\ ay KOL KINUYEL EATOP YOURS” yp ap waxy — or “That WHICH ITASTE OF yOUMS,""-e% — he is FORBIDDEN by the terms of his nee. Jeo 772 — If one says, “TAM VOWED FROM YOU" “3U7RI Joo — ONTAMSEPARATEDFROMYOU." RH PNT — oF “AM DISTANCED FROM YOU." "WE4/7} 77 ~ HEISFORMIDDEN by the terms of his neder How wil you explain this Barsisa™ ‘The Gemara answers: ‘37 n — Teach the Baraisa as meaning thus: One who says, "That which Tea of yours,” ee. is forbidden by hismeder, 133 sey "toy — and this declaration is necessary even sf he previously said, “I am vowed from you." ‘The Gemara objects: (CHAPTER ONE xeyr1 tiv oop ox — If so, that is the same as the former Baraisal®! ‘yw ~ And furthermore, 27+ mp? nox WOK — why does [the Tanna] need to teach the rule “is forbidden” twice? "The Gemara concedes and therefore revises Shmuel’s state- ment! ‘sxmv we xox — Rather, Shmuel said: xy vx7 ae ‘a} pote vagy 9 bate — It is because [the vower] also said, “in that which T eat of yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours,” ‘apm ram egy x17 — that only he is forbidden by the neder to derive benefit from his fellow but his fellow is permitted to derive benefit from hi. ‘NOTES 19, One cannot explain as above that the Intter clause qualifies the Tormer clause — i.e. one who says, “That which T eat of yours,” is forbidden only if he prefaces it with “I am vowed from you” — because all agree that “That which I eat of yours” itsesa valid yad for a neder| (Ran; see note 16) (Rather, itis clear that the declarations in each clause are effective n their ov right!) 20, Le, the Baraisa teaches that the phrase ‘That which I eat of yours” Ifirst clause) must be stated even when one said, “Tam vowed from you” [latter clause] (Ran; ef. Tosofos). 22, [Literally the first clause] AWhough the two Baraisos were taught independently, the Gemara refers tothe one it quoted firs as the first clause” [because oftheir similarity]. Now, there is no dificult if two Baraisos teach the same rule, However, the Gemara means to ask as follows: Ifthe latter Tanna meant that the vower must state both clauses in order forthe ned to be effective, why did he reverse the ‘order ofthe clauses? It would have been more logical to teach them ‘order, with the latter clause qualifying the former [i.e the neder is ‘fective only if the vower also says... than to teach them backward ‘and mean that adeclaration from the frst clause is needed even ‘where ‘one previously stated” a declaration from the Iatter clause! Rather, reason dictates that th latter Tanna reversed the order ofthe clauses in order topreslude the thought that one clause qualifies the other. Le. ‘he realized that i he followed the order of the former Tanna, people right construe him as meaning that the neder is effective only if the ower also says a phrase from the latter clause — as we in fact interpreted the first Baraiea — and he deliberately reversed the order to preclude this interpretation end teach us that a declaration from cither clause is effective in its own right! Tt follows thatthe first Baraisa should aso be interpreted as meaning simply that a declaration from either clause is effective. Although the firet Tanna was unconcermed that one might understand him as meaning that the later clause qualifies the former, the second Terns ‘went out of his way to enlighten us further! At any rate, we see that feven a declaration such as “T am vowed from you” itself is effective (Ran; see Chidushei R Akiva Eiger 22, Le. if the Tanna means to state only one ruling, why does he repest “ig forbidden" in the latter clause? (lan; see note 18). This dificulty pertains to both Baraisas (Rosh). 23, The Gomara stands by its quotation of Shmuel as stating that the ‘Mishnah’s two clauses contain only one ruling, ie. the Mishnah refers ‘tm a case where the vower said, “T am vowed from you in that which 1 ‘eat of yours,” However, in light ofthe cited proof that even “Iam vowed from you" itself suffices to invoke a prohibition, the Gemara reintr- prota the reasoning behind Shmuel's assertion (Ran), 24, Shmuel infers from the Mishnah that only the vower is forbidden by the terms of his neder but the other fellow is not forbidden ~ for ints latter clause the Mishnah quotes the vower as saying “in that which Z cat of youre"! And since the Mishnah states “is forbidden” only ‘Shmuel infers that even the neder inthe first clause (where one sys, “7 ‘am vowed from you") affects only the vower but not his fllow. The ‘Mishnah would not have included diverse prohibitions in a single statement of is forbidden.” ‘Shunuel comes to clarify the inferred rule that“ am vowed from you” renders only the vower forbidden, and he states the following: When ‘one declares, “T am vowed (or ‘separated,’ or ‘distanced’ from you,” is only when he add, “in that which eat of youre” or "in that which ? taste of yours,” thatthe neder applies to him and not his fellow (RanKOL KINUYET rend 7°97 Wwe Dax — But ifhe merely said to his fellow, “Tam vowed from you,” or “I am separated from you," or “Tam Aistanced from you,” yyyvex Tay — both of them are forbid- den to derive benefit from one another." ‘The Gemara concludes by citing a concurring opinion: ‘xpan "373 19h 737 wyT Ky °3 — This is im accordance with ‘that which R’ Yose the son of R’ Chanina said: yy 3773 — fone says to hisfellow, “Tam vowed from you,” PND TY — Doth of them are forbidden to derive benefit from one another. R’ Yose bar Chanina’s opinion — and Shmuel's concurrent interpretation of our Mishnah — are challenged: jan ~ We learned in a Mishnahi”oyn ‘phy way ~ If one ays to his fellow, "1AM CHEIREM TOWARD YOU,” WX VN — ‘THE PERSON TO WHOM THIS VOW WAS DECLARED 1S FORBIDDEN to derive benefit fromthe vower.® xb a1 53x ~ Thisimplies: But the vower is not forbidden to derive benefit from the person to ‘whom he declared the vow. According to R’ Yose bar Chanina and Shmuel, let both of them be forbidden to derive benefit from one another"! ~ 2 ~ ‘The Gemara answors: ‘vrre7 739 — The Mishnah deals with a ease where [the vower] specified: x>%>y nx) “But you arenot cheirem toward me’ ‘The Gemara poses another chellenge fom a second segment of that very Mishnah ‘B70 *9y nx — The Mishnah states further: If one says to his fellow, “YOU ARE CHEIREM TOWARD ME,” "YOM “37 — THE VOWER 18 FORBIDDEN to derive benefit from the person to whom he declared the vow. x79 53x — This implies: But the person to whom the vow was declared is not forbidden to derive benefit from the ‘ower, According to R’ Yose bar Chanina and Shmuel, let both of them be forbidden to benefit from one another. ~ ? — CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM Sal ‘The Gemara answers: mp7 189 — The Mishnah deals with a case where [the vower] specified: x> yyy xpx1 ~ “But Iam not cheirem toward you.” ‘The Gemara objects ven pnp 99x — But according to you, if the vower does not spe- cify, what isthe law? vox yrae — Both of them (the vower and the one to whom he declared the vow) are forbidden to derive 3eneft from one another ~ even though the vower didnot mention explicitly that both shouldbe cheirem to one another. 20979 x9 xp°0 — But since the citod Mishnah teaches in a later clause: Jprvoe ay oy Bey ay WIT — one says to his fellow, ot aa ¢heirem TOWARD YOU AND YOU ARE TOWARD ME," BOTH OF THEM ARE FORBIDDEN toderive benefit fromone another, wemay infer: 773 pote PPT AT — Its in this [ease], where the vower specii- cally rendered both parties cheirem to one another, that both of them are forbidden to derive benefit from one another; <7 :s9n0 — however, ithe vower did not specify that both should be iorbidden, but merely said “You are cheirem toward me,” xt ‘inva ynamy ios — he is forbidden to derive benefit from his fl- low, bu his fellow is permitted to derive henefit from him. ~ 2 — Conceding the point, the Gemara revises R’ Yose bar Chanina’s statement: -xp90 373 19h 377 VanA 39 bx — Rather, this is how R’ Yose theson of R’ Chanina’s dictum wasstated: | yb%x-17m ~ Ifone saystohis fellow, “Tam vowed fo you,” pyiox nTUY — both of them are forbidden to derive benefit from one another," ‘pT BY — however, ifhesaysto him, “Tam vowed from you,” ‘apva ram sWox xin — only he is forbidden to derive benefit from his fellow, bu his fellow is permitted to derive benefit from him. ‘The Gemara notes that this resolves only the opinion of R’ Yose har Chanina, but not thet of Shmuel run 7) ~ But consider our Mishnah, 9%) 2097 — which NOTES: 1 This is because “Iam vowed from you” implies, “and my possessions sare restricted by a vow from “you and your possessions.” [Le inthe vow, the term “you” certainly includes “your possessions," since atthe very least the vower means to forbid himself from deriving benefit from his fellow ~ meaning that he cannot use his fellows property. Itistherefore reasonable to assume that “I” als ineludes “my possessions. "| Since the ‘ower set his possessions apart from his fellow, that fellow may not bene fitfrom him ~ justashe may not benefit rom that fellow (Ran; cf. Ros. ‘According to this version, Shmuel hols that “I am vowed (or “sepa ‘ated,’ or ‘distanced’ from you” itself implies that both parties may not ‘bene from each other, whorea “That which Tet of yours" implies that itisonly the vower who may not benefit from his fellow. Thus, each ofthe ‘Baraisos cited above teachos two soparate laws. The Baraiss tach that ‘one who says, “Tam yowed from you" ifo-bidden according tothe terms this neder, meaning that both parties may not benefit fom each athe ‘they teach further that one who says, “That which I eat of yours” is {forbidden according tothe terms ofhisneder, meaningthat the vower may ‘ot benefit from his fellow (hut that fellow may benefit from the vower) ‘The Baraisos state is forbidden twice because each clause refers to a different category of prohibition. (They employ the singular form “is forbidden” regard- ing the former ease forthe sake of uniformity, since the singular form must be used regarding the latter ease (Tosafos)| However, since the Mishnah states is forbidden only once, one cannot interpret it asreferingto two different nedarim ~ aneder of "Lam vowed from you" and a neder of "That which I eat of yours.” For since these rnedarim invoke diverse prohibitions, it would be unftting to state is forbidden only one, inclusively, regarding both of them, Shmuel there fore explains that the Mishnah referstoasingleneder in which the person ‘aid, “Tam vowed from you in that which [eat of yours.” Regarding this ‘ate, the Mishnah rulesitat the vower is forbidden according tothe terms of hisneder ~ meaning that he may not et from his fellow but that fellow ‘may eat from him. However, Shmuel informs us, fhe would merely tate, “Lam vowed from you,” both parties would be forbidden to benefit from one another (Ran on 4b) (The Gemara has retracted it intial view that according to Shmuel, “I am vowed (or ‘separated’ or ‘distanced’ from you" isnot valid yad a al currently holds that he considers this declaration a valid yad. However, this isnot what Shmuel comes to inform us, Shmuel informe usthat "Tem ‘vowed from you” itealfinludes both partes in the prohibition, and thus, effects a broader neder than “Tat which I eat of yours” (see Ran below Saabs pga xb, and note 1D 2. Below, 47, $, Because “Tam cheirem toward you” means “I shall be considered like ‘Temple property to you" (Ran to A7b; see 2a note 8). 4. Letus say that in the statement “I am cheirem toward you," the term you" includes “your property" (just as “I” includes "my property" ‘Shus, the vower shouldbe prohibited to benefit from the other fellow's property [ust as that fellow is prohibited to benefit from the vower's property] an’ 5: [In absence ofthis specific exclusion, however, even the vower would be forbidden to derive benefit from his fellow's property.) 6. Letussaythatin the statement “You arecheirem towardme," the erm “me” includes “my property” [just as ‘you” inches “your property") ‘Thus, the other fellow should not be allowed to benefit fom the vower's property [ust asthe vower may not benefit from his property] (an. 4. (This isnot because the words “T” and “you” necessarily include “my property" and “your property.” Rather, itis beause the word 39, echa, has a double connotation. Its simple meaning is fo you, but it sometimes means of yours (see Judges 17:2 with Roshi for an example of the latter ‘sage; Gilyon HaShas). Thus, 39-277! means both “am vowed f vow. ie. my property is forbidden to you, and “Tam vowed of yours," Le. your [property is forbidden tome (Ron; see Chidushei R’ Akiva Eiger, Shalmet Nedarim and Merome Sadeh) & This is Deeause 777, heimach, and 32, mimecha, have only one ‘meaning ~ from you! (Ron). [Simiaey, the expressions eyn 59 339, ‘am cheire toward you, and wyn 24 ns, You are cheirem toward me, each ‘ave only one meaning. Thus, the Mishnah cited above has no beating on. the ruling ofF”Yose the son of’ Chanina,) §. The elucidation here follows Tosafos and Rosh, who explain that the Gemara first clarified R’ Yose the son of R’ Chanina’s opinion, and now roooeds to clarify Shmuel’s opinion, Ran has a different approach, | }KOL KINUYEI teaches its ruling regarding the ease where the vower said, “I am vowed from you,” or “I am separated from you,” or “I atm dis- tanced from you,” bxvae prmana® xympix) — yet we inter- preted the Mishnah according to Shmuel as meaning that ‘pba axe) yp orto ay taXWy ay Tt33 — inall these cases] it is only when he also says “in thet which I eat of yours,” or “in that which [taste of yours,” ynva 713m) 39x) x17 — that [the vower] is forbidden to derive benefit from his fellow but his {fellowis permitted toderivebenefit from him; | YpHT3T TES 538 = however, inthe case where he merely sad, “I am vowed from you,” or ‘Iam separated from you,” or “I am distanced from you,” Pr'9s DEP’ — both of them are forbidden to derive benefit from oneanother. Thus, Shmuel doesnot distinguish between foyou and from you." — 2 — ‘The Gemara therefore offers yet another version of Shmuel’s statement: “yon ay baaw' xzve Xs — Rather, Shmuel’s teaching was originally stated asfollows: | myio»2x¥1 929318 2KW DST EY 3} = It is because [the vower] also said, “in that which I eat of ‘yours,” or “in that which I taste of yours,” 11OX xIn [x7 x17 ingvay xix — that he is forbidden only to eat of his fellow’s food and is permitted to derive other forms of benefit from him. 9 ‘pa 77709 — But ifhe merely said, “I am vowed from you,” or“ am separated from you,” or “I am distanced from you,” | yo rigzns trax — he would be forbidden even to derive other forms of benefit from his fellow. (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM Sat ‘The Gemara counters: ‘99% ~ Ifitisso, that omitting “in that which I eat fo taste] of yours” allows for a broader probibition, 39 Samay xp — Shmuel should have stated his clarification thus: 798 x9 DX) 42 vt nag 3p bata may (hx) — But if he did not say “in that, ‘which I eat of yours,” or “in thet which I taste of yours,” Px) Inga sonny sox] (advan xbx tox — he is forbidden even to derive other forms of benefit from his fellow! — ? — Conceding the point, the Gemara reverts tots orginal version of ‘Shmuel’s statement and offers a new explanation oft: ‘ypnrx 139 xbx — Rather, this is how [Shmuel’s teaching] was stated: 7p aytwsuxyy 9p S3tx xv 9x7 KpvY — It is because [the vower] also sai, “in that which I eat of yours” or “in that which Itaste of yours,” wwoxy xin — that he is forbidden by hhisneder, yp" 97302 ox bax — But if he merely said, “Iam vowed from you,” or “I am separated from you.” or “I am distanced from you,” Wx “BAT Tava x — this does not necessarily imply that he means to say he is forbidden to derive ‘any sort of benefit from his fellow. xy %xo ~ What is the reason? 95% 7709 — “Tam vowed from you” xpunwa x> yaw TIN — connotes “I will not converse with you"! yoE7e 919 — “Tam separated from you” xyoqry xypau xb ‘av 1931 — connotes that “Iwill not do business with you" ‘95 uz0V19 - “Tam distanced from you” y37x3 xy5'KR XD7 ‘yavia 79/7 nhaxs — connotes that “I will not stand within four ‘amos of you.” NOTES according to which the Gemara initially thought that by revising R? Yose bar Chanina’s statement it could resolve the difficulty even according to ‘Shmuel, but now proceeds to refute this thought. Soe Ran for elabora- tion, However, so Parashas Nedarim, who argues that Ran’s explanation does not it with our version ofthe text, 10 (Rather, Shmuel must hold as explained originally that “I” automat- cally includes ‘my possessions” and “you” automatically includes “your possessions.” But this is contradicted by the cited Mishnah’s ruling ‘egarding the case of “Tam cheirem toward you and you are toward me.”) ‘Because of this difficulty, the Gemara will revise Shmuels statement, concluding that Shmuel meant to address an entirely different issue, ‘Thus, nether R’ Yose bar Canina nor Shmuel hold that “T am vowed {from you” engenders a prohibition on both parties; R’ Yose bar Chanina holds this only regarding “T am vowed fo you” (39), and Shmuel did not discus thie matter a all (Tosofs, Rosh 1, Since the declaration "I am vowed [or ‘separated’ or ‘distanced from you" is ungualified and contains no allusion to eating, it cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the vower to eat ofhisfllow’s fod, We do not need Shmuel to inform us of this, as it is selfevident that if this declaration isa valid neder it renders the vower forbidden to derive any Dbenefit from his fellow, What Shmuel means to teach us is thal an inconclusive yad is effective. Ie. “I am vowed [or ‘separated’ or ‘is ‘anced’ from you” isan inconclusive yad, because as the Gemara will explain, although t canbe interpreted asa neder against deriving benefit from the other party, it can also be interpreted in an entirely diferent fashion. Nevertheless, Shmuel teaches, itis effective in invoking the rnder, because an inconclusive yad is valid! ‘Thus, Shmuel state, the qualification “in that which Teatof yours” is, needed to reduce th effet ofthe nde andlimitittoaprohibition against cating. In absence of this qualification, the vower is restricted from all rms of benefit, because ayad such as am vowed from you" wsellective despite its lack of clarity (Rashba, Ran). {According tothe previous explanation, as well, Shmuel held that an inconclusive ya is effective, but this was considered obvious and it was ‘assumed that Shmuel mean to inform us of diferent novel point (see fend of note). Now, however, we understand Shmuel as coming t inform sof the very fet that an inconciusiveyad is efective.] 12, [The emendation ofthe text fllows Ran, Tosofoe, Rosh et al.) The original text of Shmuel’s statement (on 4b) is: In all these cases, the ‘Mishnah’srule doesnot apply unless the vower says “in that which Lea of yours,” or “in that which Itaste of yours.” The implication is that unless the yower adds one of these clauses, the declaration “I an vowed from you,” et, is completely ineffective! Shmuel meant that omitting the ‘extra clause leads toa broader prohibition, he should have phrasod his ‘statement in a manner reflective ofthis point (Ran; see furiher, Rash [The Gemara could have voied this very objection above, in response to ‘the previous explanation (that if the vower omits the latter clause both parties are prohibited to derive benefit from one another)-However, there {ignored this point in favor of refuting that explanation entirely Ran ).) 1. Le his declarations considered an inconelusiveyad ~ becausehe may not mean to prohibit any benefit — and (as the Gemara shall explain, ‘according to this final interpretation] Shmuel consiers an inconclusive ad to be ineffective! an 4, Le. it can be understood as meaning “I will not converse with you.” Although it ean alo be understood as meaning “I will not derive benefit from you,” its an inconclusive yod (Ran’s first explanaticn). 15. Le. it can be understood in this fashion, and is therefore an inconclusive yad (Ran's first explanation). 16, Le itcan be understood in thi fashion, Sino each of these delara- tions can be interpreted as meaning either thatthe vower shall befor bidden to derive heneft from ha ellow, or tat he shall be forbidden todo something elee entirely, it ean inconclusive yad and stotll ineffective. It does not prohibit the vower from deriving benefit or from doing the other act. Aneder never takes effect onthe basis of partial declaration unless its meaning is clear (Ran’s fist explanation; Toscfs, Rosh; se Ran for an alternative explanation; se also Ramban; Ritva; Rarbam, Hil. Nedarim 123; R' Avraham Min HaHtor; ad sve Shalmei Nedarim). tis noteworthy thet the Gemara has reverted toits orginal version of ‘Shmuo’s statement ~ that the declaration Lam vowed [or separated’ or ‘distanced’ from you" itself is ineffective. Although this version was refuted above (4) on the basis of two Baraisos, that refutation no longor applis. Originally, Shmuel was understood as holding that "Tam vowed from you" ete. isnot considered ayo at all (eit is simply an expression of dgpleasure). Since thee are Baraisos which teach that it isan olfctive neder, Shmuel was refuted, forthe Baraisos obviously classify this as a ged. Now, however, we understand Shmuel as holding that "am vowed from you" isa jad but isan inconclusive one (ie, it eertainly implies a prohibition against something but it is unclear what tha thing is). We cannot refute Shmuel on the basi of those Baraios, ince there is & ‘Tannaic dispute whether an inconclusive jad is effective or not (see below). The Tannaim of those Baraisos consider it effective, but Shmuel follows the opinion that it isinefTective (Ran), | |5b‘ ‘KOL KINUYEI Having clarified Shmuel’s statement, the Gemara analyzes it: ‘bam 73yZ xi — Shall we say that Shmuel holds that, oT, nian pxy — partial declarations that are inconclusive ‘Brn ymin xb — are not valid partial declarations? ‘The Gemara responds: pe = Yest rpny sang paving) np opm Samay — Shmuel interprets our Mishnah in accordance with the opinion of R Yehudah, avr pra xd niota pay OPT TNT — who says that partial declarations that are inconclusive are not valid partial declarations." "The Gemara demonstrates that this is R’ Yehudah’s opinion: ent — As we learned in a Mishnah:* va by tn - THEES, SENCEOPAGETis: os '99 ny nm NA — “YOUAREHEREBY [PERMITTED TO ANY MAN." -YpIK 77177927] — R'YEHUDAH SAYS ‘thatthe get must include the following statement: "3" M7777) ‘ym — “AND THIS document I8 WHAT SHALL BE TO YOU FROM ME, 31D 18 — ADOCUMENT OF EXPULSION, and a bill of release, pIRW NR) — AND ALETTER OF ABANDONMENT."®! The Tanna ‘Kamma maintains that partial declarations that are inconclusive (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM are valid, whereas R’ Yehudah maintains that they are not valid ‘The Gemara asks: rpm van pruned mrpixd dseway pry wos — Why is Shmuel, forced to interpret the Mishnah in accordance with the minority opinion of R’ Yehudah?* 13373 mpt> — Let him interpret it in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who dispute R’ Yehudah, and who consider partial declarations val ‘niatm ory pA a2 by x — even though the partial declar- ations are inconclusive!” — ? — ‘The Gemara answers: x97 7x — Rava said: enw prvane — The wording ofthe Mishnah posed a difficulty to [Shmuel], as follows: "xDD — Why does it teach in its latter clause that the vower states “in that WHICH 1 EAT OF YOURS,” and “in ‘that WHICH TASTE OF YOURS"? ByYD "RW DIK NAW UND — Let it teach that he simply states “in that which I eat,” or “in that which T taste"!"! nnot ory yrs nye yaw ~ Learn from this that we require partial declarations that are conclusive!” NOTES 4L.Le.itia lea that Shmuel himself follows this Tannaic opinion, since he interprets the Mishnah acoordingly (Ran; see further 2.Gittin 85a, ‘3. Thisisthe essential phrase that abillofdivoree must contain (Rashi to Gittin le. cit). 4. Thisphrase (“and abil of release) ia part ofthe text ofthe Mishnah at its source, and was inexplicably omitted hore It is cited correctly below (see Rashash). 5, R’ Yehudah requires the get to state explicitly that the husband is di ‘voreing his wife with this document, Otherwise, hemight be construed as ‘meaning to divorce her with a verbal pronouncement (which is ineffec- tivel, and giving her the document as proof of her verbal “divorce.” Al- ‘though the language ofthe ge "You are hereby permitted to any man Indicates thatthe document is what effects the divorce this snot conclu: sive — ie there is rom fr the alternative interpretation ~ and R’ Yehu- dah holds that partial declarations that are inconclusive are not effective. ‘The Tanna Kamma, however, dooms it unnecessary for the get to contain these explicit clauses, since even without them iis apparent that this document is what effets the divorce and itis alzo apparent that the thusband himself as opposed to some stranger) is the one effecting it (see below, 6a note 2), Thus, the Tanna Kamma holds that partial declarations are effective even when they are inconclusive (Ran). [Welear from here that the dispute regarding partial declarations that ‘are inconelusive isnot limited tothe subject of vows, but pertains to any ‘area of Torah law where a matter must be explcated. The essonew ofthe a 7, HIP TBE — Scripture states: Aman... who shall dissociate himself by vow- ing a neder as a nazir to abstain for [the sake of] Hashem"! We learned above that this is the source ofthe law that partial declarations of nezirus are effective. Since Seripture mentions partial declarations together with full declarations, nvm wpa ivy arm — it compares partial declarations of nezirus to xban3 arn nT — $0 oo, partial declarations of nezirus are effective only with a clear utterance." ‘The Gemara wonders why Abaye and Rava needed to debate this issue vabpnag 133) ATT wa77 xpNES xo — Shall we say that [Abaye and Raval disagree in the very dispute of R’ Yehudah and the Rabbis? 1yn7 ~ For we leamed in the Mishnah:* iby tou — THEESSENCEO AGaTis: yy >99 nom NO — “YOU ARE HEREBY PERMITTED TO ANY MAN.” BUR TT} "3 = W YEHUDAH saYS that the get must include the following statement: ym 9 NENT PT] — “AND THIS document 15 WHAT SHALL BE-TO YOU FROM ME P3YR TBR — A DOCUMENT OF ‘CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM EXPULSION, 3B D3} — AND A BILL OF RELEASE, 73x) PIRW — AND A LETTER OF ABANDONMENT.” The Tanna Kamma maintains that partial declarations that are inconclusive are valid, whereas R? Yehudah maintains that they are not valid. 1379 7BRT "BK — It would seem that Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the Rabbis (the Tanna Kamma), x37) T1379 Tost — and Rava stated his opinion in accordance with R’ Yehuda," — ‘The Gemara responds: ‘ax 7p wx — Abaye can tell you: rym Ymax aT HDS = I stated my opinion even in accordance with R’ Yehudah! mimata ov WR TMT °37 wKR xb YP TW — So far R’ ‘Yebudah did not say that we require partial declarations that are conclusive, vi 132 xx — except in the case of a get, inin3 [937 — where we require “severance,” xpi) — and this is not present when the language of the get is incon- clusive rb muy vp xeebya Sax — But in general, ic regarding other contexts, did you hear [R’ Yehudah] say that we require partial declarations that are conclusive? No! Therefore, I can maintain that even according to R’ Yehudah an inconclusive partial declaration is effective, except in the case ofa get. ‘The Gemara continues: ‘yo x97) — And Rava can say: pr} Hex MET AG - T stated my opinion even according to the Rabbis! x5 1x3 72 inivata avn ypva xb7 PT "xp — So far the Rabbis did not say that we do not require partial declarations that are conclusive, vi 733 xp — except in the case of a get, where even if the language of the get does not clarify that it is the husbond’s document, this is obviously the intent, NOTES failed to specify, the neder is ineffective because itis inconclusive [i.e he might have meant I shall not converse with you”). See further, Shalmei Nedarim, [For analysis of whether “That which I eat of yours itself is effective, according to the conclusion that we require conclusive yados, see Rash with Korban Nesanel; Beur HaGra, Yorek Deak 206:546; Keren Orah to 2) 10, Numbers 62. 11. A Baraisn cited on 3a derived from the redundancy of via) "3, a5 @ nazir fo abstain, that patil declarations of nezirus ae effective just ike full declarations. It then derived by means ofa hekeish thatthe same applis to all nedarim. Note that the cited verse contains references to both fll declarations and partial declarations. It begins: xbg2 "9... 2x “my vp yh, man... who shall dissociate himself by vowing a neder as «anazr {ie full eearation|; and continues:19 vin, to abstain for the sake of] Hashem (ie. by making a partial declaration] (see Ran here and -Mefaresh on 3a) 12. The Mishnah in Nazir (925) its the opinion of R’ Tarfon that ifone ‘sees man coming towards him and sas, “I am hereby a nazirif this man ‘sanazr,” the vow is ineffective even if that man is ultimately dentiied as anazir. The Gemara (id, 348) explains that R’ Tarfon bass this on the verso 719 727195 xOEND... WX, which he expounds ae meaning, A ‘man ... who shall utter clearly, vowing a neder as a nazr. [We have ‘generally translated xbp!">astwho shell dissociate himself in accordance ‘with Rashi ad loc. However, Targum Onkelos renders it who shall utter clearly. R? Tarfon understands uter leary as teaching that the wow of nezirus does not take effect unless itis immediately clear thatthe person has uttered a vow. If something needs to be clarified ~ e.g, the man approaching the vower must be identified in order for us to determine \whother the uttorane is indeed aneder ~ iis ineffective (Ran). 13. Le. theyad must be conclusive. The hekeish is ot needed to teach that ‘the previously described aw ofaclear utterance” extends yadoe; itab- ‘viously extends to them, since there sno bass fr thinking that yds are ‘more effective than full declarations! Rather, the hekeish teaches that just ‘as thee is a law of “clear utterance” that pertain to ordinary declara- tions of neirus, so too, there isa special law of “clear utterance” per- taining uniquely to yados. Thi law requires that the yadae be conchsive ‘ow, the Gemara's explanation is based onthe opinion of’ Teron Other Tannaim (Misha Nazir ibid.) dispute Tarfon and rule that = ‘vow af nezrusis ald evenifit effectiveness isnot known witherain’y a the time ofthe declaration. (Thus, fone says, “Tam hereby anazir that man sana," andthe unidentified man tums out oe a nozir tbe ‘vow ineffective | These Tannaim dont expound utter clearly asexcluding ‘ow whose outeame is inconchusive ~ and thus, theres no basis for = hekeish comparing yodos to ordinary declarations inthis regard. Rather, cording to these Tanna, the phrase utter clearly is understood ax ‘referring direct to yado and as teaching thet aya i ineffective unless itisconelusve. Our Gemara means that evn aecording oR’ Tarfon, wo expounds the phrase utter clearly as referring to ordinary declaration of retiras, the hekeish provides a source forthe requirement that yados be conclusive Ra ef. Rosh). or discusion of why Abaye rejects this exposition and considers inconclusive yadsefetive, se Prashas Nedarim; se lo note 6 14. Gitin iid 15, Seo note’ 16, Although Rava bases his position onthe Scriptural requirement of = “lear utterance,” and this requirement is pei to the context cf radar, he would not expound Serpture as distinguishing batwee= Conelusive and inconeusive yados unless he followed the opiion of ‘Yehudah, who recognizes such a distinction in general. According othe Rabbis who do not recognize thi ditncton all forms of yada ae in the category ofa “clear ulterace” (Keren Orah; ste end of note 6) (See futher in Keren Orh for discussion of why Rava neds the expositions all ithe follows thevew oF’ Yehudah who generally void inconclusive declarations} 11 Thisisan allusion to Deuteronomy 24, which tates that when amen wishes to divorce is wile he shall write hera document of severance 323) regret 18. (The Gemara understands the term sceranee a teaching thatthe bil of aivoree must provide absolut dislution ofall connection between the Inusand and wie (see Gin 21b, where the Gemara discusses several applications ofthis law). Since the women is known conclusively to hve boon the man's wife unt tis time, “severance” requires & conclusive declaration of voce (Rosh)KOL KINUYEL ryan mwx nx wIgD ET TH — since a man does not divorce his fellows wife!" wn) nyny v3 xpbys 53x — But in general, i.e. regarding other contexts, did you hear (the Rabbis} say that inconclusive partial declarations are valid? No! I therefore maintain that even according to the Rabbis inconclusive partial declarations are ineffective, except in the case ofa get.” ‘The Gemara presents a challenge to Abaye’s opinion that all ‘Tannaim accept the validity of inconclusive partial declarations: ‘gona — They challenged Abaye on the basis of the following Baraisa: *2y xm 71a — If one says regarding acertain object, “TT ISHEREBY TO ME," (Py) 770 — or “THIS IS HEREBY (TO MEI,” “WOX — HEIS FORBIDDEN to derive henefit fom the object, »2B2 1972? 7 NITY — BECAUSE (HIS STATEMENT] IS A PARTIAL DECLA- RATION OF aneder with reference to AN OFFERING.”! "YaST U8 +2y — Thisimplies: tis beeause [the vowerl said “tome,” x11 10x — that he is forbidden on the basis of his partial delara- tion. soy tex x5 53x — However, if he did not say “to me,” ‘but merely said, “It is hereby,” or “This is hereby,” xb — he ‘would not be forbidden to derive benefit from the object, presum- ably, because his partial declaration would be considered inconclu- sive!" waa xBawn — ‘This is a refutation of Abaye!” — ? — [Abaye's position is defended: wax 7? Tax — Abaye cam tell you that this is what the Baraisa means: W047 xin Yoy "xT NBYD ~ Its because [the vower] jd “to me” that he is forbidden on the basis of his partial (CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM at declaration, because ‘to me" renders his statement a partial declaration of a neder. xin +33 vax bax — However, if he merely said, “It is hereby,” Y2y Tox x5) — and did not say “to me,” one could argue that TRI xMA 77D PENT xT IT ‘exe — “Itis hereby ownerless,” or “It is hereby designated for charity,” is what he is saying. Thus, his statement would not ‘be considered a partial declaration of a neder at all” ‘The Gemara counters: vane 19729 7 NiTW “29H 7) — But [the Baraisa] teaches that the vower is forbidden BECAUSE [HIS STATEMENT! IS A PARTIAL DECLARATION OF a neder with reference to AN OFFERING. Since cven the statement “It is hereby” alludes to an offering, this itself ‘would be considered a partial declaration.” Obviously, then, the reason the vower must add “to me” is to make his partial declar- ation conelusive, in contradiction to Abaye's view." — ‘The Gemara therefore offers another defense of Ahaye's position: ‘xprx xpx — Rather, say that the Baraisa means the following soy Tox xepD — It is because [the vower] said “tome” x17 ‘pW 1M! Wx — that only he is forbidden to derive benefit from the object he mentioned, but his fellow and all others are permitted to derive benefit from it. xm "7 Thx 538 — However, if he merely said, “It is hereby," PoYOS TY — both of them, and all others,” would be forbidken to derive benefit from it, "yaya Wapn xv »97 NITY — because perhay “It is consecrated to the Temple” is what he is saying." NOTES 1. Thus, even though the get doesnot state explicitly “And this is what shall be to you rom me ete,” it is understood that this isthe husband's bill of dvoree to his own wife (Ran; se following note). 2. Only inthe case of a et doos the language not have tobe conclusive, for sine the husband gives tohis own wifeit is obvious that this ishisbill of divorce to her despite any deficiency in its language (Ran). (Ran cites Rashbe, who finds the Gemara's language problematic. The Gemara states thatthe Rabbis eonsder “inconclusive” yados effective in the case ‘of age, when in fact the reason for their rulings that they regard these -yodos as conclusive — because a man doesnot divorce his fellow's wife! However, Ran explains that the Gemara uss this expression because the language of the get itself is inoolusive, and it is only from the circumstances of the husband's giving it to his wife that the matter is [known conclusively. Thus, iis eorrect to say that in this case the Rabbis ‘accept “inconclusive” yedas. See further, Shalmet Nedarim.} ‘Since the Gemara siates thatthe Rabbis rely upon the fact that a man. doesnot divoree his fellow’s wil, it implies thatthe point of contention botween R’ Yehudah and the Rabbis is whether a get must contain the words “from me.” However, the Gemara in Gittn (85b) states that their ‘point ofeontention is whether the get must state “and this is what shall, ‘bea document ofexpulsion ote." R’ Yehudah holds that in absence of this clause the language is inconclusive because it leaves room for the thought thet the husband means to divoree her with an oral declaration, and the docament is to be used merely as proof of her divorce (see 5b note 5). The Rabbis, however, hold that the clause “You are hereby permitted to any man” suffices [for since the husband wrote the ‘document and gave it to her tis obvious from the circumstances that he means to effect her divorce through the document (see Rashi ad lo.) ‘This is apparently a different interpretation of the dispute! Ran explains that R’ Yehudah and the Rabbis are actually in disagreement concerning both points ~ (a) whether the language ofthe [get mst speify hat it isthe hushand’s illo divorce ta hi om wife: (>) ‘whether it must specify thatthe divoree shall be effected through the document. Te two Gemaras complement eachother, with our Gemara ‘explaining the basis of the dispute regarding the first point, and the ‘other Gomara explaining it regarding the latter point, See Ran for a ‘discussion of whom the halachah follows regarding each point. 43.Le. the statement “It [or ‘This']is hereby tomo” implies “Itishereby like an offering to me,” and is therefore a ad for a neder (Rosh; soe osafos) 4. Even the statement “It is hereby,” or “Thisishereby,” would beayad for aneder (since it would imply that the object should be forbidden}! Its deficiency would merely be that itis an inconclusive yd (Ran; see Keren (rah . [The advantage of adding “to mes merely that this precludes the possibility of any alternative interpretation, and thus renders the ‘yd conclusive. Yet the Tanne insists on this addition!) 65, [Wesee from the Baraisa that there isa Tanna who dovs not recognize the validity ofayad that is inconclusive, Thisrefutes Abeye's contention that all Tannaim consider inconclusive yadoe effective except in the case ofaget] 6 [Since itis quite reasonable ta interpret “Itishereby’'asa declaration of ownerlessnes (3p9n) or charity, the statement "It is hereby" is not considered indicative of a prohibitive neder, ie, it s not even an {nconelusiveyod! Only when the vower adds “tome” does his statement amount to a partial declaration of a neder prohibiting something to himself an). (Thus, the Baraisa does not deal with insmnelusiveyados atall) 17. The Barnisa doesnot teach simply that “Thisis herebs tome” isayad {or a neder, but teaches that itis ayad fora neder with reference to an ‘offering. Now, people who consecrated offerings commonly said, “This is hereby an offering.” Thus, even the partial delaration "This is hereby” Itends to the interpretation that the missing words are “Ylike) an offering.” This declaration itself thorofore qualifiee as yad for aneder svith reference to an offering (Ran). 8.Le, the delaration “Thisis hereby" is ayad for aneder referring toan offering, but is nevertheless nota conclusive ya, since it does allow for alternative interpretations. “This is hereby to me,” however, is a conclusive yad for a prohibitive neder with reference to an offering. Since the Baraisa requires the vower to state a conclusive yad, it contradicts Abaye's contention that all Tannaim acoopt the validity of ‘inconclusive yados (see Ran). 8, Tosajos. 10. The Mishnah teaches below (18) that roa er} a9e,Indetermi ‘nate nedarin fare treated] stringently. This means that when someone ‘made a complete declaration that definitely qualifies esa valid neder, ‘but there is uncertainty as to is procise intent, we ‘ollow the most stringent interpretation of his words — unless ‘he tells us that he intended for the more lenient. meaning (ee there) In our ease, since inconclusive yados are effective (according to Absye’s view), “It Is hereby’ is definitely considered a valid neder. However, it is unclear whether the vower means that the objet should be forbidden tom lke tn offering, or that it should actually be consecrated to the Temple, We therefore aply the stringent interpretation and assume that he meant aKOL KINUYEL ‘Another challenge to Abaye’s opinion is presented ‘ping — They challenged Abaye on the hasis of the following Baraisa: npn 977 — If one says regarding an animal, Hs ONEISHEREBY designated as ACHATAS," BPW 7TT — oF “THIS (ONE IS HEREBY designated as AN ASHAM,” 39%9 XITW 1D bY BNE yx} NXpN — EVEN THOUGH HE WAS OBLIGATED to bring A CHATAS OR ASHAM offering, BI59 BY XD — HE HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING!" spxtpa 1 99g — However, ifhe said, “THIS ONE IS ‘HEREBY designated a6 MY CHATAS;" "apy 1710 — oF “THIS ONE IS HEREBY designated as MY ASHAM,” amp W737 3H THT BX. — then IF HE WAS OBLIGATED to bring the offering HIS WORDS STAND and the snimal is so designated. Now, when a man is obligated to bring a chafas, the statement “This is hereby designated as a chatas” is atthe very lasta partial declaration of “This is hereby designated as my chatas!” Its deficiency is merely that it is inconclusive. Yet the Baraisa teaches that this statement is ineffective. ax7xn3h — Thisisarrefutation of ‘Abayel!! —? — ‘The Gemara responds: vax 2 79 — Abaye will tell you: _»79 x9 ~ Whose opinion is reflected in this Baraisa? _xemmmmy3) ~ Ttis the opinion of RY Yehudah, Just as R’ Yehudah requires a conclusive declaration in the case of a get, s0 too does he require a conclusive declaration in the case of a neder. ‘The Gemara counters: ‘exT xm "38 Aq) — But Abaye is the one who said above: mm 139 rns Yay Mas — “T stated my opinion that an CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM 6a” inconclusive partial declaration is effective even according to R’ Yehudah, for R’ Yehudah requires @ conclusive declaration only in the case of a get!” —? — ‘The Gemara answers: m3 171 — [Abaye] retracted that postion and concedes that R’ Yehudah always requires a conclusive declaration. Abaye's opinion that an inconclusive partial declaration is effective follows the view ofthe Rabbis who dispute R’ Yehudah in the case of get. According to Abaye, the Rabbis recognize the validity of inconclusive partial declarations in all contexts. ‘The Gemara asks: rrpim 1979 H¥ XG "5 xb — Then shall we also say that Rava stated his opinion thet inconclusive partial declarations are inefective only in accordance with the opinion of R’ Yehu- dah ‘The Gemara responds: 29717 wy — No! Rava will tell you: 979 DK HIT I. — I stated my opinion even according to the Rabbis. 1x37 pws arn ava x57 p39 Yap xb — So far the Rabbis did not say that we do not require partial declarations that are ‘conclusive, 3133 xox — except in the case of a ge, where ‘even if the language of the get does not clarify that itis the ‘husband's document, this is obviously the intent, D7 PX7 ywan nvx mx woz — since a man does not divorce his fellows wife, _nimata arn ya xyby3 59x — But in general, ice. regarding other contexts, the Rabbis concede that we require partial declarations that are conclusive." NOTES toconscrte it, thus renderings benefit forbidden a all people Ran). iy contrast, when the wwer states ti hereby tome,” be leary intends to invoke a probibitvenederwnde which ony hei forbidden to deriv bene from the abject (oh). [According to the opinion that inconclusive yados are ineffective, we cannot apply the principle "Indeterminate ndarim are treated sin: gently,” since an inconclusive yad is not enough of a declaration to, qualify as.a neder at all (Machaneh Ephraim, Hil. Nedarim §7, Shalmei Nadarim toa 79) 11 Since he didnot specify that the animal skal be designated as “my ‘hss, or 0 nasa,” bean be snderond a intending to designate the animal asa vluntryeiflering of achataso sham And {insofar a neither of thee olflerings maybe brought valuta since they come only to effect atonement for speci transgressions ~ this Aesgnation is meanings (oe Ran: se also Tosafos and sh). 12, Because it an be construed a designation of voluntary chatas ‘sce Ram) 13, For Abaye ai that ll Tanna agree that an inconclusive sedis sffctive exept inthe as of get See Ta note 8 fo further dicussion oth Bras. 14 Actually, Abaye himself never stated that his opinion accord with R? ‘Yehudah, Rather, the Gomara postulated above that this sso. Thus, the Gemara now means that we must retract our previous postion regarding Abaye'sviow (soo Shitoh Mekubetzes above) 15, Le, since we retracted the position that Abaye's opinion holds true according to all Tannaim, perhaps we should also retrad the postion that Rava's opinion holds true according to all Tanna. Rather, we should understand Rava as flloeng the opinion of? Yebudah, and as saying that f’ Yehudab's disqualification of inconclusive declarations in the ease ofa get extends to al other contexts. Thus, we wil be left with ‘ur original asterton that Abaye follows the Rabbis whereas Rava follows R’ Yehudsh (Ran; seo Parashes Nedarim) 16.Seo notes Land 2. In conclusion, then, the dispute between Abaye and Rava centers on the opinion of the Rabbis. Abaye maintains that the Rabbis’ ruling regarding age — that an inconclusive partial declaration is valid — extends to all other contexts as wel. Rava maintains that the Rabbis’ ruling pertains specifically to the case of ge, where the circumstances compensate forthe lack of elarty in th language, but in ‘general the Rabbis require that partial declarations be conclusive. All ‘gree that R’ Yehudah always requires partial declarations that are conclusive, as illustrated by the Boraisa regarding “This one is esignated as achatas” (se Tosafos x31 72 YOKT) { j i j6b! KOL KINUYEL A related inquiry is cited: x91 109 ~ Rav Pappa inquired: xb 1x pornp5 7 v2 — Is there validity to a partial declaration for kiddushin, or not?” ‘The Gemara clarifies the inquiry yoy 1317 — What is the case to which the inquiry pertains? max) nb tax7 xprbnx — If you say it is the case where one says “You are hereby betrothed 2 mis) ADVAN oN) — and he says to her fellow, “And you, too,” I will ask: xp — It is obvious that the second one's betrothal is effective! yeyy permp unc — This is case of kiddushin itself, io. itis a fll declaration, nota partial one!® myx nd vox TH bx — Rather, the inquiry pertains to.a-case where one says to a woman, * neTipa nx 9 — “You are hereby betrothed tome,” nxynnyand m7 Tex) — and he says to her fellow, “And you!" The following is the CHAPTER ON! NEDARIM. reasoning of the inquiry: ya"1pX% — Do we say that my nx) nyand nb Tex — “And you, too,” is what he is saying to her fellow, n-yany pwrnp ma YoEM — and on the basis of his partial declaration kiddushin takes effect in her fllow?®! 1x xpbt — Or perhaps, we say that mmyany nd ws rx a) — “And you, consider the possibilty of marriage to me," is what heis saying toherfellow, -rnvsna purrp np yop xy — and thus, kiddushin does not take effect in her fellow." — ? — ‘The Gemara wonders whether Rav Pappa was actually n doubt about this matter: 2p 299 mb wyam vm — Did Rav Pappa truly inquire about the effectiveness ofa partial declaration for kiddushin? ~wxrya x7) vax xpp 31 019 ~ Why, since Rav Pappa said to Abaye: 7 brn pam niata paw orp bane Wap — “Does Shmuel actually hhold that partial declarations of kiddushin that are ineanclu- NOTES 1 Under Torah law, marriage takes effect in two stages — pup, ‘kiddush (also called pore, erusin), and pw, nisuin, Kiddushin is effected when a man gives a woman an abject (ea ring) worth at least ‘a perutah and tells her, "You are hereby betrothed to me.” Alterna: tively, he may write this declaration ina document and hand ittoher, or hhe may cohabit with her for the sake of hiddushin. After the act of 1hiddushin is done, sho is logally his wife and is forbidden to all other men, but doesnot yet live with her husband, The second and final stage of marriage takes place when the husband brings the wife into his domain, inthe ceremony known as chuppah. Nowadays, both acts are ddone together, but in earlier times as much as a year would elapse between the two events. [We will occasionally use the term “betrothal” for kiddushin, for lack of a better English equivalent. However, kid- ddushin is actully a genuine marriage, not a mere betrothal. Note that the term kiddushin refers to both the state of marriage andthe act that effects it] Rav Pappa inquires whether hiddushin can be effected on the bass of ayad, ie. by an act that is not accompanied bythe ful declaration, “You are hereby betrothed to me," but by a partil declaration. The inquiry pertains even to a yad that is conclusive. Although there is no direct Scriptural source for considering yados effective in the context of ‘hiddushin (and above, 3a, we required Seriptural sourees for yados ‘regarding both nedarim and nezirus], perhaps kiddushin is analogous to nedarim (since kiddushin is effected with a declaration), Thus, we may derive through the method of mak matsinu (i.e. analogy; see 4b note 10) that just as aneder can beeffected through a partial declaration, 0 too, kiddushin ean be effected through a partial delaration. On the ather hand, perhaps yados are effective only in the case of nedarim, which are a more stringent context than kiddushin, insofar as a neder takes effect on the bass ofan oral declaration alone, whereas kiddushin additionally requires an aet — either giving the woman an object of value, or handing her a document, or cohabiting with her. If we aocept the later argument and assume that kiddushin is not anelogous to nedarim, then even a conclusive yad willbe ineffective for hiddushin, since we will have no source for its validity (Ran, Rashbo; fr further tlarification, see Aone: Miluim 27:1 avs ye) 7, and Chazon Teh, Boon HaBzer 38:7). [Regarding Ran’s explanation that wo eould derive the validity of _yuios through mah matzinu, see Ran to 4b w'rarma ren (cited there in note 10) and Parashas Nedarim here; see also Shitak Mokubetzes “rors Por an alternative explanation of the source forthe validity of _yadas inthe context ofkiddushin, see Tosafes an Rosh] 2. And he gives them two objects of value (eg. two peruiah cons) for the sake of effecting hiddushin (see note 4 for elaboration). 53. Since “And you, too” obviously means “And you, to, are hereby betrothed to me,” it is @ full declaration of hiddushin, despite its variance from the common formula. It is only when the declaration leaves open the possibilty of being interpreted as something other than ‘kiddushin that it is considered “partial” (Ran; see note 7. 4, The man must also give two perufahs, one for each betrothal However, we cannot say that he handed each woman one of the ‘perutahs, because ithe gave a perutah to the second woman herself it ‘would be absolutely lear that he means to betroth her — even though hhe merely told her “And you.” His statement would then not be considered a “partial” declaration of kiddushin, but a fll declaration, tnd would render her his wife even ifyaos ae ineffective! Perforce, we are dealing with acase in which he gives the first woman twoperuiahs — ‘one for herself and the other for her fellow — and makes a full declar ation tothe first woman and a partial declaration tothe second. Ifthe second woman indicates her consent to becoming marred to him, her ‘hiddushin ean take effet ~ provided there is validity to ayad. The irs woman [who aeepts both coins silently] i considered to be acting as ber agent forthe act of receiving the perwtah eventhough she herself is als» becoming this man’s wife (Ran; see Toscfos, Kiddushin 82a Yrax: =~ (Ran implies that the second woman does not need to explicitly appoint the first as her agent, but must merely indicate her consent an the first may automatically become her agent. For discussion of thie point, ev Beis Shmuel 36:1 and Aunei Miluim 38:2. Cf. Tosafas vx == vxobs Roch, Kiddushin 2:26; Beur HaGra, Yorek Deah 36:12. For = alternative explanation ofthe Gemara’s case, see Rambar, Hil. Isiux 42 and Shulehon Aruch, Buen HaBeer 36.) 5. (Le, kiddushin can be effected through a yod, and therefore, bis partial declaration is effective.) 6. The translation follows Rambar, Hil, hus 4:2. CE. Mefaresh. 1. Le. kiddushin eannot be effected through a yad, and therefore he partial declaration is ineffective. (IF his statement could nat be inter preted as anything other than kiddushin, then it would be considered = full declaration, and the marriage would take effect even if yados are ineffective] Since itis possible to interpret the statement as meaning “And you, consider the possibility of marrage,” itis in the eatogors fe ‘yad, Admittedly, this is conclusive yd, since it is much more like that he meant “And you, too, are herdby betrothed to me.” However, = Jhiddushin eannot be effected through a yad, then even a conclusive saz is ineffective! Therefore, we wil rue that “And you” isnot adeclarston of kiddushin, and we wil (legally) define it as mesning “And you consider the possibility of marriage” (Ran, Rosh, Rashba). It's clear from Ran’s (and Rosh’s) explanation here that the differ. ‘ence between a “partial declaration” ofiddushin und a fll decaratio= isnot in its length, but in its larity. Whenever the statement leaves se ‘doubt as to its meaning, itis considered full declaration of hiddusto= ‘even ifs shorter than the common formula. Only when the statem=ne leaves some room for an alternative interpretation is it considered = “partial declaration.” Within this eontext, we distinguish betes partial declarations that are conclusive and thot that are noone ‘A “conclusive” yod is one that tends strongly to one interpretation ‘making the alternative unlikely. An “inconclusive” yad sone that tena ‘only slightly to one interpretation, or allows equally for both interpres= In this respect, partial declarations of hiddushin differ from pars declarations of nedarim. In regard to nedarim, even a statement tae leaves no doubt as to the person’s intent to vow is considered a ya, ane ‘only an explicit vow is considered a full declaration ofa neder. Ths ‘evident from the Gemara above, which classifies “Iam vowed from roe in that which T eat of yours” as a yod (albeit « conclusive one), ewum though this statement ean only be interpreted asa neder. (Seo Tosa xan cat and Ran to 2a oven 2-2] ‘The ron for this distineton is as follows: Regarding nedarim ane ‘oaths, the Torah specifies (Leviticus 5:4): engi nUSY, fo express sate ‘the lps, meaning that a neder or oath can be effected solely throug = ‘oral declaration. Even if a person decides in his heart that he wil be6b? KOL KINUYEL = CHAPTER ONE sive are valid partial declarations,” an) mi xyya0 S532 perry? "2 wry xpp ~ this implies that Rav Pappa holds that there is validity toa partial declaration for hiddushin.® —? ‘The Gemara responds: sob ang buena mi x7/a07 kD ha KT — I's concerning ‘contradiction within the opinion of Shmuel that [Rav Pappa] spoke to Abaye."* Letting the previous inquiry stand, the Gemara turns to a related inquiry by Rav Pappa: gp 32 173 — Rav Pappa inquired: nyo 7) wy — Is there validity toapartial declaration forpe'ah, mys 72 Px 1% — oF is there no validity to a partial declaration for pe’ah ? ‘The Gemara clarifies the inquiry: NEDARIM voy 121 — What is the ease to which the inquiry pertains? ‘inxey sept — If you say it is the caso where one said, xp vip) xxix p37 — “This patch! shall be pe’ah, P73) ye) — and this one too," Iwill ask: xm xn bom mapa HoT — ‘That is a genuine declaration of pe'ah, not a partial declara- tion! sob xan xp °3 ~ Rather, where does [Rav Pappa] inquire? ‘yxy p23 — It is regarding a ease where one said, “This patch shall bepe'ah, pom) — and this one,” xy vei vos — but he did not say “too.” 1x9 — What is the lew? ‘The Gemara interjects a comment: nyo gin nia ny ox 137 S30 — This implies that if one said, “This entire field shall be pe'ah,” myo yy — it is ‘pe'ah ints entirety! — ? — NOTES bound by aneder or oath, itis not binding unless heexprese the neder a oath with his ips (Shevuos 26). Thus, «declaration expresing the Deron’ intent to be bound hy a neder i nota neder ~ even though it Teaves no doubt as to his intent! Such a delaration i effetive only under the law of yados Le- when it can be considered a partial declaration ofa nader i binds him, because we derived fom Scripture that patil declarations of nedarim are elective like fll declarations. ‘Kiddushin, on the other hand, is effected primarily through an act, such a giving the woman aperuch forthe sake of betrothal The pur pote ofthe accompanying declaration ita clarify the intent behind the fact. Indeed, i a man and woman were discussing marziage and he gave her a peruah itis deemed to have been given for hidushin even ihe didnot make any declaration, since the inten is obvious (oe Kiddushin Gai! Therefore, any statement that eaves no doubt a ote meaning is considered all declaration ofidaushin. Tis only when the statement issomewhat ambiguous that itis considered a part! dedaration. Our Gemara does not compare kiddushin to nedarim in regard to defining “partial declarations.” It compares them only inthe sense that partial delartions are possible in both contexts, and therefore, the Gemarainguies whether a yd is effective fr hddushin a iti for nadarim, Assuming that ii effective, however, the determination of ‘hut is considered yad willbe based onthe laws of kiddushin, which te diferent than tho avs of nedarim (hidusheiR’ Shlomo fein} 81; se there for further clarification; se alo "Avraham Min Hatfor and Keren Orah; ef, Tosofs nora er se further, Birkos Shmuel, Kiddushin 0 8 Rav Papp sald this in Tractte Kiddushin (6). Tho, the Gemara 71x ~ Or perhaps, we say that wpmx *> — when was the context of (pe'ah | compared to that of offerings? wpmncy xin nxn 939 ~ It is in regard to the commandment not to delay that it was compared, but not regarding other matters — ? — ‘The Gemara seeks a clarification: \vpmnx xprm — And where is the context of [pe'ah ] compared to that of a vow regarding offerings? 1207 — It is as taught in a Baraisa:** NOTES patch should be appended to the first one as pe'ah to complete the required measure, The latter declaration would thus be effective even if ‘woassume tha there iso validity to partial declaration for pe'ah. Le. since the meaning ofthe delaration would be unquestionable, it would ‘he considered full delaration of pe'ah, rather than a partial declara- tion (see note 7] Perforce, Rav Pappa refers toa case where the first patch contains the required measure. [Yet itis clear from his inquiry ‘that if yadoe are effective for pe’ah, then the second patch will in fact ‘become pe'ah, Thus, we see that even after a person has fulfilled the ‘oquirement of pe'th he may continue to append this designation to ‘ditional portions of his field, presumably up to its entirety] (Ran, as ‘explained by Keren Orah mnt ee also Chasam Sofer; ef. Tosa, Rosh). [For further discussion of Ran’s view, see Mishneh LaMelech, Hi. Matnos Aniyim 1:15, Shalmei Nedarim, Mishnas R’ Akaron, Zeraim $3, and Kekillos Yoakou $6.1 16, Leviticus 28:2, The verse reads: 37473 719 nee raT-NS, which, understood simply, means: you shall not destroy the edge of your field when you harvest. However, the verse could have stated 71939 799, the ‘edge within your field, which would clearly indicate that only a portion ofthe field may be designated as “the edge.” Since it states 379 M9, which can be understood as the edge that is your fel, it alludes that tven the entre field may be declared pe'ah' (Ran, Mefaresk; see also Tosafos). (Tosafos end Rosh, citing Yerushalmi, note that one cannot literally ‘make hsentre field pea, forthe verse implies tat the pe’ah obligato takes effect only when one begins to harvest it! Rather the point star after commencing his harvest by reaping even a single stalk, one me declare the remainder of his field pe'ah.) 7. The hebeih is deserbed below. fone makes a partial declaration ofa neder to bring an offering hes obligated to bring it Geo Gemara above, 6). 19, As weshall se shorty, the verse containing the hekeish linking p's to vows of offerings deals with the commandment not to delay f= ‘ment ofthe vow. Perhaps the subjects are linked only in regard to tae commandment. Although there i a prinepl that “There is no pars hekeish," i.e @hekeih links its subjects in all respocts, perhaps Se ‘ekeish san excopion to the general rule, since pe ah snot maton ‘explicitly inthe hekeish but merely alluded to (as we shal ee) Rox: = Fook here and Tesafos to Ta > xan 7), 20, The Barsea focuses on the verse Deuteronomy 25:22:73 evo 33D) aw TD MBPT TTD Nhe ED KD TTI, Whee towaneder to Hashem, your Gd, dona beaten paying i for Hoxton your God, will demand ito ou, nd there will be asin in you The base nnader to which th verse refereiea vow toring anfferng however. Se Barais expounds on each phrase ofthis ere. This Baris iscted =a ‘entirety in Tractate Rosh Hashanah, Sb. Our Gemara cites only Se Segment that dels with peahKOL KINUYEL ‘oyun, — When Seripture states OFYoU,! ragpr nn vp) my — ‘THIS 8 an allusion to LEKET, SHICH'CHAH AND PB‘AH.” Since the verse alludes to pe'ah in a verse dealing primarily with vows of offerings, it establishes a hekeish between these subjects — but possibly, thisis nota full Ackeish as explained above. Itis therefore appropriate to inquire whether there is effectiveness to partial declaration for pe'ah, as there is for a neder to bring an offering Leaving the inquiry unresolved, the Gemara cites another inquiry by Rav Pappa: piv) 111 — Is there effectiveness to a partial declaration for charity, n21¥9 7 px 1x — oF is there no effectiveness to a partial declaration for charity?® ‘The inquiry is clarified: v97 137 — What is the ease to which the inquiry pertains? ‘oT xprPx — If you say itis the case where one said, 79 rngys? xin ~ “Let this zuz be designated for charity, 3777) ~ and this one, too,” Iwillask: xm mpyy ngTy x13 — That is ‘charity itself, ic. the later statement is full declaration, not a partial one! “YHx7 19 xx — Rather, the inguiry pertains to the case where one said, “Let this zuz be designated for charity, pry — andthis one,” _¥23 19% x2) ~ but he did not say “too. ow — Rav Pappa inguires: What is the meaning of “and this one”? wygTz]¥ 72 P19 ~ Is the person] saying, “This one, too, shall be designated for charity”? » = Or perhaps, what does he mean by “and this one”? ‘voxp xebua xmppiy — He means to say that it shall be CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM Ta’ designated for general expenses, mypxxb"] xin X12) — and, he did not finish his statement!*! — ? Having explained why “and this one” is considered merely a ‘partial declaration, the Gemara elaborates the underlying basi of the inquiry" 1TBx Mm — Do we say that _nusaqph wen 19 ~ since the context of [charity] is compared in Scripture to the context of offerings — "7793, 3937 ~ for it is written: with your mouth, andit wastaught ina Baraisa that ng] — THISIS@ reference to pledges for CHARITY" — therefore: w) mUBIR MD = dust as in the context of offerings there is validity to a partial declaration, 7:3 v2 np1y mx — s0 too, in the context of charity there is validity to a partial declaration? — xp 1 = Or perhaps, wpmncy xin nxsn 939 — it is only regarding the commandment not to delay that the context of [eharity] is compared to that of offerings, but itis not compared regarding the matter of partial declarations." — 2 — Yet another inquiry by Rav Pappa: ‘apa 7: v2 — Is there effectiveness toa partial declaration for hhefker, pb 72 PX NOdT 1K — oF is there perhaps no effectiveness to @ partial declaration for hefher ‘The Gemara wonders why this was even mentioned: ngty wa — [Heffer]is the same as charit "The Gemara responds: ‘vox at? xyBn Bx — [Rav Pappal stated his inquiry in the style of “If you will conclude and say,” as follows: xn BN. NOTES 1 Deuteronomy 23:22; se precoding note. 2, The Torah commands that one leave the following portions of one's crop for the poor: oz, let leanings) — earsof gain that fll from the reaper (Leviticus 19:9, 23:22), now, shich'chah (forgotten produce) — sheaves inadvertently left in the field, as well as standing produce averlooked by the reaper (Deuteronomy 24:19); ms, pe'ah (edge) — portion ofthe standing crop (Leviticus ibid). The Baraisa expounds the word 793%, of you, in Deuteronomy 23:22 (which deals primarily with offerings] as teaching that the prohibition not to delay pertains even to those entitlements of the por. This is because the word 73, with you, is used elsewhere with respect to the poor, asi is stated (Exodus 2:24): “p¥ NTA, the pauper who is with you (Rash; Rashi to Rosh Hashanch 9b; see Maharatz Chayes) (Thus, ifthe owner did not leave these por- tions for the poor, but took them himself, he is required to return them to the poor without delay (see Tosafos etal. to Rosh Hashanah ibid)) 83. Ths inquiry doesnot follow the previous one in sequence, fortis not ‘dependent on any particular resolution to the previous inquiry. Rather, it parallels the previous one, as both turn on the same point ~ whether ‘ahekeish based on an allusion isa eomplete hekeish. Perforce, the basic ‘question was brought up on several occasions and applied to different contexts, and the Gemara lists the various applications here (Ran [on 6b] asexplained by Chasam Sofer; however, se the alternative explanation cited by Ran in the name of his teachers). 4 Le he meant to ay, "Let this zu be designated for chat, and this other one for my own expenses,” but he did not finish the sentence (GMefaresh). Although itis more reasonable to interpret ‘and this one” ‘asmeaning that the second zuc shal alsobe designated fr charity — and this therefore a conclusive yad for a charitable designation ~ perhaps ‘even a conclusive yod is ineffective with respect to charity (Ran on 6b; 00 Rita). 5. (The preceding clarification, that “and this one" can bent a8 not being a charitable vow, explains only why this is considered a yod rather than full declaration. Now, the Gemara will explain why Rav Pappa was uncertain whether yados are effective in the context of charity.) 6. The reference is to Deuteronomy 23:24, which reads: won TNH yO ‘yg DBT Wwe My PHS Me DTG WHE Tey), What emerges from your lips you shall observe and ou shal do, justas you vowed fo Hashem, your Gad, a nedavah that you spoke with your mouth, Tis verse appears shortly after the commandment tae In Xo, you shall not be late in ‘oping it bd, v.22), and so, that which is mentioned here i inked to ‘the commandment not to delay (Tosafos wo xan ox") 1.The word mouth is associated with charity inthe were (saioh 45:23): Chart has iarued from My mouth Mefares; Toafo, Rosh Hashanoh 6a; Rashi and Rive, Rosh Hashanah ibid) The Borsa — whichis cite fully in Rosh Hashanah bi.) ~ derives fom bere that charitable ‘ows are subject o the commandment ot to delay (Rosh) At any rate, ‘ows to charity, which ar alluded ton the phras with oar mouth, are linked to vows of offering, which are mentioned earlier inthe verse Gust 43 ou wowed to Hashem (Ritva; see Rosh Hashanah ibid). 8. Although there isa goneral rule that «hekeish links it cubes in all reapcts, perhaps tie ete ~ ike the one regarding plah ~ isan ‘exception to the enerl rue, since charity i not mentioned explicitly in ‘theverse, but merely alluded oan on Bh; see Bb note 1. Tosafes “wh van ex see also Gilyon HaShas Tit is noteworthy that Roma (Yoreh Deak 258:13) rales that if one males «vow to charity in his heart without any orl delaration — {sbinding upon him. Accordingly one might wonder what the Gemara's inquiry is here. Even ifayad isinelfetve, the vower sbuld be bound by ‘is intnt to decare the money as carits!"The same question pertains to ‘the Baraisa on Ga, which teaches that the declaration “This animal ia hereby achataa"isinefectiv because isaninconclusivegad se notes 1112 there) Since vows of offerings can be made in one's heart ~ as derived from Scripture in Sheowos 260 ~ why does the designation not take effet onthe basis ofthe person's intent? ‘Some commentators anawer that these vows take effect through inuant only ifthe person mean to effectuate them in this manner and not through adeclaration. However, when he seeks to bring them about with adeclaration, the declaration is what effects them, and therefore, it quires valty (Keren Orah to 2a Ture! Even [Avnei Shoham), Chagigah Oaxexor ef Chasam Sofer to, MishnasR’ Aharon 3:19, Derech Emunah, Hil. Matnos Aniyim in. Beur HaHTalachahto 2:13 97 xen] 8, Hefter is the term for ownerlesness. I person wantsto render his property ownerless ~ thereby allowing anyone to take it ~ he declares inthe presence of three people, “This is hereby hefker.” (ee below, 45a) Rav Pappa inquires whether heer ean be effected by means of yo 10. person commonly declares his property heftr with the intent that poor people should come and takes. Thus, har would seem to be 8 form of charity and should be subject tothe same rues (Tsafs).KOL KINUYEL ngiyd vv: of) — If upon analyzing the inquiry regarding charity, you wll conclude and say that there is effectiveness toa partial declaration for charity, nyqx? wp py — because ‘you will apply the principle that there is mo hekeish in part, I vill continue with the following inquiry: wa] "2 RET TPIS — Dowe say that heffer isthe sameas charity? p91 = Or perhaps, we say that mpry "axe — charity is different than hefer, ame wbx ym xO AT — since charity is fit only for the poor, | m>rw32 ya amas pa pan ax — whereas heffer is it for both the poor and the rich, Leaving Rav Pappa's inquiries unresolved, the Gemara cites a related inquiry by another Amora: pay tgp — Ravina inquired: xb we xosm ma 7) wy — Is there effectiveness to a partial declaration for tho designation ofa lavatory, or not?!" ‘The inquiry is clarified: vey "7 — What is the ease to which the inquiry pertains? ‘vox xpvons — Ifyou say iti the case where one said, | P19 xpan m3 wy) x3 — “Let this structure be designated a lavatory, "3 P75) and this one, too," Iwillask: m3 x00 rn va3 0301 ~ Certainly, that second one is also considered a lavatory, since the latter statement isa full dectaration! Px ‘yox7 m9 — Rather, the inquiry pertain to the ease where one said, “Let this structure be designated alavatory, EY — and this one,” 92 19x x°) — but he did not say “too.” — pag» px — What is the meaning of “and this one” that [the person] said? x37 "3 m2 poz) — Does he mean “and this CHAPTER ONE NEDARIM. Tat ‘one, too, is designated a lavatory”? _yrTa} 9 ph 1 — Or perhaps, what does he mean by “and this one”? xymyn> ‘yoxp xobya — He is actually saying that it shall be designated for general use." — 2 — ‘The Getara interjects a comment: xy39) > xpivp7 Soa — This implies that it is obvious to Ravina p30 m3} jum vy — that there is effectiveness to designation as a lavatory! xpay9 m xa xp) — But Ravina himself inquired about this, as follows: rab warn trp xo2 — If one designated [a structure] for use as a lavatory, but did not yet use it as such, what is [the law]? trp y799 A's} timotn — Similarly, if one designated {a strue- ture] for use as a bathhouse, but did not yet use it «s such, what is [the law]?" vv yon — Is designation effective in this respect, 51949 TWh J 1X — or is designation ineffective in this respect? How could Ravina inquire about designation as a lavatory through a partial declaration, when he is in doubt whether designation is effective at all? "The Gemara responds: avg pyanmp 9q tha seq 3 — Ravina inguired about one issue within another, as follows: epte wan px 1x’ryna Tm — Is designation as a lavatory effective or is such desig nation ineffective? am w» pid xyon Dx ~ Ard if you will, conclude and say that such designation is effective, 1x77 ¥" ‘1 px — is there effectiveness to a partial declaration of des- ignation, or is there no effectiveness to a partial declaration? ‘The Gemara offers no resolution to the inquiry, bat concludes: ib won — Let it be inquired. NOTES 1. That, you will conclude that although charity is merely alluded to ‘and not mentioned explicitly (see note 8), this isa bona fide hekeish and Links vows for charity to vows of offerings inal respects ~ including the rule that yadoe are effective (Rn) 12. Le although a poson declaring his property hefter might intend for ‘poor people to take it, nothing prevents a wealthy person from taking it. ‘Thus, hefker is diferent than charity, which i pledged specifically for the ute of poor people (Tosa). Tt is noteworthy that whereas Rav Pappa inguired about yados regarding various contexts, he did not inquire about yados for oaths. This is beause oaths arv clearly inked tonedarim through a hekeish, in the verse (Numbers 20:3): nyaw vague ni mp sr3 bx, Ifa man vue ‘aneder to Hashem or swears an oath. Indeed, we learn in the Mishnah ‘below (a) that an oath may be effected through ayad (Ran; ef. Tosafos to2b wean; see Shalmet Nedarim there) 18. Ite forbidden to recite the Shema, pray or engage in Torah study in lavatory. This is derived from the verse (Deuteronomy 2:15): 390 ‘ur, your camp shall Be holy (Rosh; see Berachos 26a and Rambam, Hil Krias Shema 3:4). The Biblial restriction pertains only to a genuine lavatory ~ ie one that was actually used. The Rabbis decreed that the same rule should apply to a place designated as a lavatory (Rabbein Yonah to Berachos, end of ch, 3 zim"). Ravina inquires whether the Rabbis extended the restriction even toa structure that was designated asa lavatory through a partial declaration (Tosofos, Rash; see also Ran here and below, end of abn papba777) 1, [Aa shove, this explains why the statement “and this one” is considered a partial declaration. The underlying bass of the question ‘whether the partial declaration is effective was explained in the preced- Ing note 15. Le. the inquiry prosumes that if a structure was designated as a lavatory through a full declaration, it is automatically considered “unholy” — and unfit forthe recitation ofthe Shera ee. ~ even though ‘twas not yet used asa lavatory. See Tosafos S730. 16. The following inquiry is cited in Berachos (26a) and Shabbos (10a). 7. A bathhouse is lke a lavatory in rogard to the restriction against ‘eeting the Shema ete. in an unholy place (see Shabbos ibid). Ravina ‘nguired whether designation as a bathhouse also renders the place “unholy.” See Tosofos ‘ww r, Hagahos HaGra, and Tosofos to ‘Shabbos 10b xo 7°, rgarding this inquiry. 18, This expression the equivalent of the common Talmudic expression ‘pn Lat it stand, However, pep orp Ww, The language of [Tractate] Nediarim is unconventional Tosafos; see above, 2 note 8) Tin summary, the Gemara has cited inquiries regarding the effective- ‘ness of yados for kiddushin, pe'ah, charity, hefker, and designation as a lavatory, and left all these inquiries unresolved. Ran discusses the halachah regerding each of these case, and states the following: ‘With respect to kiddushin, the unresolved inquiry leaves usin doubt regarding a matter of Biblical law. In keeping withthe gexeral principle that undecided matters of Biblical lw are treated stringently, we must considera yad effective. [Thus, the woman betrothed on the bass of « partial declaration may not marry another man until she receives a Aivoree from this one] ‘With respect to pe'ah and charity, many Rishonim (Ramban, Rashba, Rosh) rule stringently for the same reason — these are undecided satters of Biblical law. Furthermore, since the inquiry regarding hefker vwas based on the assumption that a yod is effective vith regard to charity, the inquiry regarding charity i deemed to have been resolved. Ran accepts the latter argument, but objects tothe former. The principle that undecided matters of Biblical law are treated stringently applios only to ritual matters [orron]. With respoct to monetary matters, the rule is that in any undecided case the money remains in the pos. session of its original owner. Ran argues (and proves et length) that since the ease of pe'ah and eharity center on the question of whether ‘the person who made the partial declaration is obligated to give the produce or money to the poor, this is considered a monetary matter rather than a ritual issue. Thus, the original owner may keep it! [For resolutions ofthis objetion, ee Korban Nesanel $10 to Rosh, Chasam Sofer, Keren Orah, and Mishnas R’ Aharon, Zeraim 6:5. See further, ‘Shack, Yoreh Deah 259:14; Mochaneh Ephraim, Hil. Nedavim §8and Hil. Taedakah $2, Urim VeTumim ~ Kiteur Tekafo Kohen $121; Kuntres HaSefikos 19.) ‘With respect to hefter, all agree that this is @ monetary issue and the property designated hefter by a partial declaration remains in the possession ofits original owner (see further, Ketzos HaChoohen 278:1 ‘and Keren Orah) ‘With respect to designation as a lavatory, the partial declaration is ineffective, since this is merely a mattor of Rabbinical lv (as explained in note 13), and undecided issues in Rabbinical lw ae treated leniontly (Ran,