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5 04/04/2003)
[6] On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County,
Texas, Trial Court Cause No. X02-00232-8
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice FitzGerald
[9] AFFIRMED
[10] OPINION
[11] David Eugene Edwards appeals the district court's judgment denying his
application for writ of habeas corpus to avoid extradition to California
where he is charged with twenty-five felony counts of securities fraud,
mainly against the elderly.*fn1 In two issues, appellant questions
whether he was denied due process because he was not presented before
a court of record within the forty-eight- hour mandate of article 15.17(a)
of the code of criminal procedure, and he questions whether the
documents supporting the California Governor's Warrant were
insufficient, whether he was denied gubernatorial discretion, and
whether the State established his identity or presence in the demanding
state. We affirm.
[12] Facts
[17] In his first issue, appellant questions whether he was timely brought
before a magistrate or judge of a court of record. Specifically, he asserts
he first appeared before a magistrate eight days after his arrest, and he
first appeared before a "court of record" thirty days after his arrest,
neither of which were within the forty-eight-hour requirement under
article 15.17(a). Conversely, the State argues article 15.17(a), which
governs arrests generally and requires that an arrested person be brought
before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest, does not apply to
an extradition proceeding. Instead, the State asserts the more specific
statute, article 51.13, section 10, which governs extradition proceedings,
controls over the more general statute, article 15.17(a). Article 51.13,
section 10 requires that a person arrested in an extradition proceeding be
taken "forthwith before a judge of a court of record*fn2 in this State."
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 10 (Vernon 1979) (footnote
added). Article 51.13, section 10 does not demand an exact time
restriction. As such, the State argues article 15.17(a) is inapplicable, and
appellant was arguably brought before the judge of a court of record
"forthwith." The State adds that even if appellant had not been timely
presented "forthwith," appellant has made no claim or demonstration of
harm for the eight-day delay. Cf. Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290, 297
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (court in habeas review of extradition could
consider whether appellant lacked sufficient mental competency to assist
his counsel's preparation of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the
extradition proceeding).
[18] We conclude that whether appellant was timely presented before a judge
of a court of record does not fall within the limits of our review. See
Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (stating rule that reviewing court is limited to
deciding whether extradition documents are facially valid, whether
petitioner has been charged with crime in demanding state, whether
petitioner is person named in request for extradition, and whether
petitioner is fugitive); Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d at 297(Texas courts
reviewing habeas corpus order in extradition case are limited to the four
grounds set out in Doran and to consideration of the applicant's mental
competency). However, even if we could consider it, we conclude the
record does not show appellant was harmed by any delay in bringing
him before the court pursuant to either articles 15.17(a) or 51.13, section
ten. Appellant asserts the violation of the statutes also violated his
constitutional right to due process. Assuming for purposes of this
opinion that (1) article 51.13, section 10 was violated, and (2) that any
such violation would violate his constitutional right to due process, we
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any violation any due process
right did not contribute to the denial appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2 (a).*fn3
[20] In his second issue, appellant questions whether the trial court erred in
denying his application for writ of habeas corpus because the documents
supporting the Governor's Warrant were invalid on their face, he was
denied gubernatorial discretion, the State did not prove he was the
person stated in the Governor's Warrant, and the State did not prove he
was present in the demanding State. We review these arguments in
order.
[22] Appellant argues the documents supporting the Governor's Warrant did
not meet the requirements of article 51.13, section 3 because (1) the
demanding state's complaint upon which the warrant was issued did not
constitute a proper affidavit, as it was not based on personal knowledge,
and (2) that arrest warrant was not issued on the complaint.
[24] Appellant first argues the affidavit in support of the amended complaint
was insufficient because Deputy Sondra Serenka did not state she had
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the complaint. There is no
requirement that an affidavit in support of a complaint recite the affiant
has personal knowledge of the matters stated in the complaint. Ex parte
Harris, 389 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Ex parte
McDonald, 631 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet.
ref'd). Appellant relies upon this Court's decisions in Ex parte Bahmer,
763 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.), and Ex parte Zepeda,
No. 05-97-01435-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 9, 1998, no pet.) (not
designated for publication). Those cases, however, are distinguishable
from the present case. In Bahmer, there was no affidavit contained in the
supporting papers. See Bahmer, 763 S.W.2d at 433. Notwithstanding that
the unpublished Zepeda opinion has no precedential value, the affidavit
in that case was not signed by the affiant; instead, it was signed by
someone else on behalf of the affiant. See Zepeda, No. 05-97-01435-CR
at *2; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.7 ("Opinions not designated for
publication by the court of appeals under these or prior rules have no
precedential value . . . .").
[30] Next, appellant argues the Texas Governor mistakenly believed that,
based on the nature of the crimes alleged and conflicts in the supporting
documents, he had no discretion to refuse California's demand for
appellant's extradition. As such, appellant was deprived of any possible
benefit of gubernatorial discretion allowed under article 51.13, section
6.*fn6
[31] Article 51.13, section 3 mandates extradition in cases where the accused
was present in the demanding state during the commission of the offense
and thereafter fled to the asylum state. Unlike section 3, section 6 is
stated in permissive language, allowing the Texas Governor the
discretion to surrender any person to the demanding state whose actions
in Texas, or in a third state, intentionally result in a crime in the
demanding state. Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3
with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 6.
[32] The amended complaint and application for requisition allege offenses
committed in California, including first degree burglary. That count in
the amended complaint states that appellant "did enter an inhabited
dwelling house located at [the victim's] home with the intent to commit
theft and [a] felony[ies], Securities Fraud." The application for
requisition states that because the victims were contacted and deceived
in their homes, the suspects' joint actions constituted first degree
burglary. It also explains that appellant, whose business was located in
Washington State, conspired with sales agents in California to convince
California residents to invest money in fraudulent bank notes. The
California Governor's Warrant states that appellant stands charged with
the offenses listed in the amended complaint and application for
requisition "by intentionally committing an act or acts while outside the
State of California resulting in said crimes in this State, and it has been
represented and is satisfactorily shown . . . that [appellant]*fn7 is now to
be found in the State of Texas." Arguably, California can pursue
appellant's conviction under the law of parties. As such, the offenses
listed in the amended complaint and the application for requisition are
not inconsistent with the language of the California Governor's Warrant
that tracks section six. Nothing in the California Governor's Warrant or
its supporting documents suggest appellant did not receive the
gubernatorial discretion to which he was entitled. We resolve this
argument against appellant.
[33] Identity
[34] Appellant next argues the State failed to prove he was the accused
named in any of the demanding or asylum state's documents.
Specifically, he contends the State's proof, an enlarged photo copy of a
Washington State driver's license and supporting certification that the
license was a true and correct copy, did not identify appellant as the
same person named in the Governor's Warrant.
[35] The Texas Governor's Warrant, which appears regular on its face, made
out a prima facie case authorizing remand of appellant to custody for
extradition. See Ex parte Larson, 494 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973). By introducing the Texas Governor's Warrant into evidence at the
habeas corpus hearing, the State shifted the burden to appellant to prove
that he was not the person charged with the crimes in California.
Appellant placed identity into issue at the hearing by denying he was the
person named for extradition. As such, the burden then shifted to the
State to show that appellant was the identical person named in the Texas
Governor's Warrant. See id.
[36] The amended complaint and the arrest warrant contain information
identifying the person sought for extradition. Both documents refer to
"David Eugene Edwards," whose birth date is October 8, 1957. The
arrest warrant describes the accused as a six-foot-tall male weighing
205, living at 75th Avenue Ct. W., University Place, Washington,
98467. The driver's license states the same address, birth date, height,
and weight for "David Eugene Edwards." To prove identity, the
prosecutor introduced into evidence the driver's license and a supporting
affidavit stating the license was a true and correct copy. On cross-
examination, appellant identified himself by the same name, address,
birth date, height, and weight as reflected in the supporting documents.
Based on this record, the State showed appellant was the identical person
named in the Texas Governor's Warrant. We resolve this argument
against appellant.
[38] Finally, appellant argues the State failed to prove he was present in the
demanding state. Article 51.13, section 3 provides that no demand for
the extradition of a person shall be recognized by the Texas Governor
unless, "except in cases arising under Section 6," it is in writing "that the
accused was present in the demanding State at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the
State . . . ." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3. The
California Governor's Warrant expressly tracked the language of article
51.13, section 6. See Rentz v. State, 833 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (holding in part that where appellant
was charged with sending package containing cocaine to co-defendant in
state of Florida, it was not necessary for State to prove appellant was in
demanding state at time of offense). As such, the State was not required
to prove presence in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the offenses. We resolve this argument against appellant.
[39] Having resolved all arguments in appellant's second issue against him,
we overrule appellant's second issue.
Opinion Footnotes
[43] *fn1 California's application for requisition states that appellant stands
accused of illegally receiving $365,000 from victims residing in Santa
Clara County, California and $98.7 million from over 1,300 victims
nationwide.
[44] *fn2 A court of record includes those courts whose proceedings are
permanently recorded, and which have the power to fine or imprison for
contempt. Black's Law Dictionary 362 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "courts
of record"). A record is a written account of some act or court
proceeding drawn up under authority of law by a proper officer and
designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence of the matters
to which it relates. Id. at 1273 (defining "record"). The magistrate court
before which appellant appeared eight days after his arrest was a "court
of record" for purposes of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
[45] *fn3 Appellant also argues the violation of his due process rights
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. If the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over appellant's habeas corpus petition, then appellant would
have had no procedure to challenge his extradition. However, the trial
court did have jurisdiction to consider appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 51.13, § 10 (Vernon 1979).
[47] *fn5 In his reply brief, appellant asserts Rolan was the affiant of the
original complaint, and that the arrest warrant was issued on the original
complaint instead of the amended complaint. No evidence in the record
supports this assertion. Appellant attaches documents to his reply brief,
one of which purports to be a copy of the original complaint. However,
attachments to briefs are not part of the record and cannot be considered
as evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.1 ("The appellate record consists of
the clerk's record and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter's record.");
Robles v. State, 85 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
[48] *fn6 Section 6 provides: The Governor of this State may also surrender,
on demand of the Executive Authority of any other State, any person in
this State charged in such other State in the manner provided in Section
3 with committing an act in this State, or in a third State, intentionally
resulting in a crime in the State whose Executive Authority is making
the demand, and the provisions of this Article not otherwise
inconsistent, shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not
in that State at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled
therefrom. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 6.
[49] *fn7 The California Governor's Warrant states "she" instead of "he."
Considering that the document also expressly states "David Eugene
Edwards" in two places, we consider this error to be merely clerical and
not reversible.
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