Republic of the Philippines COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Intramuros, Manila SECOND DIVISION ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Petitioner, = versus ~ SPA NO. 15-001 (DC) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. ax NOTICE 1. ATTY. ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Petitioner 8% Floor, Pacific Star Building Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. comer Makati Avenue Makati City 2. ATTY. GEORGE ERWIN M. GARCIA G.E. GARCIA LAW OFFICE Ground Floor, LAIKO Building 372 Cabildo St, Intramuros, Manila GREETINGS: Attached is a copy of the RESOLUTION of the Commission (Gecond Division) in the above-entitled case promulgated 01 December 2015. Manila, December 01, 2015. FOR THE DIVISION: ABIGAIL rN, (CUARESMA-LILAGAN fi Acting Clerk of the Commission (V [2 lot NwRepublic of the Philippines COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Intramuros, Manila SECOND DIVISION ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Petitioner, Present: Parrefio, A.A., Commissioner ~versus- Lim, A.D., Commissioner Abas, S.M., Commissioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD \ SONORA POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. DEC 0 1 208 . ————* Promulgated: RESOLUTION Based on the Constitution, law, and jurisprudence, and viewing it solely from the legal perspective, shorn of emotional and other extraneous considerations, We are led to no other result than to GRANT the petition and find that respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares committed material mistepresentation when she declared in her Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the upcoming National and Local Elections on May 9, 2016, that: “7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016: 10 - No. of Years 11 - No. of Months 8.1 AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN.” 1 ___ See Exhibit “B” (Respondent's Certificate of Candidacy for President, 2016 NLE), RECORDS.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 2 of 34 Elamparo v. Liamanzares Second Division Resolution NATURE OF CASE This is a petition brought under Section 78? of the Omnibus Election Code? and Section 1, Rule 234 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523¢ filed by petitioner Estrella C. Elamparo (“Petitioner”) seeking to deny due course to or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President of the Republic of the Philippines filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares (“Respondent”) for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. FACTS Culled from the uncontroverted submissions in the pleadings as well as admissions of the parties during the hearing conducted in this case are the following relevant facts: 1. _ Respondent was born on September 3, 1968 in Jaro, Iloilo, of unknown biological parents, hence, a foundling” 2. After having been born, respondent was abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, and was found by a certain Edgardo Militar.8 21 On September 6, 1968, a certain Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City the fact that ; “Sec. 78. - Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required ‘under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.” 3 ‘Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, 3 December 1985. « __ “Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. - A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition or political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.” S$” 15 February 1993, «IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT TO RULES 23, 24, AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PURPOSES OF THE 13 MAY 2013 NATIONAL, LOCAL AND ARMM ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS, 25 September 2012. 7 See Exhibit “C” (Foundling Certificate); See also Annex “1” of Verified Answer dated ‘November 6, 2015 (Certificate of Live Birth), RECORDS. * Par. 5, Petition; Par, 1.1, Respondent's Verified Answer; See also Exhibit “C”, RECORDS.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 3 of 34 Elamparo’. Uamanzares Second Division Resolution respondent had been found; a Certificate of Live Birth was issued for the said child, named: Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar? 3. On May 13, 1974, when respondent was 5 years old, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal granted the petition for adoption of respondent by movie stars Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.ka. Fernando Poe, Jr. or "FPJ"). The court ordered a change in respondent's name from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.10 4. On December 13, 1986, soon after turning 18 years old, respondent applied for and was granted by the Honorable Commission a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila." 5. On April 4, 1988, respondent applied for and was issued a Philippine passport by the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Manila.2 6. Respondent initially pursued college studies in Manila. In 1988, however, she transferred to Boston College in Massachusetts, US.A, and graduated from said school in 1991 with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies.9 7. On July 27, 1991, respondent got married to Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares in San Juan City, Metro Manila, Respondent's husband is a citizen of both the Philippines and the US.A. When they got married, her husband was already based in the US.AM 8. On July 29, 1991, respondent left for the U.S.A to live with her husband and raise their children there.15 9. On October 18, 2001, respondent was naturalized as a citizen of the U.S.A.,)6 after taking an Oath of Allegiance to the USA, which stated: Exhibit “C”, supra. Annex “2”, Respondent's Verified Answer; RECORDS. Annex “3”, Respondent's Verified Answer; RECORDS. ne 2 Annex “4”, Respondent's Verified Answer; RECORDS, % _Atp. 4, par. 9, Petition; RECORDS. 4 Bid, p.4, par. 10. Bid, p.4, par. 11. Wid, p. 4, par. 12.Page 4 of 34 yen ke SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Second Division Resolution 5 lamparo v, Liamanzares hereby ly and entirely renounce I declare, on oath, that I absolutely and ent and sbjure al alegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince poet state, or sovereignty, of whom or which Ihave heretofore been 1 subject or Citicen; that T wil support and defend the Constitution and laws ofthe United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; will bear true futh and allegiance to the same; that I wil bear arms om i behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States cae \ required by the law; that I wil perform work of national importance under i Civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obliga freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God. i 10. On July 7, 2006, respondent took her Oath of | Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in Manila,”” to wit: I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by | the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I hereby i declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines, and I will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 11. On July 10, 2006, respondent filed with the Bureau of Immigration a swom petition for reacquisition of Philippine | citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its implementing rules and regulations. Respondent also filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three (3) minor children. 12. On July 18, 2006, then Immigration Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr. issued an order granting respondent's petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, pertinently stating: A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate that the petitioner was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents | and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter, itizen and is now a holder of an American Passport; was issued an ACR and ICR and has taken her oath of | ey | ” | Ibid. p. 4, pat. 19; See also Exhibit “G" (Petition for Reacquist tention | Philippine Citizenship); RECORDS, a answer B. 4, Pat: 13; See also respondents Oath of Allegiance (Annex Answer); RECORDS. . ‘ — “19” of VerifiedSPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 5 of 34 Elamparo v, Llamanzares Second Division Resolution allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship. 13. On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates ("ICs") for respondent and her three children. 14. On August 31, 2006, respondent applied to be registered as a voter at Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.21 15. Per the respondent's travel log from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),” it appears that respondent used her US passport on July 26, 2006, September 11, 2006, November 1, 2006, July 20, 2007, July 23, 2007, October 31, 2007, October 5, 2008, April 20, 2009, May 21, 2009, July 31, 2009, August 3, 2009, November 15, 2009 and December 27, 2009. 16. On October 13, 2009, respondent secured from the DEA her new Philippine passport with No. XX4731999 (valid until October 12, 2014). 17. On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Aquino I appointed respondent as chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).4 18. On October 20, 2010, respondent executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship® before a notary public in Pasig City, Metro Manila, to wit: I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 1"07 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United ® See Bureau of Immigration Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 dated July 18, 2006 copy of which was attached as Annex “D” and Annex “22” of the petition and verified answer, ‘respectively; RECORDS. ‘Annexes “23”, "23-A", “23-B", and "23-C” of Verified Answer; RECORDS. 2 Annex "24" of Verified Answer; RECORDS. 2 _ Exhibit “I”; RECORDS, Respondent, however, denied having used her US passport on July 2, 2006 and September 11, 2006 Annexes “5” and “25” of Verified Answer; RECORDS. % —_P.5, par. 18, Petition; See also Annex “26” of Verified Answer (respondent appointment letter as MTCRB head); RECORDS. % Exhibit “K" (Affidavit of Renunciation of US citizenship before a Philippine Notary Public notarized on October 20, 2010); See also par. 1.38 of Verified Answer; RECORDS.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 6 of 34 Elamparo v. Uamanzares Second Division Resolution States nationality/ American citizenship, together with all Rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue influence. 19. On October 21, 2010, respondent submitted to the Bureau of Immigration the notarized Affidavit of Renunciation”. She then took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB before President Aquino on the same date (October 21, 2010). 20. On July 12, 2011, respondent executed before the Vice Consul at the US Embassy in Manila an Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.” 21. On December 9, 2011, the USA Vice Consul issued to respondent a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States, wherein it was stated that Respondent "expatriated herself" on October 21, 2010, the same date shown in respondent's former US Passport.?* 22, On October 2, 2012, respondent filed with the Commission her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator of the Philippines, and wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013".29 23. On May 16, 2013, respondent was proclaimed as Senator of the Philippines after topping the 2013 senatorial elections. 24. On December 19, 2013, respondent was issued a Philippine diplomatic passport." 25. On March 18 2014, respondent was issued a regular Philippine passport; % Annexes “28” and “28-A” of Verified Answer; RECORDS. % —_P. 6, par. 21 of Petition; See also Annex “30” of Verified Answer; RECORDS. % _P.6,par. 22 of Petition; See also Annex “31” of Verified Answer (Certificate of Loss of ‘Nationality of the United States); RECORDS. ® Annex "32" of Verified Answer; See also p. 6, par. 23 of Petition; RECORDS. %* _P.6, par. 24 of Petition; See also p. 14, par. 1.43 of Verified Answer; RECORDS. Annex “33” of Verified Answer; See also p. 7, par. 25 of Petition; RECORDS. %2 Annex “34” of Verified Answer; See also P. 7, par. 26 of Petition; RECORDS.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 7 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution 26. On September 16, 2015, respondent announced her candidacy in the 2016 presidential elections. 27. On October 15, 2015, respondent filed with the Commission her COC for President of the Philippines. 28. On October 16, 2015, petitioner filed with the Commission the instant Petition. 29. On November 10, 2015, respondent filed her Verified Answer (With Special and Affirmative Defenses). On even date, a hearing was held on the petition and both parties argued their respective positions exhaustively. 30. The respective memorandum of the parties as required by the Commission (Second Division) was simultaneously submitted on November 23, 2015. 31. On November 23, 2015, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution based on the undisputed submissions in the pleadings as well as admissions made in the course of the November 10, 2015 hearing, as further amplified and ventilated in the respective memorandum. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS, Petitioner contended, thusly: I. The Commission has jurisdiction over the petition. I The Certificate of Candidacy of the respondent must be denied due course/cancelled on the ground that she committed a material misrepresentation in stating that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. A. Respondent, being a foundling, cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen under the Constitution; B. _ International law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship upon respondent; . =P. 7, par. 30 of Petition; RECORDS, ‘* See Exhibit “B”,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 8 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares c Second Division Resolution Respondent, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225; Assuming arguendo that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen, she lost that status when she became a citizen of the United States of America. Il. The Certificate of Candidacy of then respondent must be denied due course/cancelled on the ground that she committed a material misrepresentation regarding her residency in the Philippines. A. Respondent's period of residency in the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months as of May 2013 as declared under oath in her COC for Senator in the 2013 elections is an admission against interest and conclusive upon her; By the principle of estoppel and the Filipino people relying on what she stated in her Certificate of Candidacy during the 2013 senatorial elections, respondent cannot deny but is bound by her admission that she had resided in the Philippines for only 6 years and 6 months as of May 2013; Assuming arguendo that respondent is qualified to file a petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA. 9225, her filing of the petition in July 2006 is the earliest starting point from which one may reckon her residency in the Philippines. Assuming arguendo that respondent is qualified to file a petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA. 9225, she failed to re-establish her domicile in the Philippines. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS On the other hand, respondent countered, thusly: 1 The Petition fails to state a cause of action against respondent. ,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 9 of 34 Elamparo v, Llamanzares A A. Second Division Resolution The petition does not contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in respondent's subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; and The petition does not allege that respondent's representation in her COC regarding her natural-born Filipino citizenship and her period of residency in the Philippines (assuming these representations are false) were done willfully or deliberately in order to “mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render (her) ineligible.” The Commission lacks jurisdiction over the petition. The DOJ, and not this Commission, has primary jurisdiction to revoke the B.L’s July 18, 2006 Order which: (a) found Respondent presumptively a former natural- bom Filipino; and (b) approved her petition for reacquisition of natural-born Filipino citizenship. Insofar as the petition assails the B.L’s Order, the same is a prohibited collateral attack on respondent's natural-born Filipino citizenship; The petition is essentially a petition for quo warranto because it seeks to establish the ineligibility of the respondent for the Presidency of the Philippines. The petition is, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and it may be filed only if respondent is proclaimed President of the Philippines in the May 2016 elections. TI Respondent did not make any material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of President in the May 9, 2016 elections. A. Respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 1, Even though foundlings are not expressly mentioned in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, it was nevertheless the intent of the framers of the 1985 Constitution to include them as citizens of the Philippines under paragraphs .SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 10 of 34 Elamaparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution (3) and/or (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution; 2. Under applicable treaties and “generally accepted principles of international law,” a child born in the Philippines in 1968 of unknown parents, is a natural-born Filipino citizen; 3. Respondent re-acquired her _natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of RA. 9225; 4, Respondent executed a sworn renunciation of her US.A. citizenship prior to the filing of her COC as President in the 9 May 2016 Elections. This sworn renunciation is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted. B. On May 9, 2016, Respondent will have been a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months. 1. It is well-settled that in order to re-establish one’s domicile of choice in the Philippines, only the following requisites must concur: (a) residence or bodily presence in the Philippines; (b) an intention to remain in the country (animus manendi); and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi), which respondent all satisfied no later than May 24, 2005; 2. Respondent could legally re-establish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship on July 7, 2006; 3, Respondent committed an honest mistake, on a difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC for Senator in the May 13, 2013 elections that her “period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013” is “6” years and “6” months. Respondent had the legal duty to correct this honest error, and could not be bound (by,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 11 of 34 Elamparov. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution estoppel) to repeat it, when she filed her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 elections. C. Considering that the Petition not only fails to state, but lacks a cause of action, and is also beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission, it is relegated to nothing but an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to answer a purely political question - should respondent serve as the next president of the Republic of the Philippines? MAIN ISSUE AND SUB-ISSUES The main issue to be resolved is: Does respondent's COC, filed for the purpose of running for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National__and__Local__Electio: contain__a__false material ' representation? The answer to the foregoing question hinges on the resolution of the following sub-issues: (1)Are the sworn representations by Respondent in her COC that (a) she is a natural born Filipino citizen and (b) has a Period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 of 10 years and 11 months material? (2) Are the above-mentioned representations, assuming they are material, false? (3) Assuming the said material representations are false, are they deliberate attempts to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render respondent ineligible for the office that she seeks to be elected to (President of the Philippines)? RULING OF THE COMMISSION The Petition is GRANTED. ,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 12 of 34 Elamparo v, Llamanzares Second Division Resolution Respondent's COC, filed for the purpose of running for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections, contains material representations which are false. Hence, it should be denied due course and cancelled. FALSE MATERIAL REPRESENTATION It bears stressing that this petition is filed under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.35 Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides: Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. - A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false, xxx % Similarly, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled when there is a false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy” Sec. 78. - Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.*8,, See Paragraph 1 of the Petition; Records, : Emphasis supplied. Efren Racel Ara Tea v. Commission on Elections and Estela D. Antipolo, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012. % Emphasis supplied. eeeSPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 13 of 34 Elamparo v. Uamanzares Second Division Resolution Section 74 of the same Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy? Sec, 74, Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is igi ible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and i that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. xxx xxx _xxx!0 Respondent is running for President of the Republic of the Philippines. Item 11 of her COC for President states: 1 AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO. As defined by the Supreme Court in Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. v. | Commission on Elections and Agapito J. Cardino,! a candidate is eligible | if he has a right to run for the public office. Relative to this, the Supreme Court in Efren Racel Aratea v. Commission on Elections and Estela D. Antipolo® emphasized that: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course i to or cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a i material representation that is false, which may relate to , a. ‘Underscoring supplied. GR. No. 198237, 9 October 2012. | Supra, see Note 25. neseSPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 14 of 34 Elamparo v, Liamancares Second Division Resolution the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Applying here the ruling in Aratea, there is a need to examine Section 78 of the Code in relation to the constitutional provision on. the qualification or eligibility for the position of President. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution declares: Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for _at least ten years immediately Preceding such election.? Petitioner claims that respondent committed — material misrepresentation in stating in her COC that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that she a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years as of May 15, 2015 (day before the election). In the case of Victorino Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections and Ermelita Cacao Salcedo,’6 the Supreme Court listed down the elements of material misrepresentation, thus: As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to_a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Emphasis supplied. See p. 10 of the Petition; RECORDS. See p. 53 of the Petition; RECORDS. GR. No. 135886, 16 August 1999. sareSPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 15 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution XK XXX XXX Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. Considering the ruling in Salcedo IJ, the elements of material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Code, then, are the following: (1) The representation pertains to a material fact; (2) The material representation is false; and (3) The false material representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. THE FIRST ELEMENT - MATERIALITY To reiterate, Respondent claims that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months up to the day before 9 May 2016.47 To comply with the 1* element, these two representations by the Respondent must pertain to a material fact. In Salcedo Il, the Supreme Court clarified that: Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a material representation, the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code. In Abella vs. Larrazabal, supra, a petition was filed with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondent Larrazabal for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding residence. The Court held that the challenge made against private respondent's claimed residence was properly classified . 7 See Footnote No. 1.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 16 of 34 Elamparo v, Llamanzares Second Division Resolution as a proceeding under Section 78, despite the fact that it was filed only on the very day of the election. Meanwhile, in Labo vs. Commission on Elections, the disqualification proceeding filed by respondent pursuant to Section 78 of the Code sought to cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by Petitioner Ramon Labo, who ran for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections, based_on_the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. XXX XK XXX Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave - to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.‘® In Nardo M. Velasco v. Commission on Elections and Mozart P. Panlagui, ® the Supreme Court pronounced that: The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts arethose__that__refer_to a candidates qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. *, © Emphasis supplied. © — GR.No, 180051, 24 December 2008. % Emphasis supplied.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 17 of 34 Elammparo . Lamanzares Second Division Resolution Similarly, in Luis R. Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections and Miguel R. Villafuerte,5! the Supreme Court held that: Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to Prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the Tequisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as Provided in the Local Government Code.52 To repeat, respondent claims that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months up to the day before 9 May 2016. As shown above, these Tepresentations refer to a material fact, as the term is defined in our settled jurisprudence. Therefore, the 1* element exists. The representations by Respondent as to her citizenship and period of residence in the country pertain to facts that are material in character. THE SECOND ELEMENT - FALSITY RESPONDENT'S PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 9, 2016 WOULD NOT BE AT LEAST 10 YEARS. In Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan, the Supreme Court declared: The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. The Constitution requires that a candidate for President of the Philippines should be a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution declares: 5 GR.No, 206696, 25 February 2014. 2 Emphasis supp! ® GR.No. 181097,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 18 of 34 Elamparov. Uamanzares Second Division Resolution Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for_at_least ten years immediately Preceding such election. For purposes of the May 9, 2016 presidential elections, respondent is required a residency in the country of as early as May 2006. She is not compliant with this basic requirement. RESPONDENT'S COC FOR SENATOR Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial Elections. In her COC for Senator, she answered “6 years and 6 months” in the space provided for the candidate's period of residence in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration, respondent admitted under oath that she has been a resident of the country only since November 2006, Undeniably, this falls short by 6 months of the required May 2006 commencement of residence in the Philippines in order for respondent to qualify as a candidate for President of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 elections. If we reckon her period of residency from November 2006, as she herself declared, she will be a resident of the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a period of 9 years and 6 months. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by respondent is an admission against her interest. Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory application) expressly states: Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. ,, % Emphasis supplied.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 18 of 34 Elamparov. lamanzares Second Division Resolution Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the ines for at least ten years immediatel preceding such election. For purposes of the May 9, 2016 presidential elections, respondent is required a residency in the country of as early as May 2006. She is not compliant with this basic requirement. RESPONDENT'S COC FOR SENATOR Respondent ran for Senator in the May 13, 2013 Senatorial Elections. In her COC for Senator, she answered “6 years and 6 months” in the space provided for the candidate’s period of residence in the Philippines. Based on her own declaration, respondent admitted under oath that she has been a resident of the country only since November 2006, Undeniably, this falls short by 6 months of the required May 2006 commencement of residence in the Philippines in order for respondent to qualify as a candidate for President of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 elections. If we reckon her period of residency from November 2006, as she herself declared, she will be a resident of the Philippines by May 9, 2016 only for a period of 9 years and 6 months. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, this sworn statement by respondent is an admission against her interest. Section 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court (which is of suppletory application) expressly states: Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. , 5 Emphasis supplied,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 19 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution The rationale for the rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloys5 Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself UNLESS SUCH DECLARATION WAS TRUE. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds to the truth, and it is his fault if it does not Respondent's representation in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months by May 2013 is an admission that is binding on her. After all, she should not have declared it under oath if such declaration was not true, Respondent's convenient defense that she committed an honest mistake on a difficult question of law, when she stated in her COC for Senator that her period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013 was 6 years and 6 months, is at best self-serving. It cannot overturn the weight given to the admission against interest voluntarily made by respondent. Assuming arguendo that as now belatedly claimed the same was due to an honest mistake, no evidence has been shown that there was an attempt to rectify the so-called honest mistake. The attempt to correct it in her present COC filed only on October 15, 2015 cannot serve to outweigh the probative weight that has to be accorded to the admission against interest in her 2013 COC for Senator. Certainly, it is beyond question that her declaration in her 2013 COC for Senator, under oath at that, that she has been a resident of the Philippines since November 2006 still stands in the record of this Commission as an official document, which may be given in evidence against her, and the probative weight and binding effect of which is neither obliterated by the passing of time nor by the belated attempt to correct it in her present COC for President of the Philippines. Respondent cannot now declare an earlier period of residence. Respondent is already estopped from doing so. If allowed to repudiate at this late stage her prior sworn declaration, We will be , % GR No. 192893, 5 June 2013, ‘%* Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, G.R. No. 159284, 27 January 2009; emphasis supplied.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 20 of 34 Elamparo v. Liamanzares Second Division Resolution opening the floodgates for candidates to commit material misrepresentations in their COCs and escape responsibility for the same through the mere expedient of conveniently changing their story in a subsequent COC. Worse, We will be allowing a candidate to run for President when the COC for Senator earlier submitted to the Commission contains a material fact or data barring her from running for the position she now secks to be elected to. Surely, to rule otherwise will be to tolerate a cavalier attitude to the requirement of Putting in the correct data in a COC. In fact, the COC filer, in that same COC, certifies under oath that the data given are indeed “true and correct”. RA. 9225 As will be discussed in the later portion of this Resolution, respondent is not a natural-born citizen. Hence, she is not covered by R.A. No. 9225,” which provides for the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by natural-born citizens, At this juncture, however, we temporarily put this consideration aside to resolve the respondent's arguments regarding her period of residency in the country. Petitioner correctly posits’ that the earliest starting point from which We should reckon the respondent's residency is July 18, 2006 when respondent was granted reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, In Teodulo M. Coquilla v. Commission on Elections and Neil M. Alvarez,®° the Supreme Court pronounced: In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the US. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as visitor or as a resident alien. Indeed, residence _in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. itizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, 29 August 2003, See p. 66 of Petitioner's Memorandum, % — GR.No. 151914, 31 July 2002.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 21 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution Therefore, following Coquilla, respondent lost her domicile of origin when she became a U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001. Again, in accord with Coquilla, from October 18, 2001 until Iuly_18, 2006 when she was granted reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, respondent was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws have allowed her to stay as visitor or as a resident alien. The Supreme Court reiterated the pronouncement in Coquilla by declaring in Manuel B. Japzon v. Commission on Elections and Jaime S. Ty that A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. Recently, the Supreme Court declared in Rogelio Batin Caballero v. Commission on Elections and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. that: Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes, Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had__ effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation @ GR. No. 180088, 19 January 2009. © GRR. No. 209635, 22 September 2015,SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 22 of 34 Elamparo v. Lamanzares Second Division Resolution from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. In short, from the time respondent became a naturalized US. citizen’ on October 18, 2001 until her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship on July 18, 2006, her domicile of choice was the United States of America. The earliest starting point therefore from which We may reckon her period of residence in the Philippines is July 2006, which is 9 years and 10 months before 9 May 2016, still short of the 10-year residency requirement for the Office of President of the Philippines. Clearly, Respondent's period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016 will not be at least 10 years. In light of the above discussion, the unavoidable conclusion is that respondent's claim in her subject COC that she has been a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years up to the day before May 9, 2016 is false. RESPONDENT IS NOT A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN Respondent's representation in her subject COC that she is a natural- born Filipino citizen is false; Respondent, being a foundling, is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. That respondent is a foundling is shown by her Birth Certificate, stipulated upon by both sides, openly admitted in her Verified Answer®, and reiterated in open hearing by her counsel, I. THE CONSTITUTION Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution defines a natural- bom Filipino citizen as follows: Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to . 2 exhibit “c’ © The opening salvo in the Verified Answer reads as follows: “1.1 Respondent does not know ‘who her biological parents are”, See TSN November 10, 2015.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 23 of 34 Elamparov. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution - the Constitution in effect when Respondent was born in 1968 - states: Article IV. - Citizenship Section 1, The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. 2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. 3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. 4, Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. 5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The enumeration is clear and exclusive. Applying the definition of natural-born citizens in the 1987 Constitution to the enumeration of Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution which is the Constitution applicable to the respondent, the only logical deduction is that she would be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen only if her father was a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that respondent is admitted a foundling negates, at least at this time, any possible finding that respondent was born of a Filipino father. Significantly, those listed in Section 1 (4) of the 1935 Constitution - those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship - despite the obvious blood relation to a Filipino mother, are not considered as natural-born because they still need to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Such election is the operative fact that would confer Filipino citizenship, hence, said person is not natural-born not being a Filipino citizen at birth. It would indeed be an absurd situation to consider a foundling with no known bloodline to a Filipino parent as a natural-born aSPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 24 of 34 Elamparo v. Lamanzares Second Division Resolution Filipino citizen and deny such status to a child with a known bloodline to a Filipino mother. Notwithstanding her clear knowledge that her biological parents are unknown, respondent avowed in her subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to run for President of the Philippines. Respondent knew or ought to have known that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. The representation in her subject COC for President that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen is obviously false. As a sitting Senator, and well educated at that, respondent knew or can be reasonably expected to know, that our 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions have consistently adhered to the “jus sanguinis” or “citizenship by bloodline” principle wherein natural-born Filipino citizenship is solely and exclusively determined by a bloodline to a Filipino father (1935 Constitution) and by bloodline to a Filipino father or mother (1973 and 1987 Constitution). Nowhere in any of the three Constitutions of the Philippines is there a direct or indirect inclusion of a foundling as a natural-born Filipino citizen, or a Filipino at birth. There is none. And none has been mentioned or pointed to by the respondent. Since all Constitutions enumerate who are Filipino citizens, and a foundling is not in the enumerations, there is then no constitutional or legal basis to consider a foundling as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Mario Salinias v. Commission on Elections, et al.,® the Supreme Court held: It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the is mention of one thing, or consequence express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, . © GR.No. 146943, 4 October 2002.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 25 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. (Emphasis supplied) 20x The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one’s own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made _specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms _to_those expressly mentioned. (Emphasis supplied) We do not agree that a departure from the clear meaning of the Constitution is warranted. As correctly pointed by petitioner in her memorandum, only when the meaning of the words is unclear or equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation. The provisions of the Constitution are clear. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. In Republic v. Carlito Lacap,*” the Supreme Court noted that: The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. Respondent harped on the alleged intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to consider a founding as a natural-born Filipino citizen. , Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, (1990), pp. 160-161, citing the cases of Canlas vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim us. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139 (1958); People vs. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245 (1978); People vs.Lantin, 30 SCRA 81 (1969); Manila Lodge No. 761 s.Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 (1976); Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 (1980); Lerumvs.Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950); Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540 (1982). @ GR.No, 158253, 2 March 2007.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 26 of 34 Elamparo 0. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution In par. 4.43 of her memorandum,* respondent attached the transcript of deliberations supposedly indicating that delegates inserted the concept of “foundlings” in Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Respondent pointed out that Delegate Rafols wanted to include in the enumeration of Philippine citizens the following sub- section:® “The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.” Respondent likewise claimed: Delegate Rafols explained that the phrase “natural children” was meant to include “natural children of unknown parentage.” Delegate Montinola objected to the amendment, citing Spanish Law which applies a “presumption” that “a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard.” He then suggested that this apply to the Philippines. In other words, Delegate Montinola suggested that a foundling be presumed born of Filipinos. As discussed, Delegate Roxas essentially agreed with Delegate Montinola when the former expressed the view that “(b)y international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation.” This was the final statement on the matter of “foundlings,” and this explains why foundlings were not mentioned in Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.” A clear case of clutching at straws. What is not within the plain language of the Constitution is simply not there! A closer look at the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention will ferret out the truth that while Delegate Rafols intended to include “natural children of unknown. parentage” in the enumeration of who are citizens of the Philippines, his proposed amendment was eventually put to a vote by the Convention and was eventually struck down by his fellow delegates, Respondent does not dispute this fact. In short, the framers, by voting to reject the; © Records, p. 96. © See Item 4.44.2 of Respondent's Memorandum. 7% See Item 4.44.3 of Respondent's Memorandum.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 27 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution suggestion made by Delegate Rafols, evinced their collective decision to exclude foundlings from the enumeration of who are Filipino citizens. In a word, both the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as well as the intent of its framers, support the position that the 1935 Constitution adopted the principle of jus sanguinis. INTERNATIONAL LAW As argument of last resort, respondent invoked “customary international law”. She asserted: Under applicable treaties and ‘generally accepted principles of international law, a child born in the Philipp’ in 1968 of unknown parents, is a natural- born Filipino.”! Even if we were to take this declaration at face value, and concede it to be true, it would not result in a finding that the respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply cannot be the case for the very simple reason that such “customary law” will be in contravention of the Constitution, It is a hornbook doctrine that any law, be it statutory law or “customary international law” or any other specie of the latter kind, is void if it is contrary to the Constitution, the highest and the fundamental law of the land. Respondent invoked: (a) the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, (b) the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, (c) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (d) the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (e) the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. First. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s Parentage is established, its nationality shall be: See Item B.1.2 of Respondent's Memorandum; Records, p. 106..wt SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 28 of 34 Blamparo . Llamanzares Second Division Resolution determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. Article 15 Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on its territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no nationality, or of unknown nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said State. The law of that State shall determine the conditions governing the acquisition of its nationality in such cases,” The Philippines not being a signatory to this convention is not bound by it, Assuming arguendo that the terms of this convention apply, it does not support respondent's claim that a child born in the Philippines in 1968 of unknown parents is a natural-born Filipino, The 1980 Hague Convention does not categorically state that a foundling found is a national, much less a natural-born citizen, of the State where said child is found. The phrase “shall have the nationality of the country of birth” implies a future legal act or process to acquire precisely that “nationality”. Still and all, such provision as interpreted by respondent, cannot override the constitutional provision requiring blood relation to a Filipino parent in order for an individual to be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Second. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness teads: Article 1 1. A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Such nationality shall be granted: (a) at birth, by operation of law, or ; 7 Emphasis supplied.4 SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 29 of 34 Elamparo v. Llamanzares Second Division Resolution (®) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, no such application may be rejected. Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that territory of Parents possessing the nationality of that State. It should be emphasized that the Philippines is not a signatory to this convention. Hence, its terms do not bind the Philippines. Both Articles 1 and 2 refer to a “Contracting State.” Since the Philippines is not a Contracting State to this convention, all its terms do not apply at all to the Philippines. And even assuming that its terms may apply in our jurisdiction, the same terms do not categorically state that a foundling found in the Philippines ig a natural-born Filipino citizen. What is more, even if its terms so state that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen, this hypothetical declaration will never prevail over the Constitution which requires blood relation to a Filipino parent in order for an individual to be considered a natural-born Filipino. Third. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: Article 15 1, Everyone has a right to nationality Additionally, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: Article 24 XXX 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.”> Lastly, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child declares: ;SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 30 of 34 Elamparo v, Llamanzares Second Division Resolution Article 7 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.” The Philippines ratified the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, all of which declare that the child has the right to acquire a nationality. This right granted by these three conventions cannot be overstretched like a rubber band. For these conventions do not in any way declare that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen. To illustrate our point: Even if the wordings of these conventions are deemed to have declared that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen, these international conventions cannot supplant or override the Constitution which requires a bloodline to a Filipino parent to confer the status of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Consequently, it stands to reason that respondent's claim in her subject COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen is false, Respondent's representations as to her citizenship and period of residency in the Philippines are both on a material matter and both false. THE THIRD ELEMENT - DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD, MISINFORM OR HIDE A FACT The Supreme Court in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections” tuled that: . Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In othet words, it must _be made with an intention to deceive the electorate_as to one’s qualifications for public office. . * ld, 7 Supra, see Note No. 34.SPA No. 15-001 (DC) Page 31 of 34 Elamparo 0. Lamanzares Second Division Resolution This third element is just as important as the preceding two elements. WAS THERE A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD, MISINFORM OR HIDE A FACT? ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCY: We answer the question in the affirmative. In her COC for President, respondent pertinently stated: 7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016: 10 - No. of Years 11 - No. of Months’ Respondent deliberately attempted to mislead or misinform the electorate or hide a fact from them when she supplied the answer, 10 years and 11 months”, to the question in Item No. 7 of her COC. As earlier discussed, this was material but false. On top of that, in so declaring a residency of “10 years 11 months” in her present COC, she deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the electorate for the reason that such declaration was false based on her own COC for Senator in 2013. Her statement in her present COC for President that she has been a resident of the country since November 2006 can be given only one interpretation, which is that it was intended to create the impression on the part of the unsuspecting electorate that she is compliant with the residency requirement, hence, eligible to run when actually she is not. Based on respondent's. own 2013 COC which remains an official document to this day, respondent shall have been a resident of the Philippines for only 9 years and 6 months up to the day before May 9, 2016. In short, the declaration of “10 years and 11 months” in her present COC for President was intended to hide the fact earlier stated under oath in her 2013 COC for Senator that she had actually resided . ” L, see Note No. 1; boldness supplied.