Political Law

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)

POLITICAL LAW
HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to
the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable
sovereignty also in the field of international relations."
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is
vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created
two international persons the Holy See and Vatican City.
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
"sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states. In
a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political
but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican
City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the
Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state".
HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014
We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then Ministry of Public
Works and Highways, now DPWH, was created under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981
(EO 710). EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public
Highways and transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works of
Highways.
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al. vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent.
However, a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was

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committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation
and national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A
petition was filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the
constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII 2)
required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for
people's initiatives and such lack could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also
could not delegate its legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate
rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so under law.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples initiative. However, his
petition did not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative
did not meet the requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and
would render the initiative void, since there should be both direct proposal and authorship by the
person affixing their signature to the petition.
TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic political creed of the
nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

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conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993
Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme
Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing,
held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the
Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of
Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist
from the inception of mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing.
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the
historical background, nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all
the major Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining
the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny of these cases
would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams
of interpretation - separation and benevolent neutrality - the well-spring of Philippine
jurisprudence on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room
for accommodation.
IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine
the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that
the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the

Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National
Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO
MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and

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to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly
established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction
or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991
Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM
Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as
Representative, was not able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to
take office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve
as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official actually serves. The
Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo
shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from
re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may be affected
by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was
assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but
that it involves the division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is
simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, section 5(4).
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list
seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties
participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the
maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the threeseat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54
available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party
one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of
the 1987 Constitution. In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum
vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of

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the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b)
of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be
given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House
of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill
up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in
the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent
upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number
of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first
round of seat allocation.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to
a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as
"wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding
in SUVs.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a
voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

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Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
(sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary session),
statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress. It
also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of Congressional premises while
in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not
connected with the discharge of their office.
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, being appointed to
other government posts, does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is
not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in
view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec.
13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without
forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to
another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts
before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with
forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a
person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate
the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp
v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to
render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn
147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p
388, 40 ALR 941)." Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office
shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain
kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the
second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).
AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

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As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding
Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House
does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House.
There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of
the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12)
of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt about Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just
the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained
OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which
petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a
member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power
to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The criteria for valid delegation are that:(1)
Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No.
170338, December 23, 2008
It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice
of. It consists of publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after
said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state
that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA 8792, an
electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and
regulations. The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12
Senators as it is a continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state
that they expire after every Senate.

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BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914, November 20,
1991
Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure
and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator
Enriles privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the
legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.
SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is
compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a greater imperative to
enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department heads can only exempt themselves by
a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on whom the executive
power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a
collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in
inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or
Executive Secretary.
Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege, there can
be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of
executive privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based
on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious
acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by

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either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to
present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.
LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute
heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in language sufficient to
notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title. Complying with the second
directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to read a bills entire text
during deliberations.
BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT
AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since
these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lumpsum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget

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within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced
to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda
and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.
TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program
by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes
and court decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it stated that savings as a
concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial
determination.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39. Authority to
Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General
Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be
allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law:
Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project
to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated
for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay
for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

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On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department,
office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such,
Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority
of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the
savings in other items of his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot
serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under
the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so
long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were present, namely:
1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a
candidate, listening to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly
transfer of power, declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the
presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution.
Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal
prosecution, then he would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized
Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence
refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal
penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states
that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification
were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office, neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A preamble is really not an
integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the

Political Law

pardon was intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the
pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643, September
4, 2008
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President.
It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among
others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the
process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions
of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It
possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by
public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs.
Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional
Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale; under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there
are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers

Political Law

who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of
them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al.,

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held
by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions
to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status,
rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the concerned GOCCs are
also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of
these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by
the respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and
functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such being the
case, the designation of Duque was unconstitutional.

Political Law

MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015
The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then President Estrada of the
grant of additional allowances and benefits. MIA failed to prove its existence. The alleged
approval of the President was contained in a mere photocopy of the memorandum... The original
was not presented during the proceedings. A copy of the document is not in the Malacaang
Records Office.
Further, the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double compensation proscribed by
Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.
DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May,
letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular
presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in
which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to
fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution
could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period
for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers
neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under
Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to,
because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court,
or in any of the lower courts.
GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those appointments to
offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are
made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country
indirectly after the end of his term.
IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the Presidents wisdom but the
matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.
SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

Political Law

Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required for calling out the
armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it springs from
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is
not the same as a declaration of martial law.
DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino.
She invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the
Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting
people's general welfare, preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace,
attending to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging the
President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power. Residual powers are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare.
YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999
A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under
the constitution were 1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to
which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of
government.

Political Law

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular
measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or
constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH
G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as
to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen
on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the
major branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the
Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a
major branch of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of
the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO,
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case
where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or
challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the
favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put,
when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to
a judicial post becomes unanimous instead of the majority vote required in the preceding
section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term integrity as an essential qualification for
appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that integrity
as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that
the unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in
issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral
uprightness.

Political Law

ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.

FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No.
173121, April 3, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to
exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for
impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990
Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec.
1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on
Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." The SC agreed. The
appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence of
ConCom from the executive department.
DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new
LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned
such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization was not permanent and stable.
The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the Philippine
President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a
democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid
down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its
representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary

Political Law

alliances or factional divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may

transpire in the political alignments of its members.
AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3,
2013
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police
power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited,
regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking,
hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property
condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of
collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest
of public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes
injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a citys territory into
residential and industrial areas).
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms
to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept
of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power
has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police
power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nations
legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974
The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property
with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their
possession did not also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent.
It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession
with a permanent character when the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php
10.00 however was quite high taking in consideration that the said properties could be sold on a

Political Law

range of Php 2.50 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The
proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012
Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just compensation, the law
on stock distribution option acknowledges that landowners can require payment for the shares of
stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital
stock of the corporation.
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO
ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA CAUSING vs. THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due process, the petitioners
filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA. In order to be
proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or
separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges
against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. In the case at bar, the
investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was
then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options
and the entire process that the case would undergo. Thus, the petitioners could not argue that
Cadet Cudia was not afforded due process.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

Political Law

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the PTCs
investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal protection. The
Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear presumption
of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to overcome that
presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a preliminary step to
selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory
purpose. However, petitioner has sorely failed in discharging that burden.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained.
Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the
dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the
rally.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Political Law

It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on
freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a contentbased restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed
with.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral which
aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the
COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation
which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELECs breach of the
petitioners fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election. Thus, the
COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins were not paid for by any
candidate or political party and the candidates therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It
was part of the petitioners advocacy against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit to
free speech of candidates during elections but do not limit the rights of broadcasters to comment
on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners, as the petitioners are private individuals who
have lost their right to give commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the
tarpaulin removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the tarpaulins is
fundamentally part of protected speech, as it is important to convey the advocacy of the
petitioners, who are also part of the electorate. More importantly, every citizens expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it
is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by
any candidate, political party or party-list group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction
to issue its order as it lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third,
the tarpaulins and their messages are not religious speech, as they do not convey any religious
doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church
doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995
Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts
and individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar than which, upon its facts,

Political Law

there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it
relates to public comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order.
SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006
(Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election
of national candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to
publish surveys covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their
right to free speech and expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST.
THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands
of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and
(3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals to control information
about themselves.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and
ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a
business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a
person have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing his property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy.
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997

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Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of
prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which
commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in
Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of
public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The
Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost
of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the
Philippines. The governments goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal.
The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not to any church.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957
American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation
distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to
comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay
municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS
paid in protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court
dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayors permit.
Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because such license fee
constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.
EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who
were expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by
their parents. As Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their
religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship
which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department
Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should
participate in the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right
to religious profession and worship and their right to free education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)
The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for
public viewing as it offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that
INC is protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent
or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is
not an attack against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not
a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs

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power to regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz
regarding the Director of Posts power to check as to whether or not publications are of a
libelous character.
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919
The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.
CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS
NOY, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused during custodial
investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its definition to include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer
must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist
in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police
station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station.
MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which
the Miranda doctrine applies when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive

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setting. The rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A
person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence,
the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, Marieta may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not even
being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not
restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that
she was forced or pressured to say anything.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for
any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article
II of the law. Hence, a drug test can only be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested
for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To make the provision applicable to all persons
arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase a person
apprehended or arrested in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory
drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. Moreover, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and frisk. Stop and frisk
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and
the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure
that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

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The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer. Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that they
themselves observe whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police officer who should observe facts that
would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt
the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected
be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon
ones basic right to security of ones person and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled
searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine reason
requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.
MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R.
No. 203335. February 18, 2014
Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel; likewise
with RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the
Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the
RPC and RA 9775.

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction
deemed not to have lost it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time
when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease
Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. It provides that

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those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002
A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S.
citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The person may only be
said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he repatriates or by an act of Congress,
but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the residency requirement for
elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant
visa and has waived his status as a non-resident.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No.
183110, October 7, 2013
A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a
court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner
acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a
Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.
ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928
Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote.
After completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office
though his cancellation of voters registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to
deposit in the mails on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the Court explained that the registration
of a voter does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the
right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No.
193314, February 26, 2013
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify

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as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being
barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply.
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136,
December 2, 2014
The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The Court
emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is
ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs,
it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility
of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The
determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Thus, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling
Kimberlys COC and denying the latters substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny
due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC once more gravely abused
its discretion.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698,
February 25, 2014
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify the
cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to
Qualifications for elective office (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications
necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled
with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate.
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011
We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, contrary
to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing
"Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the
procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates
(retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission
on Elections explains that "the procedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot
be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of
disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act

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on nuisance candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for
filing "sec. 78" petitions under the oec is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the
filing of COCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by
the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for
another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication
are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing
"Section 78" petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we
therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a
disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due
course, the candidate cannot be validly substituted.
RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013
When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should
be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014
San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The
COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the disqualification petition. In the
said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito was distributing an Orange Card with the intent to
entice voters to vote for him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable amount for campaign
funds. Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have been conducted prior to the
decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that, As contemplated in
paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a complaint for disqualification filed before the
election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether
the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before
the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint
was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of
the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.
PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009

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Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before
the campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a
certificate of candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a
candidate is only liable for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not
before. Any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period, when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate.
Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA
J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters
pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary
civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need
of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal
has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly
chose as their rightful leader.
ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA
G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014
It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of
the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical
fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old
Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are
elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and
fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is
disqualified to serve another term a Sangguniang Member.
Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not
undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or
without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still
be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February
24, 2015

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Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due process for being
considered a nuisance candidate even before a clarificatory was even conducted. The SC ruled
that nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate." To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates
of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation
may be motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, subject to an
opportunity to be heard. Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had
already declared petitioner a nuisance candidate even before the clarificatory hearing. This was
an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized
to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations or reasonable
basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right
thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is
something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not
free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a
particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly
explained with sufficient basis. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal
mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to
implement.
FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or
tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and
mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court
or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is
an adjudication on the merits.
REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No. 147096,
January 15, 2002
The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation,
thus, they did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in

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accordance with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the
operative act that gives rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the
ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the
National Library, and other public officers or agencies specified by Congress. Publication in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required before laws can take effect.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011
The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was
no need to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law
Centers guidelines, interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be filed
with the center.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No. 170599,
SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasijudicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this
issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for
another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB assumed the powers and functions
of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases,
this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of
responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the
A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the
line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two
ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a
format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also
adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in

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substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an

administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)
Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order
to compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature
delegated to the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law
to delegate to Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will be just and
reasonable.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)
Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it
filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the
Adjudicator on the land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as
a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans
petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs.
JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014
Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It amounts
to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from
the service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of
falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on
government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of
an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act,
as in this case. The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of
public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a
public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society has
consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal
principles, and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the
norms envisioned for our public service.

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SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007

All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and
such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local
government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the
appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after
publication. In this case, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions
involved actually became vacant.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES UNION
(CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE, et al.,
G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014
Apropos then is the Courts ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v.
Barin, to wit: however, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal
of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a
legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is
no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does
not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its
related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Based
on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence of any bad faith, we rule
that the ATO employees right to security of tenure was not violated.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES
G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending
authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner
Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner
Mallari. The defense of respondent Cortes that her appointment was made by the Commission
En Banc and that his father, a member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his
appointment did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to
be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the
appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and
neutrality of the Commission En Banc.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.
VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

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The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a highly
urbanized citys should be participated by the qualified registered voters of the entire province of
Nueva Ecija not of Cabanatuan City only. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided
in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase implies,
"substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the
geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation
lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of corporate power ends and that
of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the
ambit of the constitutional provision.
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA
R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
Designing and implementing a local government units own "organizational structure and
staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local
governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient
governmental services especially at the local government level require rational and deliberate
changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time. However, the assailed decision by
respondent Commission on Audit was anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 186, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4968, which proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for
government employees.
NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area
requirement when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands is
expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites
for the creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local
Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of the
exemption in the case of provinces was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to
reflect the true legislative intent. This will also be consistent with the declared policy to provide
said local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units in order
to achieve the desired results.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
The MMDAs power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in
Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with
legislative power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can
only lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.

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LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011

The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed that
Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the
Senate during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws
belong to a class of their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other
natural resources).
AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province.
Records of the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not the sole determinant
of the creation of a legislative district.
SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be
delegated the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the
Constitution but only Congress may create provinces and cities.
ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the
autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term region used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766
(Organic Act of the CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an
autonomous region; otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the
Ifugao Local Government Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom
will be exercising executive and legislative powers over the same area.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994
The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto
municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of
governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality) that point to the states recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality
of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, which
states that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the
status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the legality of EO 353 only thirty

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years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision should be timely raised.
SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009
The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is
a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to
effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units,
free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this automatic realease
of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or
suspending its release to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in
court as to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012
There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations
Act, even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services
involved in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National Government,
which it may designate to implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of local
autonomy does imply the establishment of local government units into mini-states, as what is
involved in local autonomy is decentralization of administration and not of power.
GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the
Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings.
Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police
power, but the methods and means used in exercising such power to protect public health,
morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance in
question is valid as the citys primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the
city since these arcardes were intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the
sidewalk for pedestrians.
SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city116 subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.
The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the
absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that
Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

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PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006

The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its
basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or
hospital, and not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline
filling stations and gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there
was no due process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance (Paraynos
gasoline filling station) without proper judicial proceedings.
CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355,
October 31, 1919
Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of
expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does
not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a
particular property is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on
expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is private but
the second condition (public purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the
street was necessary and its extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary
as other lots have been offered to the city free of charge.
JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230, August
9, 2005
The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local
government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property; b) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; c) There is payment of just
compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent
laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no offer because the letter
Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineers office only proved its intent to
acquire the property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.
ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the
municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as
mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances
levying taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.
QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006

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Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and exclusively
used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by
the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies
the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as
Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec.
232 of the Local Government Code which provides that a province or city or municipality
within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property...not
hereinafter specifically exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt
certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same
phrase exclusive of this franchise in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayantes
exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to
once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power all of the franchisees properties
actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate tax
because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality
refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation
imposed by Congress on the local governments exercise of the power to tax. Furthermore, the
power of local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed strictly
against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.
QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008
While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise
create sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers.
In interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor
of municipal corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other taxes provision does not expressly
provide in clear and unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and
as a claim of tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABSCBN is liable for Quezon Citys franchise tax.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16, 2008
Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly
provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts
legislative franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both
local and national taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal

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revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for
public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty
of a local executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to
defective streets, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City
Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from negligence in
general, regardless of the object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective
streets in particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street
where Teotico was injured was a national highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the
Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality on which responsibility is placed. It is enough that the said province, city or
municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road.
TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978
The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does
not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate
a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of
the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but
merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service.
KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003
Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since one party is an
independent component city. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction
over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, the general
rules governing jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to
adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs
have the power to hear and resolve the dispute in the case at bar.
SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

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The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall election
as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on
serving for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code.
Any subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be disqualified from running
because of the three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and he must have fully served three consecutive terms. In this
case, there was an interruption in Potenciosos second term as municipal councilor as he
succeeded the retired Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by
operation of law and does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the
succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of office (which does not interrupt the
continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully served his second term and as
such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.
MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003
The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective
official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once
Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume
office and exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to
stop him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the
writ of execution pending appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision
proclaiming Fermo as winner of the election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was
occupying the office of Barangay Captain was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was
a mere formality, because through the stay of the MTCs decision, it was as if the writ of
execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.
VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term dual
citizenship as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the certificate
of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto,
such a declaration, under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this
case, Lopez should not be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino

Political Law

father. Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an
alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her Filipino citizenship
since a renunciation must be express to result in the loss of citizenship.
MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Manzano should not be disqualified because the dual citizenship meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the
Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual
allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his election of
Philippine citizenship.
MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over
municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before
the Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances
contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be
considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may formally
charge and suspend the petitioner, there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.
TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void.
The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race, one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a
candidate) or to a petition to deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded
on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which
is the cancellation or denial of due course of the persons certificate, with the said person not
treated as a candidate at all as if she never filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled
does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore cannot be substituted by another person.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011

Political Law

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives
notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).

VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a
belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the
case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga
omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international
law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.
As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has
lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan,
from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide
on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that
are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis
in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis
of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R. No.
173034, October 9, 2007
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Political Law

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by
the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with
foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treatymaking, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)
Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread
terror among the civilian population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The
Court convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are expected to result, the attack
should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a reasonably well-informed person
in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available
to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging PenaIrala, then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage
Paraguayan. The Court held that deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated
customary international law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.