CHAPTER FIFTEEN Liberal Justice and Political Democracy 1, LipeRaLism ON THe DEFENSIVE ‘The sixties caught liberal cheorists by surprise, in part owing to a complacency phers.! The emergence of a non-commi deeply critical of liberalism presented liberals with a challenge they had not pre- ‘viously confronted. Among the surprises of that challenge was a sustained attack ‘upon the strong and positive conception of the state represented by Kennedys New Frontier and Lyndon Johnson’ in terms of smaller scales and * and imperialistic sta ‘An unraveling of the 1972. Not only was there a frontal atack on conventional electoral politics from ouside the party, but both the “movement left” and the party insurgents were of th (one ofits principal cham- “Mid-cwentieth century liberalism .... has thus been fundamentally re- shaped by the hope of the New Deal, by the exposure of the Soviet Union, and simistic view of human nacure develo Soon the Democratic party was des | | UBERAL Justice 5 sponsible.” Along with proclaiming an en and to the party’ traditional suspicion of big b became simply opportunism witha caring face, a in the last decade of the twentieth century no major politcal party and only tiny number of national politicians openly confessed toa liberal political identi Ironically, or ominously, parties and politicians of every stripe proclaimed th: devotion to “democracy” ed in the aftermath, ‘of both was exposed. F in the 1980s the new conserva ne produce such remarkable po conservatism, even self-styled revolutionary conservatism While liberalism pre ‘ically disappeared as a publicly professed ideology, i reained a virtual mono oly in the Academy. TL, Fregpoat anp Equausry: Linerat, DILeMMa ‘The socials simply cannot fac the fact tat there is no co betceen democracy and capital John Patt Diggins? During the latter half of the twentieth cencury liberal theorists constructed problematic centered upon what were perceived as contradictions between libet conceptions of liberty and equality. A free society required that al citizens shou sming that tights would be accompanied | freedom would naturally enable some ore wealth, and greater power than d the translation of equal rights seemingly could not be alleviated or eradicated altogether without restricting tk rights of those who had legally acquired greater social advantages—or withot taking away some of those gains and, in effect, ring them to those-wh« for one reason ot another, had failed to exploit freedom succesflly, To be “di advancaged!” in a free society was to have equal rights but to be unable, of to hay526 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN, society that was increasingly defined more by of class conflict, conservative politicians could, nonetheless, exploit class resent- ‘ments to drive a wedge between the working class and the poor. Liberalism thus appeared caught berween libertarian principle and its inegal- i juences. The dilemma exposed the core difficulty of liberal political theory. Ie stems from the attempt to deal with the social and political + [quences of combining a free political economy with an administrative state that had come to assume significanc welfare responsibilities. For social and economic inequalities to be remedied or eased by state action assumes that the state, as the representative of the political, possesses a sufficient degree of autonomy to per- form that function. But the free politics of a liberal society allows, indeed pre- ‘umes, thac those who control economic power are naturally entitled and expected to promote corporate ot self-interest through the political process. argued that the role of the state should tise above interests, the reply of James Madison—a Founding Father and a sturdy liberal—was that while “Justice ‘ought to hold the balance” between conflicting interests, the difficulty is that those ‘who judge are “but advocates and partis tothe causes which chey determine." vie virtue as the easy antidote to in- the powers of government, thereby branches, proved to bea solution 1g problem. The problem was not majority rile or minority tights. concerned not numbers but power. A huge pharmaccutical corporation injustice, went untested. The institutional structure of checks-and-balances,sepi- ration of powers, and different electoral cycles forthe elective branches of govern | «proved so effective in blocking the formation of a consistent democratic will hat we can never know whether a popular majority is tyrannical or trustworthy. ‘The deliberate frustration of majority cul-helped to shift emphasis so thar _democracy, now discouraged by practical barriers, could be narrowed, equated ibiliey for danger to justice and fairness. Typically economic and social disadvantage trans- lated into politcal disadvantage. To be unequal was to be perpetually ata power- Idisadvantage. If liberalism were to restore its democratic creden [only to provide remedies for economic jnequalities but to confront ties of power, and the consequent exploitation of advantage, were inher- ‘nt in a competitive society UBERAL JUSTICE 827 Raising the minimum wage by the usual modest amount hardly increases the ‘comparative political power of the poor or enables them to exp and compete with the more affluent. For a liberal concept of justice would have to formulate a democratized politcal economy that coulc serve as an alternative to the corporate political economy and be commited t s particularly economic institutions traditionally as presently constituted controls 0 lites of solution, points to the presene ‘of a second—or at leas to an irony. The more that liberal theory has tried to cop with the political consequences of bonding with capitalism, the more elusive th solution to the primacy ofselFinterest and the more difficult the problem of hov to constitute a democratic civic culture ina capitalist society. The measure of th culty would be the extent to which liberal cheory continued to favor mecha devices designed to secure political power against egalitarian democrac rather than devising the means by which a democratized political economy coul. compete with corporate power. Ie would come dovin to a choice between chal lenging capitalism and weakening democracy by benign neglect. ¢ inevitability of revo nezived, those same conceptions can be rede ssity_of critically confionting capitalism and sm at asptem of power dar oot a media culture that promotes mas treated as structural, inevitable, or accidental, bur the issue remains regardless © whether political and economic equality and power are actepred as interewine: or as merely contiguous or contingent.628 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN ‘The terms of the dispute reflect a historical distinction between the political and the economic long maintained by liberal theorists. Although launched in the zame of political economy, the teachings of the classical economists were about society conceived as an economy, a prosaic structure of interrelated actvities— 1, production, and exchange—aiming at the systematic produc- By the time that Marx and Engels had written their Manifsto of the Commu 148-1849), a rival interpretation of economy had crystallized. So- ypes proceeded to analyze economic structure in terms of ‘power-relationships and scial- classes, thus bringing an essentially political analy- henomena. Although they succeeded in puncturing stitutive role of self-interest, their strong criticism of ca prelude wo socialist societies. The exception was the “utopian socialists” who, in their efforts at establishing small communities based on cooperative labor and Yommoi ownership of property, attempted a radical saling-down of power. In “contrast, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century and throughout the lus to rethinking “became stigmatized as handouts to ‘Asa consequence an important ceived in a new discourse-realm of expert *p in outlook to che emergent. dentally, prior to World the adoption of business methods by governmental bureau- ion of administration by economists served 0 confirm Maris main point of the primacy of the economic and ‘of the subordination of governance to management. UBERAL JUSTICE 529 IL Jonny Rawis axp rus Revivat oF PousricaL Pimosora Rawls bok had an imomence impact and enabled meral end political hilo top secing themselves as purely (or atest Drimaril) descriptive approaches: they could now claim an active role inthe discus and revlon of public probles —Alexander Neiamis? When John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) appeared, it was greeted as a deliv- crance of analytical philosophy from its apolitical indifference and acclaimed as thecentury’s most important treatise on politcal philosophy. Analytic philoso pany demonstrated chat it could addres social evils, defend redistribution of resources. As hhe would propose a liberal resolution to what he claimed was the looming crisis of modern constitutional democracy. These aims and achievements were under- girded by an expansive conception of the role of political philosophy as ambitious as that of any of the classical cheorists and as confident that matters political could be grasped sub specie aeterni In constitutional democracy one Philosophy] most important aims is presenting a political conception o ‘an not only provide a shared public bass fr the jusification of political and socal institutions but also helps ensure sabil- iy from one generation to he next... Thus politcal philosophy is not mere politics: in addressing the public culeure it takes the longest view, looks to society’ permanent historical and social conditions, and tries to mediate socieny’s deepest conics." Unlike most classical philosophers Rawls did not seek to instruet the princes of the day in the arts of satecraft but co teach citizens, officials, and jurists a polic- ‘order By his achievements Rawls can statement of liberal democracy, of represented the twentieth century litical forms His works raised two broad questions: first, in what proportions ae the liberal id which, along with totalitarianism, ipa contribution to the typology of po- and the democratic elements blended? and, second, are there significant powers, such as Superpower and corporate globalism, that have been omitted and that, hhad they been acknowledged, might have called into question the characteriza- ell as what it means tobe a citizen of690 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN “To explore these matters and the differing emphases berween A Theory of Jus tice and Political Liberalism, ics helpful to consider the frst work as reflecting a specific historical and political context, one that extends from the beginnings of the welfare and regulatory lems could be managed through a combination of expert policy and administra- tion—to the Great Society of Lyndon Johnson, where the regulation of corporate {power was believed less pressing because the “economic pie” sulficed to accom- > modate not only a “war on poverty” but a war in Vietnam. A Theory of Justice, with its economic emphasis upon redistribution of resources, reflected and as- sumed the New Deal-Gi swarfae, state In contrast, ‘conservative dominance and “cultural wars,” liberalism gravitating towards the \ center and, having struggled to balance socioeconomic inequality with political and legal equality in the face of mounting evidence of ineq all three do- tains, retreating from that engagement and even disa -was located in a non-material realm, in deep-rooted doctrinal differences, the do- iain that Marx would have called ideological and Niewsche cultural imi some recent changes in the isolation and joined economics and legal theory to form 2 new kind of public philosophy-—abstract, technical, and politically moderate. Jurisprudence had in- creasingly come to reflect the influences of philosophy and economic theoies.!? Philosophers, in eurn, became attracted to economic formulations and to legal modes of reasoning, especially as displayed in decisions of the Supreme Court. Economists, for their part, became important contributors to public policy at 2 time when economics had come to provide the discursive link connecting the ‘worlds of finance and business generally with the world of governmental burcau- cracies where private interests are refracted into public policies. Economic ra- tionaliy and bureaucratic rationality came to form a seamless web. Rawls isthe philosophical synthesizer ofthese developments. IV. Economy anp Pourricat, Economy estce is the frst vireue of socal inttusons, a rush i of stems of hough. —John Rawls! A Theory of Justice adopts the main elements of the liberal problematic: the ten- sions between liberty and equality, the historical distinction of the political from LIBERAL JUSTICE 53 the economic, and a consensual basis of society as the fundamental politic: consideration. By installing justice asthe fist vireue ofall social institutions, Rawls served ne is incention to engage the issues of inequality. The terms of engagemer to the requirements of policy and administration. Appropriate «of the theory of rational choice.’ citizen but the rational, self-interested. ‘The centrality assigned to economic policy has important political conse quences for Rawls. The role of administration is enlarged, while governance Conceived technocratically, narrowed co a highly centralized aufonomous siai independent ofthe social and econom) ‘arker arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal inst tutions which regulates the social conditions necessary for. Rawls proceeds to posie the autonomy of the regulatory redress socio-economic inequalities, without, however, exami economy of concentrated wealth and corporate pow structures of economic power was no i gesture of legitimatior cures and justified if the be managed, not chai tory possibilities in favor ¢ enged—which would mean subordi istered benefits.”® ‘implications for equality lay in the reliance upon administrative exper! ise rather than political ation by the unequals? V. Jusrics anp INEquaLrry justice is concerned with rectifying wrongs. In its politi ether wrong is systemic or merely episodic. IF iti ced and if the vicsims are consistently of che sam nature of the system would seem in order. Or, mor tiny must fist decide which system is at aul: the political? th economic? the international?592 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN outside the system, as when he characterizes inequality as a misfortune resulting ffom unpredictable social sarting-points and “narura” individual talents chat are {uous populations. natural endowments and in che family draw. Aiough Rawlsian justice focused “Although Ravls stipulated thar “the higher expectations of those bet ated” were just only if"tiey work as part of a scheme which improves the expec- st advantaged. ..,” che stipulation is compromised because the justice were not granted equal standing,”” The range of available the goals of “compensating benefits for everyone,” and “At the same time, Rawls was singulaely cool about The value of| rights of par- ‘ici as a means of countering corpo! uence. He explicitly excluded economic rights, such as worker participation in decision-making, and thereby upon the liberty of those who cont _Bxcent of health care, and resist environmen LIBERAL Justice avoided the crucial question ofthe civic consequences of economic organi By failing to acknowledge the economic system as a system of power o provision for the means of popular resistance to it, the Rawlsian vision avoids any direct challenge to the system of capitalism and its politics. ‘When taken together the to principles—of justice a chefs vir of scia institutions and the priori +o the peculiarity of Rawlsian jus closed off from the external world so that no one enters and no.one in these respects, a complete or total construction, stable and unchanging. theory of justice... must not be mistaken fora seoey of the [existing] tice." These usually signalled a sensitive point where disparities i and opportunity were acknowledged without being engaged. The fected by questions of foreig role of the military and nal structure of power and influence and a aly domestic but also foreign and military policies Rather Rawisian justice prefers a setting undisfigured by the power formation represented in domestic concentrations of economic power and wealth, corporat534 CHAPTER FIFTEEN ‘what was wrong with current political practices such that a comprehensive re- codification of basic principles was urgent. Instead he perpetuates acceptance of 4 gystem of power by blucing the identity of the economy into the protective ist priniple of justice stipulates an “inviolablity founded on justice” possessed by “each person . .. thar even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." The formidable hurdle which that principle presents to any radical scheme for equality points to the kinds of considerations that lead Rawls to want tated not by it fora conception for distributin danger is thatthe benefits may be insuflicen and that “conflict” would ensue, Accordin ted primarily for its impact upon “coordinati Inequality, rather than viewed as a sunning sore on the body politic that casts doubt on its democratic professions is regarded as a potential danger to the eco- nomic order, a threat to the “coordination, effice cconomy postulated as one of “moderate liberal promise of social reform plaus rewards’ also assures inequality." The pr rate inequalities depends, in the last analysis, upon a type of foduces them. thus faithfully mirrored contemporary liberalism’s fundamen- tal perplexity, that despite constitutional guarantees of equal liberty and a dy- namic economy that seemed not merely to promise but to deliver increasing ualities persisted and began to deepen. ests, Rawls would not consider the -m inseparable from the radically un- ‘competitive economic structure of stik- ingly unequal rewards. As a result he was unable to conceive a solution beyond (seate-administered philanthropy.) LIBERAL JUSTICE 53 ‘This deficiency is nowhere more apparent than in his discussion of participa tion. Ravls deplored the undervaluation of what he call “the fair value of polit is predomi es work weds 10 the advantage of opener eco “ular confidence in political instieutions and officals. ‘On several occasions Rawls complains that the existence oF economic inequal ities poses serious difficulties for political democracy. “Disparities in the distribu tion of property and wealth that far exceed what is compatible with polit equality have generally been tolerated by the legal system." In a capitalist soci equality might have existed under fortunate historice conditions. Universal suffrage is an insufficiene counterpoise ...™ While chese excrescences are deplored, they are never theorized, Instead Raw! proposes ad hoc remedies. Because “the democratic process does not even in the ‘ory have the desirable properties that price theory ascribes to truly competitiv markets,” itis ‘necessary... that political parties be autonomous with respect © private demands, that is, demands not expressed in the public forum and argue: for openly by reference to a conception of the public good." Public subsidie should be introduced to make political parties “independent from private exo education, voting for subsidized parties hardly changes polit does not provide the kind of strong defense of participation ideal of citizenship political affairs.” On may devote much of their time to polities.” “There are,” Rawls remarks dismis sively, “many other forms of human good.”*” ‘The Rawlsian alternative to participation turns out to be a Madisonian ma nipulation of structure to produce the desired results. The strategy of imposin economic modes of theory upon political practices requires that polities and it institutions assume the form of procedures and devices of redistribution whos ational construction supposedly guarantees just outcomes. The success of th strategy depends upon the performance of the economy, upon not allowing poli cies aimed at the amelioration of inequality to jeopardize the economy's health538 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN ‘Accompanying that strategy is a strong faith in the ability of formal institutions ‘0 contzol the vagaries of politics. Stated differently, nowhere in Rawlss work is there a theory of governance, of ‘whats equired of those who rule and affect che dail ives of milion. He com- es and their constituents are fed into ined within and firmly constrained by ‘i plc apt uy yen ocracy. Rawis conceives of an [Branches an “allocation distribution branch that assures just distribution by vent concentrations of power; and an exchange branch that arranges for goods and services which the marker fils to provide.*" And the more chat an increasing re- liance upon administration defines the eof politics, the greater the gap be- tween liberal politics and democratic politics, the closer the affinity between snmental administration and corporate management. At the same time liberal fds ein the quandary produce by Hel conceptions of stom Of hat enable them to. Cate as an agent of the popular will age for liberal idealism. VI. Tas “Orica Posrrion’ ano tHe Traprmion of Contact THEORY tablish the legitimacy of his scheme of justice by positing an for a theoretical purpose, “so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.” LIBERAL JusTiCE 58 “The imagined situation is tightly controlled by Rawls chrough yariousstipula tions and his individuals carefully programmed for she ask of accepting the prin His chooser sions mighit undermine Rawlsian reason or hemp. + Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers looked upon ignorance asthe ener of reason ("Dare to know!” Kant had exhorted.) Rawisian rationality, howeve followed a different, more specialized nomic theory, of taking the most effective means to gi ‘What docs the liberal cheory have to deny or ignore regarding the cons ‘quences of liberal practice and policy in order to insure that persons woul choose liberal justice over any alternative? What strategies of argument, allegot cal constructions, and imaginaries are introduced to assure a modus wivendi b tween social and political inequalities and economic stbility?> First, the number and kind of considerations to be taken into account by chooses are reduced beforchand. Then, in order to insure thatthe rational prin« ples of justice will be selected, the cho fect, programmed ata certa level of ignorance. He is deprived of cer ic societal and self-knowledge. that “original position,” when first are chosen, certain facts and inform tion are deliberately withheld. Class, satus, and standing with regard to “the dist. bution of natural asses and abilities” are suspended. To allow for some degree informed choice, choosers are allowed knowledge of “the general facts abo shuman society. They undecstand political affairs and the principles of econom theory; they know the basis of socal organization and the laws of human psyche ogy.” They are, however, denied knowledge of “the stage of civilization” of ts 6 Apparently a liberal reasoner could not make a principled, dina538 (OHAPTER FIFTEEN Rawls ‘equality is temporary, achieved by the suspension of sonal genealogies; this allows them to contemplate their tract emer a a anstton beeen dst invidals whose status and per- zest” independent of personal history while deciding upon “the principles that free and rational per- sons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position ¢, and disease, and is a matter of .0 many—then the suspension ofthat experience is, in is difficult to recognize Rawis's conception of an ab- racted rationality asa plausible account of human ac- uaintance with eg whose trace will be th liberal bad conscience ‘VIL Laneratiso AND Its Pourricar A] group of persons mu decide once and forall what isto count ‘among them as use and nyjus. —Jobn Rawls focus was upon admini quality an chereby promote the ends of cooperation and stability. Those ends appeared tobe independent of ora lease to dwarf, the claims of democratic pol hie seemed intent upon placing his beyond the vicissitudes of populist publication of Political Liberalism to present a conception of the citizen and to address politcal from an explicitly liberal viewpoint. For the ism could claim a theory of truly imposing intellectual power and scope. It came, hovieves, just asthe political fortunes of liberalism began to wane. LIBERAL JUSTICE Political Liberalism is not an amplification of A Theory of Justice but regist some notable shifts, including some severe qualifications about the eater pt cat The discourse of economics, minsration, and poi long wth proble of inequality, virtually disappears and is replaced by an emphasis uf culture, and the role ‘most significant change is that dos equality is the central preoccupation, and its pressed with an urgency lacking A Theory The issue, Rawls claimed, concerned a danger to the very existence | democratic society represented by “comprehensive doctrines.” These are defi as systems of belief thae “hold forall kinds of subjects ranging from the cond of individuals and personal relations to the organization of society as a whol ‘well as to the law of peoples."® ‘The peculiarity of Rawls formulatio of fundamentalismis or of Muslims) ze systems such as those of Hegel, are ignored or barely noted. On the other hand, democracy and socialism, w ‘conceived as comprehensive doctrines, ae summarily blacklisted. His strategy blunting the political influence of comprehensive doctrines isto propose a lit conception of the political and of the citizen that can attract the adherents of" sonable” comprehensiye doctrines and, in effect, isolate the unreasonable, question is whether his solution, by exacting political loyalty test, approxima comprehensive doctrine while distancing liberalism from democratic conceptit Certainly Rawls’ intention was not to construct a comprehensive doctrint fact, Political Liberalism begins on a confessional note, that the main idea + Theory of Justice, “the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness,” been misconceived as 2 comprehensive doctr ‘That confession is starting given his del “fully comprehensive tine” as one chat “covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather cisely articulated system ...."! The serious weakness of A Theory was that it ‘not been comprehensive enough; and of political power. Rawls proceeds ‘and Plato, which Popper had castiga to include a conception of pol characterized not simply by a cal, and moral doctrines” but able."® When Rawls submits that A Theory af Justice was bound to be challer by other comprehensive doctrines, he reveals whats really at stake, not the'e prchensiveness of doctrines but the threat of conflict. Rawls described the problem of doctrinal pluralism as “a torturing quest involving “a number of confics between religion and democracy” so serious540 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN unreasonable comprehensive doctrines’ posed “ tions." One important consequence was that the central goal of “stabi unachievable because of the conflicts that A Theory would provoke among other comprehensive doctrines. Unlike Locke, for whom toleration meant removing state control over tligion, Rawls contends chat toleration is insufficient and chat religions must importantly conform to what the state needs. To resolve these problems a conception of the roduced, ‘A “political” conception of justice, as opposed to a conception of justice based ‘upon a comprehensive philosophical doctrine, might enable those who held ‘wide-ranging incompatible beliefs to live together in peace and cooperation and accept “the political conception of a constitutional regime."® The end result ‘would prove closer in spitit to a Rousseauian regime of public vireue and of a civil religion wich reasonableness as its dogma. ‘VILL, Rawss’s Geneatocy oF Lissnanist ‘The move from justice and inequality to the political consequences of belie marks an important moment in the evolution of liberalism. Polisfal Libram explicitly ‘ejecesas inadequate the Madisonian conception that fee politics would inevitably reflect interest-group pressures and that the solution lay in developing a constitu- tional system of ailing authorities. That understanding, Rawls contends, represents a “modus vivendi,” a mere expedient of a balance of force rather than & political conception. Ie would not bring stability for “the right reasons." In challenging the Madisonian conception, Rawls was taking i ‘mainstream understanding with «wo centuries behind ig, that inerests tiable, while belie tended to be inf ralism of conficing interests but by systems. And where Madisonian iberalsm had relied upon the fragmenting effect of the pluralism of interests and beliefs to undercut majority rule, Rawls counted con “asubstantial majority of jm of comprehensive doctrines” And where Madisonism had relied upon “a skill fal constitutional design” to guide individual and group intetests towards “social purposes,” Ravils proposed the idea ofan “overlapping consensus” that required be- political doctrines to soften their sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." Rawls’ chosen starting-point and its UBERAL JUSTICE ea legacy of “a transcendent element not admitting of compromise” produce modernity curiously detached from material interests indeed, Ravls tertains the possibly chat material interests mi atic ideals. He prefers the question in che sixteenth cencury: “how is a just and free socie opose a “reasonable ph "an overlapping consensus” among deeply opposed doctrines. ‘of the Reformation as the starting-point of Political Liberalism and the decision to engage on a political plane the comprehensive doctrines fore- shadowed by religious belief systems have important theoretical and political ‘consequences.”? i they raise the problem of the historical relationship between liberalism and religion; and, second, they call attention to the elevation ofa certain conception of the political to a magistal plane “above” the sound and fury of class conflict and competing economic interests. Where the siteenth- and seventeenth-centuy rulers {all back on toleration of diversity because they could no longer effectively impose 2 uniform religion, Rawls advocates a certain political uniformity co offer the effect: using conflict upon doctrinal differences Rawis once nlc, economic power structures, and their polit indamental interests... need not arise, ot arse teties” becomes clear once it is recalled tha ocrad movements closely accompani sectarianism. and_was.cleeply- influenced, by b engaged laity, and, everyman (and woman prseer of Ser “More imporcant, popular religion in the United States continues to retain? powerful hold over ordi Churches, synagogues, and mosques an not only the cru panics, Muslims, and has, overwhelmingly, been popular religion,ae 2 502 ‘CHAPTER FIFTEEN “The liberal reflex, however isto keep religion “private,” to insist on a “wall” of separation between “church and state.” Asa result, liberalism discarded a poten- tially democratic element while deepening the rift between liberalism and democracy, a rift with political consequences. Whereas in the nineteenth century a religious leaders and ideas played a powerful role in promoting democratic ad- ‘ances, suchas the abolition of slavery, womerissulfzage, and popular educa more secently a substantial segment of o thas gravitated towards a radicalism of he right. The major exception isthe ex- » qraordinary role played by black churches during the civil rights movement and op afterwards. Se ats 'As liberal theorists —many of whom are academics—become secularized, the f religious impulse does not vanish but ixe@iinareine a conception of the po- There politics is purfed inco an idealized theoretical realm where the out- the victim of discrimination—are to be gious impulse @euras\n the form of IMice as though dealing with d earthiness” of the economic. Rawls begins che transubstantiation of the political by ejecting the pragmatic solution to religious conflicts. He will sek instead igious heterodoxy by proposing an ideological orthodoxy of the “politically reasonable” and a proper language of citizenship that the adherents to a comprehensive doctrine are obliged to accept. IX. Tite REASONABLENESS OP LIBERALISM twhere be acts simply a private me a means, degrades himself a the role of mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. ‘Te olivia tae, in relation to civil scien is jus as spiritual Karl Max” In The Jewish thought when sifliciene reflexes remained to agonize the liberal conscience and dispose it ro re- LIBERAL JUSTICE 543, tain, for always consciouslyreligious categories in disguised form while decrying religious influences and insisting upon che separation of church and One reflex projected an idealized political domain where moral principles and altruism prevail and ideals of the common good, civic vite invoked. Ics the realm of formal equaiy and equal sighs approximate the political ideal, one imagines an Eden like ) or original position (Raws) where humans are conceived ‘without thei sinful material and social acquisitions or the burdens of their na- tional history. Ther soe possession is the faculty of reason. Reason and innocence necessary preconditions that allow humans to deliberate and reach the apostasy and a reenactment of the moment when the children of Israel forsake their God and hasten to worship the Golden Calf Rationality come inseparable. This placés an horted to become “ a good citize philosophy. Rawls declares that philosophy’s quest for truth in an independent ‘moral and physical order is incapable of providing the kind of workable, shared7 544 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN bass of sremencsequied of poi oncepson. Tonal pilsopby in cvitably provokes disagreement,” while, in contrast, a sobered political philoso- a ae “to examine whether some ‘mutually acceptable way these questions publicly estab fore broadly, Rawls con- ilosophy a the grand adjudicator ofthe disagreements in “the” and the values of political ‘The kind of agreement il philosophy seeks in an era of profound doc- tinal differences is embodied in the two principles described in A The ony of Justice. Ewe porpose “we” need “ro collec” our “sted convictions.” Fortis one “stars fom fare itself including its main institutions and the pretation, asthe shared fund of implicily ecog- system of cooperation. Persons in Rawls’ society will have a “put a “political conception of themselves” distinct from their “non-public identity’ ception o ble con ofiuice? ‘Moreover, when one presses a claim, no matter how “intense” apply to “the basic structure of a modem constitutional democracy, ety main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together i UBeRAL Justice se ‘not their politcal and social institutions are just.” They should be able to do th “Whatever their social position or more particular incerests."®? X. Tan Turear or Comprinenstve Docrainss But how is a public citizen to be created in a society where members adhere conflicting comprehensive doctrines? In Political Liberalism, while Rawls aga admits self-interest into the calculations of those in the original postion, sel interest virtually disappears when he discusses comprehensive doctrines. TI overriding concern isto distinguish the “reasonable” from the “rational” and install the reasonable as the prime virtue of both citizens and doctrines. The re sonable is, Rawls specifies, a more public quality than the rational. Citizens a reasonable if they accept the terms of reciprocity and fairness on which a socie cof the free and equal can communicate about political fundamentals even thou they entertain a variety of conflicting comprehensive doctrines.® Like the Pul tan congregant, reasonable persons are willing to testify “before one another” th they are prepared wo accep air terms of cooperation.” The seasonable can fai comprehensiveness ofthe doctrin, Even a democratic comprehensive do of comprehensive religious, philosoph “Towards that end liberalism assumes the responsibility for fixing the standax for public discourse. Accordingly, it finds thar the causes of disagreement are dt not to conflicts of interest, but to the “hazards” that accompany judgments. The: hhazards form “the burdens of reason” chat afflict the reasonable and lead to “re: sonable disagreement.” Their “sources” include conflicting evidence and its rek tive weight, vague concepts that need interpreting, differing “total” life experiencs and normative considerations, the necessity of selecting from the fll ringe of va ues, and adverse conditions under which judgments are often rendered. Sinc546 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN that all who participate in publ ciples that human life and the fulfil rationality as a basic principle of px of a democratic regime. When a believer attempts to offer a “public justifica- tion” on some political matter, she is cequired to partition her beliefs. She cannot appeal to her doctrine as such but only to che “reasonable” pat that accords with the prevailing conception of the political Should there exist “unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines,” these should be “contain{ed} . The test isin their wi rocity. Ifthey do, then an “ ‘exists that assures social stability. ts commitment to a broad comprehensive moral doc- comprehensive doctrines ‘ion of justice to “a module sonable comprehensive doctrines covery of the power in a polic- ical culeure. Culture becomes the method by which popularly held beliefs oper- LIBERAL Justice ste as the equivalent of a general wi cexcive power “imposed” on individ lective body.” The “family ... of very great political values” of constitutional regime “normally. will have suficient weight to override all other values that may. ‘come into conflice with the ‘These “very great values” consist ofthe princi- inquiry, “fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and, the methods and conclusions of science when ieesche would have smiled... XI, Linerdt, Pourriear Curture For while no one any longer supposes that a practicable politcal devotion 10 the Catholic or the Protestant futh ort any ns view, it may sil be thought shat gener and treated as an uncontested, unambiguous, homogenous domain. There is not a hine that political cul wufaccure whose products are de- «aatic society" asthe expression of apolitical conception of justice: ‘This public culture comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public raditions of thei interpretation (including those of wel as historic texts and dacuments that are of common knowled He emphasizes that comprehensive doctrines are part of “the background’: and belong to “the culture of the social, not of the politcal.” Contraty to Rawls, however, if those doctrines were truly in the “culture of the social,” then their bearers would be not only doctrinarians but members of various racial and ethnic groups and social clases. Society would thus appear as548 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN ulticultural and socially stratified rather than multidoctrinal, as different ways secognized that Rawlss ception of church membership is imped ‘upon the believer. Each: dadares as a rexpoasibiliy to pursue a conception of the good. Ctzenshipis pronounced a “moral” calling chat requires certain modes of conduct or civility. ‘Wen a cizen votes, for example, she is exerting a form of eoercion over others “a pblicconospton ofjustie” hat is“explicly (allegedly) the reason, and content are public. public goods; and is refers primarily not to the reason of the citizen but to specifically, ro the discourse of judges, government off- rel eminen her the aca, ote than debating and supporting, i is difficul to extract a conception of citizenship as an activity or as an experience inthe participation in and exercise of power. Nowhere docs Rawls mention local citizen. Instead citizens are to pretend to affecting the constitution and its amendment. The constitu- tional issues include voting, decisions about which religions are to be tolerated, and who is to be assured of fair opportunity or to hold property, Non-funda- ‘mental issues are most tax legislation, regulation of property sights, environmen ‘opportunity and the famous “difference ino ofA Theory of Justice are denied the status of constivutional fundamentals" UBeRAL JUSTICE 6 “The homogenizing, oppressive, character of public reason lies in its setting terms and style of public discussion, All voter, all citizens who engage in put muse conform: “Otherwise public discourse runs citizens talk before one another one way and vote < then” There are explicit guidelines for exercising public reason: no appeals comprehensive doctrines, only to “plain truths” (which was the language Puri often used to describe biblical teachings) and “the rules of evidence, inferen 3« publicly accountable, and most subtly politicized in cis further suggested that when certain coneroversial matters have bt they shouldbe “taken off” che “public agenda" and placed “beyond ties must agree to certain principles of justice on a shore list of alternatives gi by the tradition of moral and political Philosophy ams iacy—and sides with! the mote. ells a participatory democracy is den lect an aversion to socal conflcr that isin keeping with his elevation of stabil cooperation, and unity as the fundamental values. The political conception justice thar is ar the heart of his liberalism muse be “stable” and attract the “a ‘iance” of those who subscribe to conflicting comprehensive but reasonable d trines. The allegiance is pledged to the basic structure of the “constitutio regime.” The expansive meaning comprises *... society's main politi hhow they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation.’¢ 550 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN , “the basic seructure of modern const “the character and attitudes of the members from a comprehensive doctrine in that tuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public culture ofa democratic society” and is ‘equivalent, therefore, to its “basic values "That this formulation does not strike Rawls as iliberal is because the anony- mous power of acculturation has been pressed into service co do the work of “the fundamental suctural features of the public word” 18 Yer surely the efficacy ofa liberal conception of to shape the outlook and responses of citizens, cannot be con- capacity but will inevitably come to influence their out- philosophical, or moi ception of politcal culture, while doctrine, require him not only ire the adherents of “reaso ests of promoting Beyond its repressive tendencies, Rawls aversion to conflict causes him to deny to the political the vitality represented by those who firmly believe comprehensive doctrines. Ifit is not forced to defend itself, Rawls’s pu could easly become flaccid, dominated by stale discourses and ti I Fortunately shared values are sometimes less widely shared than the interpreters of offical values tend to believe or hope) ges. vote LIBERAL JusTICE XIL Linratism aN GoveRnance, ‘Towards the close of the nineteenth century Max Weber had asserted that capitalist class was ill-equipped to govern, that the culture of profit and s ‘interest rendered it unfit for a role that demanded disinterestedness and the n turing of a political class Raves, withoue confronting that charge, confirm it by failing to address the problem of political, as distinct from administrati relied instead upon rules and principles that would both sat! interest and appeal to a sense of fairness, There were no spe: norms, no cultural provision for those who would wield great power and be countable for its uses, In effect, Rawls was conceding that a capitalist soci could not, of itself, produce a governing class capable of surmounting i gins and ideology. Not long after the appearance of A Theory of Justice that vacuum would be to be filled. In the administration of George W. Bush (2001) the business ex utive became a familiar figure in the upper teaches of government: For the C] the transition was easy, He or (the exceptional) she was accust power and increas smpeting against rival companies changing circumstances, controlling a large bureaucratic structure—accuston to hierarchy and obedience, and all the while cultivating a charismatic public p sona. The proof of their political qualifications was the ease with which exe: tives moved between boardrooms and war rooms without experiencing cult shock ot learning block. The political and the corporate were being melded. sethes, signifying the emergence of a new political form—and the decline of older one. XIU. Neo-tiseratisw i rie Cor Wax ‘The near-universal praise for Rawlss com actual course of American were fa different from the p on to liberal theory obscured ¢ inated. Most academic economists and soc ral and anti-communist. The same could be said ‘many political theorists, despite the influential exceptions of Leo Strauss and school and the Anglophiles Russell Kirk and Wiliam Buckley all of whom we conservative, anti-liberal, elitist, and anti-communi552 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN From the perspective of the present, the midpoint between the defeat of one totalitarianism and the disintegration of another was the high-water mark of ism and che beginning of that ideology’ evolution from “socal ism; from a New Deal ideology—empha- ‘gn economies and anti- communist political parties, to open foreign markets for American goods and ‘American culture while establishing military bases and propping up dictatorial regimes throughout the world. ‘The new liberalism remained state-centered, but its state was now imperial, its reflexes conditioned by anti-communism and Cold War exigencies, outlook accommodative to elitism and its politics to techn policy and expertise. P gaged in cold and some hot wars the expansive assumptions thd theoreticians peifonce came tobe interwoven with and dependent upon, hose of the economy-and its corporate structures. Unsurprisingly, th ideology of the thirties rapidly evaporated, leaving scarcely a tra ‘What happened to the liberal tradition in America? During the period of its ascendancy, (from the 193¢ gad no coherent ideological val in che United Sti 1 paly af academic conservatism thar contributed is share of sand menacing ideologies. Jcemns and included the dev ‘centered rhetoric reflexive of the prolonged global rivalry with regimes depicted as dynamic, expanding, and radically evil! imaginary during the years from about 1940 to 1990 by demonic forces of epical dimensions: fanatical doctrines of i should have been unthinkable in a tary strategy that promised to by the reat of mu- tually assured destruction to both sides ("MAD"); and a post-war peace that brought a new and Id war,” whose scope encom- sm abroad but spies, ta at home. Itwas an updated LIBERAL JUSTICE 55 Roosevele’s quaint anachronism aboue capitalists as “economic royalists” evoke: practically no resonance, and the New Deal state was consistently underconcep tualized as a pragmatic accretion of programs with litle theoretical and no myth ical underpinning, In contrast the post-war inflation of the vocabulary of powe to fantastic proportions—many efforts at social programs were described a “wats,” e.g.. om poverty, drugs,crime, cancer, and even education—contributec 0 a contourles liberalism: myths are expansive, careless of boundaries, A quar ser-century after che New Deal its inheritors could smoothly couple an expansive ‘lLinclusive social liberalism of a "Great Socieey” with “the American super “Power” whose reach was global and interstellar, But chat appearance of a mega ‘state, tlumphanely atop the world, proved premature. ‘The Great Society collapsed, crumpled by a distant war, the: Vietnam War, th first war to be “experienced” as a television event, the war that symbolized hov massive power, when disconnected, decontextualized politically, and renderec abstract by its technologies, might flail about like “a hel janc” (in Presiden Nixon’ anxious phrase), Defeated abroad and harassed at home, the liberal stab began a gradual disengagement from social policy, masking its uncertainty by against the likes of Panama, Grenada, and, with a creaking ef fort, against Iraq in 1991. Largely under the aegis of liberal administrations, New Deal, Fair Deal, anc Great Society became intermixed with the experience of “total war” and the ac quisition of an empire—the Welfare State mutated into the National Securit State, then the Imperial State, episodes in the transformation of power toward ity and eventual mythologization—and accompanied by thi steady marginalization of the demos as social welfare was replaced by corporate welfare, the citizen by the sometime voter. lapse/defeat of communism differents Nazism and Italian Fascism. Some liber beral values. Thus confirmed in the essential rectitude and uni- versality oftheir own basic belief, liberals saw no need to re-examine fist prin- ciples and because “democracy” had conquered totalitarianism, they saw no need ‘o ask whether the mobilization of democracy for cold war had not begun the conscription of democracy to serve the l of a global power as mythi- «al as democracy itself would become. Its name, Superpower, was inspired not by any ideology or theory but by a comic strip. Far from being absurd, however, the usage unintentionally exposed Superpower Democracy as a contradiction. in554 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN terms and inaugurated the postmodern of presidential high offices in a republic, presidential p in the specific sense of aban- carnival for choosing one of the late rwentieth century was production for anointing “the jodern democracy’s elections to totalitarian elec- es singled out » publicists and’ pol resistance sprang up in those countries prompted some uneasy questions, ‘went unnoticed was encouraged by the particular features of totalitarian scientists, The! emergence of LIBERAL Justice or simply a manipulated and fearful mass? Was democ cy as exemplified by pre-Mussolini Ialy and the Weima Republic, a precondition for the emergence and consolidation ofthe distinctive ‘modern phenomenon of totalitarianism? The frst question implied that ther ‘was reason to be afraid of modern democracy; the second that there was good rea son to be aftaid for democracy. The eff uestion was to inhibie theorists from exploris notions of ap Similarly, the Volk”) made it virtually impossible to develop a politics emphasizing commus values other than nationalism or patriotism, Insofar as the question democracy was problematical, chey were symptomatic of future tensions becweei liberalism and democracy: while the former was becoming conceptualized in in dividualistic and elise or meriocratic terms (“inner directed”), the pasively allowing tlf eo be constructed as “the lonely crowd” or “mass"—and to be managed practically as an “ directed” electorate whose formative experience derived from the apolitics spheres of work and consumerism? AA picture of the citizenry constructed by political and social scientists accom plished an astonishing inversion ofthe electoral “democracy” staged by the Nazis rnot the enthusiastic masses endorsing the regime by a vote of 99 erent bari parody, an apathetic mass half of which could scarcely be ‘The consequence of a depiction of che electorate as bem tose would have a thinning effect upon democratic legitimacy that would be re flected during the '80s and.’90s in the mostly unopposed rollback of socia programs for the Many. The depol n of the citizenry, as rationalized is academic studies of voting behavi because based on the Stand monly coma was a peculiar combination that celebr: passivity One side eet of dhe YicemgsVormulation, a polaricy that it cepted a fundamental distinction™Of fascist chinking, was to rep of racism by marginalizing ic conceptually. The dualism of elive and:mass left nc significant space for other differences. That race was scarcely addressed during the decade following World War II was in some measure due to an uncritical a556 (CHAPTER FIFTEEN CHAPTER SIXTEEN the anti-capitalist sentiments that had been widespread in the thirties. The result was that the idea of democra tended to become disembodied, critically disconnected from the socio-economi ed “The social problems Power and Forms 1. Oup anp New Pouricat Foss, A social relasionship which is either claed or limits the admision of outsiders will be called an organization... Max Weber! rs were named monarchy, afatocracy and democracy ‘the predominance ofthe one, the few, or the many. While a particular -ommon for theorists to recognize hyb J competing or conflicting elements derived (oobilicy by birch lenexcept pethaps for moments of revolution”), never attained th by the wealthy few, was rarely invoked, even thot power of ca