IN THE STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA UNIS KENNETH DAVID MELTON and 2 ) a. 8 MARY ELIZABETH MELTON, ) ee & Individually, and as Administrators ) Sa 2 of the Estate of JENNIFER j 8 BROOKE MELTON, deceased, ) ° > Plaintiffs, ) ) CIVIL ACTION ( ( T1 ) FILEN®. A GENERAL MOTORS LLC, and ) pe THORNTON CHEVROLET, INC., ) ” Defendants. ) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT Plaintiffs Kenneth David Melton and Mary E) zabeth Melton respectfully move the Court to sanction Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”) for its discovery abuses, including the perjury of its engineer and its attempt to spoliate evidence through that perjury about the ignition key system in its Chevrolet Cobalt cars and similar small cars. GM also should be sanctioned for ' misleading the Court and for disobeying the Court’s discovery order to produce certain documents that relate to the safety-related defects in Cobalts, as well asPlaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 2 other cars with the same ignition key system. The grounds for the Meltons’ Motion are set out more fully below. L Brief Background The Meltons lost their daughter, Jennifer Brooke Melton (“Brooke”), to GM’s pre-production design and engineering choices in Brooke’s 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt, Brooke died on her 29th birthday because GM chose not to make a 57 cent repair to her ignition key system. Or, rather, she died because GM did not make the 57 cent repair, concealed the safety-related defects, did not honor its defect-reporting obligations to NHTSA and the public, did not timely recall the Cobalt, and elected to let people die, rather than fix the car—all because it was cheaper to do so. It was the classic business profits over people safety decision that GM has made before.’ In a word, Brooke’s continued life and safety did not present an “acceptable business case” to GM. Edward Ivey, a “GM engineer,” prepared a report that victims have called the “let them burn” memo for GM. Ivey later denied having done all the work for GM, and claimed that he was just sitting around one day and did a statistical analysis for his own edification. That was not true, as has been found. Nonetheless, in his Report, Ivey permitted GM to examine the cost of preventing "In 1973 McGhee, 837 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. App. 2002), Because GM concealed the Ivey Report’s true origins and actual distribution inside GM, (at least until GM attorneys were later deposed), the plaintiffs in GM’s other Georgia debacle, the Moseley v. General Motors Corp. case in Fulton County, Georgia, were not able to admit it into evidence. Had they done so, the verdict might have been far higher than $106 million.Plaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 3 IL The Critical Evidence Sought In the Meltons’ original case, they sought discovery of information, including all documents, related to the design and testing of the ignition switch in many GM cars, including the 2005-2007 Chevrolet Cobalts. TI, GMs Contempt and False Response a. The Court’s Compulsion Order GM fought discovery, as is its litigation nature. The Meltons moved to compel. On February 13, 2013, this Court ordered GM to “produce all documents relating to the design and testing of the ignition switch in certain GM cars, including 2005-2007 Cobalts.” In response to the Court’s Order, GM produced some, but not all of the documents that the Meltons now know exist. Specifically, GM chose not to produce any documents relating to the change in the ignition switch during the production of the 2007 Chevrolet Cobalt. b. GM Engineer’s Perjury On April 29, 2013, the Meltons’ counsel deposed Mr. Ray DeGiorgio, the lead design engineer for the ignition switch in Brooke's Cobalt. Working with information leamed from an expert deconstruct of the key system, the Meltons” counsel asked DeGiorgio if changes had been made to the detent in the ignition ? GM Document - PRTS - Complete Report N172404.Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 4 switch in 2005-2010 Cobalts, as well as the replacement ignition switches. DeGiorgio Dep. at 57-58. Under oath, he said no. Mr. DeGiorgio added that he had taken apart Cobalt ignition switches and determined there were no design changes in 2005-2007 ignition switches.. DeGiorgio Dep. ut 69-70. Mr. DeGiorgio went on to testify that he spoke with a representative of the ignition switch manufacturer, Delphi, and she told him that there were no changes made to the ignition switches in Cobalts. DeGiorgio Dep. at 117-118. He later signed his errata sheet, thereby confirming his answers and forgoing a last chance to swear truthfully. See DeGiorgio errata sheet, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. As later events show, Mr. DeGiorgio’s testimony was false and he perjured himself. On February 7, 2014, GM informed NHTSA that it was conducting Recall No. 13454 for certain 2005-2007 model year Chevrolet Cobalts and 2007 model year Pontiac G5 vehicles. On February 19, 2014, a Request for Timeliness Query of General Motors’ Safety Recall 13454 was sent to NHTSA. The timeliness query pointed out that GM had failed to recall all the vehicles with the defective ignition switches and had also failed to fulfill its legal obligation to report the safety-related defects to NHTSA within five days of discovering the defects. On February 24, 2014, GM informed NHTSA it was expanding the recall. GM, for the first time, also acknowledged that detent changes were madePlaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al y. General Motors, LLC, et al Page S to the ignition switches in Cobalts during the 2007 model year. GM then produced documents in response to congressional requests leading up to the April 1 and 2, 2014 hearings. Among the documents produced by GM is a document titled, “GENERAL MOTORS COMMODITY VALIDATION SIGN-OFF,” dated April 26, 2006. This document is attached as Exhibit B. According to this document, Delphi had met all of the sign-off requirements in order to provide a new ignition switch for certain GM vehicles. GM has acknowledged that the ignition switch in the Cobalt was included in this design change. The design change included a new detent plunger “to increase torque force in the switch.” Mr. DeGiorgio’s signature is on this page as the GM authorized engineer who signed off on this change to the ignition switch. This GM Commodity Validation Sign-Off shows that Mr. DeGiorgio repeatedly perjured himself during his deposition on April 29, 2013. Mr. DeGiorgio perjured himself in order to fraudulently conceal evidence from the Meltons that GM had signed off on the change in the ignition switch so that the Meltons, and ultimately a jury, would never know that GM was changing the switches in 2007 and later model year Cobalts and concealing these changes from Brooke, Mr. DeGiorgio perjured himself when he signed the errata sheet confirming that all the testimony was true and accurate. c. GM Perpetuates the FraudPlaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 6 On May 13, 2013, the Meltons served their Fifth Request for Production of Documents. In Document Request No. 1, the Meltons requested all documents relating to the change to the cap and spring in the Cobalt ignition switches. On June 17, 2013, GM filed its Response to the Fifth Request for Production of Documents. In its Response to Document Request No. 1, GM stated: As design release engineer Ray DeGiorgio testified, GM LLC did not request and was not asked to authorize or approve a change in the cap and spring in the ignition switch used in the 2008 Chevrolet Cobalt or in replacement ignition switches for the 2005-2007 Chevrolet Cobalt that would affect the torque required to move the key from the run to accessory position. GM LLC objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attomey-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine. GM served this response in its continuing effort to fraudulently conceal evidence from the Meltons that GM had signed off on the change in the ignition switch so that the Meltons, and ultimately a jury, would never know that GM was changing the switches in 2007 and later model year Cobalts and concealing these changes from Brooke. GM might wrongly contend that since the evidence has since been found that it was not spoliated or that there is a “no harm, no foul” situation, For the purposes of the Melton case that evidence was “spoliated,” just as surely as ifPlaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 7 GM had shredded a document, dumped magnetic data, or erased a video or.photo jpg file.- The result is the same, namely, the Meltons did not have the evidence to prepare their case, and could not factor it into their settlement and case-strength discussions IV. Sanctions For Spoliation a. Georgia Spoliation Law and Sanctions Georgia law abhors spoliation of evidence, including testimony, documents, and things. When a party destroys material evidence, the trial court is authorized to impose a wide range of sanctions on the offending party. Chapman v. Auto Owners Inc. Co., 200 Ga. App. 539, 543, 469 S.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1996); Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC v. Campbell, 258 Ga. App. 767, 768, 574 S.E.2d 923, 925-26 (2002). Sanctions are appropriate even when the evidence is negligently or recklessly destroyed. R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 246 Ga. App. 177, 181, 539 S.E.2d 873, 877-78 (2000). Georgia courts particularly disdain and punish spoliation when the offending party is aware of impending litigation, but shirks its legal obligation to preserve evidence, Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 542, 469 S.E.2d at 785. Starting in Chapman, and adopted again in Campbell, the Georgia Court of Appeals set out five factors to use in deciding sanctions for spoliation of evidence, First, “whether the [party] was prejudiced as a result of the destruction.Plaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 8 Campbell, 258 Ga. App. at 768-69, 574 S.E.2d at 926. Second, “whether the | prejudice could be cured.” Id. Third, “the practical importance of the evidence.” Id, Fourth, “whether the [offending party] acted in good faith” Id. And, finally, “the potential for abuse if expert testimony about the evidence was not excluded.” | Id. accord. Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 542, 469 S.B.2d at 785. The Georgia Court of Appeals has also held that “even when the conduct is less culpable [than the malicious destruction of evidence,] dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the [opposing party] is extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately [prosecute] its case.” Campbell, 258 Ga. App. at 770, 574 S.E.2d at 927. In deciding the appropriate sanction, the Court must weigh the degree of the spoliator’s culpability against the prejudice to the opposing party. Id.. Based on these principles, the Georgia Court of Appeals has often upheld j case dismissal when a party has been found to have intentionally or recklessly destroyed crucial and irreplaceable evidence. b. The Range of Available Sanctions. As the opinions in Chapman, Campbell, Lee, and Bowen show, the Court may impose a variety of sanctions against the spoliator, depending on its degree of culpability. The sanctions range from dismissal of the case, preclusion of expert witness testimony, fact establishment, and/or a jury charge that the evidence would have been adverse to the spoliator. Chapman, 220 Ga. App. at 541-42, 469 S.E.2d at 785-786;Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 9 Campbell, 258 Ga. App. at 768, 574 S.E.2d at 926; R.A. Siegel Co:, 246 Ga. App. at 181, 539 S.E.2d at 878. ¢ also O.C.G.A. § 24-4-22, Other appropriate sanctions are available as well, Indeed, “the trial court has wide latitude to fashion sanctions on a case-by-case basis, considering what is appropriate and fair under the circumstances.” Bouye & Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 274 Ga. App. 758, 618 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2005) (quoting R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 246 Ga. App. 177, 179, 539 $.E.2d 873, 876 (2000) In Bouve, a premises liability defendant orchestrated the destruction of key evidence, namely, a rape kit, and the trial court imposed sanctions. The “appropriate” sanction was a “judicial finding” that the plaintiff in that case had been raped, a disputed fact that the rape kit would have helped to prove. Id. at 764, 618 S.E.2d at 655. The Court of Appeals upheld the sanction, reiterating that the “list” of potential sanctions set out in R.A. Siegel Co. and other cases was “not intend[ed] . .. to be exhaustive.” Id. at 764, 618 S.B.2d at 656. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 290 Ga. App. 541, 659 S.B.2d 541 (2008) (store that destroyed videotape of on-premises shooting precluded from contesting the contents of the tape as recalled by plaintiff and her mother, who viewed the tape before it was destroyed); Kroger Co. v. Walters, 319 Ga. App. 52, 735 S.E.2d 99 (2012) (Kroger’s Answer struck for spoliating a videotape and acting in bad faith in also concealing that spoliation); Howard v. Alegria, 321 Ga. App. 178, 739Plaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Malton et al v. General Motors, LLG, et al Page 10 S.E.2d 95 (2013) (trucking company’s Answer struck for spoliating black box evidence and also concealing:that spoliation). Accordingly, the Court may fashion pretty much any sanction it wants to fit the misconduct and to nullify any benefit from the spoliation. c. Analysis of the Harm To The Meltons. An application of the Chapman/Campbell factors to GM’s spoliation in this case, and the attendant facts and circumstances, shows the following: i. The Meltons are prejudiced as a result of the Mr. DeGiorgio’s false testimony. He denied them the right to present their case based on fact, and not falsity. ii, The prejudice cannot be cured. False testimony is by definition prejudicial to the party against whom it is directed. Perjury by definition harms the listener and the Court, as well as the integrity of the entire judicial process whose foundation is unvarnished truth, not whitewashed falsity. ‘The immense practical importance of the evidence is beyond dispute. ‘The length of the detent and its torque are the key issues in the case. Mr. DeGiorgio’s false testimony goes to the heart of the liability and defect case. There is no evidence more practically important than the internal design of the ignition and the detent. iv. GM most certainly did not act in good faith. The MeltonsPlaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 11 respectfully suggest that false swearing and perjury equal bad faith 100 times out of 100. Nothing more be said on that issue. v. Factor five weighs against GM as well, since the Meltons’ experts were not allowed to take into account the correct history of the detent and key system changes. d. The Requested Spoliation Sanctions As the spoliation cases show, the Court has extremely wide latitude in crafting an appropriate sanction to fit the circumstances behind the spoliation. It can dismiss complaints or strike answers, which of course is the strongest sanction. It can include an adverse inference, which is usually appropriate with some other added sanction. It can include fact and issue preclusion. The sanction can, and should, prevent the spoliator from denying or contesting the very facts it tried so hard to hide. Frankly, because the Court has the power to strike answers, anything in the middle range surely passes legal muster. The Meltons ask the Court for the following sanctions, taking into account what GM tried to accomplish, the scope of its fraud and dishonest efforts, and the intended (or least fully expected) harm: i. The Court should strike GM’s Answer. Such a sanction is appropriate where there has been a wilful, wanton, and prejudicial destruction of critical evidence. The Meltons do not include this sanction as a mere “throwPlaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 12 away.” GM’s misconduct and its engineer’s perjury warrant dismissal. Lesser sanctions will not punish GM adequately: ii, The Court should order that GM not be allowed to contest the rescission of the Settlement Agreement entered into previously in this case. Again, if the Court can strike GM’s Answer, it can strike a defense in the Answer. iii, The Court should also order GM to pay all of the Meltons’ prior costs of discovery. iv. If the Court is not inclined to dismiss GM’s Answer, the Court should enter a preclusion order prohibiting GM from contesting the defect and whether it caused Brooke’s death. This particular sanction is akin to that imposed in Bouve & Mohr, LLC. As noted above, the premises defendant destroyed the rape kit, which would have helped to prove that a rape had occurred. 764 Ga. App. at 764, 618 S.E.2d at 655. “After finding that evidence had been spoiled willfully, in bad faith, and to [the plaintifi’s] detriment, the court essentially removed from the jury’s consideration the issue to which the evidence related.” Id. The Meltons ask the Court for a similar sanction, namely, that it remove from the jury's consideration any issue about whether the defect existed and whether it caused Brooke’s death. Finally, as part of the appropriate sanction the Court should tell the jury about the spoliation.Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 13, vy. That GM be ordered to produce Ray DeGiorgio live at trial when " this case goes to trial vi. The Meltons do not believe that, an “adverse inference” jury charge would cure the harm to them, or adequately punish GM’s intentional spoliation, or do them substantial justice for the loss of critical visual evidence. GM’s conduct is particularly egregious and intentional. It is bad faith of the highest order. If all GM suffers for its misconduct is an adverse inference, then its decision to lie and conceal evidence might have been worth it. V. Rule 37 Sanctions In addition to spoliation sanctions, GM’s conduct warrants sanctions under Rule 37 of the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure. Howard, 321 Ga. App. at 187; 739 S.E.2d at 103 (court imposed spoliation and Rule 37 sanctions). a. Rule 37 Law and Sanctions Rule 37 permits sanctions for discovery abuses and violations of court orders. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37; Resource Life Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 304 Ga. App. 719, 734-39, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010). If the violation is egregious enough, the complaining party need not have obtained a compulsion order or even filed a motion to compel. Howard, 321 Ga. App. at 329, 739 S.E.2d at 104. If the deposition or written discovery response is evasive or incomplete, as an outright lie would be, Rule 37 treats the responses as a total failure to respond. Id. Of course,Plaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al y. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 14 here, GM-failed to obey the Court’s discovery order and committed outright perjury to conceal critical defect evidence. DeGiorgio Dep. at 57-58. The perjury by GM’s engineer can only be described as the gravest of discovery abuses. As the Court in Howard noted: ‘An interrogatory answer that falsely denies the existence of discoverable information is not exactly equivalent to no response. It is worse than no response. When there is no response to an interrogatory or the response is devoid of content, the party serving the interrogatory at least knows that it has not received an answer. It can move the court for an order to compel a response. If the response is false, however, the party serving the interrogatory may never learn that it has not really received the answer to the interrogatory. The obstruction to the discovery process is much graver when a party denies having the requested information than when the party refuses to respond to an interrogatory asking if such information is available. Id. at 188, 739 S.E.2d at 104 (emphasis in original). Rule 37 sanctions are plainly warranted here. Id.; accord Deep South Cons , 248 Ga. App. 183, 186, 546 S.E.2d 302 (2001) (Complaint struck for failure to produce documents); Resource Life Ins. C Buckner, 304 Ga. App. 719, 734-39, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010); City v. Griffin v, Jackson, 238 Ga. App. 374, 377-82, 520 S.E.2d 510, (1999) (defendant’s answer struck when it repeatedly lied about the existence of certain documents); accord Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co, 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (1th Cir. 1993) (Suzuki’s Answers struck for discovery violations that concealedPlaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 15 GM’s negative rollover review of and rejection for sale of the SUV that became the Suzuki Sarnurai): b.. The Requested Rule 37 Sanctions As with spoliation, the Court has wide latitude to impose a range of Rule 37 sanctions to punish GM for its discovery abuse and violation of the Court's discovery order. See Howard, 321 Ga. App. at 187, 739 S.B.2d at 103 (“trial judges have broad discretion in controlling discovery, including the imposition of sanctions”); Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542 (courts enjoy “broad discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for violation of discovery orders” and obligations), Those sanctions, again, can range from the striking of GM’s answer, issue preclusion, impositions of costs, and so on. Given that the Court can strike GM’s Answer here, any lesser sanction’ is also appropriate. The Meltons ask the Court to impose one or more of the following sanctions: i, That GM’s Answer be stricken. The Meltons believe that this is the only effective sanction for what GM has done. > The Meltons do not seek one of the two sanctions imposed in King v. Dillon ‘Transport, Inc,, 2012 WL 592191 (S.D. Ga. 2012). There, the Court made the discovery abuser’s lawyer hand write out federal Rule 26 verbatim and deliver it to the Court. Coupled with an expense sanction against the party, imposition of that lesser sanction was an effective additional judicial response. Here, it is not yet known to what extent, if any at all, GM’s counsel in the first iteration of this case helped, caused, or tolerated the discovery abuse and perjury. That will likely be the subject of a later motion involving the crime-fraud exception to the attorney- client privilege and work product doctrines.Plaintiffs? Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 16 ii. That GM be prohibited from asserting any defense to the rescission claim. By its perjury and disobedience to a court order, and other discovery abuses, GM induced the first Settlement Agreement. But for the fraud and discovery abuse, the Meltons would not have éntered into it. Accordingly, it is fitting and proper that one of the sanctions be that GM cannot now raise the Settlement Agreement as a bar to the Meltons litigating this case as it should have been litigated in the first place. iii, That GM be ordered to produce Ray DeGiorgio live at trial when this case goes to trial. iv. That GM pay all of the Meltons’ discovery costs in the first iteration of this case. VI. Inherent Powers Sanctions ‘The Court has inherent powers to sanction GM as well. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1545; Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1447 (11th Cir. 1985). A court’s inherent powers to manage its affairs extends to the litigants before it and may be imposed for bad faith conduct and discovery abuse. Id.; accord Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n. 14 (1978). The Meltons ask the Court to use those powers, in addition to its many powers set out above, to sanction GM as requested in the two “requested sanctions” sections above.Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 17 VII. Closing Thoughts on Discovery Our judicial systém only works if discovery works, and if witnesses tell the truth, and are sanctioned for not doing so. As one court has said in the discovery context: Despite the barriers of technicality and quiddities of procedure which infuse our legal system, at enormous cost, to insure that litigation constitute a search for the truth, our ultimate reliance must be found in mutual trust and decency. Though the conduct of [the discovery abuser and her counsel]and expert offer stark evidence to the contrary, litigation is not a game of hare and hounds where rules are easily bent, where truth is skirted by lies and evasions and cheap victory is sought at the expense of fairness and candor. Even if the cynics are correct in saying that such practices are endemic to the system, it is necessary to say in this case that they will not be tolerated. People v. Haase, 781 P.2d 80, 83 n. 2 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added). The Georgia Supreme Court has very recently put it similarly: [t]he civil discovery process is supposed to work to allow the parties to obtain the information they need to prove and defend their cases before impartial juries. Discovery is not supposed to be a game in which the parties maneuver to hide the truth about relevant facts, and when a party does intentionally mislead its adversary, it bears the risk that the truth will later be revealed and that the judgment it obtained will be re-opened to allow a new trial based on the truth. Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, ___S.E.2d__ (2014). The Meltons likewise ask this Court not to tolerate what GM has done.Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support ‘Melton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 18 VOL. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Meltons ask the Court to grant their Motion and enter the requested sanctions against GM. DATED: May 12,2014. Respectfully sybmitted, Georgia Bar No. 186100 Patrick A. Dawson Georgia Bar No. 005620 Of Counsel 531 Roselane Street Suite 200 Marietta, GA 30060 (770) 427-5588 BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, IS & MILES, P.C. Benjamin E. Baker, Jr. Georgia Bar No. 032926 Of Counsel 218 Commerce Street Post Office Box 4160 Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 269-2034Plaintiffs’ Motion For Sanctions, And Brief In Support Malton et al v. General Motors, LLC, et al Page 19 8 OD & BERNARD, P.C. fenneth R. Berard, Jr. Georgia Bar No. 054844 8470 Price Avenue P.O. Box 1154 Douglasville, Georgia 30133-1154 (770) 920-8350 Attorneys for Plaintiffs1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2a 22 23 24 25 RAY DEGIORGIO April 29, 2013 MELTON vs. GENERAL MOTORS 212 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET Our Assignment No.: 429136 Case Caption: Mélton v General Motors DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY ¥ declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the entire transcript of my deposition taken in the captioned matter or the same has been read to me, and the same is true and accurate, save and except for changes and/or corrections, if any, as indicated by me on the DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET hereof, with the understanding that I offer these changes as if still under oath. Signed on the 23 day of __MAy. + 204 Ey See RAY DEGIORGIO EXHIBIT A 2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comv ea a oe 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 RAY DEGIORGIO April 29, 2013 MELTON vs, GENERAL MOTORS. 213 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET Reason for change: wiews wotb Uso BY cme? RERETER. 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