THE CULTURE OF JEWISH MODERNITY ‘An Introduction to Gonrt Er Political Philosophy ALAN UDOFF, BALTIMORE HEBREW UNIVERSITY —___—_ Ten Essays by Act Bars David Paterson, Oxford University LEO STRAUSS Sander Gian, Cornel Unters Amy Goth, Unversity of Washington Pal Mendes ahr Hebrew Unterty Steptane Movs, Hebrew Uniersiy ete uth an modueton by sant Fredandee Usnety of Te Avis Cilan Rose, Unversty of Susex Hilail Gildin. i1 ae onecnannpereeneno ESSE gg eto st rh AI a 8 ak pp ee Rare Ret awe wfc, ea ns Pt won hes © 1980 by The Pree Prem “ NS RST Rt an tna “acid fight and the Higeoiest (AEA rain th genie ome Ea Pe es ts a Gomera a erg ee eet yk iat Wate ped poe va mre te mo Ty eal Paty Sr the Uno Cle Frew. 1 al ity Te Usivty 8 tags A ered 7 ra ea te oe Sar iriscargeeehos Ser Grasp micerm iene eae "Progr gr Reta? The Conterary Cat sr Wesern Chon” re Sed hte ice No aay tas mee pape meets ees mao aga an tar eng pa pn cre Sac ata st vad st a Son fon gn 7 ep it permian of desu cne ” Om HO, B78 Contents Prefsce Introduction PART ONE Woacls Petia Pitosophy? (On Claicl Polcal Piles Phe Three Waves of Moser) ‘Natural Right sod the Hatori Approach An Eplogse rawr Two. Tetodono Buty of alta! Popy PART THREE ‘rogren or Resura? The Contemporary Criss in “Western Givation What i Liber! Easton? Liberal Education and Responsibility Major Works Dad by Le Sain index 8 a 2% 5 1 159 167 a 20 Su San 349 357Preface Introduction A shorter version of this book of introductory essays by Strauss was published in 1978 under the tile Pola! Philasphy: Six Boays by Leo Strows. The present edition contains four important additional essays Its title better reflects the intended design of the collection. All articles in this collection are printed in their entirety. ‘Several helpful suggestions for additions to the present collection were made by Laurence Berns and by the anony- ious referees. Gisela Berns, William Elton and Stanley (Comngold gave useful advice concerning some of the rans Tations that appear in the editorial note, ‘The assistance of alls gratefully acknowledged, ‘Another welcome feature of this edition is the index, prepared by Marilyn Flig. Foomotes preceded by an a=- terisk as well as all translations in brackets have Been ine serted by the editor. ___S—=CS~sés—Se a Lrr———_—Ce bye war praca hy tke ke Pat, Maciel Fos and Stones Some hes Enon fo es fo ns peeking nd sold sue ofthe pet pool a r—_ Ein in wae pomehng inion the fovea important ing ofan pat sak The Sloe sucht rener boos yar of tee ight tive te spin dawn on hn that te ent plea ——Crt—tr——S atte an here of human topes taco fy, Man Peon 8 Hot He hgie to pens, brings wih sone asonent, what mens onder a r————SC a ——™rtC~—r—S Car” ineproations by mas ain eae try Sine tine Sus! ayant fer the eval of pa a r—— =e a —LUrr—C————C* tytn however iperane odie pole inert Thiet yeu nena adheres of he asi ei susion in plsphy ving noel ec themesih Intduction ‘om the tabu agains believing that valuejudgments can be tau, began to exhibit an interes in normative polis pli losophy. ‘The most impresive revslt of this emancipation fs generally held to be John Rawls’ 4 Theory of Justices RanW book ein erve 35 an example ofthe ewental dif ences betwen the political philosophy Straus seeks to re vive and what has been accomplished by the analyte seo, Even those who most admire Rawls would have to admit {he following: his snot the Book one would recommend to someone who wished to gain an walerstanding ofthe taner ‘workings of politica) lifes In fatness to Ravi should Be stlded that his work is not intended fo supply suc a un derstanding. Apparent, Raw though tht it wes posible to etait the norms by whieh politi life should be gor. ‘zed in the shsence of uch an Understanding. In any Ce, the attempt to achieve 2 comprehensive understanding, of poll ing i co what Sua eae by peli Aa philosophy, while according t the rpproach represent by Rawls such an demanding canbe dspened with ‘When speaking of politial philosophy in whet follows we ville refering to politcal ploy in Svan seme of There would have been no need to revive polis! phi loopy ind nt ndrgones denne Thea demise are reflected in the power of two different snd ne compatible school of contemporaty thought. To the adher ofthese schools iis no Longer posible to accept as true {he teaching of any political phlowpher ofthe pas wiht willy distegarding something that should be obvious to very competent perion tod. According to one of these schools, the defect shared by all politcal philosophers fads Cxtrsion in he manly "cent charcer a het veork, owing to which the concasions of one pail phi leper have never agrend with the conc of athe, ‘The adherents ofthe other school, whichis ealed histori Glam, would rie a deren objection, They would 1) that 1 A Theory of sce Cambsdge, Mass Belknap Pres 6) Inroducion ix no contemporary whose sense of history is stil intact could pouty acept the claim of the great political philosophers ff the past that their teachings were permanently valid, however much he might find to admire im the authors who advanced it I- will be clear from the essays that follow that Stratis dil not think hese objections to be equal in value, even though he found it necesary to devote a grent desl of attention to each of hem. ‘The objections to political philosophy in the name of sei- cence presppore a distinction between philosophy and set tence that ova unknown before the nineteenth century. Until that ime, acura philosophy and natural science, political philosopty and political science, moral philosophy and ‘moral scence were equivalent expressions. Inthe chi part (of "What Is Political Philosophy?” and in che essay entitled “The Three Waves of Modernity,” both of which are in: luded in this collection, Strauss outlines the development ‘of modem politcal philosophy, a development which can help one understand why that distinction eame to be drawn. Strauss traces the origin of modern political philosophy «0 Machiavelli. The closing pages of his Thoughts on Machi- ell aise the question of the extent to which all modern philosophy or science found a congenial home on the new continent Machiavelli claimed to have discovered, Hobbes is deseribed as having been the fist great modern political Philosopher to cevelop a new politcsl scence containing a moral teaching which was not exposed to the objection of ignoring men as they are that Machiavelli had leveled at his predecesors, Hobbes criticism of what had been accom plished by polities! philosophers before his time reminds ‘one of the Kinds of objections one hears today. After listing various branches of human knowledge, Hobbes proceeds (© comment on their achievements 25 follows ‘Ad sly the geometicians have very admirably performed. {hee por: For bnworver asacance dauhacrue tothe ie of ‘oan, Seeder fom the observation ofthe heavens or from. the deeripion of the earth, om the notation of Une,Iron from the remotes expeciment of misgstion; nally, what sever thing they see tn wie this psc age doh ier {Goa he roe spencn of sntigly we must acknonelge to bea date which we ove meray to geomet tthe moe Dhilospher had ax happily dchged tel duty. Row fot what could have been added by harman indy tthe Srp of that happlnei which i cnsent ik hes [pile For wee sett of han ss din ston asthe nature of qiany in geometten Ege, the sien of stare nd ambition, wich susine! by the Erroneous opinions ofthe ws sy touching the nator ot Gh aed rg noid ry ft ge nd rmnkind seul enjoy suck an immoral pence, thst onl i Sere for habitation, on spoon tha de earth ould {ow ton narrow for er inky here would any be {ec"anyprecence for wart now 20 the Conary. that the sword noe the pon shoud be slowed yc ‘Silom: that the knowledge ofthe Iw of ature should foe its growth, not advancing a wit beyond io sncen stuns iat tee shou sill be sc iting wl he several tons ol popes ha: evry He aon tte dated Some and ort clevaced by others thatthe very sme san shoul weve ies embrce heerlen ad ‘stu his own son far oerwie n Hascl than he doc in others thes Tey, eto any Hy so many eee scent tn a hier he wt al woes, hath noe made any popes jn the haowledge Sethe nh seinen In another writing Hobbes decane the ned fora scence of polis that would deserve plac longde the achieve tens of Copernicus, Kepler, an Calle sind he procnin hs poialplleophy to be that very science, Benue, Hobbes thought he had spplied men with their Bat Linc understanding ofthe eis butte uma con thon ta wih Gl kaw owt vce can do remedy them, he believed his philosophy made pombe a Political ite that is ised on' knowledge of the pola! truh ands capable of beng guided by such Bnowledge. ‘The changes that Hobbes polteal philosophy were iter 2 Deco, Ep de The asain [sb Hobbes Introduction xt made o undergo ate described by Strauss, who shows how indebted the philosophers who made them—ane particu larly Locke-were ta the innovations of Hobbes, tras so reveals the extent co which these changes were based on an acceptance of Hobbes’ premises and can therelore be de- scribed asthe product of an intemal eiccism and develop- ‘ment of Hobbes’ teaching, The later versions of the new political scenes at least im their popular form, were charac- terized, no les than was Hobbes! version, by confidence in the solidity of that scence and in the beneficent social effects that woul result from its widespread diffusion. The best Jknown expression of thar confidence was the belief in Prog- ress. Strauss shows hove, atthe very moment at which mod- ‘em politieal philosophy begun to exert practical influence, ic was confronted with a criss within its own ranks. He Jabs that crisis, which he associates with Rousseau, the frst crisis of modernity. Rousseau's views too, according to Strauss, can be understood in large part as resulting from Rousetw's internal criticism of his great modern prede- ‘essors. Rousveau's criticism, however, tends as much to the “destriction ofthe principles of his predecesors a it does to the further development of those principles, Rousseau there- fore opens a new epoch in moder political philosophy, an ‘epoch whose most easily recognizable feature is the replace ‘ment of nature by history as the key to understanding man, For & while it was believed that such a replacement was compatible with a knowledge of human affairs that is ex pable of supplying men with rational guidance. Nieusche tacked the beliet in this compatibility and argued that the insight into the historicity of man necessitated the abandon: rent of the traditional belief in reason. With Nietache be- ‘gan what Strams calls the second and presentday arisis of rmadlerity, While the critiams of Rousseau and Niewsche ‘did not nulity the influence of early modern political phic lovophy, they did much to undermine confidence in its prin- ciples and tenet. After reading Straust account of modern political philosophy, one is led to wonder whether the s@-si Inuoducton quence of transformations he desis snot, at es, un Aastandable, or whether the “gata ies” of mot fm poll plone does nou given the exsene a tmoden pilsphy eet more ceo the hema apt than would the absence ofthat diversity. Straus ceetiny rakes ditcat to alop the super vew that the be Wiking variety of mode polial philosophies repre: ‘euss0 many alternatives rm which one might be emfeed 1S chose if one were noc deterred rom dong o by a asin which thir diversity reson stout any en madern philatoptiy or lence was orginal apie by the hope of achieving indspuble tuscan fn i tranches, nctaing polities pitrply. ang the nine teenth century. abt eontemporeneoaly with what Stews Sia theft ss of meric isnton cae te be Arayn Berveen the branches of modern philosophy that bad in vay lle hat promise and thee that had ot “Te seco pars of modern phienophy en nat ral sence, phses in parcolat—came to be known 3 “eine wl te aro pars cet be kn “pilosopy." Thre for whom the developmen of modern piel philosophy demonstrated te tale to tall fs triginal promise began to sek fs falilinet in an under Standing of human sis hat would be patos” the ne seme ofthe tem, adc, it as hoped ce of the endlew controversies which phish telaed to be Some eee pase ole Th nthe ‘ther hand, for whom the development of moder pot pliloopty had culminated not tf selederacton but In the aicovery of new denon of rey the “histor ‘aT dimension, sldanaly sought t undersea "oence™ fim thei of tht cone. “The efforts to found s new slece of polis ate con Sinuing today, Thee efforts te datingihed frm tote of Hobe in tac the new sclencef meant to bes branch of 2 Le Sram atra Right aud tary (Chicag: Un of Ching Pra 1859) pp 71, Inroducion it science rather than a branch of pilotphy, Since the exist Inguetene: hough no fat of ce ow, supe no clear fuelns oe the proper sty of econ, revolulos, Et was and oui poli ase, the projected new ‘dence of polities must be preted hy tellotions regarding the nar of science, ‘The purpoe of such reli Is 0 letcrmine why the natal wienos have Beem sccosfl 50 that one cn proceed to ahve comparable succes ee. Stee, Unfortunatly, these reflections have the dares of lop wather sn of lence, The atempt to aceve Eh undertonding of pole whichis independeat of ph Iowophy thus proses to be tll dependent on pilosophy 0 2 gee which fa tom epi (ne well etre whch common fo mt all men-ayatemps to mae te dy af ols scene Fiennes and a Fe lof that Sisincion to probit pole ener om der mak- Sng vt genes on seking to validate them. although politcal scenes resale to sy the who make vale Fadgmens and the caves that prompt them t0 60 0. At Sine tncion etwas an a 5 pounded sit wee sn obvious uth which even the most Ripert amiarisy with scence shold enable one to selec Neither the dado in gueston nor the aguments Intended enhance is plausibility appened sound 10 Bros Kid not seem obvious to hin that i was impor. sible to once, on the tai of objective evidence, that Someone wes a coward or 4 fol Nor we persuaded by the eomtenton that men could be compel © agree aboot fhe whereas values wee alway cngoveria Te seewed Nm dat there were cave in which agreement regarding the fac tht someone was a “cheapskate” of 4 "ourpas”—pr- Smbly valu udgente—cold e aleve wit relative ce On the oer hand, apecent about the ens ofthe French Revoltion-prevrably fact—scemel nowhere in Sight Despite his bee thatthe fatale dstneion was Uhtcabier Sau sted he aguments advanced on is0 Inraducton Dehilf with grea patience and care, and he made the effort to meet each one of them, ‘The essay in this collection en titled “An Epilogue” as well ay Part I of “What is Political Philosophy?” will introduce che reader 10 this portion of Straus’ work, Scauss did not bate hie arguments against the faccvalue distinction on the claim that he had solved the ride of knowledge. He did, however, evticize the theories of knowledge advanced in support of that distinction, low. ver difficult it may be to give an adequate accotme of how “values” come to be known, or, for that matter, of hove facts ‘come to be known, or of the obstacle that sande in the way of effecting a separation between facts and values, that such an obstacle exists can be experienced without diffcuty. One heed only make the atiempt xo combine the “values” of ‘Trovsky with Hiver's factual beliefs garding human ale fairs or the “values” of Hitler with TTrossky’s factual belief regarding human aflars, something that i should be pos: sible to do ifthe fact-valve distinction were sound. ‘The contemporary attempt to make the study of politic into a moder science is largely inspired by a positivist or neopositvist repudiation of traditional philosophy in gem ‘eral and of waditional potitieal philosophy in particular. At the same time, that attempt is dependent upon reflections regarding the nature of modern science, According to Straus, if those reflections were carried far enough the rerule ‘would be the replacement of a poscivist understanding of science by a historcist understanding of science. On one occasion Strauss used Emest Nagel's The Structure of Sci encet co illustrate what he meant by aiming that if posi. tivism understood itself, it would necesarily transform into historicism. Nagel opens his work by disewtsing the relation of science to common sense. Without denying the gennine- ness of the knowledge of the world that can be acquired by 4A cone ented "Natal Right” gen atthe Unive of i cage ln tue Astunn Que, 168 The Swear of Selene (New York: Hao, Brace and Wold, san, Intaduction 20 common sense, Nagel exsily shows how superior the scien- knowlege of say, heal and disease isto the common. sense knowledge of health and disease and, more generally, hhow superior scientific Knowledge i to. common sense Knowledge. The conclusion of Nogel’s discussion is that modern science is clearly the best way to achieve knowledge that is superior to common sense krowledge® Later in the same work, Nagel pauses to consider certain dificulies con- nected with the principle of causality. He dlismises the view that this principle is "a priori and necessary,” and for various reasons he rejects the contention thatthe principle fof causality can be understood as an empirical generaliza- tion, According to bim, the principle of exusaliyy is a “maim for inquiry” oF a “methodological rule" of, most interestingly of all, “the expression of resolution.”® The purpose of this maxim or rule is co formulate one of the {goal pureed by theoretical science in modern times.” This maxim is of no small importance for modern science accord. ing to Nagel. Modern science as we know it stands or falls hay its acceptance.t Yer one cannot be required co aocepe it either on groumcls of its evident necessity or on factual grounds, The question therefore auises whether according to [Nagel modern science rests on an arbitrary foundation, Tt is to Nagelscreit that he does not refuse to diseus this issue, even though his discussion of iti rather brief ‘ue if te principe fo cau] & a male, tea rule una may be lowed of ignored at wil? Tit merely an abi lary mater what general goals are pursued by theoreti Xa Sat po pra. SRE Scr fp see EE Ste a Soe 11, Nap rere, p36". ie wo dent No i ws Spin dt hl ees tne te SrGS preted oy te pone fe uno ion ang ‘Richy nme mm onching mp ern am what tore Secasi Inteducon science in its development? Ie i undoubtedly only 3 con {ingene historia! fact that the enterprise row as cence ors aim a achieving the type of explanations preabed by the principle: for ie Logically postble that in dein effort x mastering their eneronments men might have alsied at Somieing quite dferene Accordingly. the goats en adopt Inthe pustie of knowledge are login arbitrary “The fact thae Nagel ialicizes “logically” in eis passage may lead one to wonder whether according to him the principle of causality posses some powers of persuasion based neither on logicnor on fact Does he hold, for example, that ‘one is somehow compel to accept this principle by law ‘of human nacure> Apparently not, since Nagel describes the acceptance of the principle of causality us “undoubtedly only 2 contingent historical fact.” He further suggests that what is true ofthe goal enunciated by that principe i te ofall the goals by whose pursuit modern science is defined, ‘The view of modern science that emerges from Nagel discussion of the principle of causality contradits the view he expressed earlier when he spoke of the relation between science and common sense. Eatier, modern science seemed to be the rational way to vse above common sense in the pursuit of knowledge. Now it appears to be only one of 4 umber of ways of pursuing knowledge and to be no more defensible rationally chan any of the other ways, We may be told that the earlier discussion was only introductory in character and that it must be understood in the light of [Nagel’s later remarks, Hf this step it taken, chen the last bat- ‘er to a histovieist understanding of sienceis removed. “The hisovicie will have no dificlty in accepting Nagel’ view regarding the nevident character of the principle by which science as we Know it stands or falls He will abo welcome the view that sis principle isthe expresion of a resolution and that its acceptance is due not to insight but toa decision, That decision, he will point out, would not 12 Nagel, Sucre, p. 8 Introduction it have been the epochsmaking or “historic” decision that ¢ proved to be if had not been made by several generations ‘of great minds in succession. The great men who made that decision believed themselves to be astenting to an evidently recesary truth and, in that belie, they often were willing to make that decision at great personal risk to themselves. [Nevertheless in retrospect their belief can be seen to have been delusion, The power exerted by that delusion over generations of great minds is one example of what the his: toricist means when he speaks of the dependence of thought fn history or ine. In making these observations, the histor sti not recommending the abandonment of the sclentine pursuit of knowledge. He would be the firs co alfiem ‘moder selonce is part of the historical destiny of modern rman, He would only contend that a proper appreciation of the arbitrary decisions that lie at the foundation of modern science should dispel the temptation ¢o regard all human thought that does not form part of modem science as some- hhow inferior in cognldve rank to scientific ought. In par ticular, the historicist would regard the understanding of the historicity of movdern science a6 more Fondamental in ch acter than any result of scientific inquiry. He would forther Claim that what is tue of science as a “historic event equally true ofthe grea religious, political, and philosophic events of the past. All were based on unevident assumptions that belonged to a definite historical situation, even though the great men responsible for chese events believed diem: selves to be giving their fre asient to something that ¢ran- scenaed history. Certain expetienets of modern Western man seem to Tend plausibility tothe historicist contention, Among these is the perceived loss im the compelling power of the beliefs ia Rea- fon, ia Nature, and in the revealed word of God by whieh previour generations had taken their bearings when they made history. The experience of this las, combined with the alleged insight imo the arbitary character of those beliefs, lend support to the view chat those beliefs wereseit reduction themselves the work of history, History, by depriving mod cin Western man of the beliefs by which the great thoughts and actions of the past were sheltered and inspired—per. ‘haps thereby endangering the powibilty of great thoughts and actions in the future—has for the fast time laid bare the true matrix of those belief actions, and thoughts fe has laid bute the historicity of man, In the esay of this collection entitled “Natural Right and the Historia] Approach Strauss discuss the various stages through which historicism passed before assuming it con temporary form. His analysis brings out the distrust of philosophical reason that characterized hstoricism from the Start as well as the steps through which tha distrust umned {nto theoretical denial ofthe very possibility of insights that ste universally valid and hence not histovically relative Strauss proceeds to point out the seltcontradictory character ‘of this posision: In the very act of proclaiming that no hit ‘man thought can be universally valid because all human thought is historically relative, historic advances 2 desis regarding all human thought for which thesis it elas uni versal validity. 1¢ would be a serious misunderstanding of Strauss to think tha, according to him, this objection slices to dispose of historicism. On the contrary, Strauss proceeds to shove how the attempt to meet thi objection gave rie (0 the most thoughtful and posterful version of historiciem, version which be labels radical historiism. In speaking of oricism, the thinker whom Strauss hse ' Martin Heidegger. The radical historicist faces ion Straus raises by ascribing his insight into the historicity of human existence to the unique and wnprece- ‘dented historical situation of modern man, He claims that the manner in which his insight i achieved confirms the ‘content of that insight. This elaim is accompanied by an analysis that is meant to lay bare the ullimate aswumptions which formerly guided and were thought co justify philowo- phy asthe attempt to achieve comprehensive knowledge of the eternal order. This analysis attempts to show that those | | | Introduction ie assumptions are by no mens vmate i character, that thoy ave derived rom a deeper roo to which eater thought had no aces, that ther wld erie and severely nite, and that they lack the power to july fhilsphy in he adional seme ofthe term. & Fund fbenal prt f ti ly s wholly new acount of tman exten That new acount i el oe superior to Al previous accounts precielybeenne I soot bad the questionable seampiont whi all previous phos hese leg to have taken or granted ‘Stas wites to encourage ht renders to None face the hale of history te lay mow pw trfl both piltephy ply ano pol psx Sh parca, For hin this exo facing the callenge of Fede. Sau rela Som peaking of Heidegger In bay hat soul lend oa weeng aia fA the tame time, Stns leaves his reader ino doubt con: tersing his rejection, for what he ls cobeoced are sod festons, of Hetegge's views, Heidegger, who surpasses In apecaitve fnteligence shi contemporain andi the ame time Intell he counterpart of what Hider we potent meme to go sway hot yet odden by yon, or rather to think is way tn which pilowphers tiny ate have nove though Defoe. Cain tat no ne as querioned the premises of plop a adcaly ts Heidegger" "The thinker of his ova generation 10 hom Strics was clover than to any others despite thelr {irene Jacob Rl, sti th Hetiegger Kl tho was well yeied in mathematics and the ata ces at dhe te, found thit Ari, as elucidated by Hsdeggr io Hetegge’ sept td overeame the pil {ophial adion, wat sounder and made more sense than Tesoro sews Kc sed by thio other Sti casa phosophy and materi, swell 8 Of tie relation to modern pilouphy, moder natural 13, Leo ras, “An Unspaten P Joke's The Clog 0. amaryl pst bib1 Inrodution Re rap facunieeeea taaeeria macrioeee eye ce eee ees eden nese tesa oa es eee ees or manors a eee eee Saat epee ns ee eae Sie ee es Saat eee earaceries eee eee Biase cen enoa ea ere ee ee ee oe ee ease ont ier ae ee ie pose eo ee eee Se ee Se ear a oe a ara Scasnenas nee an eer sco Name ee ae nua ap eerie erro ee ee ae ve tp nae mong se a ie cee Stn ae 21886 18.286 "rs woes bec ranted fe nea byes iy Ee sicily eee cde ital sme fp lt nh in, ie Incrnducton 8 fee hitnself from the responsibilty For answering it by de- story of to any other power diferent from "ie Strauss is by no means suggesting that all Distoriciss are fascins. There have been Marxisss who be- ‘came supporters of Stalin not because they were attracted to him but because they regarded his victory over is rivals for the leadership of the communist movement as the ¥er~ dict of History. There are American and British conserva- tives and liberals who support the American or the British Constitution on historieist grounds. Even Burke, whom Strauss admired greatly asa statesman, and whose defense fof practical wisdom against the “speculast” approach to polities he considered an enduring contribution to politcal Philosophy, is criticized by Strauss for the concluding para raph of Thoughs on French Affairs. There Burke can at least be understood to be saying that his refutation of the speculatist” political docernairism which animated the French Revolution could be rendered invalid by the triumph of that Revolution. "Burke comes close to sug- gesting that (0 oppose [what he himself regards 2s] a thor ‘oughly evil eurrene in huiman afar is perverse i that cur~ rent i saffciently powerful; he is oblivious ofthe nobility fof last-ditch resistance... Its only short step from this thought of Burke to the supersession ofthe distinction be- ‘ween good and bad by the distinction between the pro- sgresive and the retrogtade, oF between what is and what Js not in harmony with the historical process.” To Burke's credit, he did not take this step, according (0 Suauss “To return to Heidegger, Strauss declares that the Nax tional Socialist episodes in his career cannot and should rot be ignored. Moreover, he asserts that “one is bound to ‘misunderstand Heidegger's thought radically if one does ‘not sce thei intimate connection with the core of his phil- ‘sophie thought.” However, this s not the end of the mat- 18, See belo 16, Suan Nie ight nd oy pp 817-818,sit Inraduton ter, Strauss goes on to add that “nevertheless” these epi- sodes “afford 100 small a basis for the proper Understanding of his thought."® Serauss believed that there simply was a good deal one could ill learn from Heidegger in spite of his grave errors, ‘To give only one example, Strauss admired the interpretation of the thought of Kant found in Heidegger's Die Frage nach dem Ding. ‘Strauss’ comments on Heidegger's relation to Huscer shed additional light on Strause understanding of Heideg- ser. According to Strauss, "Husserl.. had realized more profoundly than anybody else that the scientific under standing of che world, far from being the perfection of our ‘natural understanding, is derivative from the latter in such 42 way a5 to make us oblivious of the very foundations of the scientific understanding: all philosophie understanding. ‘must start from our common understanding of the world, from our understanding of the world as sensibly perceived prior to all theoriring. Heidegger went much farther than Hiusserl in the same direction..." Elsewhere, Strauss ‘explains what he means by going much further: “what is primary isnot the object of sense-perception but the things ‘we handle and with which we are concerned, pragma.” ‘What is primary is che pre-sientific world of human con cern. Interestingly, the transition from Weberian socal sc- tence to Socratic politial philosophy is described by Strauss Jn almost the same terms" The allimportantdiference is thar Heidegger's prescientfe world of human concern is lundersiood in the light of the experience of History, whereas the prestclentife world of Socratic political philoe- phy is understood as the work of nature and law. For “ac- ‘cording to Socrates the things which are “frst in them= selves’ are somehow “fst for us; the things which are "Best 2, Leo Sina, Sis x Plo Plil Phos (hig Ui. cfg aia 38. ee 22 Kicnand Som, “A Ching Acme. 2S Scum Natal Rg ond oy pT AS, 1-125, Introduction it in themeclves' are io 8 manner, but necessarily, revealed in men’s opinions.”™ In Socratic political philosophy, man’s patural understanding of the world is somehow natural in the literal sense, and makes possible an ascent to the pur- suit of comprehensive and universally valid understanding, ‘which Huseerh regarded as the true goal of philosophy. Strauss and Klein afirm that Heidegger surpasses all his ‘contemporaries in speculative intelligence. But they do not ‘think that he surpasses Socrates, Plato or Aristotle in spec: ‘lative intelligence, or that his new accoune of human ex- |stence rival that of those classical thinkers. Tn conclasion, something should be said about how Strauss understood the practical implications for political lie today of his attempt to reuurn to classical political phi locophy. Although the following passage has been quoted ‘more than once by other writers, i would seem that ‘enough attention has still not been paid to it by some crit. ies of Strauss: We ot eombly xpec at» s wdetdig ‘Ms pot philophy lappy us wih ecps or {Slay ue, Forth reve sce of modern pia phi ta Brought Ito bing ind of sce? holy un own tothe ca Lind of soit to whi he clase richie a0 auted aad iborted by the cass are Pot Taedsteyapptiaste. Only we ag today can poly Find soln tothe problems of today. Bet adequate iuercoding ofthe pring cabot by the ses {muy be te tetapensblesatng pont or a deste aa us tobe achieved by sof presenta Scie In pee 1 dhmncter a fo thew appt, to be achieved By vol these pics oo ta While he defended the validity ofthe classical solution for the kind of society for which it was elaborated, he thought that “liberal or constitutional democracy comes closer to 24, Le Stra, The iy and Mon (Chicago: Rand MeNaly& Com 1884), p18. PSE Sram, The Cian he Map Usto iraducton ‘what the classics demanded that any alternative that is via- ble in our age." He was less sincere anally of constitu tional democracy than Winston Churchill and Alexis de Tocqueville, even though, like them, he was not a doc naire democrat. Nor did he think, any more than they di, ‘that modern constitutional democracy was somehow a dis ‘guise aristocracy, He was immune tothe appeal of grandi- ‘ose and extravagant promises to create a higher and better humanity, however conceived, and fully awake to the evls of tyranny. He therefore saw through communism and fas- ism without difficulty. He thought that there was a human nature and that it could not be changed but his wnder- standing of it and of the standards implied in i was loftier and more comprehensive than that of Hobbes and did not fomit the things with which Hobbes dealt. The reader is referred to the essays in this collection entitled “What Is Liberal Education?" and "Liberal Education and Responsi- bility" for more light on how Strauss understands the grav- ‘eat problems of the present 25 Leo Ser, What dtl Py nd tr Sain Glens, cee 1D ps Part Oneiors Note Thi tea seve version of dhe Judah L. Magee Exceed te Hen Ct. esa Becamber 1954 and Jonaary 1055, ane mui "8 in Whe fe Pita! Ponty eden’ The Free Pre). When the coy mis repaid ithe eather cdaion of hs vane (His ‘hse Paten Patopin Si Fay by Low Sra [lodiaoap ober te). the fl pata wap he Iteeee othe puter and ih he peettion af x Sra. The porguph is ere reso It isa great honor, and at the same time « challenge to accept # task of particular difficulty, ro be asked to speak bout political philosophy in Jerusalem. In this city, and in this land, the theme of political philosophy—"the city of | righteousness, the faithful city"—has been taken more se- ‘ously than anywhere else on earth. Nowhere ese has the longing for justice and the just city Ailled the purest hearts and the loftiest souls with such zeal as on this sired sol. T ‘know al to well that Tam utterly unable to convey to you ‘what in the best possible case, ip the case of any man, ‘would be no more than a faint reproduction or @ weak imi tation of our prophets vison, I shall even be compelled to lead you into-a region where the dimmest recollection of that vision is on the point of vanishing altogether —where the Kingdom of God is dersively called an imagined prin- ipalityto say here nothing of the region which was never illumined by i, But while being compelled, or com- pelling myself, to wander far away from our sacred heri- tage, or to be silent about it, I shall not for a moment for- get hat Jerusalem stands for What Is Political Philosophy? 1. The Problem of Political Philosophy “The meaning of political philosophy and its meaningful caracer is a5 evident today 2s i always has been since the time when poliial philosophy came ro light in Athens All political action aims at either preservation or change. ‘When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worte; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about fomething better. All politic action is then guided by some thought of better and worse. Bur thought of beter ‘or worse implies thought ofthe good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of ‘pinion: it no longer quostioned but, on reflection, it owes to be questionable. The very face that we can ques- ‘on it dizeetsus towards such a thought of the good as rno longer questionable—towards a ghought which is no longer opinion buc knowledge. All political action has then in tela directedness towards knowledge of the good: of| the good life, ar of the good society. For the good society isthe complete political good If this drectedness becomes explicit, if men make it their explicit goal to acquire knowledge of the good life and of the good society, political philosophy emerges. By calling 34 Polat Phitophy this pursue political philosophy, we imply that ft forms a part ofa lager whole: of philosophy: or that political phi: losophy isa branch of philosophy. In the expresion “po litical philosophy,” “philosophy” indicates the manner of tueaument: a treatment which both goes to the soots and is ‘comprehensive: “political” indicates both the subject mat- ter and the function: politics philosophy deals with polit: cal matters in a manner chat $s meant to be selevant for political life: therefore its subject must be identical with the {goal the ultimate goal of politial action. The theme of politcal philosophy is mankind's great objectives, freedom and government or empire—objectives which are capable of lifing all men beyond their poor selves. Political philoso- py it that branch of philosophy which is closest co potiieal ie, t0 nonphilosophie life, to human life. Only in his Politics docs Aristotle make use of oaths—the almost in ‘vitable accompaniment of passionate speech. Since politcal philosophy i « branch of philosophy, even the most provisional explanation of what political Philosophy is cannot dispense with an explanation, however provisional, of what philosophy is. Philosophy, as quest for ‘wisdom, is quest for universal knowledge, for knowledge of the whole. The quest would not be necessary if such know! ‘edge were immediately available. The absence of knowl ledge of the whole doer not mean, however, that men do not have thought: about the whole: philosophy is neces sarily preceded by opinions about the whole. Its, therefore, the attempt to replace opinions abont the whole by knowl fee of the whole. Instead of "the whole,” the philesophers sso say "all things": the whole is not a pure ether or an. lunrelicved darkness in which one cannot distinguish one part from the other, or in which one cannot discern any. thing. Quest for knowledge of “all things” means quest for knowledge of God, the world, and man—or rather quest for knowledge of the natures of all things: the navures in the totality are “the whole.” Whet fe Plat Philosphy? 5 Philosophy is essentially not posession of the truth, but {quest forthe truth. The distinctive trait ofthe philosopher is that “he knows that he Knows nothing.” and that his insight into our ignorance concerning the most important things indices im to strive with all his power for know: ‘edge. He would cease to be a philosopher by evading the ‘quenions concerning these chings ar by disregarding them boeause they cannot be answered. Lt may be that as regards the possible answers to these questions, the pros and cons will always be in a mare oF less even balance, and there- fore that philosophy will never go beyond the stage of dis- casion of disputation and will never reach the sage of decision. This would not make philosophy futile. For the clear grasp of @ fundamental question requires understand ing of the nature of the subject matter with which the {question is concerned. Genuine knowledge of a fondamen- fal question, thorough understanding of it, is beter than blindness to it, or indifference to it, be that indilference or blindness accompanied by knowledge of the answers to fa vast number of peripheral or ephemeral questions ar not. Minireum quod potest Raber: de cognitione rerum alts simarum, desiderabilu ext quam certisime cognitio quae hhabetur de minimis rebus.* (Thomas Aquinas, Summa ‘Theologica, 1, qu. 13.) ‘Of philosophy thus understood, politcal philosophy is a branch, Political philosophy will chen be the attempt to replace opinion about the mature of political things by knowledge ofthe nature of political things. Political things are by thelr nature subject to approval and disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. It sof thei essence not to be neutral But to raise a claim to men's obedience, allegiance, decision, or judgment. One dacs not understand them as what they ate, a6 politieal things, if one does not “The leg nowledge one ci have of te Right things more sizable chan the mo evan Eowedge oe ha he lame tag”6 Polcal Pieephy take seriously heir explicit or implicit claim to be judged in terms of goodness or badnes, of justice or injustice, Le, ‘fone does not measure them by some standard of goodness or justice. To judge soundly one must know the «ue standards If political philosophy wishes to do justice tite subject matter, ic must strive for genuine knowledge of these standards. Politeal philosophy is the ateempt truly to know both the nature of politial dhings and the right ot the good, political order. Political philosophy ought to be distinguished from po. cal hought in general. In our times, they are frequently femtfied. People have gone so far in debasing the name of Philosophy as to speak of the philosophies of vulgar im- postons. By political dhoughe we understand the reflection ‘on, or the exposition of, political ideas; and by a political ‘tea we may understand any politically significant “phan: tas, notion, species, or whatever it # about which the ‘mind can be employed in thinking” concerning the political fundamental. Hence, all political philosophy is politica, thougtnt bu not al political thought is politcal philosophy. Political thought is, a sueh, indiferent to the distinction hheeween opinion and knowledge; but politcal philosophy is the coniciow, coherent, and relentless effort to replace opinions about the political fundamentals by knowledge regarding them. Poliial thought may not be more, and may not even intend to be more, than the expounding oF the defense of a firmly held conviction or of an invigorat- {ng myth: but ie i esental to politcal philosopty to be set in motion, and be kept in motion, by the disquieting swarenese of the fondamental difference between convie- tion, or belief, and knowledge. A political thinker who is rot 2 philosopher is primarly interested in, or attached to, a specific order oF policy: the political philosopher is primarily intersted in, or attached to, the truth. Poitcal thought which isnot political philosophy finds its adequate expression in laws and codes, in poets and stores, in wacts What fe Pla Pheri? 7 and public speeches inter alia the proper form of present ing political philosophy isthe treatise. Political thought is avold asthe human race the frst man who uttered a word like “father” or an expresion like “thou shalt not..." was the fist politica thinker; But political philosophy appeared ata knowable time in the recorded past Ly politcal theory, people frequently understand today ‘comprehensive relleeions on the polities) situation which lead up to the sggestion ofa broad poliey, Such reflections appeal in the last resort to principles accepted by public ‘opinion or a considerable part of it; Le, they dogmatically sume principles which can well be questioned. Works of political sheory in this sense would be Pinske's Autoeman- pation and Heras Judenstaat. Pinsker's Autoemancipa tion carzes as its motto the words: "If 1 am not for myself, ‘who will be for me? And if not now, when?” It omits the words: "And if Tam only for myself, what am 1?" Pinsker’s silent rejection of the thought expresied in the omitted ‘words ie crucial premise of the argument developed in his taact. Pinsker doct not justify this rejection, For a justi tation, one would have to turn to the Srd and 16th chap. ters of Spinoza’ Tractatus theologicepaliticus, to a work of 1 politcal philosopher. ‘We are compelled to distingwish political philosophy from poitial theology. By poitial theology we understand political teachings which are based on divine revelation. Po- Lica philotophy i limited to what is accessible to the tne assisted human Mind, Ae regerds socal philosophy, it has the same subject matter a poticical philosophy, buc it re. gad it from a diferent point of view. Political philosophy Fests on the premise that the political asociation—one’s ‘nunery of one's nation—is the most comprehensive or the ‘most authoritative association, whereas social philosophy conceives of the politcal association as a part of a larger whole which it designates by the term ““ociery.” Finally, we must discuss the relation of political philoso-8 Palco Phils phy to politcal sconce. "Political science” is an ambiguous fermi designates sich investigations of political dags as are guided by the model of natal science, and i designates the work which is being done by the members of political science deparuments. As regards the former, or what we may call "scientific" political scence, it conceives of isl? as the sway towards genuine knowledge of political chings. Just as genuine knowledge of natural things beyan when people turned from sterile and vain speculation to empirical and ‘experimental study, the genvine knowledge of political ‘things will begin when political philosophy will have give way completely to the scientific study of politics. Just as natural science stands on ite own fet, and at most supplies ‘unintentionally materials for the speculations of matural Philosophers, politcal seience stands on its own feet, and at ‘most supplies unintentionally materials forthe speculations of political philosophers. Considering the contrast berween the sligity of the ene pursuit and the pitiful pretentious nes chatacteristie of the other, itis however more reason able to dismiss the vague and inane speculations of political philosophy altogether than to go on paying lip service to a ‘wholly discredited and decrepit uatition, ‘The sciences, both natural and political, are frankly nonphitosop ‘They need philosophy ofa kind: methodology or logic. Bi these philosophic disciplines ave obviously nothing in ‘common with political philosophy. "Scientific" political si fence i in fact incompatible with political philosophy. “The useful work done by the mien called political scien tins i independent of any aspiration towards “scientific” politica science. Tt consists of careful and judicious collec- tions and analyses of politically relevant data. To under stand the meaning of this work, we remind ourselves of ‘our provisional definition of political philosophy. Political philosophy is the attempt to understand the nature of po Titcal things. Before one ean even think of attempting (0 understand the mature of political things, one must know politcal things: one must. postess politial knowledge. At What I Police! Phlsphy? 9 Teast every sane adult possesses political knowledge to some ‘degree. Everyone knows something of taxes, police, lav, jails, war, peace, armistice. Everyone knows that the aim of war is victory, that war demand the supreme socifce and ‘many other deprivations, that bravery deserves praise and cowardice deserves blame. Everyone knows that buying a shire, as distinguished from casting a vote, is not in itself 4 political action. The man in the steet is supposed to posses less political knowledge than the men who make it their business to supply him with information and guid: ance regarding political things. He certainly possesses less poliscal Knowledge than very intelligent men of long and varied politeal experience. At the top ofthe ladder we find the great stiteman who posesier political knowledge, po- Titea! understanding, politieal wisdom, political skill in the highest degree: politcal science (politike episteme) in the original meaning f the term. Al political knowledge is surrounded by politcal opin- fon and interspersed with it By political opinion we under. stand here opinion as distinguished from knowledge of political things: errors, esses, beliefs, prejudices forecasts, And so on. Iti ofthe essence of politcal life o be guided by a mixture of politcal knowledge and political opi Hence, all political life is accompanied by more or lest coherent and more or less strenuous efforts 0 replace po: titiea! opinion by polideal knowledge. Even governments ‘which lay claim to more than human knowledge are known coemploy spies. ‘The character of polities! knowledge and of the demands smade on it has been profoundly affeced by a fairly recent change in the character of society. In former epochs, intel- ligent men could acquire the politcal knowledge, the po- Titcal understanding they needed, by listening to wise old ‘men or, which is the same thing, by reading good historians, as well as by looking around and by devoting themselves to publie affais. These ways of acquiting political know! felge ate no longer sifcient because ve live in “dynamic10. Paltet Phoophy moss Societies", in societies which are characterized by toh immense complexity and rapid change, Political knowledge is move difieul to come by and it becomes ob solete more rapidly than in former times. Under these con ditions ie becomes necessary that a number of men should devote themselves entirely to dhe ask of collecting and digesting knowledge of politcal things. It is this aciviey whieh today is frequently called political science. Tt does fot emerge if i has not heen realized among other things that even such political matters as have no Dearing on the situation of the day deserve to be studied, and that their study tase be cavied on with the greatest possible care: & specific cate which is designed to counteract the specific fallacies to which our judgiment on politieal things is ex posed. Furthermore, the men we speak of invest much in giving poliicat knowledge the form of teachings which can be transmitted in classrooms. Moreover, while even the ‘most unscrupulous politician must constantly ery to replace in his own mind politcal opinion by political knowledge fn order to be aecesful, the scholarly student of political things vill go beyond this by uring to state the results of his investigations in public without any concealment and without any partsamhip: he will act the part of the en: lightened and patiotc citizen who has no axe of his own to grind. Or, dilferently exprested, the scholarly quest for political knowledge is exentially animated by a mora im pe, the love of truth, But however one may conceive of the diference between the scholarly and the nonscholarly ‘quest for politcal knowledge, and however important these differences may be, the schotatly and the nonscholarly quest, for political knowledge are identical in the decisive respect their center of reference isthe given political situation, and ‘even in most eases the given politial situation In the in- dlividal’s own country. It is fue that a botanist in Israel pays special attention to the flora of Israel, whereas the botanist in Canada pays special attention 10 the fora of Wha fs Palitiat Philp? 11 Canada, Bu this diference, which is not more than che futcame of a convenient and even indispensable division ‘of labor, has an entitely diffrent character than the only Apparently similar diference between the preoccupation of the Israeli political scientist and the Canadian political scientist. It is only when the Here and Now cess to be the center of reference that a philosophic or scenic ap- proach to polities ean emerge ‘AIL knoivedge of politcal things implies assumptions concerning the nature of politial things; ie. asumptions tuhich concern not merely the given polities) situation, but political lite or human life 7 such. One cannot know any. thing abou a war going on ata given time withont having ‘some notion, however dim and hay, of war as such ancl is place within human life as sich. One cannot see a police fan as a policeman without having made an assumption about law and governinent 28 such. ‘The assumptions con: feening the nature of political things, which are implied in all knowledge of politcal things, have the character of opinions, It is only when these assimprions are made the theme of critical and coherent analysis that a philosophic or sientife approach to politics emerges. ‘The cognitive status of political knowlege is not cilfer cent from that of the knowledge possessed by the shepherd, the Insband, the general, oF the cook. Yer the pursits of these sper of man do not give rise to 2 pastoral, marital, military, or cilinary philosophy because heir timate foals ate slficiently clear and unsmbigvous. The ulimate pelitica goal, on the other han, urgently calls for coherent reflection. The goal of the gencral is vitory, whereas the goal of the statesman is the common good. What victory Icans is not exentally controversial, but che meaning of| the common good i esentally controversial. The ambigt- ity of the political goal is due to its comprehensive char. acter. Thos the temptation arses to deny, oF to evade, the ‘comprehensive character of politics and to treat politics ss12. Poll Philly fone compartment among min. But this temptation must De resisted if i i necessary to face our situation as human beings, ie, the whole stvation Political philosophy as we have tried to circamscribe it thas been cultivated since its beginnings almost without any Interruption until a relatively shore time ago. Today, politi cal philosophy is in a state of decay and perhaps of ptte faction, if It has not vanished altogether. Not only is there ‘complete disagreement regarding its subject mater, its methods, and its function: its very pasiiliey in any form has beoome questionable. ‘The only point regarding vthich academic teachers of political scence still agree concerns the usefulness of studying the history of polities! philoso phy. As regards the philosophers, i is suftcient to contast the work of the four greatest philosophers of the lst forty years—Dergson, Whitehead, Husterl, and Heidegget—with the work of Hermann Cohen in order to see how rapidly and thoroughly political philosophy has become disered ited. We may describe the present situation a follows Originally political philosophy was identical with political science, and it was the alLembracing stady of human affair. ‘Today, we find i cut into pieces which behave a8 i€ they were parts of a worm. In the Bist place, one has applied the distinction between philosophy and science 10 the study fof human affair, and accordingly one maker a distinction Derween a nonphilosophie political sefence and 4 nonscien- tific political philosophy, a distinction which under present conditions takes avay all dignity, all honesty from political philosophy. Furthermore, lage segments of what formerly belonged to political phitosophy or political selence have ‘become emancipated under the names of economics, soci ‘ology, and social psychology. The pitiable rump for which Ihonest socal scientists donot care is left at prey to phi- Tovophers of history and to people who amuse themselves more than others with profesions of faith. We hardly ‘exaggerate when we say that today political philosophy dock not exist any more, except as matter for burial, ie, for What Plt Phitaphy? 13 Jstorcal esearch, oF else as a theme of weak and uncon: vincing protestations. TE we inquire into the renions for this great change, we receive these answer political philosophy is unscentif, of ies unbistorical, or itis both, Science and History, those too great powers of the modern world, have finally sue ceeded in destroying the very possibility of political phi Josophy. ‘The rejection of politcal philosophy as wnacentise 9 characteristic of preventday positivism. Positivism is no longer what i desired to be when Auguste Comte origi- nated ite sill agrees with Comte by maineaining that rmodlern science is the highest form of knowledge, precisely because ic sims no longer, a8 theology and metaphysics did, at absolute knowledge of the Why, buc only at relative knowledge of the How. But after having been modified by utilitarianism, evolutionism and neo-Kantianism, it has abandoned completely Corate’s hope that 2 social science ‘modeled on modem natural science would be able to over- come the intellectual anarchy of modern society. In about ee ees rm reached its final form by realizing or decrecing Gr there iva fundamental diference between facts and values, and that only factual judgmencs are within the fompecence of science: scientific social science is incompe tent to pronounce value judgments, and must avoid value judgments altogether. As for the ‘meaning of the term “value” in statements of this kind, we can hardly say more than that “values” mean both things preferred and pring ples of preference, ‘A discustion of the tenets of socal science positivism is today indispensable for explaining the meaning of politcal Philosophy. We reconsider expecially the practical conse- ‘quences of this positivism. Postivistic social science is "valuesree” or “ethically neutral’: it is neutral in he ‘conflict between good end evil, however good and esil may be understood. This means that the ground which is com-4 Pala Phitsaphy mon fo all sca scents the ground on which they carry tn their imvexigations and discussions, can only be reached through & proces of emancipation Irom moral judgments, or of abucacting from mora judgment: moval obtsenest fe the necesry condition for scenic analysis. For tothe fxtent to which we are not yet completely insensitive to Inoral distinctions, we are fored to mate value judgments “The habit of loking at sola or human phenomena with- cov making value judgments bas & coroding infuence on tay preferences, The more serious we ae a soca scents, the tore completly we develop within ourselves a sate fof indference to any goal or of aimlesnes and drting, State which may be called niilim. “The socal scents hot iansime to preferences; his activity is constant fight guna the preferences he has as a human being and Giizen and which threaten to overcome his sienlic de tachnweat, He derives the power to counteract these danger- ‘ous influences by his dedication to one and only one value “to truth. But according to his principles, th is not a Value which ii necestary to choase: one anay reject i 38 ‘well a choose it.The scientist as sclentis: must indeed have ‘chosen it, But neither sclentiss nor science are simply nee ‘essary, Socal science cannot pronounce on the question of ‘Whether social science itself is good. Te is then compelled to teach that society cam with equal right and with equal reason favor social science as well as suppress it as dstorb- ing, subversive, corrosive, nihilistic, But strangely enough ‘ve find socal scientists very anxious to “sell” socal scence, ite, to prove chat socal science is necessary. They will argue 1 follows, Regardiess of what our prefezences or ends may be, we with to achieve our ends; to achieve our ends, we must know which meant are conducive to our ends; but adequate knowledge of the means conducive to any social tends is the sole function of social scence and only of sociat science; hence socal science is necessary for any society or any social movement; social science is then simply neces sary; itis a value from every point of view. But onoe we SS Whet Ls Polizal Prilsophyt 15 front this we are seriously tempted to wonder if there are hot 2 few other things which mast be values from every point of view or for every thinking hurman being. To avoid this inconvenience the social scientist will scorn all con- riderations of public relations or of private advancement, fnd take refuge in the virtous contention that he does hot know, but merely believes that quest for eth is good: ‘other men may believe with equal night that quest for muth ie bad. But what does he mean by this contention? Fither hhe makes a distinction between noble and ignoble objec. tives or he refuses to make such a distinction. If he makes ‘distinction between noble and ignoble objectives, he will, say there 8 4 variety of noble objectives or of ideals, and that there it no ideal which i compacible with all other ideale: if one choose truth a one’s ideal, one necessarily rejects other ideals; this being the case, there cannot be a necesity, sn evident necessity for noble men to choose truth {in preference to other ideas. But as long as the social scx fenuist speaks of ideals, and thus makes a distinction bevween, noble and not noble objectives, or between idealist integ- rity and petty egoism, he makes a value judgment which according to his fundamental contention is, as such, no Tonger necesary. He most then say that it is a5 Tegitimate to make the pursuit of safety, income, deference one’s sole sim in life af itis to make the quest for truth one's chiet fim, He thus lays himself open to the suspicion that his Activity at a socal scientist serves no other purpose than to Increate his safety, his income, and his prestige, or that his competence asa social scientists a skill which he i prepared to sell to the highest bidder, Hones, citizens will begin to ‘wonder whether such man can be trusted, or whether he can be loyal, expecially since he must maintain that it is ‘a8 defensible to choose loyalty as one's value a itis to reject i In-a word, he will get entangled in the predicament ‘which leeds to the downfall of Thasymachus and his tam: ing by Socrates in the frst book of Plato's Republic “Te goes without saying that while our social scientist may16 Pall Philosphy ae wh Sie int Ce fein oo ne sty do et an a ry 3 ny sat re He oma Se RS = hehe owe Sse ti ers ea ci a ye se ced Bon Se ete Sy Sin sneer gcen re et ee i a Se lane wis tem ty eee ina el pas i A oe Se a i ne et ce agen oy cen cr 2 ee Ser ee yak eh oat els ae tiga os wren Me oa ie a te ice ho Se Whet tr Poel Philephy? 17 thing relevant shout the sociology of veligion. Generally speaking i i impossible to understand thought or action Ur work without evaluating it, IF we are unable co evaluate nlequately, as we very frequently are, we have moe yet succteded in understanding’ adequately. The value judg: ‘mons which ate forbidden to enter through the front door ‘of poitieal science sociology, or economies enter these dite Ciptines through the back door: they come fram that annex ‘of prevent day socal science which is called psychopathology. Social scientists see themselves compelled to speak of un balanced, nentotic, maladjusted people. Buc these value judgments are distinguished from those used by dhe great Iistorians, aot hy eater clarity or certainty, but merely by their poverty: a lick operator is as well adjusted as—he may be better adjusted than—a good man or a good cti- ten. Finally, we must not overlook the invisible value judg ments which are concealed from undiscerning eyes but nevertheless most powerfully present in allegedly purely de- seriptive concepts, For example, when socal scentists dis- tinguish Between democratic and authoritarian habits oF types of human beings, what they call “authoritarian” is in ll-caves known 10 me a caricature of everything of which ‘hey, as good democrats of 2 certain kind, disapprove. Or ‘when they speak of three principles of legitimac}—rational, traditional, andl charismatie—their very expression “routini. sation of charisma” betrays a Protestant or liberal prefer- feuce wich no conservative Jew and no Catholic Would accept: in the light of the notion of "voutinization of cha- rinma,” the genesis of the Halakah ont of biblical prophesy fon the one hand, and the genesis of,the Catholie Church ‘out of the New Testament teaching, necesarily appear as ‘ewes of “routinization of charisma.” If che objection should bbe made that value judgments are indeed inevitable in social science but have a merely conditional character, would reply as follows: Are the conditions ia question not necesarily fulfilled when we are interested in social phe- hhomena? Must the social scientist not necesily make the18. Policl Phieophy assumption that a healthy social life inthis word is good, Je imedine necsatly makes the asurption that [Shut ana a heainy long ie are ood? And ao are not Str Bue on condos, of assumpsion, su however do nor become questionable a Ing at we Ue eta qu fac (eg tae there are “fact” hat rent have cause? Fhe impontitey ofa “valuetre” poe scence am be howtos sigply a follow. Pol scence presop Pos 2 Unction between political things and things Phd are not pollcal; i presupposes therefore some 3 se ie tne quesion “what & pola?” Ia order 10 be uty sentne,poical since would have (0 ras 1 {Gueaion and co answer it expicdy and adequately, But i Finponble to define the poled, te, hat which = Thectin a relevant way to tne polit, the “county” othe ate withoue answering the question of what costes “Hie Kind of mociry. Now, a soces cannot be defined with SGhtsefrenc wo ie purpose. The mow wellkown attempt to dene "he natek without regard tis purpose 4 teal led to'a defaition which wat devive {rom “the ‘Soden type of ate and whi soll applicable only % {hue per ewes an attempt to dene the modern sate ‘Bthout having fee defined the sate But by defining the TMnte or rather cil society, with reference 1 i purpose, Sn a tana nce ht of whch oe ms ial actions an intone the ps ml 0. Fan ey mein a wandad fo judging of i "The tejection of value judgments i base on the a sumption that the conflicts between diferent vals of Tanmayuems are essentially insoluble for human reson. Spurs sumption, while generally taken wo be sufiently iaished, hat never been proven. 2 proof would reqs Serenone ot the magnitude ofthat which went ito the Gncption and elboraion of te Critique of Pure Reson; erat requiem comprehensive critique of evaluating What I Pleat Phosphy? 12 reason, What we find in fact are sketchy observations which pretend to prove that this or that speeiic value confit is insoluble, It ix prudent eo grant chat there are value con- fits which cannot in fact be settled by human reason. But it'we cannot decide which of two mountains whose peaks are hidden by clouds is higher than the other, eannot we decide that a mountain is higher than a molehii? If we ‘anuat decide, regarding a war becween two neighboring rations which have been fighting each other for centuries, ‘which nation’s eause {s more just, cannot we decide that Jeaebels action against Naboth was inexcusable? The great- ‘ext representative of social science positivism, Max Weber, ‘has porlated the insolublity ofall value confit, because ‘his sou] craved a universe in which failure, that bastard of forceful sinning accompanied by all more foresful faith, instead of felicity and serenity, was 0 be the mark of hue man nobility. The belie that value judgments are not subject, in the last analysis, 0 rational control encourages the inclination to make irresponsible assertions regarding right and verong oF good and bad. One evades serious dis- ‘cussion of serious issues by the simple device of passing them of at value problems. One even creates the impres: sion that all important human conflicts are value conflicts, wheress, co say the last, many of these conflicts arise out of| men’s very agreement regarding values. '. The elit that scientifc knowledge, ie, the kind of knowledge posesed or aspired to by modern seience, i the highest form of Bumen knowledge, implies a depreciation of prescientific knowledge. If one takes into consideration the contrast between scientific knowledge of the world and prescientfc knowledge of the world, one realizes that posi: tivism preserves in a scarcely disguised manner Descartes’ tuniversal doubt of prescientifc knowledge and his radical Deak with it Je certainly distrsts prescientific Knowledge, which ie likes 40 compare to folklore. This superstition Tsers all sorts of sterile investigations or complicated idio- cies. Things which every ten-earold child of normal in-20 Pala Philp telligence knows ate regarded as being in need of scientific proal in order to become acceptable as facts. And this sc Chie proof. which is not only not necessary, fs not even Dpomible. To illustrate this by che simplest example: ll {tiles in socal science presuppose that its devotees can tell fhuman beings from other beings: this miost fundamental nowledge was not acquired By them in clasrooms; and this knowledge is not transformed by social science into fcientife knowledge, but retains i initial statos without ny modification throuighost, If ehis prescientifc knowledge ie not knowledge, all scientibestodies, which stand or fall ‘with i, lack the character of knowledge. The preoccupation With stientife proof of things which everyone knows well tough, and better, without scientific proof, leads to the neglect of that thinking, or that reflection, which must peccede all scientific studies if these studies are wo be rele Vane ‘The scentie study of polities i often presented as Incending from the ascertainment of political “fact,” ica of ‘what has happened hitherto in politic, to the formulation Of "laws" whese knowledge would permit the prediction of fauure politcal events. This goal is taken as a matcer of course without 4 previous investigation as to whether the Subject matter with which politealsclence deals admits of Edequate understanding in terns of “laws” or whether the Toniversels through oshich political things can be understood ts what they are must not be conceived of in entirely dif event terms. Sientfi concern with politcal facts, relations fof political facts, recurrent relations of political facts, oF Taw of political behavior, requires isolation of the phe nomena which itis studying. But if this iolation i n0t 10 ead to irrelevant or misleading results, one must see the phenomena in question within the whole to which they ‘must clarify that whole, Le, the whole jeasocial order, One cannot arrive, eg. at J kind of knowledge of “group polis” which deserves to be called sclentife if one docs not reflect on what genus of eal orders is presupposed if there is to be "group poli- Sa, What te Politeal Phlaphy? 24 sic at al, and what kindof pola order i presupposed ty the specie “group pol which one ls wong. Bat oe cannot cll the charac os pectic democracy tv of democracy in general, without having a lent Under- Sanding ofthe atemative to demxracy. Scentife polite Gal scents are inclined co Tese ie a the dninction Between democracy and authorriniom, 2, they abl the the given pial onder by reusing within hezon whieh dened. by the given poliieal order and it pp. The acleniie approch tends to fad to. the neglect ofthe primary or findamental question and there with to thoughilew scrprance of received opinion. Av te {ands tha fndanenal quenions our finds of siete cate ae srangely wnecxcng. To eer again to te fot simple and at the same time decive example, po- Tea! scence neqives elacation of what angie piled things tom ting which are ot pla i r= Sue that the question be red and anvered "What Is Polldca” This quo ano be deat with scentBeally Et only teal. And dialectal tentment nee iy begins from preentiic knowlege and takes He mow ‘iol Presi knewlee, or “cmon eae” knom- tiger ought toe dred by Copernis and the tutceing natal scence: But the fact that what we may Gal tleoplomicrncopic inowledge ie very fri sersin areas doct not ede one to deny that thee ate things wih can only e seen ah wha they ae if they aze teen with the arene eer or, more precy, they a teen inthe penpociveof the cise, a iting from the perpecve of the alenteobaerer. If oe dees is, fone wl epeat the experience of Gulliver wid the muse in Brolngnag and become entangled nthe tind of t- starch projects by which he ws amazed in Laputa 4 Resin necenarly araforms ful nto istorii. By tuo enon by he modelo lene toc slenee fin danger of mistaking peste of sy, sven consi United Stes OF more geneaiy of22 Pala Philsphy modern Western society, for the essential character of hu {nan society, To avoid this danger, its compelled to engage in "cross-cultural research,” in the study of other cultares, both present and past. But in making this effort, i€ mises the meaning of those other cultures, because if interprets them though a conceptual scheme which originates in fodern Western society, which rellects that partcalar so ‘Gety, and which fis at best only that particular society. To Svold this danger, social scence must attempt to under Stand those cultures a6 they understand or wnderstood them. elves: the understanding primarily required of the social cienist ip historical understanding, Historical understand- ng becomes the basis ofa truly empirical acience of scicty. Hue if one considers the infinity of the task of historical understanding, one begins to wonder whether bistorical tundestanding does not take the place of the scientific study (of society. Furthermore, social science is said to be a body tue propasitions about socal phenomena. The propo. ions are answers to questions. What valid answers, ob- jectively void answers, ae, may be deveroined by the rules be principies of logic. Shut the questions depend on one's Sizection of interes, and hence on one's values, ie om fubjecive principles. Now ic is the direction of interests, and not Logie, which supplies the fundamental concepts Tt ff therefore not posible to divorce from eich other the subjective and objective elements of social scence: the ob jective answers receive thelr meaning from the subjective if one does mot telapée into the decayed Pla fbnisn which is underlying the notion of timeles values, ‘one mut conceive ofthe values embodied in a given social Scenee as dependent on the society to which the socal sci tence in question Belong, i, on history. Not only is soci SGence superseded by historical studies; social science ivlf torical.” Reflection on social science 35 & forical phenomenon leads to the reltivization of social science and ultimately of modern science generally. AS a consequence, modern science comes to be viewed as one What tr Plea Phowphy? 23 Iistorically relative way of understanding things which is ‘not in principle superior to alternative ways of under- standing. ‘eis only at thie point that we come face to face with the serious antagonist of political philosophy: historiciam. After having reached its full growth, historia is distinguished from positivism by the following characteristics: (2) Tt abandons the distinetion beewoen facts and values, because very understanding, Rowever theoretical, implies specific fevaluscions, (2) It denice the authoritative character of moder science, which appears at only one form among, many of man’s thinking orientation in the work. (8) Tere. Iises to regard the historical process at fundamentally pro- tgesive, of, more generally stated, 26 reasonable. (4) Te denis the relevance of the evolutionist chesis by contending that the evolution of man out of nonman eannot make {intelligible man's humanity. Hisoriism rejects the ques. tion of the good society, that i to say, of the good society, because of the essenGally historical character of society and fof human thought: there is no esental necesity for raising the question of the good society; this question is not in pYinciple coeval with man; it very possibility is the out- fome of 2 mysterious dispensation of fae, The crucial issue foncerns the status of thore permanent charactorstics of humanity, such as the distinction berween the noble and the bate, which are admitted by the thoughtful histories: can these permanencies be used a criteria for distinguishing, Detoreen good and bad dispensations of fate? The histovcist, anwvers this question in the negative. He looks down on. the permanencies in question because of their objective, ‘common, superficial, and rudimentary character: to become relevant, they would have to be completed, and heir com- pletion is no longer common but historical. Tt was the Contempt for these permanencies which permitted the most radical historicit im 1988 to submit to, or vather to wele ‘come, a8 a dispensition of fate, the verdict of dhe least wise and lestt moderate part of his nation while it was in Ic24, Paieal Philosphy least wise and feast moderate mood, and at the same cme foupask of wisdom and moderation. The biggest event of Tag would rather yeem to have proved, if such proof was ecesary, thae man cannot abandon the question of the food society, and that he cannot free himself from the re Sronsbiy or amsering it by defersing to History or t@ hy other power diferent from bis own reason, 2. The Classical Solution When we describe the poll philosophy of Pato and af tol uta! pital plesophy, we Spl tht Ane Ge fore of pola philewphy TRE dane 1 aS Gatto be braced by noble snpliciy end cae eur This suggestion guides usin ae right se san attempt to arelate what was fomeriy ti Mpa” character of dasa! thooght sec heze understood In contaditision to what RARE bnan alto human. oman beng i id 0 BME Tit ne fs glded by nator rather than By conve eae inherited opinion, or by wadicon, co sy noe se ec tnime, lai plea pilopky 1 non in a, bac ie belongs Yo the fre moment when esis wadons were shaken, and there Was not Tet Be rere aon of polit pilsopy. In all ter sae itpoper? ey of plc hing was me Feet oy a adion of pola philosophy which aed Te hem between the philosopher end pot hing, de se ot eber the indliduapilowper cherished eS hat raion, From this it follows that the oa empha ae te pital things wih fesh- clase Plrcerne which ave never been equaled. They Fe TT Sa ings in eke pempective ofthe enfghened meee etresnans They see things cles which the eo (ie 2 Sve or sven do wot we clay, oF do Mebane Bos this ha no other reason But the fat Te he tok foriher afeld In the same dretion a the | | ee ates eros te hap sh oe mc al Sane tg pan pay Eman ete imines east there tribe ite segmbteseam cs hs my sa eo oa es ee eee ee erento ee rete eo a et a eee ec Cats mer ec a ccnees areas wea etl a ery oe ee eae ee ees a peepee ve aa vgn ann oe te, os Florine iets pico peena pn en eae ee eee Fete eeeraars er ey empl acre ei sn ao lp bt a eer eas pen preerer o sb sen i ec a err26. Pla Philp isc tha he base ask of plies o soca sence 0 See a he mene corte human relation, amd that ede alld the eThov-We reladon. It obvious tat ee Sad te We ae supplements to Dewar Po: te Merion is wheter the fundamental inate) of Beste Phe tan be peed ot by amy suppemens and Per eis nr nee tower fo are fundamental Teng oto the nveral beginning. ‘The phenowenn Saw cated tne McThonsWe relation wat known (0 Teg Aa bythe mame of endsip. When opeating 02 eet ace him ante second penn. But pilowptic rae feng smu epeshing oie 0 eedeeRscre and nom bt speaking o aye enced ar eet papa Sach ana cannot be meant (0 De a cae ee ftteng tometer seni can at bet en ora ing together ov arouse dese for When Pa abot ageone with whom T have clove eafon PERE tens donot cal im my Tho, Adequate sing Sot im aabycal or objective speck mst be PEASE a continue the manner of speaking about” ee leon human il By speaking of "be Thoo ce ate rend" Tam ying to preserve in objective fe Shar eannot be preseal in objective speech Ta ee re spjetly someting tht {8 incapable of eing SRyeEiea tam yin to preserve in "speaking abo apres, ual ony nape to” ene 1d ia JRRLGTS he phenomena am untrue othe phenomenss se te eet Wile aemping tay 3 foundation arene human commision, 1 preese 28 #8 (era Tor genuine human communication Seer of canal poll puloophy pps wan ie gene chit fat Plo’ Laws, ich 8 it ak par exelenge, ‘The Laws i a convertion eee idan plating in general between a old ‘Rehan seangeran old Cretan, and an ol Spartan. The ane ks place on the snd of Cre, At the be cae tzev the ipresion that the Adienian bas What Plc Philsphy? 27 ome to Crete in onder to study dhere the best laws. For if ies trve that the good is identical with the ancestral, the best las for a Greek arom be the oldest Greek laws, and hese ate the Cretan laws But the equation of the good with the ancestral is not tenable if the fist ancestors were rot gods, or sone of gods, or pupils of gods. Hence, the Gretans believed that theit laws were originated by Zeus, who instcted his son Minos, the Cretan legislator. The Laws opens with an expression of this belil. Te appears Jmmeditelyalterwards that this belief has no other ground, fo etter gronnd, than a saying of Homer—and the poets ate of quetionable veracty—as well as what dhe Cretans Say-and the Cretans were famous for their lack of veracity, However this may be, very shortly after its beginning, the conversation shifts fom the question of the origins of che Cretan laws and the Spartan Inws to the question of their inteinse warth: a cade given by & god, by a being of super- thurman excellence, mst be ungualiiedlly good, Very slowly, very eiruimapecy does the Athenian approach this grave ‘question, To begin with he limits his eritiism of the prin e underlying the Cretan and the Spartan codes by ct ‘daing not these codes, Buta poet, 2 man without authority ‘nd, in addition, an expatriate, who bad praised the same principle. In the sequel, the philosopher atacks not yet the Gretan and the Spartan codes, but the interpretation of these codes which had been set forth by his ewo interlocu- tors. He doce not begin «0 criticize these venerable codes explicitly wntil he hat appealed to a presomed Cretan and Spartan law which permits suck erties under certain conditions under conditions which, are fulfilled, to some fextent, in the present conversation. According to that In, all must sty with one voice and with one mouth that all, the laws of Crete, or of Sparta, afe good because they are fgoiigiven, and no one is sulle to say something different; Dbut an old citizen may utter a criticism of an allegedly divine law before a magistrate of his own age if no young, ten ate present. By this time It has become clear 10 the28 Pala! Pritsphy reader that the Athenian his not come to Crete in order qe study there the best laws, but rather in order to intro: duce into Grete new laws and intittions, rly good laws eat institutions. ‘These laws and institutions will prove £0 er to-a considerable extent, of Athenian origin. 1 seems that the Athenian, being the son of a highly civilized so tdety, has embarked on the venture of civilizing a rather incited society, Therefore he fas to apprehend that is iggetions will be odious, not only as innovations, but fbove all a foreign, as Athenian: deep-seated, old animosi- ties and suspicions wil be aroused by his recomroendations. fritcism with a remark about the fpobable connection between certain Cretan and Spartan Risdtations and the practice of homosexuality in these ties ‘The Spartan, rising in defense of his fatherland, doce tot, indeed, defend homosexuality, but, turning «0 the Dilensve, rebukes the Athenians for their excessive dine ng, The Athenian is ehos given a perfec excuse for recom, mending the introduction of the Athenian incicution of Damquets: he is compelled to defend chat institution: by (defending it he acts the part, not of a cvilzing philosopher ‘eho, being a philosopher, s 2 philanchropist, but of the Dtriot He act ina way which i perfectly understandable Pains intelocutors and perfecly respectable in thelr opite jon, He attempts 10 show that winedrinking, and even: Gnunkenness, iit iv practiced in well presided banquets, is Conducive to education in troperance or moderation. This Speesh about wine forms the bulk of the frst two books of the Lous, Only alter the speech about wine has been trought to ite conclusion does the Athenian torn to the iquesdon tf the beginning of polka fife, to quertion Ghch fs the true beginning of is political theme. The Tpecrh about wine appeas to be the introduction to politi ‘il philosophy. ‘Why does the Platonic dialogue about politics and laws ‘egin with such an extensive conversation about wine? What is the artistic or logographic necessity demanding this? What fe Plitcal Phibmphy? 29 ee ee See rare eee eee oe eee trey een aes ie a eee ae ars isc gm Se ee este iS tn i a et eee narra rE eres ee ee oe Snic avsh ati iets wit eee ea ee saeed eee Seee 30 Palital Philosphy 2 nm ng tet Sine tel a sec Sar linge se edi et a sem ah a Mo Ft Pe ea my Soars oe a aos See Perrot thatthe Athenian suanger had gone "after he A es a oS nemecu sete ick fps 1 rae meet on Tete gn a tt aa el a ee eat corn phen Fe eae Tae Ee wi ee ta Tg ose ol it i me ne te Freese ty ee ls sng ea et ee ‘sth emt et Tb ec et Seri Bs gree the el Sg A cr ce meri To A tea en on ed ri What te Political Philosphy? 31 erative demanding passive obedience, without iS and boat's, His refusal sas based on a deliberation, on a pre: dential consideration of what was the right thing to do in the circumstances. One of the circumstances was Socrates’ ‘old age: we are forced to wonder how Socrates would have decided if he hac been 80 or 40 years old instead of 70. Another circumstance was the unavailability of a proper place of exile: where should he flee? He seems 10 have 2 choice between laveabiding cities nearby, where dis Tite ‘would be unbeatable since he would be known asa fugitive from justice, and 2 lawless country far away, where the pre- valling lack of order would make his lle miserable. ‘The Aisjunction is obviously incomplete: chere were law-abiding ites far away, for instance on Crete, which is mentioned 484 lawabiding place in the very deliberation in question. ‘We are entitled to infer that if Socrates had fled, he would have gone to Grete. The Leus tells us what he would have done in Crete alter his arrival: he would have brought the blessings of Athens, Athenian laws, Athenian institutions, banquets, and philosophy 10 Crete. (When Aristotle speaks about Plato's Laws, he takes ic for granted that the chiet character of the Laws is Socrates) Escaping to Crete, living fn Grete, was the alternative to dying in Athens. But Soc- rates cise to die in Athens. Socrates prefered to scrifice hig ife in order to preserve philosophy in Athens rather than to preserve his fife in order to introduce philosophy into Crete. If the danger to the future of philosophy in [Athens had been less great, he might have chosen to flee 10 Crete, His choice was a political choice of the highest order. 1 did not consist in the simple subsumption of his case lander a simple, universal, and unalterable rule, Tue let us return after this long story to the beginning ‘of Plato's Laws. If the originator of che Cretan laws, or any ‘other laws, is not a god, the cause of the Laws anust be human beings, the human legislator. There is a variety of types of human legislators: the legislator hat diferent characer in a democracy, in an oligarchy, in a monarchy.32 Poll Pilaaphy “The legislator isthe governing body, and the character of the governing body depends on the whole social and po- fiscal order, the polite, the regime. ‘The eause of the 130s js the regime, Therefore the guiding theme of political phi- Tosophy i the regime rather than the laws, Regime becomes the guiding theme of political thought when the derivative ‘or questionable character of laws has been realized, There fre a number of biblical terms which cin be properly tramated by “law”; there is no biblical equivalent to “segime’ TRegime is the order, the form, which gives society its haracer, Regime is therefore a specific manner of life. Re. fime is the form of life as living together, the manner of Fiving of society and in society, since this manner depends ddecvely on the predominance of human beings of «cera type. on the manifest domination of society by human be ngs of a certain «ype. Regime means that whole, which we today ate in the habit of viewing primarily ina fragment: {eed form: rege means simultancously the form of life of a vocety, it syle of life, its moral taste, Form of society, four of sate, form of government, sprit of laws. We may toy to articnlae the simple and unitary thought that ex: prenes itself in the term politela as follows life is activ ‘Whieh is dinected towards some goal; social life is an active Ify which is directed towards suc a goal a can be pursued ‘only by society, but in order to pursue a specifi goal, a Slo comprehensive goal society must be organized, ordered, Constructed, constituted in a manner which isin accordance svidh that goal, this, Bowever, means that the euthoritaive Jmuman beings must be akin to that geal “There i a variety of rogimes, Each regime raises claim, explicitly oF implicily, which extends beyond the bound ties of any given society, These claims confit, therefore, ‘eith each other. Thete i a vatiery of conflicting regimes, "Tins the regimes themselves, and not any preoccupation of snere bystanders, force us to wonder which of the given ‘conflicting regimes is etter, and ultimately, which regime IPO UCIT NTI UNI UUIUDE CEES E ECE EESTI CEEES EEE SEEE CEI SE COTEEEECEEECEEECEEE COTE ETE EEEEEEEEEETEETESETEEOEEEEEEE Whet Ie Pbzal Philsopy? 39 i he best regime, Cspot philosophy gue ty We quotin of the bat gine. the herstnion of ae bw regime depends om the coming together, on the ctnidence cs thing which hate 4 tatu deny fo ove vay tom ch oe (2 O the cainence of pinphy and pia pone; sat. Maton depends thereon on cance Homan ater Crave so many sae tht it amon a mtae i fndtal achieves the highest ha can ome expect of sky! Th pig manne of eng ofthe Bot rege tame) iu king aetaity wile Being supesion tall Sa repeats imate eso he dl ate Sf man, inte fac that mn te been Belg fn Remorse and ode “Te praca meaning ofthe notion of the ek regime appa most demiy when one coir he ambigy of {he erm spot einen” Avs sugges wo emily i teen dittoos ofthe good ion hn ore pope enim of te get eo le than ws ches hie comty well withoucany regard £0 the aiference of regincr—vho eres bt eo) Wel in Fandamenat inifeence vo the change of region The ‘en, ina word, ie pattern, the man Thos let belongs and a ois fateland. In i Potts, sale rye tht tee nO the hon gonietion, For sha mean 0 Be Ipod etre depends ently onthe vgine, A good te teh in Hitlers Germany woud be abd hen chewhere Tt wheen goo nen relate fo the eine, good man ches not have toch a teutvy, The eming of goed tman iavaye and srerywhere th me. Te good 7 Hanal withthe goed shen ony in one een te ce ofthe be regime: For only i the bt reine te good Of ine agi the god ofthe goo an em that el ing vite“ mount saying that nis Poe Ey Annie queone the propoion that pasion i novgh. Hr the pont of ew ofthe prt the fatherSe 44 Poll Pilsply land is mote important than any difference of regimes. From the point of view of the patriot, he who prefers any regime 10 the fatherland is a partisun, if not a raitor ‘Resttle raj in elec atthe parcsan sees deeper than the patriot but that only one kind of partisan i superior to the atsiot: this is the parsisan of virtue. One can exprest tistoui’s thought as follows: patriotism is not enough for the seme reason hat the most doting mother & happier if hher child i good than if be is bad. A mother Toves her child ecae he is er oven; she loves what is her own. But she ho foves the qood. AH human Tove is subject to the Taw that it be both love of one’s own and Tove of the good, and there is necessatly 4 tension beeween one’s own and the {good, 2 tension which may well lead to a break, be it only the brecking of 2 heart. The relation between one's own. find the good finds its politcal expression in the relation ‘between the fatherland and the regime. In the Janguage of lassie metaphysics, the fatherland. or the nation is the aver whetens the regione f dhe form, ‘The clasies held he ‘ew that the form is higher in dignivy than the matter, ‘One may call this view “idealism.” The practical meaning (Of this idealism is that the good is of higher digniey than ‘one’s on, ot thatthe Best regime is a higher consideration than the fatherland. ‘The Jewish equivalent ofthis relation might be said co be the Telation beeen the Torah and rel ‘Clasical politieal philosophy 0 very common objections, the raising of which requires neh ther originality nor intelligence, nor even erudition, The ‘Objections are these: (I) elasical political philosophy ftidemotratic and hence bad: @) classical political philoso, phy Is based on clasical natural philowphy or on classical Pocmatogy, and this basis has been proven to be unerue by the succes of modern natural science. “To speak fist ofthe classic’ attitude towards democracy, the premises: "the clases are good,” and “democracy is good do not validate the conclusion “hence the classics is today exposed to ‘wo What Is Political Philphy? 95 were good democrats.” It would be silly 1o deny thae the asics rejected democracy a8 an inferior kind of regime. “They were not blind to i advantages. The severest indict iment of democracy that ever wae written occurs in the tjghth book of Plato's Republic. But even there, and pre: tively there, Plato makes it clear—by coondinating his ar Fangement of regimes with Hesiod's arrangement of the ‘ges of the world —thac democracy is in very important respect, equal to the best regime, which corresponds to Hesiod’s golden age: since the principle of democracy is freedom, ail human types can develop fveely in a democ- cy, and hence in particular the best Muman type. Te is ue {hat Socrates was Killed by a democracy; but he was killed when he was 70; he was permitted to live for 70 Tong years. Yer Plato did not regard this consideration 2s decisive, For he was concerned not only with the possibility of philoso- phy, Bat likevrze with a sable political order that would be ‘congenial to moderate political courses; and such an order, he thought, depends on the predominance of old families, “Mote generally, che classics rejected democracy because they thought that the alim of human life, and hence of social life, is not freedom but virtue. Freedom as a goal is am: biguous, because itis trecom for evil as well as for good. Virtue emerges normally only through education, that is t0 say, through the formation of character, through habia tion, and this requires leisure on the part of both parents and childien, But leisure in its tun requires some degree ‘of wealth-—more specfeally a kind of wealth whose acquit le with leisure. Now, 48 regards wealth, it so happens, a6 there is always a minority of well