Cafpeta No: 73 TEORIAS DEL PODER / LEOPOLDO MUNERA $750 Dab, Robert A., The Concept of Power , Behavioral Science, 2:3 (1957:July) p20 THE CONCEPT OF POWER by Robert A. Doit Departmen of Paint Science, Yale Uninerely ‘What is “power? Most people have an intuitive notion of what ‘itmenns. But scientists have not yet formulated a statement of the concept of power that is rigorous enough to be of use in the sy5- tematic study of this important socal phenomenon. Power is here eined in terme of a relation between people, and is expressed Dorr held by cre of more paren. With tan concent Hi ‘Ector to thes "power” over fon tax and fseal policy. Ts soe pele have more peer ian ‘other is one of the most palpable facts of naman existence. Because of this, the ‘concept of powers ancient and ubiquitous fas any that social theory can boast. If these ‘assertions needed sny documentation, one could set up an endless parade of reat fames from Plato and Arstole through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber to demonstrate that «large number of seminal socal theorists have devoted « goed deal of attention to power and the henomens asvoriatod with it, Doubtless it ‘would be easy to show, too, how the word tnd its synonyms are everywhere embedded in the of eivilized peoples, often in subtly diferent ways: power, influence, cca- ‘tol, powvolr, pulsance, Macht, Herschaft, Gevalt, imperium, polestes,’ auctoritay, potenti, ete. TT shall spare tho reader the fruits and myvelf the labor of such demonstration. Reflecting on the appeal to authority that ‘might be made does, however, arouse two ‘suspicions: First (following the axiom that ‘where there in emoke there ia fre), if so ‘many people t so many different times have felt the need to attach the label power, oF something Hike i, 10 some Thing they bo Tieve they have observed, one is tempted to suppose that the Thing mnust exist; and not ‘only exist, but exist in a form capable of m “or azampln, toranke members of the United States Senate legislation on foreign policy and being studied more or lost systematically. ‘The second and more cynical suspicion thet a Thing to which people attach many labels with subtly or grosly diferent mean- ings in many diferent cultures and times is probably nota Thing st all but many Things; there are students of the subject although T do not recall any who have the temerity to aay so in print, who think that because of this the ‘whole study of “power” in a bottomless swam) Paradoxical ait may sound, itis probably too carly to know whether these erties are right. Fer, curiously enough, the systematic study of power is very recent, precisely be- ‘cause it is only lately chat serious attempts have been made to formulate the concept rigorously cnough for rystematic eeudy.! If ‘ve take as our criterion forthe eficiency of 2 wientifc concept ite usability in a theo- Fetieal aystem that pomesses a high degree “Br denoting he importance such ae power snl seal fa po ictal, and ty tenting pn rigors ‘oneepial lay, Harold -Lantell hag Sal ‘emia! ‘Solr Siocon * partonar I coontlow profile dlarawone during a Sear STioti pet at ewe te Contr for Ae anced Bead la the Behavioral Sciences T have draenfrole aot aly ‘on our Joint work eto Ivo pulaed ad une wt the Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright(c) General Systems Science Foundation a202 Rosser A. Das of systematic and empirical import, then we simply cannot say whether rigorous defi- nitions of the concept of power are likely to be useful in theoretical systems with a rel large pay-off in the bard coin of Scientific understanding. The evidence is not yet in. TT think it can be shown, however, that to define the concept “power” in a way that toems to catch the central intuitively under- stood meaning of the word must inevitably result in a formal definition that is not easy to apply in concrete research problems; and therefore, operational equivalents of the formal definition, designed to meet the needs of a particular research problem, are likely to diverge from one another in im- portant ways. ‘Thus we are not likely to Produce—certainly not for come consider- Able time to come—anything like «single, consistent, coherent “Theory of Pow ly to produce a vatiety of theories of limited scope, each of which employs some definition of power that is useful in the context of the particular piece of research or theory but different in Important respeets from the definitions of other studies. Thus we may never get through the swamp. But it looks as if we might someday get around it. ‘With this in mind, T propose first to essay i will, I hhope, catch something of on notions as to what the Thing is. By “formal” T mean that the definition will presuppose the existence of observations of a kind that may not always or even frequently be possible. Second, I should like to indicate how operational definitions have been or might be modelled on the formal one for subject. Tha commenis of Jacob Marschak on this peper have also been most helpful. There are, of Gohree, approachos radically Giferent from the ‘one employed here and in the works mentioned Shove Joba R. P- French dr. @)yhas developed a ‘modal that assumes "a unidimensional continuum vo which ean be meusured with a ratio Staley” and he defines “the power of A over B (ith respect fo given opinion) [to bel ental £9 fhe maximum force whieh A ean induee on B {oblige inthe opposite direction.” ‘provides stl snther approseh, Blo. some specifie purposes, and the actus) or possible results of these operational d.f- ; nitions. T should like to be permitted one liberty. : ‘There is a long and honorable history at- tached to such words 26 power, influence, eontrol, and authority. For a great many , purposes, it is highly important that a distinction should be made among them; thus to Max Weber, “Herrechaft ish... in ‘Sonderfall von Machi." Authority is special case of the first, and Logitimate Authority ‘subtype of cardinal significance (11). In this essay I am seeking to explicate the primitive notion that seems to lie behind ; fll of these concepts. Some of my readers ‘would doubtless prefer the term “influence, while others may insist that T am tall ‘shout control. I should like to be permitted to use these terms interchangeably when it is convenient to do so, without denying for seeming to deny that for many other purposes distinctions are necessary and ‘useful. Unfortunately, in the English lan- guage power is sn awkward word, for unlike SGnfluence” and “control” it bas no con- venient verb form, nor can the subject and object of the relation be supplied with noun } Forme without resort to barbaric neologisms. + POWER AS A RELATION AMONG PEOPLE What is the intuitive ides we are trying to capture? Suppose I stand on a street , comer and say to myself, “T command all automobile drivers on this street to drive fon the right side of the road”; suppose farther that all the drivers actually do as T “command” them to do; still, most. people will regard me as mentally il if I insist that T have enough power over automobile drivers to compel them to use the right side of the road, On the other hand, suppose a policeman is standing in the middle of an Intersection at which most traffic ordinarily ‘moves ahead; he orders all traffic to tum Tight or left; the traffic moves as he orders it to do. Then it accords with what I con- ceive to be the bedrock idea of power to ty that the policeman acting in this partic lar role evidently has the power to make automobile drivers turn right or left rather than go abead. My intuitive ides of power, then, is something like this: A has powe Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (¢) General Systems Science FoundationConcerr of ‘over B to the extent that he can get 3 to do something thet B would not otherwise do If Hume and his intellectual succesors had never existed, the distinction between the two events above might be frmer than ie x. But anyone who sees in the two casen the need to distinguish mere “asocistion” from “cause” will realize that the attompt to define power could push us into some messy epistemological problems that do not seem to have any generally accepted s0- Tutions at the moment, I shall therefore uite deliberately stocr clear of the possible entity of “power” with “eause,” and the host of problem this identity might give ie to. TLet us proceed in # different way. First let us agre that power ina relation, and that it is relation among people. Although in common speech the term encompasses re- lations among people and other animate or inanimate objerts, we shall have our hands full if we confine the relationship to human Deingy. All of the social theory I mentioned iri only when it deals with call the objects in the relationship of power, actors. Actors may be individuals, groups, roles, offices, govemments, nation-states, or other human aggregates. ‘Tonpecify the actors in a power relation — ‘A has powcr over B—isnot very interesting, informative, or even accurate. Although the statement thet. the President. has (some) power aver Congress is not empty, nether is He very useful. A much more’ complete statement would include references to (a) the source, domain, or bose of the President's power over Congress; (8) the means or Instruments used by the President to exert ower over Congress; (c) the amount or extent of his power over Congress; and (d) the range or scope of his power over Congress ‘The hase of sn actor's power consists of all the reources—opportunities, acts, objects, ete—that be can exploit in order to cffect the behavior of another. Much of the best writing on power—Bericand Rusell is a ‘good example —consists of an cxamination of the possible bases of power. A study of the ‘var potential of nations i also a study of the ‘pases of power. Some of the possile hases of President's power over a Senator are his 208 patronage, his constitutional veto, ~ the posubility of calling White House’ con- ferences, his influence with the national electorate bis charima, bi charm, and the Th a sense, the baso is inert, passive, Tt must he exploited in some fashion if the Dohevior of others is to be altered. The ‘means or instruments of such exploitation ‘are numerous; often they involve threats or promises to employ the bare in same way ‘and they may involve actual use of the bane. In the ease of tho President, the means would inelude the promise of patronage, the threa of veto, the holding of a conference, the threat of appeal to the electorate, the ‘exercise of charm and chari “Ths the meana ina mediating aclvity by A between A's hase and B's response. The scope consists of B's responses. The spe of the President's power might therefore include such Congressional actions ax passing or kiling a bill, failing to override a veto, holding hearings, ete. ‘The amount of an actor's power ean be represented by a probability statement: eg “the chancos arc 9 out of 10 that if the President promises a judgeship to five key Senators, the Senate will not override his veto,” ete. Clearly the amount can only he specified in conjunction with the means ‘and scope. Suppose now we should wish to make a relatively complete and concise statement ‘bout the powrer of individual A over indi- ‘vidual a (whom I shall call the respondent) with respect to some given scope of re sponscs. In order to introduce the basio Ideas involved, let us restrict ourselves to the 2 hy 2 case, where the actor A does or docs not perform some act and the re- pendent a docs or does not “respond. Tet us employ tho following symbols: 1 Powsn, (A,w) = does w. For example, the President makes a ntion- wide television appeal for tax increases. (A, ®) = A does not do w. (G2) = a, the rospondent, does 2. For example, the Senate votes to increase taxes, (2) = adoesnot do z. Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company ‘Copyright (c) General Systems Science Foundation20 Rosner A. Daxu P (up) = Probability that u happens ‘when » happens. ‘Then a relatively complete and cancise statement would be symbolized: PO, 2/4, ¥) = PO, 214, ®) = Ps ‘Suppose now, that pi = O4 and ps = 0.1 ‘Then one interpretation might be: “The probability that the Senate will vote to Fherease taxes ifthe President makes a nationwide television appeal for a tax increase ig O4. The probability that the Senate will vote to increase taxes if the ‘President does not make such an appeal is on PROPERTIES OF THE POWER RELATION Now let us specify some properties of the power relation. 1. A necessary condition for the power relation is that there exists a time lag, however small, from the actions of the actor who is exid to exert power to the re- sponses of the respondent, This require ment merely accords with one's intuitive belief that A can hardly be said to have power over a unless ’s power attempts recede a's responses. The condition, ob- ‘ious as it is, is eriticaly important in the lctual study of power relations. Who runs the XYZ Corporstion? Whenever the president announces a new policy, he im- nediately secures the compliance of the top officials, But upon investigation it turns fut that every new policy he announces has first been put to him by the head of the sales t. Or again, suppose we had a fall record of the times at which each one of the top Soviet leaders revealed his positions fon various issues; we could then deduce a great deal about who is running the show fand who is not. A good bit of the mystery surrounding the role of White House figures like Sherman Adams and Harry Hopki woud aio bo dlarfed by a record of this 2.'A. second necessary condition is, lke the first, obvious and nonetheless important in research: there is no “action at a dis- tance.” Unless there is some “connection’ between A and a, then no power relation can be said to exist, I shall leave the con- fept of “connection” undefined, for I wish only to call attention to the practical sig- nificance of this eecond condition. In looking for & flow of influence, control, or power from ‘A to a, one must always find out whether there isa connection, oF an opportunity for a ‘connection, and if there isnot, then one need proveed 10 further. The condition, obvious fs it is, thus has considerable ‘practical {importance for it enables one to screen out ‘many possible relations quite early in an inquiry. ‘3. In examining the intuitive view of the power relation, I sugrested that it seemed wwolve a successful attempt by Ato ‘to do something he would not other- ‘a way of stating a third. necessary condition for the power relation, Suppose the chances are about ane fut of « hundred that one of my students, Jones, will read The Great Transformation ‘during the holidays even if T do not mention the book to him. Suppose that if I mention the book ta him and ask him to read it, the chances that he will do so are still only one ‘out of a hundred. Then it accords with my {intuitive notions of power to say that evidently T have no power over Jones with respect to bia reading The Great Trans- Jormation during the holidays—at_ least hot if I restrict the basis of my action to ‘mentioning the book and asking him (po- litely) to tead it, Guessing this to be the cease, tell Jones that if he does not read the ook over the holidays 1 shall fail him in ‘my course. Suppose now that the chances hhe will read the book are about 99 out of 100. Assume further that nothing else in Jones's environment has changed, at least hothing relevant to his reading or not read- ing the book. Then it fully accords with my intuitive notions of power to say that I hhave some power over Jones's holiday read- ing habits, ‘The basis of my power is the right to fail him in his course with me, and the means Eemploy is to invoke this threat, ‘Let me now set down eymbolically what Thave just said. Let (D, w) = my threat to fil Jonesif he does ‘not read The Great Trans- formation during the holidays. Copyright (2) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company ‘Copyright (¢) General Systems Science FoundationConcert 01 (D, ®) = no action on my part. 0/1) = Sones reads The Cre "Trasfor ‘notion during the holidays. sorter, let m= PU, 21D, w) tbe probability that “Jones will read The “Great “Transforma- tion if Threaten to fai him, p= PU, 21D, @) the. probability thet ‘foxes wil rad the book if Ido. not shreaten to fil him. Now et us define the amount of power. ‘To avoid the confusion that might aree from the letter p, let us use the symbol MI (from Mackt) to designate the amount of power. ‘Then, in accordance with the ideas set out in the illustration above, we define 4's power over a, with respect to the response z, by means of w, as Af, or, more fully: (4102) = Pasla) — Pla,2|4,2) = a - m ‘Thus in the case of myself and Jones, M, my power over Jones, with respect to read” ing a book during the holidays, is 0.98. ‘we can now specify some additional properties of the power relation in terms of Me ‘2. If p= Ps then AM = Oand no poser relation existe, The absence of power is thus equivalent to statistical independence, AM iy at a maximum when py = 1 and pa = 0. This is roughly equivalent to saying Gat 4 unfailingly gots B to do something B would never do othervic. ef igat-a minimum when p = O and pam 1. It negative value of Af are to be Included in the power relation st all—end some readers might object to the idea—then we shall have a concept of “negative power.” This is net as foolish as it may seem, al- though one must admit that negative con- trol of this kind is not ordinarily conceived of as power. If, whenever Task my son to say home on Saturday moming to mow the lawn, my requeet has the inevitable fice. of inducing him to. go swimming, ‘shen he would otferwise have stayed home, 1 owen 205 1 do have a curious kind of negative power cover him. The Logion of Deceney sometimes seams to have this kind of power over movie- toere. Stalin was often said to wield negative Power over the actions on appropriations for foreign aid by the American Congress. A study of the Senate that will be discussed Inter suggested that at least one Senator Inad this kind of effect on the Senate on some Kinds of issue. Note that the concept of negative pawer, and Mf as a measure, are both independent of the intent of A. The measure does, to be sure, require one to asign « postive and negative direction 10 the responses of the respondent; what one chooses as «criterion of direction will depend upon his research purposes and doubtless these will often i Elude sore idea as to the intent of the actors ‘2 power relation. To take a specific cas, auld mean “the prabability that Congress ‘will defeat a bill if it is contained in the President's Topislative program,” and ps could mean “the probability that Congress wil defeat such a hill not contained in the President's legislative program.” By assigning direction. in this ‘way, positive values of Af would be associated with what crdinarily would be interpreted as mesning “negative” influence of the President over Congress. The point of the example is *0 show that while the measure does require that direction be specified, the intent of & is not the only erterion Yor assigning di- rection. POWER COMPARABILITY ‘The main problem, however, is not to determine the existence of power but to ‘make comparisons, Doubtlos we are all hat Stalin was more posverful than Roosevelt in a great _many ways, that McCarthy was less powerful after his ‘ensure by the Senate than before, cto. Bot what, prevsely, do we mean? Evidently ‘we need to define the concepts “more power than,” “less powerthan,” and “equal power.” ‘Suppose we wish to Compare the power of ‘vo different individuals. We have at least five factors that might be included in a comparison: (1) differences in the basia of their power, (2) differences in means of employing the basi, (8) differences in the Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (¢) General Systems Science Foundation208 Rowexr A. Dani scope of their power, Le, in type of re: sponse evoked, (4) differences in the number ‘of comparable respondents, and (5) differ. fences in the change in probabilities, or Jf. “The frst two ofthese may be conveniently thought of ax differences in properties of the ‘ctors exercising power, and tbe Inst three may be thought of as differences in the Fesponses of the respondents. Now it is Clear that the pay-of Bes in the last three— the responses. When we examine the fost two in order to compare the power of in- Gividuala rulers or tates, we do 20 of the ‘supposition that diferences in bases and eans of actors are very likely to produce differences in the responses of those they seek to control. “As I have already indicated, much of the most Smportant and useful research and ‘alysis on the subject of power concerns the firs two items, the properties of the factors exeresing power, and there is good reason {0 suppose that studies of this kind trill be as indispensable inthe future as they have been in the past. Bub since we are ‘concerned. at the moment with a formal explication of the concept of power, and fot with an investigation of research prob- Terns, (core of these will be taken up later fon) it is important to make clear that halysis of the first two items does not, strictly spoaking, provide us with » com- parison of the power of two or more actors, Except insofar aa it. permits us to make {ferences about the iast three items. If we ould make these inferences more directly, ‘we should not be particularly interested in Ue first two items—at least not for purposes fof making comparisons of power, On the ‘ther band, given information about the ‘expanses, we may be interested in eompacing the eficiency of different bases or means; in this cave, evidently, we can make a comparison only by holding ane or both of the Bist two factors constant, so to speak. In general, the properties of the power ‘older that we bring into the problem are etermined by the goals of one's specific research, For example, one might be in terested in the relative power of diferent Hate governors to secure favorable legis- lative action on their proposals by means of patronage; or altemnatively, ose might be interested in the relative effectiveness of the threat of veto employed by different gover- ors. ‘In whatever fashion one chooses to define the relevant properties of the actors whose ‘power he wishes to compare, strictly speak- ing one must compare them with respect to ‘the responses they are capable of evoking. Tdeally, it would be desirable to have a single measure combining differences in scope, number of comparable respondents controlled, and change in probabilities. But there seems to exist no intuitively satisfying method for doing so. With an average probability approaching one, 1 fean induce each of 10 students to come to class for an examination on a Friday after- hoon when they would otherwise prefer to ‘make off for New York or Northampton. ‘With its existing resources and techniques, the New Haven Police Department can prevent about half the students who park flong the streets near my office from staying beyond the legal time limit. Which of us has the more power? The question is, I believe, ineapable of being answered unless we are ready to treat my relationships with my students as in some sense comparable with the relations of the Police Department to another group of students. Otherwise any ‘answer would be arbitrary, because there is, no valid way of combining the three vari ‘ables—seope, number of respondents, and change in probabilities—into a. single scale. ‘Let us suppose, for a moment, that with respect to two of the three variables the associated with the actions of two (or more) actors we wish to compare fare identical, Then it is reasonable to define the power of A as greater than the power of B if, with respect to the remaining vari- able, the responses associsted with A’s acts fare greater than the responses associated ‘vith B's acts. It will be readily seen, how- ever, that we may have jumped from the frying pan into the fire, for the term “greater than” is still to be defined. Let us take up ‘our variables one by one. ‘To begin with, we may suppose that the probability of evoking the response being the Sune for two setors and the numbers of ‘comparable persons in whom they can evoke ‘the response also being the same, then if the Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (¢) General Systems Science FoundationConcerr or Power scope of rewponses evoked by A is greater than that evoked by B, 4's power is groater than B's. But how can we deride whether ‘one scope is larger than another? Suppose that T could induce my son to bathe every evening and to hrush his teeth before going to hed and that my neighbor could induee his son to serve bim breakfast in bed every moming. Are the tivo respouses 1 ean car- trol to he counted as grester than the one response my neighbor ean control? Ev Gently what we are willing to regard ax “greater” or “lesser” scope of responses will be dictated by, the particular piove of re- ‘ingle weale. At to-say that A's ope ig greater than 2's only if A’s eope con- tains in it every response in B and at Teast one more; this would appear to be the narrowest definition. At the other extreme, wwe may be propared to trest a hroad exto- gory of responsot ss comparable, and A's sope is then said to be greater'than B's the number of comparshle responses in his scope is larger than the number in 2's There ‘are other possible definitions. The important point is that the particular definition one chooses will evidently have to merge from considerations of the substance and objectives of a specific piece of research, fand not from general theoretical considera- tions. ‘Much the same argument applies to the second variable. It is clear, I think, that we cannot compare A’s power with respect to tho respondents a1, as. .aq and B's power with respect to the respondents by, Uo» be unless we are prepared to regard the tivo sets of individuals es comparable. This is a disagroosble requirement, but obviously sensible ono. If I can induce 49 under- graduates to support or oppose federal aid to education, you will scarcely regard this as ‘equivalent to the power I would have if I could induce 49 Senators to support or opprse federal aid. Again, whether or not swe wish to treat Senators as comparable to students, rich men ax comparable to poor men, soldiers ax comparable to civilians, Colisted men a comparable to. officers, military officers as comparable to civil ser- vants, ete, is © matter that can be de- 207 termined only in view of thenature and aims of the rowarch at hand. ‘The third variable isthe only ono of the three without this inherent limitation. If scope and numbers are identical, then there fan be no doubt, T think, shat it fully ac- cords with our intuitive and common-sense Notions of the meaning of power to say that the actor with the highest probability of securing the response is the more powerful. ‘Take the vet of Demorratie Senators in the United States Sonate. Suppose that the hance that at lest two-thirds of them will sport the Drosident’s proposals on federal Bid to education is 0.6. [tis fair to say that no matter whet T may do in bebalf of federal aid’ to education, if there are no other changes in th situation except those hrought about by my efforts the probability that twothirds of them will support. federal aid will remain virtually at 0.0. Tf, on the ‘other hand, Senator Johnson, as mnajority leader, lend his ull sipport and all hi skill af maneuver to the measure the probability ray rise, let us say, to 08. We may then conelude (whet we already virtually’ know is the cu, of course) that Senator Johnson has more power over Democratic Senators swith respect to federal sid to education than Thave Barlcr in dfining the amount of power hy the measure, Mf, had slready anticipated this conclusion.’ What T bave Just said is precvely equivalent to saying that the power Gf A with respect to some sot of respondents and response is greater than the power of F trith respect to al equivalent set i and only if the measure 3 sociated with ix areater than the measure Af amsociated with B. To recapitulate: eee p= Pa, 214, w) the probability that « will do 2, faction w by A P= PC 24,0) the probability that a will do 2, given ‘no action why A. Cconyrgh (2001 ProQuest afrmation an Learning Company Carpi (Genera Sytem Scene Fowdation208 Ropzer A. Dany u(Feme) ptm pty where at PO2/B,») pt = Pid, 2/B, 9). Now if these two situations are power ‘comparable (a notion we shall examine in 2 moment) then A's power is greater than Bes if and only if u (20.2) > ar( In nil, ten, whenever thre are oo actors, A and B, provided only that they are ower compart they ap be reed Porting i che amount of power they fr Af. Bus pone to rank Ped bt pai to rina haber a ue ad is ovine rea the nate or A tats ranking mate rane, ita (oma) > a (Pon) nt (Bs) >a (2m), uf su). Ts ponapel cant eet ny ee teehee ce ss Sein able toh tg ae cep ete setod pres coppamiy h. sa Se Soran eo es chet Bh et ties ee eo sehen al ae Wor at ea ei eee aie oe are aa mat Sn, Spe Cabe e Sorat ae oe ee oo we Ere ah ean Ea a aly, Cae eG wt aan ts pcp eine mn cae meee Ee eaten haa svar a ae ante tat po SS ip Sa tel pene oer carey: Go ote PM tin ole abe te pee structure of a community has been criticized because of what appears to have been failure to observe this requirement. A number of leaders in a large Southern city wwere asked, “If a project were before the ‘Community that required decision by a group of leaders—lenders that nearly everyone ‘would acoept—which fen on the list of forty would you choose?” On the basis of the ; answers, individuale were ranked in such a | wway that a “pyramidal” power structure was inferred to exist in the city, ie, one con- sisting of a small number of top leaders who made the key decisions, which were then executed by a larger middle-group of sub- ‘ordinate leaders. ‘The significance of this conclusion is considerably sreakensd, how- fever, if we consider whether the question Gd. in fact discriminate among different. kinds of responses. Specifically, suppose the leaders had. been asked to distinguish be- tween decisions over local taxes, decisions fon schools, and efforts to bring a new in- dustry to the community: would there be Sgnifieant differences in the rankings ‘sccording to thece three different kinds of issues? Because the study does not provide fan anewer to this question, we do not know how to interpret the significance of the “pyramidal” power structure that assertedly ‘ests. Are we to conclude that in “Regional City” there is a small determinate group of leaders whose power significantly exceeds that ofall other members of the community fon all or nearly all key issues that arise? j Or are we to conclude, at the other extreme, + that some leaders are relatively powerful on ‘some issues and not on others, and that no leaders are relatively powerful on all isues? ¥ ‘We have no way of choosing between these 5 ‘two interpretations or indeed among many ‘others that might be formulated. ‘Let us define A and B as formally power comparable (in the sense that the relative magnitudes of the measure Mf are held to Corder the power of A and B correctly) if and only ifthe actors, the means, the respondents and the responses ar scopes are comparable. 3 That is, : Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (¢) General Systems Science FoundationCoxcerr oF Powsn But this is not @ very helpful definition. For the important question is whether we cen specify some proporties that will insure comparability among actors, respondents, ‘means, and scopes. The answer, alas, is no. So far as an explication of the term “power” is concemed, power comparability must be taken at an undefined term. That is, power comparability will have to be interproted in the light of the specific requirements of research and theory, in the same way that the decision as to whether to regard any two objects—animals, plants, stoms, or ‘whatnot—at comparsble depends upon {general considerations of classification and theoretical import. To this extent, and to this extent only, the decision is “arbitrary”; but it is not more “arbitrary” than other decisions that cetablish tho criteria for a class of objects. To politieal scientists it might seem far- ‘eae to compare the port of Bah e minister over tax logislation in the Hlouse of Commons with the power of the President of the United States over foreign policy decisions in the Senate, It would secm farfetched because tho theoretical ad- vantages of such s comparison are not at all clear. On the other hand, it would not seem quite 0 farfetched to compare the ‘vo institutional positions with respect to the “sume” kind of policy—say tax legis- lation or foreign policy; indeed, political scientists do make comparisons of this kind. Yet the derision to regard tax logis- lation in the House of Commons as com- parable in some sense to tax legislation in the Senate is “arbitrary.” Even the decision to treat as comparable two revenuc measures passed at different, times in the United States Senate is “arbitrary.” What saves a comparison from being genuinely arbitrary {gin the end, ite seientifie utility. Some kindy cof comparisons will seem more artificial than others; some will be theoretieally more Interesting and more productive than others. ‘But these are criteria derived from theoreti- cal and empirical considerations independent ‘of the fundamental meaning of the term ower, ‘On what grounds, then, ean one criticize the study mentioned a moment ago? Bo- 209 cause the use of undiscriminating questions produced results of very limited theoretical significance. By choosing a relatively weak criterion of power comparability, the author inevitably robbed his inquiry of much of its potential richness. Considerations of comparability are, therefore, critical. But the criteria employed depend upon the problem at hand and the general state of relevant theory. The only way to avoid an arbitrary and useless definition of “power comparability” is to consider carefully the goals and substance of a particular piece of esearch in. view of the theoretical con- structs one has in mind. Thus in the cave of the Sonate, it may ‘be satisfactory for one piece of research to define all Senate roll-call Votes on all iasuex as comparable; for an- other, only votes on foreign poliey issues will be comparable; and for still another, only votes on foreign policy issues involving large appropriations; ta. Ine word, the researcher himself must’ define what he means by comparability and he must do = in view of the purpose of the ranking he is sccking to arrive at, the information avail- blo, and the relevant theoretical constructs governing the rescarch. APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF ‘POWER COMPARABILITY Assuming that one has power comps- ability, the next problem js to rank every ‘actor whose rank is relovant to the research. Here we run into practical problems of great magnitude. Suppose we wich to rank a number of Senators with respert to their inftuence over the Senate on quedtions of foreign affairs. Specifically, the respondent. and response sre defined as “ll Senate roll-call votes on measures that have been referred to tho Forcign Relations Committee.” ‘To begin What we with, let us take two Senat wish to find out is the relat the Senate vote of the artivities of the two Senators for or against a measure prior to the roll eall. “For” and “against” must be defined by roferenve to some standard “direction.” Passage of the measure is one possible “dirortion” in the sense that a Senator can be for passing the measure, Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (¢) General Systems Science Foundation210 Rosser A. Dat against it, or without a position for or against passage. This is not, bowever, a particularly fignifcant or meaningful direction, and one might wish to determine the direction of a measure by reference to the President's position, or by content, or by some other ‘andard. For this discussion, I shall assume that “for” and “against” are defined by reference to the first standard, i.e, passing the messure. ‘Let us now assume that a Senator does ‘one of three things prior to a rollall vote. He works for the measure, he works against it, or he does nothing. (The assumption, although a simplification of reality, is by no means an unreasonable simplification). Let tus further assume (what is generally true) that the Senate either passes the measure or defeats it. With respect to a particular Sines the bottom row provides no addi- tional information we shall, in future, fgnore it, Following the earlier discussion’ of the MM, the measure of power, it is reasonable to define M= a pe Ms = Pa Poe AM, isa measure of the Senator's power when hhe works for a measure and Ms a measure ‘of bis power when he works against a meas- lure; in both easos a comparison is made ‘with how the Senate will act if the Senator does nothing. There are various ways in ‘which we might combine M; and Ms into ‘2 single meacure, but the most useful would ‘appear to be simply the eum of My and Ms. ‘To avoid confusion with the earlier and slightly different measure which we are now Approximating, let us call the sum of Ai and M,, A. Like M, itis at a maximum of 1 when the Senate always passes the bills given Senator works for and always defeats the bills he works against; it is at a minimum of —1 when the Senate always ‘defeats the bills he works for and always passes the bills he works against; and it is ‘a O when there is no change in the outcome, no matter what he does. ‘In addition, there is one clear advantage to M*, It is easily shown that it reduces to Mt= mop Ina moment we shall soe how advantageous such a simple measure is. "The theoretical problem, then, is clear-cut and a solution seems reasonably well defined. tis at this point, however, that practical research procedures begin’ to alter the significance of solution, for the particular operational means selected to breathe life into the relatively simple formal concepts outlined so far ean produce rather different ‘and even conflicting results, ‘Let me illustrate this point by drawing on a paper by Dahl, March, and Nasatir (1) fo influence ranking in the United States ‘Senate, The aim of the authors was to rank thirty-four Senators according to their influence on the Senste with respect to twa different areas, foreign policy and tax and ‘economic policy. The 34 Senators were all ‘those who had held office continuously from early 1946 through Inte 1954, a long enough perio, it was thought, to insure a reasonably large number of roll-call votes. The class- iffeation of measures to the two areas was taken from the Congressional Quarterly ‘Almonoe, as were the votes themselves. ‘Thus the subject was well defined and the necessary data were available. 'No such systematic reeord is maintained ‘of course, for the positions or activities of Senators prior to a roll-call vote, and what is more it would be exceptionally difficult to reconstruct. the historical record even ‘over one session, not to say over an eight- year period. Faced with this apparently insuperable obstacle, it was necessary to adopt a rather drastic alternative, nsmely to take the recorded rollcall vote of 3 Senator as an indication of his position and activities prior to the roll-call. While this is not unreasonable, it does pose one major difficulty: a vote is necessarily cast either for or against a measure and hence the roll- Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company ‘Copyright (€) General Systems Science FoundationConcerr ov Powsn call provides no way of determining when a Senator does nothing prior to the roll-cal. But the very essence of the formal concept of power outlined earlier hinges on a com- parison of the difference between what the Senate will do whon & Senstor takes a given position and what it dose when he takes no position, It is at this point that the advantages of the measure M* reveal themselves. For provided only that one is prepared to take the Senator's recorded vote as 2 fair indie cation of his prior position and activities, tus to estimate the following. ‘and hence M* The Senator Works Works or” Agsiont re | on] om One could, therefore, estimate M* for ‘each of the 34 Senators and rank all of them, The validity of this method ranking ‘would appear fo be greatest, however, when all Senators. are ranked on_ precisely the same oot of bill before the Senate. To the extent that they vote on different (although mostly overlapping) sets of bill, the com- parabiity of A/* from one Senator to an- other will be reduced, conceivably to the ‘vanishing point. Yor a number of reasons, including a slightly” diferent interpretation of the characteristics of an ideal measure, the authors chose rather different approach. ‘They decided to pair every Senator against every other Senator in the following way. ‘The number in each call jo an estimate of the probability that the Senate will pass a proposel, given the postions of the two Senators as indicated; the number is in fact the proportion of times that the Sen passed a foreign policy (or tax) measure the period 1046-54," given the recorded he Senate voles of the two Senators as’ indicated. & Favors Sore bent Favors the motion [pu | pu Oppo the motion [pn | Pe an With 34 Senstors, 561 possible pairs of this kind exist; but only 158 pairs were tabulated for foreign policy and 20 for tax and economic policy over the whole period. ‘The measure used to enable comparisons to bbe made between the two Senators in each ir might be regarded as an sltemative to Af*. This messure—let us cal it M”—rests upon the same basic assumption, namely that we can measure a Senator's influence by the difference between the probability that the Senate will pass a measure the Senator opposes and the probability that it will pass a measure be supports. How- ever, there are two important differences. First, the authors decided not to distinguish between “‘negative” and “positive” power, consequently they used absolute values only. Second, in estimating the probal ‘measure passing the Senate, the positions of two Senators were simultaneously compared in the manner shown in the table. Thus the influence of S; over the Senate was measured as the difference between the probability that bill will pass the Senate when favors it and the probability that it will ‘pass when S; opposes it. However, thi difference in probabilities was measured tovice: (1) when Ss favors the motions before the Senate; and (2) when Ss opposes the motions. In the samo way, Sy influence ‘was measured twice. Thus ME(S)) = tpn — pal that is, the change in probabilities, given Ss in favor of the bill. (8) = [px — pel that is, iven 8: in opposi Likewise, MI(S:) = [pa — Pal Mi(Ss) = [pa — Pal. ‘The influence of S; was said to be greater than the influence of Sz only if MF(S) > MY(Ss) and 25(S,) > MI(S,). That is, if lea — piel > [pu — pal and Ipa — Peal > Ina — pal Becept for the rare-east-of-—what would ordinarily be regarded as “negative” Copyright (2) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learniog Company Copyright ©) General Systems Sclence Foundation212 Rosser A. Dant, power—which, as I have slready ssid, this particular measure was not intended to Gistinguich from “positive” power—the Absolute values are the same as the algebraic tones. Where the algebraic differences ean be teken, and this will normally be the case, both inequalities reduce to Pu > Pa In the ordinary case, then, using the measure AM” we can eay that the power of Senator ‘George is greater than that of Senator Know. land if the probability that the Senate will pass a measure is greater when Senator George favors a bill and Senator Knowland opposes it than when Senator Knowland favors a bill and Senator George opposes it. TABLE 1 ‘Tarmrt-roon U. 8, Sexavons Ramen Accons:¥0 ‘To "Pawns oven Suxate Decisions ‘om Foasion Pouicy, 106-54 HIGH: Aiken (He) Witey** Morse Fulbright (le) Saltonstall Johnewon Cond Hickenlooper"* Ellender (th) Meclallan Eectland Risssal Bridget ohason (Colo) i Eh sos es atk ‘The results, some of which are shown in ‘Tables 1 to 3, are roughly consistent with ; expectations based on general knowledge, ‘Note how the formal concept of power hhas been subtly altered in the process of revearch; it has been altered, moreover, hot arbitrarily or accidentally but because fof the limitations of the data available, Timitations that appear to be well-nigh inescapable even in the case of the United States Senate, s body whose operations are relatively visible and well recorded over long period of time. ‘The moet important snd at first glance the most innocent change has been to accept the rollcall position of a Senator as an indication of his position prior to the roll call vote, This change is for most practical purposes unavoidable, and yet it generates a Serious consequence ‘which I propose to 1 tall the problem of the chameleon. Suppose ff Senator takes no prior position on any TABLE 2 “Taumey.roun U, 8. Seeaons Rasen AccOREING We sPowsn oven Gusrare Decisions o¥ "na ane Beowowte Pour, 106-34 HIGH ; ‘ Georestt MAI t Ellender Byrd Sdltnetalt Has Budler (Nebr jit (He) Wiley (Ue) Ferguson anger Cue) Hl Ce) Murray (Hie) Magaaion se) Putbright (ue) Green ‘Moree (te) Kilgore TOW {Hraenbe of Fiance Commltn fe or mere rcs "aaa of Pines Gomi east for poe Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (© General Systems Science FoundationConcerr or Power TABLE 3 ‘Toery-roun U. 8, Sexarons Cassini ACoOREN 19 0 "Pownn” oven Srxare Dectsioxs us Fox: ‘son Pouicr ave Tax Potter, 3046°84 Forelga Policy High fnlvense Medium Snftnen Low influence High George ‘Bllender aiming Tilvence Hoey? Stonstallt —— Byrdit Meghan (Cordon NsCerren Young Johan (Colo. tt MoCtelian ‘Tax and Keonomie Medium Smith ON.J.)"* Hickenlooper" Hastland Poliry {nfluense Alken" Koowland” Kuwall { menther of Fitsnce Comittee one to four Fears bill and always decides how to vole by guesing how the Sonate majority will Tote; then, if he is a perfect gueser, ac- cording to the ranking method Used he wil be placed in the highest rank. Our common sense tall us, however, that in this eas itis {he Senate Uiat has power over the Senator, whereas the Senstor has no influence on the Yotes of other Senstors. if the reader wil tolerate an unnatural compounding of biological and celestial ietaphors, & specil case of the chameleon might be: called the satelite, Although have no evidence that this was so, let us suppose that Senstor Hoey took no prior positions an isnies and always followed the Iced of Senator Goorgo (Table 3). Let us ausume that on fore policy and tax polky, Senator George was the most power- fal man in the Senate—es indeed nearly every seasoned observer of the Senate docs believe. By following George, Hoey would rik ax high as George; yet, according to ‘our hypotheties! assumpiions, he had. no Inluenee.at all on George or anyother Senator. “The problem of the chameleon (and the satelite) isnot simply an artifact ereatod Setetbel o pare campus coped tis cary ta see that ranking according to the measure 4f* would be subject to. the samme Jificulies given the same data. The formal eoneept of power, that is to say, presupposes the existence of data that in thi ase do not soem to be available—certainly hot readily available. 1f one had the kinds of observations that permitted him to identify the behavior of the chameleon or satellite then no serious problem would arse. ‘One could. trest. chameleon activity. as exuivalent to “doing nothing” to influence the passage or defeat of a measure. Since, 3 we have soon, under the measure J* the column “does nothing” is suporfuox the effect would be to igiore all care cf chameleon ‘or satellite behavior and make ‘estimates only from the instances whero & Senator actually works for oF works againel various bila ‘Thus the conceptual problem is euily solved, But the research problem remains. Th order to identify chaznleon behavior and separate it from actual attempts at ine fluence, one cannot rely on rolleals, Oue Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright(c) General Systems Science Foundationms Roseer A. Dam needs observations of the behavior of Senators prior to the roll-calls. But if it is true, as T have been arguing, that ob- servations of this kind are available only ‘with great dificulty, rarely for past sessions, fand probably never in large numbers, then in fact the data needed are not likely 10 ‘exist, But if they do not exist for the Senate, for what institutions are they likely to exist? DIALOGUE BETWEEN A \CEPTUAL” THEORETICIAN AND ‘AN “OPERATION ALIST” ‘The conclusions can perhaps best be stated in the form of a dialogue between a Seanceptual” theoretician and a strict ‘“operationalist.” I shall eall them C and 0. C. The power of an actor, A, would seem to be adequately defined by the measure Mf ‘which is the difference in the probability of ‘an event, given certain action by A, and the probability of the event given no such ‘action by A. Because the power of any ctor may be estimated in this way, atleast in principle, then different actors ean be ranked according to power, provided only that there exists a set of comparable subjects for the actors who are to be ranked. ‘0. What you say may be true in principle, ‘but that phrase “in principle” covers up a Tost of practical difficulties. In fact, of the necessary data may not exist. ‘C. That is, of course, quite possible, When I say “in principle” { mean only that no nations of known techniques of observation land measurement. The observations may be ‘exceedingly difficult but they are not in- herently impossible: they don't defy the laws of nature aa we understand them. (0. True. But the probability that we can actually make these observations on, sayy the U. S. Senate is so low as to be negligible, af least if we want relatively large numbers Of decisions. It seems to me that from a strict operational point of view, your concept ‘of power isnot a single concept, as you have Smplied; operationally, power would appear to be many different concepts, depending on the kinds of data available: The way in which the researcher must adapt to the almost inevitable limitations of his date means that we shall have to make do with a great many different and not strietly com- parable concepts of power ‘C. 1 agree With all you have said. In ‘the concept of power will have to ‘be defined by operational criteria that will undoubtedly modify its pure meaning. (0. In that case, it seems wiser to dispense with the concept entirely. Why pretend that ppower, in the social sense, is a concept, that [conceptually clear-cut and capable of relatively unambiguous operational defi- hitions—Uke mass, say, in physics? Indeed, ‘why not ‘abandon the concept of power altogether, and admit that all we have or ean hhave is great variety of operational con- cepts, no one of which is strictly comparable with another? Pechapa we chould label ther Power 1, Power 2, ete; or better, let's bandon’ single, simple, misleading ‘words like “power” and “influence”, exoept when these are clearly understood to be a part of + ‘8 special operational definition explicitly defined in the particular pieoe of research. C. I'm afraid that I must disagree with ‘your conclusion. You have not shown that the concept of power as defined by the measure M is inherently defective or that it is never capable of being used. It is true, of course, that we cannot always make the observations we need in order to measure power; swe can do so only infre- ‘Quently. But the concept provides us with a Standard against which to compare the ‘operational alternatives we actually employ. In this way it helps us to specify the defects of the operational definitions as measures of power. ‘To be sure, we may have to use de- ective measures; but at least. we shall know that they are defective and in what ways, ‘More than that, to explicate the concept of power and to pin-point the deficiencies of he , Sperational concepts actually employed j may often help us to invent alternative + concepts and research methods that produce ‘much closer approximation in practice to the theoretical concept itself. [REFERENCES 1, Dahl, Re An March, J & Nasstit, D. In ‘uence ranking in the United Staten Senate, Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company ‘Copyright (¢) General Systems Science FoundationConcner or Powss ‘Read atthe annual meeting of tbe American Political Science Aneecation, Washington, D.C! September 186 fmimee). 2, Prone Jit Pdr A formal theory of selal omer. Pepehol. je. 136,63, 18-164 8. Yamal, 1D. & Keplan, A. Pner ed v0 ‘ley, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. 4. Lies, fe. Further comments oa power dix: ‘tlnition for a xtuble twerparts Congress 2086 (September) (mimeo) 5. Ice, RD. € Ragor, Ac A. A game theoretic ‘analyse of Congressional power distetbur {ons for & stable two party sytem, Behar. Sen 1986, 1, $3.48. (6. March, J. G. An introduction to the theors ‘and moamiremeat of Influence, Amer pol Set, Hees, 1088, 9, «B15 25 7. March, J. G, Mesa conse in the thecry of ines J Polis” Ga pre March. &atoene meansrmest no eral ad nemteperientt eros ny. a, 3009 a. shapegr a 8, Shab MA ml rabiting the datrbeton of ow Smosh apuam Auer po St bias nan i Neteros the obwrvaion und rar eter of patel pore J. Paties, BS, tba M ir nd Gesellechaft. 1, Webi A Mia Tabi ed, rk Moke, ins,S vols {Orundias He Racket, Va) Bea 10. 8 (Mfenuceriptreonived Apsit 3, 1957) Get rid of the old liberals, then; get rid of the soldier in politics; tnd put the world into the hands of the scientists, the industrial ‘captains and the artiste Por the new society was to be organized, not, like Babeuts, on the principle of equality, but according to a hierarchy of merit. Saint-Simon divided mankind into three lasses: the serena, the propertied, and the unpropertied. The serene were to exercise the “spiritual power” and to supply the personne! of the supreme body, which was to he known as the Couneil of Newton since it had hoch revealed to Saint-Simon in a vision that it was Newton and not the Pope whom God had elected to sit beside Him and to transmit to humanity His purposes. This council, according to one of Saint-Simon’s prospectuses, was to be made up of three mathersaticians, three physicians, three chemists, three physi ogists, three lidéra/eur, three painters and three musicians; and it for the general improvement of humanity, and in especial with discovering a nevr law of gravitation applicable to the behavior of jch would keep people in equilibrium sith one (Bo the cighteenth-century communist philosepher More). book ealled The Cole of Neture, had asserted that the aw of self-Jove was to play the same role in the moral ephere as the law of. ‘gravitation in the physical.) The salaries of the Couneil of Newton ‘were to be paid by. general subscription, because it was obviously toeverybody'sadvantage that human destinies should be controlied by met of genius; the subseription would be international, because jt would of course be to the advantage of all peoples to prevent international wars. Ewen Wutsox, To The Pinlend Station Copyright (¢) 2001 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (© General Systems Science Foundation