw3> nN NYT Ya Mey AMM — JUSTAS REGARDING NEZ/RUS, [SCRIPTURE] MADE PARTIAL DECLA- RATIONS OF NEZIRUS effective LIKE full vows of NEZIRUS, Ay Bry} BITTE NIT BN gy Bry — $0 TOO, REGARDING all other NEDARIM, (SCRIPTURE] MADE PARTIAL DECLARATIONS OF NEDARIM effective LIKE full NEDARIM. DYYT2 Tp — AND conversely,*! JUST AS regarding other NEDARIM, bm? 33 7319 oxen 4331 — ONE who violates the terms of unduly postpones its fulfillment TRANSGRESSES either the com- ‘mandment NOT TO DESECRATE OR the commandment NOT TO DELAY,” RIN} AK ~ 80700, regarding NEZiRUS, Vaz 73 ‘amen baat bm: — ONE who violates the terms of ‘or unduly postpones its fulfillment TRANSGRESSES either the (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM, 3a? commandment NOT TODESECRATE OR the commandment NOTTO DELAY Bry} MMaY — AND furthermore, JUST AS regarding other NEDARIM, 1A3°973 79M BJ — A FATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEDARIM YN 772 BM DYN — AND AHUS- BAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NEDARIM,% NII" A — $0 TOO, regarding NEZIRUS, 13 TIT] 7") BH] — A FATHER CAN [REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEZIRUS, YAWX DY} TEND byt — AND A HUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NEZIRUS. At any rate, we learn from the hekeish of nedarim to nezirus that partial declarations of nedarir are effective like full nedarim. ‘The Gemara wonders why we must resort to the hekeish: -nvrm3 3 230 1» — What is special about the verse regarding nnezirus that makesit« source for the law of partial declarations? pra “y, 31R37 ~ It is that the double expression as @ nazir toabstain (nazirlchasr) is written there, and the redundancy is ‘expounded as coming to include partial declarations as effective ‘naj ory3 — With respeet to other medarim, too, Lean say 3 soon rub, 30n3 — “Why, by vowing a neder (lindor neder) is written regarding them, and this redundancy can be expounded inthe same manner!* '¥ mg xerprry — Thus, why do Tneed the hekeish of nedarin to nezirus to teach that partial declara- tions of nedarim are eTective?” ‘The Gemara answers: seub yp 209 0% — If [Scripture] had written “a neder by vouing” (neder lindor), with the noun preceding the verb, soon a, 20373 — asit wrote “asa nazir fo abstain” nazir lehazir), t-yaNg73 ~ then it would beas you said — 733 x> xyrpry — the hekeish of nedarim to nezirus would be unneces- sary, for we would exoound the repetition itself. 291 nwo ayy Tub, — However, now that by vowing a neder is actually written, there is no significance in this repetition, for 737 ‘pyy 3 fobs nn — the Torah spoke inthe common language ‘used by men.” NOTES 13, Numbers 6:2. (Our translation of the verse follows Rashi. Cf Targum Onkeles, cited below, 5b note 12) The nazr's vow of nezius requires him to abstain from wine and all products of the grapevine [as ‘well as to avoid contamination with tumah of a corpse, and to refrain from cutting his hair. When his intentions are virtuous, he undertakes this vow “forthe sake of Hashem” (Rashi ad loc; see below, 9b). 14, Ran deletes the clause “to make equivalent terms for nezirus effective like genuine vows of nezrus,” because as stated above the law of kinuyim isnot derived through Scriptural exposition. IFkinuyim are foreign-language terms, itis el-evident that they are effective; and if they are terms that the Sagee invented, the verse abviously does not allude to them! Ran's emendation is borne out by the fat that the next ‘segment of the Barsisa mentions only yados, (Tosafos and Rosh, however, while agreing thatthe law of kinuyim i not derived from the verse, avoid emending the text. Rather, they explain that the Baraisa mentions kinuyim in passing (because it parallels the law of yados, which is in fact derived from the verse). ‘At any rate, the expression 7¥19 7%, a8 @ nazi fo abstain, comes to include yados of nezirus as effective. The exposition shall be clarified below. 15. (This constitutes a hekeish, which indicates thatthe laws taught in ‘one context apply tothe other as well] 416. [The hekeish does not merely teach that nedarim are like vows of nezirus; it also teaches that vows of nezrus ae like other nedarim. The ‘Baraisa proceeds to explain the ramification of this point.) 17. If one makes a neder prohibiting something upon himself and violates it, he transgresses the commandment (Numbers 90:3): wx ‘gy 50). 7 TRIP, Ife man vows a neder to Hashers... he hall not desecrate his word. And if one makes a neder to bring an offering and tarres[e.he does not bring it before three festivals pass ‘by; see Rosh Hashanah 4a], he transgresses the commandment (Deuteronomy 23:22): p29 Moxh x9 WINE TE Ta TN, When you vow ‘a neder to Hashem, your Gad, do not be late in paying it (Ran). (See further, Rambam in Sefer Hates, Lo Saaseh $57; tambon thereto ‘sei $84; Chidushe R’ Reuven 43 18. The Gemara wil ater (Sb) discus th circumstances in which thee prohibitions apps toners 19, The Torah grants the husband and father the right to cancel the hedarim of a wife or daughter in some circumstances, as stated ia ‘Numbers Ch 90, "is subject is elaborated below in Chapters 10. 20. (Concerning the soure ofthe rle that yados are ao effective for ‘haramim and oath, se Rte, cited by Shitah Metubetes.) Hecems unusual hat we needa Sriptural hekesh to extend the laws of nazis to nedarim snd vice versa. Why, nezru is tof a frm of ‘eder and th, simple analogy should tell us that whatever applies in ‘ne context appies nthe other as well This matter is discussed on 4b; ce note 10 there Se further, Chidushe Akiva Eiger and Rashosh here, and Kovets Shim, Kiddushin $16. Meanwhile, the Gemara uestons the necessity fr the kesh from a diferent perspective 2, Numbers 6:2 reads: “19 79 799 xem. wh Aman tuho shall disociate himself by vowing a neder os a nazi to abstain for ihe sake of Hashem. Although the phrase “rj 73, by vowing @ reder, appears in the verso dealing with necirus, it is actully Superfuous in that contest. The verse could hav stated brie, “Ifa Iman will asec himself by Becoming a nazir for the sake of Hashem.” The phrase by vowing a neder is therefore understood as referring to the entire category of medarim, of which neirus is @ bulbeatogory (tin Safa Mekubetes. 22 Scripture often emloys repetitive terms to reflect spoken language. However, the convention is for the verb to precede the now, as in (Numbers 30:3: px ex, forbid a prohibition, and (Rath 47) “335, validate any mater. The phrase vp 7}, by vowing a neder, follows this conventian, andthe repetition is therefore insignificant. I the phrase "a ara nazr fo abstain, however, the noun precedesKOL KINUYEL ‘The Gemara notes that this answer is subject to dispute: pry nap eb min 97 my ney pea aerray — This fits well according to the one who holds that the Torah generally spoke in the common language used by men.®! ry m9 jen) xox. yy 4p pba NIN 1737 — But as for the one who does not hold that the Torah spoke in the common language used by men"! mro-vay wep 979 7792.45 — what does he do with (Ge, how does he expound) that redundant phrase by vowing a rneder (lindor neder 8! ‘The Gemara responds that the one who holds this opinion has @ different approach to expounding the passage: CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 3a ‘pigrgs IT nin mibyy mb w97 — He expounds [by rowing a neder] as coming to make partial declarations of nedarim effective like fullnedarim, —nv9739 nism: wrpD' — and he then ‘compares vows of nezirus to ordinary nedarim through the hhekeish, to derive that partial declarations of necirus are effective like full declarations. 2" ‘According to this approach, the redundant phrase as @ nazir fo abstain is superfluous. The Gemara proceeds to explain its purpose: ama mp. — As for the phrase as a nazir to abstain (nazir lehazir), wey — he expoundsit asfollows: t2b — This teaches NOTES the verb, counter to the Scriptural convention. This indicates that the ‘redundancy is meant tobe expounded, and we interpret it as coming to include partial declarations of nezirus as effective. We then extend this law to all other nedarim on the basis ofthe hekeish (se Ran, Rosh and Tosafes). 23, Le. we do not expound redundant phrases when their style accords ‘with common usage, even though there is a law that could be ‘expounded from the repetition (Ran; see Bava Metza SI). 24, Le, we expound redundancies even when they refleet common ‘usage. This sue is a matter of Tennaic dispute (sce Bava Metzia bid) 5, Since we can derive from the hekeish that yados of nedarim are effective — just like yados of nezirus — what is the purpose of the redundancy in by vowing a neder? (Interestingly, the Gemara previ- ‘ously asked the opposite question ~ since Scripture states by vowing a rader, why do we need the hekeish! Ran explains that previously the ‘question was directed at the Tanna of the Barasa, who relies upon the hhekeish to extend the law of yados from nezirus to nedarim. The Gomara asked why the Tanna needed to resort to the hekeish when there isa source in the context of nedarim itself. Here, however, the ‘question is directed at the Tanna who holds that “The Torah did not speak in the common language used by men.” Since we have no evidence whether this Tanna derives the law from the hekeish or from the verse itself, the Gemara asks: Being that the hekeish is availabe, ‘why'd Seriprure need to writ, redundantly, by vowing @ neder’) 26, [Le in contrast to the Tanna of the Baraisa, who expounds os @ rnazr to abstain as teaching that yados of nezirus are effective, and then ‘extends this to other nedarim through the hekeish, this Tanna does the ‘opposite, He expounds by vowing a neder as teaching that yados of ‘ordinary nedarim are effective and relies upon the hekeish to extend ‘this to nezirus vows]| | ! | | 3b! KOL KINUYEI nna by by nvmny — that a vow of nezirus can take effect upon another vow of nezirus. Tn consideration of this response, the Gemara revisit the first opinion: ny 1p pods nN m737 Tos eb — And according to the ‘one who said that the Torah spoke in the common language used by men, so that by vowing a neder cannot be expounded at all, o»]-7199 9 — and who therefore expounds as a nazir: fo abstain as coming mvvys nis nr niby> — to make partial declarations of nezirus effective like full vows of nezirus, m7 xy9 nvmIT5y 99 nN — from where doeshe derive that a vow ofnezirus can take effect upon another vow of nezirus? ‘The Gemara qualifies its question: anvomaby bo nna ps wayT pH NTR ATI — Alls well if he holds like the one who says that a vow of nezirus cannot, take effect upon another vow of nezirus.! rp X39 1" NOX nvina by by nv xT p09 — But if he holds like the one ‘who says that a vow ofnezirus ean take effect upon another vow ofnezirus, TW xy — from where does he derive this? ‘The Gemara answers ‘n> x99 xp — Seripture should have stated zor as the word for “to abstain.” -mg9,, 1x9 — What isthe purpose of stating lehazir?® wn nym Nyy — Learn from this phrase, therefore, two laws — that partial declarations of nezirus are effective like full nezivus vows, and that a vow of nezirus can take effect upon another vow of nezirus. An alternative answer is cited px xarwo3 — In the West (ie. Eretz Yisrael) they say: mx vag V%,, To. AIT mY pr9oT XID — There is a Tanna who derives the effectiveness of partial declarations from the verse bby vowing a neder, as stated above,"” ya m9 pray XIN THX) CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM “myn vn x9" (31, — and there i a Tanna who derives it from the verse, according to whatever comes from his mouth shall he do.® Having clarified the source for the law of partial declarations, ‘the Gemara returns to the Baraisa it cited above: ‘v9 why — The master stated in the Baraise: 131 yy m= ‘anisn 53 bm 593 — AND JUST AS regarding other NEDARIM, ONE ‘who violates the terms of his neder or who unduly postpones its fulfilment TRANSGRESSES either the commandment Nor TO _DESECRATE his word oR the commandment NOT'TO DELAY, 5 too, regardingnezirus, one who violates the terms ofhisnezrus or who "unduly postpones its fulfillment tranegresses either the command rent not to desecrate his word or the commandment not to delay ‘The Gemara analyzes this statement: pvvqy7 bm da xybws — Itis understandable that the command ment “not todesecrate his word” regardingnedarim —nnav> Hy — canbe found to apply nb3i x5) bate 133 1949 N23 — in acase where one says, “This bread I shall eat,” and he does not eat it; 1137 bm bs pie stv — he transgresses the commandment not to desecrate his word. —nrmay bm 93 x2 = But as for the commandment “not to deseerate his word’ regarding nezirus, ni nny ‘3"7 — how can it be found to apply? "¥1y -9901 WHT 19 — Onee one says, “Tam hereby = nazir,” which isthe standard vow of nezirus, "yng m9 mo — he fisautomatically amazir; bax — if he then eats products of grapevine 43x» baa m2 Dp — he is subject to the specis! commandment on a nazir not to eat such produets,"" nay — and if he drinks products ofthe grapevine navy 933 m9 5p — he is subject to the commandment on a nazir not to drink su: products!" When is the commandment not to desecrate his word needed?” NOTES 1. That i, if eomeone says, “Tam hereby a nasiras of today,” and then repeats, “Tam hereby a naziras of today,” he is obligated to keep two terms of nezirus totaling sity days. [The standard term of nezirus, ‘whieh takes effect on the basis ofan unspecified vow, is thirty days (sce ‘Nazir 5a) This is derived from the expression as a nazir to abstain, ‘which is expounded as meaning that even after vowing to become a rnazir, someone can make another vow “to abstain” (Ran; see also Rosh). (This rule does not apply regurding other nedarim. Thus, ifone says, “This bread is hana to me today,” and then repeats his words, the bread is forbidden to im for only one day (Riva, cited in Shitoh Metubetzes)] 2. A dispute regarding this point is cited below, 17a (se also Gemara. below, 18a). According to this opinion, the verse as a nazir to abstain does not address the case of a double nezirus vow, and is therefore available to touch that yados of nezius are effective like full declara- tions. See Ran for further discussion of this matter 3, ninh and ya are different forms ofthe same word, both identically meaning fo abstain. Now, inthe verse re39 m3 73 79 (by vowing @ neder as a nazrfo abstain), the verb 7) isnot symmetrical with the carer verb 39. The verse would have been more balanced stylistically if sr rather that ‘a had been used, for > parallels "y2>. Since Seripture altered its style and chose the asymmetrical word, an extra law may be expounded on its basis (Ran; ef. Shitah Mekubetzes and. Rashash, who explain that there isa grammatical difference between sw) and“). 4. One law is derived from the redundancy of cp 79, a8 a naz to abe ‘ain, andthe second from the fact that 17 was used instead of >] 5. Thia is the Tanna who holds that the Torah did not spoak in the ‘common language used by men. According to his opinion, the verse as.a ‘azrto abstain is available to teach that a vow ofnezirus can take effect ‘upon another vow of nezirus, as explained above (Ram), 6. Numbers 80:3, This the Tanna who hold that the Torah spoke in ‘the common language used by men, and thus, the aw of partial decara- tions cannot be derived from by vowing a neder. He derives it instead {rom te fact that in the passage of nedarim Scripture tates, accord {o.hatever comes from his mouth shall he do tmplying that ony far ‘of nader coming from one's mouth ~ including partial delaration — ‘must be heeded. (This rule is then extended to nezirus through Se Iebesh (Rashba).) According to this explanation, the Tanna does m= dezive two lave fom as « nai to abstain; he expounds it 3 teachne only that a vow oferrus can take fect upon another one (Ran, oss For the explanation ot how the former Tanna expounds acorns whatever comes from his mouth shall he do, oe Ran] ‘LThis statements perplexing, for we earned above (ee 2b note 5) th ‘aneder can take effet only upon an object, and consequent, ander perform a certain act has no substance! Only adelaration suchas “T= breads forbidden to me" effets a noder and engenders the commans mont not to deserate one's word R' Akiva Eiger (in Gilyon HeSno= remarks "May Hashom enlighten my eyes (regarding the Gemar> intent" However, Shitah Mekubetes cits a different version o text, which infact reads y 299" a,c case whereone sys, “Th ‘breads forbidden] to me." See also Rashash 8, Numbers 6-4. Seefllowing note 9, Ibid. v. 3. Te passage (vs. 9-4) reads: From new or aged wine shall he ‘abstain; vinegar of wine or vinegar of aged wine shall he not drink anything in which grapes have been steeped shall he not drink, and fre and dried grapes shall he not eat. All he days ofhis abstinence, onsehone ‘made from wine grapes, even the pips or skin, shall he not eat. 10, The Gemara assumes that there is an instance in which the naz ‘subject only to the commandment against desecrating his word. Pox since the Baraisa teaches that nezirus is similar to ather nedarin i {gard to this commandment, and inthe case of nedarim there is n0 0: ‘commandment, the implication is that in the case of nezirus as wel possible to violate only this commandment. Thus, the Gemara wonder hhow it is possible for a nazir to violate the commandment agains esecrating his word without also violating the specific commandmens ‘aginst cating or drinking grape products (Ran, Tosaos, Rosh; see mex note)3b? KOL KINUYEI ‘The Gemara answers: xq3 vy — Rava said: oraya vy stay? — Its purpose is to rake the nazir transgress two prohibitions for violating (his vom ‘The Gemara turns to the second part ofthe Baraisa’s statement: nb nngwn "7 m7"77 WEN bg — How can the commandment, not to delay be found to apply regarding nezirus? “ax 1P2 297 — Once one says, “Tam hereby anazir,” m9 my my = he is automatically a nazir; 52x — if he then eats products of the grapevine 59x33 m np — he is subject to ‘the commandment not to eat such products, and if he drinks ‘them he is subject to the commandment not to drink such products," —? — ‘The Gemara anticipates a response and rejects it: yy xn AY oS wa — You might contend that the ‘commandment applies where one says, “When I desire, I shall CHAPTER ONE be a nazir."*! myx Dx 1%) — But if he said, “When I desire,” nxn ba x99 — there is no commandment not to delay, since he stipulated that the matter is subject to his whim! ‘What, then, is the case of nezirus to which this commandment applies? ‘The Gemara answers 297 Tos — Rava said: w ob yo wer xb wey 2 ‘yn Ny — It is @ case where one said, “I shall not depart this world without first being a nazir,” mq xnyy X°M0 127 ‘yy — where from that moment onward he is obligated tobe anazir.0 Rava cites a proof to his explanation: snvx wuz prt v2 — This is analogous to the case of ‘one who tells his wife, while handing her aget, 12.1715 — “Thisishereby your bill of divorce, sngyETIP ANNTYY — to take effect one moment before my death," Stax? nyros ‘syanpyana — where the law is thatthe husband is@ Kohen she ‘NOTES UL Le. the commandment not to desecrate his word in addition to th ‘commandment not to eat or drink products of the grapevine. Rava “answers that there isin fact no instance in which the nazir violates only ‘the commandment against desecrating is word. Rather, the hekeish comes to teach that, bsides the specific nezirus prohibitions, a nazi is ‘also subject tothe standard prohibition applicable to all nedarim (Ran, ‘Tosojos; see Ran for an alternative explanation of the Gemara’s (question and answer). [ian raises a question: Just as the hekeish extends the nedarim prohibition to nerirus, it should extend the nezirus prohibition to nedarim. Thus, ifone forbids bread upon himself with a neder and then tats it, be should be subject to he shall not eat as well as he shall not desecrate his word! Why does he violate ony the later commandment? ‘Ran answers that since he shall not eat i written specifically regarding grape product (ee note 9), despite the hekeish,itcannot be understood ‘as applying tonedarim, since nedarim: are not limited to grape product, ‘and.an prohibit other things besides eating. By contrast, the command ‘ment not to deseerate one's word isnot specific, and ean apply tonezirus just as to nedarim.} 12, (One cannot answer as above that he is subject to two prohibitions, for once the nezirus takes effet, the commandment not to delay is inapplicable! This commandment pertains only to one who unduly postpones fulfilling his wow] Tt would seem, however, that the probibition does apply in a case ‘where one says, “I hereby undertake to become a nazir.” In the pars Tel case of one who vows, “I hereby undertake to bring an offering” [which i the source of the commandment not to delay; see 38 note 17) if the vower tarres beyond three festivals (Le. Pesach, Shavuos and Suceos), he violates the commandment (see Rosh Hashanah 43+). Presumably, the same should apply to a vow of nesirus. However, this actually not so. When one says, ‘Thereby undertake to bring an offering," the vow is not sel fulfilling it ean be fulfilled only through the vower's act of bringing the offering, and accordingly, the vower is commanded not to delay this act. By contrast, when one says, “Thereby undertake to become a nozir,” the vow is selfulfiling, for since it does not require any action, the nezirus takes effect im- mediately! Consequently, the commandment not to delay is not appli ble Ran), 13 In this case the nezirus does not take effect immediatly, sine the ‘ower stipulated “when I desire.” Perhaps he is subject to the com- ‘mandment not to delay.) 1M, [And if he does not become a nazir immediately he transgrosses ‘the commandment not to delay.] The declaration “TI shall not depart this world without first being a nazir” implies thatthe vower under- takes to become a nazir under condition that guarantee {tothe extent possible (Shalmei Nedarin)} that he will complet the torm of nezirus before his death, While ths doesnot render him a nazir automaticaly = because the wording of the declaration makes clear that he is not invoking the state of nezirus itself through it — it does impose upon him the responsibility to commence his nezirus at once, lest he soon die. Therefore, he is subject to the commandment not to delay, and ifhe taries at all he immesiately transgresses this commandment, [See Tosofoe reganding the statement: “I horeby undertake to under take nezirus.”] ‘One might argue: Since the source of the commandment not to delay is the context of offerings, the case of nezirus should be no more stringent than that of offerings. Just as one who vows to bring an offering isnot in violation until three festivals have passed, so too, one ‘who vows to be a nasir should not be in violation for a period of three festivalal Why is he deemed to immediately violate the commandmen: against delaying? The answer is that inthe case of offerings itself, the three-festival period applies only to one who says simply, “T hereby undertake to bring an offering.” without imposing a deedline. If coe says, “I hereby undertake to bring an offering immediatly,” his slightest procrastination is a violation of the commandment not to delay, since the terms of the vow render even the momentary delzy ‘unacceptable. In our ease, the vower did not say simply, “T herebs ‘undertake to be « nazr,” (as explained above). Rather, he stated, shall not depart this word without first being a nazr.” Since he migh= die at any moment, thisis the equivalent of saying, “Thereby undertake ‘to bring an offering immediately," and requires him not to delay at (an). (CE Rosh, who explains that in our case as well the vower is ‘alation only after three festivals have passed. See also Rashba, and so Einayim LaMishpat fora thorough discussion of these views.) [Ran concedes that thee is aeaso in which the three festival period applies toa vow of nezius.Ifone says, for example, “Thereby undertake tobe a nazir within two year,” he is ubject to the same law as ane >= makes a standard vow to bring an offering, and if he tarries beyont three festivals he violates the commandment against delaying. (A- though he alloted himself two years, he may not wait that long, for the ‘Torah does not tolerate any delay beyond three festivals; see Kere= Orch and Chidushei R’ Naftali Trop.) Accordingly, Rava’ could have answered that the commandment not to delay is applicable in a case where the vower says, “I hereby undertake to be a nazir within tw years.” However, since in any event Rava needed to find case in whic= ‘the vower made some unusual stipulation (as explained above), he chose the case of" shall not depart this world without frst being a naz’ inform us the added novelty that inthis instance the commandment act to delay applios immediately (Ram 15, A man might divorce his wife in this unusual manner for the following reason. The Torah requires the wife of man who dies childless to undergo the ydbum process (soo 2b note 18). That is, bs ‘paternal brother either marries her or performs chalitzah to permit her ‘tw marry someone else. However, this applies only toa childless man's ‘widow, not to his divoreee A childless man might be concored thet his wife will require yibum or chalitzah upon his death. (The brothers ‘whereabouts might be unknown; should the wife become subject chalitsah, she would remain forbidden forever to remarry.] Therefore the husband isues her a get with the stipulation that it take effect oni> ‘2 moment before his death. He thus accomplishes that she will not be ‘subject to yibum or chalteah upon his death, and that he will romsi= married to her until a moment prior to his death. He could als sccomplish th by issuing her a get on his deathbed; however, he = concerned that he might die suddenly or while away from home (Rast: to Suocah 286).3b KOL KINUYEL is forbidden to eat ferumah immediately upon receiving the ‘get, because we are concerned that the husband may die the ‘moment after she eats ferumah.'"! xnyy be PRK Xpb _nmp xpbr7 xno) — Thus, we see that at every moment we say, (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM “Perhaps the husband! will now die” “yyy anh} m2 79 — Here, in our case, too, [the vower] is obligated to be a nazir immediately, n/p xpi x97 [P7987 — because we say that perhaps he will now die." NOTES 16. {Terumah (the portion separated from and given to a ‘Kohen) may be eaten only by a Kohen and his household, A Kohen's Inraelite wife may eat erumah, but his widow or divorese may not, ‘unless she has offspring from him.) In our ease, should the husband die immediately after the wife eats terumah, the divorce will take effect rutroactively from the previous moment — when she was esting the ‘terumah, Thus, she will retroactively be considered a non-Koheness and will have eaten the terumah ileglly! ‘To prevent this, we forbid her to ‘ent terumah from the time she rocsives the get, out of concorn that her hhusband might die at any moment (Ran). 17, We see from the case of divoree that whenever something is depen- ddent upon a person's death one must concern himself with the possbil ity that oath is imminent, Nevertheless, the law pertaining to nase ‘is not exactly the same as that pertaining to divorce, In the case = divoree, ifthe woman eats ferumah and her husband does not de Se ‘next moment, it emerges that she has not violated any (Bisbal ‘prohibition (though she violated the Rabbinic injunction describes = the provious note In our case, however, even ifthe vower does not ie ‘the next moment, he has violated the [Biblical] commandment nats ‘delay the fulfillment of his vow. The very fact that he can die at any Se requires him to commence his term of nezirus immediately (since Se ‘possibilty of imminent death infuses his vow with the meaning “! sta commence nezirus immediately”) (Ran, as explained by Keren Orsi = ‘Rashba; see Rosh and Magen Avraham 568:13)KOL KINUYET ‘The Gemara presents an alternative explanation of where the commandment not to delay i applicable regarding nezirs: ‘ypg apy! 73 x78 39 — Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: 7379 722 ningpn 133 xin} — It applies in a ease where one made the ‘vow of nezirus while he was in a graveyard. "The Gemara analyzes this answer in light of @ dispute recorded elsewhere regurding the status of one who makes the vow of nezirus while in a graveyard?" ‘unbn nvm mmby pen xb a pb XAT — This fits well according to the one who says that the state of nezirus does not take effect upon {the vower] immediately. pa) xx rmby xbmn sabe vax — But according to the one who says that it takes effeet upon him immediately, nxn ‘3 xp" = is there any possibility of hie violating the commandment not to delay? ‘The Gemara asks further: ‘yyy — And furthermore, 7327 73.71 2x} — Mar bar Rav Ashi has said: nia wby nig xiron — Actually, all agree that the state of nezirus takes effect upon (the vower] immediately, 39993) — and when do they disagree? 32> syibp mipia ~ It is regarding the vower’s liability to lashes that they disagree." Since the vow takes effect immediately, how ean there be a commandment not to delay?" "The Gemara responds: CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4a! amen ba > BR 137 YBN — Nevertheless, i.e. although the nezirus takes effect immediately, {the vower] is subject to the ‘commandment not to delay, 797 52 Hse NPT Bw — because if he taries inthe graveyard he delays the nezirus of taharah."' ‘An inference is drawn from this answer: wx a7 7x — Rav Ashi said: | y2) x17 — Since itis so, that the commandment not to delay applies even where the vow has taken effect as long as it has not been fulfilled in a state of taharah, "yma waxy xvoW YH} - if a genuine masir contami: nates himself with tumah intentionally, 1147 53 Ye 713 mage nvm — he transgresses the commandment not to delay, with respect to the nezirus of taharah.° ‘The Gemara offers an additional explanation ofthe apliceil- ity ofthe commandment not to delay regarding neirus: ‘yo xgk3777773 NOH27 — Rav Acha the son of Rav Ta sai snnfan ann 933 731 — [A nazir] transgresses the command- ‘ent not to delay in rogard to his shaving, if he postpones this rite Rav Acha elaborates: nappa nogan Tos Rey x30 x) — And it isnot necessary to say this according to the one who says thatthe nazir's shaving is essential; certainly, if this itis essential the commandment ‘NOTES 1. He is required to leave the graveyard immediately, purify himself of the tumah be acquired there, and accept the nezirus upon himself. fhe tarries in the graveyard, he transgresses the commandment not to delay the fulllment of his vow (Ran, Tosafos; cf. Rosh; see Chidushet Akiva Biger to 3b) (A nazirs forbidden to contaminate himself through ‘corpse, If he becomes contaminated offer commencing the term of nezirus, he forfeits the days of the term that he previously counted. He “ust purity himself of the tumah, bring a special offering to atone for becoming tami, and begin his term of nezirus anew (Numbers 9-12). Concerning our ease, where the vower is contaminated with corpse‘u- ‘mah atthe time of his vow, the Gemara assumes that the nezirus does ‘ot take effet immediately. Rather, the vower i obligated to commence nezirus as soon ashe can purify himself (se further). 2, R’ Yoehanan and Reish Lekish debate this issue in Tractate Nazir, 16b, The bass oftheir dispute isthe ruling ofthe Mishnah there that i ‘one makes the vow of nezirus while in a graveyard, the time he pendsin ‘the graveyard doesnot count toward his term, and he is not required to bring the special tamah offering. R’ Yochanan understands this as excluding the vower only from the offering requirement, but not from all, the laws of necirus, Thus, the vow takes effect immediately, and the hnazir may not drink wine nor shave his head even while inside the graveyard, If he violates either of these restrictions he incurs lashes FReish Lakish understands the Mishnah as meaning that the state of netirus doesnot take effect tthe time of the vow. Thus, when the vower Teaves the graveyard he must deelare that he accopts the nezirus upon himself and only then do the restrictions become effective (an 8. {Since aoonding to Reish Lakiah thenezirus doos not take effect a the time of the vow, itis reasonable to say that the vower is subject to a ‘commandment no to delay its implementaton.] 4, Since according to R? Yochanan the nezrus takes effect atthe time of the vow ~ in the graveyard ~ the vower cannot possibly delay its imple ‘mentation, and the commandment not to delay isnot applicable (Ran 5. Le. Reish Lakish concedes thatthe vow takes effet immediately in the regard that when the vowtor purifles himself of tama his term of nezirus commences automatically. Reish Lakich disputes R’ Yochanan ‘only insofar as holding that the vower is not liable to lashes for drinking, ‘wine (or shaving bis head} while tn the graveyard (Run, cf. Tosofos, Rosh). [Mar bar Rav Ashi states this in Nazi (17a) in Fesponse to & challenge to Reish Lakish's opinion] 6. Since the nesirus takes effect automatically when the vower is ‘purified, and he does not need to accept it upon hime again [it has in ‘ect already been implemented, and there is no basis for @ command tment not to delay its implementation (Ran; ef. Tosofos, Rosh) 7 (The vow of nezirus is primarily flied by the nazir's observing his term in a state of taharah (i. purity from contamination with corpse- tumah). As mentioned in note 1, if a nazir becomes tame during his term, he forfeits the period that he observed and must begin his term ‘anew upon attaining purification, Thus, even if we say that one who ‘makes the vow whilo in a graveyard enlers a state of nezirus ‘immediately this snot the tree nezirus that he undertook to observe — for itis not a nesirus of tghayah, The commandment against delaying ‘requis him to falfil the vow in state oftaharah as soon as possible, 8 (Le, ifan ordinary nazir, who made the vow and began to observe his term, intentionally contamirates himself} he is liable to lashes on account of violating the protibition not to delay ~ since he thereby postpones the observance of is complete term in foharah, Although Seripture (Numbers 6:6-7) frbids the nazir from tumah with two explicit prohibitions — he shal! not come near a dead person, and he ‘shall not contamsinate himself {and these prohibitions are punishable by lashes] — and Seripture stales further (ibid. v. 12) that the days he observed before contracting tumah are forfeit, this does not preclude the hacir from being subject to arother penalty. Rather, iPhe contaminates himself intentionally, he incurs an additional set of lashes for delaying his observance ofthe nezirus'n taharah (Ram; ef. Rosh; see Turei Buen, Rosh Hashanah 4a mp7". [Accordingly the commandment against delaying applies not only to the unusual case of one who makes the vow of nezirus while inside & graveyard, but also to any nazir who contaminates himself (see Rambam, Hil, Neirus 6:21) 9, At the conclusion of his term of neirus, a nazi is required to bring a set of offerings (an olah, chates and shelamim.), and to perform a ite in ‘which he shaves his head anc burns the hair in the fre over which the ‘meat ofthe shelamim: is cooked (bid. vs 19-20). Ihe delays this rite at all after the completion of his term, he immediately violates the ‘commandment not tadelay (tased on Ran below ymuarp nxn 937 Rosh). This applies to every nazir who concludes his term; itis not limited to any specifi circumstances (see Tosofos) {Rav Acha introduces a novel point. Although the vow of nezirus primarily engenders restrictions on the nazir (see Rashi, Temurah 4b prea 10 79), snee it also requires him to perform the concluding ‘Hos the prohibition against dlaying which pertaineto tho fulfillmont ‘of vows ~ applies even to that rite 10, After describing the nazir' entire concluding rite ~ ie, the bringing “of is offerings and the shaving ete. — Scripture states iid. v. 2 and ffterward the nazir may drink wine (ie. the neziras restrictions are lifted), There is a Tannaie dspute (cited in Nazir 46a) concerning the meaning of “oflerward,""R’ Bazar understands it tomean “afterall theKOL KINUYEI not to delay applies to it, _npxe ndban NT pod Yroe bx navn — But even according to the one who says that the nazr’s shaving is not essential, the commandment not to delay applies, oypm xb xq mn nye — for if he delayed it [the ‘nazir | has in any event not fulfilled the mitzvah of shaving." ‘Yet another explanation is presented: ‘yoy 199 377 APT KyVT I — Mar Zutra the son of Rav Mari said: pmuaqp 1x4 533 721 — [A nazir] transgresses the ‘commandment not to delay in regard to his offerings, if he postpones bringing them. ‘This explanation is challenged: > xz03 x97 Jor — But sit from here that this the prohibition ‘against delaying the nezirus offerings) is derived?® aniyo ‘i xppl — It is derived from there, ie. this other verse, as taught inaBaraisa: "ayy PWT en Scripture states: {FOR Hashem, your God, WILL DEMAND TT! nays) MWD YX ‘= THIS 18a reference to the CHATAS AND ASHAM OFFERINGS, 8s well as obligatory olah and shelamim offerings." Since the hnazir’s offerings are included in the category of obligatory offerings, he is automatically subject to the commandment not to delay. Why do we need to derive through the hekeish of nezirus to rnedarim that this commandment applies to necirus offerings? ‘The Gemara responds: _xpiny ti — Were it not for the hekeish, you might have said (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4at that mga nayn mepHY san ero ~ there is a novel [aw] ‘that the Torah innovated regarding anazir, and therefore, the prohibition against delaying does not apply here!" ‘The Gemara seeks a clarification: vr ng — What is the novel [law] regarding necirus? x! ‘yaa Hy nxyn Mm wane x7 — If you say it is the rule that ‘one cannot assume!” an obligation for the nazir’s chatas offering through an ordinary neder,® T will respond: "70 bn nen — Consider the obligation for the chatas offering that one brings for eating cheilew,"” 1733 MND PxY — which one cannot assume through a neder,™" 533.733) ‘nxn — yet if one who became obligated to bring it tarries in fulfilling this obligation he transgresses the commandment not to delay. Why should the nazir not be subject to this commandment? ‘The Gemara offers a clarification ofits statement: roe ep xb — Rather, what is the novel (law of nezirus] that would have led us to think the commandment not to delay is inapplicable here? _xymx 12H xp70 — It might have entered your mind to say that "yy "79 “Tax oxy Drxtn — since if fone says, “I am hereby a nazir,” 1y70 ya ox — even if he adds “from grape-seed,”*! bob m3 "7 ~ he is a nazir for all the nezirus restrictions’ ba pnw iby “Way XD 2s ‘ingn — I might say thet ithe postpones his offerings he should not transgress the commandment not to delay." Yesewe x7 NOTES components" of the rte have been performed. Thus, it is essential for the nazir to bring his offerings and shave his head in order for the nesirus restrictions to be lifted. The Sages understand the verse as “after even a single component” of the rite has been per- formed, Thus, ifthe nazir brought [even one of} his offerings but didnot shave his heed, he is nevertheles free ofthe nezirus restrictions (Ran), UL Le, evenifthe shavings not essential othe dissolution of thenezirus ‘restrictions itis an integral component of nezirus! Therefore, it stands ‘to reason that ifthe nasir postpones it he is in violation of the pro- hibition agains delaying the fullllment of [any component of his Vow. 12, histo, refers to an ordinary nazr who completed his term. Ihe fares blore bringing his equitedofering, he vilates the command ‘ment not to delay According to this explanation, however, he violation ‘occur only ifthe nazr allows thee festivals to pas by between the ‘Conclusion of hs term and the bringing of his offerings (for as «rule offerings are subject to three festival grace period; see 3b note 12] (an; see Parashas Nedarim and Yonas Bile 4 for discussion ofthis pint; ee also R Akiva Eiger o Fa above arn 93°. 18, According to Mar Zutra when the Baraisa on 8a derived through the hekeishofretirutonederin tat asi issujet tothe commandment otto delay it meant that he may not delay his offerings, The Gemara sonders why we must resort to the heeih as the eouree ofthis aw. 14, Deuteronomy 28:22. Thin is part of the verse containing the commandment not to delay the ffliment ofa vow, It reads init entirety Tove 39 MPTP UTD we DAN RD TI Me IB TS sooty When you vow & heer to Hashem sour God donot beaten ‘poving i or Hoshem, your God, will demand it of you and there will be ‘@ sin in you. The phrase “rin, When you vow (alternatively: If you Sow], would seem to imply that the commandment apples only to ‘aluntry vows, However a Baraia (cited fully in Roch Hashanah 6) “rpounds cach adtional phrase in this verve a referring toa speciic {ppe of offering, including mandatory ones Tosofos). Our Gemara cites one egment of the Baraisa 18. The words will demand it allude to obligatory offerings, which Heshem “demands” of «person. This eatogory includes the char, ‘thle generally comes to une fr definite rangrenions, andthe ath {n, which generally comes to atone fr act involving possible rane- ireations Ir alio includes obligatory oh endshelanim offerings, sich SS thove that every individual must bring on the thre eaival. The Sommandment not to delay applies oll these offerings (Rashi to Rosh ‘lshanah iis Ros, ee also Rashash Presumably, this stegory includes the naz’ offerings [since they are obligatory] (Ran; see the fulltext of the Baraisa in Rosh Hashanah ibid; se also Raskash 16. Lethe specific teaching regarding nezirus ~ as derived through the hekeish ~ is necessary, because we might not have applied tonexius the ‘general rule that is derived from for Hashem, your God, will demand i. 1. Literally: attach. 18 Le. ifone who is no: nazir say, “I hereby undertake to bring the nazir’schatas,” no obligation takes effet; only a nazir ean be ile to this offering. Since the nazir’s offerings are more lenient than other ‘offerings in this reapect, one might have thought that they are also more Tenient in the respect that they are excluded rom the commandment not to delay (Ran). [One can also not obligate himself to bring the nazr's ‘lah or shelamim, but since one can undertake to bring a voluntary olah or shelamim, the Gemara mentions specifically the chatas.) 419. (Cheilev isthe term for fate whore consumption the Torah forbade ‘One who eats cheilev unintentionally incurs the obligation to bring « hates.) The Gemara ases chelev a8 a prototype of the violation for ‘which one ineursachatzs, employing the expression “chatas for cheleu” ts a reference to the general category of chatas offerings brought for ftonement (Ran). Chvilev is used as the prototype because eating cheilev was the most common reason for which chotas lability was ‘neurred, since the forbidden fats of slaughtered animals were fre ‘quently found in homes (Rosh; f. Rashi to Sotah 15a 25m nxn =) 20, {Le if one who didnot commit a transgression says, “I am hereby obligated to bring a chatas for atonement,” no obligation takes effect) ‘Thus the chatas shares this leniency with the neirus offerings (Ra. 21, Le if one who ate cheileo doos not bring his chatas in a timely fashion, he has violated the prohibition against delaying, as taught in ‘the Barsiea segment just cited. 22, Le, hespecfis that he means to undertake only one aspect of ness — that of abstaining from grape-seed [and not the aspects of avoiding other grape products, umah and hair shaving! (see Nazir Sb). 28, Despite his qualifation of his vow, the declaration “I am hereby © ‘nazir” brings the fll stat of nezirus into effect (Ran. The Gemara in [Nazir (3b) eves a Seritural source for this novel rule 24, Le. since nezirus is subject to one novelty insofar as it takes effect ally on the basis lied vow, pethape it issubioe tothe additional rovelty of being excluded from the commandment not to delay. The ‘Gemara will challenge this reasoning shorty. [Note thet the declsation “I am hereby a nazir from grape-seed” is not ayad (partial declaration) for neirus. Rather, itis afl deciaration btpartal nevirus! Nevertheless, we drive from Scripture (see Nozir 38) that i effets the stato of neziras in fll)KOL KINUYEI = [Scripture] therefore informs us by means ofthe hekeish that the nazir is subject to this commandment. ‘The Gemara notes that this answer is qualified: ‘7os7 pxnh xqra7 — This fits well according to the one who says that 3b m2 7 1¥90 72-743" — when one makes the vow of nesirus specifically in regard to abstaining from grape- seed he is automatically a nazir for all the nezirus restrie- tions: ary yorAw SAY X>x — But according toR’ Shimon, who saysthat ypi22-7mw sp 7 Px — oneisnot anazir until ‘he makes the vow of nezirus in regard to abstaining from all [the restricted eategories),"” 0% xpx »xD — what is there to say? Since nezirus is no different than any other obligation in regard toits vow, why should it be different in rogard to the commandment not to delay? CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 4a ‘The Gemara continues, challenging the basic premise of the previous clarification: ony) - And furthermore, sa xan wren 1x7 — that rule You cited is a novel [law] in which nezirus is more stringent than other contexts! Why should it lead us to think that the razr is treated more lenently than other vowers insofar as being ‘exempt from the commandment not to delay his offerings? ‘The Gemara concedes and offers another explanation of the novelty: meri 1p px — Rather, what is the novel [law] of {nezi- rus] that would have led us to think the commandment not to delay is inapplicable here? xp ny pI] — Tt might have entered your mind to say that Suet — since the law is NOTES 25, A dispute regarding this issue is cited in Nazir (ibid). The Rabbis ‘maintain thatthe qualified vow effets a fll state of nesirus, 26, Le. he must say, “I am hereby a nazr,” without specifying any particular eategory of the necirus restrictions (Rosh). And if he does 0 into specifics, he must mention al the categories, a8 follows: “I 1am hereby a nazir from grape products and from haireuts and from ‘tumah" (Rosh to Nasir 3b. 27, (According to the Rabbis who rule thatthe declaration “Iam hereby ‘anazir regarding grape-sea brings onthe full stat of nezirus, the vow of nezirus is more stringent than other vows, which do not take effect fully in an equivalent case)meee Abt KOL KINUYEI xy ;wzwe ADs vy Ne OX} — that if [the nazir] shaves over one of the three [offerings] he has discharged his shaving obligation,"' ann 33 mby ‘Way xb — he should not transgress the commandment not to delay for postponement of any of these offerings) y9 vpwn xz — [Seripture] there- fore informs us by means of the hekeish that he is subject to the commandment not to delay. ‘An alternative answer is presented: xpos nnsgix} — Or, if you prefer, say: mvrin vx» — What is ‘the novel (Iaw] of [nezirus] that would have led us to think the ‘commandment not to delay is not applicable here? x67 own ‘su tonne ~ It is as proposed originally ~ because one cannot assume an obligation for [the nazir’s chatas offering] through an ordinary neder." bn nxva 7 XW x27 XT} ~ And as for that which you asked from the ease of the chatas offering brought for eating eheileo,' I can respond: symp a9 RXBD 111939 — The chatas that is brought for eating cheilev comes to cffec atonement for the sin. Since one is commanded to achieve ‘atonement, it stands to reason that he may not delay the offering." ‘eqns xp “9 NBT — By contrast, for what necessity does the chatas offering of anazir come?" Since it isnot analogous to the chatas for eating cheilev, if not for the hekeisk we might have thought that it is excluded from the commandment not to delay. CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM. ‘The Gemara counters nibh nxpn vm — But consider the chatas of a woman who hhas given birth, 939 x07 x57 — which does not come to effect atonement,” anisn 3 nrva Mey 139) — yet for postpon- ing it one transgresses the commandment not to delay." — ? — ‘The Gemara answers: mrupa barb np wry xp x0ng — That [chatas] renders [the ‘woman who has given birth] permitted to eat kodashim. ” ‘The Gemara returns to a segment of the Baraisa quoted on $2, which derives various laws from the hekeish between nedarin: and nezirus ‘ip vox — The master said: oy mm — AND JUST AS regarding NEDARIM, RB 7772 MD 3X] — A FATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEDARIN SRX™Y]3 70% 231 ~ AND [AMUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NBDARIM, TN AX ~ SO ‘Too, regarding NEZIRUS, YRa RIN "pM 34 — AFATHER CAN REVOKE HIS DAUGHTER'S NEZIRUS, nw. MIN} "MD Syst — AND A HUSBAND CAN REVOKE HIS WIFE'S NEZIRUS. ‘The Gemara wonders _xyprn mp ~ Why do I need the hekeish asa source for this law? oryqm wma m3 1nrn — Let it be derived through tbe method of mah matzinu, from the context of nedarim.'* ~ ? — NOTES 1L Although the nazir must ofer an ola, chatas and shelamim as part ‘ot his concluding rite, if e offers only one of them and shaves his head the nezirus restrictions ae lifted (eee Mishna Nazir 45a), 2, Since the offerings are subject to the leniency that the nezirus ‘estrictions ean be lifted even if only one of them is brought, if not for the Aekeish we might heve thought that they are subject to the ‘additional leniency of being excluded from the prohibition against delaying (Ran, on 4) 3, See da note 18 4. Le. the obligation fo this chats also cannot be assumed through an. ‘ordinary neder, yet we know that one who became lable to itis subject tothe commandment not to delay. Why should the nezirus offerings be different? (ace a notes 19-21). 65, That is although the chatas is lenient inthe sense that one cannot ‘assume an obligation for it through an ordinary neder, it stands to reason that ane who became obligated is subject to the prohibition ‘agnnst delaying it ~ for he is commanded to bring it in order to effect the atonement that he needs! (Zan, on 4a) 6. The nazir does not need the chatas for atonement. Even the Tanna ‘who says (below, 10a) that a nasir is called a “sinner” (because he distressed himself by abstaining from wine) concedes that he did not ‘commit a ral sin that ealls for penance; accordingly, that chafas does hot come primarily to effect atonement! And although offering the Chatas serves to lift the nesirue restrictions and permit the nazir to drink wine, he is not commanded to lift these restrictions; itis simply his prerogative to da so ance he completes his term ofnezrus. Thus, the bringing of the chatas does not produce a result that the nazir was commanded to bring about. It simply represents the fulfillment of his foneluding rite, Therefore, the nazr'schatas isnot analogous to the ‘hatas for eating chile. | And since the nazir’s chatas is subject to the leniency that its obligation cannot be assumed through an ordinary rneder, we might have thought thet the goneral commandment not to ‘elay is inapplicable to this offering (Ran, on 4a; see there for further discussion; se also Rashash on 4a). 17, Seripture decrees (Leviticus 12:6) that every woman after childbirth ‘ust bring an olah and achatas — although she has not committed any transgression! [Now actualy, there is an opinion (ae Niddah 3tb) that the woman who has given birth is considered a “sinner” because when in the throes of labor the sears that she will nver again cohabit with hher husband, and this is flse oath. However, this isnot the primary ‘reason forthe ehatas, since even & woman who knows that she did not entertain such a thought is obligated to offer it (Ran, on 4.1 8. [Let us therefore say that the nazr’schatas is also included in this category] It is unclear why the Gemara assumes that the chatas of the ‘woman who has given birth is included inthe general category of chotoe offerings to which the prohibition against delaying applies. One cout ‘seemingly argue (at this point) that sine the chatas ofthe woman mh has given birth does not come for atonement, itis no different thas t= nazir's chatas ~ and both are excluded from the prohibition (To Yeshanim, Gilyon HaShas, Tosafs as emended by Keren Orah). For = resolution of tis dificult, soe Keren Orah. 9, Le, sacred foods, such as the meat of an offering. Scripture sistas (ibid v. 8): may) HED Ty 79>} the Koken shall provide atonement f= hher and she shall be purified, meaning that onco the chatas is Tet the woman is permitted to eat Rodashim — which she had previously been forbidden to eat. Now, eating hodashim isa mitavah, since ere person ~ whether man or woman ~ is obligated to bring the peso bffering annually and partake of it (Ran; see also Tosafos). Thus, Se ‘hatos ofthe woman who has given birth causes er to attain a dese of purity that she is commanded to reach. tis therefore anslogo=s the chatas for eating cheilev, which effects atonement that one = commanded to achieve. That is why the prohibition against delerne applies to this offering, By contrast, the nazir's chatas does not Sp him attain anything that is commanded. Therefore, if not for Sue hekeish, we might have thought that on account of ite leniency = = ‘excluded from the prohibition against delaying (see note 6) 10, Moh matsinu ("What do we find?" i an analogy which teaches a a law known tobe true in one contoxt applies to every similar conte Once the Torah taught that a father or husband may revoke Sa nnedarim of his daughter or wife, it follows automaticaly thst Sax ‘applies to vows of nezirus as well. Why do I need the hekeish to mass this? (See Rosh. ‘Ran wonders why the Gemara asks this question only regarding Sie law of revocation, and not regarding the law of yados (pa declarations). Le. one could just as well ask why the Baraise, in ts Se tlause, must derive from the hekeisk that just as yados are eactn= Se nezirus, 0 too, they are valid for all nedarim. This, too, may be Gera through the method of mah matzinu! Ran answers that if we wea derive the law of yados through mah matzinu then one wo vila nneder that he effected through a jad would not bo liable to lashes — ‘because there is principle that punishment may never be meted este ‘the bass of analogy [77772 po79 Ps) The Baraisa therefore derive law of yodos through the hebeish, because laws derived throws Se method of exegesis are punishable (soe 7a note 19). Repsoding revocation, however, itis proper to ask why the Baraisa needs to m= to the hekelsh when the matter may be derived through simple aia {since no punishment is involved). See also Tosofos. See fers Mishneh LaMelech, Hil. Nezirus 2:17, and Chidushei R’ Akiva Eager ‘a, and Kovetz Shiurim, Kiddushin $16.4b? KOL KINUYEI ‘The Gemara responds: syprey nin my "at xpOPT — Ifnot for the hekeish, Tight have said: Perhaps it is only in the case of nedarim that [a father or hhusband] may revoke the vow, _xptnp my mvc xo mina — because [an unspecified neder] does not have a time limit." nya 133 99x — But in the case of nezirus, xmwwip m2 RT = which has atime limit, ph ow nivmy N97 — since the ‘term of an unspecified nezirus is thirty days!” xo xprx — I might say that they may not revoke the wow." yp maw xp — [Scripture] therefore informs us through the hekeish that revocation i posible even for vows of nezrus.! ‘The Mishnah stated: saan ny 17h TaN WIRY — ONE WHO SAYS TO HIS FELLOW: “IAM. ‘vows from you,” ete, [or “I am separated from you," oF “Tam distanced from you,” .is forbidden by the terms of his neder]." ‘The Mishnah’s ruling is qualified: ‘xm vax - Shmuel said: yp723 — In all these [eases], the ruling does not apply 3 BYID waxy ap Dan aRY BRIE WD — ‘unless [the vower] also says: “in that which Teat of yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours." CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM ‘Shmuel’s interpretation of the Mishnah is challenged: vain — They challenged Shmuel on the basis of the following Baraisa: 7x2 12x 17a — If one says, “TAM VOWED FROM YOU," ‘yee MoM — oF “IAMSEPARATEDFROMYOU." "2a ~NV4 — Or TAM DISTANCED FROM YOU," "IDX HT Y771 — HE IS FOR: BuppeN by the terms of his neder. 3 barx vay — Ifone says, “That WHICHTEAT OF YOURS,” 37 BEY TAY — or “That WHICH TASTE OF YOURS,” “Wo FY 777] — HE 18 FORBIDDEN by the terms of his neder. Thus, we see that each of these statements itself is suficiont to engender a prohibition.!” — ? — ‘The Gemara defends Shmuel's interpretation: vung 139 — This is what (the Baraisa] means to teach in its latter clause: yyvax 57737 199 — When was this matter of the first clause stated, i. that one who says, “Tam vowed from you,” ete, is forbidden by his neder? aye vx Bix 3p pro xy 4p — Its regarding a case where he also says, “in that which I eat of yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours." "The Gemara counters: .xqbvx x70) — But another Baraisa was taught in the opposite fashion, as follows: 49 531x "usw — If one says, “That WHICEE NOTES ‘1 When one says, “Let this thing be forbidden to me like an offering,” ‘and does not specify a time limit, it becomes forbidden to him forever (sh), Perhaps the Torah allowed revocation in order to spare (a ‘daughter or wife the felon distress of abtinence from that which she forbade upon herself (Ran; see Tosafos, Rosh and Keren Ora) 12. This is derived from Scripture in Nasir 5a. Thus, nesirus is not ‘analogous to an ordinary neder in rogard to the distress it causes. 13, Even if a woman specified that she should be a nazi for life, her father or husband would be unable to revoke the vow, for sinee the standard term of nezirus is only thirty days perhaps the Torah did not provide the mechanism of revocation at all for nezrus. By contrast, in {he ease of an ordinary neder, even ifthe woman specified tha it should be elfectve for only thirty days it would be subject to revocation, for ‘since the Torah did provide this mechanism it may be employed even in the ease ofa limited neder (Keren Orah 14, (When two subjects ae linked through a hekesh, we learn that the laws pertaining to one apply to the other ~ even though they are not analogous.) Tan asks; Why do we not derive from the hekish that ust as unspeci= ‘ied nezirus lasts only thirty days, so too the prohibition engendered by ‘any unspeciiedneder lasts only ciety days? Ran answers that this ism possible because the term neder includes two categories of vows — vows, btprohibition [ne “7: and vows of consecration [xy "pI. Vows of tonsecration effet a permanent state of sanctity, for once an animal is designated as an offering it remains consecrated forever. Therefore, ‘vows of probibition also take effect permanently [unless the vower specifies otherwise, bocause we compare the two categories of nedarim ‘to each other [rather than comparing one of them to vows of nezirus]. 15. These are partial declarations (yodos) of nedarim. The Gemare’s following discussion is based on the premise that there are three types, of partial declarations: (a) Partial declarations that are so incomplete as to be meaningless. A declaration in this category is not eonsidered a yad a all. (b) Partial declarations that are inconclusive [mst yxy orn, ie. that can be interpreted as prohibitive nedarim — or even tend towards this interpretation — but also allow for alternative interpretations. tis ‘a matter of dispute whether an inconclusive yd is effective (as we shall, learn on 5b. ©) Partial declarations that are conclusive [nirot or, i. that early indicate the vower's intent. Those are certsinly effective, for we derived the validity of yados from Scripture above (Sa). [This reflects the view of Ran; see, especially, Ran to end of Ba ‘yon "37 05x, Others explain the distinction between these categories Aiferentiy; see Rosh to end of Sa and to Nazir 2h peraw 7a0p xo 7. Fitea (to 2a 179 9979) asterts that even a conclusive yd is vid ifthe ‘yower says he did not truly intond for a neder. Ct. Kehilos Yaakoo, Hosajos $1.1 16. The Mishnal reads: “One who says to his fellow: ‘Lam vowed fox you,’ or ‘Tam separated from you,’ or Tam distanced from you, — ‘that which Tet of your that which I taste of yours is forbids by the terms of is neder.” Shmuel informs us that the Mishnah i= stating one law: A nader i effected ifthe vower combines one of the Statements in the first group with one of those inthe second group — for example, he says, "I am vowed from you in that which I est of yours.” The statement “Tam vowed from you,” or “I am separsint from you,” or “T am distanced from you” itself is ineffective, (The ‘Gemara initially understands the reason as being that] none of these statements by itself connotes that the vower means to probs ‘anything, and thus, these are not even considered partial delarstions fot nedarim, ie. they are not yados at all (Ran). (Perhaps the reason = because “Tam vowed (or ‘ceparated’, or ‘distanced’ from you" = understood as an expression of displeasure, meaning “I will baw ‘nothing to do with you, a if was under vow" (se Meir) However, Shmuel concedes thatthe statement “That which xt yours” ot “That which I taste of yours” itself is @ valid yad fora made One who declares, “That which I eat of yours,” is understood = alluding that his fllow's food shall be subject toa certain rule, na ‘assumed to mean that it “shall be forbidden to me like an offen ‘Shmel means only that the statoments in the Mishnah's first oe ‘are ineffective in their own right (Toso, Rosh; see Ran below === ‘tae prand Rashbe at length; soe further, Tosofos to Sb ars ane Rosh (Pesahis] 82 with Korban Nesanel 97 and Keren Orah)) 17, (We learn from the Baraisa that “I am vowed (or ‘sepersied = ‘distanced’ from you" does imply that the declarer means to ins nneder | Unlike the Mishnah, which states “is forbidden” only athe listing all the declarations the Barisa state it twice. Thus, whee is possible to interpret the Mishnah as meaning that statement Som the latter clause must be added to one from the former clause i= =e to make it a yad, the Baraisa clearly implies that a declaration Som cither clause is effective — contrary to Shmuel’ interpretation am {Presumably, the Barasa means thatthe declarations inthe rst muse ‘ender the vower prohibited to derive any benefit from his fellow, sm these delarations are unqualified. The declarations in the latter sm ‘which refer specifically to eating or tasting, would prohibit xy Se specified benefit (Rashba).] 18. Le. the later clause qualifies the former clause, tesching thas ie ‘vower is in fact forbidden by his neder only if he adds “in thst was ‘eat of yours” ete, Thus, both clauses together deal with a ner ase ‘esting or tasting ofthe fllow's food. ‘Note, however, that this explanation resolves ony the messin wie phrase “is forbidden” atthe end of the frst clause. We ar sil == to understand why the Baraisa repeats is forbidden” after the See clause — if indeed the latter clause is merely a qualification af former! The Gemara will point this out below. Meanie, = =m different objection to the answer (Ran).