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Eva Aldea - Magical Realism and Deleuze - The Indiscernibility of Difference in Postcolonial Literature
Eva Aldea - Magical Realism and Deleuze - The Indiscernibility of Difference in Postcolonial Literature
Eva Aldea
For Marcus
Contents
Preface
ix
List of Abbreviations
19
41
73
103
Chapter 6 Conclusion
146
Notes
150
Bibliography
163
Index
181
Preface
Since being introduced to magical realism through the short stories of Julio
Cortzar, many years ago, I have always wanted to know why magical realism has
been so fascinating and tantalizing a genre for me and so many other readers.
What exactly is it that makes the appearance of the unusual, strange and supernatural so alluring when it is described in that deadpan, matter-of-fact voice we
have all become so familiar with since the Latin American literary boom reached
the Anglo-Saxon readership in the 70s? I never found a thoroughly satisfactory
answer. Any definitions and descriptions of the genre seemed to me never quite
to get to the bottom of how the interaction between the real and the magic in
magical realist novels and stories actually functions. I mean functions in the
way a car or train functions I wanted to know what drives the fantastic yet
thoroughly familiar engine of magical realism.
There was nothing for it but to investigate the matter myself. Having
come across the idea of the machinic assemblage in Gilles Deleuze and Flix
Guattaris work, an early project looking at Cortzars stories as such little
literary machines yielded some results. It also pointed to the fact that Deleuze
could provide the thoroughly different approach to magical realism that I was
looking for, partly as a philosopher that could take me back to basics What is
the real? What is the magic? partly because of his insistence that the all that is
is in the same way, yet is different. This challenge to hierarchies of being seemed
to me to chime true with the main motion of the magical realist machine.
This book is the final result of a long process of research but also of thought,
the importance of which my guide throughout would never let me forget. I am
very grateful to Andrew Gibson for his long and continued support for, belief
in and acute criticism of my work. I would also like to thank my parents for their
never failing belief in the ultimate fruition of my work, and my friends and
colleagues for their input, patience and support. Finally, a special thank you to
Marcus Cheadle, without whom this book would never have been written.
List of Abbreviations
Primary Works
BD
CR
DV
FR
LP
MC
NC
OHYS
SC
WCS
B
C2
DII
DR
EP
List of Abbreviations
KM
LS
PS
TP
WIP
xi
Critical Works
AP
DC
LC
MGP
MRF
MRPD
MRT
MS
OMRF
PNC
PU
SCD
TWL
WAF
Chapter 1
with questions of cultural hegemony and its role in colonization, and to explore
the politically subversive power of exposing the relativity of such hegemony.
However, many critics also link magical realism with postmodernism, referring
to a number of specific textual characteristics that allows the genre to raise
questions about the nature of reality and fiction.
hybridity in magical realism than Cooper, but he also lists elements of grotesque and picaresque as typical of magical realism, as well as features that
Cooper sees as postmodern, such as intertextuality and metatextuality; again,
however, these characteristics appear more circumstantial than necessary for
the central resolution of the antinomy in magical realism.
While Cooper and Durix find some typically postmodern devices in magical
realism, such as self-reflexivity and metatextuality, playfulness and irreverence
towards established cultural forms or categories, they have not been able fully
to integrate these in a definition of the genre. Frederick Louis Aldama argues,
however, that these particular devices do define magical realism. He approaches
postcolonial readings of magical realism critically, suggesting that they have
made the mistake of confusing literary and ethnographic components. He
traces this error back to Carpentiers work, as well as to Fredric Jamesons
reading, and sees it repeated in the work of various critics such as Gonzles
Echevarra, Cooper and Durix. According to Aldama, such critics reify the
literary text, on the one hand, and view the empirical world as a narrative on
the other. Aldama, in contrast, proposes a view of the literary, not as a source
of information or a conveyor of truth or falsity about the empirical world, but
as a narrative with its own kind of rationale, separate from the extra-textual
world.19 That is, as opposed to those critics focusing on cultural hybridity,
Aldama looks at magical realism as dealing with exclusively textual versions
of reality.
Aldama refers to magical realisms vibrant interplay between discourse and
story, a characteristic that makes the genre a rebellious aesthetic (PNC 19).
Magical realism derives from realism the formal arrangements selected for
telling the story, but adds to them the mimesis-as-play of intertextuality,
metatextuality and self-reflexivity (PNC 37). According to Aldama, these impurities in the discourse are crucial to magical realism, offering a how-to-read
magicorealism contract that prevents the reader from hesitating in the face of
the magical elements, allowing them instead to perceive an everyday reality
that is seamlessly both real and unreal (PNC 3739). Aldama thus also suggests
a definition of magical realism that hinges on the resolution of the antinomy
between the real and the magic, but claims that it is the intertextuality and
metatextuality of magical realism that brings about this resolution, ensuring
there is a categorical difference between the invention of limitless possibility
within the novels pages and the reality outside (PNC 1819). That is, the resolution of antinomy in magical realism, to Aldama, does not extend to the differences between cultural versions of reality.
Nevertheless, Aldama situates magical realism within postcolonial literature
by default, focusing on US ethnic minority and British postcolonial literature,
and apparently discounting the possibility that the genre could exist in a nonpostcolonial context. Ultimately, he expresses the familiar view that the coexistence of the real and unreal in magical realism is particularly suited to expressing
analysis indicates the fact that marginality and subversion may be seen as the
site where postmodernism, postcolonialism and magical realism intersect.
This is Linda Hutcheons thesis in an article analysing postmodernism and
postcolonialism: The formal technique of magic realism (with its characteristic mixing of the fantastic and the realist) has been singled out by many critics
as one of the points of conjunction of postmodernism and postcolonialism.
Its challenges to genre distinctions and to the conventions of realism are
certainly part of the project of both enterprises.24 This conjunction, however,
hinges on the fact that Hutcheon sees postcolonialism and postmodernism as
related by a strong shared concern with the notion of marginalization, with the
state of what we would call ex-centricity.25 However, such a shared concern is
by no means a given: Jamesons approach to magical realism problematizes
the positioning of magical realism precisely at this intersection. In addition, but
in contrast to Jameson, Aijaz Ahmad identifies magical realism with postmodernism, something that for Ahmad is inherently problematic in the face of a
postcolonial realm that he defines as essentially political. To Ahmad, it is impossible to reconcile the explicitly political concerns of the Third World and postmodern theories of the fragmentation and/or death of the Subject: the politics
of discrete exclusivities and localisms on the one hand, or, on the other as
some of the poststructuralisms would have it the very end of the social, the
impossibility of stable subject positions, hence the death of politics as such.26
This leads Ahmad to dismiss the claim made by postcolonial theorist Homi K.
Bhabha that magical realism has become the literary language of the emergent
postcolonial world as a routine feature of metropolitan theorys inflationary
rhetoric.27 However, neither Hutcheon nor Ahmad actually consider magical
realism in any great detail, and certainly do not offer any adequate definition of
the genre.
Wendy Faris states that magical realism is an important component of
postmodernism,28 which she defines using Brian McHales distinction between
modernism as an epistemological and postmodernism as an ontological literary mode. To Faris, the moment of invention, the realisation of the imaginary realm is what signals that magical realism, as postmodernism, is concerned
with questions of being rather than questions of knowledge, echoing
Gonzles Echevarras and Spindlers typologies. Faris refers to John Barths
essay The Literature of Replenishment in which he takes Garca Mrquezs
One Hundred Years of Solitude to be the perfect example of postmodernism,
describing it as a synthesis of straightforwardness and artifice, realism and
magic and myth, political passion and nonpolitical artistry, characterization
and caricature, humour and terror.29 In addition, she lists a number of secondary specifications of magical realism, some by now familiar, which also allow
her to place it within the postmodern: metafictionality, linguistic playfulness
and self-awareness, repetition and intertextual reference, an anti-bureaucratic
agenda, a carnivalesque spirit and so on. Once more, however, while these
10
devices certainly appear in magical realist works, it is not obvious how they
are specific to magical realism. Despite these critics attempts, it remains unclear
how magical realism can be satisfactorily described as a particularly postmodern genre. Indeed, efforts to align magical realism with postmodernism,
although interesting, have failed to provide a definition of the genre.
11
12
realist narrator and the focalizer must present a coherent Weltanschauung, but
she also stresses that it is the consistency and verisimilitude within the fictitious
world which is key, not whether this Weltanschauung actually conforms to a
particular cultural world-view (MRF 36). Chanady elsewhere notes that most
of Garca Mrquezs supernatural motifs do not, in fact, have a connection to
an existing indigenous world-view. Thus, although magical realism can be
traced to Latin American syncretism, Chanady extends the term to refer to any
fictitious juxtaposition of the natural and the supernatural.35
In Chanadys magical realism both authorial reticence and focalizer work
simultaneously to resolve the antinomy between the magic and the real.
Chanadys definition of magical realism thus combines elements of Spindlers
anthropological and ontological magical realism: the manner in which the
presence of a particular world-view works to resolve the antinomy between the
real and the magic is exactly through the use of a matter-of-fact narration.
Chanadys essential definition of magical realism is the coexistence of the
natural and supernatural without antinomy, an idea that has, as we have seen,
dominated contemporary theories of magical realism in literature. Indeed, this
definition of magical realism certainly permits, even encourages, the prevalent
postcolonial readings of the genre. However, the division between the cultural
and the textual that Spindlers typology suggests also indicates an inherent
problem in magical realism, which Aldama touched upon above. Aldama
stresses that magical realism, as a text, was not a de facto site of resistance and
emancipation and that it certainly does not change the course of history
(PNC 41) a textual resolution of antinomy does not necessarily equal a resolution of the antinomy between cultural world-views.
Indeed, Jamesons definition of magical realism suggested that it was borne
out of a conflict between cultures. In addition, Jameson indicated that as such,
magical realism was precisely opposed to an aesthetic postmodern textuality
divorced from the real world. Brenda Coopers attempt to reconcile Jamesons
definition with an articulation of magical realism as genre that expresses
cultural hybridity through postmodern techniques highlights the inherent
contradiction in postcolonial approaches to the genre. Cooper is forced to
conclude that the hybridity of magical realism does not, in fact, necessarily
imply a straightforward political reading of the genre: This mode contests
boundaries, seamless unities and ethnic purities and can therefore co-exist only
very uneasily with cultural nationalism (WAF 216). In the texts she considers
she often finds that the proposed alignment of realism and the colonial power,
on the one hand, and magic and a decolonizing force, on the other is, at best,
ambiguous. In fact, she has to admit that the folkloric tradition of these novels
often carries a conservatism and a cultural exclusiveness that also shuts down
the vision of the third eye (WAF 218). She explains this ambiguity by pointing
to the relatively privileged point of view of most writers of magical realism,
their position as migrant cosmopolitans, which inevitably implicates them in
Western capitalist culture. In fact, despite her best efforts to prove the contrary,
13
in her book about African magical realism, Cooper does little to move away
from a conclusion she draws in an earlier article: The term Magical Realism
in its most common usage [. . .] is not linked to a specific ideological or theoretical framework and cannot be assumed to be politically enlightened.36
Similarly, while Durix expressly narrowed the definition of magical realism
by adding the proviso that the text must include a socio-political content, he is
acutely aware of the inherent problems with such a condition. For, although
the presence of the two radically antithetic but nevertheless equally essentialist discourses in the same fictional structure results in a mutual questioning of
each ones pretensions to totality and unproblematic ease, the seriousness of
the political discourse is duplicated and somewhat undermined by the equally
serious at least on the surface conventions of magic (MGP 188). Durix
argues for the liberatory potential of the hybrid aesthetics of the New
Literatures, but while magical realism plays a major part in this aesthetics, he is
continually forced to concede that it is a problematic genre in the postcolonial
context. The magic is always in danger of undermining political readings of
the genre and demonstrating that magical realism offers nothing but a futile
inversion of existing hierarchies, pandering to the tastes of Westerners eager to
read about quaint exotic worlds (MGP 188).
In fact, can the magic in magical realism be seen to embody any kind of
politics at all? Timothy Brennans critique of magical realist works in his
Salman Rushdie and the Third World is worth noting. Although he does not
attempt to define magical realism, his readings of One Hundred Years of Solitude
and Midnights Children highlight a central problem for magical realism in a
postcolonial context. He notes that the way these novels magically, we must
note end in apocalypse ambiguously counters their passionate opposition to
censorship and their struggle for human rights in the public forum.37 Brennan
repeatedly suggests that the magical elements seem to be contradictory to,
rather than facilitating, the socio-political content of these novels. In Midnights
Children authorial creation, or what we would call the magical content, is
sourced from Indian culture, folklore and myth and explicitly attempts to fulfil
Indias, in Rushdies words, national longing for form,38 suggesting a postcolonial, nationalistic theme. However, Brennan notes that Rushdies novel also
repeatedly suggests that such invention or fakery is problematic in this setting:
Although the nave dilemma of fakery is a truism in fiction, in Rushdie it is
something more a plague on political discourse, and so, in Rushdies case
(who combines the two), a double bind.39 Indeed, this double bind between
realist political discourse, on the one hand, and authorial invention, fakery or
magic, on the other, is at the heart of the possibilities and problems of magical
realism in a postcolonial context.
However, the problem posed by Cooper, Durix and Brennan is perhaps
the wrong one. Their analyses of the genre assume, as many critics do, that the
magic element of magical realism must be central to the genres perceived subversion of Western categories of real and supernatural. However, looking back
14
at definitions of the genre, the one narrative technique that has consistently
been privileged as essential to magical realism is the factual or matter-of-fact
tone. Wendy Faris highlights that this device is provided by the realism in
magical realism, and therefore realism must be part of the genres definition.
In other words, the term magical realism itself indicates not only the inclusion
of both natural and supernatural events without antinomy, but also the key role
played by the realistic narration in the resolution of this antinomy. It may be
true, as Zamora and Faris point out, that magical realism is an extension of
realism in its concern with the nature of reality and its representation, at the
same time as it resists the basic assumptions of post-enlightenment rationalism
and literary realism.40 However, to Zamora and Faris, as to most of the other
critics that we have considered, realism is key to a consideration of magical realism not because the genre departs from realism, but because realism integrates
magic into the rationality and materiality of literary realism.41
Robert R. Wilson further explores how realism is central to magical realism
using the notion of literary space. Any fictional world invokes an experience
of place of volume, distance, co-ordination, interiority and exteriority [. . .]
made possible by deictics and descriptive phrases that appear to place characters and things in relation to each other and to a larger context. This space,
continues Wilson, can take three forms: 1) a world in which all deictics and
descriptions operate as if they were being used in the extra-textual world; 2) a
world in which all such indications of space are generated in accordance with
self-contained axioms or rules; and 3) a world where the descriptions of
space are sometimes those of the extra-textual world, but at other times [. . .]
are those of another place which, if it were to exist purely, would be an enclosed
axiomatic game of the second kind.42
While the first kind of fictional world corresponds to realism, and the second
to fantasy, magical realism belongs to the third category, a fictional space
created by the dual inscription of incompatible geometries which allows the
coexistence of two distinct fictional worlds, following different rules, in an
enfolding of two kinds of cause and effect, two kinds of organism, two kinds
of consequence, two kinds of time and space [. . .] even two modes of textuality
(MS 7172). To Wilson the hybridness of space eruptions occur normally
because the two worlds interact, interpenetrate and interwind, unpredictably
but in a natural fashion (MS 71). This effect is attained by avoiding asking
certain questions and adopting a neutral narrative voice. What Wilson terms
hybridness is thus the resolution of the antinomy between the two worlds,
through precisely a matter-of-fact narrative.
Crucially, Wilson states that the two worlds of magical realism like parabolic
trajectories, always approach each other but never actually merge (MS 73).
This is a point that appears to have been overlooked by many critics, but which
is, in fact, entirely necessary to the most common definition of magical realism.
As Chanady succinctly points out, if the supernatural is not recognized as such,
there can be no magical realism (MRF 22). To some extent, we are back to the
15
16
As we have seen, most critics considered above adhere to the idea that magical realism implies a resolution of the antinomy between the magic and the
real, allowing the two levels in the text to coexist in a non-hierarchical or equal
way. In addition, many readings imply that as Jameson suggests, the real and the
magic are representative of pre-capitalist and capitalist, native and colonial, or
non-Western and Western cultures or world-views. Such readings also suggest
that the resolution of antinomy in the magical realist text implies a subversion
of the Western world-view, or a decolonizing movement, expressed as a cultural
and generic hybridity. Yet there is surely an implicit contradiction here. If
there is to be any kind of hybridity in the magical realist text, the two worldviews, cultures or levels of reality also have to be perceived as distinct and separate, as both Chanady and Wilson suggest. In fact, in order to define magical
realism it has to be differentiated in this way from simple realism or fantasy.
Furthermore, the particular relationship between the real and the magic has
to be defined technically or textually; the mere contextual presence of two
world-views is not enough to distinguish magical realism from any type of writing that deals with different cultures. Only the method proposed by Chanady
provides an adequate way of describing the unique way a magical realist text
works: resolving antinomy through a matter-of-fact realist narrative. However, if
this is the manner in which magical realism must be defined, Chanady is also
the only critic who provides a convincing account of how the real and the magic
are distinguished in the text. A simple contextual approach is unable to do
this, or to define magical realism adequately. However, Chanadys method highlights a central problem for postcolonial approaches to the genre. If magical
realisms perceived suitability for describing the postcolonial condition depends
on the resolution of the antinomy between the real and the magic, then if this
resolution depends on a realism that is explicitly connected with a Western
world-view, how successful can the genre ever be considered to be?
Yet it is striking how pervasive the view of magical realism as a decolonizing
genre is, despite the quite obvious problems with this approach. Michael Valdez
Moses takes magical realism to be a genre akin to the historical romance, its
magic as nostalgia for the pre-modern, precisely because of its essentially
Western perspective, but he also notes how writers of magical realism seem to
encourage the utopian hopes of those who look to magical realism [. . .] for
a radical alternative to the malaise they understand global modernity to be.44
We will return to look at the reasons for this common approach, as well as for
its common problems, in the last chapter of this book.
As Christopher Warnes points out in his recent Magical Realism and the Postcolonial Novel, there has not been any notable definition of the genre in recent
years that diverges substantially from Chanadys model.45 Warnes recommends
a formal, lucid and consistent definition and a close attention to the semantics
of structure.46 However, he also affirms the formal properties of magical realism we are already familiar with: at key moments in each novel the supernatural is naturalised and integrated into the novels realism without being explained
17
18
Chapter 2
20
univocal Being. To Deleuze, difference, rather than identity, is therefore primary to Being.
Deleuze emphasizes the role of the virtual in an understanding of reality.
A view of reality that only takes the actual side into account, which allows the
virtual to be reduced to a simple possible (DR 205), leads to error and illusion.
However, to Deleuze, this error does not come about without reason. The
virtual consists of pure difference-in-itself, which becomes actualized in
matter and forms. However, in this process, says Deleuze, difference-in-itself is
negated:
Difference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends to be cancelled;
this means only that difference is essentially implicated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be explicated is to be cancelled or to dispel the
inequality that constitutes it [. . .] it is cancelled insofar as it is drawn outside
itself, in extensity and in the quality which fills that extensity. (DR 228)
The difference-in-itself of the virtual is pure intensity, or rather, differences
in intensity without matter or form, but the actualization of this intensity into
matter and form turns difference-in-itself into actual things. Yet, since the virtual and the actual are both part of the real, this is an inevitable transaction:
difference creates both this extensity and this quality [. . .]. Difference of intensity is cancelled or tends to be cancelled in this system, but it creates this system
by explicating itself (DR 228).
This inescapable reduction of the virtual in its process of actualization leads
to us to make mistakes in the way we see and describe the world, and the rejection and correction of these mistakes is a central theme in Deleuzes work.
Once difference-in-itself is actualized it produces specific difference, and it is
here that the long error of what Deleuze calls the image of thought begins:
identity (actual) is privileged over difference (virtual) (DR 129). In Difference
and Repetition, tracing a line from Plato and Aristotle through Descartes to
Kant and beyond, Deleuze finds that this initial confusion underpins and links
such erroneous concepts as a transcendent origin or creator, the primacy of
the thinking subject (or Cogito), and, importantly for our investigation, what
Deleuze calls the illusion of representation (DR 277).
In the face of this inevitable error of thought, how is it then possible to grasp
the true nature of reality? Deleuze proposes that while there is an actualization
of the virtual, there is also a counter-actualization or counter-effectuation of the
actual, whereby the actual can, in a sense, communicate with its virtual side.
Even when it has been actualized, every object still has a virtual side, an excess
of the virtual that is not explicated, but left unaccomplished in actualization.2
Essentially, counter-actualization is a process of recognizing or thinking the virtual side of actuality, but it is also, to Deleuze, a way of reaching the full potential of reality, or, on an individual level, to personal freedom. Counter-actualization
21
is where our greatest freedom lies the freedom by which we develop and lead
the [virtual] to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters
of actualizations and causes (LS 243). To Deleuze, counter-actualization, the
thinking of the virtual together with the actual and according difference its
proper weight, is therefore the only ethics and the aim of every individual and
of creation as such.
22
23
Deleuze insists that what he and Guattari are practising is pure philosophy,
something which they explain as attempting to save the infinite by giving it
consistency: it [philosophy] lays out a plane of immanence (WIP 197). A philosophical plane of immanence, also called the plane of consistency, is nothing
but thought cutting through the virtual, capturing a slice of it. In their joint
projects Deleuze and Guattari proceed to demonstrate how all structures in the
actual, so called assemblages, are conditioned by the virtual, by thinking various
planes of the virtual which relate to these structures. Confusingly, they assign
different terms to these planes in different contexts such as the abstract
machine, the body without organs or the line of flight. Importantly, however,
whatever it is called, this virtual plane is never separate, neither prior nor anterior to any of the actual structures social, economical, psychological or linguistic that Deleuze and Guattari consider.
It is important to note three aspects of Deleuze and Guattaris endeavour.
First, Deleuze and Guattari never abandon the basic principle of the unity of
the actual and the virtual and the univocity of Being. Second, they valorize
those assemblages which make the virtual more apparent or more active within
the actual; and third, the ultimate aim of their project is an articulation of the
virtual movement which is presupposed by all of the actual structures they investigate. Throughout their writing this aim is made clear: what they designate
variably as the molecular, micropolitical, rhizomatic, nomadic and so on, is
constantly articulated as more positive, because closer to its virtual part, than
the molar, macropolitical, arborescent or sedentary. Most valued is the abstract
machine, the body without organs, or the line of flight, which all designate the
virtual plane in itself. While the actual and the virtual are always seen as one,
there is a continual imperative not only to move from those actual constellations in which the virtual is less active or apparent to those in which it is more
so, but ultimately also to effect a counter-actualization that implies a thinking of
the virtual side of Being in itself. Hallward points out Deleuzes distinction
between two general kinds of actuality, two orientations of the creature; that is,
the difference between the forms of actuality that are oriented to life in the
world, e.g. through personal fulfilment, social interaction, political integration, responsible communication, ethical concern etc. and the forms which
set out to become adequate to the virtual events which sustain or inspire them
and are thus oriented towards a being out of this world.15
24
the virtual that which is impersonal, apolitical and aspecific, and in Hallwards
terms out of this world. Badiou similarly states that the aim of Deleuzian
thought is to go beyond worldly life: for individuals to attain the point where
they are seized by their preindividual determination and, thus, by the power of
the One-All of which they are, at the start, only meagre local configurations
they have to go beyond their limits and endure transfixion and disintegration
of their actuality by infinite virtuality (DC 1213).
There is certainly a politics of Deleuzian thought, insofar it privileges
certain ways of being in the world, but this is always superseded by an imperative to understand that which this world presupposes. Readers of Deleuze who
favour the plural and political, seem to consistently neglect the full implications
of Deleuze and Guattaris lines of flight. There is, as Deleuze and Guattari
make clear, on one hand, a relative deterritorialization in the actual, and on the
other, an absolute deterritorialization from the actual to the virtual. When they
speak of the political or revolutionary, it is in the sense of going beyond the
actual social, political and revolutionary as such, towards a purely creative force
presupposed by social or political formations and structures. As Badiou insists:
The question posed by Deleuze is the question of Being. From beginning to
end, and under the constraint of innumerable and fortuitous cases, his work
is concerned with thinking thought (its act, its movement) on the basis of an
ontological precomprehension of Being as One. It is impossible to overemphasize this point, consistently occulted by critical or phenomenological
interpretations of his work. (DC 20)
For example, the often invoked Deleuzian concept of becoming can be seen as
this kind of redemptive movement from the actual to the virtual. While Deleuze
and Guattari describe becoming in many different ways (TP 232309), it can be
summarised as the process of individual deterritorialization, or the counteractualization of an individual (although the individual is not necessarily a
person) precisely towards a pre-individual state. It is, however, not always one
single motion. Deleuze and Guattari trace a progression of becomings:
Exclusive importance should not be attached to becomings-animal. Rather
they are segments occupying a median region. On the near side, we encounter becomings-woman, becomings-child [. . .] On the far side, we find becomings-elementary, -cellular, -molecular, and even becomings-imperceptible
[. . .]. Everything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane of consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the
imperceptible is seen and heard [. . .]. The imperceptible is the immanent
end of becoming, its cosmic formula. (TP 248, 252, 279)
Certainly the centrality of the idea of Being as One for Deleuze implies
an imperative to a redemptive movement in his philosophy, as suggested by
25
Hallward: the need to overcome the illusions of the actual and reach the full
potential of Being through thinking the virtual. Deleuze gives possible models
for this redemption in his concepts of counter-actualization, becoming-imperceptible, or absolute deterritorialization. What Hallward crucially points out is
the radical even though paradoxical difference of the virtual from the actual in
Deleuzes philosophy, and the implicit valorization of the movement towards
this virtual in his works, including those authored with Guattari. However,
Deleuze makes it clear that counter-actualization always begins in the actual,
that it presents the possibility of thinking the virtual in this world, rather than,
as Hallward claims, out of it. To Hallward redemption is only possible by an
abrogation of the actual or worldly. Hallward posits the actual as the Given
[. . .] as opposed to the Real [. . .],16 and concludes that Deleuzes philosophy
articulates the unqualified dependence of the actual upon the virtual, the pure
redundance of the actual .17 In fact, to Deleuze, the very possibility of counteractualization, which is not simply a virtualisation, is, as it were, the redemption
of the actual as such the redemption of the actual from redundancy. Deleuze
not only insists that the virtual is real, but also emphasizes that the actual is a
necessary part of Being: the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way
that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself,
to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualised (B 97). The virtual
is not primordial, and the actual derivative; rather they form an inextricable
circuit, which the movement of Being perpetually traces:
there is coalescence and division, or rather oscillation, a perpetual exchange
between the actual object and its virtual image: the virtual image never stops
becoming actual. The virtual image absorbs all of a characters actuality,
at the same time as the actual character is no more than a virtuality [. . .].
The actual and the virtual coexist, and enter into a tight circuit which we are
continually retracing from one to the other. (DII 114)
That is, Deleuzes philosophical method continually involves the actual as much
as the virtual. In fact, we have no choice but to begin any inquiry into the nature
of Being from the actual. Badiou points out that the starting point required by
Deleuzes method is always a concrete case (DC 14). And therefore he finds in
Deleuze not an abrogation of the world but a sort of unwavering love for the
world as it is (DC 44).
If Being is One, and the virtual is always part of the actual, redemption or
counter-actualization is a matter of recognizing and understanding the virtual
in the actual. The actual without the virtual gives rise to illusion, because it
does not attain the ground of its own truth as Badiou puts it (DC 47). In the
face of this illusion, Hallward concludes that if equal, univocal being is immediately present in everything, without mediation or intermediary, then our
task is to eliminate everything that mediates or re-presents this being.18 In fact,
the idea of redemption hinges on a non-hierarchical distribution of univocal
26
27
what is only a method (procd) in the social field into a procedure as an infinite virtual movement.19
Thus literature exceeds the limited field of politics in the actual:
In reality writing does not have its end in itself, precisely because life is not something
personal. Or rather, the aim of writing is to carry life to the state of a nonpersonal power. In doing this it renounces claim to any territory, any end
which would reside in itself [. . .]. The line of flight is creative of these becomings. Lines of flight have no territory. Writing carries out the conjunction,
the transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes from resentment of
persons, societies and reigns. (DII 3738)
What distinguishes art from philosophy and science is the unique way it brings
together the actual and virtual in thought. Art does not actualize the virtual
event but incorporates or embodies it: it gives it a body, a life, a universe
(WIP 177). We saw that the movement of Being was essentially double: while
philosophy follows one side of the movement of being, from the actual or the
given states of affairs to the virtual, science follows the other side of the circuit,
from the virtual to the actual, or from chaotic virtuality to the states of affairs
and bodies that actualize it (WIP 155156). Art, however, embodies the whole
circuit in such a way that the virtual and actual become indiscernible. Deleuze
describes this function of art in his work on cinema:
this point of indiscernibility is precisely constituted by the smallest circle, that
is, the coalescence of the actual image and the virtual image, the image with
two sides, actual and virtual at the same time [. . .] it does not suppress
the distinction between the two sides, but makes it unattributable, each side
taking the others role in a relation which we must describe as reciprocal
presupposition, or reversibility.20
The way art creates zones of indiscernibility between actual and virtual is key to
an understanding of the role of art in Deleuzian ethics. Deleuze often articulates this indiscernibility or becoming-imperceptible as an embrace of or
immersion in the world, a surpassing of the human in an inclusive sense.
[To become is] to find ones zone of indiscernibility with other traits, and in
this way enter the haecceity and impersonality of the creator. One is then like
grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything, into a becoming,
because one has made a necessarily communicating world, because one has
suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us from slipping between
things and growing in the midst of things. One has combined everything
(le tout). (TP 280)
28
What art does is to allow us to think the univocity of Being through an immersion in the world precisely without necessarily renouncing the actual as
Hallward would suggest. Thus art, for Deleuze, is one of the most accessible
models of counter-actualization or redemption as it provides us with a way of
thinking the virtual as Being: What is an essence as revealed in the work of
art? It is a difference, the absolute and ultimate Difference. Difference is what
constitutes being, what makes us conceive being.21 Thus, not only is Deleuzes
ontology central to his theory of art, but art is also key to his ontological
inquiry.
29
30
works in, or by, the virtual. From the perspective of the actual, divergent series
are perceived as incompatible, unconnected, and do not form part of a system.
However, the virtual object = x, since it connects series only through difference,
allows for divergent series to coexist and connect, and this very coexistence
makes the virtual thinkable in the actual, by making series resonate, diverge
and ramify.
This may seem rather intuitive, but Deleuze does allow that disjunctive synthesis has a practical effect, perceptible in the realm of the actual. Every system
of disjunctive synthesis has a virtual object = x ensuring communication between
series, and while this is always imperceptible within an actual system, the path
it traces in the system is visible in reverse as the function it performs within
the system: the connection of the series. As such it can be thought in terms
of an actual identity, and the relation it gives to the series in the system can be
seen as resemblance, although these are merely statistical effects of its initial,
invisible function. This resemblance, and the identity that it creates, is always
external to the system, because only pure difference is at its core (DR 119).
However, these statistical effects are precisely the resonance of the virtual in
the actual, which allow us to think disjunctive synthesis in the serial system that
is literature.
The way that Deleuze works with series in literature is connected to his theory
of language and sense. Language consists of a series of propositions (or words)
and a series of things, or, a series of signifiers and a series of signifieds. However,
to Deleuze, the sense produced by language is not simply the direct reference
of one of the series to the other. It is rather a resonance between series, effected
precisely through disjunctive synthesis. The two series of language do not actually correspond to each other, and therefore allow the continual displacement
of terms of one series in relation to the terms of the other series. Deleuze asserts
that there is always an excess in the series of propositions, there are always more
words than things, since the elements of the series of words are part of a totality,
language, and do not exist independent of their differential relations within
this language, whereas things come into being progressively (LS 58). This excess
in one series, seen as lack in the other, works as the object = x of language, by
means of which the series communicate, without losing their difference.
Deleuze likens this object = x to Lvi-Strausss symbolic value zero, a value
itself void of sense and thus susceptible of taking any sense, whose unique function would be to fill the gap between signifier and signified (LS 59). To Deleuze,
the object = x has the function of articulating the two series to one another, of
reflecting them in one another, of making them communicate [. . .] of assuring
the bestowal of sense in both signifying and signified series. For sense is not to
be confused with signification; it is rather what is attributed in such a way that
it determines both the signifier and the signified as such (LS 61).
Nevertheless, the statistical effect of the virtual object = x appears as
reference or resemblance. Because of the inevitable illusion that the actual
gives rise to, if we consider language purely from an actual perspective, it seems
31
32
a single one (LS 199). Therefore its effect is a third outcome which unites two
divergent meanings, allowing them to coexist.
The Deleuzian notion of series thus explains how counter-actualization is
a synthesis which affirms the disjunct as such and makes each series resonate
inside the other (LS 204). It shows us how counter-actualization means that the
virtual has an effect in the actual, and that it is therefore possible to think the
virtual in the actual. In addition, it gives us a practical set of tools to apply to
literature. We saw in Deleuzes examples that disjunctive synthesis has a double
effect in a text: it makes convergent series resonate with new meaning, and it
allows divergent series, and therefore divergent meanings, to coexist at the
same time.
33
suited to such description: places, events and characters that are systematized
or categorized. Hamon lists, for example, domestic interiors, ritualized events
such as meals or feasts, ordered parts of society such as villages or towns. In
addition, he suggests that the theme of family history within a socio-political
context is favoured by the realist genre because it provides validation on both
the level of character and of setting.
This appears to be a description fitting the realism in magical realism identified by Amaryll Chanady, a realism produced by a narrator who is situating the
story in present-day reality, using learned expressions and vocabulary, and showing he is familiar with logical reasoning and empirical knowledge (MRF 22).
Crucially, in Deleuzian terms this highly systematized detail of the realist narrative can be seen as structured by connective and conjunctive syntheses. Series of
items are coordinated by location, series of locations by social organization,
series of characters are connected by family ties, and their actions are connected not only temporally, but also conceptually through socio-economic or
psychological circumstances. Thus a heterogeneous series of events emerges
through a conjunctive synthesis subject to coexistence in historical time and
space, and forms a coherent plot.
In fact, the main structure of the realist text appears as two super-series,
that of the narration and that of the events. These series are composed of
sub-series, such as scenes, characters, settings and the narrative elements that
relate to them, which are all convergent. In addition, the events of a realist text
all conform to the laws of nature. Indeed, to Deleuze, such universal laws are
part of a system of convergent series. Deleuze states that the laws of nature
are merely an empirical principle governing a domain of the actual, which
is a qualified and extended partial system, governed in such a manner that the
difference of intensity which creates it tends to be cancelled (DR 241). The
laws of nature are therefore part of a system that is not self-differing and not
disjunctive. Furthermore, the two super-series seem to be convergent with each
other, in the same way that the two series of language appear to refer to each
other. As we saw, this illusion of representation is false but inevitable if we
only consider the actual part of language or narration. That is, without the
divergence or difference of the virtual, the series of narrative and events
will appear to resemble one another. This effect of the language system that
Deleuze calls the illusion of representation is in essence the same effect that
Barthes names the referential illusion in realism, and it is an effect inherent
to a convergent system.
However, while this convergent system of the realist narration is central
to magical realism, effectively providing the authenticating matter-of-fact tone
that makes both the magic and the real appear real, magical realism also
includes a necessarily incongruent element: the magic. Chanady convincingly
argues that the magic appears as different because it does not fit into the
world-view indicated by the learned and rational narrator, who can be identified through a detailed and thus authenticating realist narrative. We can now
34
reformulate this idea using Deleuzes thought: the magic appears as different
because it is a divergent element in the otherwise convergent series of realism.
It does not fit into a system of reality that follows empirical laws: it is divergent
from the domain of the laws of nature. This is why realism is key to magical
realism. It sets up the system of convergence against which the magic is
different or divergent, but crucially, it is this divergence that makes things
happen in a unique way in the magical realist text, a divergence that is virtual
difference-in-itself. In the particular system that is magical realism, the virtual
becomes visible, or thinkable, as the magic event, just like in Prousts Combray
passage it took on the identity of the madeleine.
However, the narration, continuing to be realist, also appears to authenticate
the magic: magical events are described in the same way as the real events,
using the same authenticating detail. This creates a discrepancy between the
way the magic is perceived as divergent from the laws of nature, and the way
magic is described as if fitting within these laws. Because of this discrepancy
the illusion of representation is exposed. When both the series of narration and
events were convergent, there appeared to be a relationship of representation
between them. Now that the series of events includes a divergent element that
is not mirrored as a divergent element in the narration, this representation is
put into question. That is, if the narration would indicate that this element was
in some way strange or deviant, as it does in stories of the fantastic or uncanny,
this discrepancy would not be apparent. We have to stress that what is seen as
real and magic is set up by the text. Thus it does not actually matter if author,
reader or even fictional characters (as opposed to the focalizer or narrator)
believe or perceive the magic to be true or as actually taking place. It remains
divergent from the world-view, or system, established on the realist level of
the text.
By means of this very textual discrepancy, it becomes obvious that, as Barthes
would say, the supposed referent is slipping away: the narration is authenticating something which cannot be authenticated, that does not belong within the
framework of thought that authentication per se indicates. Thus the magic
exposes the non-correspondence of the narration and events. At the same time,
it also exposes an excess in the signifying series: the authenticating devices of
realism appear extraneous when used to describe magic, because authentication is part of a partial system that does not include magic, in which magic is a
lack. In this way, magic appears as an object = x in the text. It is, in effect, an
esoteric unit in the text: non-referential and nonsensical. It becomes clear
that the magic can take on any meaning, or rather, that it creates its own sense
within the system of the text. Thus magic superimposes a disjunctive synthesis
on the connective and conjunctive syntheses of realism. The convergent series
of realism are then able to take on new resonance, diverge and ramify. Magic
therefore not only creates its own sense, but as a virtual object = x, creates the
sense of the text, making its series communicate with each other. Practically,
this resonance and divergence, this communication with the virtual, translates
35
as new and multiple meaning. As we saw in the examples from Proust and
Carroll, meaning created by the relationship or resonance between the series in
the text itself, rather than the apparently representational meaning of realism.
The magic realist text thus seems to be counter-actualized, yet it also retains a
realist narrative. This means that it retains the structure that underpins the
referential illusion. It continues to authenticate its events, and thus continues
to produce the illusion of representation, even in the face of the disjunctive
synthesis that makes it resonate. In fact, there are two very different movements
in magical realism: that of disjunctive synthesis and virtual resonance, and that
of realism and representation.
Why, then, does the counter-actualization of the magical realist text not
obliterate the illusion of representation completely? To explore this we can
compare magical realism to minor literature. To Deleuze and Guattari, one of
the main characteristics of a minor literature is the deterritorialization of
language (KM 18). A language is territorialized when it is ordered and codified, conceptually, socially or politically. Such a major language is appropriated by minor literature, in which language stops being representative in order to
now move toward its extremities or limits (KM 23). Language, when it directly
reverberates with a virtual intensity, no longer has any referential meaning, but
is only a sequence of intensive states, a pure and intense sonorous material
opposed to all symbolic or even significant or simply signifying usages of it
(KM 21, 6, 19). This is an experimental language put to strange and minor
uses, which prevents straightforward representational interpretation (KM 17).
Magical realism never reaches this stage of directly intense language, because
of the dominance of its realism. Realism is exactly a territorialized language,
because it reflects a particular order of thought. While the magic in magical
realism may make the text resonate in new ways, it never deterritorializes
language completely in the way minor literature does. However, Deleuze and
Guattari also consider literature which doesnt succeed in bringing itself into
full effect that is, in rejoining the field of immanence (KM 87). To Deleuze
and Guattari, although it starts out on the right path, Kafkas The Metamorphosis is blocked. The becoming-animal of Gregor Samsa is a deterritorialization of the human and his place in society and the family, which is a step
towards counter-actualization. However, Gregor is reterritorialized by his
family, forced back into a social order unable to accommodate him, and therefore goes to his death without following a line of escape. To Deleuze and
Guattari, the story ends up being too much of a metaphor that is, a representational rather than a minor type of text because it is not rich enough in
articulations and junctions (KM 38).
If we compare this consideration of minor literature to the concept of
serial structures, it seems that the counter-actualization of a text is a complete
deterritorialization of language, through a disjunctive synthesis that causes a
ramification or proliferation of series, to the extent that language takes flight.
Texts of minor literature are worth nothing except in themselves and [. . .]
36
37
see the magic as a subversive element, there is still an uneasiness regarding the
merits of magical realism in a postcolonial context. This stems from the very
fact that the magic functions as a virtual object, or, in Peter Hallwards terms,
from the fact that magical realism tends towards the singular, rather than the
specific.
In Absolutely Postcolonial and elsewhere, Hallward rethinks postcolonial theory
and texts from the perspective of the singular and the specific.29 It is important
to note that Hallward posits both the singular and the specific against the
specified. The specified should not be confused with the specific, although it
also is a mode of individuation dependent on relationality. The specific is
actively subjective: that is, a choice of relation by the subject itself. It is not
inherently oriented towards a certain political or ethical position. The specified, in contrast, is passive and objectified: a relation imposed from outside.
It is a way of thinking of individuals [. . .] as individuated by certain intrinsic,
invariant and thus characteristic properties, innate or acquired, racial or sexual, national or cultural, physical or spiritual.30
The postcolonial movement, for obvious reasons, seeks to overcome specified, determined identities (such as colonizercolonized or oppressor
oppressed), and the singular and the specific are both ways of thinking being
as de-specified in this sense, but in very different ways. The specific achieves
de-specification because it reveals the specified object to be a free subject, able
to make its own active relational choices. The singular on the other hand is
de-specifying because it denies the existence of relationality as such. In the
singular, the individual is determined neither by static categories, nor by active
relations, but purely by the creative whole or the One of which it is a part. To
Hallward, it is crucial to consider whether a text operates as singular, specific or
specified in the context of postcolonial literature. A text which expresses the
specified, expresses political, ethnic and sexual identities as rigid and essential.
A specific text, on the other hand, exposes these identities as fluid, and questions the relational processes that lead to identity in the first place. The specific
text, however, retains a political or social dimension: to Hallward it is fundamentally militant, but as opposed to the specified it deals with how over what
(AP 248). In contrast to the socio-political dimensions of both the specified and
the specific text, the singular text is a productive autonomy (AP 15); denying
even the existence of relationality, the singular text is entirely ahistorical, asocial and apolitical. Instead it is an impersonal affirmation of the immediate
presence of a univocal creative force (AP 1518).
Hallward makes the observation that while the priorities of the postcolonial
are mainly presented as specific, theories of the postcolonial are, in fact, more
of an expression of singular thought (AP 20). In postcolonial theoretical texts
Hallward notes the ritual invocation of the ubiquitously specifying categories of
gender, ethnicity, and community affiliation (AP 22). Indeed, we have seen
that in postcolonial readings of magical realism the relation of the text to the
38
39
We can then position this analysis of realism and magical realism in a postcolonial context using Hallwards terms. Realism is generally seen as a type of
narrative complicit with colonization. According to Bhabha, colonial discourse
resembles a form of narrative whereby the productivity and circulation of
subjects and signs are bound in a reformed and recognizable totality. It employs
a system of representation, a regime of truth, that is structurally similar to
realism.33 Realist narrative in literature is thus ostensibly politicized: it is seen
as a part of a dominant discourse, the discourse of the colonizer. Said, whose
notion of Orientalism is central to ideas about colonialism and discourse, indeed
refers to Orientalism as a radical realism: rhetorically speaking, Orientalism
is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in
the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts.34
Compare this anatomical and enumerative discourse to the authenticating
devices of realism we considered earlier. Therefore the relation of postcolonial
literatures to realism is problematic: it is often felt that realism needs to be
replaced with a new, liberating discourse in the fight against colonialism.
Indicative of the line taken by many surveys of postcolonial literature, Ashcroft
et al. in The Empire Writes Back, identify the main strategies available to writers
who want to replace a dominant discourse as abrogation and subversion through
appropriation.35 Clearly, magical realism, in the postcolonial context, would be
an example of appropriation, since it uses realism. Indeed, it does also appear
to subvert realism to a certain extent, insofar as it questions both its specifying
characteristics and its representational mode.
However, if we view magical realism as a text which also tends to the singular,
we must question what this subversion of realism as a dominant discourse
actually entails. As we saw, the specific and the singular text move beyond the
specified in two very different ways. If we consider realism as specified and complicit in the dominant discourse of colonialism, we find that a subversion of
realism through the specific or through the singular would have two very different effects. A specific discourse questions identities that are seen as essential or
authentic by considering the relational framework behind these specified identities, while a singular text questions notions of essence and authenticity only
insofar it moves away from a framework that allows such notions. Thus the
specific, while subverting the specified, remains in the field of the relational,
and therefore remains socio-politically oriented. In contrast, the singular text
does not engage with the specifying discourse at all, and thus subverts the
specified purely because it subverts the relational, and therefore the social or
political, as such.
We can thus see that if magical realism is an example of a singularizing text, it
is problematic for those critics who wish to see it politically subversive. In fact, it
seems to occupy a paradoxical position that is typical of the postcolonial, according to Hallward. It appeals to those who call for subversion of the dominant
colonial discourse, because it is a subversion of realism. We have noted that
the genre seems to encourage such readings. However, if magical realism is
40
Chapter 3
42
lived on as the genre has been taken up by writers all over the world. Indeed,
Shannin Schroeder, in his overview of the genre in the Americas, reads One
Hundred Years of Solitude as founded in Latin American reality, but sees magical
realism as a formal encoding of any decentred or marginal position.4
Notably, both a Latin American and a global postcolonial view of magical
realism define it as a new way of describing a particular social or cultural situation and therefore see it as a historical or political literary genre. Furthermore,
it is often the magic, in particular, which is seen as conveying the political force
of magical realism. This is also true for readings of Garca Mrquezs novel.
What critics often imply is that the anti-realist elements of One Hundred Years of
Solitude are also its anti-colonial elements. Zamora, for example, finds it uses
fantastic events and characters to address the abuses of contemporary political
and social institutions and myth to recreate history from a new perspective.5
On the other hand, many critics also point to the inherent disjunction
between the novels historical and political content and a magic that challenges
Western ideas of representation, meaning and truth. The novels elements of
magic seem to negate not any political message, and even themselves, through
their own ambiguity, and here the end of One Hundred Years of Solitude poses a
particular problem. Higgins notes that Paradoxically, [Garca Mrquez]
attempts to translate reality into words while casting doubt on the feasibility of
such an undertaking.6 Yet, as Williamson points out, the view that the novel
presents an autarchic fictional world creating through the act of narration
special conditions of development and meaning which enable the fictive imagination to achieve a free-floating state of pure self-reference akin to the exhilarated innocence of children at play [. . .] cannot explain the political and
historical allusions in the novel.7 The very multiplicity of possible readings of
One Hundred Years of Solitude poses a problem for critics: on the one hand there
is meaning, on the other it is so prolific that it negates itself. This tension is
clear in Regina Janess extensive analysis of the novel. She suggests that it
shatters what seemed to be a centre in order to bring the wider historical, cultural, metaphysical, and literary implications of the narrative to the surface,8
and thus points to one of the central problems for interpretations of magical
realism. If magical realism shatters the centre to such an extent that there is
considerable difficulty in achieving a coherent reading, how can it at the same
time be seen as carrying a particular message?
The contradiction lies in the fact that magic seems to break with the politically charged world that realism sets up in One Hundred Years of Solitude, thus
appearing to be a subversive force, at the same time as failing to provide any
politically useful rearticulation of that world. Williamson notes that the novel
does not necessarily support an equation of magic with liberation, for if one
examines how magical realism actually functions in the narrative, it will become
clear that there is an intimate connection between it and the degenerative
process described in the novel; indeed magical realism can be shown to be
a manifestation of the malaise that causes the decline of the Buenda family.9
43
44
and the real as two sides of the same thing, shown to be, at the same time,
radically differing. Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw how both the real
and the magic could be seen as organized by series. However, the series of the
real and of magic were very different. While realism is an ordered system of
convergent series connected by resemblance and contiguity, magic appears as a
divergent element in this system, ramifying and proliferating series by difference alone.
One of the most noted qualities of One Hundred Years of Solitude is its matterof-fact style, now almost universally seen as one of the defining characteristics
of magical realism. Critics refer to the novels deadpan or neutral tone and
its narrator that does not pass judgement, show surprise, or offer interpretations.13 The other oft-quoted stylistic characteristic of One Hundred Years of
Solitude is its richness of ethnographic detail, its local colour, which vividly
conveys the lives of the inhabitants of Macondo.14 This detail captures peoples
everyday life, including mundane household chores, habits of dressing, eating
and sleeping, and even bodily functions, but it also anchors One Hundred Years
of Solitude in both geography and history, whether it is by describing the preparation of a local dish, the social conventions or the political machinations of
the region: With scrupulous fidelity, the narrative constructs a fictional reality
that is recognizably costeo [of the coastal area in Colombia] in its historical,
geographical, ethnological, social and cultural detail.15
These elements are absolutely central to the novel as Gene Bell-Villada points
out: For all its fantastical exaggerations, and its natural or political catastrophes (those stereotypical Latin American experiences), the narrative centre
of One Hundred Years of Solitude is its faithful and convincing account of the
domestic routines and vicissitudes of the Buenda clan.16 In addition, the public sphere in One Hundred Years of Solitude includes the social movements, the
government actions, the technological changes (railroads, movies, telephones),
and the ecological developments, and also those organized rituals such as wakes
and group mourning, festive orgies and carnival, all of which affect Macondo
life at every possible level and give the book its outer boundaries and broad
shape.17 It is notable how Bell-Villadas analysis, suggesting that the Buendas
provide the narrative centre of One Hundred Years of Solitude, while Macondo
society determines the novels outlines, conforms to Philippe Hamons list of
the authenticating features that shape the realist novel: families, villages and
towns.
This matter-of-fact tone and local colour of One Hundred Years of Solitude
indicates that the novel is describing a real world in a realist way; in Deleuzian
terms we could say that it is structured as a system of convergent series. The
description of the Buendas and their house in the first chapter of One Hundred
Years of Solitude is typical of the novel: We learn that rsula and the children
broke their backs in the garden, growing banana and caladium, cassava and
yams, ahuyama roots and eggplants (OHYS 45), and that the house had a
small, well-lighted living room, a dining room in the shape of a terrace with
gaily coloured flowers, two bedrooms, a courtyard with a gigantic chestnut tree,
45
a well-kept garden, and a corral where goats, pigs, and hens lived in peaceful
communion (OHYS 9). It is clear how the elements of this description form
convergent series, some connected in lists of resemblances, like that of vegetables or animals, some coordinated by their use or place, like the interior details.
They are all brought together by the Buenda house, the pivot of this ordered
domestic system. It is the convergence of series that is crucial here. The matterof-fact list of vegetables, animals, chores and domestic features appear more
real for their very precision, indicating that the narrator has been there, seen it
and counted the chickens. It is this convergence that we recognize as reality
because our worldly reality is indeed a system of convergent series.
The ordered system of the Buenda household is the centre of the ordered
world of One Hundred Years of Solitude. The house is part of a series of locations
that make up the village of Macondo, which is in turn a point of convergence
for several series of geographical points. Thus the reality effect, that is, the
impression of a textual representation of a real, recognizable location, in a real,
recognizable geographical position is here furnished by several interconnected
systems of convergent series. In terms of the village, we have a series of places:
the Street of the Turks, the red light district, the river, the West Indian quarter,
the jungle. The village is itself firmly placed within a series of regional features:
impenetrable mountains to the east, with the ancient city of Riohacha beyond,
the swamps to the south, the sea to the west, and the jungle to the north.
The world of One Hundred Years of Solitude in its convergence describes what
is, to Deleuze, a fundamental human condition: The human being is a segmentary animal. Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata composing us. Dwelling,
getting around, working, playing: life is spatially and socially segmented. The
house is segmented according to its rooms assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city (TP 208). Deleuzes work with Guattari, in its focus
on the assemblages of the actual world, provides us with concepts to analyse this
world of convergent series or segmentarity further. However, various modes
of social organization, what Deleuze and Guattari call social assemblages, are
segmentary to different degrees, some more supple, some more rigid. One
social assemblage that is exceptionally rigid, whose segments are clearly delineated and fixed, is the State (TP 210211). The space of One Hundred Years of
Solitude conforms to what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the space of the
State, which is striated, by walls, enclosures, roads between enclosures (TP 381).
The action of segmenting space in this way is a process of territorialization,
that is, dividing space into so many specific territories. The story of the
settlement and development of Macondo is in many ways an example of how
the State is the principle of territorialization that organizes striated or sedentary space, in opposition to what Deleuze and Guattari call smooth or
nomadic space. Nomadic space is not divided by walls and there are no preestablished paths that guide movement of people or goods. In opposition to
the territorializing action of the State upon land, the process creating nomadic
space is deterritorialization. As an example of nomadic space, Deleuze often
mentions the desert or sea, spaces without divisions, boundaries and fixed
46
points, and in One Hundred Years of Solitude the jungle surrounding Macondo is
such a smooth space. Jos Arcadio Buenda, as he leaves his home village,
is confused by the jungle which lacks paths or reference points. However, as
they settle, the Macondians create a new territory within the nomadic jungle,
establishing a new State.
Not long after its founding, Macondo begins trading with the outside world
and becomes a destination for several waves of migrants, and in conformity with
the State described in A Thousand Plateaus begins to capture flows: of population, of commodities and of money. Throughout its cycles of destruction and
regeneration, Macondo, as the State, never ceases to decompose, recompose
and transform movement (TP 386). Indeed, while the chronology of One
Hundred Years of Solitude has often been seen as circular, it is, in fact, a strictly
linear affair. This is not to say that there is not an element of repetition in One
Hundred Years of Solitude. However, rather than being a feature of cyclical time,
this is typical of how the social machine of the State works: by continually
capturing or territorializing flows. In the same way as the Buenda house and
Macondo village act as coordinating elements for series of points in space, they
are also pivotal elements for series of points in time, acting as indicators of the
passage of linear time. Each cycle of degeneration and renewal that the house
and the village go through are described in detail. The initial descriptions of
the house and village identify the Buendas as farmers in the coastal region of
Colombia, but also as living in the post-independence era in the late nineteenth
century. The changes that the house goes through always indicate a progression
in time: each time it is repaired we learn of details like a pianola, a gramophone, or a new bathroom that indicate a particular moment in history.
Similarly, descriptive series recount the introduction of the railway, automobiles and electricity in the village, as the novel clearly traces the progress of
the early twentieth century. The history of the State, say Deleuze and Guattari,
is always about segments and classes, rather than masses or the flows of people
(TP 221). Thus any new arrivals in the village are quickly fitted into the State
organization, as merchants (the early new arrivals, the Arabs, the Turks), as
labourers (the people that the Banana Company brings in), even as sanctioned
marginals (the French matrons). Equally, the flow of time is captured in One
Hundred Years of Solitude by its convergent series of descriptions, segmenting it
into snapshots or successive moments in history, forming a linear series which
moves inexorably from beginning to end. That is, the repetitions of the novel
themselves form series which by the variation between elements betray the passage of time.
47
the actual, and organized like the social assemblage of the State. However, to
Deleuze, representation is an illusion. Under the ontological doctrine of the
univocity of Being, as Hallward notes No art is imitative, no art can be imitative
or figurative, because art is Real, and vice versa.18 In fact, One Hundred Years of
Solitude, or rather, the realism of One Hundred Years of Solitude, is part of a whole
regime of signs (TP 111148), which underpins the illusion of representation,
as well as guaranteeing it through the reality effect.
A regime of signs, say Deleuze and Guattari, is a system of language and
world, of linguistic form and content, together. That is, a regime of signs is a system in which the referent and the sign combine laterally, without the hierarchical relationship of representation. Rather than prioritizing one or the other,
to consider how a regime of signs works is to look at the order of this languageworld system as one, analyzing how language and non-linguistic assemblages
work on the same principles of organization. The question is what the relationship between these linguistic and non-linguistic components is, if it is not one
of representation. As we saw, the content of One Hundred Years of Solitude
appears to be organized in a convergent, segmented way under the principle of
the State. In fact, this organization belongs not to an external State of Macondo,
which is then represented by the form of realism, but to a regime of signs which
includes a specific form of expression, realism, as well as a specific content, the
State of Macondo.
Deleuze states that there are many and various regimes of signs; the one
which allows us to make the important connection between the State and the
realism of One Hundred Years of Solitude is that of subjectification. Here we need
to go back to some of Deleuzes thoughts on how the illusion of representation emerges. Deleuze traces this illusion back to a fundamental philosophical
concept which he considers a basic error: the Cogito, or the idea of the thinking or reasoning subject. Both the State and the regime of subjectification are
dependent on, or even borne out of, the Cogito. To Deleuze, the Cogito
expresses the unity of all the faculties in the subject; it thereby expresses the
possibility that all the faculties will relate to a form of object which reflects
the subjective identity (DR 133). It is thus the idea of the Cogito that allows
for the idea that an independent and coherent subject can perceive a separate
and discrete object, a condition necessary for representation. However, the reasoning subject does more than just allow for the idea of the understandable and
describable object, says Deleuze, it sanctions it and guarantees its reality.
The State, according to Deleuze and Guattari, as opposed to a primitive
society of tribal or despotic rule, is dependent on its own sanction, that is, a
sanction not from an external deity or a supreme sovereign but from the
people. Such sanction is only realized if the State is perceived as a separate
site of reason, just like the Cogito. Since reason, by definition, resides in the
reasoning subject, it has to sanction its own subjection to the State (TP 376).
The existence of the State is therefore dependent on the reasoning subject
performing a double role: the legislator, the State, and its subject, the people.
48
This doubling, however, gives rise to an illusion, making the State, rather than
the subject, appear as the ultimate source of reason. Similarly, the regime of
signs of subjectification, in contrast to the regime of signs of signification, where
the meaning of signs is assured by a god or despot, is dependent on the subject
to sanction or guarantee its own utterances or expressions. In the same way
that the State is perceived as a source of reason because of a doubling of role of
the reasoning subject, so an expression is perceived as rational or real by a
doubling of the thinking subject, the Cogito, into an I who speaks the subject of the enunciation or author-subject and an I who is spoken the subject
of the statement or narrator-subject. Deleuze states: Then from the subject of
enunciation issues a subject of the statement, in other words, a subject bound
to statements in conformity with a dominant reality (TP 129). Dominant reality is precisely the ordered reality of the State, the ostensible source of reason.
Indeed, the subject of the statement conforms to the State precisely through a
realist narrative, appearing, as Chanady says, familiar with logical reasoning
(MRF 22). Thus the subject of the statement or realist narrator becomes a sign,
or guarantee, of the reality of any expression by the subject of the enunciation
or author (TP 129).
This doubling of the subject is precisely what drives the reality effect: the
narrator appears as if he has been there, seen it all. Therefore, under the regime
of signs of signification any expression that follows the organization of the State
will appear as a site of reason and will thus appear to represent reality, although
they are in fact, part of one and the same system. In the realism of One Hundred
Years of Solitude we can detect this mechanism. There appears a kind of shadow
of a Cogito, an author, external to the text, immediately also implying an
external object or referent. It appears as if the subject-author, doubled as
the subject-narrator of One Hundred Years of Solitude is describing an objective
external reality (Macondo and its inhabitants) using reason.
In fact, however, the narration and reality are part of the (convergent) series
of the same system: subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression
is tied to an assemblage, in other words, an organization of power that is already
fully functioning in the economy, rather than superimposing itself upon contents and relations between contents determined as real in the last instance
(TP 130). The State organizes space and time in the same way that the regime
of signs organizes expression. In fact, the State of Macondo is the content of
the regime of signs of which the text of One Hundred Years of Solitude is the
form. Yet this illusion of representation is not primary to the nature of things,
but a secondary effect of a particular order. Deleuze and Guattari consider the
elements of any expression, signs, as deterritorialized. Signs do not actually
resemble reality, they are removed from the territory of things themselves.
However, the regime of signs of subjectification captures these signs just as
the State captures deterritorialized flows. It makes signs signify, and what is
more, through this significance, ordered in convergent series, conform to the
order of the State. Writing under this regime of signs, of which the realism of
49
One Hundred Years of Solitude is an example, is writing that means reterritorializing oneself, conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of
established states of things (DII 74). In contrast, to Deleuze, a sign that has not
been reterritorialized is immaterial, that is, virtual. It does not mean or designate anything but reveals the essence of its nature, and this essence is nothing
but Being as difference (PS 41).
If realism, then, is writing that conforms to the territory of the State and is a
system of convergent series, then the insertion of a divergent element into that
system has greater implications than merely undoing the realist form. Indeed,
the magic in One Hundred Years of Solitude seems to imply great subversive
potential. In the previous chapter we suggested that the magical element,
because of its divergence, performs a disjunctive synthesis in the system. This
disjunctive synthesis causes the convergent series to diverge and communicate
with each other in new ways, which has the effect of proliferating meaning
in the text. However, disjunctive synthesis is also a counter-actualization, that is,
a way of thinking the virtual side of reality that reveals both the text as a production of the real, and difference-in-itself as the condition for that real. What then
does this mean in terms of the regime of signs?
To answer this question we have to consider how the magic works as a divergent element in One Hundred Years of Solitude, whether it actually does perform
a disjunctive synthesis in the text, to what extent this can be seen as a counteractualization of the regime of signs, and finally what implication this may have
for the readings of magical realism. There is, interestingly, no precise definition
of what the magic of One Hundred Years of Solitude and magical realism actually
entails. There are, of course, famous episodes that are always quoted, but with
little explanation as to exactly why these are magical. It is almost seen as a given
that they are magical, that every reader perceives them as such. Examples are
Remedios the Beautys ascent to heaven, the trickle of blood that finds rsula
across the village, or the rain of flowers after Jos Arcadios death.
It has been said that the narration in One Hundred Years of Solitude eliminat[es]
the barrier between objective and imaginary realities [. . .] creating a total fictional universe19 and that it fus[es] the real and the fantastic.20 However, statements asserting that the narrator stays composed in the face of events that
would seem to warrant a more aroused and partisan verbal statement21 surely
suggest that the reader is actually surprised at this unperturbed treatment of
events. Indeed, the critics insistent reaffirmation of the narrative neutrality,
even when describing the magical, betrays the magics difference from and
incongruity with this credible narrative. The incongruity is there because the
realism of magical realism is much more than just a matter-of-fact narrative.
The realism is part of a regime of signs, in which magic appears as different
from the established order of things. The regime of signs sets up the world of
One Hundred Years of Solitude as our world, not Middle-earth or outer space.
The same physical laws apply in Macondo as they do here and now, they just get
noticeably broken. It is often said that the status of magic is equal to that of
50
the real in magical realism because the characters perceive it to be real. This
is not so either. Even if the Macondians believe that the magic is real in so far
as it actually takes place, that it is no trick or illusion, the magic is not the
same as everyday reality around them. Not everyone levitates in Macondo: it is
not a rule of this world that humans fly. Similarly, not everyone is followed by
butterflies, not everyone is clairvoyant, and not everyone becomes a ghost or
ascends to heaven. While seen as really happening, these events surprise and
elicit comment from the Macondians, who flock to see the magic flying carpets
of the gypsies or to gawp at the miracle performed by the priest.
Thus the first thing that we can say about magic in One Hundred Years of
Solitude is that it is indeed divergent from the convergent series of the real: it
strays from the network gridding of the possible (TP 212). However, as we now
know, the real here is not a matter of an external reality, but of elements which
appear as the content of a regime of signs. Interestingly, the regime of signs
that One Hundred Years of Solitude operates under does not seem to shift significantly throughout the novel (excepting the end, as we shall see later). That is,
the narrator continues to guarantee the authors expression, the text, insofar as
we are not given to believe that he has suddenly ceased to be the reasoning
subject of the narration, even when what he tells us clearly does not conform to
dominant reality.
The first instance of magic in the novel is little Aurelianos strange powers.
At the age of three he
went into the kitchen at the moment she [rsula] was taking a pot of boiling
soup from the stove and putting it on a table. The child, perplexed, said from
the doorway, Its going to spill. The pot was firmly placed in the centre of
the table, but just as soon as the child made his announcement, it began
an unmistakable movement towards the edge, as if impelled by some inner
dynamism, and it fell and broke on the floor. (OHYS 15)
This event is clearly divergent from dominant reality. rsula, witnessing the
episode, is alarmed since it is not normal or natural. In contrast, the narrator
is matter-of-fact, as if the event stood to reason. However, the event diverges
from the domestic series of ordered items with fixed places and functions. Not
only does the pot not stay put, literally; it momentarily loses its identity as an
inanimate, domestic object, displaying an inner dynamism. The action of the
pot also diverges from the series of causality: there is no reason why Aureliano
predicts the pots action and why it falls, and it is of no importance to the linear
progression of the plot of One Hundred Years of Solitude. Indeed, many of the
magic events in One Hundred Years of Solitude are premonitions and omens,
events that appear significant, yet are strangely ineffectual and meaningless.
A premonition makes rsula scrub the house clean in preparation for
Aurelianos return, but this turns out to be futile as he is taken straight to jail.
Before her own return to Macondo, an empty flask became so heavy it could
51
not be moved and a pan of water on the worktable boiled without any fire
under it for half an hour until it completely evaporated (OHYS 36). Before
rsulas death, as in the very last days of Macondo, orange disks are seen in the
sky. None of these portents has any direct usefulness for anyone; they yield no
practical information.
Yet because the reasoning tone of the narrator is intact, in the face of their
very lack of reason, the magical events appear all the more significant. The
reality effect is still there, even though its contents are zero. On the one hand,
their referent exposed as null, signs appear as they really are: deterritorialized,
that is, not directly referential. On the other, the realist narration remains and
the magic omens still appear as if they are significant, that is, they appear as
symbolic. Symbols, say Deleuze and Guattari, are precisely deterritorialized
signs (TP 111148). However, symbolic meaning still conforms to reason, and
is still part of the regime of signs, because it is always reterritorialized, or given
meaning, by the persistence of a narrator-subject conforming to the order of
the State. Thus while a symbolic sign is indeed deterritorialized, it is, according
to Deleuze and Guattari, negatively deterritorialized. These magical omens,
while they deterritorialize realism to a certain extent, seem to be immediately
reterritorialized by the regime of subjectification. It seems that there are more
kinds of signs than simply the territorialized signs of the State and deterritorialized virtual signs.
In his Proust and Signs Deleuze traces an apprenticeship of signs, a process
of learning the truth about signs, starting with the most material signs, or signs
oriented towards the actual, and ending with the virtual signs of art the signs
that reveal the essence of Being as difference. There are various kinds of actual
signs, says Deleuze, which appear to have different relations to their meaning,
although, of course, any relation to a meaning outside the sign is ultimately
an illusion. In Proust and Signs there is a progressive understanding of how the
various actual signs work which eventually leads to a revelation of the virtual
signs of art, and the destruction of this illusion. The first step is a realization of
the falsehood of an objective interpretation of signs, that is, considering signs
to have purely referential meaning. This is also the realization of the inadequacy of realism: A literature is disappointing if it interprets signs by referring
them to objects that can be designated (observation and description), if it surrounds itself with pseudo-objective guarantees of evidence and communication
(causerie, investigation), and if it confuses meaning with intelligible, explicit,
and formulated signification (major subjects) (PS 33). That is, if it is a literature that assures the meaning of signs through authentication. This disappointment leads onto the next step of the apprenticeship of signs subjective
interpretation: finding meaning by the association of ideas, that is, by linking
signs and ideas by resemblance or contiguity. Meaning is no longer necessarily
authenticated by dominant reality, it is guaranteed instead by the reasoning
subject itself. However, the subject remains, and thus signs still remain part
of the regime of signs. The magical omens in One Hundred Years of Solitude are
52
therefore a kind of magical sign that force such a subjective, symbolic or associative reading upon us.
This deterritorialization of the sign, while it does not get rid of meaning,
opens up the possibilities of meaning. In Deleuzian terms, the divergence
introduced into the convergent system of realism by the magical event or sign
has the effect of proliferating series and ramifying the system. Now, rather than
appearing to directly mirror reality, the series of One Hundred Years of Solitude, at
the points of magic, set off new series of associations. One of the famous
instances of magic in the novel, the trickle of blood following Jos Arcadio
Buendas death, immediately appears symbolic. Closer scrutiny reveals that
read symbolically the event gives rise to a series of possible interpretations. The
trickle
came out under the door, crossed the living room, went out into the street,
continued on in a straight line across the uneven terraces, went down steps
and climbed over curbs, passed along the Street of the Turks, turned a corner
to the right and another to the left, made a right angle at the Buenda house,
went in under the closed door, crossed through the parlour, hugging the
walls so as not to stain the rugs, went on to the other living room, made a wide
curve to avoid the dining-room table, went along the porch with the begonias, and passed without being seen under Amarantas chair as she gave an
arithmetic lesson to Aureliano Jos, and went through the pantry and came
out in the kitchen, where rsula was getting ready to crack thirty-six eggs to
make bread. (OHYS 135)
What this magic event does is to literally traverse several of the series of One
Hundred Years of Solitude the village, the house and the family connecting
and ramifying them. Thus, rather than having one specific significance, it
makes series resonate through the association of ideas: it could mean that
ultimately Jos Arcadios mother was to blame for his death by making him
what he was, that the bad blood of his crimes affected the whole community,
or perhaps, simply that his death hurt his mother more than it benefited anyone else. However, in itself, the trickle of blood does not signify anything, its
referent is null. It is an object = x, that precisely because it has no sense, can
take on any sense (LS 79).
We have to remember, however, that this resonance, these interpretations or
associations, are just statistical effects, as Deleuze would say. Yet, it is precisely
because the statistical effect of resemblance persists that a subjective interpretation persists. For what is symbolic meaning but the connection between ideas
through resemblance or contiguity, that is, the reterritorialization of the sign
into the convergent system of series of the State, through reason? Thus, any
series of associations, any connections between series, any possible meanings,
are segmented and convergent. The possible meanings of the magical events
surrounding Jos Arcadio Buendas death are still connected to the actual, and
53
the State, because they are, precisely, the meaning and not the essence of the
magical sign. Such magical signs are still only the first step of the apprenticeship of signs.
If some magical events only deterritorialize the sign, others deterritorialize
not only the sign but also its non-linguistic part. We can see this in what is
one of the most quoted magical events of One Hundred Years of Solitude, which
embodies some of the most typical magical realist characteristics of the novel:
the ascension of Remedios the Beauty. The narration is unwaveringly realist, it
is neutral and unmoved by the events, and there is no explanation sought or
provided. The episode is described using a wealth of detail and is anchored in
the physical world: just before she takes off it is noted that Remedios is unusually pale; then we see, just as rsula does, Remedios the Beauty waving goodbye in the midst of the flapping sheets that rose up with her, abandoning
with her the environment of the beetles and the dahlias and passing through
the air with her as four oclock in the afternoon came to an end (OHYS 243).
The details of the sheets, the garden, and even the time, are all authenticating
the scene, placing the magic in the midst of the convergent realist series of
the Buenda house. The magic, however, does not belong to any of these series.
It diverges from the domestic details of the sheets and flowers, from the mundane activity of folding, the washing, from the Buendas view of Remedios as
a useless retard, from the series of the birth-to-death descriptions of the
family members, and, finally, from the laws of nature.
However, Remedios is more than just deterritorialized as a sign through
her magical ascent to heaven; she is deterritorialized as a character, that is, as
a non-linguistic element of the regime of signs. She does not fit into the
segmented order of the State of Macondo: Remedios the Beauty was not a
creature of this world (OHYS 202). She resists the order of the State, rejecting
the conventions of society in matters of clothing, as well as behaviour and
education. She rejects the series of the family, turning down all her suitors.
Remedios the Beauty resists the territorialization of the State, and ultimately
embarks on her own line of flight literally. She leaves the segmented territory
of Macondo, and disappears into the smooth space of the sky. Nevertheless,
Remedios still seems to be connected to the stratified earth by the thin thread
of meaning. As an object = x the magical character of Remedios the Beauty
creates resonance, which can be seen in the many attempts at reading her
character and her departure from earth as symbols of innocence, virginity and
solitude. Avril Bryan, considering the portrayal of the myth of virginity in One
Hundred Years of Solitude, reads Remedioss innocent purity as an antithesis to
Amarantas twisted preservation of virginity, and Remedioss ascension as the
only way to keep the beauty and purity of the symbolic virgin: she never succumbs to her suitors, and she never ages.22 Others have seen Remedios as a
symbol of the sterility of the concept of purity as a model for human conduct.23
She has also been seen as a symbol of the barren solitude of the Buenda women
and, by extension, their class, in contrast to the fertility of the lower class, or
54
55
resonances in motion: offering a range of possible meanings, exposing the contradictions of the novel that we considered at the beginning of this chapter.
Then it goes a step further and reveals itself as fiction in such a way that
it reveals the essence of the sign of art: its own production. The magic of
Melquadess prophesy, together with the biblical hurricane that ends the
Macondianss time on earth, constitute the absolute deterritorialization of the
novel. The State of Macondo and its local representative, the Buenda family,
are totally destroyed. Already before the cataclysm the nomadic jungle is invading the segmentary space of the village, breaking walls, wiping out boundaries,
as well as eradicating social structures commerce and government have left,
and the life of the remaining humans is increasingly chaotic and driven by
instincts rather than social codes. The wind, when it comes, finishes off the core
of Macondo, the Buenda house: it tore the doors and the windows of the
hinges, pulled off the roof of the east wing, and uprooted the foundations
(OHYS 422). As magical events, the revelation of Melquadess prophecy and
the apocalyptic wind are deterritorialized signs. However, their potential
reterritorialization as symbols is in itself deterritorialized, as the doubling of
the subject of the novel, the provider of reason and association, collapses in
the mise-en-abyme of the novels ending. As Aureliano reads the parchments, the
story of Macondo written by Melquades, reader and the read, narrator and the
narrated are conflated. The sign can still be reterritorialized symbolically, reason can still capture it, organize and striate it because of the persistence of
the subject. However, the magic of the end of One Hundred Years of Solitude
obliterates not only the extra-textual referent but also the narrator-subject, in
that it makes the two indistinguishable. Through this ending, McMurray says,
the fictional universe appears to engender itself from within, eliminating all
elements of the real world outside the novel, including the supposed omniscient, or real author.25 Content and expression no longer appear as world
and copy, the fictional universe is revealed as an autonomous part of the real
universe. The texts sense is revealed as Deleuzes essence, no longer a meaning dependent on the referent object or the reasoning subject. Rather it is the
text itself. Suddenly writing appears as, in Deleuze words, becoming, becoming
something other than a writer, since what one is becoming at the same time
becomes something other than writing (DII 55): writing becomes a production
of the real.
Thus One Hundred Years of Solitude takes us through a kind of apprenticeship
of signs, from the illusory referentiality of realism, via the plural but still convergent meaning of the symbolic to the essential signs of art which reveal the structure of reality itself. The signs of art give us something that life, in its actuality,
cannot give us a view of the world, of Being in its creative action of becoming.
This is because essence, says Deleuze, is not something seen but a kind of
superior viewpoint, an irreducible viewpoint that signifies at once the birth of
the world and the original character of a world. It is in this sense that the work
of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the beginning of the world, but
also forms a specific world absolutely different from the others and envelops
56
a landscape or immaterial site quite distinct from the site where we have grasped
it. (PS 110)
It is important to note that while art that reaches this level of absolute
deterritorialization has the power to reveal the beginning of the world, it also
forms a world which is quite distinct from the one in which it originated.
Indeed, while absolute deterritorialization means an insight into the ontological conditions of territory, it also means achieving an irreducible viewpoint
without any territory.
The premises upon which the above reading of the magic in magical realism
as a sign of art revealing the conditions of Being rest are those of a singular
concept of Being. Deleuzes irreducible viewpoint is nothing but a singular
position: the place, necessarily within Being, where the conditions of Being
become clear. This position, as Deleuze points out, is distinct from the situation
or state of affairs in which we encounter it, precisely because it is not transcendent, but is a part of reality unto itself: a part of reality structurally different
because it is absolutely oriented to the virtual, yet existing or being in the same
way as the state of affairs from whence it was grasped. The inevitable consequence, as Hallward succinctly insists, is that:
The purpose of art is not to represent the world, still less to cultivate or enrich
our appreciation of the world, but to create new and self-sufficient compositions of sensation, compositions that will draw those who experience them
directly into the material vitality of the cosmos itself.26
The magic elements, as signs of art, are non-relational, impersonal, and
ahistorical, and distinct from the characters, relations, places and events
from which they have sprung. In fact, in One Hundred Years of Solitude absolute
deterritorialization takes place only through the total annihilation of the State
of Macondo. It is as if the virtual conditions of Being can only be revealed at the
price of the coherence of beings. On the other hand, as we saw in One Hundred
Years of Solitude, much of the magic is never absolutely deterritorialized, but falls
back into the symbolic or subjective. In the remainder of this chapter, we will
further consider the relationship between the magic and the real in magical
realism, and whether it necessarily ends in destruction, by having a look at three
key texts of the genre in English.
57
It is true that the term magical realism has in a sense been imported and
imposed on writers in English since this discovery. In the decade following the
one in which the Latin American literary Boom reached the English speaking
world (One Hundred Years of Solitude was first published in English translation
in 1970), numerous novels in English that gained critical acclaim as well as
popularity were being labelled as magical realism. Certainly this was partly due
to publishing houses strategically placing their products in a genre with a
proven sales record. However, the term also provided a fruitful, if problematic,
critical tool.
Midnights Children clearly demonstrates the central problematic of magical
realism. It is ostensibly and undeniably anchored in the historical and the political, a novel about individual and collective national identity. However, it is also
permeated by magical events that have often been read as part of the search for
identity in the novel. The argument generally follows this pattern: Rushdies
use of magical realism shows us in practice how the imagination offers us ways
of making sense of the world.28 Referring to Linda Hutcheons concept of
historiographic metafiction, which she uses to describe writing with a theoretical self-awareness of history and fiction as human constructs,29 critics assert
that the novels magical realism, by foregrounding the commonality of the
processes of making history and making fiction, allows us to understand how
all identity is created by the processes of the imagination. Midnights Children is
seen to demonstrate this by magically paralleling the history of India not only
with the personal history of Saleem Sinai, but also with his account, in the process of being created as we read, of both histories.
Furthermore, recalling Carpentier, the magical realism of Midnights Children
is seen as particularly suited to describing the postcolonial situation in general
and India in particular. The richness of the novel, the way it attempts to contain the whole subcontinent and its cultural hybridity, its carnivalesque style,
the heterogeneity of its language and its syncretization of the mythical and the
historical are all seen as ways of expressing the hybridity, multiplicity, and
syncretism of the reality of the postcolonial situation. Indeed, as in the case of
One Hundred Years of Solitude, this is seen as the specific political potential of
magical realism. However, the focus has shifted from magical realisms fusing
of the genres of the real and the surreal as a strategy of liberation 30 to the
forms of diversity and multiplicity that magical realism is seen to introduce
into the text.31 As Elleke Boehmer states, it is because of its inclusiveness that
magical realism is seen as an oppositional, anti-authoritarian, anti-colonial
genre: Magical realism [is] enamoured of its own overabundance, performing
its tricks of hyperbole, melodrama, parody and fantasy, sometimes for its own
sake, but also in order to make a point about the mongrel nature of the world
in the face of imperialistic forces, and the value of the Many over the One.32
However, there is a contradiction in this position, similar to the one found in
critical approaches to One Hundred Years of Solitude. As Timothy Brennan asks:
How does the writer account for both the many and one how capture a sense
58
of the new unities while finding the allegiances on which identity thrives?33
That is, there is a contradiction in the novel between the search for identity
and the enactment of identity as imagined and multiple, which echoes the
problems that Hallwards analysis of postcolonial theories in his Absolutely Postcolonial uncovered. On the one hand, nothing is more orthodox in the postcolonial domain than an insistence on the multiple, particular, heterogeneous
nature of contexts and subject positions (AP 21), while on the other, in every
postcolonial study worthy of the name, any carefully delineated border of
periphery and metropole, colony and empire becomes blurred, de-territorialised,
and unbounded (AP 34). Indeed, the narrative exploration of national and
personal identity in Midnights Children can be seen as a dramatization of the
postcolonial project which attempts to define such identity at the same time as
paradoxically rejecting any fixed identities.
Like One Hundred Years of Solitude, Midnights Children is rooted in realism.
Indeed the thematic and structural similarities between the two novels are
striking and well documented. Both are family sagas spanning generations
against the backdrop of a communitys destiny; both focus on domestic settings
and details, while also providing rich descriptions of the geographical and historical milieu. Indeed, Midnights Children, is, if anything, more overtly grounded
in space and time. While Macondo is merely recognizable as Colombia in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the setting of Midnights Children
is explicitly the Indian subcontinent in the decades running up to and following
Independence. In Rushdies novel historical events are continually recounted,
and the named settings Kashmir, Bombay, Delhi, Pakistan and Bangladesh
are elaborately described. The serial and segmented structure of the State is
recognizable in the novels central domestic setting, Saleems family home, and
in its abundant familial connections and hierarchies. Despite resembling One
Hundred Years of Solitude in the frequency of its prolepses and analepses, the
passing of linear time is even more undeniable in Midnights Children. Indeed, as
in Garca Mrquezs novel, frequent glimpses of future events keep the narrative moving relentlessly forward, despite its many detours. The authentication
process is central to the novel, although continually foregrounded and questioned by the narrator. Saleem, appearing self-consciously in his own narrative,
describing his act of writing this story, is nothing but a thinking because
doubting subject. The regime of subjectification is, in fact, affirmed when
Saleem questions the accuracy of his recollections. His very insecurities about
certain historical facts allow us to feel he is a trustworthy eyewitness to his own
story. Thus the much-discussed metafictionality of Midnights Children is not as
subversive as is implied by critics reading it as historical metafiction. Yes, the
novel does draw our attention to the processes of fiction and history alike in
these self-conscious passages, but it does not break with the basic principles of
the regime of signs that realism exemplifies. We become aware that history and
fiction share a common origin the subject but the object and the subject, the
world and its representation, persist.
59
As in One Hundred Years of Solitude, the State is the ordering principle of the
realism of Midnights Children both in terms of the serial structure of time and
space, and as part of a regime of signs. However, in Midnights Children, through
the focus on the parallel between the national and personal, the State also
appears as the regulator of identity. That is, the State is explicitly India, which
is, in turn, explicitly tied to the identity of the narrator. Indeed, the State and
its order, the regime of signs, are shown as a necessary prerequisite for identity,
national or personal. Against this order, the magical sign of art is divergent, and
thus distinct from the principles of identity. Importantly, Deleuzes theoretical
framework indicates that the central conflict in Midnights Children is not so
much between the plurality of the masses and the idea of a unified India, as is
commonly held, as between the possibility of identity, be it hybrid and multiple,
and the breakdown of an order that upholds that possibility. That is, an order
that makes possible the distinctions, categories and divisions the segments
necessary for identity.
The magic of Midnights Children centres on the children and their abilities.
While the narrative is often hyperbolic, it does not include as many instances
of incidental magic as One Hundred Years of Solitude. However, there are, as in
Garca Mrquezs novel, many instances of premonitions and omens, some
seemingly just as meaningless: comets were seen exploding above the Back
Bay; it was reported that flowers had been seen bleeding real blood (MC 136).
Many of the premonitions, however, are more systematically reterritorialized as
symbols by the State than they were in One Hundred Years of Solitude. In fact, this
is a notable effect of the search for national identity, as Midnights Children foregrounds the importance of myth in the national project. We must here note the
important difference between magic and myth. Magic, as we saw, involves a
deterritorialization of meaning. While the magic in magical realism may well
have mythical origins, myth, in contrast to magic, is part of an order of meaning
territorialized by the State. In Midnights Children many of the omens are
explicitly linked to the myths of India:
Baap-re-baap, such so-bad things: at Gwalior they have seen the ghost of the
Rani of Jhansi, rakshasas have been seen many-headed like Ravana, doing
things to women and pulling down trees with one finger. I am good Christian
woman, baba; but it gives me fright when they tell that the tomb of Lord Jesus
is found in Kashmir. On the tombstone are carved two pierced feet and a
local fisherwoman has sworn she saw them bleeding [. . .] the new-born secular state was being given an awesome reminder of its fabulous antiquity, in
which democracy and votes for women were irrelevant . . . so that people were
seized by atavistic longings, and forgetting the new myth of freedom reverted
to their old ways. (MC 245)
In this passage freedom is exposed as myth alongside the multi-denominational
myths of the past. However, while the magical children, the fantastic heart
60
(MC 195) of the novel, seem to have all the hallmarks of a national myth: a
pantheon of new gods to bring the plurality of India together, they are, in fact,
with regards to the national project anyway, entirely ineffectual. Saleem, for all
his grand plans, is exemplary in this: as Goonetilleke notes, he is not able to
achieve anything with his supreme magical powers, he uses his gift for useless
and valueless things, and is characterized by surprising passivity.34 It is not
through revealing the inherent myth-making of the nation that the midnights
children pose a threat to the State and to identity, but through their magic,
their very lack of meaning and thus identity. Indeed, myths are useful to
the State, while magic, on the other hand, is not; quite the opposite. Hence the
childrens forced sterilization and loss of powers.
In Deleuzian terms the magical midnights children are all lines of flight or
radical deterritorializations of identity, and even of the human as such. They
are all, to some degree, becoming-other. Recall how the concept of becoming
is a counter-actualization of the individual, a process that has nothing to do
with multiplying possible identities, as Brian Massumi claims,35 but which
means going beyond the boundaries that make up identity, and the order of the
State as well as the laws of nature. Becoming-woman (and man again) and
becoming-animal (-fish or -bird) are only some of the childrens magical abilities, but they are all divergent elements in the convergent series of the real.
There is, from Kerala, a boy who had the ability of stepping into mirrors and
re-emerging through any reflective surface in the land, violating the order of
space, and the Benarsi silversmiths son [. . .] given the gift of travelling in
time, violating the order of time; but there is also at Budge-Budge outside
Calcutta a sharp-tongued girl whose words already had the power of inflicting
physical wounds, defying the illusory difference between representation and
reality (MC 198199). The magical becomings of the children are collectively
united in Saleem, their All India Radio operator (MC 166), an object = x in
the system of convergent series that is the State of India. The object = x, introducing pure difference into the system, does indeed allow such an India to be
a multiplicity, but in Deleuzian, that is, singular terms. Therefore it is emphatically not the kind of multiplicity that could underpin the hybrid yet particular
identity that the Indian national project, and indeed the postcolonial project,
is looking for.
However, going beyond identity or the human can be dangerous, as Deleuze
tells us (DII 105; TP 229), and indeed some of the children die or are harmed
because of their magical capabilities. Perhaps they are all doomed from the
beginning, as the State clearly deems them a severe enough threat to destroy
them. Saleem, as the nexus of the magic in the novel and India, is the site of a
battle between the ordering forces of the State and the magic of the children.
It becomes clear that the more deterritorialized Saleem becomes as a character,
the less effectual he becomes as a subject. In fact, because of its divergence from
realism, the magic of the novel appears, rather than a political tool, as Saleems
loss of identity and thus political agency. When Saleem is brained by the family
61
heirloom spittoon and loses his memory, he enters a state of extreme deterritorialization. He becomes like the enlightened Buddha capable of not-living-inthe-world as well as living in it (MC 349). However, he retains the magic power
of a fantastic sense of smell, and is coopted into the secret service of the
Pakistani army. It appears to be Saleems lack of identity and the lack of identity
of his fellow soldiers that prevents them disobeying their orders even when the
full horrors of the invasion of East Pakistan become clear. In fact, the more
deterritorialized they become the more they seem unable to make a stand
against the realities they witness. Their flight into the Sundarban jungle a
smooth nomadic space just like the jungle surrounding Macondo makes them
all go through individual deterritorializations, and emerging from the jungle
they choose to deny the horrors before their eyes. They
saw so many things which were not true, which were not possible, because our
boys would not could not have behaved so badly; we saw men in spectacles
with heads like eggs being shot in side-streets, we saw the intelligentsia of
the city being massacred by the hundreds [. . .] slit throats being buried in
unmarked graves [. . .] lady doctors were being bayoneted before they were
raped, and raped again before being shot. (MC 375376)
We see clearly here that the magic is literally ineffectual in the face of real
horrors. The deterritorialized soldiers, in particular Saleem, lack the power to
do anything but deny these atrocities, which, in themselves are described using
a realist, not a magical mode.
As we near the end of Saleems narrative his deterritorialization also appears
as personally dangerous, as his identification with India as a multiplicity becomes
more explicit:
Who what am I? My answer: I am the sum total of everything that went before
me, of all I have been seen done, of everything done-to-me. I am everyone
everything whose being-in-the-world affected was affected by mine [sic]. I am
anything that happens after Ive gone which would not have happened if
I had not come [. . .] each I, every one of the now-six-hundred-million-plus
of us, contains a similar multitude. (MC 383)
This is a vision of a multiplicity which is a slipping between things and growing
in the midst of things (TP 280). However, it is not compatible with the definition necessary for a national or personal identity, but, in contrast, it is a way to
rid ourselves of ourselves.36 This is the point at which writing becomes a distinct world rather than a representation of the world, as Deleuze and Guattari
describe it in What is Philosophy?:
Characters can only exist, and the author can only create them, because they
do not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part
62
As in the end of One Hundred Years of Solitude, this transaction leads to an apocalypse. Saleem cracks up into six-hundred-million specks of dust, into the
six-hundred-million rich crowd of India. As Saleem passes into the landscape
of India, the novel becomes not a representation of India as a nation but the
production of an India as a world, a singular multiplicity.
We can compare Hallwards consideration of the contradictory project of
postcolonialism with Timothy Brennans sustained critique of what he sees
as the failure of Midnights Children to provide models of national identity.
Brennan notes that the narrators sweeping claims to be the imaginative
source of history, eventually lead to a repudiation of the individual as a moral
being,37 and that an all-inclusiveness finally undermines the idea of national
distinctions themselves, which are orderly and bordered. Everything means
not just India. If neither Saleem nor Padma create true national images, it
is because the truth of postwar nationalism is international.38 In one sense,
Brennan does not take his critique far enough, for the all-inclusiveness of
Midnights Children is not about internationalism but about a multiplicity
which supports neither individual nor national identity, neither Saleem
nor India, but which reveals the singular creative power that writes this
multiplicity.
The metafictionality of Midnights Children thus does not lie in the frame narrative about the telling of the novels story, but in the becoming molecular of
Saleem. It is only when the difference between narrator and narrated, subject
and object, disappears, as in the final apocalypse in Garca Mrquezs novel,
that writing becomes something else (DII 55). Again, however, it seems that
such an absolute deterritorialization of the text is incompatible with the territoriality of realism. Midnights Children, via Hallwards concept of the singular,
demonstrates the implications of the magical sign of art. While the sign of art
reveals the conditions of Being, it also reveals the non-relation of all individual
beings, and is therefore incompatible with the idea of identity. In retrospect we
can see that the magic of One Hundred Years of Solitude, rather than assert a Latin
American identity, ultimately subverts the possibility of identity: hence the
contradiction encountered by critics. However, the contradiction remains,
because while One Hundred Years of Solitude and Midnights Children end in the
annihilation of time, place and identity, magical realism, as we have noted, is
definitely rooted in place and history. Is this realism necessarily entirely contradicted and destroyed by a magical becoming-molecular? The next two novels
we will consider are also about identity, but, as opposed to One Hundred Years of
Solitude and Midnights Children, do not end in apocalypse.
63
64
65
effects of her presence in the system of reality around her. Although she is
constantly, and sometimes violently, reterritorialized, she is at core entirely
deterritorialized. Nights at the Circus is not explicitly metafictional like One
Hundred Years of Solitude and Midnights Children, but it foregrounds narration
in its first section by making Fevvers tell her own story. In fact, the novel demonstrates that textual self-reflexivity is not a necessary element of magical realism. The magical element, Fevvers, is both the subject and the object of her own
narration; it is clear from the outset of the novel that she is making her own
reality. At the same time, however, the omniscient narrator guarantees the
dominant reality of her setting, and her inclusion in it. Indeed, Fevvers illustrates quite succinctly the contradiction between the singular position and the
wish for a relational identity. That is, as an object = x, she is not bound by any
convergent system such as the State or the laws of nature, and is, as it were, autoproductive. However, she is also therefore entirely non-relational. The only way
to attain relationality is by reterritorialization, that is, entering into a configuration of relations that is by essence territorial. In order to find a place in the
world, a definition of herself, Fevvers has to perform, she has to insert herself
into the order of the State through the circus and reterritorialize herself in the
gaze of her spectators.
Fevvers thus allows us to see the central dilemma of magical realism with
greater clarity: magic occupies a position where the binary divisions of any
domination scenario are erased and where any rigid organization is destroyed,
thus implying a liberation from such specifying structures. However, it also
implies the impossibility of the kind of relations necessary for individual identity. In Nights at the Circus Carter dramatizes this dilemma further through the
group of Clowns. The identities of the clowns are ostensibly and unashamedly
constructs, but underneath there is no true self, no original. Nevertheless, the
clowns feel that their awareness of the specified nature of their identity, their
choice of the construct, as it were, is a form of freedom: I have become this
face which is not mine, and yet I choose it freely (NC 122). However, they
also demonstrate the dangers of absolute deterritorialization, similar to those
encountered by Saleem in Midnights Children. First Buffo, their leader, in his
madness and in a flurry of numerous performed identities, deconstructs himself to his death. Later, the clowns as a group perform themselves to oblivion.
Carter seems to imply here, as Day observes, the danger of a non-material, ahistorical and transcendental principle (that is, a singular principle) that is presupposed by identity: enacting or embodying this principle ends in chaos and
destruction.49
What Carter seems to advocate is the necessity of constructing a territorial
identity. While both One Hundred Years of Solitude and Midnights Children ended
in total annihilation, Nights at the Circus includes a kind of personal apocalypse,
but ends with a reconstruction of identity. This apocalypse, or rather extreme
deterritorialization, takes place in the smooth space of a wintry Siberia. The
train that Fevvers and Walser are travelling on, a mini-State dividing people and
animals in ordered segments, is literally shattered into pieces. This precipitates
66
Walsers total loss of identity through trauma, like Saleems amnesia, as well as
Fevverss loss of a performative space and thus her main way of creating identity. In the end, however, they both find new identities through their love, that
is, by establishing a relation to each other. Walser starts off comfortable in his
role as an adventurous, independent man who possesses a specifying gaze both
in his role as a man and as a journalist: he writes down and thus determines the
identities of the objects he investigates. Carter has him go through a complete
becoming-other in his madness, in order to allow him to emerge a new man; an
identity he receives by subjecting himself to Fevverss gaze. In the last pages of
the novel he offers an alternative narrative of himself, in her unique style. Fevvers,
in turn, having been lost and bedraggled, finds herself again in his eyes. As they
meet, he, still in a precarious mental state, looks at her uncomprehending and
she suffers the worst crisis of her life: Am I fact? Or am I fiction? Am I what
I know I am? Or am I what he thinks I am? She only regains her confidence and
identity when she spreads her wings and sees the eyes fixed upon her with astonishment, with awe, the eyes that told her who she was (NC 290).
Clare Hanson reads this conclusion of Nights at the Circus as a pessimistic
message: one can redraw ones own identity but always at expense of someone
elses. Fevvers finds herself again, but only through remoulding Walsers image
of her, and to Hanson the end of the novel is thus only a reversal rather than a
deconstruction of the power relations that make up identity.50 In a sense this
is true, since we are certainly not given an alternative to the construction of
identity through a system predicated on delineation and boundaries, on territorialization. However, Carter offers a rather upbeat ending from the point of view
of Fevvers, as she has chosen her performance and her spectator. She has thus
been able to escape her specified identity through what Hallward would call a
specific position. Yet Carter does not allow this to be an entirely unproblematic
solution for Fevvers. Walsers question whether she really is the only fullyfeathered intacta in the history of the world is met with the enigmatic Gawd,
I fooled you! (NC 294) and the resounding laugh that closes the novel. This
laugh seems yet again to set in motion Fevverss endless circulation as the object
= x, making her resonate with all the identities she has ever been given, as we
have to re-open the question what is she? In fact, the magic does not necessarily lead to destruction or dissolution, but the mechanisms that keep things
together, that allow the characters to return from the brink of apocalypse, from
total deterritorialization, are those of reterritorialization and of the State.
67
68
Paul Ds memory of the utter humiliation suffered by having to wear the bit at
Sweet Home, as well as the physical and sexual abuse he experienced as part of
a chain-gang in Georgia, and many more such episodes, are striking precisely
because of their unflinching realism. Without these realist episodes, Beloved
would not be perceived as such a significant character, for she only attains
her identity as a repressed memory through her resonance with these realist
passages, in particular the horror of Sethes murder of her own daughter.
Notably, this, the central passage in the novel, is entirely realist. However, before
we consider Beloved, we need to understand the realism of the novel better, for
it nevertheless seems to have an extra dimension to it, not present in the other
novels discussed so far.
The recollected episodes of slavery and escape often emerge from the
involuntary memories of the characters, and the link to Proust has been made
on occasion.58 Sethe tries hard not to remember her days of slavery, and is often
successful: The picture of the men coming to nurse her was as lifeless as the
nerves in her back where the skin buckled like a washboard; but then something will trigger her memory: The plash [sic] of water, the sight of her shoes
and stockings awry on the path where she had flung them; or Here Boy lapping
in the puddle near her feet, and suddenly there was Sweet Home rolling,
rolling, rolling out before her eyes, and although there was not a leaf on that
farm that did not want to make her scream, it rolled itself out before her in
shameless beauty.59 In Proust and Signs, Deleuze considers the signs of involuntary memory that the narrator in of la recherche du temps perdu experiences
as part of the apprenticeship of signs, as a step towards understanding
the signs of art. However, these signs of memory are still only a beginning:
Reminiscences in involuntary memory are still of life: of art at the level of life
[. . .]. On the contrary art in its essence, the art superior to life, is not based
upon involuntary memory (PS 55). What the signs of memory do, however, is
foreground the difference inherent in the process of art:
The essential thing in involuntary memory is not resemblance, nor even identity, which
are merely conditions, but the internalized difference, which becomes immanent. It is
in this sense that reminiscence is the analogue of art [. . .]: it takes two different objects, the madeleine with its flavor, Combray with its qualities of color
and temperature; it envelops the one in the other, and makes their relation
into something internal. (PS 60)
That is, the signs of involuntary memory introduce a break in the text, by showing up the difference between the narration and the narrated, shattering the
illusion of representation. However, reminiscences do not go as far as the signs
of art, since they are, says Deleuze, less dematerialized and still depend on
associations, and are therefore easily reinterpreted objectively as realism
or subjectively as symbols (PS 64). The device of memory thus accounts for
Beloveds self-awareness of history and fiction as human constructs,60 as it does
69
in Midnights Children, but again we see that such a characteristic is not what
defines the magic of magical realism.
Indeed, the memories of Sethe and Paul D are reterritorialized within the
linear narrative of the story of Beloved, as passages of realism. However, they do
seem to have an almost autonomous, physical presence. As Sethe explains to
her daughter, Denver, Some things just stay [. . .]. Someday you be walking
down the road and you hear something or see something going on. So clear.
And you think its you thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. Its when you
bump into a rememory that belongs to somebody else (BD 43). These involuntary rememories are the legacy of slavery, and, as has been often noted, seem
to be as real and persistent as the scars on Sethes back. They are, we could
argue, the remnants of a different regime of signs within the regime of subjectification that governs the realism of the novel. Indeed, the frame narrative of
the novel is set in a world segmented and ordered like Macondo. At the centre
is the family, however small, and the domestic setting, and then the black
neighbourhood in Cincinnati, placed the right side of the all-important line
dividing North and South. The year is 1873 and both the benefits and the disappointments of abolition are dramatized by the various characters inhabiting
this setting. Certainly the third-person matter-of-fact narration of this frame
setting establishes the authenticating voice of realism. However, while the voices
of the characters remembering their past also speak under the regime of signs
of realism, they describe a different kind of regime. Slavery can be seen as
part of what Deleuze calls a despotic regime, as opposed to the State, which is
part of the regime of signification (there may have been a State for the white
slave-owners, but clearly from the slaves perspective there was no sanction
of their subjection through reason). In brief, in this regime all signs are sanctioned by the despot, all signification imposed from this signifying centre.
(TP 111148) Rather than the constant reterritorialization of flows that characterizes the State, the despotic regime is an extreme territorialization (although
it may be very local applied only to the slave population for example). In
Hallwards terms, it is a system under which individuals are entirely specified.
The racist discourse that underpins the specification of blacks as slaves is dramatized most explicitly in Beloved by Schoolteacher, the new master of Sweet
Home, who has his nephews measure the slaves, writing down their animal as
well as human characteristics. However, the specification of slaves as animals,
as childlike, or as inhuman is constant throughout the characters recollections.
Their memories are part of their extreme territorialization, remnants of the
despotic regime erupting in the present. What Beloved emphasizes in the realism of these memories is thus identity as specified. The extremity and violence
with which it has been specified is clearly an imperative to despecify: and this
imperative is akin to the persistence in postmodern literature not only of desire
for elimination of domination, inequality and oppression but also of desire for
transcendence itself, as DeKoven points out in her discussion of the novel.61
In a sense, then, the despecifying magic of Beloved feels more necessary in
70
Morrisons novel than it ever did in the others, and the battle between a specified identity, a new acceptable identity, and the non-identity of the singular,
becomes far more explicitly a matter of extreme importance for the survival of
the individual.
The memories of the past, the eruptions of the despotic regime, lead to
Beloveds appearance in the novel. Sethes struggle with her memories seems
to evoke this magical character, although her appearance cannot be easily
explained. In fact, the very slipperiness of Beloved that any reader or critic of
the novel has to battle against is due to her magic, her absolute deterritorialization, her function as an object = x. As Phelan points out, she is stubborn, she
wont yield to interpretation; however one rearranges her character, something
does not fit.62 No symbolic or real status that critics have attempted to pin on
her ever quite holds: whether she is seen as the ghost of Sethes murdered baby,
a runaway slave, the motherdaughter bond incarnate, guilt come alive, or the
collective memory of the Middle Passage. These possibilities are merely resonances evoked as she traverses the convergent lines of the realism of the
novel.
Harris incisively reads Beloved as not a person but a thing without any
personality traits or any morality, unleashed and unrestrained, limited only by
the imagination. She is the personification of desire, thus epitomizes the
demonic.63 Indeed, say Deleuze and Guattari, becomings are demonic, a term
they specifically place outside the order distinguishing the divine and the
satanic. Beloved may be a becoming-human of desire, but at the same time as
she is also a becoming-other, a becoming-ghost, of the human. According to
Heinze, Beloved can never be fully conceptualized because she is continually
in a state of transition,64 rather like Melquades in One Hundred Years of Solitude.
Beloved is always in flux because she has no identity of her own. Just as her
skin is entirely smooth and unlined, so she is a smooth, deterritorialized entity.
In a sense, she is like Fevvers insofar as she accepts the (pseudo-)identity that
others give her (as they speculate on who she is), and she also precipitates the
becoming-other of another character. Beloved enters into a zone of imperceptibility with Sethe: She imitated Sethe, talked the way she did, laughed her
laugh and used her body the same way down to the walk, the way Sethe moved
her hands, sighed through her nose, held her head. Sometimes [. . .] it was
difficult for Denver to tell who was who (BD 283). However, their mutual deterritorialization seems to spin out of control, enter into the territory or rather
the lack of it where things are torn asunder, as in the case of Saleem or
Macondo.
Conner reads Beloved as a creature of the sublime, which he explicitly links
to the annihilation of self and the disruption of individual and community.65 As
Corey has noted, after Paul D leaves the house it enters a liminal period when
time seems to stop,66 as if it becomes a piece of the timeless place from which
Beloved has come back home (BD 214). We can compare this timelessness to
that of Melquadess parchments, as it embodies, quite literally, a simultaneous
71
72
Chapter 4
74
Recall that the realism of magical realism reflects the structure of the actual,
and only the actual. Indeed, the laws of nature, which apparently order the
realist experience, are to, Deleuze, merely a set of such protective rules governing our thought in the realm of the actual, rules that indeed, exclude winged
horses, fire-breathing dragons or any other magic. However, art can also
allow us to venture beyond these protective rules, and by the process of counteractualization to restore a piece of the virtual chaos, precisely by allowing us to
imagine, to think, all sorts of magical events.
We have to remember here the implications of Deleuzes ontology for the
status of art as being. If everything that is, is in the same way, art is not a
secondary type of being, but yet another creation. The movement of counteractualization is never a representation, or image of the virtual, but rather,
thought of the virtual. Art enables us to think the virtual by recreating rather
than representing the infinite, by embodying the infinite in a new and unique
creation, that can stand alone. What art does, say Deleuze and Guattari, is to
preserve itself:
What is preserved the thing or the work of art is a bloc [sic] of sensations,
that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects. [. . .]. [It] could be said to exist
in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas,
or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. (WIP 164)
Indeed, what is crucial to Deleuze is that the work of art is unique precisely
because of the way it allows us think the virtual, and that this implies, inevitably,
leaving the subject behind and considering a realm that is not personal or even
human.
The absence of the human from art central to Cinema 2, one of Deleuzes
most comprehensive considerations of the workings of an art form. Here he
posits the condition for the counter-actualization of cinema, in the so-called
crystalline image, as the negation of what he calls the motor-sensory schema
(C2 122150). The motor-sensory schema is precisely the human subjective
system of rules that protects us from the chaos of the virtual. Our actual, organic
body has to sort the information it gains from the senses pragmatically in order
to function in the world. To illustrate this, Deleuze and Guattari quote Kants
Critique of Pure Reason:
If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy . . ., my empirical imagination would never find opportunity
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onto his own ontological thought, and he finds the Bergsonian concepts of
duration and space parallel to his virtual and actual. Bergsons lan vital
corresponds to the creative Being which at every instant separates into two
movements: duration and space, virtual and actual. Inevitably, however, as the
lan vital extends into matter it loses contact with the rest of itself (B 104), that
is, the virtual is obscured by the actual, leading to an illusory and erroneous
view of Being. Just like Deleuze himself, Deleuzes Bergson urges us to go
beyond the state of experience toward the conditions of experience (B 27).
This can only be done by understanding the concept of duration. The form of
duration is the pure past, which we must reach through pure recollection.
The past is not merely that which has been and gone: We have great difficulty
in understanding a survival of the past in itself because we believe that the
past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus confused Being with
being-present (B 55). To Bergson, however, the past exists all-together and
all-at-once, like Deleuzes virtual. Deleuze uses this Bergsonian framework in
Cinema 2 to describe the crystalline image, and the interaction between virtual
and the actual that it embodies. Duration, the pure past or time all-at-once,
is always coexistent with the present of matter and form, which, as present, is
always passing on. It is this coexistence that is precisely made visible, or rather
thinkable, in the crystalline image: The present is the actual image, and its
contemporaneous past is the virtual image (C2 7677).
How can we properly think this duration? Deleuze tells us that the condition
of the coexistence of the virtual and actual in the crystalline image is indiscernibility. The crystalline image works like all creation, it is the actualization of
the virtual: an effective splitting of Being into virtual and actual. But it is also,
crucially, a counter-actualization: a coming back together of the actual and
virtual, affirming the univocity of Being. This takes place precisely through the
indiscernibility of the two sides of Being: The crystal-image is, then, the point
of indiscernibility of the two distinct images, the actual and the virtual, while
what we see in the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state, the
very distinction between the two images which keeps on reconstituting itself
(C2 79). The practical effect of this is what differentiates the organic or actual
image from the crystalline one. The rules of the motor-sensory schema are
no longer functional, but are replaced by non-localizable relations: motorsensory linkages [. . .] give way to a succession of varieties subject to their own
laws of passage (C2 5). As we have already seen, the magical signs in magical
realism, at the point of maximum deterritorialization from realism, gain the
freedom of multiple meanings, unchained to a referential or even an associative series, that is, free from what Deleuze calls objective and subjective
interpretations.
However, Deleuze insists that This is not at all a case of each has its own
truth, a variability of content. It is a power of the false which replaces and
supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts (C2 127). It is thus,
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for the crystalline image as well as the magical sign, not a matter of a freedom
of interpretation, but a whole new regime of meaning. The image, rather than
being truthful, becomes fundamentally falsifying; that is, what Deleuze calls
a simulacrum, not a representation of anything, but a whole new creation in
itself. As all the rules of convergence of the organic narration, or realism, are
negated, we run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility:
we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and
there is no longer even a place from which to ask (C2 7). Recall that indiscernibility is also what characterizes Deleuzian becoming: a process of deterritorialization which means entering into a zone of imperceptibility with what one is
becoming. Indeed, the crystalline sign is a becoming-indiscernible of the sign:
when the sign has detached itself from the motor-sensory schema, when it has
become fully non-human, it is no longer possible to perceive the sign as true
or false according to the convergent rules of the actual. The implication of
indiscernibility is the revelation of a different ontological order, or a new regime
of signs; a crystalline or magical regime of the signs of simulation, in contrast to
the realist regime of signs of signification.
In the last chapter we encountered the apprenticeship of signs that Deleuze
discovers in Prousts la recherche du temps perdu, a process of understanding
various kinds of signs, from the most actual so called worldly signs to the
most virtual the signs of art. Only the signs of art are, like crystalline images,
free from the motor-sensory schema, but it is necessary to go through the other
signs of the apprenticeship in order to reach an understanding of these. Recall
that when a divergent element, an object = x, is introduced into a convergent
system, it makes all series, convergent as well as divergent, communicate and
resonate anew through difference itself. The sign of art as such an element
allows us to see all signs as connected but only through difference. We saw how
divergent series created a kind of resemblance or resonance as a statistical
effect. In the same way the signs of art create a kind of unity of the work of art
when, in fact, there is no totality except a statistical one which lacks any profound meaning (PS 125126). Deleuze contrasts this kind of statistical unity
with the unity obtained by traditional logical thought. Rather than parts being
linked together and forming a whole through patterns, order or laws, parts
become valid on their own, in themselves, precisely because they do not correspond to a whole at all, but are different in themselves.
Deleuze also uses Bergsons concepts to articulate his theory of the signs of
art. The sign of art is properly time regained, that is, Bergsonian duration,
or pure time regained; because time, ultimate interpreter, ultimate act of interpretation, has the strange power to affirm simultaneously fragments that do not
constitute a whole in space, any more than they form a whole by succession
within time. Time is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces, including
the space of time (PS 129130). Thus Deleuze can insist that the signs of art
constitute a superior viewpoint, superior because it is no longer a particular
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the novel, describing Pis tribulations at sea. The novel ends with a coda where
Pi offers an alternative story of his experiences at sea. The initial frame narratives are interesting for two reasons. First, they ostensibly provide the realist
impulse of the novel, and second, they set up what can be seen as a cultural
context both aspects which can be seen as rather superfluous to the central
story of the novel. It is notable that the narrative strand that initially seems to be
central to the novel, Pis attempt to embrace Islam, Hinduism and Christianity
at the same time, turns out to be confined to the frame narrative. In the main
section there are no references to this particular experience of Pis apart from
a few mentions of prayers and rituals. In fact, any specific religious or cultural
background becomes redundant in the face of his struggle for survival, therefore also making the careful initial set-up of these particulars in the novel seem
redundant. However, before we consider the importance of the situation of the
cultural particulars relative to the placement of magic in the novel, we need to
consider what the magic, as well as the real of the novel, consists of.
The magic of Life of Pi is not the incidental magic of One Hundred Years of
Solitude, nor the continuous magical thread in Midnights Children. It appears in
the main section of the novel in its entirety and nowhere else. It consists partly
of the extraordinary survival of a boy at sea for 227 days, but mainly of the not
supernatural, but, to say the least, distinctly implausible presence of a Bengal
tiger (called Richard Parker due to a clerical error) throughout the story of
Pis survival. The tiger is one sustained element of magic that remains present
in an otherwise realist narrative for some 200 pages. It seems to echo magical
realisms Latin American roots, reminding us both of Borgess Dream Tigers and
the tiger prowling the large country house in Julio Cortzars story Bestiary.2
However, this sustained magic does not mean that the narrative relinquishes
its realism at any point. On the contrary, the narration throughout the middle
section of the novel, in the face of the presence of the tiger, remains unwaveringly detailed and empirical. Martels novel on the whole remains, as Martel
himself notes in an interview, simple and linear, without any stylistic trickery3
and, as Steve Street points out in his review, Martel takes pains with
verisimilitude.4 Pis experiences on the lifeboat, both in terms of the animals
and of his survival tactics, are described with care. In fact, the inclusion of the
frame narrative does seem to serve one specific purpose as regards the narrative
detail of the main section of the novel: we find out why Pi knows so much about
animal behaviour he is the son of a zoo keeper. This knowledge is indispensable to him on the lifeboat, and also indispensable to providing the narrative
with a pseudo-scientific discourse that works as one of the authenticating devices
of realism. Unsurprisingly, several critics have compared Life of Pi to Defoes
Robinson Crusoe, and Martels novel does use some of Defoes classic realist
devices: the practical details of the ordeal, the tale told by an eyewitness. Even
as he, like Saleem in Midnights Children, professes the fallibility of his memory,
Pis eyewitness account creates a reality effect by the very particularity of the
details that are recalled: What I remember are events and encounters and
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routines, markers that emerged here and there from the ocean of time and
imprinted themselves on my memory. The smell of spent hand-flare shells,
and prayers at dawn, and the killing of the turtles, and the biology of the algae,
for example.5
It is precisely bodily sensations Deleuzes so called motor-sensory schema
that make up the convergent series of the realism of this part of the novel. We
can note in particular the visual impressions of the endless ocean, the light and
dark, the glaring sun and the cold wet rain; the specific mechanics of survival,
fishing, killing turtles and gathering precious water; and finally the pseudoscientific precision of an educated young man, reasoning and rational, observing the nature that surrounds him inside and outside the boat. While specific
details of history and geography are left out, something we will return to later,
the narration remains consistent with the realism we have previously identified
in magical realism. There may be no houses or towns, but the boat is quickly
divided into very specific territories the tigers and the boys. There may be no
historical events to mark the progression of time, but Pi acts in a meticulously
rational way, segmenting his day according to the tasks that need to be performed: we are given a list of activities including inspection of raft and lifeboat, tending of solar stills, examining of scabs and sores, dinner for self
and Richard Parker and so on (LP 190). The lifeboat with its territories,
and the ordered activities of Pi are, indeed, Pis protection against the chaos
that assails him from both within and without the life-boat. The magic of
the animals and the sea, in contrast, constantly challenge these motor-sensory
schemata and push him to the limits of human life.
True to most definitions of magical realism, the magic in Life of Pi is described
precisely by the same realist narration as Pis rational activities. The tiger
starts off as part of a veritable menagerie on the lifeboat. Immediately after the
shipwreck the boat offers salvation to not only Pi and the tiger, but also an
orangutan, a zebra and a hyena. Pis narration of the animals is always steeped
in zoological details, and the not unexpected outcome of the strange animal
gathering on the boat is described in the same tone. The hyena gets to the
dying zebra and kills the orangutan in battle when hunger overcomes it An
adult female orang-utan cannot defeat an adult male spotted hyena. That is
the plain empirical truth. (LP 130) before succumbing to the tiger. The
tiger thus literally absorbs all the other animals, and becomes the one enduring
magical sign. This magical sign persists in the face of an unswerving realist
narration, vividly evoking the fluid power of the tiger:
He completed the turn of his head with a slow turn of his body, moving his
forepaws sideways along the side bench. He dropped to the floor of the boat
with ponderous ease. I could see the top of his head, his back and his long,
curled tail. His ears lay flat against his skull. In three paces he was at the
middle of the boat. Without effort the front half of his body rose in the air and
his forepaws came to rest on the rolled-up edge of the tarpaulin. (LP 152)
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taking flight: Am in lifeboat. Pi Patel my name. Have some food, some water,
but Bengal tiger a serious problem (LP 238).
However, it is not only the magic of the animals that appears as a crystalline
sign in contrast to the organic narration of the realism in the novel. Francie Lin
suggests that it is testament to Martels talent that his narrative never drags
despite the fact that the movement of time in Life of Pi is almost undetectable.
All incidents take place in a kind of vacuum.10 Certainly, the narrative is lacking
in the usual realist markers of history and geography, time and location. It is as
if the magic of the tiger within the lifeboat has a correlative outside the lifeboat:
the absolute absence of signs that is the sea. In contrast to the convergent series
of the lifeboat realm, the small but segmented world of Pi, the sea presents a
total absence of order. It is a Deleuzian smooth space, a space that is entirely
non-human, devoid of all that the motor-sensory schema needs: I considered
jumping overboard and swimming away, but my body refused to move. I was
hundreds of miles from landfall, if not a thousand miles [. . .]. What would
I eat? What would I drink? How would I keep the sharks away? How would
I keep warm? How would I know which way to go? (LP 147). The sea, like the
jungle that surrounded Macondo in One Hundred Years of Solitude, is without
markers, without territories or places, only a smooth skin reflecting the light
with a million mirrors (LP 159).
Florence Stratton suggests that the tiger is the spark of the story and that
its primary signification is the incantatory or transcendent power of art: the
imaginative truths or realities that great art encompasses. That art has redemptive or transformative power is also suggested.11 Though she is actually sceptical about the power of Life of Pi as a work of art, Stratton is on the right track
here, while nevertheless making the error of trying to give the tiger a symbolic
significance. In fact, the tiger, as a magical sign, does not signify the power of
art but embodies it. The power of art, to Deleuze, is not a transcendent but an
entirely immanent one. Art does indeed have redemptive and transformative
powers, and these are enacted by the magical sign. The tiger embodies the
spark of the story, insofar as it embodies the virtual that gives sense to all
language. Interestingly, and we will come back to this, Stratton concludes that
the central section of Life of Pi is not satisfactory, as it is hollow at the core
without literal referent.12 Indeed it is, with its null signifying value, and this is
precisely because it embodies the power of art, rather than referring to it.
What effect does the power of art of the magical sign have in Life of Pi? One
answer lies in the final section of the novel, in which an alternative story of
Pis shipwreck is offered. Crucially, this version comes after the magical middle
part of the novel, and thus after we have already gone through a kind of apprenticeship of signs in which we have encountered the magical signs of art. Thus
when we are faced with the second story, we see it in an entirely different
way than we would have done, had it been presented to us at the beginning.
In the second story, in place of the menagerie of animals, Pi finds himself on
the lifeboat with his mother, a wounded Taiwanese sailor and a murderous
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French cook. The cook kills both the Taiwanese sailor and Pis mother before
in turn being killed by Pi, who is then forced to eat his flesh for survival.
Although some reviewers have labelled this the true story, most seem to imply
that it is a story Pi makes up in his frustration with the incredulity of the inspectors from the Japanese Ministry of Transport who refuse to believe his initial
account. The crux of the novel is that Pi manages to get these representatives
of reason to admit that his first story is the better one, upon which admission
Pi states And so it goes with God (LP 317). Critics and reviewers rightly agree
that this is an entirely unsatisfactory line. While Life of Pi at its outset promises
to be a story that will make you believe in God (LP xii), most readers note that
apart from the rather weak episode of Pis three faiths, the novel has little to say
about faith or the existence of God. However, a great many critics and reviewers
admit that while the novel does not make a good case for belief in God, it does
suggest a faith in fiction or the power of writing.13 In contrast to the weaknesses
found in the frame narratives of the novel, critics have praised the inherent
ambiguity of the central story. Francis King asks: Is this a narrative [. . .] of what
really happened or of what happened in the mind of a boy maddened by fever,
terror and grief? However, he concludes that it is a strength, not a weakness,
of this extraordinary novel that when boy and tiger at last reach the seaboard of
Mexico, that question still remains unanswered.14 In fact, the question remains
unanswered even though we are given the alternative of a more believable story,
and it does so because of the very power of writing or of art. What the power
of writing does is not, as many readers have suggested, make them choose, with
the Japanese officials, Pis initial story as the better story. That choice is all
their own. Rather, the power of the signs of art is precisely what leaves the
question unanswered.
This undecidability is exactly at the heart of the magical crystalline signs of
the tiger, the sea and sky. The impossibility of survival at sea for 277 days and the
extreme impossibility of survival in a lifeboat with a Bengal tiger are, in fact, the
non-human becomings of the text. Pi notices that I ate like an animal, that
noisy, frantic, unchewing wolfing-down of mine was exactly the way Richard
Parker ate (LP 225). Pi becomes-tiger in the central narrative to such an extent
that it is implied (and noted by several reviewers) that in his second story, if the
Frenchman is the hyena, the Taiwanese sailor the zebra, and Pis mother
the orangutan, Pi must be the tiger himself. Pis zones of indiscernibility
with the tiger, his becoming-tiger, thus introduce zones of indiscernibility
between his two stories. The becoming-non-human of the magical sign is therefore part of its power as a sign of art. It is also what inevitably makes the magical
sign divergent from the essentially human order of the realism in the text.
June Dwyer compares the relationship between human and animal in traditional shipwreck narratives, such as Robinson Crusoe, and Martels novel. She
notes that in the shipwreck narrative there is a privileging [of] the know-how
and the power of human over non-human animals reflecting the utilitarian
view of animals during the Enlightenment period.15 Man is seen as master of
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position, and the identity that any human culture implies, that is, the order
necessary for the human motor-sensory schema to function practically in the
actual everyday world. Magic, of course, belongs to an entirely different regime
of signs. What becomes apparent in Life of Pi is that becoming-non-human, the
negation of the motor-sensory schema, is crucial to the magical sign and its
divergence from the protective rules of the real. The clear separation between
the central narrative that contains the magic of the novel, and the frame narrative that contains the order of human culture, make this fact more apparent.
In the core story, the magic literally and poignantly forces Pi towards the limits
of his humanity. It is precisely in their utter otherness to the human that the
magical signs of the novel work as signs of art, standing on their own, apart
from the actual world. However, the signs of art also reveal the structure of the
actual world, for after we have become acquainted with the magic of the central
narrative we see how the order of the real, the actual, permeates all aspects of
human experience, even the experience of the divine. In addition, however, we
also see that it is possible to think outside this order, through the non-human
becomings embodied in art.
If becoming non-human is central to the magic of Life of Pi, it also suggests
that imperceptibility is at the heart of becoming, as, at the end of the novel, the
magic of the central narrative opens up zones of imperceptibility between Pis
alternative stories of his adventures at sea. We saw in the beginning of this
chapter how the crystalline sign, because it is free from the human motorsensory schema, allows the virtual to be valid for itself to the extent that it
becomes imperceptible from the actual. Becoming non-human in magical realism thus implies a becoming-imperceptible not only between the human and
non-human, but between the real and the magic, the true and the false.
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writing for the dissident writer, Brink notes, since realism made sufferings
apparent to those not directly affected and stimulated a sense of solidarity.
However, with socio-political change in South Africa came a new freedom for
writers: new possibilities for imaginative engagement.20 Thus in the late 90s
Brink turned to the fantastic in his novels, notably in Imaginings of Sand (1996)
and Devils Valley. Indeed, he sees literature taking on new regenerative powers
after 1994, in order
not simply to escape from the inhibitions of apartheid but to construct and
deconstruct new possibilities; to activate the imagination in its exploration of
those silences previously inaccessible; to play with the future on that needlepoint where it meets past and present; and to be willing to risk everything in
the leaping flame of the word as it turns into world.21
These words have a Deleuzian ring to them, suggesting that literature is not
simply a way to report the injustices of the world, but a way of thinking, and thus
creating, a new world.
This does not mean, however, that Brink decided to leave behind all the
themes of his anti-apartheid literature. In fact, Devils Valley is very much concerned with the issues Brink lists as silent territories under apartheid: the
settlement of South Africa before the whites, the enslavement of the peoples
of the interior, the use of the Bible as a justification for oppression, the extent
of miscegenation in Afrikaner society, the involvement of coloured in the
Great Trek, the marginalization of women, the exploitation of the environment, and Afrikaner dissidence;22 that is, the issues that lie at the core of
Afrikaner national identity. Devils Valley, like some of the novels considered in
the last chapter, is about history and national identity, and in particular deals
with the attempts of a settler colony to create an identity in a strange new land.
Of course, South Africa is a special case in many ways, since, as Elleke Boehmer
points out, the apartheid regime outlawed the cultural mixing and crossfertilization informing so much postcolonial literature. Boehmer wonders if
perhaps the new literature of a society which has laboured under a unique situation of internal colonization in a postcolonial world will [. . .] bypass the teeming dreamscapes that characterize the postcolonial writings of an Amitav Ghosh
or a Ben Okri and create something quite its own.23 Actually, as an example of
the regeneration of literature in post-apartheid South Africa, Devils Valley does
display some strong similarities with the novels of these two postcolonial authors
and with other magical realist texts. We will turn to these two authors in the
next chapter, but here we will look at how Brinks use of magical realism allows
him to imagine the real.24 This act of the imagination will prove crucial to readings of magical realism in a postcolonial political context. What is interesting
here is that at a time when the truth of the past was pursued in the name of
reconciliation in South Africa, Brink uses a genre where the specifics of a place
and time represented by realism are pitted against an ahistorical magic. As we
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question not only history, but also notions of family and nation imagined
communities that rely on stable myths for cohesion and sanction, or in our
terms, the State. She notes how the Lermiets are Lermiets only if they lend
credence to the familys myths: dissenters leave or die.29 Indeed, once the
silenced voices of the community, in particular the women, speak up, the family
and the whole community starts to disintegrate.
It is true that the many alternative and contradictory stories undo the idea of
a single, truthful version of history, as well as expose such a historys centrality
to the concepts of family and community. However, the magical events of the
novel are different to any version of history, and take us in a different direction
to that indicated by the idea of historiographic metafiction. Brink, in Mapmakers, states that whereas society tends to enslave language the writer strives to
liberate it,30 and in the inventive freedom he found after the apartheid years,
he was able to fully explore this thesis. Each of the multiple stories of the Devils
valley is an attempt to order and define experience. However, as they multiply,
the success of this attempt becomes less rather than more possible, as they are
contradictory and confusing. In contrast, the magical events escape order and
definition completely. As such they belong to a different regime of meaning,
one where origins and truthfulness are not important, where the divergent and
different can coalesce into a whole without unity.
Whatever stories the inhabitants of the Devils Valley tell, they all conform to
a particular order the linear, convergent order of society, that which is
expressed in the realism of the novel. As an eyewitness account, Lochners
narration provides us with the requisite details for the reality effect, giving us
some background history on the Great Trek, describing how he came to find
himself in the remote valley, and furnishing us with vivid visual descriptions of
the place. Like Macondo, Devils Valley is a strictly segmented place: Probably
thirty or forty houses altogether, arranged in two uneven rows, all of them
whitewashed and built to the same basic plan [. . .]. Every backyard had its shed
and its haystack and a longdrop, while most sported an old-fashioned stone
well (DV 35). At the centre of the settlement lie the church and the cemetery,
while its boundaries are the bluegum forest and the cliffs surrounding it. The
convergent series of the genealogy of the inhabitants Lukas Seer begat Lukas
Nimrod, and Lukas Nimrod begat Lukas Up-Above, and Lukas Up-Above
begat Strong Lukas, and Strong Lukas begat Lukas Bigballs, and Lukas Bigballs
begat Lukas Devil, and Lukas Devil begat Lukas Death, and Lukas Death begat
Little-Lukas (DV 105) is not only a force for community cohesion through
its air of Biblical inevitability, but also ensures that each member has his own
rightful place. Occupations are passed from father to son or mother to daughter, and nicknames seal the fate of the inhabitants: there is Brother Holy the
preacher, Smith-the-Smith, Jurg Water the diviner, Poppie Fullmoon the midwife, Gert Brush the painter and so on.
The novels realist order could be read, Joseph-Vilain suggests, as an allegory
of apartheid a society strictly stratified and determined by racial lineage.31
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the thin side to my taste. If this had been my fantasy Id have filled her out a
bit [. . .]. But this is the point: its not a dream, she is real. (DV 26)
The next moment the woman, as well as the rock-pool, are gone, yet Lochner
insists, as a realist eye-witness narrator: She was there. I can recall every damn
detail (DV 27). It later turns out that Emma, a young woman keen to escape
the colony who Lochner befriends and falls for, had dreamt of bathing in the
rock-pool that same afternoon. Joseph-Vilain sees this as a blurring of the borders between reality and dream, which to her reflects the unstable nature of
history in Devils Valley.35 In fact, it is the present of the narrative that is unstable.
Joseph-Vilain also refers to Flips nightly sexual encounters with mysterious,
animal-like women, which would appear to be dreams, if it were not for the
tangible objects they leave behind; to the porcupine-hunt that he participates
in which is then denied by the other men of the village; and the encounter
with the adolescent temptress Henta Peach in the bluegum woods which
Henta seems to have forgotten the next day. Continually in the novel, both
Lochner and the reader are unable to tell what is real and what is not, in the
here and now.
This blurring of the boundaries of the real and the imagined is the moment
of the emergence of magic as a Deleuzian crystalline sign a sign which means
that we no longer know what is imaginary or real (C2 7). The implications
of the crystalline sign go beyond the simple relativization of history, according
to Deleuze, because such indiscernibility does not simply imply the subjectivity
of truth. Rather, the crystalline sign poses the simultaneity of incompossible
presents (C2 127). The magical elements of Brinks novel are not simply
part of the alternative stories or subjective truths of the inhabitants, in fact,
the two are radically different. The inhabitants stories pose variants of the past
and appear contradictory, while the magical events are sites where such contradictions are no longer an issue. The magic does not resolve these contradictions, but rather allows us precisely to gain the superior viewpoint of art, which
is also a thousand various noncommunicating viewpoints (PS 166).
The established myth of the community recounts how Strong-Lukas singlehandedly repelled government agents sent to the valley to tax the community.
Lochner then hears an alternative story from Dalena, the wife of Lukas Death,
that Strong-Lukass daughter, Mooi-Janna, sacrificed herself by seducing the
government agents, and thus allowed her father and his men to overcome them
by surprise. Her father, to save his own reputation and the familys honour, then
killed her. Kauer suggest that this is the recovery of the silent womens voice:
Dalena telling Mooi-Jannas lost story.36 This may well be so, but the magic in
the episode is a different matter altogether. The magic crystalline sign lies not
in the alternative story as such, but in the strange fact of the girls four breasts.
These breasts are what makes her irresistible to the government soldiers, and
allows her to take her tragic action. They are also an image that haunt Lochner
throughout his stay in the valley, after he sees the woman at the rock-pool. The
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woman both is Emma dreaming herself at the pool, and isnt Emma, who does
not, we learn at the end of the novel, have four breasts. The woman at the pool,
therefore, at the same time, both is and isnt Mooi-Jannas ghost. We can now
recast the multiplication of possible meanings that we previously noted as an
effect of the magic of magical realism, as the opening up of zones of imperceptibility between these alternative meanings.
It is, paradoxically, the very difference of the magical sign from the order of
realism that makes it imperceptible from the real. The four breasts initially
appear as a meaningful sign to Lochner, a vision of the mystery he wants to
solve. They may also be interpreted as the sign of the hidden miscegenation
and incest of the community, or the secret sign of the female side of the story.
What these magic breasts really do rather than mean is, like the trickle of
blood in One Hundred Years of Solitude, to traverse the series of the novel as an
object = x. It is this movement, diverging from the convergent series of realism
yet traversing these series at the same time, that makes the magical sign of the
four breasts appear both real and unreal at the same time. Crucially, magical
signs are not merely stories we dont know if we believe, but like the ghosts, very
much there in the present. The voices in Ben Owls head that everyone can
hear; the fact that there are no birds in Devils Valley since Lukas Up-Above
tethered them all to a basket and flew away; Hans Magics spells that shrivel a
mans foot and give another a perpetual itch; the enormous whales skeleton in
the bush these are some of the other magical signs of the novel. It is impossible to say if they are true or imaginary, yet they are unquestionably present.
In fact, we can now also see how imperceptibility as a feature of the magical
sign is radically different to the idea of magic as cultural pluralism, recalling
Life of Pi. The alternative stories in The Devils Valley, Kauer suggests, allow the
construction of hybrid identities in the sense of culturally diverse identities.
The suppressed stories of Lukas the Seers wives, the strong Mina who saved his
life, and black Bilha; the story of Mooi-Janna; the story of Katarina Sweetmeat
who took a black servant as a lover; and of Emmas mother who was stoned for
carrying an outsiders child these stories do open up the pure genealogy and
patriarchal myth of the community to differences of race and gender. However,
this kind of difference is, as we saw early on in this book, still predicated on
categories of identity, a difference-between. What the magical events of Devils
Valley uniquely do, as objects = x, is to introduce difference-in-itself into the
realist system of difference-between, creating what Deleuze calls resonance or
statistical unity. At the same time, then, as the real and magic are divergent,
the crystalline signs of the magical events make the distinction between real
and magic disappear. That is, these signs collapse the difference between the
very categories that are the foundation of difference predicated on identity.
There is by definition no difference-between in zones of indiscernibility. As in
Life of Pi, the magic of Devils Valley stands in sharp contrast to its considerations
of culture and identity, because the indiscernibility of the magical sign is linked
to its becoming non-human. As mentioned, Lochner on several occasions has
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vivid dreams of women coming into his room at night and sexually attacking
him, and then slipping away before he can establish their identity. Yet in the
mornings he always finds some concrete object left behind by these women.
These events do not just erase the difference between dream and reality. The
womens arrivals are heralded by owls and baboons, and they are themselves
animal-like in more ways than one: one has webbed feet, another a hare-lip,
and a third is covered entirely by fur, and they all make love with an animal
ferocity. Even the love-making acts themselves are moments when the categories of distinct bodies, of self and world, seem to dissolve: And she was bloody
well everywhere, against me, on me, below me, beside me, all over me (DV 83).
Lochners nights are zones of indiscernibility between reality, dream, woman,
man and animal. Yet these elements (for we can no longer properly call them
categories), remain distinct, different in themselves.
The crystalline sign is important to Deleuze as a sign of art because in its
simultaneous distinctness and indiscernibility it reveals the creative force of
Being: We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time [. . .]. This is the powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world
(C2 79). The crystalline sign thus makes the powerful Life of the virtual chaos
thinkable in the actual. Andr Brink himself states that The writer is not
concerned only with reproducing the real. What he does is to perceive, below
the lines of the map he draws, the contours of another world, somehow a more
essential world.37 As Deleuze posits in Proust, once these privileged signs
of art have been understood, a superior viewpoint becomes accessible to the
whole work of art. We saw in Life of Pi that the magical signs of the central narrative of the novel made the truth or falsehood of Pis alternative stories impossible to ascertain. Indeed, because of the viewpoint revealed by the magical
signs the alternative stories of Devils Valley also cease to be merely a collection
of contradictory facts, true or false. The stories become valid simultaneously
even though they are incompossible. The novel thus attains a kind of unity
in which there is no totality except a statistical one which lacks any profound
meaning (PS 125126). This unity has no patterns, there is no new hybrid
culture, implying reconciliation, here, rather, the opposing stories all become
valid on their own: All I have, I the historian, I the crime reporter, in search of
facts, facts, facts, is an impossible tangle of contradictory stories. And yet she
said, It doesnt mean that nothing happened (DV 352353).
What the indiscernibility of the magic in Devils Valley shows us, in contrast to
the contradictory but realist stories of the past, is that the key to magical realism
lies precisely in the fact that things did happen, even though they are contradictory. Magical events, by being included in the realist narrative, are both real
(there really is a tiger on the life boat in Life of Pi, and Lochner really did see
the woman with four breasts at the rock pool in Devils Valley) and divergent
from the real (the unbelievable tiger, the magical woman) at the same time.
While realism only allows the inclusion of different representations of the
past as contradictory, the magic allows for the inclusion of the divergent
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present present both in the sense of presence, and in the sense of the
present time. The unique characteristic of magical realism is thus a tension not
only between the real and the magic, but the paradoxical tension between
the distinct divergence of the magic and its simultaneous indiscernibility from
the real.
The magic of the nightly visitations or of the dead in the valley cannot
be reduced to dream or memory. Old Lukas the Seer is the nexus of the contradictory stories of the community, but he cannot be viewed simply as memory, or
as an alternative story among other stories. He is not a mental image, but, in
Bergsonian terms, a pure recollection. He is, indeed, as ghosts tend to be,
non-chronological and non-organic. He is a piece not of the past but of the
virtual pure past a magic moment when time, including all alternative
stories of the past, exists in simultaneity. At the beginning of Devils Valley Flip
Lochner is descending down the steep mountain-sides to the valley to begin his
investigation. The very first words of the novel are uttered by the ghost of Old
Lukas the Seer: I been sitting here, waiting for you (DV 3). The novel closes
with the very same words, as Lochner, on his way out from the Devils Valley,
encounters Lukas once again: I been sitting here, waiting for you (DV 354).
The Lermiet is both living and dead, as well as both present and past. Suddenly,
he makes the whole narrative of the novel, apparently so linear, timeless. This is
the same magical timelessness that we first encountered in One Hundred Years of
Solitude, where the old gypsy Melquades, repeatedly returned from the dead
and a timeless ghost himself, performed a similar transaction with his miseen-abyme prophecy of Macondos rise and fall. We can now identify this as the
timeless or pure time of the virtual, or duration. Duration is crucial to magical
realism, since it is duration that drives indiscernibility, allowing for the simultaneity of the real and the magic, the true past and the imagined present and,
as we shall see, the future.
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in an impassive tone: Ive kept the log book for the ship. Meticulously. And Ive
kept a book of my own, and for every journey we have made together, Ive
written down my own journey and drawn my own map. I cant show this to the
others, but I believe it to be a faithful account of what happened (SC 102).
In addition to Dog Woman and Jordans narrative strands, two more appear
towards the end of the novel. These belong to twentieth-century characters
that seem to be the contemporary alter-egos of Dog Woman and Jordan an
unnamed female chemist protesting against pollution on the banks of the
Thames and Nicholas Jordan, a man who joins the Navy. Both of these narratives are solely realist until they begin to intersect with the two earlier narrative
strands. The interweaving of these narratives gives Sexing the Cherry the timeless
magic that Melquadess prophecy or Lukas the Seers continual present add to
One Hundred Years of Solitude and Devils Valley. In fact, this intersection of narratives across the centuries is, as we shall see, central to the novels treatment of
time, an aspect of the Sexing the Cherry that has often been overlooked.
As mentioned, most critics have focused on issues of sexuality and gender
in the novel, and have therefore often read the magic as functioning simply in
these terms. However, some of the problems thrown up by Wintersons use of
the real and the magic will appear familiar to anyone considering magical realism. Tiziana Giordano expresses the common view that Winterson transgresses
the border between reality and fantasy and creates hybrid fictions and bodies
which contrast the binary opposition of male and female and provide a space in
which it is possible to reinvent the very notion of subjectivity.44 Again we come
across the idea of hybridity as a mixing of categories, although of gender
rather than culture. The idea is the same, however, namely that the magic of
the text somehow allows categories to coexist in a new and liberating way. Dog
Woman is commonly seen as the key site of the subversion of gender stereotypes, and of the disclosure of natural gender characteristics as artificial
and contingent she is none of the things that a woman is meant to be. Her
magical bulk and strength not only exaggerate her lack of traditional femininity but also make her an image of female power. She has been compared to
Fevvers in Nights at the Circus, as they both exist in a liminal space between reality and illusion, truth and simulation that allow [them] to transgress the categories of western culture.45 However, it is also notable that Wintersons novel has
been accused of lacking engagement with politics. Lynne Pearce notes the tension in the novel between perceptions of romantic love as a non-gendered,
a-historic, a-cultural universal, and as an ideology which the specificities of
gender and sexual orientation constantly challenge and undermine.46 Lynn
Pykett also finds that Winterson, by creating an alternative reality in Sexing the
Cherry, backs off from an engagement with political and material constraints.47
This is, of course, a complaint common to many readings of magical realism.
Roessner and Pykett also refer to Wintersons own theories of art, in which
she draws on Romanticism and, in particular, Modernism.48 Roessner finds that
Sexing the Cherry in its celebration of the irrational and imaginary reinforces an
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essentially Romantic drive to locate a ground of being outside time, space, and
material existence,49 while Pykett notes that Winterson attempts, like the
Modernists, to harness, through linguistic precision and vitality, the power of
words to conjure worlds into existence.50 Both statements notably resonate
with a Deleuzian reading of magical realism.
Indeed, a Deleuzian framework highlights how Wintersons magical realist
text is about much more than reconsiderations of gender. The magic in Sexing
the Cherry cannot be reduced to a device for undermining binary categories;
rather it appears as something that escapes these categories, something which
appears as supplemental to the realist realm where these binaries are expressed.
Dog Woman and her magical attributes do not conform easily to readings
of her as subverting patriarchy. She may be an unnaturally strong woman,
thus de-naturing the feminine, but she is also a supporter of the monarchy, a
supremely patriarchal institution, and she is not averse to slipping into expected
gender roles, playing coy and demure when it suits her purposes. Her role as
doting mother is not particularly controversial, she is very traditional in her
view of gender roles in others, and she longs for and even attempts heterosexual love. Nor does sensitive and feminine Jordan always undo male stereotypes.
He sets out on his voyages precisely because he wants to conform:
I want to be brave and admired and have a beautiful wife and a fine house.
I want to be a hero and wave goodbye to my wife and children at the docks
[. . .]. I want to be like other men, one of the boys, a back-slapper and a man
who knows a joke or two. (SC 101)
The image that informs the novels title, referring to Jordan ascertaining the
sex of a grafted cherry tree branch, is also problematic if approached in binary
gender terms. Dog Woman, allegedly a feminist subversive, is appalled at
Jordans efforts:
Of what sex is that monster you are making?
I tried to explain to her that the tree would still be female although it had
not been born from seed, but she said such things had no gender and were a
confusion to themselves.
Let the world mate of its own accord, she said, or not at all.
But the cherry grew, and we have sexed it and it is female. (SC 79)
Responses to the grafting theme has been varied, ranging from Shena MacKays
who in her review of the novel admits she simply fails to understand the significance of the image,51 to Laura Doans who reads it as a sign of a third sex, free
of binarisms.52 There are also those, like Cath Stowers, who note that the cherry
problematically remains female. She argues that Sexing the Cherry seems to
represent a bisexuality which is based on a free play on identities and heterogeneous desires associated with femininity, for even though Jordans cherry
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tree had not been born from seed it would still be female.53 Others, however,
note the significance of the image of grafting outside the issues of gender and
sexuality. Maria Lozano reads the novel as questioning the idea of origins, and
sees grafting as the main image of this theme. Lozano suggests that Wintersons
novel replaces the notion of origins with that of metamorphosis.54 Such a view
seems closer to Wintersons own outlook on literature and art, to which, as
Pykett notes, the idea of transformation is central.55
Indeed, we can read Dog Woman and her magical body and powers more
profitably through the notion of transformation, or in Deleuzian terms, becoming. The parallel to Angela Carters Fevvers continues to be useful here. If
Fevvers is becoming-bird, then Dog Woman is becoming-dog. As we know,
becoming has nothing to do with imitation, Fevvers does not actually become a
bird, or Dog Woman a dog, but importantly, like Pi in the Life of Pi, they enter
zones of indiscernibility with something other than the human. Paulina Palmer,
who reads Dog Woman in terms of the grotesque, notes how the grotesque
body overlaps with the world, how its borders become blended with the animal
and the inanimate.56 However, Dog Woman is not just grotesque, she is magical.
Deleuze emphatically states that becomings are not metaphors but metamorphoses. Dog-Woman is not just heavy like an elephant, she actually launches
an elephant into the air with her weight.
Roessner, despite his reservations about the novels politics, very succinctly
points out that reading Sexing the Cherry only in gender terms ignores the persistent drive in it to transcend the flesh.57 Indeed, Jordans magical journeys
have been either neglected or fitted into gendered readings of the novel, when
in fact, their main dynamic is the juxtaposition of corporeal weight and incorporeal lightness, not sexuality or gender. It is true that Jordan visits mainly
female communities, that he cross-dresses and that the story-within-a-story of
the novel, the tale of the twelve princesses, revolves around the failure of marriage for women. However, just as Dog Woman moves away from the normal
motor-sensory schema of the flesh by becoming-dog, so Jordans travels can be
thought of, in Deleuzian terms, as flights from the heavy real or actual body
through the lightness of virtual magic.
In fact, in Sexing the Cherry Winterson continually pits weight against lightness
and the historical real against the magic. While Dog Woman is explicitly heavy
and bound to the material, Jordans voyages always involve taking flight. On
his first journey he visits a house without any floors, where the furniture is
suspended from the ceiling and the inhabitants travel from room to room by
ropes. Here he has his first glimpse of a magically light figure who becomes his
obsession to find again: She was climbing down from her window on a thin
rope which she cut and re-knotted a number of times during the descent
(SC 21). On his search Jordan meets the twelve flying princesses, whose stories
all revolve around escaping the heavy order imposed on them by society
through marriage. Marriage is, quite literally, what takes their ability to fly away,
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while their escapes involve renewed flight. It becomes clear that heaviness, not
the least in Dog Womans enormous body, stands for the order and rule of the
historical, material world, whereas lightness embodies the freedom of the
flighty, immaterial imagination. As Cath Stowers notes, in the places that
Jordan visits on his travels, houses and towns are refigured as floating and fluid
places, rather than solid structures.58 The solid spaces of realism, the segmented
structures of the domestic space and the village or city, are literally dissolved by
the magic of lightness and flight.
In contrast, Dog Woman, however subversive her non-feminine grotesqueness may be, is still tied to the ordered thinking of the time she inhabits, failing
to understand the freedom of true love, limited by her heaviness as well as her
rigid views on gender, indeed, by her being in and constricted by a specific
moment in linear time. In fact, the contrast between the heaviness of the historical world of Dog Woman and the lightness of Jordans magical journeys can
be seen as analogous to the distinction between Bergsons space and duration.
Space, as the most expanded form of time, exists only in a series of consecutive,
but separate, present moments. In duration, however, as the most contracted
form of space, everything exists simultaneously. While Dog Woman is stuck
in historical time, Jordans travels across time and space are made possible precisely by their existence outside of linear chronology.
In fact, the magically light woman whom Jordan comes to pursue is a character that links the idea of flight and incorporeal lightness with that of pure time
or duration, as well as situating these explicitly in the realm of art. One story is
missing from the princesses personal stories of marriage and escape. It is that
of the twelfth princess, Fortunata, who turns out to be the woman that Jordan
is searching for. She is the lightest of the princesses, a dancer who defies not
only gravity but also physicality itself. She evades marriage by flying away, and
lives apart from her sisters. After a long search, Jordan finds her running a
dancing school in a remote place where she teaches her pupils to overcome
their bodies because she believes that we were fallen creatures who once knew
how to fly (SC 72). As Roessner says, in her dance, the bodily organs undergo
a mystical transformation that takes the dancers beyond language, concept, and
time.59 She makes her dancers spin until all features are blurred, until the
human being most resembles a freed spirit from a darkened jar and
when all are spinning in harmony down the long hall, she hears music
escaping from their heads and backs and livers and spleens. Each has a tone
like cut glass. The noise is deafening. And it is then that the spinning seems
to stop, that the wild gyration of the dancers passes from movement into
infinity. (SC 72)
Here Winterson seems to suggest that, as Deleuze and Guattari say, it is the in
the power of art to restore the infinite (WIP 197). This restoration of the
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infinite starts with a negation of the motor-sensory schema, but the bodies of
the dancers become non-human not only by becoming dance and music, they
also pass from the movement of actual time to the infinity of virtual duration.
Their dance is a becoming non-human in time as well as space.
As we would expect, the magic of Jordans narrative also introduces the
element of imperceptibility to Sexing the Cherry. We do not know what is past,
present or future: The scene I have just described to you may lie in the future
or in the past. Either I have found Fortunata or I will find her. I cannot be sure.
Either I am remembering her or I am still imagining her (SC 93). Central to
Sexing the Cherry, then, is the non-human becoming we encountered in Life of Pi,
as well as the indiscernibility that we found in Devils Valley, but importantly,
here they become apparent as transformations in and of time. Indeed, Jordan
explicitly meditates on time:
Thinking about time is to acknowledge two contradictory certainties: that
our outward lives are governed by the seasons and the clock; that our inward
lives are governed by something much less regular an imaginative impulse
cutting through the dictates of daily time, and leaving us free to ignore the
boundaries of here and now and pass like lightning along the coil of pure
time, that is, the circle of the universe and whatever it does or does not
contain. (SC 8990)
Jordans journeys, which extend as much in time as in space, indeed pass along
this coil of pure time. This is nothing other than duration, which makes the
magic and the real indiscernible even though they are different, precisely
because it is the circle of the universe and whatever it does or does not contain
(SC 8990), or in Deleuzes words, the transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time (PS 130).
In Deleuzes terms, magical signs have the effect of giving us a superior viewpoint that influences our view of the whole work of art. This effect is noticeable
in Sexing the Cherry, when, in Bente Gades words, at the end of the novel these
seventeenth-century narrators are doubled by or extended into twentiethcentury counterparts.60 Indeed, the two contemporary narrators are more like
extensions of the first two narrators than their alter-egos or doubles. Nicholas
Jordan and the unnamed chemist do not simply parallel Jordan and Dog
Woman, they are future instances of these characters as they become indiscernible from them, across time. Nicholas Jordan is not merely a modern Jordan,
with his adoration of heroes, his obsession with a pineapple and a wish to
navigate the seas, he, momentarily, is Jordan. A passage begins squarely in the
twentieth century, subtly metamorphoses, and ends in the seventeenth:
Six months later I was on board an admiralty tug in the Thames Estuary
outside Deptford. We were after a mine someone had spotted, or said they
had [. . .]. I was standing on deck with a friend of mine [. . .]. I heard a foot
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scrape on the deck beside me. Then a mans voice said, They are burying the
King at Windsor today. [. . .]. nobody wears clothes like that any more [. . .].
I heard a bird cry sharp and fierce. Tradescant sighed. My name is Jordan.
(SC 120121)
In the same way the chemist not only has dreams of wreaking havoc in a
giantesss body; as she protests against pollution, and sits by a rotting river with
only the fire for company (SC 129), she is both the contemporary chemist and
Dog Woman at the same time.
This simultaneity of characters and events across time in Sexing the Cherry has
been to some extent noted by critics, although obviously not in these terms.
Palmer reads it, rather unimaginatively, in terms of historiographic metafiction:
The ambiguous relationship which some of the characters bear to reality
are they real or imaginary, we are prompted to ask? highlights one of
the novels key themes. As Winterson playfully reminds us, by drawing attention to the fictionality of the text and the acts of representation which its
construction involves, the question is ultimately meaningless since all the
characters portrayed in it are fictions.61
Indeed, as we have seen, the question what is real or imaginary? is no longer
meaningful in magical realism, and to Palmer this is a non-political affirmation
of a variety of sexual identity positions, opposed to the radical feminism in the
stories of the twelve princesses. Middleton Meyer, on the other hand, finds
political agency precisely in this moment when neither set of narratives can be
established as real vis-a-vis the other.62 At the end of the novel the chemist and
Nicholas Jordan set out to burn down a factory that is polluting the Thames,
while simultaneously, three hundred years earlier, Dog Woman, disgusted by
the filth and immorality of the city, is instrumental in the beginnings of the
Great Fire of London. This, to Middleton Meyer, is a political act: Whether
fantastic or real, characters here are empowered to enact social change, revealing the force contained in a multiple existence.63 Rather, we can say, it is a force
contained within virtual duration that allows the characters to be linked across
time and space.
If in the last chapter we saw that the magic of magical realism is ahistorical,
it now becomes clear that it is precisely in this ahistoricity, the magics very
atemporality, that the revolutionary potential of Sexing the Cherry is situated. The
novels flights of fancy lead away from the realism of Civil War London, but
they also lead toward a timeless future uniting all four narrators. Recall that in
the crystalline sign, The present is the actual image [or sign], and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image (C2 7677). Bente Gade, like Middleton
Meyer, finds political action in this episode, precisely in the extension of Dog
Woman into contemporary times and issues. For as Gade points out, monsters,
such as Dog Woman, resist identities as they cross the boundaries of the unified
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subject, but the chemist lives out her identity as a monster through burning
the factory, so that identity is reformulated from a way of being to a way of
doing.64 If the identity of Dog Woman is, as we have seen from readings of
her above, too ambiguous to be political, Dog Woman, as a contemporaneous
past as the virtual to the chemists actual is a kind of catalyst for revolutionary action. Duration is thus at the core of the unique power of art: the ability of
connecting the actual present image to its virtual double in the pure past in
order to herald the future. In fact, Jordans narrative links his view of time particularly to art, stating that the artist is able to experience time as a larger, all
encompassing [sic] dimension and so be in touch with much more than the
present (SC 91).
To Deleuze, this is what all good art does: it shows us something that the
world as it is, in its actuality of the here and now, cannot show us. If art, to
Deleuze, is a superior viewpoint, to Winterson the fiction, the poem, is not a
version of the facts, it is an entirely different way of seeing things.65 For Deleuze
this viewpoint is intimately linked to ontology. While we are only usually aware
of the present of the actual, the sign of art is revelatory in the way it enacts the
essential double nature of Being: actual and virtual, space and duration. Art
signifies at once the birth of the world and the original character of the world
(PS 110). Deleuze and Guattari explicitly see movement in art away from the
human through becoming and indiscernibility as an ontologically important
operation: it is not the passage from one lived state to another but mans nonhuman becoming [. . .]. It is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if
things, beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby Dick, Penthesilea and the bitch)
endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation (WIP 173), that is, a point which reveals the ontological conditions of their
differentiation. Indeed, in the three texts considered in this chapter, becoming
non-human, indiscernibility and duration lead us to a point before differentiation, the point of new creation, of Being in action, as it were.
In Chapter 2 it became clear that, even though the magic is distinct from the
historical, political and human realm of realism, it nonetheless has an effect. In
this chapter we traced how such an effect can be seen as ontological revelation,
but we also found in Sexing the Cherry something that was suggested already in
Beloved, namely that the magic acts as a kind of catalyst. It seems that the magic
can be read as a supplement to the realism of the genre, articulating something
that the realism cannot. The magic acts not only as an ontological revelation,
but as a part of the text that has direct bearing on the contexts dealt with in the
realism of the magical realist text. Indeed, the features that make the magic
revelatory can also be read as revolutionary.
Chapter 5
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film article, stresses the historicity of its subject in contrast to the lack of such a
historical dimension in the postmodern.3 The conflation of the two articles is
not surprising, since Jameson in this article considers Third-World literature
much in the same Marxist terms as magical realism in the article above, namely
as born out of the penetration of various stages of capital in pre-capitalist
economies, embodying a life and death struggle with first-world cultural
imperialism (TWL 68). In fact, it is in the overlap between the two articles that
we find the roots of the idea that magical realism is somehow the paradigmatic
genre of the Third World. Jameson also goes on to argue that Third-World
texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested in a properly libidinal dynamic necessarily project a political dimension in the form of a national
allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled
situation of the public third-world culture and society (TWL 69). This is an overly
general assertion to make, and one which can clearly be met with numerous
objections,4 but which, crucially, is also an assertion which seems to have had
a great deal of influence on readings of magical realism in the postcolonial
context. Again, Jameson does not actually consider literary magical realism in
his Third World article. However, he does oppose the allegorical-political
mode of Third World literature not only to postmodernism but also to Western
realism. Furthermore, Jameson finds mythical and ritual elements in this
allegorical mode, and describes it as inherently collectively political. These are
characteristics that also distinguish Spindlers anthropological magical realism,
which centres on a reversal of the hierarchy between a Western and nonWestern world-view, in an attempt to construct a new independent national
identity (MRT 8082). Indeed, the familiar politicized anthropological
approach to magical realism can ultimately be traced to suggestions, notably
Jamesons and Rushdies, that magical realism uniquely represents, and is
defined by, the cultural encounters at the center of postcoloniality.
At first glance, such a view of magical realism seems to be echoed by one
of the holy trinity of postcolonial theory, Homi K. Bhabha, in his short but
influential introduction to Nation and Narration: Magical Realism after the
Latin American Boom, becomes the literary language of the emergent postcolonial world.5 In fact, on the back of this piece by Bhabha, the model derived
from Jamesons articles has been shoe-horned into those approaches to magical
realism that use postcolonial theory, even though Jamesons and Bhabhas
theoretical positions are, as we shall see, not compatible. Bhabha, like Jameson,
is considering the function of literature vis--vis the emerging postcolonial
nation, but while Jameson proposes an allegorical model, Bhabha suggests that
the literary here operates through Derridas irreducible excess of the syntactic
over the semantic,6 and thus what emerges as the effect of such incomplete
signification is a turning of boundaries and limits into the in-between spaces
through which the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated.7
In his The Location of Culture Bhabha elaborates this idea of in-between spaces
into a theory of enunciation as the condition not only for the nation, but for
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all culture. The in-between space opens up due to the time-lag inherent in
the signifying process, the gap between sign and its initiation of a discourse or
narrative (LC 263), a concept based on Derridean diffrance. It is in this [extra]
temporality of enunciation that culture is articulated (LC 54). What Bhabha
does is to situate this process in a space prior to the text, and, importantly, prior
to any specific choices about the text. Hallward alerts us to the singularity of
such a position, and indeed, to its Deleuzian echoes (AP 24). The in-between
space of the time-lag is one of difference within (LC 19), a difference without binary terms or hierarchy. It is a properly timeless space of undecidability,
the uncanny moment of the present all at once where all possibilities, all
choices exist at the same time (LC 228). As Hallward puts it, this is the enunciatory moment productive of language itself, the creative agency that gives rise
to both culture and language (AP 25). Compare this to the Deleuzian virtual,
the undetermined difference-in-itself that is the creative force of all of being.
What is particularly important here is the fact that Bhabha situates this
uncanny moment specifically in cultural hybridity. Although it becomes a properly post-colonial movement, it is initially located by Bhabha in the colonial,
precisely in the encounter between cultures when cultural difference is, as it
were, inevitably articulated. It is striking how Bhabha describes this articulation
in terms reminiscent of Deleuze. What is at first present in the colonial encounter the boum, oboum of Forsters Malabar Caves and properly employed
in the postcolonial narrative the disembodied gaze of the slave-woman in a
poem by Meiling Jin are hybrid signifiers which, while they emerge with a
certain fixity in the present, cannot be fixed (LC 176177). They are meaningless in themselves, undecidable, untranslatable: a structure of difference that
produces the hybridity of race and sexuality [or any index of identity] in the
postcolonial discourse (LC 76). Bhabhas hybrid signifier can therefore be
described as a Deleuzian object = x, which although it may take on an identity
in a certain situation, in itself has no meaning. It is the condition of meaning as
such. To Bhabha, the experience of what he calls cultural difference lies precisely in the moment of the hybrid signifier: Cultural difference [. . .] is not the
acquisition or accumulation of additional cultural knowledge; it is the momentous, if momentary, extinction of the recognizable object of culture in the
disturbed artifice of its signification, at the edge of experience (LC 179180).
Such a view of the hybrid signifier as the extinction of culture resonates with
Deleuzes description of the signs of art: Beyond designated objects, beyond
intelligible and formulated truths, but also beyond subjective chains of association and resurrections by resemblance or contiguity, are the essences which are
alogical or supralogical (PS 37).
However, while Deleuzes and Bhabhas concepts are structurally similar, we
have to note Bhabhas insistence on the location of this moment specifically in
cultural difference or hybridity. It is this location, it seems, that allows Bhabha
to make rather striking proclamations on behalf of the hybrid. Not only does
hybridity open up possibilities for other narrative spaces (LC 255), but it is
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also a liberatory discursive practice where cultural identification [is] articulated at the liminal edge of identity and subjectivities [. . .] are empowered in
the act of erasing the politics of binary opposition (LC 256). Indeed, to Bhabha,
the liberatory possibilities of the colonial or postcolonial text lie precisely in
their enunciatory moments, which they reveal most forcefully as sites of cultural encounter. As we can see from the quotes above, it is a kind of liberation
dependent on the very uncertainty and undecidability of this moment. Bhabha
insists that this liminal moment of identification eluding resemblance
produces a subversive strategy of subaltern agency that negotiates its own
authority through a process of iterative unpicking and incommensurable,
insurgent relinking (LC 265). To Bhabha, then, the encounter of cultures,
whether in the colonial or postcolonial context, is inevitably textual, just as the
nation is constructed through narrative, and it is precisely because of their
textuality that these encounters necessarily include the possibility of liberation.
In the face of Bhabhas claims, Hallward tersely notes: It would seem that lasting
(if not catastrophic) oppression is thus effectively precluded as an enunciatory
impossibility a point Bhabha might have trouble explaining to, say, the Caribs,
the Sioux, or the Palestinians (AP 26).
We can see from this brief outline of Bhabhas position, and by comparing it
to Deleuzes, that it is, in Hallwards terms, of a singular orientation and thus
one which is difficult, if not impossible, to square with the specific, the historical and political. The problem, however, lies not in the singular orientation of
Bhabhas thought per se, but rather in the fact, which Hallwards statement alerts
us to, that Bhabha, typically of postcolonial theorists, attempts to reinsert
subjective agency within this model which is, by definition, as a singular mode
of individuation, subject-free: As a result of its own splitting in the time-lag of
signification, the moment of the subjects individuation emerges as an effect
of the intersubjective as the return of the subject as agent (LC 265). If Bhabha
proposes that hybridity is a way to liberation, any close reading of Bhabha
should reveal that this kind of liberation has little to do with what Jameson calls
a life and death struggle with first-world cultural imperialism (TWL 68).
The central problem encountered by postcolonial readings of magical realism, the double bind of the singular and the specific, is caused by a confusion
of incompatible approaches to the genre as Third World literature. Bhabhas
statement that magical realism is the literary language of the emergent postcolonial world, coupled with his outline of the enunciatory moment of such a
literature, clearly invites a reading of magical realism in terms of hybridity (in
Bhabhas sense of the word). Bhabhas statement, on the one hand, agrees
with the conclusion drawn from Jamesons articles above: magical realism is to
be read as Third World literature if the Third World is seen as that part of the
world which has suffered the experience of colonialism (TWL 67). On the
other hand, Bhabhas view of such literature as characterized by the momentous [. . .] extinction of the recognizable object of culture (LC 180) is hardly
compatible with Jamesons view of a Third World literature which depends on
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The Political Unconscious as, broadly, the model for such readings. While
Jameson admits that history is only accessible to us through texts, he insists that
it exists as a non-textual reality. This reality relates to any text as its subtext, and
the aim of literary criticism, to Jameson, is the rewriting of the literary text in
such a way that the latter may itself be seen as the rewriting or the restructuration of a prior historical or ideological subtext.11
In the Jamesonian Marxist model, the base of any society, its modes of
production, are expressed in various levels of superstructure: the political, the
economic, the juridical, the cultural and so on (PU 21). This relationship
between modes of production and superstructural levels is crucial to literary
analysis: if it is the same essence at work in culture as in organizing relations of
production (PU 24), it follows that the text can be read as another expression
of this essence. Interpretation will reveal the ideology of a text, for all literature, however weakly, expresses the modes of production of the society in
which it is produced, and thus reflects the particular ideological perspective
implied in any mode of production. Thus the magical realist text in its contradictory inclusion of the real and the magical reveals the clash between precapitalist and capitalist modes of production, articulating what Jameson reminds
us is Marxs most important lesson that of class bias and the conflict it leads
to (PU 272). Indeed, in the Political Unconscious Jameson again seems to situate
the magical on the side of the oppressed, considering how an oppositional
voice pitted against the discourse of ruling classes is constructed most notably,
from the fragments of essentially peasant cultures: folk songs, fairy tales, popular festivals, occult or oppositional systems of belief such as magic and witchcraft (PU 71).
However, Jameson states that the relationship of a historical situation to the
text is not straightforwardly causal, but rather one of a limiting situation; the
historical moment is here understood to block off or shut down a certain number of formal possibilities available before, and to open up determinate new
ones, which may or may not be realized in artistic practice (PU 134135). To
Jameson, neither the presence of two contradictory modes of production nor
that of magical elements necessarily has a revolutionary or subversive function.
In Chapter Two of The Political Unconscious, Magical Narratives: On the Dialectical Use of Genre Criticism (PU 89136), Jameson considers the possibility
of defining the genre of romance in a historically reflexive way (PU 93). The
romance is similar to Jamesons magical realism, as it is borne out of the meeting of pre-industrial and industrial society, as well as indulging in elements of
fancy which Jameson links precisely to pre-industrial society. His aim is to show
how the correlation between these modes of production and the textual form
restore[s] our sense of the concrete situation in which such forms can be
seized as original and meaningful protopolitical acts (PU 135). However, to his
disappointment Jameson finds that romances are instead more likely to offer
a nostalgic (or less often, a Utopian) harmony (PU 135). Rather than articulating a political struggle, the romantic narrative cannot dramatize the triumph
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of either force over the other one, or enact any genuine ritual purification, but
must produce a compromise in which everything finds its proper place again
(PU 136).
Thus neither the presence of contradictory modes of production nor that of
fantastic or magical elements guarantees a revolutionary text. The affirmation
of such nonhegemonic cultural voices [as magic or myth] remains ineffective if
it is limited to the merely sociological perspective of the pluralistic rediscovery
of other isolated groups: only an ultimate rewriting of these utterances in terms
of their essentially polemic and subversive strategies restores them to their
proper place in the dialogical system of the social classes. (PU 71)
This means that a reading of magical realism as a paradigmatically political
Third World genre on the back of Jamesons two articles cited earlier appears
even more misguided. As previously stated, the article on magical realism makes
no mention of the magical elements usually associated with literary magical
realism. The connection between the two articles lies in the articulation of both
magical realism in film, as defined by Jameson, and Third World literature as
dependent on the presence of two contradictory modes of production. It should
be clear at this point in our analysis that the magic in literary magical realism as
we have found and defined it, is qualitatively different to the socio-historical
elements that Jameson finds in Third World literature: no meaningful protopolitical act can be situated in the magic of magical realism.
Jamesons wish to see the romance form as something that leads us back to
the concrete situation reminds us of the postcolonial imperative to articulate
the specific historical and political situation of a text. Yet Jameson argues that
romance does not necessarily lead us in this direction. It rather resolves the
class conflict so essential to Marxist materialist readings through dream and
fantasy. There thus seems to be a residue or outside to Jamesons material
analysis of the text, textual elements that simply do not articulate the contradictions of class and society. To Jameson, these elements, and thus literary modes
predicated on these elements, cannot be anything but nave failures, denying
the reality of political struggle. It is here that the limit of Jamesons materialist
method lies: it cannot articulate what the magic of magic realism does, as
opposed to what it cannot do. It is clear that the magic is ahistorical, but this
does not mean that it is ineffectual.
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reflecting the conditions of that existing society, is, of course, necessarily already
territorialized. Only a virtual people without any relation to present or historical society can be absolutely deterritorialized and thus properly revolutionary.
Consider Deleuzes notion of the minor. A minority is not defined by the number of its members or elements, but by the connections between these constituents, connections which belong neither to the elements nor to the group as
such. While the major is that which is territorialized or coded, a minority
has no model, its a becoming, a process [. . .]. When a minority creates models
for itself its because it wants to become a majority.12 Only a people that does
not yet exist, but which is in the very process of becoming-people, is properly a
minority. Equally, minor literature does not designate specific ethnic or national
literatures, but the revolutionary conditions for every literature; any author,
even one belonging to a majority, can find his own point of underdevelopment, his own patois, his own third world (KM 18).
Clearly, Deleuzes use of the term third world here is as idiosyncratic as
his use of the term revolutionary. Indeed, we have to consider this a virtual
third world just as his revolution is virtual and thus explicitly not an image
or representation of the actual Third World, nor of any actual revolution.
However, within a Deleuzian framework this certainly does not mean that
the two cannot be usefully considered in relation to each other. In Cinema 2
Deleuze defines a Third World cinema in political terms which we can compare
to Jamesons analysis of Third World literature. Deleuze states that a Third
World political cinema exists exactly on the basis that the people no longer
exist, or not yet . . . the people are missing (C2 208). To Deleuze, it is in the
Third World, where oppressed and exploited nations remained in a state
of perpetual minorities, in a collective identity crisis, that the need for the
articulation of a new people becomes clear, precisely because the people are
missing:
This acknowledgement of a people who are missing is not a renunciation
of political cinema, but on the contrary the new basis on which it is founded,
in the third world and for minorities. Art, and especially cinematographic
art, must take part in this task: not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people. The
moment the master, or the colonizer, proclaims There have never been
people here, the missing people are a becoming, they invent themselves, in
shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new conditions of struggle to which
a necessarily political art must contribute. (C2 209)
To Deleuze it is thus not a case of finding the contradictions caused by
the encounter between individuals, classes or modes of production: If the
people are missing, if there is no longer consciousness, evolution or revolution,
it is the scheme of reversal which itself becomes impossible. There will no
longer be conquest of power by a proletariat, or by a united or unified people
(C2 211). The Deleuzian revolution is not about reversing the masterslave,
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ontological orientation. Realist fiction keeps up the appearance of referentiality through the regime of signs of subjectification. Such fiction is thus, says
Deleuze, a model of pre-established truth, which necessarily expresses dominant ideas or the point of view of the colonizer [. . .] [it] is inseparable from a
reverence which presents it as true, in religion, in society, in cinema, in the
systems of images (C2 145). The crucial opposition is not between fiction, or
text, and reality, but rather between the realist regime of signs and the
regime of signs revealed by the signs of art. That is, between a territorial regime
and one which embodies the deterritorialization of Being in the act of new
creation. Thus what is opposed to fiction is not the real; it is not the truth
which is always that of the masters or the colonizer; it is the story-telling function of the poor, insofar as it gives the false the power which makes it into a
memory, a legend, a monster (C2 145). This statement may seem to echo the
mantra of the magical realist critic that sees freedom in returning to traditional
story-telling and legend. This is not what Deleuze means, however. To Deleuze,
story-telling is precisely not the return to anthropological myth in search for
meaning, or the recollection of personal or collective memories of a people,
it is the creation of the monsters of simulacra: myths and legends without
origins, that is, myths and legends whose people do not yet exist. It is precisely
only when art goes beyond the real, starts making up legends that it contributes to the invention of a new people (C2 145).
Bogue rightly asks how this story-telling or legending relates to narrative,
and concludes that it does so by opposition. Bogue finds that Deleuze privileges
elements antithetical to narrative in his works on literature and art. For
example, in Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari find the minority of Kafkas novels in
their structure consisting of pieces of discontinuous narrative. In Cinema 2
Deleuze describes Third World cinema as operating through crises or a putting into trance of its narrative or speech-acts. Just as the minority of Kafkas
language means being a sort of stranger within [ones] own language (KM 26),
in Third World cinema the speech-act must create itself as a foreign language
in a dominant language (C2 215). Also in Proust and Signs, Bogue points out,
the search or apprenticeship progresses not through narrative but through
signs, and eventuates in a philosophical understanding of essences that
transcends the sequence of events leading to that understanding.15 That is,
this making up of new myths does not consist in a narrative movement at
all, but is rather situated in the elements that rupture narrative, such elements
as the crystalline signs, in terms of which we considered magic in the last chapter
the signs characterized by non-human becomings and indiscernibility in
opposition to an organic, human or motor-sensory narration.
It is therefore the very fact that art leaves behind a narrative that represents
the individual, the human, the historical, that gives art its greatest revolutionary
potential for Deleuze. It is a revolution that cannot be found in any existing
society. To Deleuze and Guattari,
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art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and
a people that are lacking as correlate of creation [. . .]. The artist or the philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people, each can only summon it
with all his strength. A people can only be created in abominable sufferings,
and it cannot be concerned any more with art or philosophy. But books
of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum of unimaginable
sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in
common their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame,
and to the present. (WIP 108,110)
The effect of art in the here and now is thus a resistance, a forewarning or an
imperative. Clearly, this approach sheds a new light on postcolonial magical
realism. We cannot see magic in an anthropological light any longer, so much
we already know. Defining magic as a pure simulacrum makes the debate about
origins and authenticity redundant. We have to remember that becomings are
born in history but are not of history.
It is in this sense that we can recuperate, through Deleuze, Bhabhas concept
of the hybrid signifier. If the hybrid signifier is a sign of art, meaningless and
undecidable, the very extinction of the recognizable object of culture, then
that is precisely why it has a Deleuzian revolutionary potential. We saw that the
problem was that Bhabha, like many postcolonial theorists, attempted to bring
this enunciatory moment back to the existing state of affairs: while the hybrid
signifier entailed the act of erasing the politics of binary opposition (LC 256),
such iterative unpicking was immediately followed by incommensurable,
insurgent relinking (LC 265). Deleuze, however, allows us to take the hybrid
signifier to its logical conclusion: rather than insisting on a return of the
subject as agent, Deleuze finds the revolutionary potential of the sign of art
precisely in the fact that the subject, the people, is missing. Deleuze thus enables
us to both go beyond the limits of a Marxist approach, which cannot adequately
articulate what it is that magic can do, as well as take the core ideas of postcolonial theory further, rather than attempting to reconcile it with a specific
political programme.
Robert Kroetschs What the Crow Said (1978): The Stuff before
the Stuff that is History or Culture or Society or Art
Robert Kroetsch is perhaps best known as, in Linda Hutcheons words,
Mr Canadian Postmodernism.16 The novel What the Crow Said, Kroetschs flirt
with magical realism,17 has often been overlooked in favour of his other works
such as The Studhorse Man (1969) and Badlands (1975). However, it has featured
in many considerations of magical realism, since much attention has been
given to the genre in Canada. It is impossible to read about Anglophone
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identity has to be negotiated after the fact of their decimation and marginalization by the settler population. On the other hand, while the native peoples
had a connection to the land, settler Canadians still wrestle with their relationship with the vast empty spaces and raw nature of the Canadian hinterland.
As a significant magical realist text with precisely such a Canadian legacy, What
the Crow Said is particularly interesting in our context. As Marie Vautier says in
her New World Myth: Postmodernism and Postcolonialism in Canadian Fiction, it is
located in that space between so prized by postcolonialists.20 Such a space
appears precisely as the in-between space of Bhabhas hybrid signifier.
The colonial legacy is ever-present in Canadian negotiations of place and
identity and Kroetsch is a writer who feels the dilemmas of identity keenly,
exclaiming, To be a Canadian: a fate so barren and so complicated I can hardly
endure.21 Lecker notes that Canadian writers, like other Anglophone postcolonial writers, have to commence a new literature in a mandarin language,
and he quotes Kroetsch stating that the Canadian writer has to uninvent
American and English homonyms that prevent him from hearing his own
language.22 The Canadian writer approaching Canadian identity, whether
as a settler community or in relation to native peoples and land, has first, as
Hutcheon points out, to deconstruct British [or French] social and literary
myths in order to redefine their colonial history.23 Indeed, Kroetschs work has
often been seen in terms of the deconstruction of old myths in search of better
expressions of Canadian place and identity, and many readers note that What
the Crow Said opens with a version of the Greek myth of Zeus and Danae. Vera
Lang is impregnated, not by a god turned golden shower, but by a swarm of
bees in a prairie meadow. Gunilla Florby notes that the novel is full of such
irreverent rewritings of myths, both western and indigenous. In What the Crow
Said we encounter versions of the flood as well as of the Ark, and the Tower of
Babel. The central female character, Tiddy Lang, is pursued by suitors like
Penelope. Matings between animals and humans have many parallels in Native
Indian myths, as has the talking crow that visits the characters of the novel.24
Some have seen this deconstruction of myth through magical realism from
the usual postcolonial perspective: Since most history written by the heartland
about the West appears fictional to readers in the hinterland, it appears that
the western novelist has become the hinterland historian, and magic realism is
one of the techniques of recording that history.25 However, it has also been
noted that Kroetschs rewriting of myths through magical realism has been
strangely apolitical, unspecific, ambiguous and even meaningless, echoing critical comments about magical realism as a postcolonial genre. Kathleen Wall
says, What the crow actually said was not particularly important or insightful:
what about what Kroetsch said?26 Other critics have also noted that what the
crow says is meaningless, and that, in fact, most of the events in the novel
are difficult to interpret in a coherent way. Wall finds that ultimately it is
appropriately difficult, given Kroetschs preoccupation with the temptation of
meaning to decide which causes actually operate meaningfully in Kroetschs
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border cosmos.27 Geert Lernout sees What the Crow Said as repetitive and operating outside history28 and Simona Bertacco notes that the novel prioritizes the
irrelevant. Bertacco concludes that the words used in this novel, starting with
the description of Vera being raped by a swarm of bees, underline two things at
the same time: their being physical presences, and their inability to make any
sense whatsoever.29 Yet again, we see how the magical realist text strains against
any politically or culturally loaded readings the meaninglessness of the magic
refuses to conform to the ordered interpretations necessary for such readings.
Interestingly, Lecker finds that Kroetsch does not merely rewrite myths, but
that he goes further, looking for the place of the un-created myth, the silent
realm before the origins of myth. This, however, also implies a going beyond
identity: Silence may return us to the condition preceding creation, but in
doing so it also obliterates identity. To Lecker, Kroetschs first concern is not
with the social, political, or economic phenomena which apparently define this
country, but with the relationship between language and being.30 Lecker
explains this concern as emerging from Kroetschs attempt to articulate the
emptiness and silence that is, to Kroetsch, essentially Canadian. This emptiness
expresses both the vast hinterland of Canada, and the sense that as Kroetsch
says, colonial models of history and geography are telling us [the Canadians]
that we didnt exist.31 Kroetschs statement recalls Deleuzes idea that the missing people start creating themselves precisely when the masters proclaim there
is no one around. There may not be any shantytowns or ghettos in Kroetschs
hinterland, but there is a place that lacks its own myths. Kroetschs magical realism is thus not merely about deconstructing or rewriting myths, but also about
bringing a people into existence, precisely through the act of legending or
myth-making. It is about finding that place of Bhabhas hybrid signifier, before
culture, where culture is created or enunciated. As he says in an unpublished
journal, Kroetsch is looking for the stuff before the stuff that is history or culture or society or art.32
However, like all magical realism, What the Crow Said is anchored in realism.
In the published notes to the novel, The Crow Journals, Kroetsch describes the
work as my own (rural?) experience, basically, expanded towards the tall tale,
the mythological; but always the hard core of detail.33 It is this hard core of
detail that constitutes the realism of the novel, and places it in a specific time
and place. As Hutcheon notes, Kroetschs work is rooted very firmly in the
geographical, historical, and cultural world of Alberta.34 Just as Macondo was
clearly a coastal Colombian village during a century of transition from rural
economy to early industrialization, Big Indian is a village quite obviously in the
Canadian West, in the years after the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930s and 40s.
Just as in Macondo, the community seems to exist on the edge of modern society, yet slowly modern inventions such as telephones and televisions creep into
their homes. The Municipality of Bigknife and village of Big Indian are located
not only on the border between Alberta and Saskatchewan no one is sure to
which province the place actually belongs but also on the border between
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shipments of parts of machinery, waiting for the farmers to stir alive before
going home to supper and chores [. . .]. They had expected a steam locomotives whistle, all those loafing and waiting men; they heard a sound that
was almost human. (WCS 5)
Veras cry is almost human, but not quite, as, overwhelmed by a swarm of bees,
she finds herself in the throes of a magical becoming-animal: The hum of
wings melded earth and sky into the thickness of her skin. She had no mind
left for thinking, no fear, no dream, no memory. The bees closed her mouth,
her ears (WCS 4). Like Pi and the tiger in Life of Pi, through the magical crystalline sign, Vera and the bees, as well as Vera and the earth and sky, become
indiscernible. Vera can be said to become-bee, and become-earth and -sky
through the bees.
We can now read such a magical crystalline sign as a hybrid signifier. The
incomprehensible inhuman cry, like the boum, ouboum of the Malabar Caves
in Forster, emerges in the confrontation between colonizer and colonized land,
the settler Canadian and the hinterland landscape, the woman and the bees,
earth and sky. It is precisely the incomplete signification of such a sign that
opens up the in-between space of the hybrid signifier. As we have already
noted, such a magical moment makes no sense, has no particular meaning. It is
an object = x in divergence to the set ways of the village. Indeed, as Bhabha says,
it is in the very meaninglessness of the hybrid signifier that meaning and thus
culture is articulated: it is the stuff before history and culture, in Kroetschs
words. That is, the magic in What the Crow Said appears not in contrast to a
modern or capitalist culture, but in contrast to culture itself. Importantly, however, it does not appear simply as an opposition to or negation of culture, but as
the condition of culture. Thus, while the magic of What the Crow Said resists a
political or historicist reading, it can be seen as a supplement to the historical,
social and even political conditions of the text, precisely as the ahistorical
condition of culture.
The magic of Veras encounter with the bees is not only a rewriting of
myth, but a return to a place where myths can be invented. The result of Veras
magical coupling is a son that is part animal, who returns from the wild a young
man, after his mother has had to abandon him to coyotes as a baby. However,
this is another becoming-animal that does not follow the lines of any existing
myths; the boy is not the monster we expect, but the monster of a Deleuzian
simulacrum. He is not half-bee nor even half-wolf and half-man, but a rather
neat boy who speaks only in pig-latin and can foresee the weather. On the one
hand, Kroetsch is inverting the mythical figure of Cassandra here, just as, in
one sense, he was rewriting the myth of Zeus and Danae in Veras rape by the
bees. Veras boy is a soothsayer whom people actually believe when they manage
to understand his strange utterances, but who does not tell the truth at all:
The ercilessmay unsay shall urnbay us, he yipped and barked. Be reparedpay (WCS 128). Soon afterwards a deluge starts. On the other hand, then, we
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can read Veras boy and his nonsensical prophesies as another hybrid signifier,
the in-between space that emerges as an effect of the confrontation between
the settlers and a climate they cannot understand. It is as such that Veras boy is
a part of the regime of the false or a new myth: he is a story without origins.
The magic is not the revision of the mythical, but the act of legending in
flagrante delicto as seen in Perraults film (coincidentally also about a Canadian
hinterland community). What is at stake here is not a re-articulation of cultural
knowledge through myth, but, to use Bhabhas terminology, the extinction of
the recognizable object of culture (LC 180). Indeed, it is precisely this extinction, that is, the very meaninglessness of the hybrid sign or the ahistoricity of
the magical event, that allows it to become new myth.
Just as in One Hundred Years of Solitude, then, the lack of meaning in the magical signs is marked, and crucial, in What the Crow Said. Not only are the magical
signs difficult to interpret; they seem without cause and effect. Liebhaber has
the magical ability of remembering the future, but he is entirely unable to do
anything about it, whether it is the death of Martin Lang or a flood that he
foresees. Martin Langs ghost appears and disappears without much impact.
A man makes a Lang daughter pregnant with genitals he lost in the war. Bees
hail down frozen in ice after Liebhaber fires them from a cannon into the
sky. Another man is taken up in the air by an eagle, survives the fall, but dies
by drowning in the latrine he lands in. As in Macondo, there are numerous
magical events that seem to be signs and omens that should have some significance, but which actually only appear strange and divergent from the reality
around them. Most notable is perhaps the talking crow. Despite the title, the
presence of the crow does not play a central role in the novel. The crow appears,
hangs around Tiddys mute son JG and one day starts speaking. It almost exclusively deals out insults to the world, especially to the Big Indian men. Instead
of being meaningful, what the crow said is as empty as the cawing that the
men take up: Bugger off, the black crow said. Caw caw caw, Leo Weller said
(WCS 76). Here we find another magical becoming-animal, where, while the
crow appears to become human, the men become crows. As we saw in the
previous chapter, becoming is precisely the zone of indiscernibility of the crystalline sign or sign of art, where beasts and persons [. . .] endlessly reach that
point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation (WIP 173). Like
Bhabhas hybrid signifier, becoming is an example of the very structure of difference or the in-between space where meanings are negotiated or created,
prior to the individuation and differentiation of society or even species.
Kroetsch is, indeed, explicitly concerned with the conditions of meaning in
What the Crow Said, and it becomes clear that the magic of his text is, in fact,
necessary for him to fully work through these concerns. Liebhaber, a writer and
printer, is throughout the novel struggling with words and their meanings: He
thought of the letter O, from his collection of wood type. He tried to let it
become a mere circle. A cats eye. The perfect circle of a soap bubble. He would
free the O from the O, let back into the world the zero of ought (WCS 64).
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However, Liebhaber, just like the realist narration describing his actions, fails
to free himself from meaning: He set the word OUT, building from the T he
had tried to mock out of meaning, He left the T on the table. He placed the U
on a windowsill. He carried the O into his living room. But he knew the word
OUT was still OUT (WCS 47). The realist narration here literally remains in an
ordered domestic space, at the same time as language itself remains lodged in
the regime of signs that makes out out.
In contrast, the magic of the novel succeeds where realism and Liebhaber
fail, taking us beyond meaning to the virtual conditions of meaning. The mens
cawing, as a sign, or hybrid signifier, of their becoming-non-human, takes place
during a 151-day Schmier card game. The card game starts in Tiddys parlour
but moves on to the basement of a church and then a players poor shack of
a home. The card players, having no time for anything else, ever more dirty,
hungry and bedraggled, become progressively less human. The fantastically
long game is a magical event, divergent from the ordered rural life of Big
Indian, divergent, in fact, from any society predicated on a mode of production
as it is, of course, non-productive: entirely fruitless and meaningless. Kroetsch,
in The Crow Journals, notes the episode as The meaning that doesnt quite
mean, the card players recognizing that all the numbers and pictures on
the cards mean nothing, and that they are engaged in an endless game without
significance.36 The magical episode of the game thus manages to do what
Liebhaber could not: reveal the disconnection between signs and meanings,
and liberate utterances from any significance, as in the mens caw caw.
The lack of meaning of the magic as a hybrid signifier indicates its lack of
productivity and territoriality, marking its removal from society, politics, history.
John Skandl builds a lighthouse out of ice during the winter that lasts for over
a year, but of course ultimately the beacon melts to nothing. The long winter is
a magical occurrence that like the others above, has no particular meaning, but
that does have a particular function: that of divergence from the ordered world
of the real, with its four predictable seasons, in the same way as Veras magical
coupling diverged from the ordered time and place of the town. Yet, as we
know, the lack of meaning in the magic object = x is also an excess of meaning.
All of these events can be given a range of meanings, in particular around symbolic values such as male and female, human and natural, settler and Native.37
Yet none of these are final or stable in any way. Indeed, all such meanings are,
as Bhabha says, present all at once in the magical signs. Is the crow a symbol
of Native Indian culture, conspicuously absent from Big Indian itself, the idiot
savant voice of the retarded JG, or a representation of the vanity and uselessness
of the men playing cards?
The meaninglessness of these events ensures that as Bhabha says of his
hybrid signifier, they do not constitute a return to anthropology or ethnic
studies, or an accumulation of cultural knowledge. However, the fact that
their lack of meaning is predicated on the moment of the present all at once,
that is, in Deleuzian terms, the indiscernibility of meanings, is crucial. It is this
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indiscernibility that as we saw in the last chapter, reveals the sign of art as an act
of new creation to Deleuze. It is therefore this indiscernibility that is key to the
magic as a hybrid signifier appearing as the condition of culture. As Lecker says,
Kroetsch searches to find the chaos before any sources, tries to make the world
pre-fixtual, attempts to write the the un-named, the de-created, the un-invented,
the de-mythologized.38 Like Deleuze and Guattaris art that embodies the
virtual chaos, the magic in What the Crow Said thus works as a hybrid signifier,
enacting the total ambiguity that Kroetsch suggests lies behind language, society and culture.39 It is in this place of ambiguity that new myths Vera and the
bees, her soothsayer son, the mens becoming-crow, the Schmier game and so
on are created.
Nevertheless, the fact that the what the crow said of the title turns out to be
nothing is indicative of the relationship of the magical events to the realism in
the What the Crow Said. Like the crow, the novels hybrid signifiers are strangely
detached from the everyday life of the community. These new myths seem to
have little impact on Big Indian life in the end. Unlike One Hundred Years of
Solitude, or Midnights Children, What the Crow Said does not end in apocalypse.
There is a flood, but it does not spell wholesale destruction. In the penultimate
scene of the novel, in a moment of magical coincidence, Vera on a floating
house together with her admirer Martin Straw are saved, disappearing down
the swollen river through a gap in the CN bridge, while Veras boy in a boat and
Jerry Lapanne, one of Tiddys daughters admirers, in an aeroplane, simultaneously crash into the bridge. This semi-magical climax is a moment when as
Jackman says, the world of Crow exists suspended in a moment when transformation is possible.40 However, the moment is also as meaningless and ineffectual as all the magical events in the novel: nothing actually changes in Big
Indian.
In the final part of the novel Liebhaber and Tiddy become lovers, in a scene
of bliss and hope reminiscent of the endings of Nights at the Circus and Beloved.
As in these novels, this scene of love is entirely realist, leading Slemon to argue
that the fantastic element in the novel never quite manages to dominate an
undercurrent of realism (MRPD 410). Somewhat incongruously, Slemon also
finds that in the union of Tiddy and Liebhaber, the binary oppositions of the
text, represented by the male and female, are resolved. To Slemon, this infinitely suspended moment that fuses the real with the numinous in the actuating imagination is what in postcolonial terms [. . .] represents an imaginative
projection into the future, where the fractures of colonialism heal through a
positive imaginative reconstruction of reality (MRPD 415).41 In fact, the final
scene is a definite return to the territorial order of realism, after the climactic
magical moment. There may be a healing of fractures, but it is not effectuated
by any magic, but by return to daily life on the farm, in the same way that, in
Beloved, Sethes personal healing could only start through a renewed engagement with human relationships. That is, as we have previously suggested, the
reconstruction of identity can only take place within the order of society.
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Tiddys daughters are doing what they always have done: Rose is burying a
chick, Theodora is playing ball, Rita is writing letters, Gladys is in the barn
and so on. They are all engaged in the repetitive activities that have identified
them throughout the novel, in their domestic, territorial setting. It is against
the backdrop of this domestic idyll that Tiddy and Liebhaber finally find each
other.
It seems that in What the Crow Said, though Kroetsch begins to imagine new
myths, it is not these myths but the territoriality of everyday life that provides a
resolution. In the novel magic works as a hybrid signifier, which, in what Bhabha
would call the colonial encounter, opens up a space where myths can be
invented. While this encounter is made possible by a historical situation, the
resulting hybrid signifier escapes history, entering the realm of the conditions
of society and culture. As in Beloved, the magic of What the Crow Said can perhaps
be seen as a catalyst to the healing restoration of relationships. However, if in
Beloved such a restoration was a matter of life and death for Sethe, in Big Indian
the magic seems to have little effect. Perhaps, in the privileged Canadian settler
community there is simply no need fully to explore the possibilities of imagining a new people. As we have seen, Deleuze tells us that The artist or the
philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people [. . .]. A people can only be
created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with
art or philosophy (WIP 110). In Beloved, then, the magic of Beloved herself
acted as a catalyst to a healing restoration of community and identity, but the
strength of that community and identity actually came from the shared sufferings of the people. If in What the Crow Said the return to a domestic territorial
order is merely a return to the conditions at the outset of the novel, implying
no progress and change, in Beloved, we have to remember, the return to the
territorial order of the domestic was, in fact, a progression from the despotic
order of slavery. Perhaps certain real conditions, the sufferings of real people,
are necessary in order for the magic to work properly as a catalyst for change.
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128
Robert Dixon notes that Ghosh understands that the routes of international
trade are over-determined by economic forces; that they tell a history of
imperial exploitation.48 Ghoshs narrative, indeed, in a realist manner, portrays
the vicissitudes of the lives of the refugees and migrants resulting from such
exploitation. However, Ghosh complicates the opposition between capitalist
and pre-capitalist society, between imperialist exploitation and the exploited,
and the main tool he uses to do so is the magic or quasi-magic in the novel.
Much has been made of the contrast between reason and non-reason in the
novel, but the conclusion has always been that it is impossible to say what the
message of the novel is on this subject. Both Western reason and old Hindu
beliefs are shown as arbitrary, both modern science and traditional life lead to
disasters and disappointments. Indeed, Dixon goes on to note that Ghosh
deconstructs the simple modernitytradition, occidentaloriental binaries.49
What Ghosh shows us is that for the people leading the chaotic life of the
migrant or refugee, the order of a society, whether traditional or modern,
appears crucial. Indeed, in a Marxist materialist analysis the participation in
either pre-capitalist or capitalist modes of production would be necessary to
gain some kind of political agency. However, in Ghoshs novel any organization
of the migrants, whether based on a capitalist or pre-capitalist model, any
attempt at imposing a territorial order on the chaotic world of their community, is doomed to failure. A simple Jamesonian reading of magical realism as a
struggle between modes of production is clearly limited here, as this struggle is
portrayed as not only destructive, but futile. Yet this failure to order society does
not necessarily mean the loss of all hope, as Ghosh attempts, through the magic
in his novel, to capture the possibility of a movement beyond territorial order.
The magical elements in The Circle of Reason, as we would by now expect, cannot be seen as a representation of a particular mode of production, society or
cultural world-view. Instead they appear as that which escapes such organization; escapes, that is, rather than those, who like the migrants, are excluded from
the organization of society. As in What the Crow Said the magic is that which is by
definition non-productive in a territorial sense, and therefore is also what a
historicist analysis cannot but fail to define, but the magic is not therefore
aligned with the abject powerlessness of the migrants in The Circle of Reason. In
contrast to both society and those who are excluded from it, the magic appears
as that which has neither territory nor a relationship to it. It is precisely as such
that it has revolutionary potential.
The magic of the novel centres on the protagonist, Alu, who seems to embody
deterritorialization. The novel begins with the orphan Alu coming to stay
with his uncle Balaram in the village of Lalpukur in India. Notably, Alu lacks a
firm identity: with a prodigious talent for learning, he seems to take on the
languages and skills of whatever community he finds himself in. Alus incredible ability to learn languages and his unbelievable speed at the loom are some
of the first magical features in the novel. Alu learns not only Bengali, English
and Hindi, but the difficult dialect of the Bangladeshi refugees in Lalpukur.
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Originally from remote Noakhali in the far east of Bengal, these refugees
emigrated to India after partition, and Ghosh tells us that most of them had
left everything but their dialect behind.50 The refugees dialect is a mark of
common belonging and [. . .] a secret weapon to confuse strangers with
(CR 27). That is, a last mark of identity, a vestige of territory clung on to by
those who have been dispossessed of any territory. In contrast, the fact that tenyear-old Alu miraculously learns a dialect, which even his uncle after sixteen
years in the village can barely understand, is a movement of deterritorialization.
Alu does not gain any sense of belonging through his prodigious learning.
He remains an outsider who, despite his knowledge of many languages, barely
speaks or interacts with village life. Thus Ghosh contrasts the realism of the
refugees situation with Alus magic, their painful loss of territory with his ease
at learning their language. In the same way Alus incredible talent for weaving
is pitted against a three-page politico-economic history of cotton and weaving
(CR 5558). Interestingly, Ghosh, through the character of Alus uncle Balaram,
connects both the learning of languages and weaving to reason, a faculty
Balaram obsessively privileges. Balaram tries to find a place for his strange
nephew in his world-view based on science and reason, but Alu, despite his
ability to learn, seems always to escape his plans. Alus abilities have nothing to
do with reason, logic or science. Instead, Alu appears as an empty sign throughout the novel, an object = x that can take on any value, just as he can learn any
language or profession.
Alu is not so much a migrant as a nomad in Deleuze and Guattaris sense.
Whereas a migrant moves from point A to point B, that is, has a point of
departure as well as arrival (even if it may never be reached), the nomad moves
on a continuous trajectory where points A and B are merely temporary stops.
The migrant always retains a connection to territory, even if only as a memory
or aim, whereas the nomads journey is a complete deterritorialization
(TP 380381). Indeed, in the novel, the physical deterritorialization of refugees
and migrants, their loss of territory, is emphatically not equated with the deterritorialization of its magical elements and their lack of territory. The refugees
in Lalpkur retain their dialect as the territorial marker of their point of origin,
which for many is perhaps also a desired point of return. Alu, however, in his
trajectory through The Circle of Reason, has neither firm origin nor goal. The
families he temporarily becomes part of and the places he finds himself in are
merely stopovers on a continual journey. In the same way, the skills he learns
are merely pauses or stops in a continual movement through his own lack of
identity.
As we would expect, Alus deterritorialization always appears as divergent and
different from the political specifics of the novel. While Ghosh tells us that
Alus loom poured out rainbows of cloth with magical ease (CR 75), he also
recounts two territorial battles going on around his protagonist. One battle is
comical, between two equally extreme adherents of reason: Balaram believes
the village can be saved by the disinfectant powers of carbolic acid, while his
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former friend, now nemesis, Bhudeb Roy, insists that straight roads are the
answer to all their problems. However, alongside their absurd ideas of militant
reason there is a much more violent struggle, for which the weavers son Rakhal
is making bombs. Wars keep people busy, says Ghosh, as a rule the spectators
are the busiest of all. Some keep busy helping armies with their business of
murder and massacre, loot and rapine. Others are left with blood trickling
their way and no choice but to join the flow or mop it up (CR 59). Most of
Lalpukur consists of those who mop it up, taking in a new wave of refugees
from Bangladesh. However, Rakhal is one of those who joins in, not because of
any allegiance, but because he can make money by making bombs. It is the
coming together of these two battles, of reason and of war, that leads to the loss
of Alus family in Lalpukur. When the police get involved in the village rivalry,
a warning flare ignites the explosives that Rakhal has stored in Balarams house.
The resulting explosion wipes out all things that tie Alu to Lalpukur: his home,
his family, his loom and his sweetheart. Alu, in himself lacking both identity
and place, easily becomes labelled as a terrorist, and has to flee the police.
While his family and friends lose their lives to the territorial struggles they are
either spectators to or participants in, Alu literally remains on the outside by
a quasi-magical coincidence he finds himself outside the house, itself predicated on territory, when it goes up in flames.
Ghosh, here, on the one hand, uses the comical value of the rivalry between
Balaram and Bhudeb Roy and its parallels to the ongoing war to indicate that
wars are fought over apparently reasonable but actually arbitrary causes, and
on the other, contrasts the territorial life and death struggle in Jamesons
words, with the deterritorialized nomadic magic of Alu. The first movement
belongs to the realist narration of the novel: the parallel between Balaram and
Bhudeb Roys rivalry and the war can be drawn because they are both territorial
struggles, essentially over how something should be ordered. While the war is
directly about the division of land in one way or another, the fight in the village
is about whether things should be divided into clean and dirty or straight and
crooked. Both fights belong to the same regime of signs that governs realism:
the territorial regime of signs of the State. However, in contrast to this realism,
the magical deterritorialization of Alu allows the text to do something entirely
different than articulating either the territoriality of social struggles, or, indeed,
the human misery that is the fall-out of these struggles. Again, Bhabhas distinction between cultural diversity and hybridity is useful here. Ghoshs parallel
between Balarams and Bhudeb Roys interpretations of Western science and
the war is a matter of cultural diversity: the acquisition or accumulation of
additional cultural knowledge is paralleled with the acquisition or accumulation of territory. The magic of Ghoshs magical realism, however, like Kroetschs,
allows him to go beyond instances of culture to the conditions of culture. In
Bhabhas terms, Alu, as a hybrid signifier appearing in the encounter between
Western reason and Indian village life, becomes the very structure of difference
that underlies any production of cultural identity in Ghoshs postcolonial text.
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As we shall see, it is precisely as such that he can become the site for making
myths for a missing people, but with a very different effect to the disengaged
myths in What the Crow Said.
What saves Alu from immolation is one of the quasi-magical objects of the
novel the sewing machine which his aunt asks him to dispose of, thus
making him leave the house before the explosion. To Alus childless aunt the
sewing machine is a child substitute, and to Alu it becomes a strange talisman
for survival: his aunts plea that he buy her a better sewing machine stays with
him, magically saving him from being killed yet again, and leading him on his
trajectory towards the West. The sewing machine is another object = x, child to
Tori-debu, talisman to Alu. Even its meaning as a sign for the industrialized
West is ultimately deterritorialized Dont worry about the sewing machine;
they make them better at home now (CR 422), Alu is told by an Indian countryman. What makes the sewing machine work as magic is the fact that it, like Alu
himself, is a hybrid signifier, opening up that gap of signification in the encounter between India and the West. In Deleuzes terms, these hybrid signifiers,
present the actual encounter between India and the West, colonizer and colonized as the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of the magic, which in itself escapes both India and the West.
In the second part of the novel the opposition between the territorial real
and deterritorialized magic continues, as Alus magical, nomadic adventures
are contrasted with other migrants continual search for territory and identity.
On the boat from Calcutta to Al-Ghazira, Alu is plagued by mysterious boils,
which appear inexplicably after the disaster in Lalpukur. Alu does not get rid of
the boils until he is saved again by sewing machines, but what the boils signify is
hard to say. It is suggested that the ghost of his uncle is haunting his body, but
this suggestion is not sustained. The boils appear to have some significance,
but Ghosh never allows them to assume it. In effect, they might be merely the
physical symptoms of Alus lack of identity and belonging. In contrast to this
magical aporia, one of the other passengers on the boat, Khartamma, in labour
but desperately trying to prevent her baby being born, is a clear representation
of the real dilemma of in-between travellers. She has been told that if her baby
is born an Al-Ghaziri citizen it will have a better life, and is adamant that she
needs to sign a form for this to happen: She says that she knows that the child
wont be given a house or a car or anything at all if she doesnt sign the forms.
Itll be sent back to India, she says, and she would rather kill it than allow that
to happen (CR 177). It is clear that territory is crucial to the refugee or migrant,
that it indicates the difference between a life worth living and one that is not.
This consideration of territory and the loss of it is borne out in the second part
of the novel by its realist setting and characters. Al-Ghazira is a fictional Arab
peninsula oil state, but its history of struggle for territory between the ruling
Malik, the British and the oil corporations clearly refers to a real historical
and geographical situation. Al-Ghazira is a place that is strictly segmented: the
territories of the Arab population, the corporate-owned Oiltown and the ghetto
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of migrant workers are clearly divided. The last, called Ras al-Maqtu, the
Severed Head, provides Alu with a new community of migrants. He is taken in
by Zindi, an entrepreneur, landlady and brothel madam, the various itinerant
workers and prostitutes inhabiting her house becoming his new substitute
family. These are realist characters, telling us about Al-Ghaziras past and
enacting its present situation: the low-paid jobs, the prejudice and the poverty
in the shade of riches that constitute a migrant workers life.
Alu is nearly killed by one of the symbols of these riches: a new skyscraper
shopping centre collapses while he is inside working on its construction. Again,
in contrast to the migrants who are metaphorically crushed by the Al-Ghaziri
inequality between rich and poor, Alu literally escapes the destructive exclusion
from territorial belonging that the skyscraper stands for. He is magically saved
by two cast-iron sewing machines preventing the rubble crushing him, and
incredibly survives for several days without food or water until he is saved. In
addition, his boils disappear, and he is inspired to preach to the inhabitants of
the Ras about cleanliness. Having been rescued, he addresses the gathered
crowd in tongues: Arabic with Hindi, Hindi swallowing Bengali, English doing
a dance; tongues unravelled and woven together nonsense, you say, tongues
unravelled are nothing but nonsense but there again you have a mystery, for
everyone understood him perfectly (CR 279). This is another hybrid signifier,
magical and nonsensical. Bhabha says that the hybrid signifier is a space of
undecidability, where all possible meanings exist at the same time, and which
opens up possibilities for other narrative spaces (LC 255). However, such narrative spaces do not mean the return of the subject as agent as Bhabha
suggests, but the possibility of thinking Deleuzes new people.
Alu himself is unsure of the meaning of what he is saying that money equals
dirt and needs to be cleansed but he enables others to imagine a plan for the
Ras and interpret his words into action. Soon the carbolic acid is flowing in
the Ras, and all money is pooled. Alu, however, could no longer understand
what hed started (CR 315). Recall how at the end of Sexing the Cherry, Dog
Woman appeared as the virtual contemporaneous past of the chemist, and this
simultaneity in time worked as a catalyst for revolutionary action. In the same
way, the moment of simultaneous meanings in the hybrid signifier of Alus
speech acts as a catalyst for the people of the Ras. The motley migrant community suddenly mobilize in a flagrant anti-capitalist movement, rejecting the
each-to-their-own mentality, turning away exploitative labour contractors and
setting up a system to share their assets. The unwanted people of the Ras are
precisely people who, in Deleuzes phrase, live in a state of perpetual minorities, in a collective identity crisis, and who invent themselves, in shanty towns
and camps, or in ghettos (C2 209). What makes these people invent themselves
is precisely a crisis and trance similar to that which Deleuze finds in his Third
World cinema?: Alus near-death experience and visionary insights. We saw
that Kroetschs magic was an act of making new myths, myths that do not have
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an origin, that is, a people. Rather, these new myths are precisely what allow a
missing people to appear, indeed, to become apparent in its very absence.
For a moment, then, a missing people appears in Ghoshs novel as the possibility of thinking a future people. In Alus words: We will drive money from the
Ras, and without it we shall be happier, richer, more prosperous than ever
before (CR 281). Stephanie Jones sees Alus revelation as a typical magical realist clich, a moment of magical reason [that] quickly resolves into the reality of
administration and the potential for corruption.51 Therefore she concludes
that Ghosh does not offer a workable alternative to modernity. Clearly, Alus
ecstasy does not offer a real, workable political agenda, but, in the revolutionary
deterritorialization of his magical survival and nonsensical trance-like speech,
he at least opens that space where a new people can be thought outside the
cultural and historical constraints of the specific context. If in a Marxist Jamesonian analysis the relationship of historical conditions to the text is one of a
limiting situation (PU 134), then in a Deleuzian theory the magic is an element
of the text that escapes the limits of this situation.
The power of this invention of a new people is attested by the fact that it
poses an immediate threat to the territorial order of the Al-Ghaziri State. The
people, having pooled their money, decide to go on a mass shopping trip to the
rich parts of Al-Ghazira. They traverse the boundaries of the segmented state,
leaving their proper place, entering the spaces they have previously been
excluded from. However, this excursion from the Ras is interpreted as a coupattempt by the authorities, who react with force, massacring the shoppers. The
State brutally reterritorializes those that have dared to cross the boundaries
of its order. Despite this disastrous outcome, in The Circle of Reason the very
thinking of a new people has a noticeable effect on the existing people, as
opposed to the new myths of What the Crow Said. The question is, of course, why
this should be so. Both the settlers of the Canadian hinterland and the people
of the Ras can be said to be minorities with identity crises, but, clearly, their
situations are also vastly different. The magical elements in the two novels may
work in the same way, through deterritorialization, but, ultimately, the effect of
the magic on the real will depend on the particular situation of the existing
peoples, represented by the realism of the two novels, not the magic. A people
can only be created in abominable sufferings, says Deleuze, and it appears that
it is indeed the real sufferings of the migrants in The Circle of Reason that mean
that the invention of a new people is translated into action. In What the Crow
Said, the hinterland life may be territorial, but it is also reassuring and healing
in its domesticity and order. That is, the magic may appear as the new myths of
a missing people in any situation, but it is merely a conduit or leaven for the
appearance of a new people, as Deleuze says. In Beloved the magic acted as a
catalyst to a reconstruction of Sethes identity, by the very fact that it was
antithetical to any identity. Similarly, in certain situations, such as the polluted
London in Sexing the Cherry or, even more poignantly, the abject Ras in The Circle
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135
That is, a people that is new, precisely because it escapes the conditions of any
existing people. These myths work as catalysts for action, although in Ghoshs
novel more often than not this action ends in apocalypse the explosion in
Lalpukur and the massacre in Al-Ghazira echoing the destructive results of
magic in Midnights Children. However, the action that the new myth of carbolic
acid inspires at the end of the novel, Dr Vermas funeral rites, lead to a hopeful
ending for the novel, despite these disasters.
As Kulfis presumed husband, Alu has to light the funeral pyre, something he
fears he cannot do because of his defective thumbs. Magically, however, his
thumbs have healed, as Dr Verma assures him: Your thumbs are all right [. . .].
Really. You can do whatever you like as long as you want to (CR 417). It may
seem as if Alu has finally gained some individuality and agency, but Ghosh does
not allow his magical protagonist such a straightforward ending. Alu is still
going where he is directed: being given Kulfis ashes, he follows Vermas advice:
She said it would give me a good reason to go home (CR 418). Where this
home is, however, is never made clear. The end of the novel is merely the start
of another journey, or rather, the resumption of the trajectory of a nomadic
movement that has temporarily paused.
On the one hand, Ghosh in his novel describes the bleak lot of the global
migrant, realistically depicting the poverty, violence and restricted choices of
people who fall between the independent postcolonial nations and the riches
of globalization. As Joshi Ulka points out, the novel consists of a number of
non-productive cycles of doomed loves and failed projects, from the death of
Alus sweetheart Maya, to the sudden death of Kulfi just as Jyoti Das has fallen
in love with her, from Balarams School of Reason to the commune in the Ras.52
On the other hand, Ghosh finishes his novel with the words Hope is the beginning (CR 423). As both Alu and his pursuer Jyoti Das set out on journeys once
again, they are turning away from the past, the mocking grey smudge hanging
on the horizon, pointing to continents of defeat defeat at home, defeat in the
world (CR 423); and, despite everything, believing in a future. As nomads,
rather than migrants, they are the perpetual minority, always a missing people,
who can always be thought outside the constraints of such a defeated world, not
realistically, perhaps, but magically. The novel ends, as Prasad suggests, not with
any explanations, but with a renewed search for meaning.53 While the novel
cannot be said to end on a particular political message, or even a particular
vision of the future, in contrast to Midnights Children or One Hundred Years of
Solitude, The Circle of Reason does not end in apocalypse and destruction, but
renewal and hope.
Ghosh himself does not want to be categorized as a political writer, and
although he deals with historico-political situations he is distinctly not a polemical writer. However, as Brinda Bose notes, he does engage in an intellectual
exploration of the contexts of modern history, foregrounding the dilemmas
of diaspora that are engendered in the margins of history.54 This is a possible
description of the politics that Deleuze finds in minor literature and we have
136
137
Ghosh implies that both pre-capitalist and capitalist world-views impose arbitrary rules on a chaotic world. Okri shows that the Party of the Rich and the
Party of the Poor work in the same way: through intimidation and bribes they
segment the population of the ghetto according to political allegiance.
The realism of The Famished Road also allows us to read it in Jamesonian terms.
The novel represents the constant struggle for survival by Mum and Dad, a
hawker and a day labourer. The everyday repetition of Mum and Dad going out
to toil, bringing back barely enough money, of making do with too little food
in a rat-infested room, indicates the way they are caught, in Jamesons terms, in
the conflict between the remnants of a pre-capitalist way of life and the increasing hold of capitalism. In Deleuzian terms, Azaros family is caught in a rigidly
territorial State by the struggle for that territory by various interests: what
Deleuze and Guattari would call a molar politics. The realism of the novel
depicts not only the fight for domination between the two opposing parties
and their various followers and cronies, but also between the landlord and his
tenants, and the rise in social status and change in allegiances of Madame Koto,
the bar owner. It deals with the struggle for independence, as well as the clash
between the modern and the traditional in the opposition between the building of roads by white men and the ancestral forest on the edge of the ghetto.
Indeed, The Famished Road can be seen as a national allegory, dramatizing
the vicissitudes of a Nigeria about to be born on several levels, personal and
collective. The constant births and deaths of the abiku can be posited as a metaphor for this process.
So a Jamesonian Marxist reading of The Famished Road is valid to some extent,
but it does not fully incorporate the magic of the novel. Reading the abiku as an
allegory is far too simple an interpretation of Azaros magical adventures. The
magic of the novel is so overwhelming that it is difficult to read it merely as a
tool to enhance a political message in Jamesons sense. Numerous critics have
noted the impossibility of squaring Azaros spiritual encounters with any one
reading, in particular with any political agenda. Much has been made of the
fact that Okri uses Yorb mythology heavily in the novel: figures such as the
abiku, as well as witches and wizards, demons and grotesquely-shaped spirits,
and images such as the road and the forest. These have often been read, in the
vein of Carpentier or Jameson, as an African aesthetic56 or expression of precapitalist society. However, on closer inspection, Okris use of this material is
idiosyncratic to say the least. The magic in his novel is by no means restricted
merely to Yorb mythology. In fact Okris magic is not reducible to simple
symbolism or allegory, as Jo Dandy notes: Much of the imagery used by Okri in
The Famished Road [. . .] defies easy interpretation by the reader; that is, it deliberately avoids closure and specific meaning.57 It is worth considering a longer
passage as an example of the novels magic episodes. Here Azaro goes through
one of his near-death experiences:
But deep inside that darkness a counterwave, a rebellion of joy, stirred. It was
a peaceful wave, breaking on the shores of my spirit. I heard soft voices
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singing and a very brilliant light came closer and closer to the centre of my
forehead. And then suddenly, out of the centre of my forehead, an eye
opened, and I saw this light to be the brightest, most beautiful thing in the
world. It was terribly hot, but it did not burn. It was fearfully radiant, but it
did not blind. As the light came closer, I became more afraid. Then my fear
turned. The light went into the new eye and into my brain and roved around
my spirit and moved in my veins and circulated in my blood and lodged itself
in my heart. And my heart burned with a searing agony, as if it were being
burnt to ashes within me. As I began to scream the pain reached its climax
and a cool feeling of divine dew spread through me, making the reverse
journey of the brilliant light, cooling its flaming passages, till it got back to
the centre of my forehead, where it lingered, the feeling of a kiss for ever
imprinted, a mystery and a riddle that not even the dead can answer.58
Such esoteric language, with its mix of Yorb elements (abiku myth, spirits) as
well as other mystical images (third eye, divine light) abounds in the frequent
magical passages of The Famished Road. It not surprising then that Wright finds
that the result is such a confusing superabundance of features that they are,
paradoxically, rendered featureless [. . .] links between the books disparate
images rivers and highways, dreams and hunger, nation and road-building,
political stasis and abikus become too tenuous to be meaningful in any interpretative way,59 and Maggi Phillips complains of a confusing excess of data
which is at times counter-productive in effect.60 Counter-productive, that is, to
a traditionally conceived political reading of the novel. Wright concludes that,
for Okri, redemptive energy is finally not a political but a purely visionary,
imaginative quality, and the reader can be forgiven for seeing Azaro as an image
of literary self-absorption, a figure for the romantic artists solipsistic immersion
in a world of his own making.61
There is a clear difference in The Famished Road between old myths and
magic. The fact that the abiku can be seen as a national allegory indicates that
the act of thinking the nation in traditional, mythical terms is also an act of
territorialization by the State, a way of creating a territorial national identity, as
it was in Midnights Children. Like in Rushdies novel, in The Famished Road
myths are not opposed to the nation-state, although magic is. Myths are a way
of reigning in the purely different and divergent element of magic by giving it
meaning. In fact, in one sense the elements of Yorb myth that Okri uses in
his novel are reterritorialized magic: the road, the forest, the spirit world, the
abiku all have specific symbolic meaning in Yorb cosmology. This is what
makes possible a Marxist materialist political reading of the abiku myth: precisely because the abiku myth is territorial, can it stand as a national allegory,
exposing the stasis of the politics of the existing State. In contrast to these old
myths, the missing people heralded by the entirely new myths of magic exist
only in the future, and the future is always uncertain.
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140
141
Alu in The Circle of Reason, he never gains the coherent human identity of a
proper subject.
In their book on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari state that his literature is not
a voyage through the past but one through our future (KM 83). The road that
appears to Azaro time and again in the spiritual world is a kind of virtual double
of the real road, leading him to numerous, different, often contradictory visions
of a future, new people. It is a road that is continually destroyed and then
rebuilt, sometimes appearing as a kind of paradise, esoterically beautiful, sometimes as a force for the destruction of nature and life itself. Like many of Azaros
other uncountable visions, the road is where the magic becomes a crystalline
sign, where, as we saw in What the Crow Said, the writing of myths without origin
takes place. Azaros visions have a strong element of Yorb myth, but crucially,
Okri also deviates from these myths, inventing entirely new legends. It is a
matter, as Perrault said, not of returning people to their old myths, but allowing
them to create their myths, and thus themselves, anew. The magic as opposed
to the realism of magical realism is not a national allegory, then, not a political
fiction; for the opposition is not between the atrocities of the real and the
liberation of fiction, but between a writing that refers to the territoriality of the
real, and a writing that makes up legends and thus allows us to think a new
people. One of Azaros vivid visions is of the market place populated by spirits.
Here he is able to hear the voices of the spirits speaking about him:
I felt myself being lifted up by the darkness, pushed on by invisible hands.
And the voices followed me, voices without bodies [. . .].
Strange things are happening.
The world is turning upside down.
And madness is coming.
And hunger is coming, like a dog with twelve heads.
And confusion is coming.
And war.
And blood will grow in the eyes of men.
And a whole generation will squander the richness of this earth.
Let us go.
Look at him.
Maybe what is to come is already driving him mad. (FR 196197)
Indeed, Azaros visions of a new people, both in the sense of a spiritual people,
and a Deleuzian missing people, appears as a kind of hallucinatory madness
that is, a crisis or a trance, like Alus speech in The Circle of Reason. In The Famished
Road it is this new people that is the true opposite of the exploitation of the
land: the actual building of a road and the destruction of the forest without
any consideration for the inhabitants of the area. Again, as in the Ras al-Maqtu,
at the very moment their existence is ignored, the people begin to invent
themselves.
142
In Ghoshs novel we also saw how the magical element is only a leaven or
catalyst for action, not the political action itself. Indeed, in The Famished Road
this becomes clear again, in two ways. First, we see how the presence of the
real, actual suffering of the people, as opposed to the lack of it in What the Crow
Said, that is, the need for action, has to be present for the magic to act as such
a catalyst. Second, the magical catalyst, because it is entirely deterritorialized,
does not in any way determine the action which it initiates. As we noticed
already in Sexing the Cherry, and as is the case with Azaros vision of the road, the
magic is the virtual double of an actual state of affairs, but as Deleuze emphatically reminds us, every object is double without it being the case that the two
halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual
image (DR 209). Thus the action that is initiated by the magical event is in no
way guaranteed to be liberatory or even beneficial.
To Deleuze and Guattari the deterritorialized line of flight is a line of escape,
yes but not a refuge (KM 41). It rather points to a coming collectivity, a new
assemblage without our knowing yet what this assemblage will be: fascist?
revolutionary? socialist? capitalist? (KM 85). The missing people are not yet
territorialized in any such social formation. It becomes clear in The Famished
Road that the line of flight of deterritorialization can take different directions,
and that the people to come can take different shapes. In addition to Azaro,
other characters in the novel are also involved in making up new myths. The
photographer appears as an artist-figure, who with his photographic art is
able to imagine a new people, and who is therefore seen as an enemy by the
political, territorializing forces of the novel, and often set upon by cronies: His
camera flashed and thugs in dark glasses appeared from the flash and proceeded to beat him up. The camera fell from the photographers hands. I heard
people screaming inside the camera. The thugs jumped on the camera and
stamped on it, trying to crush and destroy it. And the people who were inside
the camera, who were waiting to become real, and who were trying to get out,
began wailing and wouldnt stop (FR 204). Without the photographer, the
people continue to be missing, despite the riots in the ghetto and the vigilante
attacks on its inhabitants: And because the photographer hadnt been there
to record what had happened that night, nothing of the events appeared in the
newspapers. It was as if the events were never real (FR 214). The photographers power, however, lies not in making what has happened real by recording
it, but in inventing the real. I have a lot of powers, he tells Azaro, like flying
to the moon. What else can you do? I can change peoples faces. How?
With my camera. Into what? I can make them ugly or beautiful (FR 271).
The photographers art, his magic, is one that brings a new people into existence, but as with all invention, the people can be imagined as either ugly and
beautiful, good or bad.
Madame Koto is another central character in the novel, steeped in magic, but
one who seems to herald what Deleuze and Guattari call the diabolical powers
143
that are knocking at the door (KM 41): the possibility that the new people are
defined by corruption and greed. Throughout the novel, Azaro observes
Madame Kotos rise to power from humble bar owner to party crony. As this rise
takes place, his visions in and around her bar are of increasingly demonic
spirits:
I realised for the first time that many of the customers were not human
beings. Their deformations were too staggering and they seemed unaffected
by their blindness and their eyelessness, their hunched backs and their
toothless mouths. Their expressions and movements were at odds with their
bodies. They seemed a confused assortment of different human parts. It
occurred to me that they were spirits who had borrowed bits of human beings
to partake of human reality. (FR 161)
These grotesque spirits could be read as an allegory of the corruption of
Nigerian society. However, as with all magic, the visions Azaro has at Kotos bar
do not add up to anything so simple. Instead, Madame Koto, and the spiritual
pregnancy that Azaro perceives in her, are instances of Okri imagining a new
people. As Madame Kotos powers reach their high point at the end of the
novel, and her colossal form took wings at night and flew over the city, Azaro
realises that [Madame Kotos] dreams gave the children nightmares [. . .]
drawing power from our sleeping bodies [. . .]. That was when I understood
that conflicting forces were fighting for the future of our country in the air, at
night, in our dreams, riding invisible white horses and whipping us, sapping
our will while we slept (FR 568).
In contrast to these demonic powers, Dad offers an alternative way of
imagining a new people. As Mariaconcetta Costantini points out, Dad goes
from corporeality, drunkenness, dirt and stink, to abstinence, visions and storytelling.64 Dad takes up boxing, gains fame, and goes through fights with ever
more fearful opponents. His fights are his forays into the realm of magic, as his
opponents turn out to be from the spirit world. Although Dad never enters the
completely deterritorialized world of spirits as Azaro does, his bouts seem to
give him a strange inspiration:
He talked of grand schemes. He talked of buying enough corrugated zinc to
roof the whole ghetto. He talked of buying enough cement to build houses
for all the large families who lived in one room. He spoke of tarring all the
roads and clearing away all the rubbish that had accumulated in the consciousness of our people. (FR 467)
Dads plans are never fully realized, and he is increasingly seen as a madman,
trying to mobilize a band of beggars to clean up the ghetto, believing that he
can change the world, and ranting against the peoples weakness of will when
144
they ignore or destroy his plans. Thus many readers, like Felicia Oka Moh, have
seen Okris novel as carrying a message about the futility of political struggle.65
However, while Dads visionary madness is not political in the Marxist materialist sense, it is a moment of crisis that is revolutionary in the Deleuzian sense,
which pushes everything into a state of aberration (C2 211).
In fact, a number of the novels critics come to conclusions interpretable in
Deleuzian terms. Costantini reads Azaro as a figure akin to the lonely visionary
artist, the poet who discovers a hidden beauty through art, stripping the
veil of appearances.66 David Lim also proclaims Okri political in a strangely
singular way: Okri [. . .] goes a step beyond the kind of intervention that operates within the framework of existing socio-political relations. His brand of
creative politics is the art of the impossible, a politics that seeks to change the
very parameters of the possible in the existing constellation.67 Indeed, Okris
own words bear out this position. His particular hope for Africa lies in art:
Africa has an incredible capacity to not die and not be destroyed [. . .] resilience of the spirit, great dreaming capacities, the imaginative frames that are
visible in the art, and art that has not remotely been understood. He goes on
to say that in our age we have to posit a different conception of history, because
the facts of history alone are not enough to give an account of our consciousness and what we need to do with our age. Such a conception must lead to
infinity, to endless possibilities. To Okri this is the aesthetic of possibilities, of
labyrinths, of riddles [. . .] of paradoxes. I think we miss this element when we
try to fix it too much within national or tribal boundaries.68 We see that Okris
project can be paralleled with Deleuzes, where art is a way to revelation and
redemption, but in a manner that leaves historical specifics behind.
The magic in The Famished Road is certainly not a case of cultural diversity,
hybridity or cultural interdiscursivity, 69 as some critics have read it. Neither,
however, should it be identified with politics of postcoloniality or the nation as
proposed by Elleke Boehmer: The pathology of contemporary national society,
it seems, is not to be comprehended except partially, under the flickering light
of magical vision and through the medium of gnomic narrative.70 Okri does
not simply present an indigenous African rationality as a solution to the postcolonial condition, and the pathology of national society is more than adequately described through the realism of The Famished Road. The magic in the
novel, however, does offer a glimpse of the infinity, endless possibilities, both
good and bad, of a new people.
Certainly from a Marxist materialist or historicist point of view, the magic of
magical realist works may appear as ineffectual and a failure a Jamesonian
romance. However, Deleuze enables us to read the magic as revolutionary
outside the framework of Marxist materialism and the usual sense of politics.
Deleuze states that philosophy and art can forewarn of the advent of a people.
They have resistance in common their resistance to death, to servitude, to
the intolerable, to shame, and to the present (WIP 110). Quite apart from the
145
realism of the novels, the magical elements of these three authors works
Kroetschs articulation of the stuff before the stuff that is history or culture or
society or art, Ghoshs intellectual exploration and Okris visionary aesthetic
of possibilities are all acts of such resistance, precisely because they are the
acts of thinking a new people. Ultimately, it is only because they exist, as Deleuze
would say, as creations of the new and not representations of the past or present
situation, that they can betoken such a revolutionary resistance.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Perhaps because of the double nature of the term itself, magical realism has
most commonly been thought of as a genre that brings together two differing
paradigms, the real and the magic. The default approach has been to focus on
the coexistence of these on seemingly equal terms. Indeed, the power of magical realism has often been presumed to lie in the way it erases the differences
between these incompatible elements. Gilles Deleuzes ontological model in
which Being is univocal and yet nonetheless has two sides, the actual and the
virtual, provides a framework for reconsidering this double nature of magical
realism. Rather than seeing magical realism as equalizing the real and the
magic, this model shows us how the genre inserts a radically divergent element
into a mode of writing that depends on similarity and coherence. The potential
of the genre lies precisely in the fact that real and the magic always remain different, even when they appear indistinct, and can therefore act as complimentary
facets of the text.
Readings of magical realism that stress the coexistence of real and magic
as equal have often either failed to consider the full potential of one or the
other, or ended up caught in uncomfortable contradictions. Such readings
have been based on the assumption that the erasure of the differences between
the real and the magic also implies the subversion of the world-view projected
by realism, thereby defining magical realism as a particularly suitable mode of
writing for the postcolonial world. An influential definition of the genre by
Amaryll Chanady makes clear that this assumption rests on a paradox. Chanady,
like many other critics, defines magical realism by its resolution of antinomy
between the real and the magic. However, she also notes that for magical realism to work the real and the magic have to be distinguished as different and
that it is, in fact, the dominant realist narration of magical realism which sets up
a rational, empirical world-view that determines both what is seen as real and
what is seen as magic.
If that is so, magical realism is paradoxically dependent on realism for both
the creation and the resolution of the antinomy between the real and the magic.
This paradox is clearly the root of many of the problems faced by critics who
consider the equivalence of the real and the magic to be at the heart of magical
realism, in particular those that see a political implication in such equivalence.
Conclusion
147
In the majority of postcolonial readings, the real and the magic are seen as
expressions of the different and conflicting world-views of capitalist and precapitalist societies, and their equivalent coexistence as a representation of
the cultural mix of the postcolonial world and even the undoing of colonial
hierarchies. Yet it is undoubtedly the realism of the text that differentiates the
real from the magic. Not surprisingly then, many postcolonial readings of magical realism see it as a problematic, if not failed, mode of writing, escapist and
ineffectual at best, and neo-colonial and exoticizing at worst.
In fact, there cannot be any equivalence between the real and the magic in
a text that depends on the two being distinguished by realism. Instead, the
structural difference of the magic from the real, or rather, from the organized
image of the world set up by the realist narration, is central to magical realism.
Gilles Deleuze enables us to rethink the relationship between the real and the
magic radically, by inverting the hierarchy of different and same. The usual
approach to magical realism privileges the creation of unity and equivalence
between two elements that are seen as incompatible and unequal, that is, as two
altogether different modes of being. However, taking Gilles Deleuzes ontological imperative of the univocity of Being as a starting point forces us to consider
how both the real and the magic could be seen as part of the same ontological
principle, but still appear as structurally different. Magical realism, rather than
bringing together the disparate, enacts a divergence of the same, something
that is one of the unique powers of art to Deleuze.
A reading of magical realism using Deleuzes concept of series reveals that
the structure of the real and the magical corresponds to Deleuzes fundamental
distinction between two sides of Being: the actual and the virtual. Indeed, the
realism appears as real precisely because it reflects the convergent, ordered
structure of all actual things, all things in the here and now. The magic appears
as different because of its divergence from such a structure. Analysed in this
way, the realism in One Hundred Years of Solitude emerges as a part of a regime of
signs. The structured order that governs meaning under this regime, and makes
realism appear as a transparent representation of an external reality, is the same
order that underpins the social organization of the State with its rigid segmentation of territory and people. Magic, in contrast, is not bound by this order,
and thus appears as deterritorialized, able to move across the boundaries of the
segments of the State as embodied by the convergent series of realism.
However, as it is without territory, the magic is removed from, even antithetical to, the structure of society, history and identity. So much so, that the deterritorialization of the text effected by the magic leads to apocalyptic endings
in One Hundred Years of Solitude and Midnights Children. Indeed, in Life of Pi we
saw that the magical sign is precisely a non-human becoming, a stripping away
of the human organization that characterized realism. There is therefore no
political message encoded by the magic in magical realism, rather it is the realism of the genre that reveals the structure of a particular social organization.
The magic does not negate the realism of the magical realist text, however, but
148
Conclusion
149
people through magic cannot determine the nature of this people in any way:
in The Famished Road magic acted as a catalyst to various visions of a new people,
some heralding freedom, some heralding corruption and greed.
When freed from the yoke of being a genre that erases the differences
between the real and the magic, and therefore simply subverts realism and all
that it stands for, magical realism can truly become the literature of replenishment that One Hundred Years of Solitude exemplified to John Barth. Rather than
indicating Barths simple synthesis of straightforwardness and artifice, realism
and magic myth, political passion and non-political artistry,1 inverting the
hierarchy of the same and different by means of Deleuzes ontology exposes
the real and the magic as apparently indiscernible yet radically different. The
order of realism is the expression of the territorial field of history and politics,
and reveals this realms inherent structural rigidity as its limit. It defines the
magic as that which escapes this limit, and becomes a supplement to realism,
not by negating it, by adding fanciful elements, or supplying an alternative
world-view, but as an element which allows for the imagining of a new people
unfettered by the constraints of existing politics, society and culture; unfettered, indeed, by the real.
Notes
Chapter 1
1
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Notes
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
151
Brenda Cooper, Magical Realism in West African Fiction: Seeing with a Third Eye
(London: Routledge, 1998), 1516. Hereafter WAF and page number.
Jean-Pierre Durix, Mimesis, Genres, and Post-Colonial Discourse: Deconstructing Magic
Realism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 2. Hereafter MGP and page number.
Frederick Luis Aldama, Postethnic Narrative Criticism: Magicorealism in Oscar
Zeta Acosta, Ana Castillo, Julie Dash, Hanif Kureishi, and Salman Rushdie
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 78. Hereafter PNC and page number.
Theo L. DHaen, Magic Realism and Postmodernism: Decentering Privileged
Centres, Zamora and Faris: 191208, 193.
Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London:
Routledge, 1988) and The Politics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 2002);
Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987) and Constructing
Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1992).
Hutcheon, Poetics, 5773.
DHaen, 195.
Linda Hutcheon, Circling the Downspout of Empire: Post-Colonialism and
Postmodernism, ARIEL, 20/4 (1989): 149175, 151152.
Hutcheon, Downspout, 153.
Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992), 65.
Ahmad, 69.
Wendy B. Faris, Scheherezades Children: Magical Realism and Postmodern
Fiction, Zamora and Faris: 163190, 163.
John Barth, The Literature of Replenishment, Barth, The Friday Book: Essays and
Other Nonfiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984): 193206, 204.
Faris, Scheherezades, 163.
Faris, Scheherezades, 167174, 174.
Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans.
Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 26.
Amaryll Beatrice Chanady, Magical Realism and the Fantastic: Resolved Versus Unresolved Antinomy (New York: Garland, 1985), 5. Hereafter MRF and page number.
Gabriel Garca Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, trans. Gregory Rabassa
(London: Penguin Books, 1972), 243. Hereafter OHYS and page number.
Amaryll Beatrice Chanady, The Origins and Development of Magic Realism in
Latin American Fiction, Hinchcliffe and Jewinski: 4960, 50.
Brenda Cooper, Does Marxism Allow for the Magical Side of Things? Magical
Realism and a Comparison between One Hundred Years of Solitude and The House of
Spirits, Social Dynamics, 17/2 (1991): 126154, 149.
Timothy Brennan, Salman Rushdie and The Third World (London: Macmillan,
1989), 54.
Salman Rushdie, Midnights Children (London: Vintage, 1995), 300. Hereafter MC
and page number.
Brennan, 114.
Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris, Introduction: Daiquiri Birds and
Flaubertian Parrot(ie)s, Zamora and Faris: 111, 6.
Zamora and Faris, 3.
Robert R. Wilson, The Metamorphoses of Space: Magical Realism, Hinchcliffe
and Jewinski: 6174, 68. Hereafter MS and page number.
152
43
44
45
46
47
Notes
Chapter 2
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone
Press, 1994), 50. Hereafter DR and page number.
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London:
Continuum, 2004), 243. Hereafter LS and page number.
Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 11. Hereafter DC and page number.
Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam
(New York: Zone Books, 1988), 85. Hereafter B and page number.
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London:
Continuum, 2006), 2223.
Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin
(New York: Zone Books, 1990), 332. Hereafter EP and page number.
Peter Hallward, Everything is Real: Gilles Deleuze and Creative Univocity,
New Formations, 49 (2003): 6174, 61.
Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation
(London: Verso, 2006), 153.
Peter Hallward, The Singular and the Specific: Recent French Philosophy,
Radical Philosophy, 99 (2000): 618, 9.
Peter Hallward, Deleuze and the Redemption from Interest, Radical Philosophy,
81 (1997): 621, 18.
Constantin Boundas, Editors Introduction, Boundas (ed.), Deleuze Reader
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992): 123, 1314.
Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xvii.
Brian Massumi, A Users Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations
from Deleuze and Guattari (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 117.
In particular Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London:
Athlone Press, 1984) and A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1987). Hereafter AO or TP respectively
and page number.
Hallward, Out, 82.
Hallward, Redemption, 6.
Peter Hallward, The Limits of Individuation, or How to Distinguish Deleuze
from Foucault, Angelaki, 5/2 (2000): 93111, 98.
Hallward, Limits, 97 (quoting DR 37).
Notes
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
153
Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana
Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 48. Hereafter KM and
page number.
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert
Galeta (London: Continuum, 2005), 67. Hereafter C2 and page number.
Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2000), 41. Hereafter PS and page number.
Hallward, Everything, 63.
Lewis Carroll, Preface to The Hunting of the Snark, The Complete Illustrated Works
(London: Chancellor Press, 1993): 730731.
See for example Raymond Williams, Realism, Keywords: A Vocabulary for Culture
and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1990), 257262.
Lilian Furst, Introduction, Furst (ed.), Realism (London: Longman, 1992): 123;
Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003), 554557; Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson
and Fielding (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000), 934.
Roland Barthes, The Reality Effect, Tzvetan Todorov (ed.), French Literary Theory
Today, trans. R. Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 1117.
Philippe Hamon, Major Features of Realist Discourse, Furst: 166185, 172183.
Hallward, Redemption, 14.
Peter Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing between the Singular and the Specific
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 119, 247253, 329335.
Hereafter AP and page number; Hallward, Singular: 618.
Hallward, Singular, 8.
This statement, of course, echoes Aijaz Ahmads critique of the postmodern
referred to in the Introduction, raising the interesting question, beyond the
scope of this volume, to what extent postcolonial and postmodern theories have
developed concomitantly.
Hallward, Singular, 8.
Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004), 101. Hereafter LC and page number.
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), 72.
Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin (eds), The Empire Writes Back:
Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures (London: Routledge, 1989), 38.
Chapter 3
1
Regina Janes, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Modes of Reading (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1991), 106.
Mario Vargas Llosa, Amadis in America, Robin Fiddian (ed.), Garca Mrquez
(London: Longman, 1995), 62, 60.
Doris Sommer and George Yudice, Latin American Literature from the Boom
On, Michael McKeon (ed.), Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000): 859881, 864.
Shannin Schroeder, Rediscovering Magical Realism in the Americas (Westport:
Praeger, 2004), 123126.
154
5
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Notes
Notes
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
155
156
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Notes
Barbara Hill Rigney, Breaking the Back of Words: Language, Silence, and the
Politics of Identity in Beloved, Solomon: 138147, 146.
Peach, 15.
Marc C. Conner, From the Sublime to the Beautiful: The Aesthetic Progression
of Toni Morrison, Conner (ed.), The Aesthetics of Toni Morrison: Speaking the
Unspeakable (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000): 4976, 7172.
Peach, 2324.
Bernard W. Bell, Beloved: A Womanist Neo-Slave Narrative; or Multivocal Rememberances of Things Past, Solomon: 166176, 167168.
Toni Morrison, Beloved (London: Vintage, 2005), 67. Hereafter BD and page
number.
Hutcheon, Politics, 5.
Marianne DeKoven, Postmodernism and Post-Utopian Desire in Toni Morrison
and E. L. Doctorow, Peterson: 111130, 125.
James Phelan, Toward A Rhetorical Reader-Response Criticism: The Difficult,
the Stubborn, and the Ending of Beloved, Peterson: 225244, 230.
Trudier Harris, Beloved: Woman, Thy Name Is Demon , Solomon: 127137,
134.
Denise Heinze, Beloved and the Tyranny of the Double, Solomon: 205210,
208.
Conner, 51.
Susan Corey, Toward the Limits of Mystery: The Grotesque in Toni Morrisons
Beloved, Conner: 3148, 43.
Conner, 7071.
Chapter 4
1
7
8
9
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 132.
Jorge Luis Borges, Dreamtigers, trans. Mildred Boyer and Harold Morland (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1999); Julio Cortzar, Bestiary, Blow-Up and Other
Stories, trans. Paul Blackburn (New York: Collier, 1968): 6784.
Sabine Sielke, The Empathetic Imagination An Interview with Yann Martel,
Canadian Literature, 177 (2003): 1232, 14.
Steve Street, Review of Life of Pi, The Missouri Review, 27/1 (2004): 179180,
179.
Yann Martel, Life of Pi (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2002), 192. Hereafter LP and
page number.
Tom Burns and Jeffrey W. Hunter, Yann Martell, Burns and Hunter (eds),
Contemporary Literary Criticism, Vol. 192 (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005), 212;
Pankaj Mishra, Review of Life of Pi, New York Review of Books, 50/5 (2003):
1718.
W. R. Greer, Review of Life of Pi, at http://www.reviewofbooks.com/life_of_pi/review.
Kafka, 89.
Agusto Monterroso, El dinosaurio, Obras completa y otros cuentos (Mexico City:
Juaqun Mortiz, 1971): 77 (my translation).
Notes
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
157
Francie Lin, Floating on Faith: Review of Life of Pi, Los Angeles Times Book Review
(16 June 2002): 7.
Florence Stratton, Hollow at the core: Deconstructing Yann Martels Life of Pi,
Studies in Canadian Literature, 29/2 (2004): 521, 10.
Stratton, 19.
Werner Wolf, Migration Towards a Rewarding Goal and Multiculturalism with a
Positive Centre: Yann Martels Life of Pi as a Post-Postmodernist Attempt at
Eliciting (Poetic) Faith, Klaus-Dieter Ertler and Martin Lschnigg (eds), Canada
in the Sign of Migration and Trans-Culturalism (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2004):
107124; Charlotte Innes, Review of Life of Pi Nation 275/6 (2002): 2529; Gary
Krist, Taming the Tiger: Review of Life of Pi, The New York Times Book Review,
107/27 (2002), http://tinyurl.com/afr3a3; Lin, 7.
Francis King, A Ghastly Crew: Review of Life of Pi, Spectator, 288/9067 (2002):
43.
June Dwyer, Yann Martels Life of Pi and the Evolution of the Shipwreck Narrative, Modern Language Studies, 35/2 (2005): 921, 12
James Mensch, The Intertwining of Incommensurables: Yann Martels Life of Pi,
Contributions to Phenomenology, 56 (2007): 135147, 139.
Dwyer, 16.
Mensch, 135136.
Andr Brink, Interrogating Silence: New Possibilities Faced by South African
Literature, Derek Attridge and Rosemary Jolly (eds) Writing South Africa: Literature, Apartheid, and Democracy, 19701995 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998): 1428, 15.
Brink, Interrogating, 2122.
Brink, Interrogating, 27.
Brink, Interrogating, 15.
Elleke Boehmer, Endings and New Beginning: South African Fiction in Transition, Attridge and Jolly: 4356, 57.
Brink, Mapmakers, 221.
Mlanie Joseph-Vilain, Magic Realism in Two Post-Apartheid Novels by Andr
Brink, Commonwealth, 25/2 (2003): 1731, 26.
Lorna Sage, Escape from Paradise: Review of Devils Valley, New York Times
(21 March 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/03/21/reviews/990321.21
sagelt.html.
Andr Brink, Devils Valley (London: Vintage, 2000), 1819. Hereafter DV and
page number.
Ute Kauer, The Need to Storify: Re-inventing the Past in Andr Brinks Novels,
Anne Holden Rnning and Lene Jogannessen (eds), Readings of the Particular:
The Postcolonial in the Postnational (Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007): 5770, 61.
Joseph-Vilain, Magic, 29.
Brink, Mapmakers, 118.
Mlanie Joseph-Vilain, Andr Brink and the Afrikaner Heritage Author,
Commonwealth, 27/1 (2004): 2737, 37.
Kauer, 62.
Joseph-Vilain, Magic, 22.
Joseph-Vilain, Magic, 21.
Joseph-Vilain, Magic, 20.
158
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Notes
Kauer, 66.
Brink, Mapmakers, 169.
Susana Gonzlez, Wintersons Sexing the Cherry: Rewriting Woman through
Fantasy, Chantal Cornut-Gentille DArcy and Jos Angel Garca Landa
(eds), Gender, I-deology: Essays on Theory, Fiction and Film (Amsterdam: Rodopi,
1996), 293.
Elizabeth Langland, Sexing the Text: Narrative Drag as Feminist Poetics and
Politics in Jeanette Wintersons Sexing the Cherry, Narrative, 5/1 (1997): 99107;
Lucie Armitt, Storytelling and Feminism, Sonya Andermahr (ed.), Jeanette Winterson: A Contemporary Critical Guide (London: Continuum, 2007): 1426; Laura
Doan, Jeanette Wintersons Sexing the Postmodern, Doan (ed.) The Lesbian
Postmodern (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 137154.
Michiko Kakutani, A Journey Through Time, Space and Imagination: Review of
Sexing the Cherry, New York Times (27 April 1990): C33.
Jeanette Winterson, Sexing the Cherry (London: Vintage, 1989), 910. Hereafter
SC and page number.
Philip Tew, Wintersonian Masculinities, Andermahr: 114129, 126; Langland, 103.
Susana Onega, Jeanette Winterson (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2006), 80.
Tiziana Giordano, Hybrid Fictions and Bodies: Jeanette Wintersons Oranges Are
Not The Only Fruit, The Passion, and Sexing the Cherry, Michele Bottalico and Maria
Teresa Chialant (eds), Studi di letteratura (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane,
2003): 225246, 226.
Giordano, 246.
Lynne Pearce, Written On Tablets of Stone? Jeanette Winterson, Roland
Barthes, and the Discourse of Romantic Love, Suzanne Raitt (ed.), Volcanoes and
Pearl Divers: Essays in Lesbian Feminist Studies (London: Onlywomen Press Ltd,
1995): 147168, 148.
Lynn Pykett, A New Way with Words? Jeanette Wintersons Post-Modernism,
Helena Grice and Tim Woods (eds), Im Telling You Stories: Jeanette Winterson and
the Politics of Reading (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), 4860, 60.
Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery (London: Vintage,
1996).
Jeffrey Roessner, Writing a History of Difference: Jeanette Wintersons Sexing
the Cherry and Angela Carters Wise Children, College Literature, 29/1 (2002):
102122, 112.
Pykett, 60.
Shena MacKay, The Exotic Fruits of Time: Review of Sexing the Cherry, Times Literary Supplement, 4511 (21 September 1989).
Doan, 153.
Cath Stowers, Journeying with Jeanette: Transgressive Travels in Wintersons
Fiction, Mary Maynard and June Purvis (eds), (Hetero)sexual Politics (London:
Taylor and Francis, 1995): 139154, 148.
Maria Lozano, How you Cuddle in the Dark Governs How You See the History
of the World: A Note on Some Obsessions in Recent British Fiction, Susana
Onega (ed.), Telling Histories: Narrativizing History, Historicizing Literature
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995): 117134, 129, 133.
Pykett, 56.
Notes
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
159
Chapter 5
1
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
160
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Notes
Notes
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
161
162
68
69
70
Notes
Jane Wilkinson, Ben Okri, Wilkinson (ed.), Talking with African Writers: Interviews
with African Poets, Playwrights & Novelists (London: James Currey, 1992): 7789,
8788.
Olatubosun Ogunsanwo, Intertextuality and Post-Colonial Literature in Ben
Okris The Famished Road, Research in African Literature, 26/1 (1995): 4052, 50.
Elleke Boehmer, Stories of Women: Gender and Narrative in the Postcolonial Nation
(Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2005), 153.
Chapter 6
1
Barth, 204.
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Index
affects 74
Africa 5, 867, 134, 1367, 139, 144
agency 4, 109
creative 38, 106, 111
lack of 60, 127, 135, 140
political 60, 101, 128
subaltern 38, 107, 109, 139
subjective 107, 1121, 140, 148
Ahmad, Ajiaz 9, 153n31
Aizenberg, Edna 139
Aldama, Fredrick Louis 78, 12
allegory
in Devils Valley 89
in The Circle of Reason 127
in The Famished Road 1369, 141, 143
in Life of Pi 81
in Midnights Children 108
and Third-World literature 105, 115
anthropological magical realism 3, 5,
12, 63, 105
antinomy see also contradiction 3, 68,
1012, 1417, 36, 146
apartheid 867, 8990
apocalypse 13, 43, 62, 657, 71,
125, 135
apprenticeship of signs 46, 51, 55, 68,
77, 116
arborescence 23
Aristotle 1920
art see also signs of art; superior
viewpoint
Ben Okri on 144
and Beloved 6768
Deleuze and Guattari on 268, 735,
99,102, 11214, 1256, 144
Deleuze on 556, 735, 778, 93,
102, 103, 11217, 144, 1479
and Devils Valley 91, 93
and The Famished Road 142, 144
182
Index
art (Contd)
and Life of Pi 823, 86
Koetsch on 120, 145
painting 12, 150n4
powers of 56, 823, 86, 73, 78, 99,
102, 115, 147
and Sexing the Cherry 99100
and What the Crow Said 125
Winterson on 96, 98
assemblage 23, 26, 45, 478, 112, 142
Asturias, Miguel ngel 3, 10 passim
authorial reticence 1113
Axolotl 3 passim
Badiou, Alain 212, 246, 29
Bakhtin, Mikhail 5 passim
baroque 2
Barth, John 9, 149
Barthes, Roland 324
becoming 24, 26, 27, 60, 62, 64, 77,
86, 147
animal 24
in Life of Pi 834
in The Metamorphosis 35
in Midnights Children 60, 62
in Sexing the Cherry 98
in What the Crow Said 1225
and Being 55
and history 113
imperceptible or indiscernible 245,
27, 77
in Life of Pi 856
missing people 114, 117
molecular 62
non-human 78, 102, 116, 147
in Devils Valley 88, 92
in Life of Pi 826
in Sexing the Cherry 100
in What the Crow Said 124
other 55, 60, 66
being
as actual and virtual 1930, 51, 73,
76, 78, 102, 11213, 142, 1467
and art 28, 47, 74, 78, 113
and Bergson 767
conditions of 56, 62, 73, 102,
11213
as creative agency or force 22, 78, 93,
102, 103, 106, 111, 113, 116
Index
Canada 8, 11718, 120
capitalism
in Circle of Reason 1278, 132
in The Famished Road 137, 142
magical realism as complicit with 16
in Nights at the Circus 63
and pre-capitalist society (economy,
modes of production) 45, 16,
1045, 108, 110, 121, 1278,
132, 137
in What the Crow Said 121
and writers of magical realism 12
carnivalesque 5, 9, 57, 634
Carroll, Lewis 31, 35 passim
Carpentier, Alejo 24, 7, 10, 41, 57
passim 104, 137 passim
Carr, Helen 56
Carter, Angela, 8 passim 56, 636, 98
catalyst also conduit, leaven 72, 102,
115, 126, 1325, 140, 142, 149
Csaire, Aim 103
Chanady, Amaryll 1012, 1418, 323,
48, 146
chaos 26, 734, 78, 80, 93, 125
Cinema 2
crystalline sign 747, 81, 91, 93,
101, 116
missing people 11415
motor-sensory schema 747, 81, 116
Third World cinema 11416, 132
cinema see also film 27, 116, 132
The Circle of Reason 12636, 141
apocalypse 135
family 127, 130, 132
migrants 1279, 1335
political action 1335
reason 1289, 1335
Coetzee, J.M. 8 passim
Cogito 20, 478
colonialism see also postcolonialism
4, 8, 17, 41, 43, 147
in Bhabha 1068, 126
and Canada 11820
and realism 12, 39
Conner, Marc C. 67, 701
convergence (of series, systems,
lines) 29, 312, 75, 778, 147
in Beloved 70
in Devils Valley 89, 92
183
in Life of Pi 802
in Midnights Children 60
in Nights at the Circus 65
in One Hundred Years of
Solitude 4450, 524
and realism 334, 36
in What the Crow Said 121
Cooper, Brenda 57, 1213, 13940
Cortzar, Julio 3, 6, 15, 79 passim
Costantini, Mariaconcetta 1434
counter-actualization 201, 23, 35, 49
and becoming 60
and cinema 74
and indiscernibility 76, 78, 103
and redemption 25, 28
and series 32
crisis see also trance 114, 116, 1324,
141, 144
contradiction see also antinomy
between the real and the magical 3,
5, 1012, 36, 73
in definitions of and approaches to
magical realism 1, 12, 16, 57, 146
in Devils Valley 90
in Nights at the Circus 65
in Midnights Children 58
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 62
in Sexing the Cherry 95
The Crow Journals 120, 124
crystalline image 748
crystalline sign 77, 116
in Devils Valley 88, 913
in The Famished Road 141
in Life of Pi 813, 86
in Sexing the Cherry 101
in What the Crow Said 122
crystalline narration 75
Cuban Revolution 41
culture
Canada 115, 118, 1206
clash or conflict of 46, 12, 105,
1078, 110, 140, 147
conditions of 109, 122, 1256,
130, 145
encounter or meeting of 56, 8,
1059, 130, 140
extinction of 1067, 117, 120,
123, 134
and memory 90
184
Index
culture (Contd)
non-Western culture also native
culture 1516, 43, 63, 90, 118,
121, 124 104
and politics see politics
and religion 85
Western culture 3, 56, 12, 1518,
63, 96, 105, 109, 128, 130, 140
and world-view also versions of reality,
experience 3, 68, 12, 1517,
434, 108, 128, 147
as superstructure 11011
cultural difference 106, 1089, 127,
130, 134, 144, 147, 147
cultural diversity also pluralism, mix
92, 85, 87, 1089, 127, 130, 134,
144, 147
cultural hegemony 4, 11011
cultural hybridity 58, 12, 16, 57, 96,
1069, 118, 130, 144
cultural identity 378, 86, 92, 130
DHaen, Theo 8
Day, Adrian 656
Dayia, Kavita 127
Decolonization 41, 43
Defamiliarization 3
Derrida, Jacques 105
Descartes, Ren see also Cogito 20
despotic regime 47, 6971, 126
deterritorialization 246, 35, 76, 116
and assemblages 112
in Beloved 67
in Circle of Reason 12730, 133
in The Famished Road 140, 142
in Midnights Children 5962
in Nights at the Circus 656
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 45,
52, 546
in postcolonial theory 38
as revolutionary 113, 146
Devils Valley 6694, 96, 100
Great Trek 879
history 879, 91
myth 8892
stories 8894
women 87, 89, 91, 93
Dialogues II
actual and virtual 25
identity 60
writing 27, 49, 55, 62, 140
Dib, Mohammed 38 passim
diffrance 106
difference
in Bhabha 38, 106, 1089, 130
in Deleuze
in Beloved 68
in Devils Valley 923
in Midnights Children 60
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 49
and ontology 18, 1923, 25, 28, 334
and postcolonial theory 38, 103
in series and systems 282
and signs of art 51, 68, 778
Difference and Repetition
Being also actual and virtual 1921,
28, 142
cogito 47
laws of nature 33
series 2931
The Dinosaur 81
disjunctive synthesis 2836, 38, 49
divergence also divergent
element 2934, 72, 1467
in The Circle of Reason 129
in Devils Valley 8990, 924
in The Famished Road 138
in Life of Pi 81, 83, 86
in Midnights Children 5960
in Nights at the Circus 64
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 44,
4950, 52, 54
in Sexing the Cherry 113
and signs of art 778
in What the Crow Said 1214
Dixon, Robert 128
Doan, Laura 97
double bind 13, 40, 43, 73, 103, 107,
108, 149
Dream Tigers 79
dreams
in Devils Valley 91, 93
in The Famished Road 138, 143
in Sexing the Cherry 101
Index
duration 768, 94, 99102
Durix, Jean-Pierre 67, 13, 109
Dwyer, June 835
economics
in The Circle of Reason 127, 1289
in Deleuze and Guattari 223
in The Famished Road 139
and Jameson 105, 110
and Kroetsch 120
and postcolonial theory 38
and series 33
lan vital 76
empiricism also positivism 7, 15, 19,
324, 73, 7980, 95
epistemology 9, 108
Esquivel, Laura 1 passim
essence 28, 49, 51, 53, 55, 68, 106,
116
ethnic see native
Europe 2, 6, 8
ex-centricity 89, 118
Expressionism 2
eyewitness 58, 79, 89
fairy tales 2, 11, 110
family 15, 33, 35
in Beloved 69, 71
in The Circle of Reason 130, 132, 136
in Devils Valley 889, 91
in The Famished Road 137
in Midnights Children 58, 60
in Nights at the Circus 63
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 423,
523, 54
in Third World literature 127
in What the Crow Said 121
The Famished Road 13645
abiku 13640
allegory 1369, 141
independence 1367
myth 1378, 1412, 149
spirits 13641, 144
Fanon, Franz 103
the fantastic 6, 9, 34, 49, 87, 95, 125
Todorov 1011, 15
fantasy 74, 91, 111
185
186
Index
geography (Contd)
in Sexing the Cherry 95
in What the Crow Said 120
Ghosh, Amitav 87, 137, 142, 145
The Circle of Reason 12636
ghosts
in Beloved 70
in The Circle of Reason 131
in Devils Valley 90, 92, 94
in Midnights Children 59
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 50
in What the Crow Said 123
Giordano, Tiziana 96
Glage, Liselotte 109
Glissant, Eduard 38 passim
globalization 127, 135
Gonzles Echevarra, Roberto 13,
7, 9
Gonzlez, Suzana 84
Goonetilleke, D. C. R. A. 60
Grant, Damian 100
grotesque 64, 989, 137, 143
Guattari, Flix see A Thousand
Plateaus?; Kafka: Toward a
Minor Literature; What is
Philosophy
Hallward, Peter see also Absolutely
Postcolonial, singular, specific,
specified
and Deleuze 215, 28, 36, 47, 56,
71, 148
and postcolonial theory 369, 58, 62,
1034, 1079, 148
Index
order also culture, society, life,
reason 38, 45
in Beloved 689, 125
and history 57, 68
in Life of Pi 806
in Nights at the Circus 64, 801, 84,
86, 1245, 143, 147
in One Hundred Years of
Solidtude 50, 53, 55
and realism 72, 73, 836, 102, 130,
136, 147
and segmentarity 45
and spirit 99, 136, 1401, 143
suffering also misery 117, 126, 130,
133, 142, 136
human rights 13
Hutcheon, Linda 89, 57, 11720
hybrid signifier 1069, 117, 148
in The Circle of Reason 130, 132,
134, 139
in What the Crow Said 11920, 1224,
126
hybridity 58, 12, 16, 103, 118, 139
Bhabha on 38, 1069, 130, 13940
in The Famished Road 144
in Midnights Children 57
in Sexing the Cherry 96
identity
in Beloved 6772
in Bhabha 1068, 130
black 67, 69, 92
in Canadian literature 11821
in The Circle of Reason 12733
cultural 38, 41, 856, 92, 1078, 130
in Devils Valley 87, 923
and difference 1921, 2931
in The Famished Road 138, 141
in Life of Pi 856
loss or lack of 31, 50, 602, 656,
712, 108, 12831, 147
in Midnights Children 5662
national or regional 34, 41, 43,
5662, 87, 105, 108, 114, 118,
127, 138
in Nights at the Circus 646
personal also subjective 47, 5762,
646, 701, 108, 125
187
188
Index
Index
micropolitics 23
Midnights Children 1, 8, 5667, 69, 79,
111, 136
apocalypse 13, 62, 65, 67, 135, 137
hybridity 108
identity 5660, 62, 656, 712, 108,
138, 147
Indian writing 126
migrants, migration 12, 46, 1269,
1316
minor literature 26, 356, 38, 114,
135, 140
minority see also minor literature 7,
11416, 135
mise-en-abyme 55
missing people, new people 111,
11415, 117, 148
in The Circle of Readon 131, 1335, 138
in The Famished Road 138, 1402
mode of production see also
Marxism 10912, 121, 124, 1278
modernism 9, 96
Moh, Felicia Oka 144
molar 23, 137
molecular 234, 62
monkey 189
Monterosso, Augosto 81
Morrison, Toni 6672
motor-sensory schema 747, 116
in Life of Pi 80, 82, 86
in Sexing the Cherry 98, 100
multiplicity 5, 19, 212, 57, 602
myth 3, 5, 9, 105, 111, 11516, 1489
in The Circle of Reason 1315
in Devils Valley 8892
in The Famished Road 1378, 1412
in Midnights Children 13, 57, 5960
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 413,
53
in Sexing the Cherry 94
rewriting of 111, 11920, 122
and the State 5960, 89, 133, 138
in What the Crow Said 11920, 1223,
1256
Naipaul, V. S. 104
nationalism 1213, 62, 67, 108, 127
Nation and Narration 105
189
190
Index
Index
in Life of Pi 7982
in Midnights Children 61
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 44,
489, 51, 53
and postcoloniality 39
in Sexing the Cherry 96
in What the Crow Said 118, 121, 124
reality effect 32, 45, 478, 51, 75, 79, 89
reason also rationality 1415, 17, 33
in Beloved 69
in The Circle of Reason 12835
in Life of Pi 80, 834
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 478,
501, 545
and the State 478, 512
redemption 248, 82, 138, 144
referentiality 31, 335, 51, 55, 76, 116
representation see also illusion of
representation
in The Circle of Reason 1278, 131
and the Cogito 47
in Midnights Children 58, 60, 62
in minor literature 26, 35
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 412,
45
and postcoloniality 39
of reality also of the world 8, 14, 61,
71, 104, 112, 114, 145, 1478
and realism 35, 93
in Sexing the Cherry 101
and the signs of art 74, 77, 90
in What the Crow Said 124
regime of signs 4651, 534, 77,
11516, 147
in Beloved 69, 71
in The Circle of Reason 130
in Devils Valley 89
in Life of Pi 856
in Midnights Children 589
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 4750,
534, 147
in What the Crow Said 1234
relationality 22, 28, 37, 39, 56, 62,
756, 103, 112, 114, 148
and assemblages 112
and identity
in Beloved 668, 71
in Midnights Children 62
191
192
Index
Sale, Maggie 67
science 5, 267, 54, 73, 7980, 12830,
134
Scilar, Moacyr 78 passim
sedentary 23, 112
segmentarity 24, 457, 72, 112, 147
in Beloved 69
in The Circle of Reason 131, 133
in Devils Valley 89
in The Famished Road 1367
in Life of Pi 80, 82, 85
in Midnights Children 589
in Nights at the Circus 635
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 457,
525
in Sexing the Cherry 99
in What the Crow Said 121
series see also convergence; divergence;
disjunctive synthesis 2836, 72,
767, 147
in Devils Valley 89, 92
in The Famished Road 136, 140
in Life of Pi 80, 82
in Midnights Children 60
in Nights at the Circus 64
in One Hundrd Years of Solitude 446,
4850, 524
and postcolonial theory 38
proliferation or ramification
of 2931, 346, 38, 44, 49,
52, 140
in Sexing the Cherry 99
in What the Crow Said 121
Sexing the Cherry 94102, 113, 132,
142, 148
gender 948
history 946, 98, 1012, 148
political action 1012, 1324
sexuality 94, 968
time 948, 1002
transformation; flight; body;
Sexuality 94, 968, 106
signification 301, 51, 109
gap in or incomplete 1057, 122,
131
regime of signs of 48, 69, 77
signifier and signified 301
Index
and the regime of signs of
subjectification 478, 501,
55, 58
subjectivity 23, 22, 37, 91, 96
Deleuze on 47, 512, 56, 68, 74, 76,
91, 106, 112
sublime 701
supernatural 23, 5, 1015, 79, 95,
127
superior viewpoint 55, 77, 91, 93, 102
superstructure see also Marxism 11012
supplement 73, 78, 97, 102, 122, 1489
surrealism 104
Sskind, Patrick 1 passim
symbols 30, 35, 41, 51
in Beloved 68, 70
in The Circle of Reason 127, 132, 134
in The Famished Road 1378
and Jameson 113
in Life of Pi 812
in Midnights Children 59
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 526
in What the Crow Said 124
syncretism also syncretization 5, 12, 57,
108, 109
territory also territorialization; see also
deterritorialization,
reterritorialization) 27, 35, 45,
72, 73, 11214, 116, 1479
and apartheid 867
in Beloved 67, 6971
in The Circle of Reason 12734, 136
in The Famished Road 1368, 1403
in Life of Pi 80, 82
in Midnights Children 59
in Nights at the Circus 65
in One Hundred Years of Solitude 46,
489, 51, 534, 56
in What the Crow Said 121, 1246
Third World 9, 13, 63, 127, 132
in Deleuze 11416, 132
Third World literature 1045, 107, 111
tiger 15, 7884, 93, 122
Todorov, Tzvetan 1011, 15
trance see also crisis 116, 1323, 141
The Turn of the Screw 3 passim
193
194
Index
in Nights at the Circus 634
in One Hundred Years of Solitude
534
in Sexing the Cherry 958
in What the Crow Said 119, 1245
world-view also Weltanschauung 3,
1112, 1516, 334, 43, 105, 108,
1289, 137, 1467, 149
Wright, Derek 136, 138
Yorba 1368, 141
Zamora, Lois Parkinson 1415, 42
zones of indiscernibility see
indiscernibility