SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,
AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
ET AL., respondents.
Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.
Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

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SYLLABUS
1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAW; LAND ACQUISITION; SECTION 16(e) THEREOF; CONSTRUED. Section
16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands . . . (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with
this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. . . ." It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred
that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a

"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to

warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BASIC
LAW AND AN IMPLEMENTING RULE OR REGULATION; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.
And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped
the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of
the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section
16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54
because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAIR AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION MANDATED. The
ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash.
It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to
make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold
the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and
notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of
private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed
it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however,
misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must
rectify. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation

under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 of purposes of exercising
the landowner's right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is
the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which
he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule
that: ". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 'just' for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss."

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J :
p

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged
should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever
truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:
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". . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor
of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always
be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be
applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712)
following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465.
However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered
consolidated. 3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994,
which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as
follows:
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"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:
a)DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and
void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of
deposits in cash or bonds;
b)Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not merely
'earmark', 'reserve' or 'deposit in trust' with an accessible bank
designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners
the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments
within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
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P 1,455,207.31Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P15,914,127.77AMADCOR;
c)The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to
withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; and
d)Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the
lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from notice within
which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after
they are submitted for decision." 4
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Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5
denying their motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses
of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation
for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to
compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash
and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
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Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this

Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination
and disposition.
As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:
"Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that '(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer
beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54
have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283 respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES
'C' & 'D') without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the
requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash
and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.' (Rollo, p. 6).
"The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.
"Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F.
Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with
an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago;
that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the
Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ANNEX 'B') to pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of their
farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991
the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of
P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX 'E'; Rollo, p. 7);
that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed
the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to
the Landbank (Rollo, p. 133).
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank
which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for
brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did
not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p.
99).
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"Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation

(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San

Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco,

Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area
of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine
compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was
rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX 'F') fixing the compensation for the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at
P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for
said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the
amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991
(ANNEX 'G'). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco,
Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered
by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of
1,629.4578 hectares; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of
701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was
taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21
April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the
amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been previously
rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
"The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB
proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100)." 8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990

was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds
in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9
Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property,
the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10
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Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a

valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11
Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling
in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates
of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in
favor of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
respondent court denied the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions.

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On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition
in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to
delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the motion
and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that
private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional
release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it
has filed for just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded
the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a
trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its
power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA
6657.
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The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . .
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any
other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of
the term "deposit."
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The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an

administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this
regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or
putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the
law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing
the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his
property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that
the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners
cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing
regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore
did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null
and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the
cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
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The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of

compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as
provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of
the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the
final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account
pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter
amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property
pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following
pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform." 22

"The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his
property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
"The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
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xxx xxx xxx

"Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected."

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding
petitioners' assertion as it found that:
". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation envisioned under
RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343),
to conclude that 'payments of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money' even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case
'that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and
no other' the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule
. . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis

supplied.)

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We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the

"Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to
be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode
of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,
however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts
already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of
eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was

painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding
that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under
an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice
bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation
under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:
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". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss."

24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal
obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving
its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we
are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their
bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit
of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important
because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners,
who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. 26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
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SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1.Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy.
2.Ibid., p. 616.

3.Rollo, p. 7.

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4.Rollo, pp. 122-123.

5.Rollo, p. 149.
6.which provides formulas for valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.
7.which provide for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of depositing in an
accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land expropriated by the
DAR.
8.Rollo, pp. 109-111.

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9.Sec. 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For the purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following shall be followed:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to
the qualified beneficiaries.
10.Rollo, p. 111.
11.Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the power to issue
rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and
purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after the publication in
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
12.Rollo, pp. 111-112.
13.Rollo, p. 112.
14.Rollo, p. 107.
15.Rollo, p. 149.
16.Rollo, p. 63.
17.Rollo, p. 67.

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18.Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).
19.Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission , 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing Teoxon v. Members
of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589
(1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs. Phil. Veterans
Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224.
20.Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines , 162 SCRA 628 (1988).

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21.Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and
LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the just
compensation for the land.
22.175 SCRA 343.
23.Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14.

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24.Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals , 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990) citing Coscolluela
vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393, 400 (1988); Provincial Government of
Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).
25.175 SCRA 343, 392.
26.Mata vs. Court of Appeals , 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).