1

Article 8 The Judicial Department

Cases on Sections 1-3
SEC.1
1. JUDICIAL POWER
2. CASES
Santiago v. Bautista
Firstly, how the fuck does this deserve an En Banc
ruling? This is not even sensational. Its just a whim of
a father (apparently a lawyer) who wanted to make
good on his threat that he will file charges if his son
doesnt get highest honors. Why cant he accept the
fact that, maybe, some students are fucking better
than his son? What a faggot.
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City. He is herein
represented by his mother, Angelita Santiago, with
his father acting as legal counsel. Juanita Bautista
was a teacher at the same school, acting as a
member of the Committee on the Rating of Students
for Honor of the same.
Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:
Petition for certiorari When any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law
requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment or order subject thereof,
together with copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto.

Facts:
As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor"
was constituted by the teachers concerned at said
school for the purpose of selecting the "honor
students" of its graduating class. After deliberations,
the committee finally adjudged Socorro Medina,
Patricia Ligat and Teodoro Santiago, Jr. as first,
second and third honors, respectively. The graduation
exercises would be on May 21. However, Santiagos
parents wasnt contended with the 3rd honors that
their son would receive, and so 3 days before the
graduation exercises, the parents filed a complaint
seeking the invalidation of the "ranking of honor
students" thus made. This complaint was dismissed
and the graduation exercises pushed through as
planned. On May 24, the defendants motioned to
dismiss the case, alleging that the action for certiorari
was improper and the issue is already academic.
Reconsideration was filed but this was again
dismissed on the following grounds:
That the petition does not comply with the 2nd
paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it
has not been accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment or order subject
thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto;
That administrative remedies were not first
exhausted; and
That there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the teachers who constituted
the committee referred to.
Of course, on the other hand, defendants argue that,
in addition to the abovementioned grounds, the
"committee on the ratings of students for honor"
whose actions are here condemned by appellant is
not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions" against which an action for certiorari may
lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

Issue:
Whether or not the committee of teachers whose
decision is herein assailed falls within the category of
the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65.
Held:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action
instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions. A judicial function is an
act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the
exercise of a judicial function is the doing of
something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order that a special civil action of certiorari may be
invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances
must exist:
That there must be a specific controversy
involving rights of persons or property and
the said controversy is brought before a
tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and
obligations.
That the tribunal, board or officer before
whom the controversy is brought must have
the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws
to that end.
That the tribunal, board or officer must
pertain to that branch of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.
The so-called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions
in the performance of its assigned task. Before
tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that

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give rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine what
that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. There is nothing on
record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of
their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors,
such function involves the determination of what the
law is and that they are therefore automatically vested
with judicial or quasi judicial functions.
Therefore, since the committee did not perform
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the petition for
certiorari cannot prosper and is improper.
Consequently, the petitioner is hereby held to have no
cause of action.
Marcos v. Manglapus
Ferdinand Marcos was the dictator who fled after the
original People Power Revolution of 1986. Raul
Manglapus was then the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Facts:
Ferdinand Marcos was kicked out of the presidency
via the EDSA Revolution and was forced into exile.
Subsequently, Cory Aquino was declared President
under a revolutionary government. However, the
country was far from being stabilized as continued
threats emerged from various sectors ranging from
the rebels to the Marcos loyalists. The economy had
its own challenges as it fights to relieve itself of the
devastating effect of the accumulated foreign debt as
a result of the ill-mannered accumulation of wealth.
When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the
country along with his family but then President
Aquino stood in his way and contended that Marcos

cannot return to the country considering that his

return would be a threat to the stability of the
government and the countrys economy.
Issue:
Whether or not the President, in the exercise of
powers granted by the Constitution, can prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines posed a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.
Held:
The President has residual and discretionary powers
not stated in the Constitution which include the power
to protect the general welfare of the people. She is
obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare
and advance national interest as provided in Sections
4 and 5 of Article 2 of the Constitution. Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
the President can do anything which is not forbidden
in the Constitution. Therefore, as part of her residual
power, the President can ban the return of Marcos
and his family to the country considering the
consequences which could pose a serious threat to
national interest and welfare of the country.
The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in barring Marcoses from
returning to the country. Their return, considering
present time & circumstances, would pose a serious
threat to national interest and welfare.

Fernan, concurring:

The Presidents power is not fixed. Limits would

depend on the imperatives of events and not on
abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical
time and the current problem can only be answerable
by the President. The state cannot sacrifice public
peace, order, safety and our political and economic
gains to give in to Marcos wish to die in the country.
Compassion must give way to the other state
interests.
Cruz, dissenting:
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return,
live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed
by the Constitution to all individuals. Further, the
military has failed to show that Marcos return would
pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.
Paras, dissenting:
The Armed Forces has failed to prove danger which
would allow State to impair Marcos right to return to
the Philippines. Therefore, there is no substantial
proof that Marcos return would endanger national
security or public safety. Fears are speculative and,
more importantly, the military admits that its under
control.
But where is the judicial part of this?
In the process of the litigation for this case, the Court
was tasked to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President
when she made that decision to bar the Marcoses.
Prior to this case and perhaps in less sensational
cases, the Court could have decided to forego looking
into the Presidents prerogative precisely because of
the separation of powers doctrine. However, in this
case, the Court made it a priority and a critical point
that they establish the extents of the exercise of
judicial review. In this case, the Court carefully

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examined the concept of judicial review and,
subsequently, applied it. In the end, the Court found
that judicial review extends, as applied in this case, to
the factual basis of then President Aquinos decision.
This is because of the fact that if indeed Aquino had
no factual or substantive basis for such decision, she
has therefore committed grave abuse of discretion
with respect to her powers and jurisdiction, which in
turn can be looked at and checked by the powers
granted to the Supreme Court.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
Leo Echegaray was a sick man who raped his own
daughter Rodessa Echegaray. The Secretary of
Justice at the time of this case was Serafin Cuevas.
Facts:
On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed
the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the
Supreme Court not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction
over the case when the decision became final and
executory.
Whether or not the Supreme Court, by granting the
TRO, has in effect granted reprieve, thereby
encroaching upon the functions of the executive.
Held:
First of all, the Supreme Court is not modifying or
amending anything in the original decision. The
finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of

the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to

amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a
difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. The former continues even
after the judgment has become final for the purpose
of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates
when the judgment becomes final. For after the
judgment has become final facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust
or impossible.
The power to control the execution of its decision is
an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution
vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effect is the same the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can
at any time amend RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) by
reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the
imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other
for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United
States, laws have even been enacted expressly
granting courts the power to suspend execution of

convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld

over arguments that they infringe upon the power of
the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
United States v. Nixon
The United States of America is a powerful country
north of Mexico, east of the Pacific, west of the
Atlantic and south of Canada. Nixon was a former
president of the United States. This case is about the
sensational Watergate scandal.
Facts:
In June 1972, five men armed with cameras and
bugging equipment were arrested inside the
Democratic National Committee's offices in the
Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. Police soon
discovered that the burglars worked, directly or
indirectly, for the Committee to Re-Elect the
President. Then President Nixon and leaders of his
campaign denied any connection with the incident.
The five men were convicted of burglary, along with
Howard Hunt, Jr., a former Nixon aide, and Gordon
Liddy, a lawyer for the Committee to Re-elect the
President. Shortly afterward, the presiding judge
received a letter from one of the convicted men. It
spoke of payoffs to the burglars in return for their
silencethe men had perjured themselves to protect
others involved in the break-in.
In 1973, a Senate select committee began an
investigation, and it became clear that top members
of the Nixon administration were involved in a coverup of the break-in and several other illegal actions. It

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was also discovered that Nixon had installed a taping
system that automatically recorded all of his
conversations with his advisors. A special prosecutor
appointed to probe the Watergate scandal
subpoenaed the tapes. Nixon refused to release
them, claiming they were protected under executive
privilege. Nixon eventually released some of the
tapes, but portions of them had been erased. Finally,
another special prosecutor asked the United States
Supreme Court to compel Nixon to release all of the
tapes in their entirety.
Issue:
Whether or not the separation of powers doctrine
created by the Constitution provide the President with
an absolute power to withhold information from other
branches of government.
If the power is not absolute, whether or not President
Nixon is able to claim executive privilege under the
aforementioned circumstances.
Whether or not the separation of powers allow for the
settlement of this dispute to reside in the executive
branch or it should be settled in the judiciary.
Held:
Nixon must surrender the tapes. The impediment that
an absolute, unqualified executive privilege would
place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of
the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of
the courts under Article III (Bill of Rights).
The right to the production of all evidence at a
criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions.
The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every
defendant in a criminal trial the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him and to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also
guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty

without due process. It is the manifest duty of the

courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to
accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and
admissible evidence be produced. The Court made it
clear that the President could not withhold evidence
from an ongoing criminal prosecution of another
person simply because he was the President.
Note:
On 9 August 1974, Nixon became the first President
in United States history to resign from the presidency.
He did so in order to avoid going through the likely
prospect of being impeached by the full House of
Representatives and convicted by the Senate.
Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC
Infotech is an organization. COMELEC is the
constitutional commission which is, quite fairly, in
need of an overhaul at least with respect to its
members. Seriously, look at all the cases and
pertinent jurisprudence in political law. COMELEC is
the favorite defendant. Its either our election laws are
inherently flawed or the minds of the commissioners
(almost all of which incidentally became wealthier
after their terms) are so spent.
Facts:
On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436
authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election
system (AES) for the 1998 national and local
elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire
automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new
electoral forms and printing materials. This failed in
the 1998 elections but was revived in the preparations
for the 2004 elections. On 24 January 2003, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 172,
which allocated P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the
2004 elections. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued
an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid. Out of

the 57 bidders, the Bids and Awards Committee found

Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total
Information Management Corporation (TIMC)
eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred
to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST). After
evaluation, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had
failed in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding
these failures, COMELEC awarded the project to
MPC. On 29 May 2003, five individuals and entities
(including Infotech Foundation, represented by its
president, Alfredo Torres) wrote a letter to COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos. They protested the
award of the Contract to MPC due to glaring
irregularities in the manner in which the bidding
process had been conducted. Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements, they sought a re-bidding.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC, the agency vested
with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee
elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the
exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to
MPC the contract.
Whether or not the petitioners legal standing should
be recognized and upheld despite the fact that they
dont meet the rule on legal standing.
Held:
COMELECs awarding of the subject contract is not
only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but
also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and
procedure. For the automation of the counting and
canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections,
COMELEC awarded the contract to Mega Pacific
Consortium an entity that had not participated in the
bidding.

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On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their
capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and
concerned citizens -- respond that the issues central
to this case are "of transcendental importance and of
national interest." Allegedly, COMELECs flawed
bidding and questionable award of the contract to an
unqualified entity would impact directly on the
success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus,
any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the
expression of the will of the people would inevitably
affect their faith in the democratic system of
government.
SEC.2
1. CONGRESS AND JUDICIAL POWER
2. CASES
Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.
I wasnt able to find the original text of the case.
Facts:
In 1981, during Martial Law, then President Ferdinand
Marcos issued PD 1818 which provided that no court
in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or
controversy involving an infrastructure project, or
a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the government, or any public
utility operated by the government, including among
others public utilities for the transport of the goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or
governmental official from proceeding with, or
continuing the execution or implementation of any
such project, or the operation of such public utility, or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such
execution, implementation or operation. Apparently
because Malaga was somehow affected by this, it
was assailed in this petition.

As held in Datiles v. Sucaldito:

The injunctions seek to restrain the administrative
agencies and its officials would in effect amount to
interference by the court or the substitution of its
judgment for that of the said administrative agency in
the discharge of its functions in pursuing
infrastructure projects in question. The issuance of an
injunction is clearly covered by the peremptory
language of PD 1818. While the prohibition is by no
means absolute, as the courts are not prevented from
exercising jurisdiction where questions of law are
involved.
As held in the case of Zamora v. Caballero:
In Malaga, the Court declared that although PD 1818
prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition
extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law,
this Court declared that courts could not be prevented
from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.
SEC.3
1. FISCAL AUTONOMY
2. CASES
Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado
Radiowealth was the vendor of the equipment and
accessories which the government bought for the
offices of the Supreme Court. Manuel Agregado was
then the Auditor General of the Philippines.
Facts:
The government bought equipment (1 Webster
Teletalk Model 206 MA and 6 Webster Telephone

Speakers) and other supplies from Radiowealth.

However the Chairman of the Property Requisition
Committee appointed by the President disapproved
the purchase and installation as contrary to the
provisions of E0 32, and the policy adopted by the
Cabinet last year, discontinuing open market
purchases, and also a violation of the requirements of
EO 298. Notwithstanding this, Radiowealth wanted to
be paid their due, but the Auditor General did not
budge and refused to pay them.
Issue:
Whether or not the Auditor General, as part of the
Executive Department, was correct in his decision to
withhold payment of the equipment that the Supreme
Court bought from Radiowealth.
Held:
No one denies the power of the Auditor General to
audit, in accordance with law and administrative
regulations, expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to or held in trust by the government or the
provinces or municipalities thereof. This flows from
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. Neither does
the court claim exemption from the authority vested in
the Auditor General to examine, audit and settle all
accounts of the government or to bring to the
attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or property which, in his
opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and
extravagant (Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution).
On the other hand, this authority is absolute. The
Constitution defines the limits of the Auditor General's
powers, and it provides a remedy against his actions
when he transcends those bounds. The Auditor
General's decisions in cases affecting an executive
department, bureau, office or officer are appealable to
the President, and in those affecting the rights of
private citizens to the Supreme Court. The Auditor

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General's authority to audit disapprove this court's
expenditures has to limited to the conditions
prescribed by the Constitution, or statute, if there be
one, which did not invade the court's independence.
Executive and administrative orders and regulations
promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction
under the law or the Constitution over the court, can
give no justification or validity to the Auditor General's
decision. In the absence of express and valid
legislation, the Auditor General may not question the
court's expenditures except when they are irregular,
unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. Outside of
these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is
mandatory; and even when the objection is that the
expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant, his decisions are not final.
The Auditor General's ruling under review does not
criticize the expenditure in question on any of the
above purchase and installation of a teletalk and
telehome speakers in the offices of the Chief Justice
and of the clerk of court has been explained in the
clerk's statement; the cost of the equipment and labor
has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the
market, and there is appropriation from which the
items may lawfully be paid for.
Bengzon v. Drilon
Cesar Bengzon was the Chief Justice of the
Philippines from 1961 until 1966. In November 1966,
a few months after his retirement, he became the first
Filipino to be appointed to the International Court of
Justice. The petitioners herein are retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic
Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797.
Franklin Drilon, at the time of this case, was acting as
the Executive Secretary.
Facts:

On 20 June 1953, RA 910 was enacted to provide the

retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court
and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at
least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any
other branch of the Government or in both, having
attained the age of 70 years or who resign by reason
of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The
retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his
natural life the salary which he was receiving at the
time of his retirement or resignation. This RA was
amended by RA 1797 which provided that in case the
salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the
Court of Appeals is increased or decreased, such
increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of
this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement
pension which a Justice who as of 12 June 1954 had
ceased to be such to accept another position in the
Government or who retired was receiving at the time
of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits
that have already accrued prior to such increase or
decrease shall not be affected thereby.
Two months later, however, then President Marcos
issued PD 644 repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797
which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the officers and
enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries. PD 1638 was eventually
issued by Marcos which provided that the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. RA 1797 was restored through House Bill
16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992
General Appropriations Act were an attempt to
overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino
issued the veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797

never became a valid law absent its publication, thus
there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in
effect and HB 16297 was useless because it tried to
restore benefits which were never taken away validly.
The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.
Held:
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is
illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting. The veto of these specific
provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to
constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it
in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special
privileges given by law to former Justices on the
ground that there should be no grant of distinct
privileges or preferential treatment to retired
Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions
on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
Note from the book:
The provisions which were vetoed by then President
were in effect for so long. She vetoed those items,
apparently, because she was misinformed.
SEC.4
1. CASES

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Fortich v. Corona
Carlos Fortich was then provincial governor or
Bukidnon and Renato Corona was the Executive
Secretary of then President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Garilao was then Agrarian Reform Secretary.
Facts:
On November 1994, then Agrarian Reform Secretary
Garilao denied the application for conversation of
hectares of land from agricultural to agro-industrial
use and ordered its distribution to qualified landless
farmers.
BAIDA
(Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial
Development Association) and NQSR Management
and Development Corporation filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied. Thereafter, then
Bukidnon Governor Carlos Fortich sent a letter to
then President Ramos requesting him to suspend the
Garilao Order and to confirm the ordinance enacted
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the
subject land from agricultural to industrial/institutional
land. Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary
Torres reversed the Garilao Order and upheld the
power of local government units to convert portions of
their agricultural lands into industrial areas.
Subsequently, Garilao filed a motion for
reconsideration. Admittedly tardy, which was denied
by then Executive Secretary Torres on the ground that
the decision had already become final and executory
(in view of the lapse of the fifteen-day period for filing
a motion for reconsideration)? A second motion for
reconsideration was filed during the pendency of
which President Ramos constituted the Presidential
Fact-Finding Task Force. On November 1997, then
Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued the
herein-assailed "win-win" resolution which, pursuant
to the recommendations of the task force,
substantially modified the Torres decision by awarding
one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao property
to the qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating

only forty four (44) hectares for the establishment of

an industrial and commercial zone.
Motions for reconsideration were filed and a
resolution was promulgated regarding this case on
April 1998 affirming the assailed Corona decision. In a
November 1998 resolution, the Supreme Court voted
two-two which affirmed the April 1998 resolution,
again on separate motions for reconsideration filed by
the respondents. Now, respondents argue that the
November 1998 resolution did not effectively resolve
the matter inasmuch as the matter should have been
referred to the Supreme Court sitting en banc,
pursuant to Section 4(3), Article 8 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the matter should have been brought
to the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.

Article 8 pertains to the disposition of cases by a

division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is
to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if
a case has already been decided by the division and
the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the
failure of the division to resolve the motion because of
a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still the decision which must stand in view of
the failure of the members of the division to muster
the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite
plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be deemed
affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
People v. Dy

Held:
A careful reading of Section 4(3), Article 8 of the
Constitution reveals the intention to draw a distinction
between cases and matters such that cases are
decided while matters, which include motions, are
resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must
refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer
to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of
the concerned provision but also of the other
provisions of the Constitution where these words
appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is
clear that only cases are referred to the Court en
banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not
apply where, as in this case, the required three votes
is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the
provision speaks only of case and not matter. The
reason is simple. The above-quoted Section 4(3),

Bryan Ferdinand Dy was a convicted rapist.

Facts:
Antecedent facts are as follows:
On or about 12 January 1994, in Baguio, and within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, the above-named
accused, conspiring and mutually aiding one another,
did then and there willfully and taking advantage of
the unconscious state of the complainant who was
then under the influence of drugs, have carnal
knowledge of Gina Marie Mobley against her will and
consent.
Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan
Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration
of the Supreme Courts decision which affirmed the
judgment of Baguio RTC, Branch 5, finding them
guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
In his motion, Dy argues that the Supreme Courts
decision should have been merely recommendatory,

8
in view of the provision of Section 5(2) (d), Article 8 of
the Constitution which provides that the Supreme
Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher. He contends that Supreme Court
Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty
cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en
banc is incongruous and incompatible with the
aforementioned constitutional provision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Courts decision was
only recommendatory.
Held:
Under Section 4(1), Article 8 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present,
it is made up of three divisions. However, the
divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions
considered in any of these divisions and decisions
rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal.
The divisions are not to be considered as separate
and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the
same court.

and panty. Gerry also took off his shorts, mounted her
and had carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and
cried. The private complainant was silent during the
sexual assault because he threatened to kill her if she
would talk or shout. After the assault, she put on her
shorts and panty and again lay down. She remained
inside the room, crying.
On 14 October 2002, Gerry Ebio was convicted by
the Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced to
suffer the death penalty. The Public Attorneys Office
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the
Court lacked a quorum when the case was
deliberated as it appears that the decision was signed
only by seven justices. In a Resolution dated 7
September 2004, the Supreme Court granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that there is no
question that the Courts decision in the case was
concurred in by majority of the members of the Court
who actually took part in the deliberations. It was in
fact unanimously signed by the seven justices who
were present during the deliberations.
Issue:
Whether or not the 7 concurring justices constituted a
quorum of the 14-member court.

The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the

Court meets by Division. There should be at least
three members present for the Division to conduct its
business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3 of
Section 4 Article 8. There is no similar
pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en
banc. The 2nd paragraph of Section 4, Article 8 of the
Constitution does not expressly state the number of
justices required to be present to constitute a quorum
of the Court en banc. The deliberations of the 1987
Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a
quorum when the Court is composed of only fourteen
members. In case of doubt in a criminal case,
especially where the death penalty is imposed, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the
Court, en banc.
SEC.5
1. POWERS OF THE S.C. CLASSIFIED
2. JUDICIAL REVIEW
3. JUDICIAL REVIEW: CASE/CONTROVERSY
Marbury v. Madison

People v. Ebio
Gerry Ebio was a convicted rapist who abused his
own daughter, Dory Ebio.
Facts:
Antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 2000, Dory was preparing to sleep in the
sala. Then, Gerry, apparently drunk, approached the
her and told her to transfer to the bedroom because
they were already crowded in the sala. Armed with a
six-inch long bladed instrument, Gerry ordered her to
undress and threatened to kill her if she would not
comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts

Held:
The term "quorum" has been defined as "that number
of members of the body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body
to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that
number that makes a lawful body and gives it power
to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid
corporate act. The question of the number of judges
necessary to authorize the transaction of business by
a court is as a general rule to be determined from the
Constitution or statutory provisions creating and
regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority
of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the
transaction of business and the decision of cases.

Marbury was then the appointed Columbia Justice.

Madison was then Secretary of the State.
Section 2(2), Article 3 of the Constitution
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.

9
Judiciary Act of 1789
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate
jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the
several states, in the cases herein after provided for;
and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to
the district courts and writs of mandamus to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.
Facts:
The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure
Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a
justice of the peace in the District of Columbia.
Marbury and several others were appointed to
government posts created by Congress in the last
days of John Adams's presidency, but these lastminute appointments were never fully finalized. The
disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress
and sued for their jobs in the Supreme Court.
Essentially, then outgoing President John Adams had
appointed William Marbury as justice of the peace in
Columbia, but the new Secretary of State, James
Madison, refused to deliver it. Marbury then sued to
obtain it.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court was the correct
place for Marbury to seek his desired relief.
Held:
The justices held, through forceful arguments, that the
Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature
repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words,
when the Constitution--the nation's highest law-conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is
invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's
power of judicial review.
Note:

This conflict raised the important question of what

happens when an act of Congress conflicts with the
Constitution. Marshall answered that acts of
Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not
law and the Courts are bound instead to follow the
Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial review.
In support of this position Marshall looked to the
nature of the written Constitutionthere would be no
point of having a written Constitution if the courts
could just ignore it. "To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time,
be passed by those intended to be restrained?"
Marshall also argued that the very nature of the
judicial function requires courts to make this
determination. Since it is a court's duty to decide
cases, courts have to be able to decide what law
applies to each case. Therefore, if two laws conflict
with each other, a court must decide which law
applies. Finally, Marshall pointed to the judge's oath
requiring them to uphold the Constitution, and to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which lists the
"Constitution" before the "laws of the United States."
Further note:
The landmark decision inspired the current engraving
on the Supreme Courts wall, which reads as follows:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
In the elections of 1935, Jose Angara and Pedro
Ynsua were candidates voted for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the first district
of Tayabas.
Facts:
On October 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National

Assembly and on November 1935, he took his oath of

office.
On December 1935, the National Assembly passed
Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to
file election protests. On 8 December 1935, Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a protest
against Angara and praying that Ynsua be declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or that the
election of said position be nullified. This motion was
dismissed. On 9 December 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution stating that last day
for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy.
Held:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the Ynsua against the election of Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on 3 December
1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Note:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave

10
constitutional nature between the National Assembly
on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits
of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the
people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Arturo Tolentino was the creator of the Family Code,
and was the 9th Vice-President of the Philippines. The
Secretary of Finance at the time of this case was
Roberto De Ocampo.
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 was
issued, seeking to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
Unsurprisingly, a barrage of suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds was
filed.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution,
because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2
distinct bills, House 11197 and Senate 1630. There is
also a contention that Senate 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by the Constitution.

Held:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Sections 24 and
26(2) or Article 6 of the Constitution.
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution is
wrong. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does
the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a
body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The fact that Senate 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution was
because the second and third readings were done on
the same day. But this was because the President
had certified such as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only
of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate
days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

But where is the judicial part in this?

Some petitioners were complaining that their
constitutionally protected rights under the Bill of
Rights are being impaired. The Court said that when
cases present these controversies, the Court must
exercise its Constitutional duty. However, the Court
cannot invoke this duty to justify this Court's
intervention in what is essentially a case that at best
is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Section 5(2), Article 8 clearly defines
our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but
"cases." That the other departments of the
government may have committed a grave abuse of
discretion is not an independent ground for exercising
our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed
by the case and controversy requirement can in the
long run only result in undermining the Supreme
Courts authority as a court of law. For, as judges,
what the Supreme Court is called upon to render is
judgment according to law, not according to what may
appear to be the opinion of the day.
But why did the Court say that the issues raised
by the petitioners are not yet ripe for adjudication
(premature)?
As the words of the original case states, Indeed, the
absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need
for judicial intervention less evident and underscores
the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law
on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process
and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a
mere academic discussion of the merits of the law.
For the fact is that there have even been no notices of
assessments issued to petitioners and no
determinations at the administrative levels of their
claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the
law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding
so fundamental questions as those raised in these
suits.

11
Tan v. Macapagal
Eugene Tan was representing the people of the
Philippines. Diosdado Macapagal was acting on
behalf of the other delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Facts:
Petitioners are assailing the validity of the LaurelLeido Resolution, dealing with the range of the
authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
wants the Court to declare that it is "without power,
under Section 1, Article 15 of the Constitution and RA
6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which
seek to revise the present Constitution through the
adoption of a form of government other than the form
now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Convention being] merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein." This was
dismissed. The petitioners then filed another petition,
this time longer, hinging on American Jurisprudence,
and this is the case at bar.
October 6, 1971 Tan, Acejas, and Fernandez (as
taxpayers) assailed the validity of the Laurel-Leido
Resolution.
Laurel-Leido Resolution deals with the range of the
authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. It
seeks to replace the present (1935) Constitution by
adopting a form of government other than the form
outlined in the present Constitution.
According to the petitioners, the Constitution
Convention is merely empowered to propose
amendments and must not alter the general plan.
Issues:

1. Do petitioners have legal standing in

assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido
Resolution?
2. Is the matter ripe for adjudication?

leave it free to fulfill its

responsibility according to its
lights.

Held/Ratio:
1. Petitioners do not have legal standing.
2. The matter is not ripe for adjudication.

Pacu v. Secretary of Education

Therefore, petitioners motion for reconsideration

cannot be sustained.
1. NO LEGAL STANDING
It does not mean that in each and every
instance where such ground (locus
standi as taxpayers) is invoked, the
Court is left with no alternative but to
hear the parties.
o As far as taxpayers suit is
concerned, this Court is
not devoid of discretion as
to W/N it should be
entertained.
2. NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION
o In Gonzales v. COMELEC, Gonzales
waited before filing his suit until after the
enactment of the statutes.
He acted in accordance with
the controlling doctrine,
which requires something to be
accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court
may come into the picture.
o Such doctrine also applies when the
inquiry concerns the scope of the
competence lodged in the Constitutional
Convention.
As long as any proposed
amendment is still unacted on
by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial
oversight. The judiciary must

Joya v PCGG
Facts:
Petitioner, Dean Jose Joya, a National Artist, is
joined by several other prominent Filipino artists
(Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Virgilio Almario,
Lucrecia Kasilag, Kerima Polotan, etc.).
Petitioners seek to prevent the auction sale by
the PCGG in Christies of New York of 82 Old
Masters paintings and silverware seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila after the Marcoses fled.
Paintings and silverware were allegedly ill-gotten
by the Marcoses.
Petitioners contend that the items for auction are
cultural treasures of the nation which Art. XIV,
Sec. 14-18 of the 1987 Constitution protects.
Issues:
1. WON petitioners have legal standing to file the
case
2. WON said paintings and silverware are cultural
treasures of the nation
3. WON said paintings and silverware are
properties of public dominion
4. WON PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to
enter in agreement with Christies of New York
5. WON PCGG has complied with due process
6. WON the petition has become moot and
academic
Held:
1. NO, petitioners have no legal standing (locus
standi)

4. JUDICIAL REVIEW; LOCUS STANDI

12
Legal standing personal and
substantial (material) interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being
challenged.
Paintings were donated by private
persons to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit organization. Silverware were
donated to the Marcos couple by friends
on the occasion of their 25th wedding
anniversary.
Therefore, paintings and silverware are
NOT public property. Petitioners wont
sustain direct injury if they are sold.
Also cant be tried as a taxpayer suit.
Taxpayer suit can only prosper if the
governmental acts involve disbursement
of public funds.
Auction of the items are dispositions, not
disbursements.

2. NO
The Director of the Museum issued a
certification that said items are not
cultural treasures of the nation
3. (answered in #1)
4. not discussed
5. not discussed
6. YES
Case is moot because the items were
already auctioned off.

The Court has the discretion to take

cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is
involved. No such justification in the case at
bar.
PETITION DISMISSED

MACASIANO v. National Housing Authority

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in
his capacity as the consultant of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task
Force on Demolition and/or in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND
LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD and NATIONAL
MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, respondents.
Definition:
1. Locus Standi- legal standing before the court
2. Lis Mota- The cause of the suit or action. By
this term is understood the commencement
of the controversy, and the beginning of the
suit.
3. In Vacuo- In isolation; without reference to
related evidence
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act
No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992.
He predicates his locust standi on:
1. His being a consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on
Operation for Removal of Obstructions and
Encroachments on Properties of Public
Domain (executed immediately after his
retirement on 2 January 1992 from the
Philippine National Police)
2. His being a taxpayer.
As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44
"contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding

demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said

sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of
illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully
carried out in the past."
As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully disbursed."
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his
Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the
instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance
with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial
review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.
He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal
rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for
an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the
proper party to question the Act as he does not state
that he has property "being squatted upon" and that
there is no showing that the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He
argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not
constitutionality infirm.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
Held:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that, question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be very lis
mota presented.
To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful
judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are:
(a) The existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination

13
(b) The constitutional question must be raised by a
proper property
(c) The constitutional question must be raised at the
opportunity
(d) The resolution of the constitutional question must
be necessary to the decision of the case.
*A proper party is one who has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result
of the acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first
two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no
actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which
he is filing the petition, he has been actually
prevented from performing his duties as a consultant
and exercising his rights as a property owner because
of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under
the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power
is the "right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants."
The petition also anchored his locus standi on the fact
that he is a tax payer. But in Tan vs. Macapagal, it
was decided that as far as tax payers suit is
concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to
whether or not it should be entertained.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.
Extra Info:
Republic Act No 7279 section 28
Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition,
however, may be allowed under the
following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,

waterways, and other public places such as

sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction
and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition
orders involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, the following shall be
mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or
entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the
date of eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of
settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be
resettled and the affected communities in
the areas where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or
their representatives during eviction or
demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking
part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only
during regular office hours from Mondays to
Fridays and during good weather, unless the
affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for
demolition except for structures that are
permanent and of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the
Philippine National Police who shall occupy
the first line of law enforcement and observe
proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary
or permanent: Provided, however, That in

cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to

a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation shall be
undertaken by the local government unit
concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other
government agencies within forty-five (45)
days from service of notice of final judgment
by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further,
That should relocation not be possible within
the said period, financial assistance in the
amount equivalent to the prevailing
minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60)
days shall be extended to the affected
families by the local government unit
concerned.
This Department of the Interior and Local
Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
carry out the above provision.
Republic Act No 7279 section 44
Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition.
There shall be a moratorium on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries and
on the demolition of their houses or
dwelling units for a period of three (3)
years from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That the moratorium shall not
apply to those persons who have
constructed their structures after the
effectivity of this Act and for cases
enumerated in Section 28 hereof.
Mariano Jr. v. Commision on Elections
Facts:
I. Republic Act No. 7854 entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City

14
to be known as the City of Makati was passed. A
petitioned was filed by individuals, suing as
taxpayers. Only one was a resident of Makati, while
the others were residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig
and Metro Manila. They assailed certain sections of
the act unconstitutional on the following grounds:
II. Sec. 51:
Present Officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time
that a new election is held
1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land
area of territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical
description.
2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the
three consecutive term limit for local
effective officials.
3. Section 53 a) increases the legislative district
of Makati only by special law, b) increase in
legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill and c) the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with the Constitution because the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Note: G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H.
Osmena as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
He assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the
same grounds as aforestated.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7854 sections 2, 51,
and 52 are unconstitutional
Held/Ratio
1. The delineation of the land area did not
change even an inch previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. Section 2
stated that, the citys land area shall

comprise the present territory of the

municipality.
Also, the reason why the land area was not
defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions was because there was a
territorial dispute between the municipalities
of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio
under court litigation. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative
finding of fact which could decide the issue.
Out of respect, legislators felt that they
should leave it up to the courts to decide.
2. The petition is premised on the occurrence
of many contingent events like Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue.
3. Same as with the Tobias vs. Abalos case,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment of
the law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting RA No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makatis
legislative district
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article 6 of the
Constitution because as of the latest survey
in Makati (1990), census stood at 450,000.

Said section provides that a city with a

population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand shall have at least one
representative.
In petitioners contention that the creation of
an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the bill,
the court ruled that it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expressed the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to
such general subject.
Oposa v. Factoran Jr.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.
Ponente: Davide, Jr
Petitioner: A non-stock domestic corporation
composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests,
nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the
cause of truth, justice and national renewal
represented by its BOT; Sen Webb and Tanada; and
Rep. J Arroyo in their capacities as taxpayers, and
concerned citizens/members of congress.
Respondent: Guingona Jr.
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and
injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction which seeks to
prohibit and restrain the implementation of the
Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in
connection with the on-line lottery system, also know
as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the online lottery system on the basis of serious moral and

15
ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract
of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the
contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act
of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and
propriety of acts of the executive department are
beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the
petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant
suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal
standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and
valid.
Held:
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set
aside the procedural technicality in view of the
importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted
the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to
question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts,
decisions, or rulings of various government agencies
or instrumentalities. When the subject in issue is
transcendental interest to the public, te court
entertains the suit even if those suing do not have
a personal and direct interest sucha that they are
stand to suffer harm.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the
petitioners whether the contract in question is one of
lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent
contractor should not be decided on the basis of the
title or designation of the contract but by the intent of
the parties, which may be gathered from the

provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est

anima scripti.
The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the
challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared
contrary to law and invalid.
NOTE: The Green Book says that 4 months later, a
second Kilosbayan case was heard and the decision
to the former was reversed. Please read page 976 of
green book.
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr
Petitioners
Francisco Tatad, John Osmena, Rodolfo Biazon
suing in their capacities as Senators and taxpayers
Respondents
Jesus Garcia, Jr.incumbent Secretary of the Dept.
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
EDSA LRT Corporation Ltd.private respondent;
Private Corporation organized under Hong Kong laws
Facts

In 1989 DOTC planned to construct EDSA

LRT III, traversing Pasay, Quezon,
Mandaluyong, and Makati City
The Revised and Restated Agreement to
Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Railway
Transit System for EDSA (April 1992) and
the Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April
1992 Revised and Restated Agreement to
Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Railway
Transit System for EDSA (May 1993)
granted EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd., a foreign
corporation, ownership of EDSA LRT III
unconstitutional!

Issue(s)
The only issue discussed as far as the case
book is concerned is WON petitioners are
real parties-in-interest and have legal
standing to institute this petition
Held

Taxpayers may question contracts entered

into by the government or governmentowned or controlled corporations when
allegedly in contravention of law (Kilosayan,
Inc. v. Guingona)
Taxpayers are disallowed to do this when
only municipal contracts are involved
(Bugnay Construction and Devt. Corp. v.
Laron)
LEGAL STANDING UPHELD!

Concurring (J. Mendoza)

Concurs with the rest of the decision except
the legal standing issue
NO Legal standing as member of Congress
o No allegation of infringement of
prerogatives as legislators
NO Legal standing as taxpayers
o No allegation of unconstitutional
exercise of taxing or spending
powers of the Congress (Art. VI,
Sec. 24,25,29) or illegal
disbursement of public money
o A taxpayer must prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing
illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation and that he will sustain
a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract (Bugnay Const.
and Dev. Corp. v. Laron)

16
NO Legal standing as citizens
o The Court found standing because
the claims for unconstitutionality
were of transcendental importance
amounting to public interest
o BUT a partys standing is
preliminarily affected to an extent
by the substantive merits of his
case (Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines v. Aquino) and the Court
found the petitioners case to be
without merit
o A citizen must show that he has
personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the
government
This Courts recognition of the standing in
this case turns the SC into an office of the
ombudsman for ventilation of generalized
grievances
PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING!

because they do not allege any infringement of their

prerogatives as senators. As taxpayers, they do not
allege unconstitutional taxing or spending or
disbursement of public funds. They have to also show
that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
contract. As citizens they dont have it either, because
they failed to show a direct injury or threat of injury as
a result of the illegal conduct of the government. Also,
since the Court found their case to be bereft of merit,
their legal standing is also weak as in Lawyers
League.

Recit-ready version
In this case, petitioners question the constitutionality
of the decision of the DOTC to grant the ownership of
EDSA LRT III to EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd., which is a
foreign corporation. Given emphasis in this case is
the legal standing of the petitioners, who sued in their
capacities as senators and taxpayers. The Court
upheld their legal standing, following the ruling in
Kilosbayan and Bugnay that taxpayers may question
the contracts that the government enters into when
they are allegedly against the law and that taxpayers
are disallowed from doing this only when municipal
contracts are concerned.

Issue:
1. W/N the petitioners have substantial interest in the
ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit?

(If he asks about the opinion)

J. Mendoza disagrees that petitioners have legal
standing. As Senators they dont have standing

Kilosbayan v. Morato
Facts:
Jan 1995 parties signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) whereby the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp (PGMC) leased on-line lottery
equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental equivalent of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket sale derived from the PCSO
from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall
be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000
per terminal in Commercial Operation

Ruling:
Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction
seeking to declare the ELA between the PCSO and
PGMC is invalid --- DISMISSED.
Ratio:
The traditional rule that only real parties in interest or
those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke
the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even
in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited
by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII,
Sec 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the

judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decision-making in the
political departments of the government and bars the
bringing of suits by just any party.
Denying them the right to intervene will not leave
without remedy any perceived illegality in the
execution of government contracts. Question as to
the nature or validity of public contracts or the
necessity for a public bidding before they may be
made can be raised in an appropriate case before the
Ombudsman or Commission on Audit.
In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring
an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that
a government corporation, like the PCSO, has
offended against its corporate charter or misused its
franchise.
Primer:
Q: Explain further the concept of Standing
A: A person has standing to challenge the validity of
governmental act only if he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. People Vs. Vera; Macaisano Vs.
National Housing Authority. Thus Joya Vs. PCGG art
lovers seeking to enjoin the auction sale of European
artworks and silverware, part of the objects recovered
by the government after the ouster of president
Marcos, on the ground that these formed part of the
Filipino cultural heritage were deemed without
standing to sue because they neither owned the
properties involved nor had they been purchased with
public funds.
What appears in jurisprudence on standing is that it
is not only a rule that assures concrete adverseness
which can sharpen the presentation of the issue but it
also involves considerations of policy related to
judicial self restraint Kilosbayan Vs. Morato 1995

17
TELEBAP v. COMELEC
Petitioners:
(1) Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP)
org. of lawyers of radio and TV
broadcast companies and (2) GMA
Network, Inc.
Respondent:
COMELEC
Facts:
Section 92 of BP Blg. 881 requires the radio/TV
companies to give radio/TV airtime for free for political
ads (sale of airtime for political ads is prohibited in a
previous case, but was later repealed). Petitioners
contend that the said section is invalid on the grounds
(1) that it takes property without due process of law
and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio
and TV broadcast companies the equal protection of
the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulation the
operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.

(3) when the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners of TELEBAP have failed to show that they
have suffered harm as a result of the operation of
Section 92 of BP Blg. 881. However, the other
petitioner, GMA Network Inc., appears to have the
requisite standing to bring this constitutional
challenge, which is why the court has decided to take
or consider the case.
Note: Standing jus tertii (third party standing) is a term
of the law of civil procedure that describes when one
party may file a lawsuit on behalf of another party.
Basically, TELEBAP is asserting that it has third party
standing, when it doesnt. Standing jus tertii will be
recognized only if
(1) it can be shown that the party suing has
some substantial relation to the third party
(2) that the third party cannot assert his
constitutional right, or
(3) that the right of the third party will be
diluted unless the party in court is allowed to
espouse the third partys constitutional claim.
Gonzales v. Narvasa

Issue:
W/N the petitioners have standing in the case (given
that the members have interest as lawyers of
radio/TV companies and as citizens, taxpayers and
registered voters)
Held:
The petitioner TELEBAP have no merit nor standing
in the case. A citizen can only raise a
constitutional question:
(1) when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of
the allegedly lllegal
conduct of the government
(2) when the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action, and

Notes: in this case, hindi na nagfocus masyado sa

issues brought up by the petitioner since wala syang
locus standi to begin with. So the issues that he
raised, though answered, are not comprehensively
tackled in the decision since wala nga siyang locus
standi. And since locus standi yung topic, yung
doctrine on legal standing nalang yung ginawa kong
issue hehe :)
Facts:
-This is a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed
on Dec 9, 1999.
-The PCCR (Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform) was created by President
ERAP on Nov. 26, 1998 through EO 43 in order to
study and recommend proposed ammendments

and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution and the

manner of implementing it.
-Petitioner Gonzales, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER, assailed the constitutionality of the
creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
consultants, advisers, and assistants.
-The following contentions were made by petitioner:
1. It is a public office, hence, only congress can
create it by way of law.
2. By creating such a body, the President is
intervening in a process from which he is totally
excluded by the Constituton - the ammendment of the
fundamental charter.
-He asked the court to enjoin presidential consultants,
advisers, and assistants from acting as such, and to
enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora from
enforcing their recommendations. He also wanted to
enjoin COA from passing in audit expenditures from
PCCR and its members. He also asked to be
furnished with documents containing information on
this matter.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has sufficient legal standing
to file the case as a citizen and taxpayer.
Held:
First of all, the action must be considereed moot or
dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to
President ERAP on Dec 20, 1999 (11 days after the
case was filed) and was dissolved on the same day.
Likewise, it had already spent the funds alotted to it.
Hence, PCCR has ceased to exist. Those said events
have overtaken the petition and has left the court with
nothing to resolve. How can the SC enjoin a body
which no longer exists??
In the final analysis regarding the main issue above, it
must be stressed that the Court retains the power to
decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer's

18
suit. In this case, since Congress did not exercise
taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be
allowed to question the creation of the PCCR AS A
TAXPAYER.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges
have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that
he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the issues raised.
As somewhat of a consolation prize, his request for a
copy of the documents containing information was
granted.
J. Del Mar, et al. v. PAGCOR
Facts:
Belle Jai Alai(BELLE) agreed to provide all the
required infrastructure facilities and all the needed
funding, while PAGCOR, with no financial outlay, will
handle the actual management and operation of jaialai.
Issues:
W/N the franchise granted to Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) includes right to
manage and operate jai-alai1. (No decision regarding
this issue was given in the book)
1

a form of sport or game played for bets (Del Mar, et al. V

PAGCOR)

Petition was granted by the supreme court,

PAGCOR not allowed to manage and
operate jai-alai
MAIN ISSUE FOR CLASS: W/N Congressmen Raul
B. Del Mar (1st district of Cebu), Federico S. Sandoval
II (Malabon-Navotas), Michael Defensor (3rd
congressional district of QC) and Juan Miguel Zubiri
(3rd congressional district of Bukidnon) has locus
standi.
a) As a tax payer
b) In their capacity as members of the House of
Representatives
Held:
No, Yes
a) NO locus standi as a taxpayer since,
according to the agreement no money
(public funds) will be spent by PAGCOR
Taxpayers are allowed to sue where
there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or
that public money is being
deflected to any improper
purpose, or
where petitioner seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law
b) YES they have locus standi as members of
the house of representative since they
complain that there is an infringement by
PAGCOR of the legislatures exclusive
power to grant franchise.
To the extent the powers of
congress are impaired so is the
power of each member thereof
since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

Facts:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord
7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private
rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC.
It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
Issue:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
Held:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void
as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for
wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes
only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash
up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.

19
5. POLITICAL QUESTIONS
6. POLITICAL QUESTIONS: CASES
7. EFFECT OF DEC. OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
8. RULE-MAKING POWER
Bustos v. Lucero
Petitioner: Dominador Bustos
Respondent: Antonio Lucero, judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga
Facts:
The petitioner was accused of a criminal
case and filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga after he had
been bound over to that court for trial.
The petition was a request praying that the
record of the case be returned to the custody
of the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that
the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection
with their testimony, on the strength of which
warrant was issued for the arrest of the
accused.
It was contended that SEC. 11, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court (Rights of the
Defendant after the Arrest) was
unconstitutional because it contradicts
SEC. 13 Article VII (now Section 5 Par. 5)
which states that the SC in promulgating
rules regarding pleadings, procedure and
practice in all courts should not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
The former is said to deal with substantive
matters that impair substantive rights.
Held:
Motion was denied.
RD:

Citing a case, De Quito and Salingbuhay VS

Arellano:
Preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Section 11, rule 108 of Rules of Court is not
a substantive law nor a substantive right but
an adjective law.
o Substantive Rights includes
those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations.
o Substantive Law that part of the
law which Creates, Defines, and
Regulates rights or which gives
rise to a cause of action
o Adjective Law prescribes
methods of Enforcing rights or
Obtain Redress for their invasion.
Sec 11, Rule 108 is also PROCEDURAL,
since Evidence is identified with and forms
part of the method by which, in private law,
rights are enforced and redress is obtained.
It was also said that the right of the accused
to cross-examine the witnesses who have
given evidence against him during a
preliminary investigation is not an offense
against constitutional inhibition.
Preliminary investigation is not an essential
process of due process of law. It is a
limited and unsubstantial matter.
Sec. 11 Rule 108 still has kept the provisions
of the accuseds rights to know the charges
being filed against him and at the latter part
of the trial, he can still enjoy his right to
cross-examine the witnesses.
Because of the degree of difficulty in
demarcating the difference between

remedy and substantive right, SC should

make sure that in making rules should step
on substantive rights and the Constitution
must be presumed to tolerate such intrusion
to affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary
manner or deprive him of a defense. It shall
operate only to a limited and unsubstantial
matter to the accuseds disadvantage.
In Re Cunanan
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO
CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court
then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by
raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while other motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972.
Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author,
to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered

20
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having
been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in
admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of
the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being
most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a
purely judicial function, no matter where the
power to determine the qualifications may reside.
Distinction between the two:
Congress may repeal, alter, and supplement the rules
promulgated by the Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court
(as stated in Sec 5). Congress' power is limited to
repeal, modify, or supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its judgment the need
for a better service of the legal profession
requires it. Exercised properly, they should not be
repugnant to each other but rather complementary.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or

as other authorities may say, merely to fix the

minimum conditions for the license.
Javellana v. DILG
Facts:
Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected City Council of
Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto
Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No.C-10-90
against Javellana as he continuosly engaged in the
practice of law without securing the authority of the
Regional Director, DLG.
Javellana filed a petition for certiorari saying that DLG
memorandum circulars No.s 80-38 and 90-81 as
unconstitutional and null and void because it violates
Art.VIII sec.5 of the Constitution.
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The Local Government Code and DLG
memorandum circular No.90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharges of their public duties
and the private practice of their profession.
*Department of Local Government (DLG)
Note: Amendment of rules by statute
Section 4 of R.A. 8974
9. REVIEW OF DEALTH PENALTY

Issue:
WON case should be forwarded directly to Supreme
Court by virtue of Article VIII Section 5 par 2 (d),
provides for review of all criminal cases in which
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Held:
While the Constitution requires a mandatory review
by the Supreme Court for cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death, nowhere has it proscribed or forbidden an
intermediate or appellate review.
The Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to Supreme
Court.
A prior determination of the CA would minimize the
possibility of error of judgment. If the CA should affirm
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, it could refrain from entering judgment
and elevate the entire records of the case to the
Supreme Court for final disposition.

People v. Mateo
Facts:
On October 30, 1996 10 counts of rape were filed
against Efren Mateo. The lower court finds Mateo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing reclusion
perpetua. Solicitor General assails factual findings
and recommends acquittal of defendant.

Between 1993 until June 2004, 71.77% of cases

where death penalty was imposed, the penalty was
modified or vacated by the Supreme Court. That is
651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under Article VIII Section 5 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is vested the power to amend rules of

21
procedure. The rule additionally allowing an
intermediate review by the CA before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court is a procedural matter.
Only in cases where death penalty is imposed should
the trial court automatically forward the records of the
case to the Supreme Court (now CA) for review, and
this right cannot be waived.
The right to appeal reclusion perpetua may be
waived. If the petitioner does not file a notice of
appeal or does not indicate a desire to appeal, the
decision becomes final and unappealable. Garcia v.
People, G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999.
10. BAR INTEGRATION

controversy. The election of the officers of

IBP, including those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter,
governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by
the IBP.
Issue:
W/O this Court has jurisdiction on the matter
Held:
The contention is untenable. Section 5 of Article VIII
of the Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in
this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all
the activities of the IBP, including the election of its
officers.

In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera

Ponente:
Justice Tinga
Petitioners:
Attys. Oliver Garcia (VP of Bukidnon IBP Chapter)
Emmanuel Ravanera (former President of Misamis
Oriental IBP Chapter)
Tony Velez (current President of Misamis Oriental
IBP Chapter)
Respondent:
Atty. Leonard De Vera
Facts:
o The petitioners are seeking the
disqualification of the respondent from being
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the
16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Regional Governors elections.
o De Vera filed a respectful comment on the
petition. In his defense, he stated that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the present

*In addition, IBP By-Laws even vests in the SC the

power to amend, repeal or modify the IBP By-laws
(Sec. 77) and to have the final decision in the
removal of the members of the Board of Governors
(Sec. 44)