US vs Toribio

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was
denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao
without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel
in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his
carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil
580)
Facts:
The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would
like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the
plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be
offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of
police power in this case?

Held:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and
undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with
the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But
where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public
health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,

either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete
definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary,
to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort,
convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the
provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic
conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring
about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and
wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of
this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great
public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police
power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.March 27, 2000Puno, J.Facts

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila.Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation whose members arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered ownerof Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2,
1996.Actions Filed:
1.applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due
hearing,trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2.appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has
noauthority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolitionof its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance.

3.MMDA filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current
recourse.
Issues
1.Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory andpolice powers?
2.Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order
the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?

Held
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its
functions are administrative innature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
andadministration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislativepower.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. It is the local governmentunits, acting through their
respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. Inthe
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution orderingthe opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondentCourt of Appeals did not err in so
ruling.The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation
system but unfortunately thepowers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of aprivate street in a private
subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is
notantithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and

DIRECTOROF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT,
petitioners,vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, MetroManila,
Branch 172,
respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three
times and flunked it asmany times.
1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on
thebasis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, MetroManila, to compel his admission to the test. After hearing, the
respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring thechallenged
order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that
thepetitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through
an arbitraryexercise of the police power
.RULING:
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat
thatthe power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguishedfrom those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the meansemployed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to beaccomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
alawful subject and a lawful method.The subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police power.It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medicalprofession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

Del Rosario vs CA
Intellectual Property Law Law on Patents Infringement Karaoke Machine
Del Rosario was granted a patent for his innovation called the Minus One
karaoke. The patent was issued in June 1988 for five years and was renewed in
November 1991 for another five years as there were improvement introduced to his
minus one karaoke. In 1993, while the patent was still effective, Del Rosario sued
Janito Corporation, a Japanese company owned by Janito Cua, for allegedly
infringing upon the patent of Del Rosario. Del Rosario alleged that Janito was
manufacturing a sing-along system under the brand miyata karaoke which is
substantially if not identical to his minus one karaoke. The lower court ruled in
favor of Del Rosario but the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no infringement
because the karaoke system was a universal product manufactured, advertised and
marketed all over the world long before Del Rosario was issued his patents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.

HELD: Yes. The Patent Law expressly acknowledges that any new model of
implements or tools of any industrial product even if not possessed of the quality of
invention but which is of practical utility is entitled to a patent for utility model.
Here, there is no dispute that the letters patent issued to Del Rosario are for utility
models of audio equipment. It is elementary that a patent may be infringed where
the essential or substantial features of the patented invention are taken or
appropriated, or the device, machine or other subject matter alleged to infringe is
substantially identical with the patented invention. In order to infringe a patent, a
machine or device must perform the same function, or accomplish the same result
by identical or substantially identical means and the principle or mode of operation
must be substantially the same. In the case at bar, miyata karaoke was proven to
have substantial if not identical functionality as that of the minus one karaoke which
was covered by the second patent issued to Del Rosario. Further, Janito failed to
present competent evidence that will show that Del Rosarios innovation is not new.

Ermita-Malate hotel & Motel Operators assoc vs City Mayor

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then
acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1 class
(taxed at 6k/yr) and 2 class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of
anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to
conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is
oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in
favor of Ermita-Malate.
st

nd

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in
this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays.
As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption.
Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize
prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than
legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has
reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the
provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

Moday vs CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passedResolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition
for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the
National Highway Owned by PercivalModay for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center
and Other Government Sports Facilities." TheResolution was approved by Mayor
Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan for its
approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned
it with thecomment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are
still available lots inBunawan for the establishment of the government center." The
municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before
theRTC. The municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of
the land upondeposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. The RTC
granted the motion. Itruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare
the resolution invalid leaves iteffective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is merely to review theordinances and resolutions passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg.337, old Local Government
Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the actsenumerated in
Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Petitioners
elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that
thepublic purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that
since theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution
No. 43-89 invalid,expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile,
the Municipality had erectedthree buildings on the subject property: the Association
of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, theMunicipal Motorpool, both wooden structures,
and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which ismade of concrete.In the instant
petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision andresolution of the
CA and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawanis null
and void.Issue:WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolutionwhich was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.Held:YesRatio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of
Bunawan exercised in the instantcase, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's rightto appropriate, in the nature of
a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use orpurpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may bevalidly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there mustbe just compensation. The Municipality's power to
exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it isexpressly provided for
BP 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriationproceedings
were initiated. What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the

municipalityto exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved

Resolution No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Resolution No.
43-89 is an infirm actionwhich does not render said resolution null and void. The
law, Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grantsthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to
declare a municipal resolution invalid on the soleground that it is beyond the power
of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, digested

FACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part of a private cemetery devoted for
public use to make an extension of Rizal Avenue. Defendants contend that
expropriation is not necessary because it will disturb the remains of the dead.
Moreover, adjoining and adjacent lots were offered to the city free of charge for the
planned public improvement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a private property devoted for public use can still be
expropriated.
HELD: Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation,
provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of
authority to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the
expropriation. In the case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need
of converting the cemetery.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION

Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a

resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a
resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the
Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local
Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.
Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to
a resolution by its law-making body.
Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is
stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if
there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief
executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a lawmaking body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which
was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA

7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.