Hempel, Carl G.

Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation in

Frontiers of science and philosophy (1962): 9-33.
In this paper, Hempel proposes the term deductive-nomological
which states that many scientific explanations are deductively valid
arguments having at least one statement of an empirical law in their
explanandum. In order to arrive at a conclusive description of the
event, law, or fact to be explained, we need a set of explanans.
These are statements of particular facts, and initial conditions that
surround the general laws that are relevant to the explanandum.
Hempel then stated a series of conditions that are required for the
D-N explanation:
The explanandum must be a logical consequence of the
explanans.
The explanans must contain general laws, and these must be
essential for the derivation of the explanandum
The explanans must have empirical content
Questions
1. What is the difference between an expladandum and an
explanation?
2. What does he mean by logical consequence?
3. How do we know if the general law is relevant?
Rueben
Ruben, D. (1990). Arguments, laws and explainations
from explaining explanation 182-188, 191-208, 248-252
Ruben aims to present counter-example to Hempels account of full
explanations. First he discusses the concept of irrelevance, because
although explanans may not actually have any explanatory power
what so ever. For example, John takes birth control pills regularly
and the general law states that every man who takes birth control
pills regularly avoid pregnancy. Therefore, the expladandum states
that John would avoid being pregnant. This shows that although the
general law in the explanans states that taking birth control pills
would result in the absence of pregnancy, it is too simple to
conclude that this would affect every thing. Ruben uses this bizarre
example to show that if the explanans were too general, then
anyone could derive a wildly inaccurate explanandum.
Flat generalisations are ones which use the same vocabulary as the
singular explanans utilize, and thus do not contribute at all to
singular explanation. Rueben argues that what is needed for a
satisfying explanation of an event is a group of generalizations
which employ a theoretical vocabulary with greater depth.
Questions

1. Is there any real difference between an argument theory and a

non-argument (or, specifically, a sentence) theory?
2. Isn't the difference between an argument and a sentence
theory somewhat superficial?
3. If explanations are typical not arguments, what place do laws
have in explanation?