21. BACOLOD CITY VS HON. EDUARDO ENRIQUEZ, ETC.

FACTS:
In year 1951 the herein respondents were members of the police force of the City
of Bacolod, and in that same year the Chief of Police of Bacolod City filed
administrative charges against them for having some of them tolerated prohibited
games, another for maltreatment and another for failure to make arrest of
offenders, and said charges duly sworn to by the Chief of Police were presented to
Acting City Mayor Felix P. Amante who endorsed them to the city council for action
and suspended the herein respondents from their positions. Accordingly, it resolved
to recommend to Acting City Mayor Felix P. Amante in the interest of public service,
the immediate separation from the service of all the above-named respondents and
that the positions occupied by them be declared vacant and immediately filled. This
recommendation was approved by the Acting City Mayor, hence the herein
respondents were separated from service and replaced by others.
The respondents appealed and the judge render a judgment on their favor, hence
the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to issue an alias writ of execution ordering the
Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to enforce the payment of the back salaries of the abovenamed petitioners against the patrimonial property of the City of Bacolod.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Bacolod, who is not a party to the case be made to bear the
burden of satisfying the judgment rendered therein.

RULING:
NO.
In the case of Angara vs Orospe, the City of Baguio, not having been made a party in
that case, cannot be compelled without due process of law to pay the salaries therein
claimed by plaintiff Angara, is completely applicable to the case at bar where the herein
petitioner City of Bacolod is made to pay the back salaries of the herein respondents,
without due process of law and without any decision rendered against it.
Therefore, the orders of the respondent judge, dated January 11, 1955 and February 16,
1955, are hereby declared null and void in so far as they authorize the levy on execution
on all the properties, real and personal.

22. MENDOZA VS DE LEON ET AL.

FACTS:

Action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the
municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive
ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of
the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the municipal council personally liable?
RULING:
YES.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff had a vested
right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his lease.
Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for
damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it
said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto
arising from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities.
In this case, the rule of personal liability should be with municipal councillors in such
matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary private corporation.
The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
23. THE MUNICIPALITY OF MONCADA VS CAJUIGAN ET AL.
FACTS:
The municipalities of Moncada and the defendant, Pio Cajuigan, entered into a
contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to this defendant certain fish ponds
situated within the jurisdiction of that municipality for the term embracing July 1,
1908, to June 30, 1909, for which this defendant agreed to pay P3710, in quarterly
installments. By virtue of this lease, the fish ponds were duly delivered into the
possession of the defendant Cajuigan by the plaintiff, and he forthwith began
placing therein nets, corrals, and other accessories necessary for the conduct of a
fishery. The lessee failing to meet his payments as provided in the contract of lease,
petitioned for and received an extension, first until October 1, 1908, and second
until November 30 of the same year.
The least was declared rescinded by the municipal council on November 30, 1908,
and on or about the sixth day of the following month the plaintiff, through its
officials, entered the property and ejected the defendant and his tenants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipalitys action in the rescission of contract is valid?
RULING:
YES.
In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private
corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term be used, such as the
finishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable judgment. It requires
some considerable amount of business acumen to compel performance on the part
of lessees and in a manner which will not cause the property to deteriorate.
Questions must continually arise which are not expressly provided for in the
contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in manner that will preserve the
just claims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that on the
occasion the councillors may have reason to believe that a particular contract has
been rescinded by the other party or has never been legally entered into, in both of
which case, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the interest of the
municipality.
24. CORREA VS CFI
FACTS:
There were two policemen involved that were illegally dismissed by the
petitioner during his incumbency as the Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan (reason fo
the said dismissal was not mentioned in the case).
December 13, 1968, CFI of Bulacan rendered judgment in favor of the policemen
and ordered personally to pay the salaries which the policemen failed to receive by
reason of their illegal dismissal from office until they are actually reinstated.
August 24, 1976, CA affirmed the decision of the CFI and became final and
executory.
On April 22, 1977, respondent Court issued the Order denying the Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution. Petitioner thus came to this Court, maintaining that he
could no longer be required to pay the back salaries of the private respondents
because payment on his part presupposes his continuance in office, which is not the
case
Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring that the
payment of back salaries of private respondents should be made by the incumbent
mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray; Bulacan, and that petitioner is no

longer liable for the payment thereof; and annulling the Order dated April 22, 1977
of respondent court denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Correa as a public official (Mayor) who wrongfully/illegally
dismissed an employee during his incumbency is still liable to the case personally.

HELD:
YES.
Liability of public official who wrongfully dismissed an employee is personal;
Principle of personal liability applicable to cases where public officer discharges an
employee wrongfully.
In the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent
that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof.
A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or
beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable
therefor like any private individual. This principle of personal liability has been
applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an
employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance
with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were
acting outside their official authority.
Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
25. JOSE ACUNA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF THE CITY OF ILOILO
FACTS:
Jose Acua, made a contract with Fermin del Rosario, the then municipal attorney of
the city of Iloilo, as representative of the municipality, by which Seor Acua
undertook from the 18th day of March until the 31st day December, 1901, the
performance of the service of cleaning and watering the streets comprehended
within a certain zone in the city of Iloilo, for which he was to receive the sum of 450
pesos monthly, to be paid at the end of each month.
About four months after the celebration of the contract the provincial governor of
Iloilo, by letter written to the president of the municipality, ordered the municipal

council to rescind all contracts then existing between the municipality and persons
contracting with it.
In compliance with this direction the municipal council, on the 29th day of June,
1901, declared as rescinded the contract above referred to.
Seor Acua instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to recover
from the municipality indemnification for his damages, by reason of the failure of
the city to comply with the terms of the contract, alleging the amount to be 2,220
pesos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal ordinance is valid ordering the rescission of the
contract.
RULING:
YES.
Under the provisions of article 53 of General Orders, No. 40, of the United States
Military Governor, by and under which municipalities were created and governed, of
date the 29th day of March, 1900, it is provided that the governor of the province
shall be ex officio president of all the municipal councils within the province and
shall have general supervisory charge of the municipal affairs of the several towns
and cities organized under the order.
26. BUNYE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged for the taking possession of the New Public Market in
Alabang, Muntinlupa through the enactment of Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 to the
prejudice of the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda na Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa (KBPMBMPM) since a lease contract between the
Municipality and the Kilusan was subsisting.
Petitioners posted a Motion to Dismiss on July 24, 1992, relying on the Court of
Appeals Decision on September 23, 1991 that unless and until declared to be
unconstitutional and expressly annulled, Resolution No. 45 deserves the

presumption of constitutionality and therefore is entitled to obedience and respect.

However, the motion was denied by the respondent court on September 23, 1992.
The Sandiganbayan then found petitioners guilty of a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act on its July 26, 1995 Decision.
ISSUES:
WON the unilateral revocation of subject lease contract was effected with evident
bad faith.
RULING:

NO.
Sec.149, paragraph (3) of BP 337 explicitly requires a public bidding before a
government contract may be awarded, and the term of the contract is not to exceed
5 years. Thus, the 25-year term of the lease contract violates the BP 337 provision.
As stated in Spouses Terrado vs Court of Appeals, since Ordinance No. 8 granted
fishery privileges without the benefit of public bidding and for a period exceeding 5
years, the said ordinance and the contract of managementwere null and void ab
initio xxx.
There is tenability in petitioners submission that subject lease contract was grossly
disadvantageous to the Government. The Court, mindful of economic realities,
perceives that the projected monthly rental of P51, 243 in 1990 would have greatly
reduced by 2015 when the lease contract would have ended if not earlier rescinded.
Also, KBMBPMs failure to comply with the contractual stipulations under the Health
and Sanitation clause of the contract cannot be overlooked.

SECTION 23&24

1. MENDOZA VS DE LEON ET AL.

FACTS:
Action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the
municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive
ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of
the Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the municipal council personally liable?
RULING:
YES.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff had a vested
right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his lease.
Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for
damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it
said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto
arising from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities.
In this case, the rule of personal liability should be with municipal councillors in such
matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary private corporation.
The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.