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Did G.E. Moore show that goodness is a simple, indefinable

property?

Moores aim was to understand the nature of the property goodness

(1903: 9). He is a non-naturalist, arguing against ethical naturalists
who define moral expressions, such as goodness, by natural
properties (Moore, 1903: 12), such as a desire to desire or pleasure.
He does this by his Open Question Argument (OQA). Moores approach
to defining what something is, is to take the whole overall meaning
(1903: 10) and define it by reducing it to its simpler properties, which
are indefinable (1903: 8). He claims that goodness is not composed
of parts and draws an analogy between it and the colour yellow to
demonstrate this (Moore, 1903: 8). He argues that goodness is a
simple notion similar to yellow, stating you cannot in simple terms
explain to anyone who does not already know [goodness and yellow]
(Moore, 1903: 7). What he means by this is that goodness is a
simple, indefinable property because it cannot be further reduced to
simpler parts which define it.

I will argue that Moores OQA fails. In 1 I shall outline Moores OQA
where he argues any analysis of goodness does not mean the same
thing as goodness and thus concludes that goodness is a simple,
indefinable property. Then, I will explain why I have chosen the
meaning interpretation of the two interpretations I will give for the
OQA. In 2 I shall present Dalys successful objection to the OQA. This
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objection demonstrates that, on introspection, it does not have to be

obvious that two terms mean the same thing for their synonymy to be
true. In 3, I will argue the OQA is unsupported in making its
conclusion. This will be done by showing examples of expressions
which mean different things but both denoting the same property. This
is to point out that regardless as to whether Moore has shown by his
OQA goodness is a simple, indefinable property due to lack of
synonymy, it can be that both expressions denote the same property.

1
Moore argues that goodness is a simple, indefinable property by
stating, whatever definition be offered [of goodness], it may always
asked ... of the complex [analysis of goodness], whether it itself is
good (1903: 13). I will now set out my translation of Moores
argument into the following logical form:

P1 For any analysis (A) of goodness, such as what we desire to

desire,
suppose that A means the same as goodness.
P2 If goodness can be defined by A, then questions about As
goodness will
mean the same as questions about the goodness of
goodness.

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P3 Asking Is goodness good? is a closed question because the

answer is
obvious.
P4 Asking Is A good? is an open question because it is not
obviously true that
A is good.
C1. The questions have different meanings.
C2. Therefore, A does not mean the same as goodness.

It is important to note that this formulation of the argument adopts a

particular interpretation. Daly addresses two ways of interpreting the
OQA. His first interpretation regards sentence type (Daly, 2010: 54)
where we consider is what we desire to desire, good? to be the
same question as is goodness good? By this interpretation, Moore
would claim that the two sentences are different sentence kinds in the
argument. This claim would be made along the way to arguing that
they sentence types have different meanings. Dalys second
interpretation regards meaning (2010: 55) where we understand is
what we desire to desire good? to mean the same as is goodness,
good. By this interpretation, Moores conclusion would be that the two
questions do not have the same meaning.

I shall adopt the meaning interpretation because the sentence type

interpretation is unorthodox. Daly shows that the sentence type
argument is clearly invalid (2010: 56). The claim sentence types have
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different meanings is falsified because two different languages say the

same thing in terms of their meaning, but differ in kind by how it is
written and pronounced; the expressions sentence type (Daly, 2010:
56). Moore is ambiguous to the reader in how we are to interpret his
argument, but ultimately it is best to consider the strongest
formulation of the OQA which is the meaning analysis.

2
Here I will consider Dalys objection to the orthodox interpretation of
the OQA; the meaning interpretation. The OQA relies on the
transparency principle. This principle holds:
If two expressions mean the same thing (e.g. two predicates
express the same property), and an individual understands
them both, then they know they mean the same thing, and
know that any two sentences that differ only in the substitution
of one of these expressions for the other mean the same thing,
and express the same question (Soames, 2005: 47).

We can see that Moore relies on this principle by this extract:

... One can easily convince himself by inspection that the
predicate of this propositiongoodis positively different from
the notion desiring to desire ... that we should desire to desire
A is good is not merely equivalent to that A should be good is
good ... the mere fact that we understand very well what is

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meant by doubting it, shows clearly that we have to different

notions before our mind (Moore, 1903: 13).

Moore is claiming that by introspection it will be obvious to the person

introspecting that two expressions are synonymous. Daly argues
against the transparency principle that underlies Moores claim, stating
it is too strict a requirement on legitimate definitions. He demonstrates
this with the synonymous expressions wager and bet (Daly, 2010:
59). Daly gives a scenario where someone competently uses both
wager and bet, but doubts that they have the same meaning
because of previous scenarios where they had wrongly substituted
expressions that were not synonymous (2010: 59). Although this
argument can be applied to any synonymous expression, it has
strength in diffusing Moores claim that you will know whether
expressions have the same meaning on introspection. It is my view
that the truth of synonymy need not be obvious - just because it may
not be obviously known that goodness and what we desire to desire
have the same meaning, it does not provide justification for thinking it
is not true that they are synonymous.

A possible response that Moore could make to this would be, the best
explanation is just that they probably mean different things if it is not
obvious to us that they are synonymous on introspection. However,
this objection is problematic as Moore would then be committed to
saying that if any person doubts the truth of an expressions
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synonymy, then they probably differ in meaning (Daly, 2010: 61).

Thus, Daly has shown the meaning interpretation is also invalid.

3
This section will show the OQA failing by demonstrating that
expressions can denote the same property without being synonymous.
Brink states the OQA depends on the semantic test of properties,
which assumes that expressions pick out the same property iff they are
synonymous (2001: 158). This assumption implies that any analysis of
goodness expresses a different property to goodness due to the
failure of synonymy between goodness and its analysis (Brink, 2001:
156). Brink demonstrates this is questionable because of the causal
theory of reference. This theory states that expressions come into use
by a causal history of people introducing words which denote
properties, and subsequent speakers borrowing these expressions with
the intention of referring to the same property (Brink, 2001: 160).
Thus, in time, many expressions are introduced which pick out the
same property of previous expressions. Water picks out the property
the colourless odourless stuff found in lakes, rivers etc. It was found
through empirical discovery, a posteriori knowledge, that H20 is the
underlying structure of water (Brink, 2001:160). The expression H20
means two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. However, the
expression H20 also picks out the same property water does; the
colourless odourless stuff found in lakes, rivers etc. The property of
the expression is determined via a causal-historical chain; people
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found out that the molecule H20 makes up the liquid water. This
example shows how causal chains allow people to use expressions
meaningfully, and for the possibility of ignorance and error about what
property expressions denote (Brink, 2001: 160). We can draw an
analogy between this and analyses of goodness as throughout history
people have expressed the same property of goodness by introducing
new words, such as what we desire to desire and pleasure.

Durrant denies Moores conclusion because the OQA only shows that
there is no synonymous expression to goodness. He argues that an
expression can denote the same property that goodness denotes
(Durrant, 1970: 361). Durrants argument shows the failure of the OQA
fails as two expressions can lack synonymy but still refer to the same
property. Durrant draws an analogy with Hesperus and Phosphorus
the evening star and the morning star (Durrant, 1970: 360). These two
different names have different meanings. The first meant the star
seen in the morning. The second meant the star seen at night.
However, it was later found through empirical discovery that both
expressions were referring to the same property the planet Venus.

Soames adds further support to the idea that expressions can differ in
meaning yet refer to the same entity. Soames gives the example for
all x, x = 211 iff x = 2048 (2005: 56). We can see they are not
synonymous; 211 does not mean the same as 2048; the small 11
after the number 2 is an integer, which signals the function of
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multiplication, the number of the integer indicates how many times

you must multiply the number immediately to the left. 2048 just
means the number two thousand and forty eight. As I have shown,
both expressions do not mean the same however, they both denote
the same entity of 2048 as this is the answer once you multiple 2 11
times. Soames also makes the point that one can understand both
expressions without knowing that 211 = 2048 (Soames, 2005: 56). This
demonstrates that someone who understands these expressions are
not disposed to accept that they refer to the same entity because it is
unobvious to them, thus adding to the objection made in 2.

Moore could respond by saying, in contrast to knowing certain facts a

posteriori, such as discovering the underlying structure of water and
the planet Venus, goodness is known a priori and the explanation
cannot extend to goodness. A reply would be to deny this claim and
argue that goodness is actually known a posteriori. Grounds for
arguing this would be that people know the same property is being
referred to through moral inquiry (Brink, 2001: 162). With this in mind,
the expressions goodness and what we desire to desire may have a
different meaning, but this is irrelevant because they both be denote
the same property.

I have shown that Moores OQA fails and goodness is not a simple,
indefinable property because of two reasons. Firstly, the truth of an
expressions synonymy is not determined by whether it is obvious to us
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on introspection. Secondly, even if Moore does show that goodness

and any analysis of it lacks synonymy; it can be true that they are both
denoting the same property of the predicate goodness which is done
by a causal history of people introducing new expressions which
denote the same properties to previous expressions.

Word count
1898
Bibliography

Brink, D., 2001. Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social

Philosophy & Policy Foundation, 18(2), pp.154-176.

Durrant, R.G., 1970. Identity of Properties and the Definition of

Good. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48, pp.360-1.

Daly, C., 2010. Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Canada:

Broadview Press.

Moore, G.E., 1903. Principia Ethic. [Online] Available at: <http://fairuse.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/chapter-i> [Accessed 30 March
2015]

Soames, S., 2005. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century,

volume 1. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
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