Coin Soviet Afghanwar

SovietCounterinsurgencyintheSovietAfghanWarRevisited:
AnalyzingtheEffectiveAspectsoftheCounterinsurgencyEffort
Athesispresented
by
AndreiA.Doohovskoy
totheStandingCommitteeontheA.M.in
RegionalStudiesRussia,EasternEurope,andCentralAsia
inpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MasteroftheArtsinthesubjectof
RegionalStudiesRussiaEasternEurope,andCentralAsia
HarvardUniversity
Cambridge,Massachusetts
September2009
SovietCounterinsurgencyintheSovietAfghanWarRevisited:
AnalyzingtheEffectiveAspectsoftheCounterinsurgencyEffort
Abstract
InOctober2001,over10yearsafterthewithdrawalofSoviettroopsfromacrossthe
FriendshipBridge,AmericanforceslaunchedOperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistan.
Asaresult,therehasbeenincreasedfocusintheensuingyearsbothonAfghanistanandon
counterinsurgency.AsU.S.andcoalitionforcesfindthemselvesconducting
counterinsurgenciesinbothIraqandinAfghanistan,historicalexamplesofsimilar
operationshaverenewedrelevanceforcurrentpolicy.Whileitisproblematictoattemptto
drawparallelsbetweenSovietandU.S.experiencesinAfghanistan,theSovietexperienceis
usefulforunderstandinggeneralthemesthatrecurforlargepowersfacinginsurgencies.
ManyanalyseshavefocusedontheflawsofSovietcounterinsurgencystrategyand
theultimatefailuresofKremlinpoliciesinAfghanistan.Sovietpoliticalandmilitaryleaders
mademanymistakesinformulatingandimplementingcounterinsurgencystrategy,and
thesemistakeshadsignificantanddamagingeffectsbothonAfghanistanandontheUSSR.
FocusingsolelyonSovietfailures,however,doesnotyieldacompleteoraccurate
understandingoftheconflict.DwellingonsevereandineffectiveSovietmilitaryefforts,can
leadtooverlookingthemilitary,political,socialandeconomicinitiativesthatwerewell
formulatedandindicatedunderstandingofcounterinsurgencyprinciplesonthepartof
Sovietleaders.
ThisthesisevaluatestheeffectiveaspectsofSovietcounterinsurgencystrategyin
Afghanistaninthecontextofclassicalandmoderncounterinsurgencytheory.Thiswork
doesnotseektorewritethefailuresoftheSovietgovernmentandmilitaryinAfghanistan,
butmerelytopointouttheeffectiveelementsintheirefforts.Understandingelementsof
theSovietstrategythatheldpromise,eveniftheywerenotfullyorsuccessfully
implemented,providesamorenuancedunderstandingofthechallengesandquestions
counterinsurgencypresentsforlargepowers.Manyofthesesamechallengesandquestions
arefacingtheUnitedStatestoday.
Acknowledgements
IwouldliketothankLisbethTarlowandDonnaGriesenbeckfortheirpatienceand
accommodation.IamverygratefultoMarkKramer,whopromptlyrespondedtomyevery
questionandrequestforguidance.Iamthankfultohimforhelpingmeconceptualizemy
project,assistingmewithsourcesandremainingconsistentlypositiveaboutmywork.I
greatlyappreciatethementorshipandkindnessofColonelGilbertoVillahermosaandhis
wifeNatalietheirexamplewasveryinstructiveforme.Iwouldalsoliketoexpressmy
thankstoMajorRobertSchaefer,whoconvincedmetochooseHarvardinthefirstplace,
andwhoseexpertadviceinspiredmetostudycounterinsurgency.Iamthankfulforthe
energy,helpfulnessandleadershipofLieutenantColonelLeoMcGonagle,whosupported
measacadetandasagraduatestudent.IamalsothankfultoLieutenantColonelTimothy
Hall,whoseflexibility,guidanceandappreciationformystudieshelpedmetremendouslyin
balancingmilitarytrainingandacademics.
IalsodeeplyappreciatethehelpofMaryDiMatteo,whoseperspectiveand
understandingwasasourceofmotivationforme.Iwouldalsoliketoacknowledgethe
supportandfriendshipofmysiblings:Katya,Alexei,LaryssaandDimitry.Mostofall,Iam
deeplyindebtedtomyparents,AlexanderandHelena,whoneverwaveredintheirsupport,
encouragementandsacrifice.
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................3
Introduction...............................................................................................................5
Chapter1.CounterinsurgencyTheory.........................................................................9
EnemyCentricCounterinsurgency....................................................................................12
PopulationCentricCounterinsurgency.............................................................................14
SovietAfghanWarandCounterinsurgency.......................................................................22
Chapter2.Overview.................................................................................................25
SovietAfghanWar...........................................................................................................25
SovietCounterinsurgency.................................................................................................30
Chapter3.SovietCounterinsurgency:NonMilitaryAspects......................................35
PoliticalInitiatives............................................................................................................35
SocialInitiatives...............................................................................................................39
PropagandaInitiatives.....................................................................................................42
PropagandaWithinAfghanistan...........................................................................................44
PropagandaDirectedattheInternationalCommunityandSovietPopulation....................49
EconomicInitiatives.........................................................................................................55
Chapter4.SovietCounterinsurgency:MilitaryAspects.............................................62
Decentralization..............................................................................................................62
ZonesofResponsibility..........................................................................................................62
RoleofJuniorOfficers............................................................................................................66
LimitingOutsideSupportfortheInsurgency.....................................................................69
MonitoringthePopulation...............................................................................................74
UnitsandTraining............................................................................................................78
Intelligence......................................................................................................................86
TacticalAdjustments........................................................................................................91
BronnegruppaConcept.........................................................................................................92
EnvelopingMovements.........................................................................................................94
Ambushes..............................................................................................................................96
ConvoySecurityTechniques..................................................................................................98
Equipment...........................................................................................................................101
Conclusion.............................................................................................................106
AppendixI.StatisticsofSovietAfghanistanCredit/AidAgreements.......................109
Graphic1.NonMilitaryAidLevelsinSovietAfghanFormalAgreements.........................109
Graphic2.SovietEconomicAidDisbursementstoAfghanistan........................................110
Graphic3.SovietEconomicAidandExpendituresinAfghanistan....................................111
Graphic4.SovietAfghanAgreementsonEnergy,Oil,NaturalGas...................................112
Graphic5.SovietAfghanistanAgreementsonAgriculture,Construction.........................113
AppendixII.MapofAfghanistan...........................................................................114
Bibliography...........................................................................................................115
Introduction
CurrentconflictsinIraqandAfghanistanhavedirectedconsiderablefocustothe
questionsofinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgencies.Understandingthehistoricalexamples
ofinsurgencyconflictsandtheregionsinwhichtheyhaveoccurredisofvitalimportance
forthosewhowishtounderstandpresentdayevents.TheSovietAfghanwarisonesuch
historicalexample.AttemptsatdrawingdirectparallelsbetweentheSovietandU.S.
experiencesinAfghanistanareproblematic,astherearemanysubstantialdifferences
betweenthetwocases.Nevertheless,understandingtheSovietcaseisusefulforidentifying
basicthemesthatarecommonintheexperienceoflargepowersconducting
counterinsurgencycampaigns.TheSovietAfghanwaralsorepresentsanimportantstepin
theevolutionofinsurgencywarfareinthecontextofglobalizationandaccelerating
technologicalprogress.Manycurrentphenomenasuchastransnationalextremistnetworks
andinformationwarfarewereinauniquestageofdevelopmentduringtheSovietAfghan
war.Anuancedunderstandingofthisconflict,therefore,ishelpfulforcomprehending
currentinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgencies.
InFebruaryof2009IfoundmyselfatthecornertableofapopularCambridgepub,
translatingforagroupofRussianandAmericangenerals.Inthemidstoffacilitating
conversationduringtheircocktailhour,theconversationturnedtotheSovietAfghanWar.
OneoftheseniorRussianGeneralsatthetable,aveteranoftheconflict,saidtome,letme
tellyouthethingaboutAfghanistan,theAfghansmostlytheyloveduswewereableto
dowhateverwewantedeveryday,weownedtheplace,butatnight,everythingwould
changethenightwasalltheirs.Regardlessofthebiasoroversimplificationofthis
statement,itdoesrepresentavaluablemetaphorfortheSovietAfghanconflictofthe
1980s.
TheSovieteffortsinAfghanistangenerallyfollowedtheparadigmofthreesteps
forwardandthreestepsback.OntheonehandSovietforceswereabletodominateinthe
field,butontheotherhandtheycouldneverachievetheleveloforganizational
coordinationnecessarytosustaintheirgains.Tacticalaccomplishmentswereroutinely
reversedwheneverandwhereverSovietforceswereabsent.
ThereversalsandultimatefailuresofSovietpoliciesinAfghanistanarewell
documented.TheSovietAfghanwarisoftendescribedasavictoryforthemujahedeen1
overthelarger,butineffective,Sovietarmy.Thereismuchattentiongiventotheingenuity
andresilienceoftheAfghanmujahedeenandtheSovietsinabilitytodefeatthem.Many
analysesofthisconflicthavedwelledonthemistakesmadebySovietleadersandthe
inabilityofSovietforcestodefeattheAfghaninsurgency.
ThestrategyandconductoftheSovietcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistanfrom
19791989certainlylendthemselvestonegativecritiques.Overthecourseoftheconflict,
theSovietarmedforceskilledormaimedsome2.5millioncivilians,werethecauseof
millionsmoredisplacedpersonsandrefugeesandlostareported14,453killed,53,753
wounded,andmillionsofdollarsworthofequipment.2In1989whenGeneralGromov
evacuatedthecountrywiththelasttroopsinahighlyorchestratedshowofpropaganda,the
situationwasfarfromoptimalfromtheSovietpointofview.Mostkeyurbancenterswere
underthecontrolofSovietsupportedgovernmenttroops,whiletherestofthecountrywas
subjecttotheinfluenceofaninsurgencythatwassupportedbythemajorityofthe
population.
TheKremlinhadtakenonachallengingmissionbyinvadingaCentralAsiancountry
knownforitsresistancetooutsideinfluenceandcentralizedrule.Moreover,Soviettroop
levelswerelimitedbypoliticalconsiderations,andtrainedandequippedtodobattlewith
NATOforcesintheEuropeantheaterandnotwithirregularfightersinamountain
1MujahedeenisatermforthefightersthatopposedtheSoviettroopsandSovietbackedgovernmentinKabul.
2Krivosheev,G.F.(1997).SovietCasualtiesandCombatLossesintheTwentiethCentury.London:Greenhill
Books,287288.TheRussianStaffreportsahighernumberkilled26,000.Thisstatisticcanbefoundinthe
2Krivosheev,G.F.(1997).SovietCasualtiesandCombatLossesintheTwentiethCentury.London:Greenhill
Books,287288.TheRussianStaffreportsahighernumberkilled26,000.Thisstatisticcanbefoundinthe
followingsource:RussianGeneralStaff(translatedandeditedbyLesterW.GrauandMichaelA.Gress).(2002).
TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,44.For
additionalstatistics,see:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.Moscow:GPIIskona,Appendix14.
environment.PartlyduetotheideologicaloriginsoftheRedArmyandtosimplenegligence,
theSovietmilitaryinitiallydidnothaveanadequatecounterinsurgencystrategy.An
enduringinsurgencywasnotanticipated;itwaspresumedthatSovietforceswouldwina
quickwarinsimilarfashiontotheactionsinHungaryandCzechoslovakia.
WhiletheSovietLimitedContingentwasclearlynotreadyforthemissionin
Afghanistan,itisanoversimplificationtofaulttheSovietsecurityforcesfortheoverall
failuresofKremlinpoliciesinAfghanistan.ItisundeniablethatflawsinSoviet
counterinsurgencystrategyanddeficienciesinSovietmilitarycapabilitiesseriously
hinderedoperationsagainstthemujahedeen.However,fromtheearliestmomentsofthe
invasionofAfghanistan,Sovietmilitaryleadersbegantotransformthe40thArmyintoa
moreeffectiveforceforcounterinsurgencymissionsinchallengingterrain,andpolitical
leadersworkedtostrengthentheKabulgovernmentthroughpoliticalprograms.
Partiallyduetothecomplexnatureofcounterinsurgencyoperations,thelackof
successofSovietpoliciesinAfghanistanissometimesattributedtoutterincompetenceon
thepartofbothmilitaryandpoliticalleaders.Counterinsurgencyrequiresadelicate
balanceofbothpoliticalandmilitaryefforts.Whilethemilitaryaspectofcounterinsurgency
operationsiscrucial,complementarypoliticalprogressisnecessaryforsuccess.Highly
developedcooperationbetweenmilitary,intelligenceandpoliticalactorsisessentialfor
lastinggains.ThiscoordinationwaslackingintheSovieteffort,anddisconnectsbetween
militaryandpoliticalactionsledtoeffortsthatdidnotresultinthesynergynecessaryfor
counteractingpersistentinsurgencymovements.
Nevertheless,manyaspectsoftheSovietpoliticalandmilitarycampaignheld
promise.Myresearchandanalysisshowthat,althoughtheSovietswereattimesquite
severeintheiractions,theydidnotrelysolelyonmilitarymightandconventionalpowerto
achievetheirgoals;theyattemptedtodevelopeffectivemilitaryandpolitical
counterinsurgencyinitiatives.Thispaperwillidentifyandanalyzethoseaspectsofthe
Sovietcounterinsurgencythatwereeffective,andputtheminthecontextof
counterinsurgencytheory,notingwhereSovietpolicieswereconsistentwithaccepted
counterinsurgencyapproaches.TheseaspectsoftheSovieteffortareoftenoverlooked.
Thispaperhasthreemajorpartsorganizedintofourchapters.First,isadiscussion
ofcounterinsurgencytheories,andplacementoftheSovietexperienceinAfghanistaninto
thatcontext.Second,isanoverviewoftheAfghaninsurgencyandSovietinvolvementinthe
regioninthelate1970sand1980s.Andthird,isanexaminationoftheSoviet
counterinsurgencystrategy.Idividethecounterinsurgencyeffortintotwobroadcategories:
nonmilitaryandmilitary.ThenonmilitarycategoryincludesanalysisofSovietinitiatives
inpolitics,socialprograms,programsforpropaganda,andeconomicassistance.The
militarycategoryincludesanalysisofSovietstrategy,tactics,andforcestructure.Ipay
particularattentiontotheaspectsoftheSovietcampaignthatadheredtoaccepted
principlesofcounterinsurgencyasoutlinedbytheoristsandpractitioners,andindicated
effectiveeffortsonthepartofSovietleaders.Myanalysisofthistopicwillrelyonthe
literatureofcounterinsurgencytheory,declassifiedU.S.andSovietdocuments,andpersonal
accountsofSovietAfghanwarveterans.
ExaminationofwhattheSovietsdideffectivelyinAfghanistanisanareathathas
receivedlittleattentioninliteratureontheSovietAfghanwar.Understandingtheeffective
elementsintheSovietcounterinsurgencyeffortprovidesabalancedviewoftheconflictand
amorenuancedperspectiveoncounterinsurgencyingeneral.Inatimewhen
counterinsurgencyisahighlyrelevantandpoliticallychargedtopic,itisvitaltohavean
accurateanalysisoftheSovietcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.

Chapter1.CounterinsurgencyTheory
Politicalpoweristhecentralissueininsurgenciesandcounterinsurgencies;eachsideaimsto
getthepeopletoacceptitsgovernanceaslegitimate.Insurgentsuseallavailabletoolsto
overthrowtheexistingauthority.Counterinsurgents,inturn,useallinstrumentsofnational
powertosustaintheestablishedoremerginggovernmentU.SArmyandMarine
CounterinsurgencyManual.3
Thedynamicnatureofinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgenciesishighlycomplex,asevery
expertisquicktonote.Moreover,thisinherentcomplexityandtheacceleratedpaceof
eventsandmoderncommunicationsmakeitverydifficulttoproposeviablegeneralizations
orestablishanyhardandfastrulesincounterinsurgency.IntherecentlypublishedUS
ArmyandMarineCounterinsurgencyFieldManual,anentiresectionisdevotedtothe
paradoxesofcounterinsurgency,impressingthereaderwiththeelusivenessofaneffective
strategyinthisformofirregularwarfare.4Giventheresurgentinterestinthesubject,itis
importanttorememberthatthepopularityofcounterinsurgencyscholarshiphaswaxed
andwanedasaresultofmanypoliticalandinstitutionalfactors.Surprisinglylittlewas
writtenonthetopicafterthe1960s;therewereevenmovementsthatlimiteditsstudy
withintheUnitedStatesmilitary.IntheUnitedStatessomepositthatsquelchingthestudy
ofcounterinsurgencywaspartofareflexivereactiontothewarinVietnamawayof
avoidingentanglementinsimilarconflictsinthefuture.5Thenotionthatthestudyof
counterinsurgencybegetsmisadventuresincounterinsurgencywarfarerecursintheUnited
Statesandabroad,andisasubtle,thoughimportant,factorinmilitariesformulationand
implementationofcounterinsurgencystrategybothinwesterncountriesandinRussia.
3Nagl,J.,Petraeus,D.,&Amos,J.(2007).TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsCounterinsurgencyFieldManual.
Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,13.
4Nagl,J.,Petraeus,D.,&Amos,J.(2007).TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsCounterinsurgencyFieldManual.
Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,11481157.
5Eliot,C.,Crane,L.C.,Horvath,L.J.,&Nagl,L.J.(2006,MarchApril).Principles,Imperatives,andParadoxesof
Counterinsurgency.MilitaryReview,4953.Alsosee:Cassidy,R.M.(2006).CounterinsurgencyandtheGlobal
WaronTerror.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,99.
Independentofinstitutionalandscholarlyinterestinthesubject,however,
governmentscontinuetofindthemselvesembroiledinirregularwars6andinneedof
methodsforconductingcounterinsurgencywarfare.InthecaseoftheUnitedStatesandthe
SovietUnioninAfghanistan,theneedforcounterinsurgencyexpertisewasnotsufficiently
anticipated.Largemilitariesprimarilytrainedforconventionalwarareoftenobligedto
learn(andrelearn)thecomplexcraftofcounterinsurgencyonthejob.
Thestudyofcounterinsurgencyhasbecomeespeciallyrelevantinthecurrentday.Not
onlydotheconflictsfacingtheUnitedStatesandNATOnecessitaterenewedfocusonthe
topic,butunprecedenteddevelopmentsintechnologyanddynamicchangesinworld
ideologieschangetheverynatureofthesubjectitself.AsIwilldiscussbelowingreater
detail,theprinciplesdiscussedbyauthoritiessuchasCallwell,Lawrence,Thompson,
TrinquierandGaluladonotfullyaddresstherealitiesoftodayorthoseoftomorrow.Asis
oftenrepeatedinrelationtocounterinsurgency,Ifitworkstoday,itisobsolete.7The
insurgencyandcounterinsurgencyinthe1980sinAfghanistanrepresentanimportantstep
inthisprogressiontowardmodernrealities.Manyphenomenathatdistinguishmodern
insurgenciesfromtheirantecedentsbegantorevealthemselvesinthemountainsand
desertswherethemujahedeenfoughtagainsttheSoviet40tharmy.8
InthissectionIwilloutlinethemainelementsofinsurgencyandcounterinsurgencyas
putforthbyhistoricalauthoritiesaswellasbymodernscholarsandpractitioners.Iwill
addressthemaindebatesanddevelopmentsinthefield.Withthisbasicfoundationitwill
bepossibletoplaceSovieteffortsinAfghanistanintothebroadercontextofinsurgencyand
counterinsurgency,allowingaclearerandmorefruitfulanalysisoftheconflict.
Inreadingaboutcounterinsurgency,itisinterestingtonotethatmostauthorsonthe
subjecthavesignificantpersonalexperienceinirregularwarfaredealingwithinsurgencies
andcounterinsurgencies.JohnNaglwritesthatThebestwritingsoncounterinsurgency
6Irregularwarfareisoneofthemanytermsusedtodescribenonconventionalwari.e.warthatdoesnot
comprisetworegulararmiesseekingtodefeatoneanother,butratheralargerregulararmypittedagainsta
smaller,lessorganizedguerillalikeopponent.Othercommontermsarelimitedwar,revolutionarywar,fourth
generationwar,guerillawar,andsmallwar.
7ThisquotationisattributedtoBernardFall.
8The40thArmyreferscollectivelytotheSoviettroopsdeployedtoAfghanistaninthe1980s.
10
sharewiththebestsexmanualsthefactthattheirauthorsgenerallyhavesomepersonal
experienceoftheirsubjectmatter.9Divergenceofopinionamongauthorswithcomparable
experienceinthefieldisatestamenttothehighlyvariable,andattimessubjective,nature
ofconductingcounterinsurgencycampaigns.
Twomajorschoolsofthoughtoncounterinsurgencyare:populationcentricandenemy
centric.Theformerstipulatesthatwinningthesupportofthelocalpopulationmustbethe
firstpriority.Oncethesupportofthepopulationhasbeenwonthroughtheprovisionof
physicalsecurityandsocialandeconomicopportunities,theinsurgentforceswillceaseto
berelevant;atthispoint,onecaneasilyeradicatewhateverpartoftheinsurgencythathas
notalreadywitheredaway.Expertsofthemid20thcentury,suchasDavidGalulaandRoger
Trinquier,subscribetothisapproachtovaryingdegrees.Theprinciplesofpopulation
centricstrategyarecurrentlywidelyacceptedinthefield.
Enemycentriccounterinsurgencytheorymaintainsthatengaginganddestroyingthe
enemyshouldbethemainfocusofeffort,andthatafterthishasbeenaccomplished,other
neededdevelopmentswillproceednaturally.Thisapproachhasitsrootsinimperialand
colonialwars,suchasthosecarriedoutbyRussia,BritainandFranceinthe18th,19thand
early20thcenturies.Thecharacterofenemycentriccounterinsurgencygenerallytendsto
beclosertothatofconventionalwarinthatitemphasizesfightingmorethanwinning
heartsandminds.Theprinciplesofenemycentriccounterinsurgencyarefarlesspopular
todaythanthoseofpopulationcentriccounterinsurgencyduetotheirsometimessevere
character,andduetopowerfulargumentsforpopulationcentricstrategies.10
Inthecontextofmanynewdevelopmentsintechnologies,ideologiesandthe
geopoliticallandscape,anewhybridapproachtocounterinsurgencyisalsoemerging.This
approach,discussedbyexpertssuchasDavidKilcullen,requiresahighlyadaptiveposture
incounterinsurgencythatemploystheprinciplesofbothenemyandpopulationcentric
9SeeNaglsforewordtothiseditionofGalulasbook:Galula,D.CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.
London:PraegerSecurityInternational.
10HighprofileofficerssuchasGeneralDavidPetraeus,LieutenantColonelJohnNaglandotherssubscribetothe
populationcentricapproach.ThisapproachhaslargelybeenacceptedintheU.S.governmentatleastinits
rhetoric.
11
strategiesdependingonthesituation.Thispragmaticcounterinsurgencyapproachfurther
emphasizestheneedformilitaryinstitutionstocultivateanethosoflearningand
adaptability.11
EnemyCentricCounterinsurgency
ColonelC.E.Callwellstreatise,SmallWars,isaclassicenemycentriccounterinsurgency
manual,andisstillrelevanttothosewithpreferenceforthisschoolofcounterinsurgency
theory.WhilecurrentscholarstendnottoacceptCallwellsideaswholesale,thosewho
favortheenemycentricapproachsupportmanyoftheprincipleshesetsforth.12Callwell
formulatedhisideasinanerawhenlargepowersprojectedtheirpoweraroundtheglobe
withaheavyhand.SmallWars,firstpublishedin1896,washismostfamouswork,andis
oneofthemostsubstantialtreatisesthatespouseanenemycentricapproachto
counterinsurgency.AnofficerintheBritishArmywithexperiencecombatinginsurgentsin
Afghanistanandelsewhere,Callwelldoesnotexpressthesensitivityforthepopulationso
carefullydetailedinothermanualsforcounterinsurgency.Changesinpresscoverageand
geopoliticsexplainsomeofthesedifferences;nevertheless,manyprinciplesthathesets
forthwerestillsupportedafterhisdeathin1928andinthecurrentday.
Callwellphrasestheessenceofcounterinsurgencyassuch:Theenemymustnotonly
bebeaten.Hemustbebeatenthoroughly.13Thisremainsthecoreoftheenemycentric
approachtocounterinsurgency.Callwellstatesthatthesmallwardiffersfromthe
conventionaloneinthatThemereexpulsionoftheopponentfromgroundwherehehas
thoughtfittoacceptbattleisofsmallaccount;whatiswantedisabigcasualtylistinthe
11Mosttheoristsandpractitionerswouldagreethattheadaptabilityofthemilitaryincounterinsurgencyentails
includingcivilianinstitutionsandactorsintheeffort.Eventheharshestenemycentricapproachincludeswise
andconcertedpoliticalpoliciesthatarenecessaryforovercominganinsurgency.
12Thisisevidentinthefollowingarticle:LTCGentile,G.P.(2007,September).EatingSoupWithASpoon.
RetrievedJuly2,2009,fromArmedForcesJournal:http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780
13Callwell,C.C.(1990).SmallWars:ATacticalTextbookforImperialSoldiers.London:GreenhillBooks,151.
12
hostileranks.14Callwellisprimarilyconcernedwithfindingwaystoengagetheenemyin
battleandnotwithsecuringthepopulationscompliance.Generally,adherentstotheenemy
centricapproachmaintainthatthelargerpowerplaystoitsadvantagebyseekingoutbattle
withtheinsurgentsothatitcanutilizeitssuperiorityinfirepower,troopnumbersand
discipline.
Callwellassertsthatdecisivenessandviolenceofactionbythecounterinsurgentwill
winthesupportofthosewhoarewaveringandlookingtoalignthemselveswiththe
strongestside.Callwelldetailsthemethodsofbringingthefighttotheenemy,layingouta
frameworkfordividingtheterritorysothatarelativelyautonomous,localunitis
responsibleforaparticulargeographicalarea.15Callwellalsoemphasizestheideaof
encirclingtheenemysflanktopreventhisretreatandmaximizethecasualtiesinflicted.16
Whentheenemyrefusestofightandcontinuestoeludecapture,Callwellprescribesthe
destructionofvillages,cropsandtheappropriationoflivestockandothergoods:Ifthe
enemycannotbetouched[onthebattlefield]hecanbetouchedthroughhispocket.17
Theseharshmeasuresareaimedatcrushingresistancequicklyandavoidingaprolonged
conflict,whichintroducesproblemsforthecounterinsurgentintermsofsupplyandcarefor
troopsinlongdeployment.
Callwellsapproachembodiesthemainpointsoftheenemycentrictheoryof
counterinsurgency:finding,engaginganddestroyingtheenemy.Itisinterestingtonotethat
CallwellcontinuouslyincludescasesfromtheTsaristmilitarysactionsinCentralAsiato
illustratehispoints.HequotesthefamousgeneralMikhailSkobelevtoarticulatethe
necessityofquickandpowerfulactionagainsttheinsurgent,DonotforgetthatinAsiaheis
15Thisprincipleofdividingareaisalsousedinthepopulationcentricapproach,buttheintentoftheforcesin
eachsectionisdifferent.Theemphasisonenvelopingmovementsforfightingagainstguerrillaforcesisechoedby
laterwriterswhopromotedkineticapproachestocounterinsurgency;itwasalsoasignificantelementinSoviet
counterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.
17Callwell,C.C.(1990).SmallWars:ATacticalTextbookforImperialSoldiers.London:GreenhillBooks,40.Soviet
forcesinAfghanistanadoptedthisapproachintheformofanairwaronthecountryside,designedtodestroy
themujahedeenssanctuariesandsourcesofsupplies.
13
masterwhoseizesthepeoplepitilesslybythethroatandimposesupontheir
imagination.18
Callwellstakeoncounterinsurgencyisthestartingpointformanyproponentsofthe
enemycentricschoolofcounterinsurgency.LargepowerssuchasBritainandRussiathat
wagedwarsinCentralAsiaemployedmanyenemycentricprinciples.Theenemycentric
approachisappealingtothoseofamoretypicallymilitarymindinthesensethatit
includesmorekineticactionandactualfightingthanthepopulationcentricschoolof
counterinsurgency.
Imperialarmiesdidincorporatepopulationcentricprinciplesaswell.No
counterinsurgencycampaigncanbecategorizedasstrictlyenemyorpopulationcentric.For
example,inthe18thand19thCenturies,TsaristforcesintheCaucasusandCentralAsia
pursuedhighlykineticandenemycentrictacticsaimedatdecimatingresistancetotheir
rule,butalsoworkedtocooptthelocalpopulation,andcreatereligiousandeconomic
structuresthatwereacceptabletothepopulaceanddesignedtopreservestability.19
Counterinsurgenciesgenerallycontinuetoincorporatevaryingapproachesintotheir
campaign.ThiscanbeobservedbothintheSovietcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistanaswell
asincurrentUSandNATOoperations.
PopulationCentricCounterinsurgency
Theenemycentricmodelforcounterinsurgencywarfarefocusesondecisivevictories
throughtheuseofmilitarypower.Themainthrustofthetheoryistocrushtheinsurgency
aseffectivelyaspossible,usuallythroughmilitarymeans.Itdoesnotexcludetheideasof
winningoverthepopulation,butthepopulationisnotthemainpriority.Thepopulation
centricmodelforcounterinsurgencyismorenuanced.Accordingtothistheory,the
19See:Crews,R.D.(2006).ForProphetandTsar.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress;Khalid,A.(2007).Islam
afterCommunism:ReligionandPoliticsinCentralAsia.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
14
participationandcomplianceofthepopulationisthesinglemostimportantelementin
defeatingtheinsurgency.Thepopulationcentricapproachdoesnotexcludetheuseof
militaryforceagainsttheinsurgent,butfirmlyassertsthatthisisonlyonepieceofthe
strategy,and,ifrelieduponsolely,willnotproducelastingresults.
Populationcentriccounterinsurgencytheorywassignificantlydevelopedinthe
Frencharmy,whichacquiredsubstantialexperiencewithirregularwarfareinFrench
coloniesinthe19thand20thCenturies.Militaryofficersreturningfromthesetheaterswould
sharetheirexperiencesofforeigncultureswithinquisitiveethnologistsandother
academics,oftengaininginsightsfromthescholarsthattheyfoundusefulforconducting
counterinsurgencyoperations.20TwoFrenchofficers,MarshalsHubertLyauteyandHenri
Gallienicompiledprinciplesofirregularwarfareintreatisesbasedontheirexperiences
fightingsmallwarsinAfricaandAsia.GallieniandLyauteywereinstrumentalin
establishingtheEcoleMilitaireSpcialisedansloutreMeretletrangerin1906,aschool
devotedtointegratingthestudyofforeignculturesintotrainingforofficersdeployingto
theatersofirregularwar.21
GallieniandLyauteywereimportantfiguresinthedevelopmentofpopulationcentric
counterinsurgencytheoryintheFrenchArmy.BothGallieniandLyauteymaintainedthat
excessiverelianceonforcecouldbecounterproductiveincounterinsurgency,ascollateral
damageandresultingharmtothearmyspublicimagecouldundercutimportantworking
relationshipswiththeindigenouspopulation.Thepopulationcentricapproachstressesthe
needforofficerstounderstandthesurroundingcultureandcompletenonmilitarytasks
aimedatwinningthesupportofthepeople.TheBritishofficerT.E.Lawrencealsoheldto
thisattitude,emphasizingthattheofficerworkinginthecontextofirregularwarfaremust
learnthecultureofthearea.Lawrencenotesthattheonlywaytoinfluencetheindigenous
20Bore,C.H.(2009,MarchApril).ComplexOperationsinAfrica:OperationalCultureTrainingintheFrench
Army.MilitaryReview,6571.
21Bore,C.H.(2009,MarchApril).ComplexOperationsinAfrica:OperationalCultureTrainingintheFrench
Army.MilitaryReview,6571.
15
peopleisthroughunremittingstudyofthem.22ForLawrence,aswellasforotherswho
tendedtowardspopulationcentriccounterinsurgency,theabilitytocomprehendthe
humanterrainwasparamountandunderstoodasthebasisforfindingwaystoconvincethe
populationtowithdrawsupportfromtheinsurgency.
Populationcentriccounterinsurgencyorientsfocusawayfromthegoalofdestroying
theenemy,establishingtheofficersfirstpriorityasthepainstakingandcarefulprocessof
developingmutuallybeneficialrelationshipswiththelocalpeople.Lawrencecommentson
thisprocessinhisnotesonworkingwithBedouintribesmen:hearallthatpasses,search
outwhatisgoingonbeneaththesurface,readtheircharacters,discovertheirtastesand
theirweaknesses.BuryyourselfinArabcircles,havenointerestsandnoideasexceptthe
workinhand,sothatyourealizeyourpartdeeplyenoughtoavoidthelittleslipsthat
wouldcounteractthepainfulworkofweeks.Yoursuccesswillbeproportionedtothe
amountofmentaleffortyoudevotetoit.23
ThisintellectualvectorinmilitarythinkinggreatlyinfluencedtwoprominentFrench
officersandscholarsofthemid20thcentury,RogerTrinquierandDavidGalula,whoboth
completedimportantworksoncounterinsurgencybasedoncombatexperiencein
IndochinaandAlgeriainthe1940sand1950s.24Whereastheenemycentrictheoryseeksto
capitalizeonthecounterinsurgentsfiresuperioritybyfindingwaystoengageanddestroy
theinsurgent,GalulaandTrinquierarguethatsuchastrategyisineffective.25Theypointout
thattheinsurgentcangenerallychoosethetimeandplaceofsuchanengagement,waiting
forconditionsthatwillgivehimtheadvantage.26AccordingtoGalulaandTrinquier,whose
22Lawrence,T.(1917).The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.RetrievedJuly1,2009,fromhttp://www.dn
i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm
23Lawrence,T.(1917).The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.RetrievedJuly1,2009,fromhttp://www.dn
24See:Trinquier,R.(1961).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurity
International;Galula,D.CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurity
International.
25TheenemycentricapproachisembodiedinCallwellsstatementthatitisnecessarytoforcehim[the
insurgent]intodecisiveaction.Callwell,C.(1977).TheDangersofGuerillaWarfare1900.InW.Laqueur,The
GuerillaReader:AHistoricalAnthology.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,114.
26TrinquiercitesthebattleofDienBienPhutoillustratethispoint.HenotesoutthatthatFrenchcommanders,
whohadsopersistentlysoughtaconventionalbattlewiththeenemy,weredefeatedwhentheVietMinhfinally
16
theoriesarenowreferredtoasclassicalcounterinsurgencytheory,thecounterinsurgents
powershouldprimarilybeemployedtoprotectthecivilianpopulationratherthanchasing
downtheinsurgentforces.Theshiftfromoffensivetodefensivefocus,accordingtoGalula,
playstothecounterinsurgentsstrengths.Thecounterinsurgentwilllikelyfailinhunting
downinsurgentforcesthataretypicallyverymobileandfamiliarwiththeterrain.By
focusingonprotectingthepopulationinamorestaticposture,thecounterinsurgents
relativeimmobilityisnotsuchadisadvantageandhecanrelyonsuperiorfirepowerto
repelattacks.27
Moreimportantly,theprimaryobjectiveinthismodelisnottheannihilationof
insurgentforces,butthesupportofthepopulation:thesinequanonofvictoryinmodern
warfareistheunconditionalsupportofapopulation.28Thisbeingthestatedgoal,military
actionsareonlyimportantinsofarastheyhelpsecurethesupportofthepeople.Winning
civiliansupportisoutlinedasapoliticalendeavorthatmustbestartedbythemilitaryand
thencontinuedbycivilians.29Thisendeavorrequiresthatthecounterinsurgentconvince
thepeoplethathisruleis1)legitimateand2)thatitwillprovideabetterlifethantherule
oftheinsurgent.Thepersuasionofthepopulationrequirestraditionalmilitaryactionto
providesecurity,butreliesmostonacomprehensiveprogramofnonmilitaryactivities.
Suchactivitiesincludepublicizingthecounterinsurgentmessage,supportingpolitical
institutionsanddevelopingeconomicopportunities.AsGalulafamouslyrepeated,a
revolutionarywarisonly20percentmilitaryactionand80percentpolitical.30Itisthus
importantthatmilitaryofficersfunctioneffectivelyinnonmilitaryroles;cooperationwith
civiliandevelopmentworkersiscrucial.Galulapositsthatacounterinsurgencyisnotan
additionbutamultiplicationofvariousprograms;theyareallessentialandifoneisnil,
engagedtheminbattleafterhavingamassedsuperiorforces.Trinquier,R.(1961).ModernWarfare:AFrench
ViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,3.
27See:Galula,D.CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,58,65.
Also:Trinquier,R.(1961).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurity
International,63.
28Trinquier,R.(1961).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurity
International,6.
29Galulafamouslystatesthatcounterinsurgencyis20percentmilitaryactionand80percentpolitical.Galula,D.
CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,63.
30Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,63.
17
theproductwillbezero.31
Classicalpopulationcentrictheorygenerallyprescribesthatthecounterinsurgentstart
hisoperationsinlimitedareaswherehecanconcentratehisattentionandwherehe
considerssuccessreadilyattainable.Oncethecounterinsurgenthasachievedsuccessin
theseareasheexpandshissphereofinfluenceincrementally.Lyauteycoinedthetermink
blotorinkstaintodescribethisincrementalexpansionofinfluence.32Galula,Trinquier
andothersadvocatethatthecounterinsurgentsystematicallydivideterritoryintozones,
appointingadministrativeteamsforeachzone.33Thedivisionofterritoryimplicitly
suggeststhedecentralizednatureofcounterinsurgency,wheremorejuniorleadershave
morecontroloverthecourseofeventsinanygivenarea.Theimportanceofthejunior
leaderandlocalsolutionstoissuesincounterinsurgencyisechoedbyDavidKilcullen,who
notesthatprogramsshouldbespecificallyorientedtoeacharea.34
Populationcentriccounterinsurgencytheorywouldsuggestthatoperationsinagiven
areaproceedinthefollowinggeneralpattern:thecounterinsurgentexpelsthemainbodyof
armedinsurgents,establishespostsformaintainingsecurityinthearea,makescontactwith
andcontrolsthepopulationwiththeintentofisolatingitfromtheinsurgents,gathers
intelligencefromthepopulationandusesittotargettheinsurgentorganization,holds
electionsandtestsnewleaders,organizeslocaldefenseunits,eradicatesremaining
insurgentswithhelpofindigenousforces.35TheoristssuchasBernardFall,FrankKitson
andRogerTrinquieremphasizeotherkeyaspectsofvitalimportancesuchas:
31Galula,D.CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,61.
32Hansen,J.(1966).TheCaseAgainst"Pacification".InternationalSocialistReview,27(4),pp.131136.
(AccessedatthisURL:http://www.marxists.org/archive/hansen/1966/xx/pacification.htm,on10July;thisis
partoftheJosephHansenInternetArchive)
International,73.Also:Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:Praeger
SecurityInternational,63.
34Kilcullen,D.(2006).TwentyEightArticles:FundamentalsofCompanylevelCounterinsurgency,9.
18
establishinganapparatusforcollectingandhandlingintelligence,proactivelyinfiltrating
andeliminatingactivesanctuariesforinsurgents,disseminatinginformationinsupportof
thecounterinsurgentscauseandpromotingpoliticalandeconomicprogress.36
Thepopulationcentrictheoryiscomplexandregularlyrequiresthemilitarytoactin
nonmilitarycapacities.Thediversityoftasksandthenecessitytocooperatewithsomany
entitiesmakepopulationcentriccounterinsurgencyhardtoexecutesuccessfully.37Insome
waysthemilitarymentalityismorecomfortablewiththeoffensivenatureoftheenemy
centricapproach.Someoftheprinciplesofenemycentrictheory,however,aretooharshto
beviableformanycountriesinthemoderncontext.Forthisreason,theprinciplesof
populationcentriccounterinsurgencytheoryaremostwidelyacceptedtoday.CurrentU.S.
militarycounterinsurgencydoctrineislargelybasedonthetheoriesofGalula,though
adaptedsomewhatforcurrentoperations.
Thereisconsiderabledebateabouttheefficacyofenemycentriccounterinsurgent
strategyversusthatofthepopulationcentricapproach,however.Thisisalongstanding
debatethatisalmostinherenttodiscourseamongstmilitaryprofessionalsandtheorists
andoftenrootedindeeplyheldbeliefsaboutforeignpolicyandtheroleofthemilitary.
Somemilitaryofficersandtheoristsclaimthatemphasizingpopulationcentric
counterinsurgencyisadenialofbasictruthsaboutthenatureofwarfare,negativelyaffects
thecapabilitiesofmilitariesthatshouldremainreadyforconventionalbattle,and
ultimatelyleadstolongentanglementsinconflictsthatdonotservegreatersecurityneeds.
Conclusionsvary,rangingfromsupportformorekineticenemycentriccounterinsurgency
campaignstoavoidanceofcounterinsurgencyaltogether.38
36ThetermActiveSanctuaryisBernardFalls.Fallemphasizestheimportanceofeliminatingsuchsanctuaries
eveniftheyarelocatedwithinthebordersofanieghboringstate.Fall,B.B.(1963).StreetWithoutJoy:
InsurgencyinIndochina,194663(3rdRevisedEdition).Harrisburg,Pennsylvania,USA:TheTelegraphPress,357.
37Anyirregularwarfareatallischallengingforaregulararmy.CallwellnotesthatGuerillawarfareiswhatthe
regulararmiesalwayshavetodread.Callwell,C.(1977).TheDangersofGuerillaWarfare1900.InW.Laqueur,
TheGuerillaReader:AHistoricalAnthology.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,115.
38Seethefollowingarticlesforexamplesofsuchperspectives:Gentile,G.P.(2007,September).EatingSoupwith
aSpoon.RetrievedJuly2,2009,fromArmedForcesJournal:
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780;Gentile,G.P.(2008,MarchApril).Listentothe
Airman.MilitaryReview,114115;GianP.Gentile,"OurCOINDoctrineRemovestheEnemyfromtheEssenceof
War,"2008,ArmedForcesJournal,ArmyTimesPublishingCo.,3June2009
19
Inresponsetoprevailingsupportforpopulationcentriccounterinsurgency,some
militarytheorists,suchasGianP.GentileandRalphPeters,pointoutthatmanyhistorical
casesroutinelyusedtoshowthemeritsofpopulationcentriccounterinsurgencyincluded
manyenemycentricqualities.39Itisalsopositedthatsuccessesinmanycases,suchas
duringthesurgeinIraq,arenotnecessarilyaresultofprotectingthepopulation,butof
otherfactorssuchasreconciliationwithkeytribesandsuccessfuloperationsagainstthe
enemy.40PaulDixonpointsoutthattheBritishcounterinsurgencyinMalayaacaseusedto
argueforpopulationcentricapproachesincludedmanycoerciveaspects.Dixonsuggests
thatwinningoverheartsandmindswasnotthedrivingforcebehindthesuccessin
Malaya,andthatcoercivemeasuresfundamentallyshapedthesituation.41Itisarguedthat
coercivemeasuresareextremelynecessaryincounterinsurgencyandthatsofter
approachesareoftentoutedforpublicconsumption.
Asinsurgencies,internationalpoliticsandthepoliticalgoalsofnationsandnonstate
actorsevolveandwhiledebatescontinue,someformofcounterinsurgencyisunavoidable,
atleastinthenearterm.Itisalsoclearthattheoriesbasedonpastcounterinsurgency
experiencearenotalwayseffectiveinthecontextofcurrentrealities.Manyofthe
insurgenciesexperiencedbytwentiethcenturycounterinsurgencytheoristsand
practitionerscenteredontheinsurgentseffortsatdevelopingtheirforcessufficientlyto
obtainpowerthroughmilitaryaction.Sometheoristswhoworkwithintheframeworkof
generationalwarfare,however,claimthatfourthgenerationwarfarehasintroducedan
evolvedkindofinsurgency.Militaryactionisoftenonlyonetoolinthehandsofinsurgents
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3207722;Bacevich,A.(2009,February2).RaisingJihad.
RetrievedJuly22,2009,fromNationalInterestOnline:http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20932;
Etheridge,E.(2009,March5).NewYorkTimes.RetrievedJuly22,2009,fromWhyContainmentBeats
Counterinsurgency:TimesIsonOurSide:http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/why
containmentbeatscounterinsurgencytimeisonourside/
39Accordingtosuchwriters,thecampaignsinAlgeria,Malayaandelsewhereweremorebrutalthan
correspondingcounterinsurgencydoctrinesuggested.Themainpointbeingthatdoctrinemayhavedictatedone
approach,butcommandersonthegroundroutinelyresortedtoenemycentricpractices.Thisisdiscussedinthe
followingarticle:Gentile,G.P.(2009,January).ThinkAgain:Counterinsurgency.RetrievedJuly8,2009,from
ForeignPolicy:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4631
40RalphPeters,"DishonestDoctrine,"December2007,ArmedForcesJournal,ArmyTimesPublishingCo.,18
June2009<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144330>.
41Dixon,P.(2009).'HeartsandMinds'?BritishCounterinsurgencyfromMalayatoIraq.JournalofStrategic
Studies,32(3),353381.
20
forshapingtheopinionsofdistantgovernmentsandpeoples.Thewarofinformationis
increasinglythedeterminingfactorinasymmetricalconflictsinvolvingmajorpowers.
Victoryfortheinsurgentinthissituationispersuadingthecounterinsurgentsnationthat,
theirstrategicgoalsareeitherunachievableortoocostlyfortheperceivedbenefit.42
Despitethemeritsordemeritsofthegenerationalwarparadigm,developmentsin
worldpoliticsandtechnologyaffectinsurgenciesinsignificantways.GeneralDavid
Petraeusacknowledgessuchdevelopmentsandtheirimpactoninsurgencies,Ifyoulook,
aswedid,atwhat[Frenchmilitaryofficer]DavidGalulafacedinAlgeria,youfind,
obviously,thatheandhiscolleaguesdidnothavetodealwithatransnationalextremist
networkenabledbyaccesstotheInternet.43Manytheoristsandpractitionersmaintain
thatthehighlyagileandtechnologicallyadeptcharacterofmoderninsurgenciescallsfora
hybridandadaptiveapproachtocounterinsurgencyonethatisneithersolelypopulation
orenemycentric.Representativeofthistrendtowardwhateverworksistheattitude
expressedbyDavidKilcullen,aretiredmilitaryofficercloselyworkingwiththeUnited
Statesmilitaryonquestionsofcounterinsurgency.Heclaimsthatmyexperiencehasbeen
thatboth[enemycentricandpopulationcentricapproaches]areapplicableinvarying
degreesinmostinsurgencies.Therealartisto"readthebattle"andunderstandhowitis
developing,fastenoughtoadapt.Neithertheenemycentricnorthepopulationcentric
approachesarealwaysoruniversallyappropriate.thecorrectapproachissituation
dependent.44WhileKilcullencannotbeseparatedfromtheongoingdebateon
counterinsurgencystrategies,manyofhisviewsdoindicateashiftinthediscoursetowards
comprehensivesolutionsthatinvolveelementsfromawiderangeofapproaches.
Therearecertainaspectsofcounterinsurgencystrategythatremainimportant
regardlessofwhatapproachisfavored.Usingthemanytoolsofthestateandnotonly
42COLHammes,T.(2007,MayJune).FourthGenerationWarEvolves,FifthEmerges.MilitaryReview,14.
Targettingthepopulationofpolicymakersofanoccupyingnationisnotnew,however.Itwaswascertainlythe
caseinVietnamandotherinsurgencies,thoughtheimportanceofinformationcampaignsisincreasinglyobvious
now.See,COLHammes,T.(2007,MayJune).FourthGenerationWarEvolves,FifthEmerges.MilitaryReview,15.
43Glasser,S.(2008).CounterinsurgencyFieldManual:AfghanistanEdition.RetrievedJuly11,2009,fromForeign
Policy:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=3
44Kilcullen,D.(2007,January27).TwoSchoolsofClassicalCounterinsurgency.RetrievedJune19,2009,from
SmallWarsJournal:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/twoschoolsofclassicalcount/
21
militaryforceiscrucial.Integratingpolitical,socialandeconomicinitiativesina
coordinatedeffortisimportantforaddressingthemanylevelsuponwhichinsurgencies
challengethecounterinsurgentspower.Suchaspectsinclude:understandingthelocal
cultureandpeople,cultivationofnetworksforintelligence,controlofthepopulation,
eliminationofactivesanctuaries,adoptinglocalsolutionsthroughjuniorleaders,
informationcampaignstosupportthecounterinsurgenteffort,anddevelopmentof
governmentalandeconomicstructures.
SovietAfghanWarandCounterinsurgency
TheSovietcounterinsurgencyandtheAfghaninsurgencyofthe1980soccupyan
interestingplaceinthedevelopmentofinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgencies.Thisconflict
canbeviewedasapivotalstepbetweenthetraditionalinsurgenciesoftheearliertwentieth
centuryandthemoremoderninsurgencies,whicharesometimescategorizedasfourth
generationwar.BoththemujahedeeninsurgencyandtheSovietcounterinsurgency
includedelementsoftheolderparadigmmixedwithelementsofemergingnewforms.
TheAfghaninsurgencywasamovementofthepeoplelikemanytraditional
insurgencies,butdidhavetransnationalelements,beingsignificantlyaffectedand
supportedbyoutsidefundingandtheinfluxofMuslimfightersfromaroundtheworld.45
WhilemostoperationswereconductedbyAfghantribesmenwhowerefightingtheSoviet
invader,theinsurgencywasaffectedbyagloballyorientedIslamicideologythat
transcendedtheparticularfightforAfghanistan.Whilemostofthefightingwascarriedout
bysmallmujahedeenunitsandmilitarysuperioritywasnotthedeterminingfactorinthe
strugglebetweeninsurgentandcounterinsurgent,someinsurgentorganizationsfielded
45DavidKilcullendiscussesoftraditionalvs.moderninsurgences,notingthattraditionalinsurgencies
generallyaimatcontrollingafairlydefinednationorterritory,whilemodernIslamicinsurgenciesoftenseekto
controlavastlylargerareathatisglobalinproportion.See:Kilcullen,D.(2009).TheAccidentalGuerilla:Fighting
SmallWarsintheMidstofaBigOne.NewYork,USA:OxfordUniversityPress,Inc,13.
22
sizablemilitaryformationsandfunctionedinwayssimilartoconventionalmilitaryunits.46
AlthoughthepressandthefreedomofspeechwassignificantlylimitedinSovietRussia,
persistenceonthepartoftheinsurgentsdidaffectthewillofSovietpolicymakersandthe
populacethroughvariousmeans.47Eventhoughtheinternetwasnotafactorandinsurgent
forceswerenotabletobroadcastvictoriesormessagestotheworldinstantaneously,
propagandacampaignswereconductedthroughouttheworldwiththepurposeof
attractingfunds,volunteers,andbroadcastingtheinsurgentideologyagainsttheSoviets.
Sovietcounterinsurgencyasareactiontotheinsurgencythatcontestedthe
governmentsupportedbytheKremlinwasalsoasynthesisofvaryingapproaches.Onthe
onehand,Sovietforcesadoptedmanyenemycentricprinciplesintotheirstrategy:they
soughttoengageandkillasmanyinsurgentsaspossibleandwenttogreatlengthstobring
thefighttotheirenemies.Oftenunabletoapprehendelusiveinsurgentforces,Sovietforces
routinelydecimatedcrops,livestock,andvillagesinanefforttoweakeninsurgentsupply
sourcesandsanctuaries.48Ontheotherhand,Sovietstrategydidincludenoncoercive
principlesaimedatpersuadingthepopulationtosupporttheircause.Significantfundswere
investedinAfghaninfrastructureandeducationinanefforttobuildinstitutionsandhuman
capital.SovietpoliticiansworkedtoinfluencetheKabulgovernmenttosupportreforms
aimedatimprovingconditionsinAfghansociety.Sovietleaderssupportedsubstantial
propagandainitiativesforpromotingandpublicizingthemessageandinterestsoftheKabul
government.ItisinterestingtonotethatearlierSovietcounterinsurgencyexperiencein
CentralAsiaagainsttheBasmachimovementwascharacterizedbyasimilarsynthesisof
46RussianGeneralStaff.(2002).TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:
UniversityPressofKansas,58.
47TheeffectoftheSovietpopulationonpolicymakersisevidentinaPolitburomeeting,inwhichGorbachevread
lettersfromSovietcitizensdecryingtheSovietwarinAfghanistan:AnatolyChernyaev'sNotesfromthePolitburo
CCCPSUSessionofOctober17,1985.(2001,October9).RetrievedfromTheSeptember11thSourceBooks,
VolumeII:Afghanistan,LessonsfromtheLastWar(TheNationalSecurityArchive,EditedbySvetlana
Savranskaya):http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf
48Callwellspecificallyadvocatesthepracticeofdestroyingcropsasameansofweakeninganinsurgency:
Callwell,C.C.(1990).SmallWars:ATacticalTextbookforImperialSoldiers.London:GreenhillBooks,40.
23
softandhardapproaches.49
ThenatureoftheAfghaninsurgencyasanindigenousandinternationalmovementwith
mixedideologiesandmotivationswasextremelyhardtocounteract.Thehybridformofthe
mujahedeenmovementhighlightedtheneedforacomprehensive,adaptiveandtailored
approachtocounterinsurgency.ThechallengethattheAfghanresistanceposedtothe
SovietUnionvividlyunderscoredtherequirementthatthecounterinsurgentusepolitical,
economicandmilitarymeasuresingoodproportioninordertoachievesuccess.
InthefollowingchaptersIwillshowingreaterdetailwheretheSovietstrategy
coincidedwithmanyoftheacceptedtheoriesoutlinedinthischapter,andtowhatextent
SovietleadersusedthenecessarytoolsofcounterinsurgencyintheAfghanconflict.AsIwill
show,manyaspectsoftheSovietstrategycorrespondedtothegeneraladviceoutlinedby
expertsincounterinsurgency.However,lackofcoordinationbetweenthevariousplayersin
theSovieteffort,disjointedexecution,anddifferingvisionsoftheconflict,themissionand
thestrategyledtoineffectivenessdespitethepromiseofmanySovietinitiatives.
Tosetthestageforfurtheranalysis,thenextchapterprovidesabriefoverviewofthe
SovietAfghanwarandtheSovietresponsetotheAfghaninsurgency.
49Oliker,O.(2008,February).SoftPower,HardPowerandCounterinsurgency:TheEarlySovietExperiencein
CentralAsiaanditsImplications(RANDworkingpaper).RetrievedAugust25,2009,from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2008/RAND_WR547.pdf
24
Chapter2.Overview
SovietAfghanWar
Centrallylocatedamidstlargecountrieswithcompetinginterests,Afghanistanhas
oftenbeenthelocationofproxystrugglesbetweenrivalgovernmentsandideologies.
AfghanistanhasseenthearmiesofAlexandertheGreat,GenghisKhanandtheBritish
Empire.TheinterestsofTsaristRussiaandtheBritishEmpirechaffedatoneanotherin
Afghanistaninthe19thCenturyanepisodethatispopularlyknownastheGreatGame.
AfterWorldWarII,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionbothprojectedinfluenceinto
Afghanistan,undertakingavarietyofprojectsandaidprograms.
DuringthistimeAmericanmoneywassupportingvariouseffortsinthecountry,
suchastheHelmandValleyProject,andtherewereattemptsonthepartoftheUnited
StatestobringAfghanistanunderWesterninfluence.Concurrenttotheseefforts,theSoviet
UnionwascultivatingarelationshipwithKabulbasedontradeandmilitaryaid.Inthe
periodafterWorldWarIIAfghanistanturnedtotheSovietUnionforsupportforavarietyof
politicalandeconomicreasons.Thissupportcamelargelyintheformofmilitaryaid.Inthis
context,economicandculturaltiesbetweenMoscowandKabulstrengthened.Afghan
leadersbegantorelymoreandmoreonSovietmilitarysuppliesandsupport.Growing
numbersofAfghanstravelledtotheUSSRforeducationandtrainingmanyformilitary
instruction.Forexample,in1979,beforetheSovietUnioninvadedAfghanistan,therewere
460AfghansstudyinginSovietmilitaryinstitutions.50Inthisway,officersandotherurban
eliteswereincreasinglyexposedtoSovietlifeandideologies,andaddednewvitalityto
progressivesocialisturbanmovementsinAfghanistan.
ManyofthesemovementswerecenteredonKabulUniversityandconsistedof
MarxistproMoscowstudents.In1965thesegroupsandothersformedthePeoples
50Zasedanie
PolitbyuroTsKKPSS17marta1979goda:ObobostreniiobstanovkivDemokraticheskoiRespublike
Afganistaninashikhvozmozhnykhmerakh,17March1979,inRGANI,F.89,Op.25,D.1,Ll.24.
25
DemocraticPartyofAfghanistan(PDPA),whichwasacommunistorganizationwithstrong
tiestotheUSSR.InAprilof1978,thePDPAwrestedcontrolofthegovernmentfrom
MohammadDaoudKhaninacoupandemplacedNurMuhammedTarakiastheleaderof
Afghanistan.Thenewregimewentaheadwithaprogramofeconomicandsocialreform
inspiredbysocialistMarxistideas.Manyofthenewinitiatives,whichrelatedtoissuessuch
asagriculture,landowning,andliteracy,wereforeigntothemajorityoftheAfghan
populationthatlivedinasocietygovernedbytribalandIslamictraditions.ThePDPA
governmentalienatedmanysegmentsofthepopulationthroughadministrative
inadequacy,aswellasregimentationwhichdidnotcompensatefortheabsenceof
legitimacy.51ThePDPAwasalsoseverelyhinderedbyaninternaldivisionbetweenthe
ParchamandKhalqfactions.
OppositionmovementsthatworkedagainstthePDPArungovernmenthad
developedinparallelincounterbalancetothoseofthecommunistsofthePDPA.Men
whowouldlaterfighttheSovietArmyinthe1980s,suchasAhmadShahMassoudand
GulbuddinHekmatyar,hadmountedafailedattemptatacoupinJuly1975,beforeSoviet
troopsevendeployedtotheregion.52Thearmedstrugglebetweenthemujahedeenandthe
SovietsupportedPDPAgovernmentwasaconflictthathadbeendevelopingforsometime
andwasnotentirelyaspontaneousresponsetotheappearanceofSovietforcesin
Afghanistan,Theconflictbetweenthecommunistgovernmentandthemujahedeen
resistancewasasmuchamanifestationofpoliticalpolarizationinthecountryasastruggle
fortheliberationofAfghanistanfromSovietoccupation.Thedominantgroupsthatledthe
Afghanresistancerepresentedanoldideologicalconflictwhichtookshapeduringthe
constitutionalperiod(196473).53
51Dorronsoro,G.(2005).RevolutionUnending,Afghanistan:1979tothePresent.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,94.
52Ruttig,T.(2006).Islamists,LeftistsandaVoidintheCenter:Afghanistan'sPoliticalPartiesandWhereThey
ComeFrom(19022006).Kabul:KonradAdenauerStiftung,14.
53Jalalzai,M.K.(1996).SectarianismandEthnicViolenceinAfghanistan.Lahore:VanguardBooks,Ltd.,74.
26
InthefaceofgrowingoppositionthePDPAleadershipsoughttotightenlinkstothe
USSR,andaskedforincreasedmilitaryaid,aswellasthearrivalofSoviettroops.54Soviet
leadersinitiallyrefusedtheserequests,butaftersignificantunrestinthecityofHeratand
themurderofTarakiandseizureofpowerbyHafizullahAmininSeptemberof1979,Soviet
leadershipdecidedtotakemilitaryactioninAfghanistan.Selectspecialunitswerealready
inthecountrynearKabul,andinDecember1979Sovietunitsstormedthepresidential
palace,killedAminandinstalledBabrakKarmalaspresidentofAfghanistan.
Soviettroopsstreamedintothecountry,workingquicklytosecureprovincialcapitals
andtoquelloppositionfromtheAfghanarmyandotherresistanceunits.ByJanuary1980,
SoviettrooplevelsinAfghanistanwereover50,000.55InitiallytheSovietaimwastokeepa
lowprofile,securemaininfrastructureandurbancenters,andgivetheAfghanarmythe
freedomtofocusoncrushingtheresistance.Itturnedout,however,thatthepresenceof
SoviettroopsinspiredincreasedsupportforthemujahedeenandthattheAfghanarmy
provedincapableofeffectivelyengaginganddestroyingmujahedeenforces.Itsoonbecame
clearthatSovietunitswouldhavetoundertakemostofthecombatmissions.Soviettroop
levelssubsequentlyincreasedto110,000120,000by1982,whichwasthelevelatwhich
theyremainedforthedurationoftheconflict.56
ThefightersthatopposedSoviettroopswerediverse.Amongthefactionsofthe
AfghanmujahedeentherewasavaryingemphasisonIslam,nationalismandother
ideologies.TheRussianGeneralStaffreportsthatintheAfghanresistancein1982there
weresevenIslamistparties,alliedintheGroupofSeven,andthreeTraditionalistparties,
alliedintheGroupofThree.57ThepresenceofSoviettroopsservedtoovercomemany
54AfghanleadersmademultiplerequestsforSoviettroopstodeploytoAfghanistan.Thefollowingdocumentis
oneexample:TranscriptofTelephoneConversationbetweenSovietPremierAlexeiKosyginandAfghanPrime
MinisterNurMohammedTaraki,17or18March1979.(2001,October9).RetrievedAugust24,2009,fromThe
September11thSourceBooks,VolumeII:Afghanistan,LessonsfromtheLastWar:RussianDocumentsand
Memoirs(TheNationalSecurityArchive,EditedbySvetlanaSavranskaya):
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r2.pdf
55McMichael,S.R.(1991).StumblingBear:SovietMilitaryPerformanceinAfghanistan.London:Brassey's(UK),8.
56McMichael,S.R.(1991).StumblingBear:SovietMilitaryPerformanceinAfghanistan.London:Brassey's(UK),
13.
UniversityPressofKansas,53.Traditionalistparties,whilestillconsistingofMuslimmembers,placedless
27
internaldivisionsinthesegroups,andinspiredsupportforthemwithmanysegmentsofthe
Afghanpopulation.InadditiontofinancialsupportfromtheU.S.,Europe,Chinaandthe
MiddleEast,manyMuslimscametojoininthefightagainsttheSoviets.Leaderssuchas
AbdullahAzzamandOsamabinLadenestablishedorganizationsandtrainingsitesin
PakistantofacilitatetheMuslimworldsparticipationinthefightagainsttheSoviets.These
foreignfightersdidnotmakeaverylargeimpacttactically,buttheirpresencespoketothe
broaderthemesandimplicationsoftheSovietAfghanWar.In1979Azzamissuedafatwa,
DefenseoftheMuslimLands,whichformalizedIslamicsupportandencouragementforthe
jihadagainsttheSovietsinAfghanistan.AzzamtraveledtheworldeventoEuropeandthe
USinspiringaudienceswithelaboratedescriptionsoftheAfghanjihadinordertowin
theirmonetaryandpoliticalsupport.58Thenarrativethatensuedfromthisaspectofthe
Afghanresistancewasimportantforthebroaderpropagandacampaignandrepresenteda
growingtendencyininsurgenciestodirectinformationcampaignstowardsglobal
audiences.ThismannerofinformationcampaignhadbeenafactorfortheUnitedStatesin
theVietnamconflictaswell.59Despitethelargepowersthatsupportedthemujahedeen,
however,mostfightingwasconductedbyAfghancombatunitsorganizedinthecontextof
tribeorvillage.60
EarlyintheconflictSoviettroopsmountedlargeconventionaloffensivesthat
encounteredverylimitedsuccess.Soviettroops,equipmentandtacticswereillsuitedfor
theterrainandenemyinAfghanistan.AsSovietforcesbecamefamiliarwiththeconditions
inAfghanistan,manyadjustmentsweremade.Itbecameclearthattherewouldbenoquick
victoryinAfghanistanandthatbattlingthemujahedeenwouldtakeyears.TheSoviets
attemptedtoimplementacounterinsurgencystrategythatinvolvedpoliticalandmilitary
emphasisonIslamasapoliticalideologythanIslamists.Intheirview,Islamwasanimportantcomponentfor
Afghangovernmentandsociety,butnotablueprintforit.Itshouldalsobenotedthatfactionsoftheresistance
fluctuatedoftenoverthecourseoftheconflict,andthatthisisonlyasnapshotofthecategoriesoftheresistance.
58In1986,AzzamandOsamabinLadenevenopenedanofficeinArizonawheretherewasalargeArab
community.Coll,S.(2004).GhostWars.NewYork:ThePenguinPress,155.
59COLHammesdiscussesthisphenomenoninthefollowing:COLHammes,T.(2007,MayJune).Fourth
GenerationWarEvolves,FifthEmerges.MilitaryReview,15.
60Rashid,A.(1987).TheAfghanResistance:ItsBackground,ItsNature,andtheProblemofUnity.InK.Rosanne,
Afghanistan:TheGreatGameRevisited(pp.203229).NewYork:FreedomHouse,216.
28
components,butlackofresourcesandcoordinationcausedtheseeffortstoyieldlimited
results.Somesuccessesweresustained,however,duetoincreaseduseofspecializedunits
andutilizationofKGBtrainedKhadunits.61
IncreasedbombingoftheAfghancountrysideasanefforttodestroymujahedeen
sourcesofsupportresultedinmanyciviliancasualtiesandmillionsofrefugeesbothinside
thecountryandinneighboringPakistanandIran.62Mujahedeenforces,however,wereable
tosurviveduetoextensiveoutsidesupportfromacoalitionofantiSovietcountries.This
supportwaspredominantlyfunneledthroughPakistan.Sovietattemptstoclosetheborder
withPakistanwereextensive,butultimatelydidnotsucceedduetolongdistances,
exceedinglydifficultterrain,andlackofsufficientnumbersoftroops.
BabrakKarmal,whohaddissatisfiedleadersinMoscowbyhisunresponsivenessto
recommendationsandinabilitytoremedydivisionswithinthePDPA,wasremovedfrom
powerin1986.HewasreplacedbyMohammadNajibullah,theformerheadoftheKhad.
Najibullahpursuedaprogramofnationalreconciliation,aimedatwideningsupportforthe
governmentandfindingawaytoendconflictwithinthecountry.Thiseffortwas
unsuccessful,asforeignbackedmujahedeensoughtadecisivevictoryinAfghanistan,and
foreignpowerssawcontinuedfightinginAfghanistanasfurtheringtheirobjectiveof
weakeningtheSovietUnion.
TheSovietgovernment,ledbyMikhailGorbachev,increasinglysawthetroop
commitmenttoAfghanistanasanimpedimenttobothforeignanddomesticpolitical
objectives.InthecontextofunsuccessfulpoliticalinitiativesinAfghanistanandlackofa
decisivemilitaryvictory,Sovietleadershipdecidedtowithdrawitstroops.Withdrawalwas
completedinFebruaryof1989.
61KhadisanAfghansecurityagencyformedalongthelinesoftheSovietKGB.
62McMichael,S.R.(1991).StumblingBear:SovietMilitaryPerformanceinAfghanistan.London:Brassey's(UK),
54.
29
SovietCounterinsurgency
TheSovietUnionwasatadisadvantagegoingintoAfghanistan.Sovietleaders
misunderstoodthesocialandpoliticaldynamicsofthecountryssituation,andenteredthe
countryexpectingarelativelyquickwaragainstpredominantlyforeignbackedfighters.63
Temporarymilitaryhelp,itwashoped,wouldinstallamoreeffectiveregime,putanendto
foreignmeddlingandallowtheKabulgovernmenttoproceedforwardwithsupportfrom
thepeople.64Instead,Soviettroopsfacedanincreasinglypopularinsurgencythathad
widespreadsupportthroughoutthecountry.
Sovietleadersalsolackedadoctrineandamilitaryforcesuitedfor
counterinsurgency.Thiswaspartlyaresultoffocusingonconventionalthreatsinthe
contextoftheColdWar.AsRobertCassidynotes,largepowersareforcedtoretainhigh
levelconventionalcapabilitiestomaintainparitywithrivals.65Duetotheconditionsofthe
ColdWar,Sovietfocusonconventionalcapabilitieswasespeciallystrong.Thesituationin
AfghanistanwasconsideredprimarilythroughthelensofthestruggleagainsttheUnited
StatesandNATOSovietleaderswereafraidoflosingAfghanistantotheinfluenceofthe
West.RumorsthatPresidentHafizullahAminwasmakingoverturestotheCIAmaynot
havebeencentraltothedecisiontodeploySoviettroops,butrepresentedunderlying
63ThismisunderstandingisevidentinPolitburodiscussions,inwhichthereiscontinuingemphasisthatAfghan
resistancefightersaremostlyfromIranandPakistan,religiousfanaticsandexploitingclasstensionsin
Afghanistan.Ineffect,therewasanelementofdenialoftherootsoftheinsurgencythatheldappealwithlarge
segmentsoftheAfghanpopulation.Also,inatleastoneinstancetheborderwithPakistanisdescribedas
peacefulorundercontrol.Infacttheborderwasexceedinglyporousandacentralproblem.See:Zasedanie
PolitbyuroTsKKPSS17marta1979goda:ObobostreniiobstanovkivDemokraticheskoiRespublikeAfganistani
nashikhvozmozhnykhmerakh,17March1979,inRGANI,F.89,Op.25,D.1,Ll.2,19.Seealso:Vypiskaiz
protokolaNo.149zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot12aprelya1979goda:Onasheidalneisheiliniivsvyazis
polozheniemvAfganistane,12April1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.4,Ll.2.
64InameetingofthePolitburoon7January1980,Sovietleaderswerealreadydiscussinghowtheywouldbe
goingaboutwithdrawingtroopsaftertheissuewascomplete.AsAlexanderLiakhovskynotes,thisindicates
theyreallydidnotunderstandthesituationfully.SeedocumentationofthismeetingofthePolitburoin
LiakhovskyshistoryoftheSovietAfghanWar:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,
Russia:Eksmo,448.
65Cassidy,R.M.(2006).CounterinsurgencyandtheGlobalWaronTerror.London:PraegerSecurity
International,21.
30
concernsofSovietleaders.66InaPolitburodiscussion,AndreiGromykodemonstratedthis
ColdWarmentality,arguingthatundernocircumstancescanweloseAfghanistan.Ifwe
loseAfghanistannow,itwillmoveawayfromtheSovietUnion,thatwillbeablowtoour
politics.67SovietideologyatthetimecultivatedaperceptionthatactionsinAfghanistan
wereinsupportofworkersandpeasants,whichpromotedtheunderlyingassumptionthat
counterinsurgencywasnotallthatneeded,becauseSovietpoliciesalignedwiththedesires
ofthepeople.Therefore,duetodistractionsoftheColdwarandideologicalbias,Soviet
leadershipinitiallydidnotpaynecessaryattentiontotherequirementsofconductingan
effectivecounterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.
Aftertheinvasionin1979,theSovietsquicklyfelttheeffectsofmisreadingthe
situation.TheKabulregimedidnotwinwidespreadorenthusiasticsupport,andSoviet
actionsweresharplycriticizedintheinternationalcommunity.TheSovietarmyfoundits
heavyequipmentandconventionaltacticsoflittleuseagainstirregularforcesinchallenging
terrain.ContinuingsupportfromoutsideAfghanistanfundedalargelyAfghaninsurgency
thatbenefittedfromopenbordersbetweenAfghanistanandsanctuariesinPakistanand
Iran.
Ultimately,theKremlinwasunabletoaddressthecausesoftheinsurgency
adequately.Despitesomesuccesses,theSovietsidewasunabletooutlastandoutdothe
mujahedeeninthestruggleforAfghanistan.Theywerenotforcedtoleaveduetomilitary
necessity,however.Sovietforcesregularlydominatedthefield,andthestalematebetween
theSovietsandthemujahedeenwasaresultofacombinationoffactors.Thepopular
argumentthatStingermissiles68tippedthebalanceisalsoproblematic.Gorbachevhad
66InaconversationWithA.A.Gromykoin1980,AfghanForeignMinistermentionstherumorthatAminwasa
U.S.Agent:ZapisOsnovnogoSoderzhaniyaBesedyA.A.GromykosMinistromInostrannykhDelDRASh.M.
Dostom4janvarya1980goda,4January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.11,Ll.2.
67Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS17marta1979goda:ObobostreniiobstanovkivDemokraticheskoiRespublike
Afganistaninashikhvozmozhnykhmerakh,17March1979,inRGANI,F.89,Op.25,D.1,Ll.3.Gorbachevrepeated
thissentimentin1986,whenhementionedinameetingofthePolitburoinreferencetoAfghanistan,thatitis
importantthattheAmericansdontmakeinroadsthere:Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986
goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November 1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.
10.
68Stingermissilesarepersonalportablesurfacetoairweapons.TheUnitedStatesmadethemavailableto
MujahedeenforcesinAfghanistan.TheMujahedeenusedthemwithsomesuccesstoshootdownSoviet
31
alreadyexpressedtheneedtowithdrawfromAfghanistaninOctoberof1985;Stinger
missilestookdownthefirstSoviethelicopterinSeptemberof1986.69Manyaccountsimply
thattheSovietsideattemptedtorelyonlyonbruteforcetodealwiththesituation,
mindlesslypursuingineffectivepoliticalandmilitarypolicies,andcountingonthe
overwhelmingmightoftheSovietUniontoforcethedesiredoutcome.70AsIwillshow,this
isnotentirelythecase.
Asdiscussedinsubsequentsections,Sovietinitiativesaddressedthethreepillars
ofcounterinsurgency,thathavebeenoutlinedbyDavidKillcullen:political,economicand
military.71Sovietpoliticalandmilitaryleadersdevelopedacounterinsurgencystrategy
coveringallthesecategories,includinginitiativesaimedatwinningthesupportofthe
Afghanpopulationthroughpoliticalmeans.Bruteforceandmindlessnessdidnot
characterizethesubstantialattemptsatencouragingstronggovernmentalandsocial
institutionsandalessrepressiveregimeinKabul.TheKremlinputforthconsiderableeffort
tosupportunitywithinthePDPA,andtoinfluenceittobroadenitsbaseofsupportthrough
activebroadcastofapositiveandaccommodatingpoliticalmessage.Sovietinitiativeswere
alsodesignedtostimulatetheAfghaneconomyasawaytosupportthegovernment,win
supportwiththepopulationandsustainmilitarygains.
helicopters.Stingermissileswerewidelyheraldedasmakingthekeydifferenceinthestruggleagainstthe
Soviets.
69RecordofGorbachevdiscussingwithdrawalin1985isfoundinAnatolyChernyaevsnotesofapolitburo
meetingon17October1985:AnatolyChernyaev'sNotesfromthePolitburoCCCPSUSessionofOctober17,1985.
(2001,October9).RetrievedfromTheSeptember11thSourceBooks,VolumeII:Afghanistan,Lessonsfromthe
LastWar(TheNationalSecurityArchive,EditedbySvetlanaSavranskaya):
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf.Also,MiltBearden,aCIAofficerwhoworked
closelyonaprojectsupportingthemujahedeen,writesanaccountofthefirstStingermissilestrikein
Afghanistanwhichoccurred25September1986:Bearden,M.,&Risen,J.(2003).TheMainEnemy:TheInside
StoryoftheCIA'sFinalShowdownwiththeKGB.NewYork,NewYork,USA:RandomHouse,248.
70TherearenumerousexamplesofanalysesthatignorethepositiveaspectsoftheSovietcounterinsurgency
effortinAfghanistan.Thefollowingareexamples:Riedel,B.(2009,May9).ComparingtheU.S.andSoviet
ExperiencesinAfghanistan.RetrievedJuly25,2009,fromCTCSentinel:
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinelVol2Iss5.pdf.Also,StephenBlankshandlingofthesubject
likewiseskimsoverSovietinitiativesthatheldpromise,sharplycriticizingSovietleadershipforpoor
performanceinAfghanistan.Manyofthesecriticismsarelegitimate,butmyanalysiswillindentifythoseareas
whereSovietleadershipworkedatgoodsolutionstothesitutation:Blank,S.J.(1991).OperationalandStrategic
LessonsoftheWarinAfghanistan,197990.StrategicStudiesInstituteU.S.ArmyWarCollege,xixvi.
71Kilcullen,D.D.(2006,September28).ThreePillarsofCounterinsurgency.RetrievedSeptember1,2009,from
RemarksdeliveredatU.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyConference:
http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf
32
Althoughinitiallyunprepared,Sovietmilitaryleadersworkedtoadaptthearmyto
thesituationinAfghanistan.Someconventionalandharshtacticsdidpersist.However,
strategy,forcestructureandtacticswerereevaluatedandadjustedtotheconditionsin
Afghanistan.Improvedandspecializedtraining,changesinmilitaryformations,
organizationofeffortsandincreaseduseofnonlineartacticswerealldesignedspecifically
fortheAfghantheater.AsIwilloutlinebelow,theseadjustmentscorrespondwiththe
adviceofbothclassicalandmoderncounterinsurgencytheoristsandpractitioners.
WhileSovietleaderspursuedmanyeffectivepolicies,thereareseveralfactorsthat
limitedtheirsuccess.First,manyofthepolicieswerepoorlyimplemented.Forexample,
despitesignificantSovietpressureonthePDPAandinsistencethatthepartybeunified,
internaldivisionsbetweenParchamandKhalqfactionspersistedandseverelyimpededall
politicalefforts.72Likewise,inthemilitarycontext,newtrainingandtacticswerenot
sufficienttocultivateapervasiveethosofinitiativeandindependentactionwithinthe
officercorpsorinstillcomfortwithinmotorizedrifletroopsforworkinginsmallunitsaway
fromarmoredvehicles.Second,resourceswerelimitedduetopoliticalconcerns.As
evidencedinthename,theSovietLimitedContingentdidnothavethenumbersto
effectivelycontrolallthebordersandregionsofAfghanistan.Third,lackofcoordination
betweenmilitaryandpoliticaleffortscausedSovietgainstobeconsistentlyreversed.As
GeneralAkhromeevnotedinaPolitburosessionin1986,therehasntbeenamilitarytask
thathasntbeencompleted.ourmilitarysuccesseshavejustnotbeensupportedby
politicalones.73Politicalinitiativeswerelikewiseoftenleftunsupportedbymilitaryaction.
Despitelackofsuccessinimplementingpolicies,claimsthattheSovietsignoredthe
fundamentalideasofcounterinsurgencyareinaccurate.ManySovieteffortsbothinpolitical
andmilitaryareasalignwiththerecommendationsofcounterinsurgencytheorists,who
72InthisaccountofadiscussionwithBabrakKarmal,itisnotedthatremedyingdivisionswithinthepartywas
stressedasapriority.However,afterseveralyearsitbecameoverwhelminglyclearthatKarmalwas
perpetuatingtheproblem:ZasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot4iyunya1981goda:Obesedestov.Babrakom
Karmalem,4June1981(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.60,Ll.2.
73Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November
1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.8.GeneralGromovalsonotesthisinhismemoir,
mentioningthatafteranareawasclearedattemptstohold,andgoverntheareaweretypicallyineffectual:
Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,128.
33
activelystresstheimportanceofpoliticalwork,informationcampaignsandnon
conventionalmilitarytechniques.Sovietleadersaddressedalloftheseaspectsof
counterinsurgency.InthefollowingsectionsIwillexaminebothmilitaryandnonmilitary
Sovietpolicies.InthenonmilitarysectionIwilladdresspolitical,social,propagandaand
economicprograms.InthemilitarysectionIwillexaminestrategy,forcestructureand
tactics.
34
Chapter3.SovietCounterinsurgency:NonMilitaryAspects
Irepeatagainthatinthepresentsituationwhatwillplayamainrolewillbeyourabilityto
usepoliticalandeconomicmeanstoattracttoyoursidethewidestcirclesofthepopulation
LeonidI.BrezhnevtotheAfghanleaderNurMuhammedTaraki74
PoliticalInitiatives
Thereiscurrentlymuchdiscussionabouttheimportantroleofpoliticsand
institutionbuildingincounterinsurgency.ManypointtotheSovietAfghanwarasan
exampleofagovernmentforgettingtheimportanceofnonmilitarymeasuresin
counterinsurgency.TheSovietmilitarydiduseseveretactics,suchasintensivebombing
campaignsandexcessiveminelaying.However,manySovietpoliticalinitiativeswere
consistentwiththeideaofwinningoverthepopulationthroughstrengtheningpolitical
institutionsandprocesses.Whiletheseobjectiveswerenotachievedfully,documentsshow
thatSovietleadersfacilitatedsocialinitiatives,encouragedAfghanleaderstopursuea
moderatepoliticalprogram,andadvocatedaconciliatorypoliticalapproach.
SovietleadersalsoactivelyencouragedAfghangovernmentleaderstoadoptpolicies
aimedatbroadeningtheirpoliticalbasewithasmanysocialgroupsaspossible.This
contrastswithpopularlyheldimpressionsthatSovietpoliciesinAfghanistanwereruthless
acrosstheboard.Moresignificantly,thisapproach,andtheexplicitandimplicitimportance
thatSovietleadersassignedtopoliticalandsocialprogramsisanillustrationofeffective
elementsintheSovietcounterinsurgencystrategy.DavidGalulanotesthatitisimportantto
strengthenpoliticalinstitutions,supportandtestlocalauthorities,encourageandeducate
leadersinapoliticalmovementandpreserveunityofeffortwithotheraspectsandentities
inthecounterinsurgencycampaign.75Sovietleadersmadesignificanteffortsinallofthese
74ZapisBesedyL.I.BrezhnevasN.M.Tarki20marta1979g.(Vbesedeprinyaliuchastiet.t.A.N.Kosygin,A.A.
Gromyko,D.F.UstinoviB.N.Ponomarev),20March1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.2,Ll.5.
75Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,56,
72.
35
areas.DespitesomeforcefulfeaturesofSovietmilitaryactionsinAfghanistan,itisclearthat
Sovietleadersunderstoodtheimportanceofpursuinganeffectivepoliticalprogram.
Evenbeforecommittingtroopstotheregion,Sovietleadersworkedagainstthe
resistancebyemployingmoderatepoliciesandaccommodatingasmanypartsofthesociety
aspossible.InMarchof1979,BrezhnevtoldTaraki,Irepeatagainthatinthepresent
situationwhatwillplayamainrolewillbeyourabilitytousepoliticalandeconomic
meanstoattracttoyoursidethewidestcirclesofthepopulation.76Brezhnevwasinsistent
thatTarakipursueacomprehensivepoliticalandsocialprograminAfghanistan,insisting
thatitwasimperativetobroadenthepoliticalsupportforthePDPA,startingatthe
grassrootslevel.
Tothisend,Brezhnevadvocatedtheuseofsociopoliticalgroupstoworkwith
peasants,workersandwomen.77Healsosuggestedthecreationoforganizationsfor
workingagainstpovertyandotherproblemsinagriculturalregionswherethePDPA
traditionallyhadtheleastsupport.78Repressiveandharshmeasureswerediscouragedand
winningsupportwithintheranksofreligiousleaderswasemphasized;theKremlinurged
leadersinKabultomakeitclearthattheywerefriendlytoIslam.79Itwasalsosuggested
thatincreasedtraininggotoPDPAmembersinordertofacilitatetheirpoliticalactivities.80
In1980,theAfghanministerofforeignaffairsassuredAndreiA.Gromykothatworkwas
beingdonetoachieveunityinthePDPAandtoridthepartyofcorruptionandexcessive
Gromyko,D.F.UstinoviB.N.Ponomarev),20March1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.2,Ll.2.Itis
interestingtonoteherethattheSovietsdevelopedsimilarprogramsintheircounterinsurgencyinUkraine
(19441956).See,Potichnyj,P.J.(1987,October23).PacificationofUkraine:SovietCounterinsurgency,1944
1956.RetrievedSeptember13,2009,fromChronicleoftheUkranianInsurgentArmy:
http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html
80VypiskaizprotokolaNo.149zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot12aprelya1979goda:Onasheidalneishei
liniivsvyazispolozheniemvAfganistane,12April1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.4,Ll.10.
36
violence.81Theseassurances,whetherornottheyrepresentedactualprogressinKabul,
underscoretheKremlinspressureontheAfghangovernmenttomakepositivechanges.
UnderstandingPakistansinfluentialroleintheAfghanresistance,Sovietleaders
madespecificrecommendationstoopentalkswithIslamabadtolimitinterferenceandto
normalizethesituationofAfghanrefugeesinthatcountry.82InthefirstmonthsoftheSoviet
occupationofAfghanistan,theCentralCommitteewasveryinsistentthatAfghan
governmentleadersbeproactiveincreatingandpublicizingapoliticalprogram.InMayof
1980,theCentralCommitteeoftheCPSUdiscussedtheneedforAfghanleadershipto
articulateacomprehensiveprogramofpoliticalstabilization.83Sovietrecommendations
includedanacceleratedprocessforcreatingaconstitution,andtheinclusionoftribal
representativesinpoliticalprocesses.84Sovietleadersalsocontinuedtovoicetheneedto
reachouttoreligiousleadersandothersocioeconomicclasses,whichwerenotnaturally
inclinedtosidewiththePDPA.85Itwasalsosuggestedtoisolateradicalelementswithin
thesesegmentsofthepopulation.86
Incorporatingtribalandreligiousleaderswasaparticularlyimportantaspectofthe
politicalprogram.DavidKilcullenmentionsthispointaswell,notingthatinfluentiallocal
triballeadersandvillagechiefsregardlessofwhethertheyformallysupportthe
governmentarethekey.87TheSovietadvicetoisolatetheradicalelementswithinthese
81ZapisOsnovnogoSoderzhaniyaBesedyA.A.GromykosMinistromInostrannykhDelDRASh.M.Dostom4
janvarya1980goda,4January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.11,Ll.2.
82VypiskaizprotokolaNo.195zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot8maya1980goda:Opredlozheniyakhpo
politicheskomuuregulirovaniuvsvyazisAfganistanom,8May1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.8,
Ll.34(vPrilozheniiI;inAppendixIofthisdocument).
84VypiskaizprotokolaNo.181zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot28janvarya1980goda:Odalneishikh
meropriyatiyakhpoobespecheniyugosudarstvennykhinteresovSSSRvsvyazissobytiyamivAfganistane,28
January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.3,Ll.6.
87Kilcullen,D.(2009).TheAccidentalGuerilla:FightingSmallWarsintheMidstofaBigOne.NewYork,USA:
OxfordUniversityPress,Inc,69.
37
categoriesisconsistentwithGalulasadmonitionthatthecounterinsurgentisolatethe
populationasmuchaspossiblefromtheguerillas.88
TheSovietpromotedgoalwastostrengthentheKabulgovernmentbybroadening
itspoliticalbase,andtocurbviolencethroughestablishingcontactsandtalkswiththe
leadersandeldersofthemostwarringtribesintheDRA89inthesearchofwaystoachieve
acompromise.90IntalkswithBabrakKarmalin1981,Sovietleaderscontinuedto
emphasizetheimportanceofstrengtheningAfghanpoliticalinstitutionsusingthe
considerableexperienceandsupportfromtheUSSR.91Andropovunderscoredthe
importanceofaddressingdivisionsbetweentheParchamandKhalqfactionswithinthe
PDPA,buildingastrongarmyandpoliceforce,andfosteringgreatercoordinationbetween
AfghanandSovietmilitaryunits.92Similarpoliticalthemescontinuedthroughoutthe
durationoftheconflict.In1986,AndreiGromykostressedtheneedtogetdowntothe
businessofworkingatpoliticalstabilizationmoreactively.93Expandingsupportforthe
PDPAwasacentralthemeintheSovietapproach.Theneedtofocusonpoliticalinitiatives
thatconcretelyimprovedthelivesofruralpopulationswasemphasizedandreiteratedat
thistime.94In1986inameetingofthePolitburo,Gorbachevvoicedthissentiment,
88Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,81.
89DemocraticRepublicofAfghanistan
91PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Odopolnitelnykhmerakh
pomoshchiNarodnodemokraticheskoipartiiAfganistanavrazvertyvaniiideologicheskoiraboty,16December
1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.46,D.74,Ll.2.
1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.4.Atthistime,GorbachevwasalreadyleadingtheUSSR
towardsfindingwaystowithdraw.Hesoughtpoliticalmeasurestoneutralizethesituationenoughtoallowfor
troopwithdrawal.Suchproceedings,however,indicatethatleadersclearlyunderstoodtheimportanceofthe
politicalaspectsofcounterinsurgencyandattemptedtoimplementprogramsinthisarea.Theproblem,
however,wasthatmilitarygainswerenotsufficientlysupportedbytheprojectionofpoliticalinfluence(General
Akhromeevmakesthispointinthissamedocument).Thiswasprimarilythefaultofdisjointedcoordination
betweenmilitaryandpoliticalefforts,andtheinabilityofthearmytoprovidesecuritytoallareasofthecountry.
Itwasnottheresultofignoringthepoliticalaspectofcounterinsurgency.
38
maintainingthatitisnecessarytoexpandthesocialbaseofthe[Kabul]regimeby
accountingforaneffectiveallocationofpoliticalenergy.95
Asoutlinedabove,Sovietemphasisonnormalizingrelationswithneighboring
countriesandstrengtheningdomesticAfghanpoliticalinstitutionswassubstantial.These
initiativesareconsistentwithclassicalandmoderncounterinsurgencytheorythatstresses
theimportanceofcreatingconditionsthatassurethepopulationthatthegovernmentoffers
abetteralternativetotheruleoftheinsurgent.TherecommendationsputforthbySoviet
leaderswerewellfoundedandaddressedsignificantobstaclestothesuccessoftheKabul
government.TheyalsoillustratethatSovietleadersunderstoodtheimportanceofthe
politicalcomponentofthecounterinsurgencyeffort.
SocialInitiatives
InadditiontomeasuresmeanttoaffectAfghanpoliticalpoliciesdirectly,theSoviet
governmentundertookabroadrangeofsocialprogramsintendedforsupportingthe
Afghancounterinsurgency.Increasedsupportintheareasofeducation,cultureandyouth
weremeanttohelpinwinningsupportforthePDPA.Someoftheseprogramshadlimited
effect,sincetheywereonlyavailabletothoseinareascontrolledbythegovernment.
Nevertheless,theseprogramsspeaktotheSovietgovernmentsunderstandingofthesofter
elementsofcounterinsurgency,andincorporationofelementsoftheheartsandminds
approach.96
TheSovietUnionwasactiveinworkingtoinfluenceAfghansocietyandcultureby
providingmaterials,infrastructureandopportunitiesdesignedtofostersocialwelfareand
gainsupportforthePDPA.In1980SovietanalysisdiscussedtheneedfortheAfghan
95Zasedanie
PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November
96Broadlyusedincurrentdiscourse,thetermheartandmindsisFieldMarshalSirGerardTemplers.Itwas
usedtodescribethesofterelementsofcounterinsurgencythattheBritishmilitaryemployedattimesinMalaya.
See:Dixon,P.(2009).'HeartsandMinds'?BritishCounterinsurgencyfromMalayatoIraq.JournalofStrategic
Studies,32(3),354.
39
governmenttoundertakeprogramstoincreasetheinfluenceofthePDPAonyouth,
especiallystudents,andcreateathletic,culturalandotherorganizationstosupport
progressivemovementsintheDRA.97Sovietleadersalsoadvocatedworkingtostop
discriminationagainstShiiteMuslimsinAfghanistan,hopingthatreachingouttothisgroup
wouldaddsupporttotheregime.Othersocialprogramsincludedsummercampsinthe
USSRforAfghanschoolchildrenoneparticularprojectprovidedalmosteighthundred
slotsperyearforsummercampintheUSSR.98Inasimilarvein,Sovietleadersapprovedthe
creationofeightautomobileclubsfortheDemocraticOrganizationofYouthofAfghanistan
in1980.99
WiththegoalofstimulatingAfghanculturallife,theSovietUnionofJournalists,
UnionofWriters,UnionofArtists,UnionofComposers,UnionofDirectorswereeach
instructedtopresentoneprizeperyeartoanAfghancitizenintheirfield.100Soviet
organizationswerealsoinstructedtocoordinatethepurchaseofAfghanartandothercrafts
formuseumsintheUSSR.101
BuildingthehumancapitalandeconomicpotentialoftheDRAwasimportantto
Sovietleadership,asemploymentandprosperitywereseenasstepstowardpeaceand
stability.Althoughthesegoalswerenotfullyachieved,theSovietgovernmentdidworkto
establishmanytrainingandeducationalopportunitiesforAfghancitizens.Forexample,in
1980,theMinistryofCulturewasinstructedtoorganizeaprogramforthirtyAfghan
98TsKKPSS:OkhodebypolneniyaresheniiTsKKPSSobokazaniipomoshchiNarodnodemokraticheskoipartii
Afganistanavrasvertyvaniiideologicheskoiraboty,4December1981(Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.46,D.74,Ll.
19.
99TsKKPSS:OkhoderealizatsiipostanovleniiTsKKPSSobusileniiinformatsionnopropagandistkoirabotyna
DemokraticheskuiuRespublikuAfganistan,26February1981(Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.46,D.74,Ll.16.
40
citizensperyeartostudyintheUSSR.102InaformalagreementbetweentheUSSRandthe
DemocraticRepublicofAfghanistanitwasspecifiedthatintheyears19801982theUSSR
wouldorganizespecializedfifteendaytrainingprogramsforgroupsofupto25managers
fromtheDRAministryofwaterresourcesandenergyandtheministryofagricultureand
landreform.103Itwasalsoagreedthatfiftyagriculturalspecialistsayear(from19811983)
wouldattendthreemonthtrainingcourses.104Similarprogramswereimplementedfor
hundredsofmining,mechanic,drivingandmanufacturingspecialists.105Trainingand
educationalexchangescontinuedthroughouttheconflict.Ina1984agreement,Afghan
workersweretaskedtogototheUSSRforspecializedconstructiontraining.106In1985,
technicaltraininginmanufacturingwasprovidedforAfghanworkers.107Suchtraining
opportunitieswereongoingandwereincorporatedinmanySovietdevelopmentprojectsin
Afghanistan.
InadditiontoprovidingnumeroustrainingopportunitiesintheSovietUnion,
Moscowalsoadoptedprogramsmeanttostrengtheneducationalinstitutionsin
Afghanistan.In1980,aSovietAfghanagreementfortheyears19811985designatedthat
eightyfiveinstructorsfromtheUSSRwouldcometoworkinAfghanschoolsinthefieldsof
socialandeconomicsciences,engineeringandRussianlanguage.108Soviethelpfor
producingtextbooksinDariandPashto,andexpertiseforcreatingachemistrylaboratoryat
KabulUniversitywasalsospecifiedintheseagreements.109Theestablishmentofboarding
103MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1982).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXVI).
Moscow,Russia,9899.
Moscow,Russia,9899.
Moscow,Russia,9899.
106MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1986).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XL).Moscow,
Russia,7779.
107MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1987).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XLI).Moscow,
Russia,129132.
Moscow,Russia,9899.
Moscow,Russia,9899.
41
schoolsinKabuloverthecourseof19811985wasalsoincluded.110Inanagreement
projectedfor19861990,theSovietgovernmentagreedtobuildtenprofessionaltechnical
schoolswithacapacityforfourthousandstudents.111Infurthersupportofeducational
infrastructure,therewereexchangessetupbetweentheLeninStateLibraryinMoscowand
thelibrariesofKabulUniversity,theKabulAcademyofSciencesandtheAfghanHistorical
Society.112
Asillustratedintheprogramsabove,Sovietleadershipmadesignificanteffortsto
supportthecounterinsurgencycampaignthroughsocialprograms,supportingnumerous
policiesandprogramsforstrengtheningAfghanpolitical,educationalandsocialinstitutions
andprocesses.Whilesuccesswaslimitedinsomeareas,itisclearthattheSovietleadership
wasawareoftheimportanceofthisaspectofcounterinsurgencyandattemptedtomake
progressinit.AlthoughsomeSovietpolicieswerecertainlycoercive,Sovietleadersdid
incorporatesoftapproachesintotheircounterinsurgencyeffortaswell.
PropagandaInitiatives
Ithasbeenrepeatedthatcounterinsurgencyis20percentmilitaryactionand80
percentpolitical.113Inhisinfluentialworkoncounterinsurgency,Galulainstructsthe
counterinsurgenthowtoproceedinthepoliticalsphere.AccordingtoGalula,muchdepends
ontherelativestrengthsanddynamicsofeitherside;forvaryingcases,headvocates
poweringthroughonforcealoneoradoptingelementsoftheinsurgentspoliticalplatform
inanefforttowinthesupportofthepopulation.Regardlessofapproach,Galulastressesthe
Moscow,Russia,9899.
111MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1987).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XLI).Moscow,
Russia,129132.
42
needforthecounterinsurgenttodeclarehispoliticalprogramatanopportunetimeandina
wayaimedtotakeasmuchwindaspossibleoutoftheinsurgentssails.114
Winningininformationwarfareiscrucialforthecounterinsurgent.Losingthis
battlecannegategainsmadeinotherareasofthecounterinsurgency.ColonelThomasX.
Hammesmakesthispoint,notingthattheinsurgentcanpotentiallycircumventmilitary
meansbytargetingthemindsoftheenemydecisionmakerstodestroytheenemys
politicalwill.[which]whenproperlyemployedcandefeatgreatereconomicandmilitary
power.115
InthecaseofAfghanistan,influencingtheopinionsofthreebroadcategoriesofpeople
wasimportantfordeterminingthecourseoftheconflict:first,theSovietpopulationand
leaderswhoformedpolicyandboretheburdensoftheconflict;second,theinternational
powersthatbackedthemujahedeen,andwhosesupportwasimportantforsustainingthe
insurgency;andthird,theAfghanpopulationitself,whichhadtodecidewhethertoside
withtheKabulgovernmentorthemujahedeen.Sovietleadershipworkeddiligentlyinthe
areaofinformationandpropagandatotargetallofthesegroups.
InmanyrespectspropagandaworkcamenaturallytotheSoviets,astheUSSRwasa
countrybasedontheideologyofrevolution,andhadutilizedpropagandacampaigns
extensivelyinitshistory.IntheAfghancontext,Sovietexperiencebothindomesticandin
foreignpropagandawasveryuseful.116Sovietleadersoftenreferredtothesehistorical
exampleswhileworkingwiththeAfghangovernment.Whileitisclearthat,foravarietyof
reasons,thepoliticalmessageofthePDPAdidnotinspirethebroadsupportthatwas
desired,itisundeniablethattheSovietgovernmentpursuedsubstantialmeasuresinthis
area.Indiscussingtheseefforts,Iwillfocusontwocategories:propagandainitiatives
114Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,
72.
115Hammes,C.T.(2008).InformationOperationsin4GW.InT.Terrif,A.Karp,&R.Karp,GlobalInsurgencyand
theFutureofArmedConflict(pp.200208).NewYork,NewYork,USA:RoutledgeTaylor&FrancisGroup,200.
116SovietleaderstookintoaccountexperiencesinEasternEuropeancountriessuchinCzechoslovakiaand
BulgariawhenapproachingthesituationinAfghanistan.Thisisevidentinthefollowingdocument:Vypiskaiz
protokolaNo.181zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot28janvarya1980goda:Odalneishikhmeropriyatiyakhpo
obespecheniyugosudarstvennykhinteresovSSSRvsvyazissobytiyamivAfganistane,28January1980(Top
Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.3,Ll.6.
43
focusedontheAfghanpopulation,andpropagandainitiativesdirectedattheinternational
communityandSovietpopulation.
PropagandaWithinAfghanistan
Evenbeforetheinvasionin1979,theSovietswereveryactiveinAfghanistanandaware
oftheimportanceofpropaganda.ASovietanalysisofthesituationinthespringof1979
criticizedAfghanPDPAmembersforbeingoutdonebythecounterrevolutionaries,whose
workwasmuchmoreactiveandonalargerscalethantheworkconductedbyparty
members.117AfterthedeploymentofSoviettroops,Sovietleadersmadeitevenmoreofa
prioritytosupplytheKabulgovernmentandthePDPAwithallthetoolsnecessaryto
spreadtheirmessageandcompeteininformationwarfarebothdomesticallyandinthe
internationalarena.Asnotedin1980inaresolutionoftheSecretariatoftheCentral
CommitteeoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion(CPSU),withthepermissionofthe
CPSUSovietideologicalinstitutionsbegantoprovideoperationalhelptothePDPAin
propagandaaimedatcounteractingtheantiafghancampaignintheUNandinthemedia
abroad.118In1981,theSovietgovernmentpassedaresolutionOntheSupportforthe
PeoplesDemocraticPartyofAfghanistaninPropagandaWork.119
DevelopmentofthepropagandaeffortwasacentralaspectoftheUSSRsrelationship
withtheDemocraticRepublicofAfghanistan(DRA).120TheSovietsworkedhardtodevelop
newspapers,journalsandradiostationsthatsupportedtheKabulgovernment.Radio,in
19.
19.
120DemocraticPartyofAfghanistan(DRA)wasthetitlegiventoAfghanistanbythePDPAaftertheSaur
Revolutionin1978.
44
particular,wasemphasizedbothbyAfghanandSovietgovernmentleadersduetothehigh
rateofilliteracyinAfghanistan.121AsearlyasMarch1979,presidentTarakiaskedLeonid
BrezhnevforhelpincreatingcapabilitiesforaradiostationinAfghanistan.122Afewdays
later,YuriAndropovrepeatedtheneedtosupplytheAfghanswithmeansforradio
broadcasting.123InJanuary1980Sovietofficialsapprovedthebuildingofaradiostationin
theregionofKabul,allocatingtenmillionrublesforthejobandagreeingtosendequipment
andspecialiststofacilitatetheproject.124InDecemberof1980Sovietleadersapprovedthe
distributionofmegaphoneandloudspeakerassembliestoalladministrativezonesin
Afghanistanasawaytofacilitatespreadinginformation.125TheSovietgovernmentalso
madeeffortstobroadcastradioprogramsfromnearbyCentralAsianrepublicsin
Afghanistan.In1981,SovietleadersapprovedthebroadcastofprogramsinUzbekforthe
benefitoflistenersinAfghanistan.126
Moscowalsoorderedthesupportofotherformsofmedia.Inoneinstance,theSoviet
mediaagencyTasswastaskedwithsendingmaterialsandequipmentforcreatingadark
roomandphotostudiofortheAfghannewsagencyBakhtar.127Initiativesintelevisionwere
discussedbetweentheUSSRandAfghanistanaswell.Ina1980resolutionoftheSecretariat
oftheCentralCommitteetherewereconversationsregardingtherelayofbroadcastsfroma
TajikTVstudiotoAfghanistan.128Inthesameyear,thefilmConspiracyAgainstthe
RepublicwasfilmedwithSoviethelpinDariandPashto,clearlyforgovernmentuseasa
122ZapisBesedyA.N.Kosygina,A.A.Gromyko,D.F.Ustinova,B.N.PonomarevasN.M.Taraki20marta1979g.,
20March1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.3,Ll.12.
124PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Obokasaniitekhnicheskogo
sodeistviyaDemokraticheskoiRespublikeAfganistanvstroitelstveradioveshchatelnoisrednevolnovoi
radiostantsiimoshchnostiu1000kVt,29January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.32,D.20,Ll.2,3,11.
1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.46,D.74,Ll.4(UndersubheadingSovetMinistrovSSSR:
Rasporyazhenie).
45
propagandatool.129Anagreementbetweenthetwocountriesfor1983established
cooperationoncreatingthreeTVstudiosinAfghanistan.130SeveralAfghannewspapers
weresetupunderSovietguidance.Khambastegiwascreatedin1980,basedontheSoviet
newspaperSocialism:TheoryandPractice,andhadacirculationof3000copies.131
Iunost,ayouthnewspaper,wasalsocreatedin1980andhadacirculationof10,000
copies.132
SovietprogramswerealsoformulatedforthepurposeoftrainingAfghanspecialistsin
theskillsnecessaryformediaandpropagandaoperations.TheSovietUnionsentmany
advisorsandtrainersinjournalismtohelpstrengthenAfghancapabilities.Thishadbeenan
ongoingeffortformanyyearsbutintensifiedaftertheAprilRevolutionandthesubsequent
Sovietinvasion.133Forexample,fromNovember1980toFebruary1981tenAfghanmedia
interns(fiveinradioandfiveintelevision)weresenttotheUSSRfortraining.134TheSoviet
governmentalsodirectedleadingpressagenciestosendpersonneltotraintheir
counterpartsinAfghanistan.EditorsfromthenewspapersPravda,Izvestia,and
KomsomolskayaPravdawereeachorderedtosendarepresentativetotrainandadvise
cadresintheAfghannewspapersPravdaAprelskoiRevolutsii,KhivadandZnamya
Molodyozhi.135
SovietpoliticalleadersalsodiscussedthepromotionofjournalismamongstAfghan
students,workingoutplanstosendprofessorsinJournalismfromtheUSSRtoKabul
130MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1985).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXIX).
Moscow,Russia,212.
133Adocumentin1976onsendingofSovietpersonneltoAfghanistantoadviseonpropagandaisanexampleof
thisrelationship:PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Sovet
MinistrovSSSR,Rasporyazhenienoyabrya1976g.,November1976(Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.27,D.27,Ll.9.
Ofcourse,personnelexchangewithAfghanistanincreasedaftertheSovietscommittedtroopstothecountry.
46
University.136TheMinistryofhighereducationwasdirectedtosendprofessorstowork
directlywiththePDPAonjournalism,clearlyindicatingthatthesubjectwasunderstoodas
atoolforuseinthepoliticalcontext.137
SubstantialamountsofmediaandpropagandamaterialsweresentfromtheUSSRto
AfghanistantoexplainandspreadthemessageofthePDPA.In1980,thepublishinghouse
Plakatwasinstructedtosend50,000rublesworthofflyersandotherpublicationsinDari
andPashto.138ThenewspaperNovostiwasdirectedtopublishaseriesofbrochuresinDari
andPashtothatexplainedtheprinciplesofdomesticandforeignpolicyoftheDRA,withthe
specificinstructionsthattheybeorientedtowardstheaverageAfghan.139InOctoberof
1980aSovietnewsagencycreatedthetextbookCourseintheBasicsofPoliticsinPashto
andDari.140ThetextbookGuidebookofaPartyWorkerandPoliticalPartiesoftheWorld
werealsocreatedaroundthesametime.141
SovietleaderspersistentlyadvisedtheirAfghancounterpartsinpropaganda,reminding
themtobesuretobroadentheirbaseofpoliticalsupportthroughengagingkeysegmentsof
theAfghanpopulation.TheSovietintentionwasthatthePDPAexplaintheirplatformin
termsunderstandableandcompellingtotheaverageAfghan.ThisdovetailswithDavid
Galulaspointthatthecounterinsurgentshouldavoidabstractpoliciesthatdonotinterest
thepopulation,andthatitisimportantforthecounterinsurgenttoascertainwhatthe
peoplereallywant,andthenpromotecorrespondingpolicies.142
72.
47
SovietleadershippushedthissamerecommendationwiththeAfghangovernment.One
exampleisSovietadvicethatPDPAmembersarticulateclearlytoAfghanpeasantsthatthey
receivelandduetothereformsofthePDPA,andthatthislandwillremainwiththemonlyif
thegovernmentremainsstrong.143ForthepurposeofcontinuingtoexplaintheKabul
governmentspolicies,thepublicationNovostipublished10,000ofeachofthefollowing
brochuresinDariandPashto:DomesticPoliticsoftheDRA,StoriesabouttheReforms
andSpeechesofBabrakofKarmal.144OneSovietdocumentreferstothenumberofcopies
ofvaryingpamphlets,booksandotherpublicationssentfromtheUSSRtoAfghanistanat
290,00in1979,andat720,000in1980.145
TheseSovietPDPAprogramscameinthecontextofanactivepropagandacampaignon
thepartofthemujahedeen.AsGeneralGromovrecountsinhismemoirs,therewasactive
antiSovietpropaganda,whichwasconductedamidstthewholepopulationinAfghanistan.
Ineveryvillageandsmallcitytheysetpeopleagainstus.146Itwasofvitalimportanceto
convincetheAfghanpeoplethattheKabulgovernmentmeantwellandwouldbringthem
goodthings.147Thisobjectivewasnotfullyachieved,butcertainlystrivedforasevidenced
bythemanyprogramsenumeratedabove.
144TsKKPSS:OkhodevypolneniyapostanovleniyaTsKKPSSOdopolnitelnykhmerakhpomoshchiNarodno
demokraticheskoipartiiAfganistanavrasvertyvaniiideologicheskoiraboty,4November1981(Secret),in
RGANI,F.89,Op.46,D.74,Ll.23.
146Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,117.
147ThefollowingarticleincludesacaseoftheU.S.generalMcChrystalspreadinghismessageinhopesof
winningthesupportofthepopulation.InatranslatedmessagehesaidthatAscommanderoftheInternational
SecurityAssistanceForce,nothingismoreimportantthanthesafetyandprotectionoftheAfghanpeople.This
isanillustrationoftheneedtobroadcastamessage.TheimportancewasthesamefortheSovietsasitisnowfor
U.S.forces.Leadersinbothcaseswereawareoftherealeffectsthatinformationcouldhaveontheirmission:
Farrel,S.,&Oppel,R.A.(2009,September4).NATOStrikeMagnifiesDivideonAfghanWar.RetrievedSeptember
4,2009,fromTheNewYorkTimes:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/asia/05afghan.html
48
PropagandaDirectedattheInternationalCommunityandSovietPopulation
InternationalpropagandasurroundingtheconflictinAfghanistancannotbeseparated
fromtherealitiesofthelargerColdWar.ThewarinAfghanistanwasyetanotherreasonfor
theUnitedStatesandothercountriestodiscredittheSovietUnion,and,inturn,areasonfor
theSovietUniontostrikeback.148Thiswasanexpectedaspectofinternationalrelationsat
thetime.
Thispropagandastrugglewasalsoabattleforlegitimacyandglobalsympathyforwhich
boththemujahedeenandtheSovietbackedPDPAwerevying.TheSovietswereseekingto
gaintolerancefortheiractionsinAfghanistanintheinternationalcommunity;theywere
alsointerestedinsustainingsupportfortheeffortwithintheUSSR.Themujahedeenwere
seekingtoerodethewilloftheSovietleadersandpeople,togainsympathyandfunds
internationally,andtowinsupportwithintheAfghanpopulace.Successorfailureinthe
propagandastrugglewouldhavemajorconsequencesforbothsides.
ThepoliticsofPakistanandIranandthelargerpowersworkingwiththemhada
veryrealeffectontheSovietcounterinsurgencyeffort.Mujahedeenforcesmadeuseof
thesegovernmentsfinances,equipmentandsanctuaries.TheSovietpopulationalsoplayed
animportantroleintheSovietcounterinsurgency.Althoughlivinginasocietyofrestricted
pressandhavinglimitedeffectongovernmentprocesses,theSovietpopulationwasthe
sourcefortheconscript40thArmydeployedinAfghanistan,andthesentimentsofthe
peopledidultimatelyinfluenceSovietpolicymakers.149Winningtheheartsandmindsof
theseaudiences,therefore,wouldbeasignificantadvantageinthestruggleforAfghanistan.
Indiscussingevolvedinsurgenciesinthecontextoffourthgenerationwarfare,Colonel
Hammeshighlightstheimportanceofinternationalinformationcampaignseveninlocalized
148InadeclassifiedU.S.governmentmemofrom1979,PresidentCarterclearlyoutlinesU.S.propagandagoals
againsttheSovietUnioninthecontextofAfghanistan:WhiteHouseMemoof3July1979,PresidentCarteron
SituationinAfghanistan(accessedfromCSPAN.Org,Declassified25June1999).(1979,July3).RetrievedAugust
29,2009,fromhttp://www.cspan.org/PresidentialLibraries/Content/Carter/CarterAfghanistan.pdf
149AnatolyChernyaev'sNotesfromthePolitburoCCCPSUSessionofOctober17,1985.(2001,October9).
RetrievedfromTheSeptember11thSourceBooks,VolumeII:Afghanistan,LessonsfromtheLastWar(The
NationalSecurityArchive,EditedbySvetlanaSavranskaya):
49
conflicts,notingthatawidevarietyofinternationalinstitutionsandnetworkscanspreada
politicalmessagequicklythroughouttheworld,andwithgreatconsequences.150Soviet
strategytookintoaccountvariousinternationalinstitutionswhenconsideringthe
informationcampaignforAfghanistan,placinggreatimportanceonachievingsuccessin
thisarea.
SovietleadersrepeatedlydiscussedtheAfghanistansituationinthecontextofthe
globalarenaandtheirstandingvisviscompetingpowers.Thisisillustratedinaletter
fromLeonidBrezhnevtoFidelCastroinmarchof1980:Youareright,Fidel,thatinthe
currentcomplicatedcircumstances,thereisanopportunityforCubatomovetowards
implementingamoreactiveattempttosupportinternationalsecurity.Thisisevenmore
important,becausetheimperialisticpowerstrytoplaceallcausesofinternationaltension
inAfghanistan,usingittodistractattentionawayfromtheirowndangerousactivities.151In
aconversationwithawesternreporterin1981,theSovietrepresentativeexpressedthe
governmentstanceandprevailingunderstandingofthesituationatthetime,literally
everydayintheUSthereisspreadnewfabricationsabouttheforeignpolicyoftheUSSR,
andthisisdonenotonlybythepress,butevenmorebyofficialrepresentativesofthe
administration.152
DuringthewarinAfghanistanSovietanalystswouldoftenmentionthattheUnited
StatesandChinasawthesituationsimplyasanopportunitytohurttheUSSRandpromote
thespreadofantiSovietsentimentsaroundtheglobe.153TheSovietsviewedsuchcountries
tobeuninterestedinstabilizingAfghanistan,andfocusedprimarilyoninflictingdamageon
150Hammes,C.T.(2004).TheSlingandtheStone.St.Paul,MN,USA:ZenithPress,212.
151VypiskaizprotokolaNo.187zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot10marta1980goda:Onasheidalneishei
vneshnepoliticheskoiliniivsvyazisAfganistanomiobotvetenaobrashchenieF.Kastro,10March1980(Top
Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.5,Ll.6(vPrilozheniiI;inAppendixIofthisdocument).
152TsKKPSS:ObesedesrukovoditelemamerikanskoikompaniiTaimLaif,22October1981(Secret),in
RGANI,F.89,Op.76,D.31,Ll.23.
50
theSovietUnion.154Afghanleadersfeltthemselvestobevictimsofpropagandaaimedat
weakeningtheirgovernmentaswell.InaconversationwithA.N.Kosyginon20March
1979,PresidentTarakicomplainedthatPakistanipropagandatwistedourprograms
regardingsocialfreedomsforwomenandturnedtopoliticsofsabotageagainstus.155
Thisbattleforpropaganda,ofcourse,wasconductedwithgreaterglobalpoliticalobjectives
inmind,butitwasalsoanimportantaspectininsurgencyandcounterinsurgency.AsIhave
notedabove,theinformationbattleisvitalincounterinsurgency:theinsurgentwinsifhe
canconvincethecounterinsurgentspopulationorpolicymakersthatthepursuedstrategic
goalsareeitherunachievableortoocostlyfortheperceivedbenefit.156The
counterinsurgentmustthereforeattempttothwartsuchaninformationcampaign.Inthe
contextoftheSovietAfghanwar,theSovietUnionhadtocounteractattemptsconductedby
abroadandpowerfulcoalitionofcountries.
Accordingly,Sovietleadersundertooksubstantialmeasuresinpropagandadirected
towardinternationalaudiences.Thesestrategiesincludedexploitingthedifferences
betweenthealliesinNATOandhinderingthedevelopmentoftiesbetweentheUnited
StatesandChinainanefforttoweakensolidarityonthequestionofAfghanistan.157Also,
therewereinitiativestogainsupportfortheSovietUnionamongsttheleadersofSocialist
countriesandotherlargesociopoliticalorganizations.158TheCentralCommitteeofthe
CPSUsentlettersofexplanationoftheAfghanistansituationtocommunistaffiliated
organizationsallovertheworld;inonedocumentfortysixsuchorganizationsarelistedas
154ThissentimentisclearinthefollowingmeetingofthePolitburo:Zasedanie
PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya
1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November 1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,
Ll.4.
155ZapisBesedyA.N.Kosygina,A.A.Gromyko,D.F.Ustinova,B.N.PonomarevasN.M.Taraki20marta1979g.,
20March1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.42,D.3,Ll.5.
156COLHammes,T.(2007,MayJune).FourthGenerationWarEvolves,FifthEmerges.MilitaryReview,1421,
14,29.
51
recipientsofsuchaletter.159TheSovietsalsosoughttocourtMiddleEasterncountriesin
hopesofpreventingIslamicmovementsfromassuminganantiSovietposture.160
In1980theSovietgovernmentencouragedtheKabulregimetopublicizetheir
politicalplatformbecauseitwouldbetimelyfromtheperspectiveofhavinganeffecton
thepositionsofcountriesthatareparticipantsinthesessionofministersofIslamic
governments.161ThesupportforantiAmericanelementsinIranianforeignpolicywasalso
encouraged,asitwouldpotentiallyweakensupportfortheUSbackedopposition
movementinAfghanistan.162Itwasalsonotedthatitwouldbehelpfultodiscreditpro
mujahedeenleadersintheAfghanmigrcommunity,aswellashighlightthedestructive
effectsofUSandChinesebackedfightersinAfghanistan.163Theefforttouncoverand
discreditforeignsupportfortheAfghaninsurgencyhadbeenpartofpolicysincethe
beginningoftheconflict.Evenbeforetheinvasion,topSovietleadersagreedthatan
elementoftheirAfghanstrategywouldbepreparingmaterials,revealingmeddlingin
AfghanistansaffairsonthepartofPakistan,Iran,theU.S.,andChina,andpublicizingthese
materialsthroughathirdparty.164
Sovietambassadorsreceivedexplicitinstructionsabouthowtopresenttheissueof
Afghanistan.TheseinstructionsurgedthemtopointoutthatSovietandAfghancooperation
againstinsurgentgroupswasconsistentwitharticle51oftheUNscharter,whichsupports
159VypiskaisprotokolaNo.177zasedaniyaPolitbyuroTsKKPSSot27dekabrya1979goda:Onashikhshagakh
vsvyazisrazvitiemobstanovkivokrugAfganistan,27December1979(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op14,D.
33,Ll.26(thislistcomesattheendofthedocumentundertheheading:Spisokkommunisticheskikhi
rabochikhpartiinesotsialisticheskikhstran,kotorymnapravlyaetsyapismoTsKKPSS).
52
therightofindividualorcollectiveselfdefenseinthecaseofanattack.165TheSoviet
representativeattheUnitedNationswasexplicitlyorderedtothwartallattemptsat
includingtheissueofAfghanistaninthedailyagenda.166Alistofexplanationsand
argumentswasprovidedincasethematterwasacceptedforformaldiscussion.167Insucha
circumstance,itwastobeemphasizedthatSoviettroopswereinAfghanistanonlyforthe
purposeofhelpingthegovernmentandpeopleofAfghanistanagainstoutsideaggressionin
accordancewiththeSovietAfghantreatyof1978,andthatthesetroopswouldleaveas
soonasthethreatsubsided.168
In1980,theCentralCommitteeoftheCPSUgavespecialinstructionsforlobbying
theSovietperspectiveonAfghanistanataconferenceoftheInterParliamentaryUnionin
responsetoantiSovietbiasintheorganization.169Afghanrepresentativeswereadvisedto
sendaletterofprotesttotheUnionschair,declaringsuchdiscussionstobemeddlingin
internalAfghanaffairs.170Overall,theSovietleadershipsupportedthepropaganda
campaignonallfronts.InadocumentoftheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSUaplanwas
outlinedtocontinuethebroadpublicationofcounterpropagandamaterialsofSovietand
foreignauthors,thatexposethefalsificationsofthewesternmedia.171
165CharteroftheUnitedNations.(n.d.).RetrievedAugust11,2009,fromUNWebsite:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml
33,Ll.9(vPrilozhenii3;inAppendix3ofthisdocument(alettertotherepresentativeinNY).
33,Ll.9(vPrilozhenii3;inAppendix3ofthisdocument(alettertotherepresentativeinNY).
33,Ll.15(vPrilozhenii6;inAppendix6ofthisdocument(Opropagandistkomobespecheniinasheiaktsiiv
otnosheniiAfganistana).
169PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Omerakhprotiv
obsuzhdeniyana67IKonferentsiiMezhparlamentskogosoyuzaproektarezolyutsii,soderzhashchei
antisovetskoiIantiafganskoinapravlennosti,9September1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.43,D.31,Ll.
1.
170PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Omerakhprotiv
obsuzhdeniyana67IKonferentsiiMezhparlamentskogosoyuzaproektarezolyutsii,soderzhashchei
antisovetskoiIantiafganskoinapravlennosti,9September1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.43,D.31,Ll.
3.
171Perechensvedenii,razreshaemykhkotkrytomuopublikovaniu,otnositelnodeistviiogranichennogo
kontingentasovetskikhvoisknaterritoriiDRA(vsootvetsviisPostanovleniemTsKKPSSP206/27.6.85g.),25
June1985(Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.11,D.103,Ll.5.
53
MediacoverageoftheAfghanconflictwastightlycontrolledbySovietleaders,who
wereinterestedincultivatingapositiveimageofthewarintheUSSRandabroad.Soviet
governmentofficialsapprovedvariousrestrictionsandguidancefortheportrayalofevents
inAfghanistan.ThisguidancewasclearlyaimedatshapingtheopinionsoftheSoviet
population.Asnotedabove,retainingtheSovietpeoplessupportforthewarwasimportant
forleaderswhosepoliciesentailedcontinuingfinancialexpendituresandhumansacrifice.
CentralcommitteedocumentsspecifythatSoviettroopsweretobeportrayed
primarilyintheirdailyactivitiesandtrainingalongsidetheirAfghancounterparts;
describingSoviettroopsprovidingmedicalhelptoAfghanswasspecificallymentioned.172
Stories,picturesandothermentionofPDPApartymembersandgovernmentofficials
meetingwithSoviettroopswerealsoencouraged.173Describingthedangerofsurprise
attacksonSovietandAfghanunitsthatwereconductingroutineactivitieswasencouraged
inordertoshowthedestructivenatureoftheoppositionmovement.174Descriptionofthe
heroismandsacrificeofSovietsoldierswasalsotobeemphasized,aswereaward
ceremonies,thoughdiscussionofactualcombatwasdiscouraged.175Sovietpresssources
werealsodirectedtoaccentuatetheconstructivenatureofthepresenceoftheSoviet
troops:depictionsofSoviettroopsbuildingandprotectingeconomicinfrastructurewere
encouraged.176TheSovietgovernmentalsoencouragedstoriesandreportsaboutSoviet
aircraftandothervehiclesdisbursinggoodsandservicestolocalpopulations.177
54
Theserestrictionswereclearlymeanttopreservepositiveimpressionsofthe
situationinAfghanistanamongsttheSovietpeople.Ina1981meetingofthePolitburo,Yuri
AndropovwascarefultoadoptmeasuresdownplayingSovietcombatlosses,advising
againsttoomanymemorialsandmentioningthatnotificationstothefamiliesoffallen
soldiersoughttobebriefandasstandardaspossible.178Sovietleadersallowedonly
limiteddiscussionofthesacrificeofSovietsoldiersinthemedia.Thepresswasauthorized
toreportonlyoneaccountofasoldierwoundedorkilledpermonth.179
Sovietleaderspursuednumerousinitiativesintheareaofinformationwarfare,
aimedatvariousaudiencesthatinfluencedtheoutcomeoftheAfghanconflict.Whilethese
measuresdidnotnecessarilyresultintheoverallsuccessdesiredbytheKremlin,itisclear
thattheSovietswerediligentintheireffortsinpropagandaasapartofcounterinsurgency
strategy.TheseeffortsindicatethattheSovietswerenotrelyingonforcealone,butwere
cognizantoftheneedtowinsupportbymeansofpersuasion.
EconomicInitiatives
ThemajorityofAfghanssimplywantsecurity,peace,andprosperityandwillswingtosupport
thesidethatappearsmostlikelytoprevailandtomeettheseneedsDavidKilcullen180
Thecounterinsurgentsmaingoalistowinoverthecountryspeopleandtheir
beliefinandsupportoftheirgovernment.181Asnotedearlier,thissupportmustbeearned
throughacomprehensiveandcoordinatedeffort,pursuedwithtactandconsiderationfor
thecultureandconditionsofeachpartofthecountry.Counterinsurgencytheoristsoften
178MeetingoftheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSU31June:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.
Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,544.
OxfordUniversityPress,Inc.,66.
181Sepp,K.I.(2005,MayJune).BestPracticesinCounterinsurgency.MilitaryReview,9.
55
dividetheaspectsofcounterinsurgencyintovariouscategories.Economicaidand
developmentisanimportantcategoryinalmosteverytheory.182Initiativesineconomicaid
anddevelopmentrepresentanessentialtoolforwinningsupportforacounterinsurgency,
andsustainingmilitaryandpoliticalgains.Areasthathavebeenclearedofinsurgentsand
areadministeredbythecentralgovernment,butremainimpoverished,arelikelytorevert
backtoinsurgentcontrol.183
Likemostaspectsofcounterinsurgency,economicaidmustbecarriedoutina
thoughtfulandsystematicmannertohavethelastingeffectthatisdesired.Bothshortterm
reliefandlongtermprogramsmusttakeplacetofosterthestabilizationthatisso
importantforthecounterinsurgenttoprovidetothepopulation.184AsDavidKilcullen
writes,economicinitiativescannotbeseparatefrompoliticalgoals:economicassistance
mustbeprovidedinsuchawaythatitmotivatesthepopulationtosupportthegovernment
overtheinsurgency.185Thismeansthateconomicinitiativesmustmeetimmediateneedsas
wellasprovideforfutureprosperity.Aswillbeoutlinedbelow,Sovieteconomicinitiatives
inAfghanistanwereconsiderableandincludedelementsdesignedforaddressingthese
issues.
Sovietleadersunderstoodtheimportanceofsupportingeconomicgrowthin
Afghanistan.ThisisseenindocumentsfromtheCentralCommitteethatnotethe
importanceoftheestablishmentofanormaleconomicsituationinthecountryandof
improvingtheeconomicsituationoftheworkingclassinthecityandinthecountry[and
182Forworksthatdividecounterinsurgencyeffortsintovariouspillarsorareas,see:Kilcullen,D.D.(2006,
September28).ThreePillarsofCounterinsurgency.RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromRemarksdeliveredatU.S.
GovernmentCounterinsurgencyConference:
http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf.Also:McFate,P.J.,&Jackson,A.
(2006,January/February).TheObjectBeyondWar:CounterinsurgencyandtheFourToolsofPolitical
Competition.MilitaryReview,5669.
183SuchsituationsoccurredinAfghanistan.Forexample,itwasreportedinameetingofthePolitburothat
mujahedeencontrolledareasoftenenjoyedabettersupplies(fromPakistan)thangovernmentcontrolledareas
did.ThiskindofsituationclearlymadeitlesslikelythatthepopulationwouldplaceconfidenceintheKabul
government.See:Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,
13November 1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.89.
184Kilcullen,D.D.(2006,September28).ThreePillarsofCounterinsurgency.RetrievedSeptember1,2009,from
RemarksdeliveredatU.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyConference:
http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf,6.
OxfordUniversityPress,Inc.,67.
56
the]balanced,mutuallybeneficialcooperationbetweenthegovernmentandprivate
sector.186Sovietleadersunderstoodtheneedtointegrateeconomicinitiativeswith
politicalconsiderations,theimportanceofwhichisalsonotedbyDavidKilcullen.This
understandingwasclearlyexpressedinSovietgovernmentanalysisevenbeforethe
invasionin1979,whichnotedtheneedtoexaminethequestionsofeconomicaidto
Afghanistan[and]which[kindofaid]wouldbestfacilitatethestrengtheningofthe
politicalpositionsoftherevolutionarydemocraticregime.187Inanattemptatgaining
supportandassuringthepopulationoftheirgoodwillandthebrightprospectsofsiding
withthegovernment,SovietleadersattemptedtodisplaytheprosperityofCentralAsian
republicsasanexampleofsuccessbyreferringtotheachievementsinsocioeconomic
developmentoftheCentralAsianrepublicsovertheyearsofSovietrule.188Theintentions
andunderstandingofSovietleadersregardingtheneedtostimulatetheAfghaneconomy
didnottranslateintosuccessinallcases.Nevertheless,theSovietleadershipmade
substantialeffortstostimulatetheAfghaneconomyinarangeofindustries,focusedon
developinginfrastructure,exploitingnaturalresources,anddevelopingtheskillsofAfghan
cadresinordertomakeuseofincreasedeconomiccapabilities.
Therearemultiplesourcesthatprovideacharacterizationofthelevelsofeconomic
support,eachwiththeirstatisticalqualitiesandcharacteristics.Thedatausedinthispaper
cannotbeconsideredanexhaustiveorintegratedrecordofSovieteconomicaidduringthis
timeperiod,buttheyclearlysupportthepropositionthatboththeintentionandthe
implementationofSovietpoliciesinAfghanistanattemptedtocomplementmilitaryefforts
withnonmilitaryprograms.OneofthesesourcesistherecordofSovietformalagreements
publishedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairs.189Thegeneralproposalsandthespecific
189MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(19811990).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXV
XLIV).Moscow,Russia.
57
projectsindicatethebreadthoftheeconomicandpoliticalgoalsenvisionedbytheSoviet
andAfghangovernments.Graphic1inAppendixIshowstheproposedlevelsofsupportfor
variouscategoriesofeconomicprojects.Formultiyearagreementsandprojects,an
estimatedaverageallocationofproposedfundsisused.However,theactualdisbursements
variedasisseeninotherdatasources.190
OverthecourseoftheSovietAfghanwar,amountsofSovieteconomicassistanceto
Afghanistanwereatlevelsfarabovethosethathadexistedduringthedecadeslong
relationshipbetweenthetwocountries.191Accordingtoonesource,disbursedeconomic
assistancefrom19701974totaled96milliondollars;thisjumpedtoatotalof467million
dollarsfrom19801984.192SeeAppendixI,Graphic2foragraphicalrepresentationofthis
substantialincreaseineconomicaid.ThistrendindicatesadeliberateeffortbytheSoviet
UniontouseeconomicmeasuresintheAfghancounterinsurgencyeffort.
AletterfromthechairmanoftheCouncilofMinistersoftheUSSR,N.I.Ryzhkov,to
theGeneralSecretaryoftheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSU,M.S.Gorbachevprovidesan
additionalsnapshotofSovieteconomicexpendituresinAfghanistan.193Accordingtothis
document,nonmilitaryeconomicexpendituresfromtheUSSRtoAfghanistanincreased
from453millionrublesin1986to1258millionrublesin1987.194Thissourcealsoindicates
thataverageSovietdailyexpenditures(militaryandnonmilitarycombined)inAfghanistan
steadilyincreasedfrom1984to1987,climbingfrom4.3millionrublesin1984to14.7
millionrublesin1987.195Categoriesofthisassistanceincludedaidintendedtostimulate
AfghaneconomicproductivitybyprovidingincreasedpricesonAfghanexportsboughtby
190Bach,Q.V.(2003).SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:theFactsandFigures.Sussex,
England:TheBookGuildLtd.
191AfghanistanreceivedaidfromtheSovietUnionbeginningin1921.Militaryaid,tradeinnaturalresources,
andsupportforinfrastructuredevelopmentcontinuedonupthroughtheSovietAfghanwar:Bach,Q.V.(2003).
SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:theFactsandFigures.Sussex,England:TheBookGuildLtd,83.
192See:Bach,Q.V.(2003).SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:theFactsandFigures.Sussex,England:TheBookGuild
Ltd,136(AppendixV).
193Spravka:OraskhodakhSSSRvAfganistane,8January1988,in:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'
Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,758.
58
theUSSR,suchasgas,woolandothergoods(seeAppendixI,Graphic3foragraphical
representationofthestatisticsfromthisdocument).196
Asdiscussedabove,bothlongandshorttermeconomicinitiativesareimportantin
counterinsurgency.RecentU.S.experienceinIraqhasillustratedtheimportanceoffinding
thisbalancebetweenlargescaleinitiativesandthosedesignedtoinducemoreimmediate
economicstimulation.197Overemphasisoflargescaleprojectscanresultintheneglectof
issuesimportantforinspiringgrassrootssupportforthecounterinsurgent.Inordertowin
thissupport,thecounterinsurgentmustnotonlydeveloptheeconomyathighlevels,but
alsoprovideemploymentopportunitiesandbasicgoodsandservices.Sovietgovernment
officialsunderstoodtheneedtoprovideimmediateandnoticeableimprovementtothe
Afghaneconomy.AnanalysisoftheCentralCommitteementionstheneed,tofocusAfghan
leadersonthedevelopmentofthosebranchesoftheeconomy,whichwouldhelpsolve
socialproblems[and]providefortheemploymentofthepopulation.198Sovietleadership
didfollowthroughonthispointtosomeextent,providinglargeamountsofstaplefoodsand
othergoodstoAfghanistanoverthecourseofthewar.However,asGeneralLiakhovsky
recounts,Soviettroopsthemselvessufferedfromshortagesinsupplies,asmanygoodswere
interceptedintheprovincesenroutetotheirdestinations.199This,ofcourse,made
providingtheAfghanpopulationwithnecessarygoodsproblematic.Nevertheless,General
Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,758.ThiskindofassistancehadbeeninplacesincebeforetheSovietinvasion.
Forexample,SovietdocumentsshowthatinMarch1979thepriceofgassoldbyAfghanistantotheSovietUnion
wasraisedinordertogivetheKabulgovernmentextrafunds.See:Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS17marta
1979goda:ObobostreniiobstanovkivDemokraticheskoiRespublikeAfganistaninashikhvozmozhnykhmerakh,17
March1979,inRGANI,F.89,Op.25,D.1,Ll.5.
197AsillustratedintheexperienceoftheU.S.inIraq,itiseasyforadisconnecttodevelopbetweenthoseinthe
fieldwhoseewhereeconomicaidoughttobeappliedandthosewhodecidewherethataidactuallygoes.Those
fartherawayfromthefieldtendtosupportlargerprojects,whilethoseinthefieldtendtosupportthose
projectswhichproducejobsquicklyforthelocalpopulation.Whilebothkindsofprojectsarenecessary,itis
fruitlesstolimiteffortstolargeeconomicinitiativesthatdonotbenefitlocalcitizensconcretely,thussecuring
theirsupportforthegovernment.GeneralColinPowellisquotedasrepeatingthatthefieldisalwaysright,
meaningthattheinstinctsofthoseonthegroundoughttobeheeded:Mines,K.W.(2006,September28).
EconomicToolsinCounterinsurgencyandPostconflictStabilization:LessonsLearned(andRelearned)inalAnbar,
Iraq,200304.RetrievedSeptember4,2009,fromForeignPolicyResearchInstitute:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060928.military.mines.economictoolscounterinsurgency.html
199Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,757.Alsosee:Bach,Q.V.(2003).
SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:theFactsandFigures.Sussex,England:TheBookGuildLtd,84.
59
LiakhovskynotesthattheSovietmilitarycommandorganizedthedisbursementofbasic
goods,suchasflourandkerosene,whichdidimprovepeopleslivestosomeextent.200
Overall,however,duetostrainedsupplylinesandlimitedcontroloverthecountryside,
initiativestoimproveemploymentorstimulatelocaleconomieswerenotwidespreadin
Afghanistan.ThiswasasignificantweaknessoftheSovieteconomicprogram.
PublishedagreementsbetweentheSovietUnionandAfghanistanduringtheperiod
oftheSovietAfghanwarincludenumerousprogramsandgenerouscreditsaimedat
stimulatingAfghanistanseconomy.ToillustratetheoveralltrendofSovietprograms
throughoutAfghanistan,asamplingofprogramsfromthefollowingcategorieswillbe
discussedbelow:naturalresources,construction,agriculturaldevelopmentandtraining.
TheuseofnaturalresourceswasanimportantcategoryinSovietAfghaneconomic
initiatives.Inanagreementtotalingcoveringtheyears19791984andtotaling270million
rubles,therewereprojectsforconstructionofaminingoperationinAinak,anoilrefinery,
andoilwellsinAngot,AkdaryaandKashkari.201Inanotheragreementsignedin1988,plans
weresettoenhancethenaturalgasindustry,toincludeprojectsforexplorationand
constructionoffacilities.202SeeAppendixI,Graphic4foragraphicalrepresentationoffunds
allocatedtothissectoroftheeconomyduringtheSovietAfghanwar.
Construction,improvementandmaintenanceofinfrastructurewasanaspectof
mostprojectagreements.Forexample,anagreementfortheyears19791984included
constructionandimprovementofanairportintheregionofKabul,andsixotherairportsin
northeastAfghanistan.203Anotheragreementfor19811985includedplansforthe
constructionofthreeprofessionaltechnicalschools.204Inanagreementsignedin1979,
200Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,7567.
201MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1981).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXV).
Moscow,Russia,191195.
202MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1990).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XLIV).Moscow,
Russia,268271.
204MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1983).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXVII).
Moscow,Russia,9394.
60
planswereagreeduponfortheconstructionofseventractormanufacturingfacilities.205
Includedinthissameagreementwereinitiativestopromotetheuseofmodernagricultural
methods.206SeeAppendixI,Graphic5forgraphicalrepresentationofprojectsin
constructionandagriculture.
MostprojectsincludedexchangeandtrainingofAfghanworkers.Sovietspecialists
wereroutinelysenttoAfghanistan,andAfghanworkerswerealsohostedfortraininginthe
USSR.Onetypicalproject,for19801984,includedprovisionsforcreatingfivetrainingsites
inAfghanistan,thehostingof350Afghanworkersperyearforthreemonthtraining
sessionsintheUSSR,andthearrivalof115Sovietspecialiststoworkasinstructorsin
Afghaninstitutions.207ThisaspectofSovieteconomicassistancewasverywidespread
therewerenumerousopportunitiesforAfghanstostudyintheUSSRandmanySoviet
specialistsweresenttoAfghanistanastrainers.208
SovietaidtoAfghanistanseconomyintheformofeconomiccredits,unremunerated
assistanceandtrainingwassubstantialduringtheSovietAfghanwar.Sovietleadershoped
thatstimulatingtheAfghaneconomywouldincreasesupportforthePDPAgovernmentand
decreasesupportfortheAfghanresistance.Despitemanypromisingelementsinthis
componentoftheirprogram,however,thepotentialofeconomicinitiativeswasgreatly
limitedbyotheraspectsofthecounterinsurgencysituationinAfghanistan.Wideranging
programsinruralareaswereunrealisticduetolackofgovernmentinfluencethroughout
thecountry.Centralizeddecisionmakingandpoormechanismsforintegratingciviland
militaryoperationsresultedineconomicprogramsthatwerenotsupportedbymilitary
actions,andviceversa.Nevertheless,itisclearthatSovietleadersunderstoodthe
importanceofeconomictoolsforcounterinsurgencyandworkedatimplementingmeasures
inthisarea.InthelatterstagesoftheSovietincursion,Sovietleaderscametoan
208Manyofthesetrainingopportunitiesarelistedinthispaperssectionsonpropagandaandsocialinitiatives.
61
accommodationbyusingtheU.N.asachannelofdistribution.Thisisevidentinsomeof
thelargemultiyearplanswherehalfoftheallocationswerehandledthroughtheU.N.209
IncreasedallocationsareseenattheendoftheSovietmilitaryinvolvement.Therelation
betweennonmilitaryinitiativesandmilitaryactionsisworthyofmorestudy.Theanalysis
inthispaperindicatesabroadrangeofSovietnonmilitaryandmilitaryefforts.Thelatteris
discussedinthefollowingchapter.
Chapter4.SovietCounterinsurgency:MilitaryAspects
Themilitaryservicementhemselves,whowereinAfghanistan,believedthattheywere
fulfillingthedutyofprotectingthesouthernboundaryoftheirhomelandandthattheywere
actingonbehalfoftheAfghanpeople.Afterall,the40thArmywastaskedwithapeacekeeping
missiontofacilitatethestabilizationofthesituationintheDRA[DemocraticRepublicof
Afghanistan]MajorGeneralLiakhovsky210
Decentralization
ZonesofResponsibility
Conductingasuccessfulcounterinsurgencyrequiresmaintainingabalancebetween
coercionandpersuasion,coordinationbetweenmilitaryandcivilianentitiesandaunified
effortcarriedoutsimultaneouslybycommandersacrossaregion.Itisnecessaryfor
militaryleadershiptounderstandtheeffectofitsactions,whentoshareresponsibilities
withcivilianorhostnationgroupsandhowtoinstillunityofeffortacrosstheentire
undertaking.Manycounterinsurgencyexperts,includingRogerTrinquier,DavidGalulaand
KalevSepp,maintainthatcounterinsurgencycampaignsshouldbemanagedbyone
209MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(1990).SbornikMezhdunarodnykhDogovorovSSSR(Vol.XLIV).Moscow,
Russia,278281.
210Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.Moscow:GPIIskona,617.
62
executive.211Oneexecutiveoverseeingthecounterinsurgencyismeanttofacilitateprogress
withoutconfusion,andtocoordinatealleffortseffectivelysothattheycomplementone
another.Diffuseleadershipgenerallyprecludesorderlyprogressofthissort.Inthecurrent
day,theUnitedStatesmilitarytriestoincorporatethisconceptinitsown
counterinsurgencyoperations.GeneralDavidPetraeusinIraq,andnowGeneralStanley
McChrystalinAfghanistanareexamplesofleadersgivensubstantiallatitudeinmanaging
effortsacrossmilitaryandcivilianagencies.212
OneoftheweaknessesofSovietcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistanwasthelackof
decisiveleadershipandvisionforthecampaign.LeonidBrezhnev,YuriAndropov,
KonstantinChernenko,andMikhailGorbachevwerevariouslytoofeeble,fleetingor
uncommittedtomanagethesituationinAfghanistaneffectively.213Sovietmilitaryleaders,
regardlessoftheirabilitiesorvisionforthecampaign,weretiedtotheseadministrations,as
theyhadtoapproveplansthroughMoscow.214Thisprocesswascumbersome,and,as
AfghanistanveteranGeneralBogdanovnotes,limitedtheindependenceandinitiativeof
thearmycommand.215BogdanovalsowritesthatthecentralizationoftheSovietcommand
structuregaveAfghanleaderstheabilityofcedingtoomuchresponsibilitytotheSovietsfor
failuresandoverallplanning.216Thisstructureandinstitutionalethoswerenotoptimalina
211See:Trinquier,R.(1964).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurity
International,73.Also:Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:Praeger
SecurityInternational,61.Also:Sepp,K.I.(2005,MayJune).BestPracticesinCounterinsurgency.Military
Review,812.
212Thefollowingarticleoutlinesthehighexpectationsplacedonmilitaryleadersandtheextenttowhichthey
answerfortheoverallcounterinsurgencyeffort.InAfghanistan,newlyappointedGen.McChrystalisexpectedto
makesignificantprogress,butalsoaffordedsubstantialresources:Chandrasekaran,R.(2009,August17).
PentagonWorriesLedtoCommandChange.RetrievedAugust20,2009,fromTheWashingtonPost:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/16/AR2009081602304.html
213In1986GorbachevexpressedtheopinionthattheSovietmilitaryinvolvementshouldendinoneyear
maximumtwoyears.ThisshorttimeindicatestheGorbachevwasnotcommittedtoagenuine
counterinsurgencyeffort,andsimplywantedtogetoutquicklyforpoliticalreasons:Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsK
KPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November 1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,
F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.3.
214GeneralBogdanov,GromovandLiakhovskyalldescribetheprocessofapprovingplansthroughthevarious
levelsofSovietleadership.See:Bogdanov,V.AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,934.Also:
Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,2434.Also:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).Tragediai
Doblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,492.
215Bogdanov,V.AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,945.
63
conflictwhereempoweringhostnationforcesandtimelyresponsestolocalsituationsand
werehighlyimportant.
Whilehavingoneleaderinchargeoftheoveralleffortisimportant,
counterinsurgencyexpertssuchasGalula,TrinquierandKilcullenalsonotethatitis
importanttodivideagivenregionintozonesofresponsibility,allowingsubordinateleaders
tomanageeachzoneindependentlyinpromotingthecampaignsoverarchingintent.Both
GalulaandTrinqueirmaintainthatthecommanderofazoneshouldhaveauthorityon
operationsandprogramstherein,evenovermoreseniorofficersinmattersdirectly
regardinghisareaofresponsibility.217Theideaisthatofficersinthedistrictshavethe
perspectiveneededtoproducecounterinsurgencyeffortsthatcorrespondcloselytolocal
conditions.Thisiscrucial,sincetheoverarchingcounterinsurgencystrategymustbe
implementedspeciallyforeachlocale,asinsurgenciestendtobelocalandaremosaic
like.218DavidKilcullenemphasizesthispointinhiswritings,urgingthatcounterinsurgency
isbestconductedlocally,arguingthatonesizedoesnotfitallacrossmanyregions.219This
conceptisespeciallyrelevantinAfghanistanwherediverseethnicitiesandtribesmakeone
regiondecidedlydifferentfromanother.Forexample,initiativesforcooptingSunni
PashtuntribesinKunarprovince,wouldbeillsuitedfortheShiaHazarasofBamyan
province.
TheSovietcommanddidworktoincorporatetheconceptofregionalzonesand
localizedefforts.Inthesummerof1980,promptedbySovietleadership,Afghanistanwas
dividedintoeightmilitarypoliticalzonesofresponsibility.220ArepresentativeofthePDPA
CentralcommitteeandRevolutionaryCouncilwasappointedtoeachzonetooversee
militaryandpoliticalinitiativesinthearea.Theserepresentativesweretaskedwith
65.Trinquier,R.(1961).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurity
International,73.
218Teamey,K.,&Sweet,L.J.(2006,SeptemberOctober).OrganizingIntelligenceforCounterinsurgency.Military
Review,2429.
220Mitrokhin,V.(2002,July).TheKGBinAfghanistan:RussianEdition.RetrievedMay2,2009,fromColdWar
InternationalHistoryProject(CWIHP),www.CWIHP.org,bypermissionoftheWoodrowWilsonInternational
CenterforScholars:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf,69.
64
coordinatingtheactivitiesoftheKhad,Sarandoy221andSovietandAfghanmilitaryunits.222
TheSovietsaugmentedzoneadministrationswiththeirownrepresentativesfromthe
CentralCommitteeoftheCPSU,KGBandSovietarmy.223Afghanistansareawasfurther
dividedintotwentyonesmallerregimezones224,whichweredividedagainintosmaller
components(uchastki).225
Uchastkiincludedaguardpostofabout2025men,aswellasAfghangovernment
representatives.226ThisstructureresemblestheoneusedbytheFrenchinAlgeria,who
dividedthatterritoryintosixwilayas,andsubsectionswithineachwilaya.227Trinqueiruses
thisexampleasanillustrationofeffectivedivisionofareaforcounterinsurgencystrategy.
Oneexampleofthelocalapproachtocounterinsurgencycreatedinconjunctionwithlocal
commandswastheuseofprogovernmentdefensecommitteestoworkatthecity,village,
streetandneighborhoodlevel.228Thesecommitteeswereresponsibleformonitoringthe
appearanceofnewcomersandtrackingthegeneralmoodofthepopulation.229Asnotedby
U.S.forcesinIraq,localselfdefensepersonnelprovidegreatmilitaryvalueandcould
easilypickoutthosewhodidnotbelong.230
221SarandoyistheAfghanpoliceforce.
224TheterminRussianisrezhimnayazona.
International,57.
230Koloski,A.W.,&Kolasheski,J.S.(2009).ThickeningtheLines:SonsofaIraq,ACombatMultiplier.Military
Review,89(1),4153.ItisworthnotingthatthedevelopmentoflocalselfdefenseunitsinIraqcoincidedwitha
troopsurgethatreinforcedmanyofthepositiveresultsoftheprogram.TheSovietforcesinAfghanistandidnot
benefitfromsuchatroopincrease,oneofthereasonstheirsuccesseswerereversed.
65
RoleofJuniorOfficers
Asnotedabove,itisveryimportantthatcounterinsurgencyoperationscorrespond
closelywithpoliticalandmilitaryconditionsatthelocallevel.Thisoftenmeansaffording
lowerlevelofficersincreasedresponsibilityandautonomy.Asistrueinany
counterinsurgency,theimplementationofstrategyrestsontheshouldersofsoldiersand
theirjuniorofficers.RogerTrinquiermadespecialmentionofthispointinhisbookon
counterinsurgency,notingthatguerrillawarfareisawaroflieutenantsandyoung
captains.231
TheSovietarmywasatadisadvantageinthisrespect,becauseitscommand
structurewashighlycentralized.232RobertCassidynotesthatarmieshaveatendencyto
prepareforthelastgoodwar.233IntheSovietcasethistendencycreatedarigidly
conventionalmentalitythatwasprimarilyfocusedonlargeengagementsbasedonthe
experienceofWorldWarII.Acentralizedcommandstructurewaswellsuitedforthelarge
EuropeanbattlesenvisionedbySovietleaders,buttheoutcomewasaninstitutionalculture
thattendedtodiscouragejuniorofficersandNCOsfromtakingtheinitiative.InAfghanistan,
centralizedcommandwasahindrance,becausetheruggedterrainandthenatureofthe
enemydemandedtimelyandindependentdecisionsonthepartofcompanycommanders
andplatoonleaders,aswellastheirNCOs.Juniorleadershadheightenedinfluenceinthe
Afghantheater,asmostmissionswereconductedbybattalionsizedunitsorsmaller,and
theyoftenhaduniqueknowledgeoflocalconditions.234
TheSovietcommanddidmakeadjustmentstodecentralizeitsstructureasit
becameclearthatsuccessfuloperationsrequiredindependentthinkingofficers.
Commandersattheregimentandbattalionlevelweregivenincreasedresponsibilityand
International,74.
International,49.
International,49.
66
autonomyinoperations.Thiscameintheformofaddedfirepowerandassetsassignedto
thebattalionleveltosupportsmallerunitsinawidevarietyofsituations.235Thiswas
referredtoasthereinforcedbattalion.236Also,startinginthefirstfewyearsoftheconflict,
militaryleadersatthezonelevelweregivenincreasingauthoritytoconductoperations
independently.237ThiswasanindicationthattheSovietcommandunderstoodthe
importanceofencouragingautonomousactionatalllevels.
OneaccountofaSovietseniorlieutenantin1982illustratestheimportanceof
juniorleaderstakingtheinitiative.Havingbeenorderedtoconductaflankingmaneuver,
lieutenantZelenskiylostradiocontactwithhiscommandingofficerandsubordinates.At
thispoint,themissionstalledandeventuallyhadtobeaborted.Inthissituation,boththe
seniorlieutenantandhisplatoonleadersneededtoreactindependently.Theconfusion
afterlosingradiocontactillustratesthebroaderthemethatjuniorofficerswere
unaccustomedtofunctioningwithouttheguidanceofofficersabovethem.238Inanother
instance,anofficerinchargeofaconvoyescortiscriticizedforinsufficientpremission
rehearsalsandpreparations;thefacttheofficeriscriticizedforthisdeficiencysuggeststhat
juniorofficersandNCOswerenotsufficientlyreliedupontotakeresponsibilityforsuch
tasks.LesterGraucorrectlypointsoutthatNCOsshouldberesponsibleforsuch
preparations,allowingofficerstofocusonothercriticaltasks.239
Inresponsetosuchissues,Sovietleadersworkedtodeveloptheofficercorpsby
establishingincreasedtrainingopportunitiesforofficersbeforeandduringdeployment.In
Januaryof1981,DefenseMinisterUstinovissuedaplanthatincludedasectionontraining;
thesectionsmainfocuswastheincorporationofcombatexperienceintomilitarytraining
236Bodansky,Y.(19823).TheBearontheChessboard:SovietMilitaryGainsinAfghanistan.WorldAffairs,145
(3),283.
238Grau,L.(1991).TheBearWentOvertheMountain:SovietCombatTacticsinAfghanistan.Washington,DC,
USA:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,17.
67
andthedevelopmentofmountainanddeserttrainingprograms.240In1982,anexpanded
trainingprogramwascreated,focusingondevelopingtheskillsandknowledgenecessary
foreffectiveleadershipinAfghanistansirregularwarconditions.241Officersspentmore
timelearningtocoordinateassetsassignedtotheirunitaveryrelevantskill,sincemore
assetswerebeingallocatedtojuniorofficersinordertofacilitateindependentaction.242On
June2ndof1983directivenumber15/085orderedtheimplementationofmeasuresfor
enhancedtrainingforofficers.243Thiswasinitiallyconductedatmilitaryacademies,but
latermovedtoasitenearTashkent,Uzbekistan.244Officertrainingbattalionsincreasedin
1984and1985,andincludedthestudyofmujahedeentacticsandtrainingforindependent
actions.245Inadditiontothis,officerswentthroughanintensivecourseuponarrivalto
Afghanistanthatfocusedonkeyskillsforplanningandcombat.Thereweretraining
segmentsaimedtohelpofficersdevelopinitiative,independenceandcreativityinmission
planningandexecution.246DevelopingtheNCOcorpswasacknowledgedasimportantas
well,andNCOswereincreasinglyincludedintrainingwithcommissioned
officers.247Integratedtrainingwasimportantforheighteningunitteamwork.248
Inthefinalanalysis,theSovietmilitarywasunabletofullytransitionfromits
centralizedandconventionalmilitaryculture,andcreateanethoseffectiveforAfghanistan.
RobertCassidynotes,however,thatsuchculturalchangeinamilitaryinstitutionoften
240ThisisfoundinadeclassifieddocumentincludedintheappendixofGeneralAlexanderLiakhovskyshistory
oftheAfghanwar:Planmeropriyatiipopovysheniueffektivnostiboevykhdeistviisovetskykhiafganskikh
voiskvDRA,obobshcheniuirasprostraneniuikhboevogoopytaisovershenstvovaniuoruzhiyanayanvar
mart1981goda,8January1981(Secret),accessedin:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.
Moscow:GPIIskona,Appedix3.
UniversityPressofKansas,44.Also:Bogdanov,V.AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,267.
246Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,542.Also:RussianGeneralStaff.
(2002).TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,45.
UniversityPressofKansas,46.Also:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.Moscow:GPIIskona,193.
248IntranslatingdiscussionsbetweenRussianandU.S.generalsataHarvardKennedySchoolconferencein
2008,InotedthattheprinciplesoftrainingNCOsremainsatopicofinterestforRussianmilitaryprofessionals,
asthisareaoftheRussianarmycontinuestoneedimprovement.Russianofficerswereveryinterestedtolearn
abouttheorganizationofthistrainingintheUnitedStatesArmy.
68
occursoverlongperiodsoftime,uptotenyearsmoretimethanthe40thArmyspentin
Afghanistan.249Nevertheless,asIhaveoutlinedabove,Sovietmilitaryleaderspursued
manyeffectivepolicies,attemptingchangestobetterstructuretheirforceforthemissionin
Afghanistan.
LimitingOutsideSupportfortheInsurgency
Itishardtooverstatethesignificanceofoutsidesupportforinsurgencies.Military
andpoliticalcounterinsurgencyinitiatives,nomatterhowwellformulatedorexecuted,can
havelimitedeffectonaninsurgencyifitissustainedbysubstantialsupportfromoutside
sources.BernardFall,RogerTrinquierandothersdiscussthisissueintheirworkson
counterinsurgency.250BothFallandTrinquierasserttheimportanceoflimitingoutside
supportandtheactivetargetingofenemysupplysourcesandsanctuarieswiththeuseof
guerillatactics(evenifthesesupplysourcesandsanctuariesareinothercountries).
OutsidesupportwasacentralissueintheSovietAfghanexperience.Thisisevident
inaletterfromLeonidBrezhnevtoFidelCastrothatOnourendweareforpolitical
normalization,butgenuinenormalization,aimedattheeffectiveandguaranteedcessation
ofaggressionanallformsofinterferenceinthemattersofAfghanistan.251GeneralGromov
writesthatthequestionofpatrollingAfghanistansborderswasthefirstitemofdiscussion
inthemorningmeetingsofthe40thArmysheadquarters.252
Notonlywasoutsidesupportanincendiarygeopoliticalissue,ithadagreateffect
onthemujahedeenforces.Weapons,ammunitionandfightersfromIranandPakistanwere
International,38.
250See:Fall,B.B.(1963).StreetWithoutJoy:InsurgencyinIndochina,194663(3rdRevisedEdition).Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania,USA:TheTelegraphPress,357362.Also:Trinquier,R.(2006).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewof
Counterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,7981.
251VypiskaizprotokolaNo.187zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot10marta1980goda:Onasheidalneishei
vneshnepoliticheskoiliniivsvyazisAfganistanomiobotvetenaobrashchenieF.Kastro,10March1980(Top
Secret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.5,Ll.3(vPrilozheniiI;inAppendixIofthisdocument).
252Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,220.Alsosee:Areporton7April1980for
theCentralCommitteeoftheCPSU,SituationinsideAfghanistanandtheRoleofSovietTroops:Liakhovsky,A.
(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,452454.Also,adocumentoftheCentral
CommitteeofCPSU,OnForeignInterferenceinInternalAffairsoftheDemocraticRepublicofAfghanistan(DRA):
Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,466467.
69
importantlogisticalsupportsfortheAfghanresistance.Thisbecameespeciallytrueafter
theSovietscommencedincreasedaviationstrikesonmujahedeenfriendlyareaswithin
Afghanistan,destroyingmanydomesticbasesofsupport.253Itisalsoimportanttonotethat
theoutsidesupportextendedtothemujahedeenwasconsiderableashighashundredsof
millionsofdollarsperyearcomingfromtheUnitedStates,China,SaudiArabiaandother
wealthynations.254
ManyintheUnitedStatessawthesituationinAfghanistanasanopportunityto
deliveradefeattotheSovietUnion.ThisisconfirmedbyMiltBearden,aCIAofficerin
chargeofasupportprogramforthemujahedeen,whorecountsthatCIAdirectorWilliam
Caseytoldhimtogooverthereandwin.255AfghanwarveteranMajorGeneralLiakhovsky
sawtheoutsidesupportforthemujahedeenasameanspiritedcampaignperpetratedby
thosewithdeephatredforRussia,consideringCIAdirectorWilliamCaseytheincarnationof
thedevil,andnotingpointedlythathiseffortshelpedsupporttheriseofOsamabin
Laden.256
Sovietleadersunderstoodthateliminatingoutsidesupportwouldseverelyweaken
themujahedeen.BernardFallwrites,Aguerrillaforceslogisticalrequirementsmaybe
simplerthanthatofalargeregularforce,butithassomerockbottomneedswhichmustbe
filledthroughoutsidesupport,oritdies.257Accordingly,significanttimeandeffortwas
devotedtocondemningoutsidesupportfortheAfghaninsurgencyandcoaxingforeign
countriestoendtheiractivities.In1980Brezhnevauthorizedthewithdrawalofcertain
unitsfromAfghanistanwiththeexpressedintentofusingthismovetowingreater
253InareporttotheMinisterofDefenseinApril1986,GeneralVarennikovdiscussesincreasingtheaerial
targetingofmujahedeensanctuaries:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:
Eksmo,6489.
254Coll,S.(2004).GhostWars.NewYork:ThePenguinPress,65.
255Bearden,M.,&Risen,J.(2003).TheMainEnemy:TheInsideStoryoftheCIA'sFinalShowdownwiththeKGB.
NewYork,NewYork,USA:RandomHouse,214.
257Fall,B.B.(1963).StreetWithoutJoy:InsurgencyinIndochina,194663(3rdRevisedEdition).Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania,USA:TheTelegraphPress,359.
70
cooperationfromPakistanandIranandtheceasingoftheirsupportforthemujahedeen.258
Thisdidnotbringthedesiredresults.
SealingthebordersofAfghanistanbymilitarymeanswasanexceedinglydifficult
task.RogerTrinquiernotesthatfrontierbordersareatoughissueforthecounterinsurgent;
Afghanistanisaparticularlydifficultcaseduetodifficultterrainandethnicfactors.259When
askedin1979whytheborderwasnotmorecloselycontrolled,PresidentTarakireplied
thatWeareunabletodoitduetotheabsenceofthenecessarymeans.Besidesthis,closing
theAfghanPakistaniborderswouldevokedissatisfactiononthepartofbothAfghanand
PakistaniPashtunsandBaluchis,whichmaintainclosefamilyties,anditwouldultimately
hurttheprestigeofthecurrentgovernmentinAfghanistan.260Thesesameissuescontinued
throughoutthewar.SuppliesandpersonnelenteredAfghanistanthroughdifficultmountain
passes,insmallcaravansofpackanimals,andoveralongborderunrecognizedbytribeson
eitherside.InaPolitburomeetingin1986,GeneralAkhromeevnotedthisissuesayingthat
Sovietsoldiersareworkingtosealtheborder[withPakistan],buttheyareunabletoclose
offallchannels,throughwhichsuppliescomeacross.261Thistaskwassodifficult,andthe
bordersoporous,thatitwasnotedinaPolitburomeetingthatmujahedeencontrolled
areasoftenhadbettersupplies(whichcamefromPakistan)thangovernmentcontrolled
areasthatsupposedlyhadaccesstotheresourcesoftheAfghanstate.262
Trinquierstressestheimportanceofworkingtocombatoutsidesupportthrough
closingborderstoillicittrafficandattackingenemybasesinthefashionofguerilla
fighters.263TheSovietstrategyinAfghanistanfollowedboththesepointsof
258VypiskaisprotokolaNo.200zasedaniyaPolitbyuroTsKKPSSot19iyunya1980goda:Omeropriyatiyakhv
otnosheniiAfganistan,19June1980(TopSecret),inArkhivPrezidentaRF,F.3,Op.82,D.176,Ll.917
(accessedinLiakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,455).
International,79.
International,81.
71
recommendation,indicatingsoundelementsofstrategyonthepartofSovietleaders.Soviet
leaderswerediscussingthisissuefromthebeginningoftheoccupation.InAprilof1980a
reporttotheCPSUmentionedtheneedforSovietandAfghanforcestocontrolAfghanistans
borderstoprotectthecountryfromoutsidethreats.264VasiliyMitrokhinnotesthatKGB
leadersinsistedonthecompletesealingoftheborderswithPakistan,Iran,China.265To
thisend,fivethousandadditionalforceswereemplacedonpatrolduty,carryingout
ambushesandotherwiseinterceptingmujahedeencaravans.266InMayof1980,additional
bordertroopswereemplacedinthekeyareasborderingPakistanandChina;thesetroops
weresuccessfulinsecuringafourhundredkilometerstretchoftheborder,closingoff
sixteenpassesandroutesintoAfghanistan.267In1981,Andropovauthorizedintensification
ofeffortsagainstenemycaravans.Fiveadditionalbordertroopbrigadeswereassignedasa
secondlineofinterceptagainstthemujahedeenin1981bytheorderofDefenseMinister
Ustinov.268Theseforces,aswellasKGBspecialunits,setambushesandminedpathsused
bytheenemy.269ThesemeasuresweresubstantialenoughtopromptBabrakKarmaltosay
that,Now,thatinthenameofsavingtheAfghanrevolutiontheSovietUnionhastakensuch
aseriousstep,thefatesofournationshaveindeedmergedtogether.270
264Areporton7April1980fortheCentralCommitteeoftheCPSU,SituationinsideAfghanistanandtheRoleof
SovietTroops:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,452454.
268ThisisfoundinadeclassifieddocumentincludedintheappendixofAlexanderLiakhovskyshistoryofthe
Afghanwar:Planmeropriyatiipopovysheniueffektivnostiboevykhdeistviisovetskykhiafganskikhvoiskv
DRA,obobshcheniuirasprostraneniuikhboevogoopytaisovershenstvovaniuoruzhiyanayanvarmart1981
goda,8January1981(Secret),accessedin:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.Moscow:GPI
Iskona,Appedix3.
72
EffortstoclosethebordersofAfghanistanandlimitsupportfortheAfghan
resistancecontinuedforthedurationoftheconflict.OperationCurtainbeganin1984,and
consistedofincreasedpatrollingandambushingofmujahedeencaravans.271Thiseffort,in
revampedform,wasrenamedBarrierin1987.272SpecialforcesandKGBspecialunitswere
increasinglyusedforthesetasks.273GeneralGromovnotesthatin1985twospetsnaz
brigadeswereassignedtoreinforcetheefforttocloseofftheborderwithPakistan.274
Teamsofhelicopterswerealsousedtopatrolfromtheair,andwouldlandwithsearch
crewstoinspectcaravans.275Trinquierspointthatwiththemethodsofmodernwarfare,
wemustcarrythewartotheenemyisechoedbyBernardFall,whoassertsthatinfiltrating
enemysanctuariesisnecessaryforundercuttinganinsurgency.276TheSovietsactively
pursuedthisapproachaswell,cultivatingagentnetworksandconductingspecial
operationsinPakistan.277
Sovieteffortstoclosetheborderandlimitinsurgentsupplyprocessesdidbring
somesuccess.AlexanderLiakhovskynotesthatinmanyregionsin1985themujahedeen
weredeprivedoflargesupplybasesmilitarysupplies,provisions,[and]medical
equipment.278Shortagesinsupplyweresointenseattimesthatmujahedeenleadership
organizedspecialunitsspecificallyformaneuveringcaravanspastSoviettroopsandinto
Afghanistan.279DespiteallthemeasuresundertakenbytheSovietsandtheirmomentsof
273MajorGeneralLuchinskysaccountofthisoperationmentionsthisincreaseduseofspecializedunits.See:
275RussianGeneralStaff(translatedandeditedbyLesterW.GrauandMichaelA.Gress).(2002).TheSoviet
AfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,218219.Also:Everett
Heath,J.(1992).HelicoptersinCombat.NewYork,NewYork,USA:ArmsandArmourPress,130.
International,81.Also:Fall,B.B.(1963).StreetWithoutJoy:InsurgencyinIndochina,194663(3rdRevised
Edition).Harrisburg,Pennsylvania,USA:TheTelegraphPress,357.
277ManysuchoperationsdirectedatPakistanandothercountriesareoutlinedinthefollowingdocument:
Mitrokhin,V.(2004,April).KGBActiveMeasuresinSouthwestAsiain198082.RetrievedMay24,2009,from
ColdWarInternationalHistoryProject(CWIHP),www.CWIHP.org,bypermissionoftheWoodrowWilson
InternationalCenterforScholars(documentisintranslation).:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=3FF29963
ABFA30E0
344EE1596C121EDF&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true
279Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,205
73
efficacy,Afghanistansborderswerestillcrossedbymujahedeenreinforcementsand
suppliesthroughouttheconflict.280TheenduringsanctuariesinPakistanandinfluxof
supportweremajorreasonsthemujahedeenwereabletowithstandtheSovietarmy,and
persistinspiteofmilitarydefeats.TheSovietstrategyregardingthebordersand
mujahedeencaravansclearlyshows,however,thatsubstantialattemptsweremadeto
addressthisproblem.TheSovietcommandsimplydidnothaveenoughtroopstocomplete
thetask.
MonitoringthePopulation
Whetheroneapproachescounterinsurgencyfromthepopulationcentricorenemy
centricapproach,orsomewhereinbetween,monitoringthepopulationremainsavital
elementinthecounterinsurgencyeffort.Monitoringandcontrollingthepopulationhelps
thecounterinsurgentlimitcontactsbetweentheinsurgentandthepopulation.Ifthe
counterinsurgentissuccessfulinlimitingthesecontacts,thisbecomesasignificantblowto
theinsurgentssupportsystem.281Monitoringthepopulationisalsoavitalelementin
intelligencegathering;inthecontextofcounterinsurgency,understandingthemoodofthe
populationisoftenasimportantasaccessingmoreclassifiedinformationaboutthe
enemy.282RogerTrinquiermaintainsthatestablishingstrictcurfews,issuingcensuscards
andconductingbroadrangingsearchesandinterrogationsarenecessaryforcontrollingthe
280GeneralAkhromeevmakesthispointinthefollowingdocument,expressingthatevenlargenumbersof
Soviettroopsareunabletosealallchannelsacrosswhichsuppliescrosstheborder,implyingthattherewere
justtoomanyroutes:Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:Odalneishikhmerakhpo
Afganistanu,13November 1986(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.14,D.41,Ll.8.
281DavidGalulanotestheimportanceofisolatingthepopulationfromtheinsurgency,placingitinhisStrategy
ofCounterinsurgency.See:Galula,D.(2006).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.London:Praeger
Review,2429.
74
populationandisolatingitfromtheinsurgency.283Sovietforcesimplementedallofthese
measures.
AfghanwarveteranandhistorianMajorGeneralAlexanderLiakhovskynotesthat
allmalesovertheageofthirteenwererequiredtoregisterwiththeSovietauthorities
overseeingthearea;itwasrequiredtocarrydocumentationofthisregistrationatall
times.284Curfewsweremaintained,aswellasamandatoryregistrationprocessforany
visitorsorsuppliesenteringthearea.285GeneralV.A.Bogdanovnotesthatcurfewswere
typicallysetforelevenpmandthattheimplementationofapersonalidentification
documentwascompletelynewforAfghanistan.286ItwasalsonecessaryforAfghancitizens
toreceivespecialpermissiontohostnonfamilymembersintheirhomes.287
Lawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesplayedanimportantroleinmonitoring
thepopulation.KGBtrainedAfghanlawenforcementandsecurityagencieswerebuiltupto
significantnumbers.InameetingofSovietleadersin1986,GeneralAkhromeevmentioned
thattherewere115,000Afghanpolicetroopsand20,000Khadandotheragencyforces.288
Traininglocallawenforcementandparticipatinginpoliceworkisvitaltothe
counterinsurgent,eventhoughitisnottraditionallyaroleplayedbythemilitary.Trinquier
notesthatincounterinsurgencyPoliceactionwillbeactualoperationalwarfare.289
Securityagenciesconductedextensivesearchandinterrogationoperationsinareaswhere
theKabulgovernmentprojecteditsinfluence.290VasiliyMitrokhinnotesthattheseagencies
helpedcreatesometwohundredselfdefenseunitsthatactedinsupportofthegovernment,
International,3841.
International,41.
75
providingagentsandinformation.291Forexample,inthefirstquarterof1983Afghan
governmentagencieswereusingeighthundredagentsthathadinfiltratedinsurgent
groups.292Theirinformationdirectedgovernmentforcesin140airstrikesand360local
attacks.293Theseforcesalsoconductedmanysearchoperationstolocateanddestroy
insurgentorganizations.
WhiletheSovietshadasoundstrategyinthisareainmanyrespects,theydidnot
projectinfluenceintoenoughofthecountrytoseethebenefitsofthesemeasures.Lackof
troops,poorinfrastructureandAfghanistansruralsocietymadeitverydifficultto
sufficientlycontrolthepeacefulAfghanpopulationandisolatethemfromthe
mujahedeen.294
OneofthereasonsthatSovietshaddifficultyprojectingtheirinfluencethroughout
thecountrywasthattheirforcesweretoofewandspreadtoothinly.Sovietforceswere
oftenspreadoutinsmallremoteoutposts,havingasmanyas862guardedobjectives
mannedbysome20,200troops.295Inordertoaddressthisproblem,theSovietcommand
triedtoconsolidateforcesandeffortsinspecificareas,asitwasclearthatrelativelylow
trooplevelsprecludedeffectivecontroloftheentirecountry.296Sovietleadersstartedwith
morepeacefulregionsinnorthernAfghanistan,establishinggoodsurveillanceofthe
294Trinquiernotesthatinsurgentsaretypicallymostvulnerableintowns,anddifficulttocounteractinmore
ruralareas.Afghanistan,beingmostlyrural,wasadifficultplacetowageacounterinsurgency:Trinquier,R.
(2006).ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency.London:PraegerSecurityInternational,60.Also,
thefollowingarticleaboutcurrentmissionsinAfghanistanillustratestherolethatpoorinfrastructureplaysin
complicatingeffortstoprojectinfluencethroughoutthecountry:Dreazen,Y.J.(2009,March4).U.S.Strategy
HingesonFarFlungOutposts.RetrievedMarch5,2009,fromTheWallStreetJournal:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html
295Bogdanov,V.AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,98.Also,foraninterestingdescriptionof
conditionsinU.S.outpostsinAfghanistan,see:Chivers,C.(2008,November9).G.I'sinRemoteOutpostsHave
WearyJob,DrawingFire.RetrievedAugust7,2009,fromTheNewYorkTimes:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10outpost.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
76
population,localselfdefensewatchgroups,andpromotingeconomicandsocial
initiatives.297Itwasenvisionedthatsustainedsuccessintheseregionswouldspread
incrementallythroughthecountry.298Theattemptatconsolidatingalignsexactlywiththe
recommendationsofclassicalandmoderncounterinsurgencytheorists.Startingeffortsin
themorepeacefulareasfollowstheparadigmoftheinkblot,atermusedbyMarshal
HubertLyauteyasametaphorfortheslowspreadofthecounterinsurgentsinfluence
throughoutaregion.TheSovietsstrategyinthisrespectalsodovetailswithDavid
Kilcullensrecommendationthatthecounterinsurgentstartfromsecureareasandwork
slowlyoutwards.299DavidGalulaalsopromotesthismethodofincrementallyspreading
controloverthecountryaswell,notingthatOrderhavingbeenreestablishedinthearea,
theprocessmayberepeatedelsewhere.300InmoderndayAfghanistan,U.SandNATO
forcesareencounteringissuessimilartothosethatfacedtheSoviets:therearenotenough
troopstoprovideadequatesecurityovertheentirecountry.Counterinsurgencyexpertsare
advocatingconsolidationofeffortsinkeyareasinsimilarfashiontotheSovietstrategy
describedabove.301InareportonAfghanistanfromJune2009,expertsrecommendedthat
themilitaryfocusavailableforceswherethefewestnumberofgovernmentandcoalition
troopscanprotectthegreatestnumberofAfghans.Thiswillrequirethecoalitiontodepart
someareasitcurrentlyoccupies.302
Asoutlinedabove,Sovietforcesdidadoptsoundstrategyaimedatcontrollingthe
populationandconcentratingtheirresourcesondefinedareas.TheSoviets,however,were
unabletoimplementthesemeasureseffectivelyorbroadlyenoughtoseeoverallsuccess.
56.
301Forinterestingoverviewofcurrentstrategyregardingoutposts,andtheperspectivesofvariousexperts,see:
Dreazen,Y.J.(2009,March4).U.S.StrategyHingesonFarFlungOutposts.RetrievedMarch5,2009,fromThe
WallStreetJournal:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html
302Exum,A.M.,Fick,N.C.,Humayun,A.A.,&Kilcullen,D.J.(June2009).Triage:TheNextTwelveMonthsin
AfghanistanandPakistan.CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,16.
77
UnitsandTraining
AsitbecameincreasinglyapparentthattheSovietarmywasillsuitedtotheconditions
inAfghanistan,theSovietcommandworkedtorestructuretheforcetobemoreeffective.
Oneareaofadjustmentsinvolvedchangestounitsandtraining.EarlyonintheSoviet
occupationitbecameclearthatmotorizedrifleunitsofconscriptsoldierswerenotwell
suitedtothetoughguerillafightingandinfantrytasksnecessarytoengageanddestroythe
mujahedeenindifficultterrain.303TheSovietmilitarysufferednotonlyfromanoveralllack
oftroopsinAfghanistan,butalsofromalackofqualifiedtroops.Overall,itbecameclear
thatmobile,highlytrained,andfittroopswereneededtocarryoutthedifficultmissions
requiredinAfghanistan.Asaresult,theSovietcommandexpandedtheuseofeliteunits,re
orientedthemissionanduseofmotorizedrifletroops,andchangedmilitarytrainingto
betterpreparesoldiersfordutyinAfghanistan.Whiletheseadjustmentswerewellthought
out,institutionwidechangewasdifficulttoachieve.
TheSovietcommandsshifttowardstheuseofeliteunitsalignswithclassical
counterinsurgencytheory.DavidGalula,whoisoftencitedregardingtheneedtowinover
thesupportofthepopulation,didnotexcludetheuseofmilitaryforce.Headvocatesthe
needforeliteunitsthatarehighlymobileandlightlyarmed.304Thesemobileunits,
accordingtoGalula,shouldbeusedtoengagetheenemy,whileotherstaticunitsshould
providesecurityforkeyinfrastructureandpopulationcenters.RogerTrinquierpromotesa
similarconceptofintervaltroopsandinterventiontroops,mobileunitsthataretasked
withengagingtheenemyandoperatingfreelythroughoutaregion;intervaltroops
303TheRussianGeneralStaffnotesthatdespitethelackoftrainingdoctrineforaconflictliketheonein
Afghanistan,itwasclearearlyontraininghadtoberestructured:RussianGeneralStaff(translatedandedited
byLesterW.GrauandMichaelA.Gress).(2002).TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.
Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,43.
65.
78
functionedinlargerunitsandinamoredefinedareathantheinterventiontroops.305Soviet
airbornetroopsweresimilarinconcepttoTrinquiersintervaltroops,whiletheSoviet
specialforces(spetsnaz)correspondedlooselytointerventionunits.
SoviettrooplevelswerelowforthemissioninAfghanistan;thiswasmostfeltwhen
tryingtoholdterritoryalreadyclearedinlargeoperations.Trinquierdesignatedthistask
forwhathecallsgridtroops.SovietforcesorAfghangovernmentunitswereoftentoofew
toeffectivelymaintainsecurityafterthebulkofSovietforcesleft.Forthisreason,tactical
successeswereoftenreversedbecauseinsufficientresourceswereexpendedonsecuring
gains.306
Sovietmilitaryleaderslearnedearlyin1980thatthesituationinAfghanistanwould
requiremoreeffortthaninitiallyanticipated.GeneralGromovwritesthatSovietcasualties
inJanuaryof1980wereasharpremindertotheSovietCommandthatitwouldbe
necessarytoviewthesituationinAfghanistanasnothinglessthanawar.307Thetypesof
unitsemployedinAfghanistanwereshiftedaccordingly.
Sovietleadersquicklylearnedthatheavyequipmentandtankswerenoteffective
againsttheAfghaninsurgency.TheSovietcommandthereforerelegatedmanyheavyarmor
unitstostaticsecurityandfiresupportunits;lighterarmoredvehicleswereusedto
accompanyandtransportinfantryneartotheirmissionobjectives.308In1980,manytank
unitswerebeingsentbacktotheUSSRandreplacedbylightertroops,reducingtheir
numbersbyoverhalf.309Forexample,inJuly1980,twotankregimentsandanantiaircraft
brigadeweresentbacktotheUSSR.310TheSovietcommandreplacedmanyofthereserve
International,63.
306GeneralGromovmentionsthispatterninhismemoir,notingthatevenproSovietprovincialleadershadlittle
abilityormotivationtobeproactiveinpoliticalworkinthecountryside:Gromov,B.(1994).Ogrannychenyi
Kontingent.Moscow:Progress,128.Also,theoperationsinNangarharprovincebyToraBorain1981arean
illustrationofthispattern.Fordetaileddescriptionandaccountsseethefollowing:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).
TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,504.
309309Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,540.Also:Blank,S.J.(1991).
OperationalandStrategicLessonsoftheWarinAfghanistan,197990.StrategicStudiesInstituteU.S.ArmyWar
College,73.
79
troopsthathadbeenmobilizedfortheinvasion.GeneralGromovrecountsthatin1980
manyunitswerefilledwithasmuchas80%reservists,whichmadeconductingchallenging
combatmissionsverydifficult.311Sovietleadersquicklybegantofilltheranksofthe
LimitedContingentwithspecialistsandfulltimesoldiersinanefforttopositiontheLimited
ContingentforamoresubstantialandactiveroleinAfghanistan.312
Despitelimitedresourcesandinitialmiscalculations,theSovietCommanddidcometoa
goodunderstandingoftheunitsnecessaryforthetasksathandinAfghanistan.AsIwill
outlineinthissection,mobileunitswereexpandedandtrainedforthespecificsof
Afghanistansconflict.Forexample,MajorGeneralLuchinskyrecallsthatthedifficulttaskof
interceptingandambushingmujahedeencaravanscomingfromPakistancametobe
conductedalmostsolelybyspetnazandotherspecializedforces.313Inanofficialletter
describingthesituationinAfghanistan,GeneralVarennikovmentionstheneedfor
specializedquickreactionforcestorespondtosituationsaroundthecountry.314Suchunits
wereincreasinglyusedforchallengingmissionsagainstthemujahedeen.Thisshiftaligned
withtheprinciplesofcounterinsurgencytheoryoutlinedabove.
Witheachpassingyearairborneandairassaulttroopswereincreasinglyusedin
Afghanistan.315ParachutejumpswerenotconductedinAfghanistansmountainousterrain,
butinsertionbyhelicopterwasnecessaryformanyofthetacticsemployedbytheSoviets.
Extremeterrainoftenmadeairlandingstheonlywaytoemplacetroopsswiftlyenoughto
blockandinterceptmujahedeenforces.Airbornetroopswerenottheonlytroopsthatwere
airlanded;motorizedrifletroopswerealsousedinthismanner.Theincreaseduseof
airbornetroopshadmoretodowiththeirleveloftrainingandmentalitythanparachuting
capabilities.TheSovietarmyhadsignificantlydevelopedtrainingandselectionforairborne
313ThemissiondescribedhereconcernsthezoneZavesaorCurtain,whichwasformulatedin1984andwas
aimedatsealingtheborderwithPakistan.ForLuchinskysfullremarkssee:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).Tragediai
Doblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,521.
314NekotoryeitogiboevykhdeistviivprovintsiyakhKunduziTakharvavguste1988g.,1September1988
(Secret),inArkhivgeneralaarmiiV.I.Varennikova(accessedin:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'
Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,728).
80
unitssinceWorldWarII,andasaresultthequalityofsoldierwasmuchhigherinthese
unitsthaninothers.SovietairborneunitswereakintoUnitedStatesArmyRangerunitsin
termsoftrainingandmindset.Airborneunitschosefromtopqualityconscriptswhen
augmentingtheirunits.GeneralGromovnotesthatairbornetroopswentthrough
specializedandveryrigoroustraining.316Thecontrastbetweenairbornesoldiersandthose
ofotherunitswasverynoticeable.OneSovietconscriptrecountsthat:
Alandingassaultbrigadediffersfromamotorizedrifleregimentinthatithasmorepeople
whoalsohavebettertrainingandmorespecialization.Theirassignmentsaremoreserious
andstrictthanfortheregularunits.Manyofthesefellowsweregoodathletesandsomeeven
knewkarate.317
TheSovietcommandincreasinglyreliedonthesetoughertroopstoconductcombat
operationsinAfghanistan.MissionsinAfghanistanwereexceedinglydifficult.Soldiershad
tocarry3040kilogramsofweight,andmissionsoftenlastedforseveraldays.318Soldiers
wouldtypicallylose710kilogramsofbodyweightafteraweekinthefield,andafterlonger
missionswouldrequiremedicalhelp.319Theseconditionsmadeitverydifficultforaverage
conscriptstoremaincombateffectiveinthefield.
ThisshiftinstrategyandthecontrastbetweenthetroopswasevidenttoAfghan
insurgentforcesaswell.APakistaniofficer,whospenttimeinAfghanistanwiththe
mujahedeennotesthat,Theparatroop(airassault)unitsfoughtmuchmoreaggressively.
InthemonthsfollowingmyarrivaltheSovietscommittedmoreSpecialOperationsForces
totheconflict.InoticedtherewasahighproportionofparatroopsintheSovietorderof
battle,indicatingthattheseunitswouldplayakeyroleinoffensivesweeps.Thiswas
invariablythecase.320
SovietleadersalsoreliedheavilyonspetsnazandKGBspecialunitsformissions
againstthemujahedeen.Thesetroops,evenmorethanairborne,weretrainedtoengage
Afghaninsurgentsontheirownterms.GeneralGromovwritesthattheofficersandsoldiers
317Alexiev,A.(1988).InsidetheSovietArmyinAfghanistan.RAND.SantaMonica:RANDCorporation,29.
320Yousaf,B.M.,&Adkin,M.M.(1992).TheBearTrap:Afghanistan'sUntoldStory.London:LeoCooper,56.
81
oftheseunitshadfantasticmilitaryandphysicaltraining,andworkedtoreceivegood
intelligencethroughestablishingtieswiththelocalpopulation.321KGBunits,suchasGrom
(literallytrans.:thunder)andZenit(literallytrans.:zenith)provedthemselvesduring
operationsinKabulatthestartoftheinvasionin1979.In1980,Andropovapprovedthe
expansionofsuchunitstoonethousandpeople.322Atthistime,twoadditionalunits
KaskadandOmegawereestablished.323InJuly1981thePolitburoapprovedthe
creationofyetanothersuchspecializedgroupVimpeltoaugmentSovietSpecialForces.
Theseunitsmaintainedveryrigorousselectionprocesses;SovietSpecialForcestroops
werenotonlyphysicallyandtacticallysuperiortoregularforces,butwereoftentrainedin
foreignlanguagesandcultures.324Thecapabilitiesoftheseunitsaresimilartothoseof
FrenchSASunits,whichwereassignedexpertsinArabiclanguageandculture,andnotedas
beingsuccessfulincounterinsurgencyinAlgeriaforthisreason.325
Sovietspecialunitsparticipatedinmanyoffensiveandintelligenceoperations,even
creatinggroupsofAfghanfighterswhoposedasmujahedeen.326VasiliyMitrokhinreports
thattherewereeightysixsuchgroupsbyJanuaryof1983.327Similargroupshadsuccessin
othercounterinsurgencies.GeneralCrook,whofoughtintheAmericanIndianwarsofthe
19thcentury,isknowntohaveplantedteamsoffriendlyApachesintohostileareasinorder
tofomentconfusionandconflict.328TheSelousScoutsofRhodesiawereanotherindigenous
outfitusedincounterinsurgencywithgreatsuccess:theywerecreditedwithmorethantwo
International,160.
326Mitrokhin,V.(2002,February).TheKGBinAfghanistanGeographicalVolume1(translationfromThe
MitrohkinArchive).RetrievedMarch12,2009,fromColdWarInternationalHistoryProject:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78
CB018B7A
D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true
.Also:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,530.
CB018B7A
International,159.
82
thirdsofinsurgentcasualtieswithinRhodesia.329Concreteinformationregardingparticular
actionsofspecializedAfghanunitsisscarce,buttheconceptofemployingsuchforcesisone
thathashistoricallybeenbeneficialtothecounterinsurgent.
TheSovietcommandworkedhardtoimprovetrainingbothforeliteandforregular
troops.Atthetimeoftheinvasion,evenspetsnazforceshadverylittlespecializedmountain
trainingorequipment.Thiswasobviouslyasignificantdisadvantageforanarmywaging
counterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.330GeneralGromovwritesthattheskillspreviously
taughtformountainwarfarewereineffectiveinAfghanistan,andclearlyofuseonlyin
Europeanareas.331DirectiveNo.D314/3/00655oftheGeneralStafforderedthecreation
ofspecialmountainwarfarebattalions.332Inaddition,programsinmountainandconvoy
operationswereinstitutedin1980forcadetsandcurrentmotorizedrifletroops.These
programswererunbytrainerschosenbecauseoftheircombatexperiencein
Afghanistan.333TrainingsiteswereestablishedinCentralAsianareasnearTermez,
Ashkabad,AlmatyandFergana,sinceconditionsintheseareaswereclosertoactual
conditionsinAfghanistanthansitesdeeperwithinRussia.
In1981,DefenseMinisterUstinovformallydirectedSoviettroopstoenhance
trainingprogramsbasedoncombatexperienceinAfghanistan,andtopleaderswere
scheduledtovisitAfghanistaninordertobetterunderstandtherelevantconditionsand
issues.334TheSovietmilitarycommunityincreasinglystudiedtacticsforirregularwarfare
andmountainanddesertconditions.TheappearanceofarticlesonsuchtopicsinSoviet
International,159160.
330GeneralGromovnotesthatlackofpreparednessformountainwarfarewasarecurringthemeintheSoviet
Army:Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,126.
333Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,541
334ThisisfoundinadeclassifieddocumentincludedintheappendixofAlexanderLiakhovskyshistoryofthe
Afghanwar:Planmeropriyatiipopovysheniueffektivnostiboevykhdeistviisovetskykhiafganskikhvoiskv
DRA,obobshcheniuirasprostraneniuikhboevogoopytaisovershenstvovaniuoruzhiyanayanvarmart1981
goda,8January1981(Secret),accessedin:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.Moscow:GPI
Iskona,Appedix3.
83
militaryjournalsreflectedthisshiftinfocus.335InOctoberof1985specializedofficer
trainingwasimplementedspecificallytoprepareofficersforAfghanistan.Thetraining
includedclassesonAfghanpoliticalandculturalaspects,mountainwarfareand
autonomousandindependentaction.336
Startingin1984,basictrainingforrecruitswassubstantiallyimprovedand
lengthened(in1984itwaslengthenedtothreemonths,in1985itwaslengthenedtofive
months).337TrainingincorporatedmoreandmoreconcretetasksnecessaryinAfghanistan,
suchasnightmissionsandmountainactionsonesourcenotesthat40%oftrainingtime
wasconductedinamountainenvironment.338Soldiersweretrainedintacticslikebounding
overwatchandencirclingmovements.339Trainingincludedchallengingfieldexercisesand
specialemphasisonkeyspecialties,suchassniperskillsandtheuseoftheAGS17(an
automaticgrenadelauncher).340
Notonlydidnewlydevelopedtrainingprogramsstressthetacticsofirregular
warfareandtheneedforcreativeandindependentsolutionstocombatchallenges,they
addressedtheacceptanceofreasonablerisk.341Acceptingriskisakeyaspectof
counterinsurgencysuccess,aswillingnesstoacceptriskoftentranslatesintogreater
securityinthelongrun.Forexample,Sovietmotorizedtroopsthatinstinctivelystayedclose
toroadboundarmoredvehiclesactuallybecamemorevulnerabletargets.Acceptingriskby
relyinglessonlargefortificationsorarmorunitsactuallymeantgreateroverallsafety.
Manycounterinsurgencyexpertsmakethispoint,whichisjustasrelevanttodayasitwas
fortheSoviets.DavidKilcullensummarizestheconceptwellinthefollowingexcerpt:
335HereisasamplingofsucharticlesthatappearedaroundthetimetheSovietcommandwasbeginningto
adjustforacounterinsurgency:Vertoletchiki.(1982).SovetskoeVoennoyeObozrenie(8),13.Also:Riazanov,L.
(1983).TakticheskieUchenievGorakh.SovetskoeVoennoeObozrenie(9),1821.Also:Shevchenko,N.(1982).
TekhnicheskoyObespechenieObkhodiashchegoOtriada.SovetskoeVoennoeObozrenie(9),3739.Also:
Sidorenko,R.,&Moskalev,V.(1983).PoGornomuVariantu.SovetskoeVoennoeObozrenie(1),2224.Also:
Vorobyev,I.(1983).SovremennyiBoj:VoprosyiOtvety'Kogdavboevomporiadkesozdaetsyaobkhodiashchii
otriad?SovetskoeVoennoeObozrenie(5),21.
84
Movementonfoot,sleepinginlocalvillages,nightpatrolling:alltheseseemmoredangerous
thantheyare.Theyestablishlinkswiththelocals,whoseeyouasrealpeoplenotasaliens
whodescendfromanarmoredbox.Drivingaroundinanarmoredconvoyanddaytripping
likeatouristinhelldegradessituationalawareness,makesyouatargetandisultimately
moredangerous.342
Thisconceptisoftenhardtopromoteinlargearmies,however,astheytendtobemore
reluctantintakingrisksinthecontextofcounterinsurgencythaninfamiliarconventional
combat.343
TheburdenontheSovietmilitarystrainingsystemwasconsiderable.Eachyear
40,000to50,000soldiershadtoreceivebasictraininginordertomaintaintrooplevels.344
Inadditiontocasualties,therewassignificantturnoverinpersonnel,assoldiersandNCOs
hadlimitedservicerequirements;aftertimeintraining,theircombattourslastedeighteen
totwentyonemonths.345NotonlywasthisasignificantstrainontheSoviettrainingsystem,
itmeantthatSovietsoldierswereconsistentlylessexperiencedthantheiropponents,since
Sovietcombatveteranswereroutinelyreplacedbyinexperiencedrecruits.Afghan
resistancefighters,ofcourse,didnotrotateoutandbecameincreasinglyexperiencedin
fightingtheSoviets.346
Inthefaceofthesechallenges,however,theSovietcommandpursuedvery
promisingideasintermsofunitorganizationandtraining.Theinitiativesoutlinedabove
indicatethatSovietleadersunderstoodthekindsofunitsandtrainingnecessaryforsuccess
inAfghanistan.Limitedtroopsandinstitutionalinertia,amongotherfactors,prevented
thesechangesfromhavingthebroadeffectstheSovietcommanddesired.
343Foust,J.(2009,March27).Pakistan:NoworNever?RetrievedJuly1,2009,fromREUTERS:
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/03/27/guestcontributionafghanistansgarrisons/
344RussianGeneralStaff(translatedandeditedbyLesterW.GrauandMichaelA.Gress).(2002).TheSoviet
AfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,44.
346ThiscontinuestobeachallengeinthecurrentdayforU.S.andNATOtroopsinAfghanistan.Inarecent
interview,AdmiralMullennotedthatAfghanfighterswereshowingalevelofsophisticationthathasimproved
eachyear:Bender,B.(2009,August26).TopOfficerOffersaDireAssessmentonAfghanistan.RetrievedAugust
26,2009,fromBoston.com:TheBostonGlobe:
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/08/26/top_officer_offers_a_dire_assessment
_on_afghanistan/
85
Intelligence
Withoutgoodintelligence,acounterinsurgentislikeablindboxerwastingenergyflailingat
anunseenopponent.347
Sovietintelligenceactivityandeffortswereatsubstantiallyhighlevelsduringthe
Afghanconflict.OverthecourseofthedecadeslongSovietAfghanrelationship,intelligence
servicesregularlyworkedwithAfghanpoliticiansandsecurityorganstomonitorand
influencethesituation.Inthissense,theSovietswereaheadinthecounterinsurgencyeffort,
alreadyhavingintelligencepersonnelinthecountry.Monthsbeforetheinvasion,KGB
presencewasincreasedinAfghanistanandaspecialinformationandanalysisgroupwas
formed.348InMarchof1979thePolitburopassedaresolutiontosendevenmoreadvisorsto
variousdepartmentsoftheAfghangovernment.349Asnotedinanearliersection,theability
tomonitorandunderstandaninsurgencyisthefirststeptocombatit.Whilemechanisms
forintelligencewerenotperfect,theSovietsputconsiderableenergyintothisarea.
Sovietleadersmadedistincteffortsatmanagingthemanyworkingpartsofthe
counterinsurgencycampaignandtheintelligencecomponentinparticular.
Counterinsurgencyexpertsgenerallyagreethatthiscoordinationinintelligencegathering
isveryimportant.Inthecounterinsurgencycontext,muchinformationisgatheredby
combatunitsinthecourseoftheirotheroperationsandpassedtomultipledestinations.350
Thediffusionanddisconnectednessofseparatedataflowsmakesitdifficulttoorganize,
347Eliot,C.,Crane,L.C.,Horvath,L.J.,&Nagl,L.J.(2006,MarchApril).Principles,Imperatives,andParadoxesof
Counterinsurgency.MilitaryReview,4953.
Review,2429.
86
analyzeandtransformrawintelligenceintousefulinformation.Itrequiresadequate
coordinationbetweenagenciesandpersonnel.Sovietintelligenceunderstoodthisaspectof
thecounterinsurgency.In1981,Sovietleadersestablishedaspecialcommitteeresponsible
forcoordinatingintelligencerelatedentities,activities,andinformation.351GeneralGromov
notesthatthe40thArmyscommandestablishedthepracticeofdailymeetingsof
intelligencepersonnelfromthevariousagenciesinordertosortandanalyzeinformation
together.352Suchcooperationwascrucialformakinggooduseofintelligenceandapplying
ittothecounterinsurgencyeffort.
Counterinsurgencyexpertsuniformlyadvisethatthecreationofhostnation
intelligenceandlawenforcementagenciesisvitalforthecounterinsurgencyeffort.From
thebeginningoftheconflict,SovietleaderssupporteddevelopmentoftheAfghansecurity
apparatus.ThisisevidentinproceedingsoftheCPSUinwhichimprovingAfghanpoliceand
intelligenceisarecurringtheme.353TheKGBwasfairlyeffectiveincreatinganAfghan
securityapparatusconsistingoftheKhad,Sarandoyandotheragencies.354InJanuaryof
1980anexcerptfromaPolitburoprotocolnotedthatMoscowoughttocarryouta
programofnecessaryassistanceforalllinesofworkofthesecurityorgans,ofinterior
affairsandpolice,bothinthecenterandintheprovinces.355Afghanpersonnelwere
trainedontheterritoryoftheSovietUnionaswellasinKabul.356TheKhadfunctionedinall
29provincesofthecountry,andrapidlyexpandedasthewarcontinued.FromJanuary
352Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,267,
353ObstanovkavnutriAfganistanairolsovetskikhvoisk,7April1980(TopSecret),inArkhivPresidentaRF,F.
3,Op.82,D.176,Ll.917(retrievedfrom:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:
Eksmo,452.)
354TheKhadwasformedonthetemplateoftheKGBandtheSarandoywastheAfghanpoliceorganization.
87
1980to1982itsstaffincreasedfrom700to16,650.357In1986GeneralAkhromeevputthe
numbersofKhadandothersecurityagenciesat20,000andthenumberoftheSarandoyat
115,000.358AccordingtoVasiliMitrokhinsnotes,theKhadandSarandoyhadanetworkof
9,500informers,andsearchedthousandsofhomesinanefforttolocateandquellinsurgent
activity.359Forexample,Mitrokhinreportsthat9,600homesweresearchedinanoperation
inFebruaryof1981inKabul.360
WiththehelpandtrainingoftheKGB,Afghansecurityunitsapprehendedand
interrogatedmanyinsurgents.Oneaccountmentionsthecaptureoftheleaderofthe
organizationIslamicSocietyofAfghanistan,whoreportedlygavethenamesof825
people.361Itwasreportedthattwelvemembersofthisorganizationweresubsequently
recruitedandusedasinformers.362
KGBandKhadagencieswenttogreatlengthstospreaddisinformationandturn
mujahedeengroupsagainsteachother.Sovieteffortswereoftencenteredonattemptsto
exploittribalandethnicrivalriesamidsttheinsurgency.363SpecialunitsofAfghans,posing
asinsurgents,workedtoinstigateconflictintheranksofthemujahedeenorengagethem
363Planstoestablishcontactswithoppositiongroupsinordertocooptanddividethemisdiscussedina
meetingofthePolitburoin1980:VypiskaizprotokolaNo.181zasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSSot28janvarya
1980goda:OdalneishikhmeropriyatiyakhpoobespecheniyugosudarstvennykhinteresovSSSRvsvyazis
sobytiyamivAfganistane,28January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.34,D.3,Ll.67.Also,Vasiliy
MitrokhindetailsaparticularinstanceoftheKGBexploitingdivisionswithintheinsurgency,whenthey
recruitedaShiaMuslimSaidHusseinshaMasrur:Mitrokhin,V.(2002,July).TheKGBinAfghanistan:Russian
Edition.RetrievedMay2,2009,fromColdWarInternationalHistoryProject(CWIHP),www.CWIHP.org,by
permissionoftheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf,89.
88
bysurprise.By1983therewereeightysixsuchgroups.364Afghansecurityagentsalso
workedtocooptresistanceunits,andconvincethemtoworkwiththeAfghangovernment
forces.Oneexampleofsuchanoperationoccurredin1981,whentheKaskadunitnear
HeratcooptedKhozhdShirAgaChungar,theleaderofaninsurgentunit.365Hebeganto
workforgovernmentforces,eventuallycametocontrolfortyeightvillages,and
participatedinnumerousoperationswithSovietspecialforces.366
AfghansecurityservicesfunctionedinPakistanaswell,asthiswasamajorplatform
forthemujahedeen.BernardFallnotesthattheonlywaytoeliminatesuchinsurgency
sanctuariesistoinfiltratethem,whichispreciselywhattheKGBandKhadworkedto
accomplish.367BysomereportstheAfghanforeignintelligenceservicehad107agentsin
Pakistan.368In1980,antiHekmatyar369pamphletsweredistributedinthePeshawar
region.370Thousandsofotherpamphlets,writteninDariandPashto,weredistributedin
refugeecampsbytheKabulgovernment.371TheKGBandKhadroutinelyplantedarticlesin
theforeignpress,condemningoutsidesupportforterroristgroupsinAfghanistanand
supportingtheKabulgovernment.372MoscowworkedhardtosupportKabulsinformation
CB018B7A
367Fall,B.B.(1963).StreetWithoutJoy:InsurgencyinIndochina,194663(3rdRevisedEdition).Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania,USA:TheTelegraphPress,357.
369GulbudinHekmatyarwasoneofthemostpowerfulmujahedeenleadersandarivalofAhmedShahMasoud.
370PamphletswerealsoaimedtodiscreditotherleaderssuchasM.NabiandS.Mojadeddi:Mitrokhin,V.(2002,
July).TheKGBinAfghanistan:RussianEdition.RetrievedMay2,2009,fromColdWarInternationalHistory
Project(CWIHP),www.CWIHP.org,bypermissionoftheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf,87.
372Suchinstancesaredetailedintheearliersectiononpropaganda.
89
campaign,fundingnewspapersandallocatingfundsforcreatingradiostations.373
Counterinsurgencycallsforintelligenceworkandpersonnelatlowerlevelsthanin
conventionalwarfare;localknowledgeofthepeoplebecomesasimportantasclassified
informationinthiscontext.374TheSovietsdidworktopositionintelligencepersonnel
throughoutAfghanistan.EachmilitarypoliticalzonewasassignedKGBandKhad
representatives.375GeneralGromovnotesthatmostcommanderscultivatedtheirown
networksofintelligenceagents,andthatspetsnazunitswereespeciallyeffectiveinthis
area.376HealsomentionsthattheSovietcommandquicklyunderstoodthekindof
intelligenceworkthatwasmostusefulinthecontextofAfghancounterinsurgency,noting
thatSovietleaderscametotheconclusionthateffectiveandpainstakingworkwiththe
localpopulationbroughtresults.thereforeweestablishedthisasapracticeandrequired
commandersatalllevelstocontinuallyincreasethenumbersoftheiragentsand
informers.377Officertrainingincreasinglyemphasizedtheskillsneededtounderstand
mujahedeengroupsandgainintelligenceaboutthemthroughworkingwiththelocal
population;thisincludedinstructiononAfghanculturalandpoliticalthemes.378
TheKGBandKhadplacedgreatemphasisonlearningaboutanddisruptingthe
Afghaninsurgency.However,themujahedeenhadanoverwhelmingadvantageinthearea
ofintelligence,assympathizersfromthepopulationcouldreadilyprovideinformationon
troopmovementsandmujahedeeninformersinfiltratedmanyAfghanunits.379
Nevertheless,theSovietsdidmakeconsiderableeffortsinthisarea.
373PostanovlenieSekretariataTsKKommunisticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Obokasaniitekhnicheskogo
sodeistviyaDemokraticheskoiRespublikeAfganistanvstroitelstveradioveshchatelnoisrednevolnovoi
radiostantsiimoshchnostiu1000kVt,29January1980(TopSecret),inRGANI,F.89,Op.32,D.20,Ll.13.
374Grau,L.W.(2004,JulyAugust).SomethingOld,SomethingNew:Guerillas,Terrorists,andIntelligence
Analyis.MilitaryReview,4229.
376Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,200,264.
378Bogdanov,V.AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,271
90
TacticalAdjustments
TheLimitedContingentofSovietForcesintheRepublicofAfghanistansignificantly
expandedthetheoryandpracticeofcombatinmountainousdesertterrainFrunzeMilitary
Academy380
WhentheSovietmilitaryinvadedAfghanistanin1979itsoperationsandtactics
wererootedinmilitarythoughtthatwasfundamentallyinfluencedbytheconventional
warfareofWorldWarIIandbypreparationsforcombatagainstwesternarmies.381The
counterinsurgencyexperienceagainsttheBasmachifightersandlaterinUkraineandother
EasternEuropeancountriesduringandafterWorldWarIIhadbeenputasidebytheSoviet
militarytofocusonlargerconventionalthreats.382Theseearliercounterinsurgency
experienceswerenotincorporatedintodoctrinefortheSovietArmy,buthadmany
similaritiestotheSovietexperienceinAfghanistan.383Sovietcommandersinitiallyused
conventionaltacticsinAfghanistan,andhadverylimitedsuccess.384Thekindsofoperations
thatweretaughtandtrainedinSovietmilitaryuniversitiesandtrainingsiteswerenot
effectiveagainstthemujahedeenorinAfghanistansterrain.385Overthecourseofthewar,
USA:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,Forewordxxvii.
International,49.
383InUkraine(19441956),forexample,Sovietsemployedabroadrangeoftacticsandmeasuresagainstthe
insurgency,similartothetheirlateractionsinAfghanistan.JustlikeinAfghanistan,theSovietsfightingthe
UkrainianinsurgentsinitiallyreliedontheRedarmyforconductingoperations,butlaterbegantorely
increasinglyonspecializedNKVDunits.Tactics,suchascordonandsearch,combingandraidswereemployed.
Sovietsencouragedtheuseofindigenousselfdefenseunitsandgroupsposingasinsurgents,meanttofoment
confusionanddistrust.Politicalinstructionandpropagandawereacentralaspectofthiscampaign.Likein
Afghanistan,theSovietemphasisonintelligencewassubstantial.Whilethesecasesarenotidentical,Soviet
securityforcesandpoliticalentitiesexhibitedmanysimilarreactionsandmechanismsinbothcases.See:
Zhukov,Y.(2007).ExaminingtheAuthoritarianModelofCounterinsurgency:TheSovietCampaignAgainstthe
UkranianInsurgentArmy.SmallWarsandInsurgencies,18(3),439466.Also:Potichnyj,P.J.(1987,October2
3).PacificationofUkraine:SovietCounterinsurgency,19441956.RetrievedSeptember13,2009,fromChronicle
oftheUkranianInsurgentArmy:http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html.
384OneexampleoftheSovietunpreparednessforirregularcombatwasillustratedinJune1980,whenanentire
motorizedbattalionwascaughtinamujahedeenambush,unabletoeffectivelyreactandmaneuverand
subsequentlywipedout.See,McMichael,S.R.(1991).StumblingBear:SovietMilitaryPerformanceinAfghanistan.
London:Brassey's(UK),1112.
385GeneralGromovnotesthisinhismemoir,writingthatSoviettacticsformanysituationsprovedineffectivein
Afghanistan,andobviouslygoodonlyforactionsintheEuropeantheater:Gromov,B.(1994).Ogrannychenyi
Kontingent.Moscow:Progress,1223.
91
however,theSovietcommanddidadjustanddidintroducenewtacticsandtrainingthat
weremoreeffectiveagainstthemujahedeen.
Ultimately,adjustmentsintheSoviettacticalapproachshiftedemphasisfromheavy
sophisticatedequipmentfunctioninginaconventionallinearfashiontowardslightermobile
unitsexecutingnonlineartactics.Thesetacticsrequiredamoredecentralizedcommand
structure,enhancedassetsgiventobattalionandcompanylevelcommandersandjunior
leaderswhowouldtakeinitiativeindecisionmaking.Thenatureofcombatandtheterrain
itselfmadefunctioninginlargeunitsverydifficult,andthereforenecessitatedlieutenants
andNCOstakingindependentaction.
Thesubsectionsbelowwillincludethefollowingsampleoftacticalandoperational
areasinordertoillustrateSovietadjustmenttoconditionsinAfghanistan:the
bronnegruppa,envelopingdetachment,ambush,convoysecuritytechniquesand
equipment.
BronnegruppaConcept
Theimplementationofthebronnegruppaconceptwasanimportanttactical
innovationintheAfghantheater.Thebronnegruppa(literallytranslated:armorgroup)
wasasmallreserveformationoffourtofivearmoredvehiclesthatwouldadvancebehinda
forwardgroupofinfantrymen.Thebronnegruppawasusedtoprovideimmediatefire
supporttoinfantryunitsthatmovedforwardintodifficultterrain.386Thedevelopmentand
useofthebronnegruppacameinresponsetoproblemsexperiencedbymotorizedrifle
troops,andindicatedthatSovietmilitaryleadersunderstoodthetacticsneededinthe
counterinsurgencyagainstthemujahedeen.Motorizedrifletroopstendedtoremainclose
totheirarmoredvehicles,reluctanttoventureoutaslightinfantryincombatagainst
386GeneralV.A.BogdanovnotesthattheabundanceofterrainimpassabletovehiclesforcedtheSovietcommand
toadjusttoaformationwhichallowedmotorizedinfantrytofunctionawayfromtheirvehicles:Bogdanov,V.
AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,187.
92
Afghaninsurgents.Thistendencytostayneartheperceivedsafetyofarmoredvehicles
actuallymadeSoviettroopsmorevulnerableasitlimitedtheirmobility,makingthemeasy
targetsandpreventingthemfrominflictingdamageonthemujahedeen.
Thebronnegruppaconceptmitigatedsomeoftheseproblemsbyplacingsoldiers
awayfromthevehicles,butmaintainingthefirepowerandtransportationcapabilityofthe
armoredvehiclenearby.ThebronnegrupppafactoredintoabroadrangeofSovietcombat
operations.AnoperationaimedatdestroyingresistancestrongholdsinthePanjshirregion
illustratesthebronnegruppasuseandeffectiveness.OntheMay17th1982,afterextensive
aviationstrikes,SovietmotorizedrifletroopsandAfghaninfantryproceededthroughthe
valleyworkingtocontroltheheightstoeithersideanddestroyanyenemyencountered.
Thebronnegruppamovedforwardonthevalleyfloorprovidingcoveringfortheinfantry.387
Inthisinstancetheuseofthebronnegruppaprovidedfiresupport,andalsofacilitatedthe
effectivefunctioningofinfantryawayfromthevehicles.
Bronnegruppaswerealsofrequentlyusedasindependentelements.388The
bronnegruppawasemployedtoprovidefiresupportforoutpostsalongroadsandnear
otherobjectives.GeneralGromovmentionsthisinhisdescriptionofroadsecurityoutposts,
notingthatparticularlyvulnerablelocationswouldbereinforcedbybronnegruppa
formationsorotherarmoredvehicles.389
Thebronnegruppawasusefulastransportation,andusedtakeinfantrytroops
betweenmissionobjectivesandbases.Inanambushconductedagainstamujahedeen
supplycaravaninMarch1986nearKhanabad,abronnegruppatransportedtroopscloseto
theobjectiveandremainednearbyinordertoprovidefiresupportifnecessary.Afterthe
successfulcompletionoftheambush,thebronnegruppaarrivedtotransporttheunitback
93
tothebasecamp.Atthistime,thebronnegruppahelpeddestroyanothersmallgroupofthe
enemythatwasdiscoveredneartheambushsite.390
Initssupportingrolefortheinfantrythebronnegruppawasalsoregularlyusedto
blockandencircletheenemy.Onemujahedeencommanderrecountstheexperienceof
beingcutoffbySovietarmoredvehiclesaspartofacordonandsearchoperation.While
someoftheAfghanresistanceescaped,theblockingmovementofthebronnegruppahelped
theoperationresultinthedestructionandcaptureofhundredsofmujahedeenfighters.391
ThebronnegruppawasaneffectivetacticalconceptdevelopedbytheSoviets.The
bronnegruppahelpedretainSovietfiresuperiority,butavoidthenegativeeffectsof
centeringtacticsonheavyandimmobileequipment.ThebronnegruppahelpedtheSoviet
infantryfunctionthewaythatitneededtoonfootandoutagainstthemujahedeenbut
providedtheextraadvantageofcoveringfireandquicktransportwhenneeded.
EnvelopingMovements
Theuseofenvelopingandblockingtechniqueswaspartofashifttowardsincreased
useofnonlineartacticsagainstthemujahedeen.Mujahedeengroupswereusuallysmall
andmobileandcouldreadilyretreatandavoiddestructionbySovietlinearformations.
Envelopingmovementswerenecessarytobringthefighttotheenemy.Thecordonand
searchwasbasictacticthatusedenvelopingandblockingtechniques,thoughblocking
elementsplayedanimportantroleinavarietyofoperations.Soviettacticsinthisareaalign
withDavidGalulasemphasisthatThedestructionoftheinsurgentforcesrequiresthat
theybelocalizedandimmediatelyencircled.392
391Jalali,A.A.,&Grau,L.W.(2001).AfghanGuerillaWarfare:IntheWordsoftheMujahedeenFighters.St.Paul,
Minnesota,USA:MBIPublishingCompany,356.
392Galula,D.(1964).CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice.NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,72,94.
94
Thecordonandsearchwasusedtocaptureorkilltheenemyinaspecificarea.
Sovietswouldencircletheobjective,placingblockingunitsatstrategicpoints,thensweep
orcombthroughtheareausinggroundforcestolocateandengagetheenemy.Whenthe
SovietsenteredAfghanistanin1979,thecordonandsearchwasnotconsideredaformof
combat,sincethistacticisnotveryapplicabletoconventionalengagements.Thecordon
andsearchandtheuseofblockingtechniqueswasincorporatedintodoctrineasan
adjustmenttocombatinAfghanistan.393
Thecordonandsearchwastypicallyconductedintwophases.First,blockingunits
wereemplacedtoencircletheenemy.Blockingunitswereinsertedbyhelicopterorby
groundvehicles.Sovietunitsadoptedthepracticeofdismountingtransportadistanceaway
fromtheirultimatepositionsinanefforttoavoiddetection.394Second,forceswouldarrive
totheobjectiveandbeginsweepingthearea.
MajorGukalovrecountsatypicalblockandsweepoperationconductedintheKunar
province.Airbornetroopswereemplacedundetectedasblockingunitsalongescaperoutes
fromthetargetedvillage.Whenthesweepingforcemovedthroughthevillage,asmall
detachmentofmujahedeenfightersattemptedtostalltheiradvancetoallowthemain
mujahedeenforcetoescape;theblockingunitsinterceptedthefleeingmujahedeen.395
Evenwhenoperationswerewellexecuted,theterrainintheAfghantheater
sometimesmadeithardtosealoffallescaperoutes.MujahedeenCommanderHajiAbdul
QaderrecountedalargeSovietcordonandsearchoperationfromwhichhisforceswere
abletoescape.HisfighterswereabletoproceedundetectedbySovietblockingforcesalong
adryirrigationcanal.396
ThecordonandsearchprovedahighlyeffectivedevelopmentinSoviettactics.
Whenexecutedproperly,Sovietsencounteredsuccess.Blockingforceswerethecrucial
396Jalali,A.A.,&Grau,L.W.(2001).AfghanGuerillaWarfare:IntheWordsoftheMujahedeenFighters.St.Paul,
Minnesota,USA:MBIPublishingCompany,260.
95
componentoftheseoperations.Whentheyweredetected,emplacedhastily,or
uncoordinatedwithsweepingforces,mujahedeenforceswereoftenabletoescapewith
minimumcasualties.InAfghanistansdifficultenvironment,theincorporationofnonlinear
tactics,suchascordonandsearcheswiththeuseofblockingtechniquesshowsthe
adaptationoftheSovietcommandtotheconditionsintheAfghantheater.
Ambushes
AstheSovietLimitedContingentadjusteditsoperationalapproachtotheAfghan
theater,emphasiswasplacedonmanytacticsusedbythemujahedeenthemselves.
Ambushesareoneexampleofsuchatactic.Afghaninsurgentsroutinelyharassedand
damagedSovietforcesthroughtheuseofthistactic,butSovietsalsousedambushes
effectivelyagainstthemujahedeen.
Interceptingmujahedeensupplycaravansandothertroopmovementswere
primaryaimsofSovietambushes.Theinfluxofammunition,weaponsandfightersacross
theborderfromIranandPakistanwasavitalresourcefortheAfghaninsurgency.Borders
withPakistanandIranwereextremelylongandinhighlychallengingterrain,makingit
difficulttocontrolmovementinanoutofthecountry.TheSovietcommandwaswellaware
ofthesituationandcorrectlyidentifieditasoneofthemainreasonsthattheinsurgency
wassoresilient.Evenin1979,SovietleaderswerekeenonclosingtheAfghanborders.Ina
meetingbetweenPresidentsBrezhnevandTaraki,Brezhnevsaid,Despitethesendingof
thousandsofpeoplefromIranandPakistan,yourborderswiththesegovernmentsare
virtuallyopen,anditseemsthatevennowtheyarenotclosed?Iwillsayplainly.thisneeds
toberemedied.397Sovietleadersimplementedseveralmeasures,includingasystemof
guardoutpostsandinterceptoperationsaimedatambushingcaravansmovingthrough
borderregions.AsconfirmedinanaccountbyMajorGeneralLuchinsky,guardpostsalong
96
theborderwerenotoriouslyineffective,andAfghancaravansoftenmovedbythemwith
greatease.398Ambushmissionshadgreatersuccessinapprehendingtheincomingcaravans.
Beginningin1984,operationCurtain(laterrenamedBarrierin1987)was
conceivedtointerceptanddestroyenemysuppliesandpersonnelcominginfrom
Pakistan.399Asignificantnumberoftroopsweredevotedtotheoperation;unitsgenerally
conducted3040ambushespermonth.400Whilemotorizedrifleandotherinfantrytroops
regularlycarriedoutambushes,suchoperationswereincreasinglyassignedtoairborne,air
assaultandspetsnaztroopsastheconflictcontinued.401Thesetroopsweremorehighly
trainedandbetterequippedtoconductthiskindofoperation.
Surprisewasvitalforthesuccessofambushes.Afterdesignatingthespotofthe
ambushbasedonintelligence,troopswouldtypicallybeinsertedbyhelicopterorother
vehicletentothirtykilometersfromtheplannedambushsite,approachingbyfootand
oftenatnighttoavoiddetection.Sovietswouldusedecoyambushteamstodrawattention
awayfromwheretherealambushwasbeingprepared.402Oneveteranrecountsthat
helicopterswouldoftenmakeseverallandings,butdisbursetroopsonlyatonespotin
ordertomisdirectenemyintelligence.403Ambusheswouldtypicallybecarriedoutby
platoonorcompanysizedtroopelements,armedwithAGS17s,heavycalibermachine
gunsandmines.404Aviationandarmoredfiresupportwasmadeavailableforsuch
operationsaswell.405Overthecourseoftheconflict,itbecameclearthatincreased
helicopteravailabilitywasnecessaryforspetsnazunits,sotheSovietcommandassigned
401MajorGeneralLuchinskysaccountofCurtainindicatesthatmostunitsconductingambushmissionswere
spetsnazorotherspecializedtroops:Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:
Eksmo,521.
403Gusinov,T.(2002,MarchApril).SovietSpecialForces(Spetnaz):ExperienceinAfghanistan.MilitaryReview,
105107.
404GeneralV.A.Bogdanovnotesthatmoreambusheswereconductedbyplatoonsthancompanies:Bogdanov,V.
AfganskaiaVoina:19791989.Moscow:SovietWriter,185.
97
independenthelicopterunitsexclusivelyforspetsnazoperations.406Whenambushteams
remainedundetectedtheyweregenerallysuccessful.
Forexample,onthenightof13February1984,lieutenantS.Kozlovleadasuccessful
ambushinKandaharprovince,resultinginthedestructionof47enemytroopsand
significantmunitionsandequipment.407Aformerspetsnazsoldiernotedthatambushes
weremoresuccessfultheclosertheyweresettothemujahedeendestinationbasecampor
distributionarea.Closetocamp,theAfghanssecuritywasoftenmorerelaxedandthe
groupmoreconsolidated.Itwasalsoimportanttointerceptcaravansbeforetheyreached
thebasecamp,becauseitbecamemuchmoredifficulttotrackandlocategroupscarrying
suppliesaftertheyweredistributedatabasecamp.408
IncreaseduseofambusheswaspartofalargershiftinSoviettacticsinAfghanistan.
Whiletheyweretacticallysuccessful,overalllackoftroopsandinsufficientcontrolofthe
countrypreventedtheLimitedContingentfrombenefittingfrommanytacticalsuccesses.
Nevertheless,implementationoftheambushinoperationsshowedthatSovietleaders
understoodhowtoengagethemujahedeentactically.USandNATOforcescontinueto
employambushesagainstinsurgentsinAfghanistan.409
ConvoySecurityTechniques
MaintainingsuppliesforSovietforcesinAfghanistanwasaformidablelogistical
task.MainsupplyroutesstretchedbetweenTermezKabulJalalabad,TermezPuliKhumri
Kunduz,andKushkaShindandKandahar.Suppliesweretransportedinconvoysalong
manykilometersofpoorlymaintainedroadsbetweenSovietposts.Thispresentedan
opportunityforthemujahedeentohurtSovietforcesbyhittingsupplylines,placingmines
408Gusinov,T.(2002,MarchApril).SovietSpecialForces(Spetnaz):ExperienceinAfghanistan.MilitaryReview,
105107.
409ForaninterestingaccountofanU.S.ambushinAfghanistan,seethefollowingarticle:Chivers,C.J.(2009,
April16).TurningTables,U.S.TroopsAmbushTalibanWithSwiftandLethalResults.RetrievedAugust2,2009,
fromTheNewYorkTimes:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17afghan.html
98
andattackingunexpectedlyattimesandlocationsoftheirchoosing.410Itwasnecessaryfor
Sovietforcestoadapttacticstoaddressthesevulnerabilities.Throughouttheconflictit
remainedastruggleforSovietforcestoprotecttheirsupplylines,buttheydidtake
measurestoimproveinthisarea.In1981,theDefenseMinistryissuedanordertoimprove
convoysecuritybyfurtherdevelopingsecuritytactics,andengineerunitsupport.411Main
securitypracticesincluded:establishingpermanentsecurityoutpostsalongroutes,
employingmotorizedrifletroopstoprovidesecurity,taskingsapperunitstoclearroads,
usinghelicoptersescorts,emplacinginfantryunitsonkeyterraintopreventenemyfrom
approachingtokeyroutes.
Therewere326permanentoutpostsemplacedforthepurposeofprotectingcritical
supplyroutes.412GeneralGromovdescribestheprocessofplanningthelocationsofthese
outposts,whichwascarriedoutbyhighlytrainedgroupsofofficersofdifferentspecialties,
manyofwhomhadextensivegraduatedegrees.413Thesegroupsconductedcomprehensive
analysisofterrainandprovidedrecommendationsforoutpostlocations.414Some13,000
troopsweretaskedtomantheseposts,workingtointerceptanddetermujahedeengroups
fromambushingconvoys.415Guardpostsrangedinsizeplatoonorcompanysizedand
typicallyrotatedpersonneleverythreetosixmonths.416Thepostsweretypicallyringed
withminesandbarbedwire;otherphysicaldefensesandamenitieswerelargelytheresult
oftheinventivenessofthesoldierssomeoutpostsevenhadimprovisedRussianbanyas
(Russianbathhouse).417
410GeneralGromovmentionsthisinhismemoir,notingthatthemujahedeenhadtheirownmethodthey,as
arule,attackedwheretheywereleastexpected.Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:
Progress,120.
411ThisisfoundinadeclassifieddocumentincludedintheappendixofGeneralAlexanderLiakhovskyshistory
oftheAfghanwar:Planmeropriyatiipopovysheniueffektivnostiboevykhdeistviisovetskykhiafganskikh
voiskvDRA,obobshcheniuirasprostraneniuikhboevogoopytaisovershenstvovaniuoruzhiyanayanvar
mart1981goda,8January1981(Secret),accessedin:Liakhovsky,A.(1995).TragediaiDoblest'Afgana.
Moscow:GPIIskona,Appedix3.
416Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,533.Also:Gromov,B.(1994).
OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,120.
99
Lifeinoutpostswasdrearyandoftenboring;unitswereoftenisolatedandpoorly
supplied.GeneralGromovdescribeshowSovietsoldierswouldhavetoliterallygnawinto
themountain,makingtrenches.alongthese[trenches]thesoldierwasoftenexposedto
theenemy.418Thisduty,however,wascriticalformaintainingSovietforcepresencein
Afghanistan,andtheSovietcommandcreatedspecializedtrainingformanningoutposts.419
Onrouteswithoutasufficientnetworkofguardposts,theprocessforprovidingconvoy
securityunfoldedinsimilarfashiontoothertacticaloperations.
UsingmotorizedrifletroopsmountedinBMPs(lightarmoredfightingvehicle)or
BTRs(alsoalightarmoredfightingvehicle,differentmake)wasacommonwaytoprovide
securityforconvoys.420Helicopterswereavailableforairsupportifneededandoften
escortedconvoysofparticularimportanceoralongespeciallyvulnerablesegmentsofthe
route.421Reconnaissanceelementsorairassaultunitswereattimesemployedtooccupy
keyterrainnearroutes.422ThisallowedSovietforcestointerceptmujahedeenattemptsat
ambushingorapproachingconvoyroutes.423Engineertroopswereusedroutinelytoclear
roadsformines,andwereinhighdemandduringtheAfghanconflict.424Engineerunits
werealsoresponsibleforaddressingproblemssuchaswatercrossingsandimpassable
roadsduetorockslidesoravalanches,etc.425Thiswasacrucialtask,asconvoyswere
especiallyvulnerablewhenstoppedatobstacles.Mujahedeenwouldcreatesuchobstacles
inordertohaltvehiclecolumnsandthenattack.426Gromovnotesthatintheearlystagesof
thewar,Sovietcolumnswereespeciallyunpreparedforambushesandobstaclessetbythe
mujahedeen;later,Sovietslearnedtocarryspecialchargesforblowingthroughobstacles
421EverettHeath,J.(1992).HelicoptersinCombat.NewYork,NewYork,USA:ArmsandArmourPress,126.
100
andreestablishingaroadbedtominimizetimethatvehicleswerehalted.427Engineers
organizedintogroupstohelpforcesproceedthroughroutes,sometaskedspecificallytokey
bridgesorotherobjectives,somemovingwithconvoys.428
Whilethetacticsdevelopedforprotectingconvoyswereeffective,thesetacticswere
notalwaysexecutedsuccessfully.Limitednumbersoflightinfantrytroops,engineersand
availablehelicoptersprecludedtheconsistentimplementationofthesecuritymeasures
discussedabove.Moreover,Sovietofficerswereunaccustomedtotheconceptofdefending
supplylinesagainstanenemyfunctioningallaroundthem,andwouldmakemistakesinthis
area.429
Equipment
Theweapons,equipment,andprotectiveequipmentdeterminedthecombateffectivenessof
theLCOSF[LimitedContingentofSovietForces]inAfghanistanTheRussianGeneral
Staff430
Understandingthedynamicsofthepolitical,socialandmilitarysituationisvitally
importantinthecomplexenvironmentofcounterinsurgency.431Thenecessityofaccurately
readingthesituationandadaptingappropriatelyappliestothelowestdetailsofthe
counterinsurgencycampaign.Asshowninnumerouscases,eventhesmallestculturalor
politicalblunder,orhintofit,canhavesignificanteffectsontheeffortasawhole.432The
detailsofcounterinsurgencyoftendeterminesuccessorfailure.Thisprincipleisextremely
relevanttotheindividualsoldierinhispersonalweaponsandequipment.
429ThisanalysisispartiallydrawnfromLesterGrauscommentaryonRussianmilitaryaccounts,andpartly
frommyownanlaysisofthem.Grau,L.(1991).TheBearWentOvertheMountain:SovietCombatTacticsin
Afghanistan.Washington,DC,USA:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,149.
OxfordUniversityPress,Inc,13.
432T.E.Lawrenceemphasizessuchattentiontodetailinhiswritingsondealingwithinsurgency.Lawrence,T.
(1917).The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.RetrievedJuly1,2009,fromhttp://www.dn
101
Counterinsurgency,whileverydifferentfromconventionalwar,isstillwar,andthe
soldiersarmsandequipmentareofutmostimportanceintheoveralleffort.
Thekeyroleplayedbythemostbasicaspectsofequipmentwasclearlyillustrated
intheSovietarmysearliestoperationsinAfghanistan.Frombootstotruckengines,there
weremanyglitchesintheSovietwarmachine.433Asnotedearlier,theSovietArmywas
primarilytrainedforconventionalconflictwithNATOforcesintheEuropeantheater.Asa
result,manyaspectsofSovietequipmentwerepoorlysuitedtotheextremeclimatesand
terrainofAfghanistan.Inaddition,operationsinAfghanistanwerethefirstrealactionthe
militaryhadseeninsometime,andtherewasequipmentuntestedoutsideoffield
exercises.IthasevenbeenspeculatedthatDefenseMinisterUstinovagreedtodeployment
oftroopsinAfghanistanpartlybecauseitwasanopportunitytotestthemilitaryslatest
equipment.434
Sovietmilitarystaffandsupportingofficersreactedwelltotheproblemswith
equipment.Therewassignificantadjustmentoftheuseanddesignofweaponssystemsand
othergeartofunctionmoreeffectivelyinunconventionalcounterinsurgencywarfare.
Whilethe40thArmydidsufferfromsomeproblemsinsupplyandotherlogistics,ineffective
equipmentwasreplacedorimprovedupon,andweaponsandequipmentengineers
regularlyvisitedKabultomeetwithmilitaryofficials,continuallyimprovingexisting
models.435GeneralGromovwritesthattheinnovationsandadjustmentsmadetoSoviet
equipmenttobetterorientittotheconditionsinAfghanistanhadaworththatwas
impossibletooverstate.436
Heavyweaponsandadvancedtechnologyarenotthedecisivetoolsin
counterinsurgency.Whiletechnologyandsuperiorfirepowerhelpinmanysituations,
counterinsurgencyiswonbytheapplicationofintelligentstrategyanditsexecutionby
435Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,538,540.Also:Gromov,B.
(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,14950.FordiscussionofSovietlogisticalproblemssee:
Blank,S.J.(1991).OperationalandStrategicLessonsoftheWarinAfghanistan,197990.StrategicStudies
InstituteU.S.ArmyWarCollege,48.
102
infantrymen.ThishasbeenillustratedinconflictsbeforeandaftertheSovietAfghanwar.437
Regardlessofwhatcounterinsurgencystrategyisemployed,infantrymenalmostalwaysdo
thecrucialworkofengagingtheenemyandassuringthathestaysawayoncedefeated.
Againstahighlyagilefoethatmeltsinandoutofthepopulationandtoughterrain,highly
sophisticatedweaponryandequipmentisseldomuseful.438Lightinfantryunitsareneeded
inlargenumbers.TheSovietsincreasinguseofairborneandairassaulttroopsin
Afghanistanisatestamenttothisinevitability.439
The40tharmyfoundthatmuchofitsheavyequipmentprovedineffectiveinthe
mountainousAfghanterrain.440Manyartillerypiecescouldnottilttolargeenoughanglesto
engagemujahedeentargetsperchedonbluffshighabovewindyroads.TanksandtheBMP
1armoredpersonnelcarriersweretoounwieldyandhadgunsalsohardtoaimathigh
targets.Therewereproblemswithminesandminesweepersystems.441Laserrangefinders
malfunctioned.Tankandothervehiclepartswerevulnerabletosandandextreme
temperatures.MineblaststorereadilythroughtheBMP1,BMD1,BTR60PBandBTR70
andusuallyresultedinthedeathofthoseinside.442EnginesforvehiclessuchastheBTR
60BandtheBTR70lackedthepowersufficientformountaindriving,andmanyhigh
performanceaircraftfunctionedpoorlyintheAfghantheateraswell.443
437AliA.JalaliandLesterW.Grauprovideaninterestinganalysisoftheroleofmilitarytechnologyin
examinationofthebattleofMaiwandbetweenBritishandAfghanforcesinthe1880s.Jalali,A.A.,&Grau,L.W.
(2001).ExpeditionaryForces:SuperiorTechnologyDefeated.MilitaryReview,81(3),7183.
438IndescribingactionsinthePanjshirregion,GeneralGromovnotesthatSovietinfantrymenthatwere
climbinginroughterrainandfarfromvehicleswereoftenequippedwiththesameweaponsasthemujahedeen:
Gromov,B.(1994).OgrannychenyiKontingent.Moscow:Progress,183.Also,forthoughtfulanalysisof
technologyinwarfaresee:Grau,L.W.(1997).BashingtheLaserRangeFinderWithaRock.MilitaryReview,77
(3),43.RobertCassidyalsomakestheargumentthattheuseofsophisticatedtechnologyisahindrancein
counterinsurgency:Cassidy,R.M.(2006).CounterinsurgencyandtheGlobalWaronTerror.London:Praeger
439LargenumbersofUSlightinfantryunitsdeploytoAfghanistancurrentlyaswell;theenvironmentandenemy
callforthisjustasmuchnowasinthe1980s.Inaddition,atvariousjuncturesinIraq,UStankunitsandother
specialtiesfoundthemselvesconductinginfantryliketasks.Evenwithoutmountains,counterinsurgencyisbest
conductedlight,whethertheforceisengagingtheenemyorpatrollinganarea.
440Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,537;Alsosee,Oliker,O.,Grissom,
A.,&Johnson,D.E.(2008).IntheMiddleoftheFight:AnAssessmentofMediumArmoredForcesinPastMilitary
Operations.SantaMonica,CA,USA:RANDCorporation,9295.
103
Sovietmilitarycadrereactedeffectivelytosuchdeficienciesbyemployingnew
equipment.Forexample,newervehicleswereintroduced,suchastheBMP2andtheBTR
80in1985.444TheBTR80sgunscouldbetiltedhigherthanpreviousmodels,allowingfor
theengagementofaerialtargetsorthoseinsteeporurbanterrain.Sovietcrewswere
knowntoprotecttheBTRwithmakeshiftscreeningandrubbersheetingaroundthe
wheels.445TheBTR80alsoimproveduponearlierdesignsbyincludinghatchdoorsonthe
side,whichincreasedthespeedwithwhichsoldierscoulddismount.446Thisconfiguration
wasmoreeffectiveforreactingquicklytoambushesorothersituations.
Heavyfirepowerwaslessemphasized,andsomeinfantryunitswereequippedwith
theAGS17ontheBMP2armoredpersonnelcarrier,anautomaticgrenadelauncherthat
wasusefulinengagementsagainstanenemythatdidnotgenerallyusetanksorother
armoredvehicles.447TheAGS17couldalsobeusedindependentfromavehiclewitha
threemancrew.Sovietforcesusedthisweaponextensivelyininfantryoperationssuchas
raidsandsweeps.Capableoffiringgrenadesupto1700meters,theAGS17wasusefulfor
suppressingtheenemyandstoppinghisadvance.448TheBMP1susual73mmcannonwas
replacedbya30mmautomaticcannonontheBMP2withincreasedaimingangle.449
Machinegunswereoutfittedwithenhancedsightstoengagetargetsatlongerrange.The
ZSU234wasaweaponsystemthatprovedhelpfulintheAfghantheater.Technicallyan
antiaircraftunit,thisfourbarreledsystemcouldelevateitsaimalmostverticallyandwas
effectiveagainstforcesasfarawayas2500meters.450
444Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,537.Also:RussianGeneralStaff.
(2002).TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,36.
104
VaryingKalashnikovrifleswereusedintheAfghantheater,includingtheAKM74,
whichwasoftenusedwithanattachedgrenadelauncher(PG15).451ThemajorityofSoviet
forcesultimatelymovedtotheAK745.45mmriflefromthe7.62mmvariation.TheAK74
wasmoreeffectiveforthecounterinsurgentasitwaslighter,andhadlessrecoil,facilitating
accuracyatlongranges.
TheuseofSovietaircraftwasalsoadjustedforcounterinsurgency.Soviet
adjustmentsmirroredDavidGalulasargumentthatcounterinsurgentforcesaremost
benefitedbyhelicoptersandslowassaultplanes.452Sovietforcesemployedhelicoptersin
moreinAfghanistanthantheyeverhadbeforeandtheyprovedhighlyeffective.453As
mujahedeengainedantiaircraftcapabilities,tacticssuchasnightflightsandlowaltitude
napoftheearthflyingwereintroduced.454HighspeedplaneswerereplacedwiththeSu25
(nicknamedthegrach,orinEnglishthefrogfoot),asubsonicaircraftdesignedforproviding
closeairsupport.
TheSovietstaffunderstoodtheneedforalightermoremobileforcefor
counterinsurgency.Whilechangeswerenotmadeasfullyorquicklyasmighthavebeen
desired,thenatureofweaponsandvehiclemodificationsindicatedthatSovietmilitary
leaderswhereattemptingtoreshapetheirforceforthesituationinAfghanistan.The40th
Armysufferedfromsomeofthesamebackupsandsupplyissuesthatplaguedtherestofthe
USSR;manysoldiersdidnotreceivethebenefitofimprovedequipment.Nevertheless,in
theareaofequipmentandweapons,Sovietmilitaryleadersdidexhibitadaptabilityandan
understandingofcounterinsurgency.
21.
453Turushev,A.(2004).OsobennostiPrimeneniaPodrazdelenijiChastej40jArmiiVAfganistane.Afganistan:
UrokiIstoriiiSovremennost'(pp.2125).Omsk:OmskaiaAkademia,MVDRossii.
454Liakhovsky,A.(2009).TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,539.Also:EverettHeath,J.
(1992).HelicoptersinCombat.NewYork,NewYork,USA:ArmsandArmourPress,127.
105
Conclusion
ThisworkdoesnotseektorewritetheSovietcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistaninto
asuccess.ThereweremanyweaknessesintheSovieteffort.ItisclearthatSovietleaders
enteredintotheconflictwithaninaccurateunderstandingofAfghanistanssocialand
politicalrealities,andwithoutfullappreciationoftheresourcesrequiredtosupportthe
KabulgovernmentagainsttheAfghaninsurgency.Sovietleaderswerenotanticipatingthe
needforsuchalongandcomprehensivecounterinsurgencycampaignaftertheinitial
invasion.
Coordinationbetweenmilitaryandnonmilitaryeffortswaslacking.Sovietmilitary
leadersandpoliticiansblamedeachotherforfailuresinAfghanistan.Forexample,inone
meetingofthePolitburo,Gorbachevexpressedfrustrationatthemilitaryestablishment,
remarkingthatmilitaryleadersaredoingpoorlyatlearninginthiswar.455Inthesame
meetingGeneralAkhromeevexplainedthatourmilitarysuccesseshavejustnotbeen
supportedbypoliticalones.456Thesetwoviewpointsillustrateacivilmilitarydisconnect
thatundercutmanySovieteffortsinAfghanistan.Indeed,politicaleffortsandinstitutions
didnotsupportmanyoftheadvancesmadebySovietforces,andresultedinfrequent
reversalsofSovietmilitarygains.457Sovietpoliticalconcernslimitedtheoverallnumberof
troopsallocatedforthecounterinsurgency,whichmadeitdifficulttoachievecountrywide
stabilityandclosedborderswithIranandPakistan.Considerableandunwaveringforeign
supportimplementedacrosstheseborderswasafundamentalstrengthoftheinsurgency.
Furthermore,atcriticaljunctures,whenincreasedeffortsandresourcesmayhaveresulted
inverysignificantgains,Sovietpoliticalleadersbackedofffromtheircommitmenttothe
counterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.Forinstance,afterabriefattemptatconductinga
counterinsurgency,Gorbachevpursuedpoliticalandmilitarypoliciesprimarilyasawayto
455Zasedanie
PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November
457Suchreversalswerealsotheresultofalackoftroops.Nothavingenoughtroopstoremaininareasfor
providingstaticsecuritymadethemeasyformujahedeenforcestoreclaim.
106
expeditedisengagementandnotasapartofanenduringcounterinsurgencyeffort.458
CompoundingSovietproblems,divisionswithinthePDPApersistedthroughouttheconflict
andwereahindrancetopoliticalprogress.
Despitemistakesandsetbacks,however,theSovietseffectivelybolsteredthePDPA
governmentthatin1979wasinaprecariouspoliticalandmilitarysituation.TheSoviet
commandusedpolitical,militaryandeconomicinitiativestosupportthisgovernmentfor
nineyearsinacountrywhereterrain,infrastructureandsocietyarehighlyunfavorablefor
foreignpowers.AndwhiletheKabulgovernmentlostcontrolofmanyAfghanprovinces
afterSovietwithdrawal,itremainedinpowerforthreeyearsuntil1992.459Admittedly,
afterthewithdrawalthesubsequentsituationwastheresultofmanyfactorsnotallrelating
toSovietinvolvement.Nevertheless,theKabulgovernmentsenduranceindicatesthe
presenceofeffectiveelementsintheSovietcounterinsurgency.
Manyoftheseelementscorrespondtoacceptedclassicalandmodern
counterinsurgencytheory.Analysisofprimarydocuments,memoirsandmilitaryevents
showsthatSovietleadersconductedactivecounterinsurgencyeffortsinthepolitical,
economicandmilitarysphere.Manysuchprogramsweredesignedtowinoverthesupport
oftheAfghanpopulationthroughpersuasionandincentives.Coercionwasnottheonly
Sovietmethod.Extensivesupportandcounselinthepoliticalsphere,developmentofsocial
programsandpromotionofeconomicinitiativesillustratethatSovietleadersappreciated
theneedtowinthesupportofthepopulationbymeansotherthanforce.
Sovietmilitaryefforts,sometimesdescribedasrigidandunbendinglyconventional,
weregreatlyadaptedfortheAfghantheater.Thisthesishasillustratedthatmilitaryleaders,
thoughhinderedbyanarmyconventionalinstructureandmindset,tookmanyconcrete
stepstoadapttheirforceandtacticsforcounterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.Heavyarmor
andunwieldyweaponssystemswerereplacedbylightervariationsforthefightagainstthe
458Gorbachevwassoonquitecommittedtoexpeditingwithdrawalasevidencedinthefollowingdocument:
Zasedanie PolitbyuroTsKKPSS13noyabrya1986goda:OdalneishikhmerakhpoAfganistanu,13November
459TheSovietUnioncontinuedtoprovideconsiderablesupporttotheKabulgovernmentafterthewithdrawalin
1989.
107
mujahedeen.Nonlineartacticsandnewtechniquesweretaughtandimplementedwith
somesuccess.SovietleadersdecentralizedtheAfghanbattlespacebydividingthetheater
intoregimezones,andgivingincreasedautonomyandassetstoregimentandbattalion
commandersandtheirsubordinates.Expandedandenhancedtrainingwasdesignedto
encourageindependenceandcreativityinjuniorleadership.Substantialdevelopmentof
intelligencecapabilitiesandpopulationmonitoringwerealsostrongaspectsinthe
campaign.TheseadjustmentsshowthatSovietmilitaryleadersunderstoodthenatureof
counterinsurgencyandtheneedtoadapttheirforcefornonconventionaltasks.
RecognizingtheeffectiveelementsoftheSovietcounterinsurgencyisimportantfor
acomprehensiveandnuancedunderstandingoftheSovietAfghanwarand
counterinsurgencymorebroadly.SovietfailuresinAfghanistanwerearesultofflawed
strategyandpoorexecution,butwerealsotheresultoftheextremedifficultyofthetask
itself.LabelingtheSovietstrategyinAfghanistanascategoricallyflawedisan
underestimationofthecomplexityinherentincounterinsurgencyconflicts.
MisapprehendingthisrealitycanleadtoimpreciseandbiasedevaluationsoftheSoviet
campaignandthenatureofcounterinsurgency.
InaccurateassessmentsoftheSovietexperienceinAfghanistancanfosterbothover
andunderestimationofthedifficultiesofcounterinsurgency.ConsideringtheSovietefforts
utterlynarrowmindedandrigidcanleadtotheviewthatcounterinsurgencyiseasy,
providedthatonesimplyavoidsthegrossmistakesoftheSovietforces.Conversely,
overlookingSovietgainsandoverstatingtheirproblemscanleadtotheviewthatsuccessin
counterinsurgency(inAfghanistanorelsewhere)isvirtuallyunattainable.
StudyingtheSovietsinAfghanistan,therefore,hasimplicationsforthose
consideringthelimitationsandpossibilitiesoflargepowerscaughtinthedynamicsof
counterinsurgency.UnderstandingtheelementsoftheSovietstrategythatheldpromise,
eveniftheywerenotfullyorsuccessfullyimplemented,providesamorenuanced
understandingofthechallengesandquestionscounterinsurgencypresents.
ManyofthesesamechallengesandquestionsarefacingtheUnitedStatestoday.
108
AppendixI.StatisticsofSovietAfghanistanCredit/AidAgreements
Graphic1.NonMilitaryAidLevelsinSovietAfghanFormalAgreements
NonMilitaryAidLevelsinSovietAfghan
FormalAgreements
300
Millions(rubles)
250
200
Training/Education
150
Agriculture
Construction
100
Energy,Oil,NaturalGas
50
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Source:MinisterstvoInostrannykhDelSSSR.(19811990).SbornikMezhdunarodnykh
DogovorovSSSR(Vol.XXXVXLIV).Moscow,Russia.
Note:
1. Thisgraphrepresentsfundinglevelsunderformalagreementsforeconomicassistance
anddevelopmentprograms.Allprojectshavebeengroupedunderthemajorcategories
showninthegraph;also,fundsassociatedwithmultiyearandmulticategoryprojects
havebeenallocatedappropriatetoprojectcategoryandapproximatelyaverageyearly
allocationbasedonthedurationoftheagreement.Thisgraphdoesnotrepresentthe
finaldisbursementswhichdependedonavarietyofconditions.
2.
IthankandacknowledgeAlexanderP.Doohovskoyforhisvaluableassistanceincreatingthe
graphicsthatappearintheappendices.
109
Graphic2.SovietEconomicAidDisbursementstoAfghanistan
SovietEconomicAidDisbursementsto
Afghanistan
250
Millions(rubles)
200
150
100
50
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
ThisgraphisbasedondatafromQuintinV.S.Bachsbook,SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:the
FactsandFigures.460
460Bach,Q.V.(2003).SovietAidtotheThirdWorld:theFactsandFigures.Sussex,England:TheBookGuildLtd,
153156(AppendixVII).
110
Graphic3.SovietEconomicAidandExpendituresinAfghanistan
SovietEconomicAidand
ExpendituresinAfghanistan
1400
Millions(rubles)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
1986
1987
ThisgraphisbasedondatafromadocumentpublishedinAlexanderLiakhovskysbook,
TragediaiDoblest'Afghana.461
Afghana.Moscow,Russia:Eksmo,758.GKESstandsforGosudarstvennyikomitetsovetaministrovpo
vneshnimekonomicheskimsvyazyam(GovernmentCommitteeCounsilofMinistersonForeignEconomic
Affairs).
111
Graphic4.SovietAfghanAgreementsonEnergy,Oil,NaturalGas
SovietAfghanAgreements
Energy,Oil,NaturalGas
160
Millions(rubles)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
112
Graphic5.SovietAfghanistanAgreementsonAgriculture,Construction
SovietAfghanistanAgreements
AgricultureandConstruction
160
140
Millions(rubles)
120
100
80
Agriculture
60
Construction
40
20
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
113
AppendixII.MapofAfghanistan
114
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