Tandated by André Orianne THE THEORY OF INTUITION IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY Emmaunel Levinas Northwestern University Press Evanston, llinoisSten Sn OE ‘ale in rnc ede thee Tn dition do plnomdnige de ‘aon 1968 Lae Phimepbigac} Vs Eagan eunaeson opr ‘artemis epg toend eee "Sy Rarener Univeniy Pee AR ghee PENS “brary of Congren Casogag in Pacton Date Mian oer tapenade ace ‘ramet André Ocanne ae, / mal 2 &&— (Neeser Unive inphenomenlogy “ede top tocar ea reerence ad inde Saweato1r9 (pat pansy [sien 2 Pheer ame nd, BarData io Rissaao seats ed i pablton mech inion eremencthe ‘Amery Nucl Sanrio formation Sees ee for rine Libra Mea ANST nc 6 Pes Contents Foxe othe Second Eton Tanditors Fore blogaphal tok “he Nasi Theory of feng an te Metod of Plough 3 The Pherarerloncl Thea of Beng, The Absc xiterce ot The Perarenalogcl They of Seng Toe tenors of Intaton 65 The msc of Encer 97 Fhicsephial mon 121Foreword to the Second Edition Richard A. Cohen Hosea’ rmionesoracr the mother of went eth century continental ought A phibsophers phosope his scents are our teachers. Levinas cae Im ota ey ho studies under Hoss im Preburg during the 1908-29 cool Year tro yar tere author the peso! pizvining yhume The Theory of lttion a Hssers Phonology (99, on Hstrts Ideas Pertaining to 0 Pure Phono and 0 0 Flroneolgl Psp, ve 1 (15, a eer be (Ortanlitor an expanded version ofthe tues ase ge Fats in February 100) enled Cartesian Medan (1908 ina French eon had fr more impact than Huser's Geran cg wich was ely puted phe 18 Lv ‘uthored narrates on phenomenology from the lite 1908 tothe eal 1960 ineuding thee collected in Dacoering Eee tech Hue ond Hg ec “Lovina san hte and freigous company. Theres Martin Heidegger, Husets hand sen cer a Freburg, hose ‘monumental Bong end Tne (107 fist appeared 3 veume of users Yorbok for Phenomenology ond Research, lis "doda ecto Edmund Huser i endhip od dmiration” and expresses {Battudeto Hume! foreely turning over his unpublished ner ‘ijpion" In 10o8 Hetdagger would compl and Fublih Hsserts _Bundheakng 105 letres on conscosnes sd tine, The Phe omenlogy of femal Tine-Conslonest. ‘Aer ending Levinas The Theory of Inution i 198, Jan- Paul Satie Pare for Brin st the gag Rapnond Aro ho tad already opin sung phenonesoy Bore Set ompile np hey si 16-7, vo Shap oer teenie om sk See dagen, ion of teeny Ban ln eae cee ee ony mw eget ie fu sr Saft ceanhu tt oe esp mec coor Pal Nereis and prolific philosophers orp one apa ep Se me tite eee Pes ence arm cee ae i rs BS Pm ect ers dept in Te mg iam any aes ne Bila fr er ag ert pea (kane pens ede 7 eer ISIE Reeetareg ie ot Bee ‘were collected in 1967 into one volume in ‘English translation, net inet mle ings Soe Ce See cee deo ake igen cen sf Ong ec ta ceo a eel Sree oi ee sire nace el cae oe inn Say hae ss ape ple ad ete of Huser and of Levinas. ee st esas Gaetan, hk spelen nth Posy ore Hine in ut dc ih begins with Huser the penetul bomen: ae Sore pepe gn phenor jeal move ‘ment be initiated alongside the ‘great triumvirates of | is ‘most prodigious and creative epochs. ancient Groese e Fe Ke sie ec ee Gre, Sar ‘Bodom emplicism, Locke Berkley Hume, ‘Gece sen Kant Hegel Schelling Contemporary phenmarie, cals Seber Levin, Satz: Merent ony, Deke Coe Co iy et te Foravord othe Second Baton I xt led sch gino pl nd eevee Wy, wth ‘any one to Ce ve gn ses etn reece cameo Hees ire fig Ele ae Eras ecg eas ta 1. ScueNce, rae West, MODERNITY, AND TwTUrTtON ‘us snomous sce of penomeny shu de th at ha Ha tsb a i impor ndrd se an lg te ca union moder fey a mera ac ‘Pong "ystntcnty Wit dows weal lao ee a otilnce ta pe stnghvcngnety cree ad St ort dpe gunn ng dg Spat noe ol crt fit es SeXpeiteny hewn grey et sole mr es fe SoReal opt oe flop Sas sgh asd Slog och mosey he mot TSoiolpaot tie th tenn of ter Teer toa an inquests tr be Sey te ea a philosophers before him: an unfinching inquiry conceming the lin Cotten understate cronies mi and ts Tse hot em poets th ee, sepia dey fie No ayaa Ii ees not ny changed the wold et Eee, the ltd Inge nelshing ne wo one Seow swale wr fn gl to pp sn ph ec rn ge Keni ton afte cig opp, Ane nt wc devastats bc fed ste al wares: emascuates lng te Whee a features thy ale secs spa rl Ig tit wound Te pe cn ary Berea tyne wns ta ary ote tae seobutare not son, Sen emenes nov ase oan inte Sei Sas ea ce ya mea Fn ints on tog Ss pone He pi th se bie rights an privages of eno, and of the higher sonic ty es ou ig a re “The Prlogrmons” to the Logie nests, publihed asil / FOREWORD To THE SECOND EDrTION Pere ero txt denying esque gh ea a Sra soir he eae snd ave sential sco fag {ut be ga fora scene rutting rgisha), tate ode ic trore tech ups creteesars he jp Oiptentem armament Sait ates tae emia exw ne cent ray an thf en Srecin ca yememerag Sessions oe Sete ee cigar ang com farce Efren seca Seiad heme toees Get eanaere aerereta oe ahah eee i ‘With che detachment ofa historian, Harry Austin Welbon rte rts Satta to maha Sie eae Coe ee teers en, in alee eet in geen ocelee Sree oely wan coe cetig ed ral The of Natur howe chs ge od ie bevy et Read aoe at mde ence dest tha ey nk The Crean wart Stes tat the death offal eu, We ind aba en foe on sae girth Naa Knowledge henceforth would fa Foreword tothe Second Edtion xiii ae ‘eighing down a bighter fate Tate ae of truth the vale of Se eeoe ners En, grounds mre dan gol dss sather than the deine science, and not only a ‘Sets nt acne eae, fr camp hough Eason tors Sanaa uiganouiriemeteas ee Aree oe Eines Me siinieescnantite ne a ee er i ee Secale geen a aly ekg mates Praia er ne now oe tee Some fe remabei The e eaietnr heeccap aes ie ate Sue sci et Sey ne ate ae cee pane ata Sy penile Nag oe veh on ge Sige cal er Fs ee a eae 2 pe a ee nares tae Sasi Sa toe re oon oe et ea ce cer nee ean ee oe ace are ee ee ee eee ‘only calculating is believing, The impersonal universality of matheKiv J) FonEwonn ro THE secoND eoITioN matics, not the benevolent onniscience of divinity, is henceforth the ke the standard, the model, of true sence Again Spinor's Bohs, ‘They the rego aid doom a ana, tt the gel jdt ar ‘renee fm undentaning Sach dctne mit we have suid to conceal the tah fm the hus nce forall eter athemates 4a tot fs aoter standard of vey in sonar solely the ‘snc al peers of Fg tout op tthe al rae Mathematics, wot conpason, neither divine nor human, would henceforth be the ela star ofthe re andthe real And the tive and the real woul henefrth become th en all and be all Ofcom, the Greck atrl sents had aleay propre ‘omehig ko ths, bt they ails pre-set Christiane They were not uated bythe oder press tnt iy Cran wl fice hin aly can 2 ssome trmph, mc los tlampbalien, Whee eo become af al the tan sft ana att How dees one szommodate aie than apts eer Hess poner answer i thoes, dng ih sac to ‘he hitwte tthe se ne respecting values) One mints ‘ese or denigate tne rigorous sce, sce wee a the bearer of sound inowlg anveal tnth Te ace se seine anor tone mat boa atte ogra tee ingle eer es, witout any preuppostions whatever 1) Keowee the real can only be presuppositionless, science can only be pio its based on intone than espero Tee a Sgmennoga nt pera Letts ely eae ds dese ‘Ther is hardy «theme dearer to Hasse thin the senie character of piasopo nied. the scentic eae em pil esy: Present ight om st ee ee ition a epicenin leomenn ten i Src Pal a Remrows Sse andy ats ate of Germany Ne {Rie Huser dees himself ano ease eons oe sgt itn sel ts me theme of ory sence to hes tes eg fe Cd of European ed works, unl is Bal sesso 3907 Foreword othe Second Béstion | xv and deh in 188, om the mae and vfaed The Cote of Tena Seo roscoe Pha eae Sof Uh wer ple 100 an te ole el Se sola! Tes arguments unig The a of Ege ined criss of scence an underomingof tho hurantes fed soi sc ‘hos the sts etch an pres ye a erent sae Buus Nene ie mu ted th alguber ae’mec nde edo Tone gl gon imc see sper issn cl edt sp er i Ween te mee scenes te fans ofa en ees Conc of sence, ent eure cea fae tra Elrge by cla tehgeong fe st tees Srthout tered hla deleguing ence olan Ne courany asa eane St esend kone wi ay tna Tos iw Haag ins te cates nef sic we muses he spain tthe rae fo ter The exact sciences fll prey to what Huser alls the fallacy of Tatura tga tel be ee tae aa ate to be sy Sit ns pre a cjoe of orp Capote of meagunble wae ober The en els tos tic ana ef ment cpl obec Ts Sei re her ee ial sdence be ene (peep 1. Bat aye ‘laser the conscoumens ofthe scent Rca stot tell mo (Bescon Nutr nen or Be erudite ved Siete rb tot snaber to lnow pete ee ig the die of sense esperone, cant tal! be Known oahu a dasfinaeesecne Tristate pees e reppin, of enc ens tht se ita arent cet ene tee per “Ten chr ett ogenntaon inter eanmes th for ons of ening or cong the Fame dem «our othe tng aoa wih the do fr gan oa caption experi (perp 18 Ths pee te rosea oe es of Moin beret Preven agony sacle east of reality ara whole. It ubsottes fr the whole of reaty «part of Taig je aly sje a emptea nercne aIIIS xvi /- FOREWORD To THE secoND EDITION i penne nang fe ws eee cn, Sweat He bt lt ssh lie es mein mv ihe ged mnt 2, et an sri bale a See een ep sesh as eas eee og nf Sean ge ote er aprie rt aaa soto oh Haat rie wed Soe te ton ce Tec tne matey pera Heel ction age ert mene pa oa i ren oe tet htt per vmsurs oc sl pes St af co ig rie Cenc a mat eae a hors aca as aly tetngs of the mest cacy fhed and epee nan iota neaener eae me, ist be sd on tton ino mening Ieee eS: St none he 2G long wth the dens conclave to concranne nssous- along idoas correlative to consciousness her atte ih es ote aera pt ao thy ato es eon etn leat esa Shee gene Ipprentrect pops hay me SSeeee en rt nay te omens, pete: Epil en a een Pormword tothe Second Edition) x Sree ea aio seenbnge my ap ophsicated Consciousness rts tot to be the proximate of ‘mening st be vere A the vory leat one ak be elt siren tern gh etn dn, IS at a ta Hee aca cert {pou cence in aye when ters and tons mt he Se eae a ae, Sei Senet apn ei ee ocala ree rate mie ea ie Tt enki ae ure oes eee eter face t empinca enpnene, to the measurable aby the base ecpmne ul eeat gt ater poe beige ieee Pe tated pai tt Sowers beam Seawill | FoREWonD To THE SECOND EDITION ule to te at Sta fom fe ree af genie evidence in erm of fled ater than empty ean Seco ee oo Dipper create Seong inca Doct o eearenrenemrare Ey irae ape ayn aft assert deg his conerpion finn ters of een scoala Steen igisanac ee cats me sohbet’ tear seas cent ndreoet mea Heicgin cera oe ire Ine eterna ney teehee fun sigh jecrine Sentero ‘model of verification. In a phenomenological sense, the a larity means to see—to “see” intellects ts a se ay fe is ening ott tle Kea inf ee ans Teo ts contrary slty from ees tat nth ace mgr oe Haeran gut Inger ot, res pete ea diggs Hse lee Ent vats in the deter (paragraph 70) “esos een, Lens tes Huser Ideas ™ the val element of phenomenology at Forsword tothe Second Edition xix wllasall there scenes"). This does ot mea hat sc nce becomes at bt rahe at there san at to gen sence, tha toi to cen the unchanging by means of and dengh the changing Tuli of esencewidts~ clas nd ditnguishes—nec essary inode, set wl the song sep We enn undertand wit ment fein Sf eject, the fmaiion of enrmers or fade" Las wnt “es the eat tration op Hse fans Weer (5) Ee en, asses fata Wesco, cteeng th tig fel he tiga atonal varanasi consid though seboers Te tte ey n retin, ect sent acc’ of eens, Fr phetomengy, itu the pstemologea assum upon wh a eins Al Bets of menting al ors of tearing. sd Raytheon ‘ecningfl univer ee concen reseed wd vated fom the ground up. etaion de neste lt of phenomena nd atte same tive the motlous bor of coo reteng all teaming ocr onal melons Testo be clea then, why in 3) rtrodcigphenomenol: ‘oy to Free vital fort hn tine, Lavin eh fo foes on Hise theory of ation I the wera othe ete pe romenologial enterprise. As ach, for Hasse oto yo ‘enced hence serve ar nathing shan the hey oe sp Ades of Europe, the Wet, noe. 2. Levinas on Hussentuan INTuio’ Parner om sent pe er de tls a orgs Alsolte Existence of Condausnss® show tthe exe fe peg et ere rs Seca mac lal pest et Se el oe cece al egy Bene Te ioe co Pee ate na tices tee ween ora ae Sc Nesp dot ee se Fa oo ie4x J FOREWORD TO THE seconD EDITION Hussite in the controversies and fundamental diferences sounding th meaning of Ue tern “ransccpdence =, Tn chapter 4 “Theoret Consciousness” Levins acknowl dees the esence fs certain unresolved abvenc in Huse sty Heenan) pe ‘serpin satus nde thy are giren primacy. In the Logie! Tr sat Jeast in its first edition, Husser] seems to. cee of itetonal consdournes—for example, Wl se, llecton_are rele wo cpg acs, Tn the Tas, {ein agus, sel eb does wt lh ouceed in ver ing this ios. “The soen ofan sjeciping see a dn ates theconcisin of hs ape,“ borrowed om he sphere of serosa therefore aint Huser itaonom wh ‘elles (On the poste si however and here we see Hawes cppostion to Kae, Lovins rxopines at ths ene intellects prepares] the way for the Tetatontat theory of {Rt bectue Harte fit tin, jajget and peep ae ‘roughages pt on he ane eck 35 on aston, ‘S00 “The Intuition of Essences,” and into” whlch makeup the bulk of Levis tock cont ti ais at ue mat ones ‘ey to the vertfation of evden, ele ton Saket al the hey to lrg the esene ofthe enact urna ‘eleocon ‘with their nosmatic oricatation, as Husserd had already al Tet, bas logal-mathematical terms in the Lage oestignion nds Mela Pnty wast ac deo ho retin, See MPa The Phen orientation is originally and inese 7 eileen Bh ea mc ‘etree mae nad nee mera alo plete yt Mop ihe a sheent = Sy ae ‘crn Husa work In canes sree eee or phages conception of consonant’ oe Sete ‘bret (150), regu the taascenlence Foreword to the Second Edition 1 xi snp os end hr nn nd Synth moe dpe ad ie He Soin inalgtee furnace ke enc ie pa tame eae te id uae a acces Ot Sap ce nta ae aes SST neg a cee rg ean Me wk fone era tn eas ie ee Soe aia heft lo tree sig cena es ah lt wincinir diet fe Ka gy hi Te peg oh 0 a Sule aandar eer ESs, sear eer al ae earn nine sl Cc Mi it Seg are ice ere “ane emai SECIS sey bia cigs! Being and Timse?), but which “we are not authorized to use ... prior wees ia a ce ee ti wi ell al faces be Ted gut Cet oa ani San EscdtsE Tah mae tet ly Sindy pts ete a {ng science from its naturalistic prejudice to its genuine origins in reel eed Re eas peal ‘Reaning-complexes as “end,” “goal,” anc 2 a Soeh CRE cml a pale Se ak does not belong essentially to Judgments but to innuiveintentonal-EEE EE=EP_EE~A~COCC On, wall / FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION Foreword to the Second Edition / xxiii ‘tintin chapter or cinta wh he word ofwe, and aati tempor ages, sen ac the nopresece ‘asdpretl a ha ite ht ote do cote SEE te And feign made aly pss art (13, valu camo gerbe Ceaacons ase ce! aparently would ke, sll woud make no sere ae EXGtetaiengfatime emgage Haka pa nieanigl beaut ks apts aces sere sence perforce inca a epnizaon and sexes er ae of pat and future meanings. Meaning is lays buts ace con, yen Peeping eee ety pce ronan lus a's ene rl By recuning se “wing” tan teniy bat» frac ee ues Gee Sea cate Sit Tee, am ty Ya ii ia) te bag k TERNS Se Gerbil coats gpd Srl pes nt, ag at Feet nq. Valu, to roa hs toon ‘cect Suomen mae bya ote ah aren os emote Linas Sg an sty Te he of Deas sae Sake eam olarw teal The eatene te Has orga stoner tao i ser angerlimtgioa lieder abn ca ne . ‘ane etl a Crete en ee at Lavina he mot carl Hassel colar recon hat (133). Y ne eon ‘was already. suite vate of the ili ge of meaning that ca 2h emt pen th dortoa es lene Ls teeming at scent of atc fee erie De ks intuition,” where consdousness salvos Pe Pepe Linus mais us apa tht Hues ows pope lw oy one so of ater ebjet (Bergson fad dey rove ae ingrete ocala nn i ad a fpeasatal Beane Huei “Internal intuition,” where conscioumess canbe present tothe eels objet ance its objet nothing the than a byes = ef cracounes, Tiny even years hele Dera hese deena faa pe, eating te sy wre Tovar a nae se ianek nde on"atece Cemine ik Poewad ——“ekandahe SR 4 Nee reongnined by Hussey account acer unl Rline ac atsacd tw hetero anne an end Th Lov nonenagh i Len “ius tng ek exec "ayn nation which an psn the ide of eatin be Simi fener ot fine fom Sepia jt a cnt te Seg, OO ‘ins wake eat of Haseena ho rope tan he Ear Be nd wher cen cn be ise geno. Hasse Teka omen [yonpan| ce as eee the docs nat enter, ele tty Elgin he put, or Hane hr neko satire that often prpten ees si SEAT ly, to Deri, to see how Levinas Sse br ec tt Ae petersenii Seed ae dar are ae Fie tte Heston conier Det (as) aan a he to hes Lope 2 cece thorn te ery tel ons ato in into Levins goes onto fpboncyetiianth teins’ iene te ap eta Atel ee! mag ht non an picr te cor Te inherent defer of senses ane oS cee moa Seat be fly preter cnc, Deine esis of sence in tems of inte ees? oD ‘ “Tom tcao detain intake, ten itoIE Shh ste ev tna my ang thee vo diferent types of Iadogeaton, Deses at aoe the diaietion Lore “internal” and “external” wile tw te th aby cine casos of phenomenological anaas 5 Sowe HussentuaN Repencussions iv Levinas ur sercr ow Hosea ho ha “ Sin Wor his etial meeyn Ee ihe ve cored me the er age He Gee aged Peroni. Wad eget coated ty Leda om seit oe ulema mon rox tuon td ‘nu ideeers become of Hoar (eee a i ie Ee ler ct Hebets bck ten ae ats Hetgge se son ihe corgi Phere gl lye hace Lledo ate theca Mister things, but tat kee be int Hse a peor ta ne lead on a ee seal ecto? i = reciente Sein ua at fn echt fl pune om ee sie et sly td ti new ‘Hecanse Husserian phensene. Poreword to the Second Baton / xxv cl represents he iit se of cent oti, Levinas eo tk tin thena ae igh wa ef eset tome uted far enki emp of sere Cin cence tuk capensis bu rae epee ‘Stal pony of etc ve me, ter sene fale its met nora som, ash pope st tron ofdene inter wane ened dope bea ire cf ene: fm my hte ma Gate ibe Heeger evista es and apres ‘hopreat alia of sronce, indeed, seston contlbution nt only 1 Scissor poy the niveau aay ee rapt oe iat ena tthe hb of sense pretended hegey. Som ven eater cpr ns Haseena Eos isn Wile Levis sation of ese aco 0 pallate Husserls epistemology appears directly in The Theory of ton, the suport ase cme oa ttn "Shen eet we mt a fs Rod no da en ren cng undid net ae eet Th Theory of a2 108 we ete "De Ten ‘citron sas sped sas Been sgt. by te nu ofthe ste act of Honeneeeg © Leas ‘evel wth gn sree by hing ek ne ‘an dscover certain insights n te early Theory of Intuition that are nr doclgeain Love utr We tse may not be She eta ames of ephe of Levins oh hey nevertheles play ental agri oles in Here {ll fous ona) eS photon of enone stan and te prob of rebar ts “Tigh te era ogi to Huser is fom ‘his phenomenology, I think, that Levinas learns to account for 2 ‘aly ontario wa tn og nett ante The Tes of ton Lvs wer Te conto feetin ath, Wee sw att inf ete seat on cg et nin Bevin spew of utd ets maton ern nfo, sn oct which ees the ‘conscious life of others, is # ‘ype oft cs oe ee pero, Te spn ih Tends yo ont ich mas Seon sd Poonam, Hac mag 9 os as + stavi J FonzWond to THs SECOND EDITION “pl lg” wel pc mode of being an het of ‘sioner, cach as aspect conten (127) sats The reas of Lint ey appreciation forthe mule sed ike gone pened ep by Humes plaronclogy oe ‘att pray toga cane of oman ‘rigs Tn fine a Ciba or inte, ‘tse the cer eit but intercede ree esting at progrtly conte al edged abet ood peek, ype, elie, eveydayas, wer ‘eb death em inesialy In Estee ond Eos chapped a the same teas Tie ond the Orion we fed the sane bea sn penonelea eon par xsece {ies olines, pase pore faonng soca a These allayerd arcu te sae econo Take ingot aby an word where ah rogen of eae Seti ni iquaess een oiled oaths ed ings ancl pon of mang spear ns athena nt pc we ly oe Ii 81) Samet Geli ele poses, patton, sey merce eres © two earlier wotks, which are for the ‘moat part (but not entirely) phenomenological sedice ne Trea sd ify te sitet co an a Peat sets ita tgnpbeeoncelage ti nroiees ara, ree the one carer sy ly Hoon oat nthe “gary” dscns coe Suge eight wpa mean Tse supe oy ssopoubtes: A Hessen tw of ate he cng osc on evn Se ce pre ho eeaiae he ates othe priory of ethied siuboste Los ie othe ae Sch ici, Ls ‘eal cnt £2 Pear of ton, ution te alo. ‘A second | rised The The, cna Jn The Theory ofnttion that wl have Sethu imate for Lets Seal ae bry ty of phenomenology. the possbiity of o ntol mated lee of te a Helgi iy Slate eater fa entany. ot ican ten ely cee Foreword tthe Second Baltion J xxvii sey tne tng nt rs stedriepen heya iat Reeser tends emcee at em oy Se Se ltr eagion grt Scr cesses sae seogec ati neigh Ertan ectuarmepe eettont ‘cleat ue batona eieguimeteis HS coe neta tt nea eve Se a ga Ch a ica atta Se atresat Garay potion Eau or a Ce RTs yan nee sia eddie daca BASE recuse arena Sh eects tat ea ha Bee ra eencegele serach tr ce eee ce oc meureannsirietaarles piety de irmeatcee acy Seles nce eh peal yory Sonia tasripeesdicediumra Soca iri ges ee Saris ootuentaemena ican race Siete em Poe erate is mperant nat becaxe leads tothe wee eae moe ccrieairige eae fo ont dave pe Satie ase Teigucela e os pede won Dy uhich ge are going back to concrete man. Because oft, we dis- i etencooaaste were Scr paste ecoeee. vl J rontwono To rus secon eomion eee rectly what Sartre most ted about phenomenology ss of Intution, that the phenomenological reduction is entirely unmo- | ted tin The Thor of nsutinS Levinas renga meng ee natal ate ae oy poo Gaiden wince used dong with tilde uaderthe ea wh te eat nee which tne exenes of eat tile Dcocering Existence with Huser and Haidecee at ttre sittude. “Tn the natural atitide” Fink writes, “we know nothing of (1949) when many interpreters of Husser! felt that his phenomenal. the status of the world within the universe of absolute life.” Also: Per ved into « more triton philosophical weaken, For “Every being inthe work is stuated within horizons of fandhary. porns ampere cpetlay edu tic tata ‘The conn sth das of oeng ipo roth carl tle but vans oly tcl het sense”| meting hala we, have ct bees prea rs a cae eon tl ide fa ote names th eat reaig of Hse we must not f= aon for he phenomenolgeal eduton ay SS plea tl Leva recngausand auetns acer oe ana tne eeton nn pk Soh, wets weary, oh mba wgwg fata gata ge ad pene The te fin of irmanens to tanscendene Ts il rain Stee Sesser inal ht afoot Seno ot Srrblog ane in Hosen phenomenology: What vn door Honors ictal cui ane therthe ee 2 gui tree He Sa. pleues mis tiat Hused_ an ety ane loss the phenorendoe tae one Jas screed in opening the door toe concrete to meaning attends to the consttation ‘of “wordliness” as such, Instead of ; ‘ed ndedog praca greats such asp “end: oor belgie stn whe, where ening chow ayia orate ot gow tht can be sipped off already given, the philosopher attends to the very worldliness of "eat in the name of sence bit ofa plece vit the eee fewer ra eee tothe ogi coatiaies ofl mening oceania ihe hwy an eins ee ut what motivates the naturally nave person to take up a tion is not as ‘as Fink, and Finks Husserl, would have it Earemctcloiek kim fom avast ihe ter catont pnt hy tl ferent onsen Patent apparently so ra aif sher’s freedom, muting the of the etween the feet pede lS mrt tig rec a te cand mecoempltie the words not purely an abject of ‘because Huss has ready made theory primary in the aad ay acces gL wt Yet coms than d= een sane tay ped 6 lege rotons Ahooteteal ab ofl stomenalogia reduction by a purely radical extension in the philosophical atitade. Levinas writes inthe SSdagetabitereeiaedenmcaaaeey Siu rly ae Hes dest ‘en emcee Feet = trooped ete metric prion of he sat ite ry, Hu di me canes SE ek scene aos ri sion alton he peo menm Tc eto leper cory of at Rea tes the pubeton rs (om am ical tion present by themaees noting new wt Toot ef Ito Pek aes eat of Leas ‘Speen nnd ny Tere pe sf Eimnd Hae ee The Pherae 7 ht Huser! et imac tho won of theory js athe ges Sn Hace nd Cotenpany Cater eee fen tunkimof eee) eee Hier and Kant ihe seca ‘Consequnly, dsp the revlon cance ofthe phecomenlay- toy endoremene at et pec ater tole Hares sa clita ata ‘Soot eel oe "a a Shaiya ttt te tne tee SOIREE own cain eke Pee aye eden te, woud snp be an tense or eetntn Fete Tn “ ‘ch Fikes Levinas doce rh ofa heretical atid leady in poe, wt were tes or wokexx | FOREWORD To THE SECOND EDITION yi te sat ade, Fak nth Hass endrement, wil argue qute loa that this interpretation cot ake Sere ce wuld indotniee shsle macy ate pl ‘ophicd attde, compromising i wih the very propio pia ‘hal We coor sete tins wage Roe te Suna ound aro up Inthe preface to The Phonomenalgy of rept in contra Metloas Ponty que, Geary mae i, alge “ctainatn® it the very vite of the Fedcton at Seto sombre es rng ian of interrogating and intestate. I would o longer Apstey tobe wercone, bat rater relies the esence of ward ts auch Sat foris erie Fink aay drow ing ay contarination, and building 2 philesopy of cntooge al ined th sarton a ee noted Re histhe org fll meaning, nd being which by sels comply dod ofmne,| ne Sneek ether Levins nr Hlldgge sted wth aking the transcendental poten of pilawopy «ncn eer of the a aqhaton of a lend Preset tort tte (Lora use, thereby einai any problem oro a somewhat ‘epg stn iy prema ene na tated redaction (Fak ser), Th gustion then, for Hes snd Levine noir as they reject oth interpretation of lasers Elia forthe erence of oy to ner whit eaaakth vcs oft ave ream evo fs In ge Wade sey desig the ea sro eit oy atcha an unref Prectical world, and through this ios eo stro penta th aint ht eu ay area eae) meander wakes eat Ri “sama the human person (Dasein) who me theorizes tre tio ge dap se eet Israel menial ale es sown edges oes now fan eth (Sein-zum-Tade), Rejec c i oes ng Cm ace ge ete ema eat ed ah Irth Bt prec the ltt pe “sitet wel Cannan men Fa fh ereword tothe Second Eaton xxx sod individualized rival of elf autotiy") athe very ques- Sen re” fring ping Prin othe eto of es tng Being toward death, Gen the Heidegger onstntalioe?= Version of Husseran reduction, the shift nto philosophy, at Through which someone fe converted frm onary nave realism ping sproprion of sd bythe gusto of “nant ontology ‘Levinas too, il eject bath versions of the Hosea explana ton fr pikeopy, sting the vre of philosophy neither tn the ‘acerbabon ofa autochthonous theontng ner is myst spmrge But Levon vil also reject the Heidegger acount of ‘ingovar- death athe sbolte rupture of mundane sje ‘3 Toll not rehearse Levinas enument, which ean be four Fann er Ett nds, Tyo i fig" Deathboundednes andthe homecoming to ontology i opens {pe for Levins not sufienty eter nat ada wancetent tough. For hm, dest, to, takes meaning from socal ie. ‘What for Levinas effect an retievabe beak fom ale inne Sion within the world isthe encounter withthe alert ofthe cher Peon, hae befor th te notion o een of toward death, breaks the subject of Ks aeté and opens ip the dimension af godnes. Gorn leas othe requrement to be jst, hence the squlrement for piso. With these moves Loonas not only seoents the relaton of ees to epsteral iit procs pve a cnt oh ig of poy ut ven more impertanty, he justifies ibs ‘The pam a hen boweey oe me ae hat alread it 180 in The Theory of Totton, Levinas asin funda Soma qusoas win esomendegy th ed othe tc ‘etapypis that 6 Levinas datetv and wphngcontbuton ‘contemporary thoughtTranslator’s Foreword Because o» vax vaxricutan NATURE of Levinas’ book, 1 feet that I should explain briefly why the publication of this ‘tanslation is not only a worthwhile but a necessary task. ‘The Theory of Intulion* was written over forty years ago, when only a fragment of HusserTs thought was available to commentators Undenably, Husselian scholarship has grown ‘immensely since its publication. Bven Levinas considers it some- ‘what outdated now: Yet I believe that it ls of far more than ‘merely historical interest. "Whatever progress has been made in Hussein scholarship, ‘The Theory of intuition tll remains the best commentary we have on Hussers most central work, Ideen I, This alone would justiy our translation. But there is more. Emmanuel Levinas {in he own sight an Important philosopher, and for that reason one of he works should leave us tndiferent. Even when he ites on Huser! and modestly puts imselt in the background to let Husser'e thought unfold stelf, Levinas is too much of & ‘Phllosopher to be a mere “historian.” As he says Rimeel, tt is to a Uving thought and not to a closed system that he wants to ‘introduce un! In this iving thought Levinas himself i engaged. -userl wat one of the major influences on Levin’ own poso- 1. Enmanvel Levinas, Thorle de Fntiton das la phérordn- loots de turer (Paria Alcan, 1990: Ven, 1963) (oubseqoentyab- Iroviated ta blow). Tp ma (ciNaN ten phy. Thus Levinas frst attempt to confront Hussect’s thought ‘was also his fst attempt to confront his own thought ‘As will be made clesr in my closing historial remark, this work i dated, That Is why T have concentrated here on the development of Levinat’efeeion on Husserl as it occurred be: tween 1990 and 1965, This development has been influerced both by the growing avallablty of Husserl's writings and by Levinas own phileophical evolution. Hence I hope that, bY {king these factars into account, I may here contribute to the “updating” of The Theory of Intation which, despite its ita ‘dons, remains, belleve, of lasting importance Luvs’ Reyuzenon on HUSSERL ‘ano Its DEVELOPMENT I rasarers TEs urs nora, Ihave concentrated so woman hema a Levon weg nls te pote of the metaphyseal foundation of te Sedu st the ote sf seman, ce ink that hey best rete Levne chan {04 elton Hisers thogh. Tey we aio crcl! fo 2 seus underfunding of Huson pesoso nthe conclusions Huse gentusons af Theory of Intuition, Levinas reproaches tr Carson doc (en scones bed apparent, te itt te nor nom Sy any cert ‘es not engage the totale ofthe He the level of theory * and ‘the Homo pialosophus* becween the way the Tranelator® Forsword / xxav stood in reference to ane of the emtral theses of Iden: the abeoluteness of consciousness, The absoluteness of consclousness ‘One of Levinas’ major theses in Theory of Inton ts that phenomenology Ganseends ts spparentyepitemelopieal start {ng point to develop Snto a fulllalped entlogy The reduction, ah epposed to the Cartesian dubs, not a temporary measure ‘of prodence but te necessary and permanent opening of a te ‘ontologies! realm. ‘This test canbe mubstantated only by @ ‘arful analyse of the absolutenes of consclousness. Since anyehings mode of being i ts way of being exper ‘nord, the cheracerite mode of exiting of consciousness is tha, in reecdon, consciousness i not ten though Abechat- fungen or, as Levinas puts there is no dusty between what {sintimated and what i present in Huser terms, this means that there fe no duality brween being and appearance.’ That ‘hich i given in reflect in gven absolutely i he vena of not bring dependent on further experiences forts cofimation. Ade uation, and thereby ceraingy (since wacetsnt jr bound to the ‘Ret tat wanscendent objects sre never gen i textual), characterize the of conslvaness: Prom ts lls ‘hat consumes necevay ex the eae that 1 penal wo deny is existence’ This lace Cartentan dest. But ussets intentions go considerably further than Descartes, Descartes remains st «prey epistemological level steed wih ‘he certainty that consciousness enn, that I doubt hi, et However, for Hussel, tis not ony our Rnowtedge of the exis noe of consciousness and offs Blebnste which it beaut, ‘ne that existence Helf Furthermore, Huse wants to reverse ‘he order of the Cartesian terms, Even tbough the abscluteness at consciousness i revealed through the adoqution of i pe rion, for lee it the abelutenets of conslouenese wich founds adequate perception. As Levinss bays, "The absolut tidence of the cogito ie founded on the mote of being of tensctousness"* 6 Tp sar 1 Heim bans 7 Bmp aseLLL ae ein ‘Conscious life exists prior to reflection inasmuch a8 what is peoeived in reflection is always gven as having already been ‘here This is also true of tanseendent pereepon in that what ver eppears does so as being already pat of previous horizon. But the essential diference between the two cases is that my ‘perceptual horn is not infinite. The whole perceptual world doesnot belong by right to my horton as does the world of my Erlebisse which, “rough thelr very manner of existing." a ‘ways full the condidons necersay to be reflected upon ‘Tho absolutenes of consclousness is understood here An. & purely thence sense. Te isthe readiness of Erlebnsse to be Det, and perception ss theoretical act. Tals account ‘atifacory inasmuch as this readines elf cannot be justied ‘hile remalning on merely cheoetcal ground. : The thesis ofthe abscluteness of consciousness is central to {he two problems we shall examine. have already sketched I rance to the problem of the edition. I is equally important ith reapect othe problem of vensatan, wich we sll examine ‘ow, Senston can be rowed a chalngs to te absolute emacioumess, inasmuch as it introduces within com- scious an imeducle cement of passity lore general, phenomenclogy requires us to understand how consciousness can atthe same time be abnolut and inte- fiona, that Is, open (or relave) to anything genuinely ether ‘than ite Slane nes ean me “0a rm ma oy nop or re SS ee onersen opie: es fect oa es ‘The transcendentalreduetion es the freedoms of consciousness In 1940, Levinas publahed Oeurre dam: 4 paper on “1 nd “ower Dept base contin Between his Interpetain ote See nina EEE its trait east ee hae gc amon, Ree eas ac Ti a deter Be onan fstnene e at Ye a4) (bony ere Translators Foreword! xxxvit of Hussert there and in Theory of Intution, there are eo stk- Ing differences. One is the prominence given in “L’Ozuvre” tothe concept of freedom, the other isthe related attempt wo reevaluate ‘he significance of Hussers"intallecualism.”™ ‘To introduce these new developments, we must first return to the nodion of intentionality, the essence of consciousness “Intentonality is essentially an act of Sinmgebung™ "The edue- tion reveuls this constitutive character of intentionality: The sword that has to be conquered after the phenomenological re- ‘duction isa world constituted by a tought I fellows that ev ‘dence (the totaly fulledsnterional at) must be eae fren," ‘ince an object fs revealed emly inasmuch as itis understood (Le, given a sense of constituted). This is crucial for under Sanding the absoluteness of consciousness, because absolute tvidenee is but the epstemologeal aspect of the absolutencss of contcousne “Consciousness i= not relative to anything because ie ts free" The reversal of the Cartesian terms in Theory of I futon takes a new form here. "The total possession of oneself ‘reflection fs but the other [epistemological side of freedom “This understanding of the absoluteness of consciousness as freedom gives us 8 ew perspective on the reduction, “The reduc: don says Levinas, "is amaniner forte mind . . . tobe fre." “The phenomenological reduction fs an act of violence that man oes to himeelf . =. {9 otder to find himself again as pure hough “This new insight into the nature of the reduction and the meaning of the abscluteness of consciousness depends, in the Jast analysts, an a reinterpretation of intentionality as eration ‘rom the world rather than (or, atleast, as well as) presence to the worl ‘We must next show how these new insights lead Levinss to ‘modify his attude toward Huss’ “Intelletualism.” 1g, In fect, Levinas proposes to abandon this epithet (OEH, p i Bal it mee ae ee RS 39: Bid, p36. As we shall oe, pre thought mua stood a8 pure Eheoreical ough ales added.aavili /) TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD In econ of Teo of tation, Levies eps soma ay of tan a of begs. fr berg ns Soro ules ean err eos SRE chopped unter eh tas hese Ferner “ply Noi id te ehctcn, Te an Sin id qe come umn, Se mmapiyea my be soxace vey nea one Di ae Vena she dfcence meen th conn nd she Lon We mut toy cea ine popes etn Loc ou bee eat ore pens of ny Ti es esse Teco Irae ac arcs (Vora bang fal sof mec Warman ot ‘Schama of gpecnaten fuse ie ea iaetton by tin n eso eas he Si et hn na snr ach gr a Theory of ‘ukon the primacy of taorecal consciousness ut the cll ‘itsmsee wenn toca hore eibentn depen ae a ee i on fn nad wh Et ey al le al Hah pa ee openly dg caer ta, ijn acting gh f° Nea Bf cn noua meet oe ee conn Tis wa eso ae ‘rant ed Gana et crocs Beis eal entity ehrough the muliplictty af com Alinta og eae 2 Tpue 3 On Me Bie a ‘Translator’ Foreword J xxxix Jecying (representative) act which x prsupposed by al acts ‘Sfcamcloumnees ned not bea theoretel ac. Any sing act Sh cjecttying, That whichis waned or denied ota object et contrylaion, Ht io not" tag’ Teveavetons in Stoo fer sharply trem wht Levinas says it Theory of Intuton: “Even if te objects of complex act, much a wll eae, cl, ent in another manner tan do the objet of imple ‘eyreventan, they sl unt hae fo some extent the mode of Steen of orl cts ‘Dut, in “Osurre: the primacy of theoretical consciousness fe not only sentrpcted, aio (poisely) revauated arnas nl, What doe tne presence ofan ato entation [representation] mean atthe bss of Intentions that ae In no ‘oy intact?" The key toto aneer Is the notion of er Scnce “Every intendon i @ search for viene" Evidences feud droog to process of etscaon, ht, through Zep seoentatonEvidesce i the hy to understanding the valve of Tepesentation nt consousess, Evidence for Huse snot 8 Teling inte very selattn between sobjet and objet ta tere frsunce (bv ut) but a understanding The al tent intentionally to Sngebung, sd the att Strgebug isthe ack hich rater the redo eonsclosnes. The pay efor). wei hasbeen cntrpeted Bee appears nay asthe conan fora conscousness whose fee iets not purely negative (andor or arity). The feed ett smndcbungweald be empty id mot met ven vera whch gen ab well fe Consited The edence of = ‘wot wich i nen i the poste realization of fre om: "Evident n tat witout wBich conscleusness woul Po et cigin of beng if ther to orig of eng, here mus bug ungis en in evidence, and erence presppoes ‘epresetation a ‘ultimately it is the understanding of intentionality as Sinngenang (Les st fvedorm onto toward ce motvated By # sense) ile ions Levinas to anew wo of the ruc que Tene Tuery of Into, tha ofthe “etna” meaning of the reduced hat of the pinay 0 theory. The answet€ 25 Bid, p26 # Tp or Of pag 2g Ob P Baa 2p, Ibid, tates added. I TT I,CD SOUSSESESSSSSS = XL /- Taansuaton’s roneWworD the ft guetion is that the seduction is the exer snc fom of cessor bea fly ascot ‘a The sd question le anenered bythe resp te, a eae (ne une of djerdonngy crear ‘an be fee without being empty and losing isl ino nothing Intentionalty and sensation Tas inerpeeaor ‘absolute int 7 inasmuch as it "Ean Peng anh orate 30. AB we shall _ = seg. Al te, he tation seein en remeenbylee data nd inten: " ence the bce SCRE ee eS pia ale ‘3 OFF pista anes” Translators Foreword / ali Unfortunatly i seems impose to recon it with Hast Dory of he Coston ofthe led ee. Moree, makes {hemtolenodon of analogy even oc diel, ot pee toundertend Hence creme necsary to go bayone Theory of Intuition and analy that velo ntertonaliy se mbich ye dita Cand thar somes) re coated. Ths es ut con- Slee the problem of tempor” Tn one senso, the pent for Hosse, the “now paint” rerihng begins wih the Urinpresin, and here we sem 0 have 4 gtbineebtacon seeing ik a-brat fact" Tis an ‘utmat® unimefigie,tuels nononaited, fom which al com Staton onigate Ai the same me and fo the ae Teton I is never opvens ad in tha snne i dos not est. Yet, fr Fhtser, die gene presents nots mere pnt but has dura {ont b preteen and retention. An Unimpesion i never five cutee ti orto, Tein avaye caught in a srctre of fipresons which are prevent only on the mode of "has st, ‘ela orl about to be" Tw somepnefeat ence abso (bot so abstract, empty) freedom ad abate pcs. Tis {ewhere tal opine thi also where conscoastess never {sna has neler Bing nor fratom: The presen hs aways Seay ln ta pesene (inte enue of Ute fac), be Sauve hs fates nth reenlon of the past which fo Sttendonalty. “Tiss ew we must understand the crucial notion a aime tion: Animation ts notte injection ofa sense into a ene Stun: Tih te act in mai at once the dat sd the sense {pear a present inthe form of protenton retention in sot Levinas returns Se grblem of sensation in bie popes “ncn maton Te net on 3 {Sper retecion on the concept of freedom, temporal, 0 Crider but sb a mew rcogton of the importance of the place of te body within conolus le ‘nL eur te roblem of sensation was tentatey elo ax enpens of avng ate tbe analog charetr of esa enn, Bue ths chorctes ean be gnre, nce reel to Hous thn of evidence nore to crane the elon. {hip beeween sean and evidence we must rotun fo LU and ‘the notion of Fill. 3. iid, pp. guNLL NT Alii TRANSuaToR's FoREWoRD Masel crainly never confused sensation and evidence "ened os unas wih he see qa ey represent. But fs prods this es ef representation thee ins eroulyquctton in Inentenalité" In LU, sent ac chtrateel resembling or snalogous fo Calihough i {een rem) the sense guatien of object. In Iden ase. Sats ae the Abwhatungan tough wich these quale ee erated Butte very oto of evmblan, Lena pn ut, reupgotes te emiton of an ebjce sere Ths tn thet eaten he rial istncdon wo sony Sere sd 0 eset for Hutt) beowen Sones and sensi quali We nd the thet of sensalsis epic Jug an othe background, Thue is renforces byte aos‘of ll, scoring to which the fume of snecden som pede toine h inate fl of he oc, ser characte Italie, ay oppose to mee bate, ace by relerece wo ntenonaty an naldee ac ca 3 Igo ‘Trensletors Foraword xiii ‘intentionality If, as Derrida claims. Hussetls philotophy is a metaphysics of presence, the presence must alwaye be under stood 2s modification. There i$ colacdence between intention land event, but this coincidence takes the form of a "no longer there” or 2 “not yet there” without which there could not be “presence.” We shall later discuss this daleclc of presence and distance (temporality), since i involves some ofthe crucial ‘aspects of Husserlian phenomenslogy. ‘As we have observed, one ofthe noveldes of “Tntentonalité 4s the importance it gives to the function of the body. Hussens and Levinay concern to mark the radical difference between phenomenology and eensualistc emplriciam had led them to give 8 primarily negative analysis of the role of the body. However, ‘once all naturalistic (causal) interpretation of sensation has been unambiguously set ade, there remains room for a more poslve approach tothe place ofthe body witha the problem of Sensation, Sensation is the locus of an essential passivity in Consciousness, a passivity which we have grown 19 recognize a= 4 precondition rather Gan an anthesis © the freedom of in- tentlonality. This passivity indicates a certain way for conscious ness of being in the world. Levinas wants us to see now that “tbe corporetty of consciousness is the exact measure of this parsicipation of conscousness to the world constituted by 1" ‘The experience of sensation is alo the experience of corprelty ‘Things are felt at the tps of our Angers.” In Ideen I, Huser calls this feeling Empfindnis Tt is an experience which over~ ‘comes the duality of the sentont apd the sensed, the subject and Ue object, The feeling of my pen in my han defies dis duality. Int, the feeling of the pen and the felt pen (as such) are indls- tinguishable. "An Emini is more than jst called n pac: he experience of space tel This the characteristic experience of the hylete level and consticutes the spatiality of consciousness. Hey ard yf fly ntertona ns, dt Ht has ‘place (in my head, fr example). But this feeling ave fs (and ft is mater of eldetic necessity) in my left or my right, foot My Empfindnisee not ony locate mein space but they reveal 4. Jacquen Deri, La Vote et le phénomine (Pati. Presee Uniti’ de France, 1967), English tansaton by David B. All: Sen, Specct an Phenaiena CEvanston, I= Norhwente Univer tty Prem, 1073) 35 asliv J) TRANSLATOR’S FoREWoRD se astncamate spi concousnes. 1 can fe eat a Zin and bards er ny fot Lam extended "heaton of Empfndns snaes he dusty betmeen en satin and sen goae wit reducing ete tte oe ‘hn Eman sel sneer a ensaton so a quality bat he feundaon of teh Te come foundation, ented in the corpo of cocumen, ao a npn! ght on the ‘notion of analogy. a aan Baton can ofthe My bodys ot only the spatializaton my cneceunea bt ao enti Tis ess bly of concious simp (ye unexprested) inthe, whole Sher of perepn by tschslgen, He! eh ees ten 1 he eof moby which wil heb iets of tention of aalogy when I apple ofall Sedge erate nth fn of Fle “The aalgy betwen sole quaites en sensetions mot (2 would appear to» nae bat soaghtormand epee on areecton or mimoring of oc he oer oe Tee x ocr esate oe Rel aac Translators Foreword xlv ese ree neta Tm a os es lea os Te Papert a openbaar sree ee re, See oe fae pe neaaaieat a aterm ete it pene tn Se fr an co Te cei semen ety oh ene) woh Beko rc cn mt Per pinay, hc sain rewerne uma ae ere ee oe seen ot op chon pl ay ‘coer vet gn ge tt ning es enon Serre la gen wets Sr es nent ne at on es sl even oe ny om pecs ie “ora mein a oe cui ie see Beet ent i et ibe 2 ene ree eee er ce ae ee eae eral CE Stina: et oo co ee ey ena at eee cata eget oe a ad Se eae Toren eto fe etn ena, He cid i Remy See a ete votes bet rome ‘epee copes), ore Che re ee ee als eae we oe eee i See ee ee ad Sopher he ee et ig i ee at an at er a BBs.ali /- TRANSLATOR’s fonswoap, cerodued . in cleo, fr example" ™ Fo Huss, Is Fomine mere aston. To devaep 1 frat wel ‘tte him in rcoging this extental hotonty of conscloas. ‘es which, in Lavina wards means “that man has spoce ‘anne of bring his pas"= Without reopaning ths eset Jno, Haste can never reach alevel of fll objective Cad Anuaoubjecie) tna: Let be eer Fe feo Seaying 4c Hoes the hry of conslosnes a he sts ie exstence of alter egos, and he even temps fo epitn it Yet the araye sett remain for him Uh psu of ‘Beebe! cing sca Spee o elnmea it e tat Hussein phenomendlogy is fandamentally oreo {dale withthe pilsopie of Heidegger or Merons Fonte Yt {iil denon bcomes tpl en, ae on er, we understand cnacousnen ws eaag ens ality, a8 Sinngebung. eenanE Hisromcat Resanas iran ae and his fellow rationalists) seme full ee (ihe een Sees SRS Sere Sie fies we L* Brunschvicg's idealism ‘seemed, both philosophi- frome oe wii ft Brot ye ee tine gninetdcaietamanag tem me ‘ers, of one of n be sto Sart Bek ted at te nd. anag ‘te Ponies Pans Capt nla Translators Foreword /xlvis cya pay, tw cme ns Sra oe Sarre ame ae erty cma See sa SSM pera tne sea cane get pe ew St es eam ey a sn i Eel tet e's Tae tester accmanteey ae ‘ane taal Eee wa twa pty oc Ese Ger i Rl doi se eat tg Se a a ‘etl tiga et” te ies ht ton ie re ene Rc ‘Si Det saat ce Wier ie ad oy sega tg STE at Mat etait Si etm jae pa ial te nga aa iS Pe Fei Lp ein ety Ara Po tio ot tung is lo pla Sarai heh iE ene nila oy de mea ea et ate SS a ST ee Sa Se tat eerste Tha, ‘cama ae Se dieters te nach See Tec huemmle cena renee at Shae ea aed ee Hearst vee Nac $b. Putotte pee rie Pt: He at cong sine epee nn Se vos nat se caraare ePaeE S sist anata eee tame nee sei ee oe Pisani at semeg oon ook Ra a i Poe dex Ante cn Mey ek ut en yet melvl / TRANSLATOR’S FOREWORD ott tnesimpontie) t sepa nw Ie in reg Honest hing on Hg ie os oe ngs the tracer ena fe too oe a ao chin oot sn nto sees po she For teen tg ea endo ne ey ‘Beat ete aout of Hae esp ae a in hm et ta cel ge nga rae pa sectarian, wat sets nultonam fom iat of Berge ge ce ryt of Barge ne sae te uss’ els had to be ceslydvanguthed from he of the cnr french Wie, Hone ea {9 emphasize the idealism and intellectualism of ivee inthe scene ‘ature of Huss pulses °° EAE the Sntaionistic 20% clertal that Levinas chose "+ Plowophy around the pro Translators Foreword alix Levinas had to face an audience which was used to thinking in terms of two eonficting philosophies, both of which bore a fase resemblance to Hussetts—an audience, moreover, which suf fered from something woree then complete lack of knowledge, {he greatest ignorance of all: "To think thet you know that which youdo not” ores oN Tux TRANSLATION ™ As we nave Nora, no translation of Husserts works was available at the ime Theory of Intuition was writen. AS & Consequence, Levinas had to assemble his own set of terms, ‘which he uses both in his commentary and in his translation of the Husserlan texts he quotes. As we know, assembling such @ ‘vocabulary is more thant a "mere” matter of translation, The Spt of a Interpetation necessarily creeps Into one's choice of words ‘Today we face «diferent situation. In English as well ss in French, a moderately stable get of phenomenological terms is becoming available. This terminology, however, did oot always fee to me congruent with Levinas own, This created a problem, ‘hat of respecting the spit of Levinas’ commentary without wn necessarily confusing the reader famillar with the English ‘Phenomenological vocabulary. Some amount of compromise Was fecesary, Whenever possible, ied to use familar expression’ Yer T have, in general, paid mare atention to recapturing the flavor of Levinas’ own fext than to conforming {> preeistent terminology. "AS to Ge translation of Husset’ texts, 1 have, except in he case of Hdeen, used the existing English transitions. all transla- tions from Ideen are my own. There were two reasons why T Chose not to se che published translation of Zdzen, Firs i fenerally reongalzed as being largely inadequate, Second, | ould not use it and sll preserve the unity of syle and voc lary between the text and the quotations which charsceriass Levinas, in conclusion, I want to thank all those whose generous help 51. Ashort Avant Propos by Levinas was mite from ts tant, 1 Ae Aarts ie above intoneal remark more epecially ‘ected toys English reader. gtile and support have made this transladon posible: 1. Dreyfus, Tey Belped and encouraged me in starting this project yc, who carefully and patiently helped me revise my oripinal ‘Tetslation, straightening out numerous awkward oid. ‘matic expressions, T. Clk cmp ‘Awont Onan Bibliographical Note Forzowiva ane rte wonxs of Edmund Hussecl which are frequently ced in thie book, slong with the abbreviations eed, Logische Untarsuckangen, 2d ed, Vols. 1 and I. Halle: Nie Ineyer, 1935, 1921. [Ihe second part of Ve. 1, publlahed in {g2r, ie refered toby Levinas ee Voll, Ons reference to ‘rious pats of the work are abtcevated LU) 1, 1, and especively| Translated by JN, Findlay. Logical ivesigatins, 2 vals, New York: Humans Press, 1970. “Philosophie a strenge Wissenschaft” in Logos, I (1910) (ab- ‘revated Ph ale ses Wis). Translated by Quentin Laver, Edmund Hasse: Phenomenology end the Criss of Ploophy [New ork: Harper & Row Harper Toehbook, 1965. Pp. 70-147 “Idgen meiner rein Phinomenclogs und phinomencloischen Pilospies in Jahrbuch flr Phsoph und phagomanclog sche Forschung, Hale, 93) (abbreviated at (deen). Trans Inted by W. , Boye Glan Taos New York: Macmitn, 1991 “Husserte Vorlesungen zur Phinomencogle des inneren Zalt- Dbeusstsein” Edited by M. Heldegger, in Jahrbuch flr Philos Bhie und. phanomendlogische Forschung, X- (Halle, 1938) {abbreviated as Zeitbewnasteein). Translated by James S. Churchl, The Phenomenology of Faternal Time Consciournes, ‘Bloomingion: Indiana University Pres, 1964 ‘All quotations from Hussex's works are taken from the Eng- lish trenalations except those from Ideen, which have been espe- cially translated for tls edlion. Page references in brackets in ‘the notes are tothe English tanalation of te cted woek. wyIntroduction ‘Tu ruxwowexotocicat novEMet, which dominates ‘German phlosopical fe now more than eer, was started at dhe bepiaing ofthis century bythe work of Edmund Huser. In xg00-1901 he published tne Logtsche Untersuchungen (Loge ca Investigations). Tae appatent concer ofthese investigations twas limited to de particular problem of the foundation of log In raising and solving this problem, bowever, the investigations ‘nwodvced a method whose interest and value for pilosophy in general didnot escape the amall but enthusiast group hat Mediately formed around the master. “Tis method, or rather his manner, of posophizing isthe soul of the phenonenolgial movement Ii practiced by the funder of phenomenology bis books end ‘courses, and It ‘nites such diferent minds a2 Huser, Scheler, and Heldeggr ‘Armethod is never merely an ingrument mast explore any part of realty It isnot enough to have a parely formal? and Universally valid tea of the essence of tru in der to deter Imine the means that make us capable of dicoveing it fo the ‘various spheres of being In order nave acess. me domain ‘fing e must a leat acording to Musser, anttpas tie 1 Seg Jean Hering, Phésoménologte et plop religieute (Pati ‘Aian, 1905). Bp gad It athe ist wrk Sealing with Be Th France Sce also the maaifet” of he ‘omenology At the begining of a Jebrbuch fir Phlcrophie ‘dnomenoloptucheForsching 1 (3613) 12 Tdeom §3g5,P- 900 tad chap. 6 blow. 2 Kdeem, $78} 08,200, (i)ENR te st The me SRE ADs Oe rect Te mes eee peng een nh rr aa cnt neg utente rs cpa Repent ae nee be of ale ite Ts ing er Fa tig peavel bu penir tmi ieh e arig Eryn een oe ed ee eres ne ne ma gp aed Serge ce aes tne, os a Moni fe ppc eng rianl o “ri a tiga Brecon Peng bak armen ori t beta pt et ee Oe eS yf es a So Sine oven | etelog What we must semen at ine mane ee femeration of method Tog a EE Ee Hoodie ramen «pre Out Rofetbee I sty Intltonsm im Hussensphe- ‘omenology, 9 we cannot seperate in our presentation th he We want to show, on the contrary, ‘Sa on oe eo ppg Introduction 1 Ww rads? and hs thought has evolved in 4 manner rahe inde Tendent of historical intuenoes, What appear to be htories! Tiuenecs are often ony the reul of fongruence wih the {peat Casta! Pilowophers; Expl toa) references 19 Fltlospbers aerate tn hie wor. Huserfs doctrine bas co lve, and th numerous unpublished works which ae terete iicen yar of tedtaon * would baby present tany surpraes to anyone wanting t sudy phenemendbgy By the bsteleal method applied fo eseurtes oe Thomas Aquinas Moreover, susan atept would be premature, since the ast trad of Huser pilwcpy may no yet ave been spoken Tod fs erainly not pushed "Ting all dese eoumanees into consideration, we do cided on sober gol, We woul tke to study ond prevent Hus serfs phovophy & one sues ond presents ting piosophy. We arent facing a corps of et proposton fom which one Can adopt only Re iad Forms, we are confrondng ving and Change thought Uf which we must immerse curelve and learn its enough for us to reconsruct Russert Sum ant ow tet ul we tpt ein mie He penoloical language, we must came face to face with the ‘ame "hinge? Wetmost understand the arguments onthe base Then things rather han ty to make tonnage by ean at aton or remiss which may not have ben wien o frm ied nde these condos, the citer ta rigoouly histor. cal sty ieappenr The constant evlaton of Hesse pls fy cantor Kegy ay from grasping i simple main insrstion, ‘hich lone makes possible tia evlen conformity wir out goa, we sll 2 feu to ake into account problems vse! by er philosophers, by sadens of ‘Huss, bod patter’ by Marin Hetegee” whose Inf tree on ta Book wl afen be fle. The intense pibspbte] Ife which tune Uough Heldeggers phlosopay stetines per rls ur to sharper cutine of Hoses poopy by ace Tuating some posse, ralsing some problems, making certain ews ore precbe, of opposing olers. The nfuence of & "0. See Hering, Phénomanctonie et phlowophe religeute, p35 12 See Heidegger, “Sein und Zeit~ in Jahrbuch for Philosophie snd phatomenotopsche Forscseng, Vill (3827)es ie te tn goatee tence names edo nintendo abuts hs method. Such a powexal a se og gta ren ss Sa in ne ay ‘Extent only its continuation. Given the spirit of our book, which Seni dhs aaa tea Sondre amet Me hacer ecretes ae ea Se ah an atc ong Samay ong Ee ates ene SS bers "Ry i this’ a philosophical problem par excellence? It Secs dt Pein Revco Each rena that Heldggcr gest this rm" Koomlege of Fcc Sate rad aa tat ee oo eps te mange scree cat tm et tom mg Sie caer a pe rege sabes bh tre ne is Tere ave on different points, we shall best ao anaes ener missonfueaseage rete, ‘neumalized, largely because of the prog: sSebpttan nena ogee ae sHaRe ne semen Coe me Rena za Introduction Wii ress ofthe natural sciences and history" It is pnealy beleved thatthe scence exhaust the totally of what can be Known ot ‘ring, so that att, philoophy seems tbe without an object. Burl science knows hati to be known about belng the fclenes themselves inay Become an objet of vd. Te addon to the knowltge of being, tere St toom for the knowide of Enowiedgefor the theory of nowetge ss ually called Ths she place of plsophy, and sh a conception of i oe fn objet permite Ws fo understand the fandaentl inty of ihe eppoatecampe in Geman pllosohy ring he second ba of ie ninetenth century” Phe naarast and peyehalogc Pilsopers were fending pilowpy and expertmental pry: Stology (Wundt Bramann, Swart, while the Marbury schol {tennann Cohen, Ntorp), Aisa Rel he achoo! of Wind Sana et were tying to Yen the Kanan equ by interpret: Ingitace Ute of eowiedge Common oa thee pilsopbers ise entcaton of phltnophy aod theory of knowledge, the Ir btn undead saeco oe oer Wh he inupeychuogte mere ging a special dignity t Be teary Thonidige te ‘uameendental palewpby” above that of the aturalsinecs, the poyeholopts were liming that this elec Ton onthe scenes a to eels aclence of nature and had {o we the same methods as physics cr chemistry, in short, chat mpc peycology ha tobe the foundation of a theory of icae'asa ge teeny ono pilovpbieal cipines This Sine general teeey of the nes elpe ws understand why Dithey and Windslband were questioning the methed of the Dautchvsnenechaften. Totem was merely aqueston of com feng Kane theory of nowledge which wos only a theory of The tioedge of nature, witha snl thory forte sciences OF ce ind Ha aoe ny remaling peter ef ibe "s that of the theory of Kowwledge. Bren Hosse, ut lat Tra time to tne doce ot escape this concepon of plxrpy. ve. yg of etn pr tn cba emia nae fae oy ‘alvunders de ecbte Wissenschaft so sehr gebermt babe” (Ideen, Free ie ac we eb He aesHonea we salty t show i piosopy ges beyond an ‘Mets but a subjective manifestation, behind which one would) / Ihave to lok for Ss constituent lements* ‘We have datingushed the muluplicity ofthe subjective phe- ‘nomena, which necessanly belong tothe experience of nature, from the maiplicy of the ats of consciousness which are di- rected toward H But this distincdon, which we have made through a reflection on the Internal meaning of the experience of nature, is not condstent with the naturalistic notion of being, tlic naturalism understands this very experience inthe light of the being which ie intimates, Ifthe experience of nature is any. ‘ing at al, must be a part of mature, Since is obvicusly not {2 pal of material nature t mist be part of peychic nature, ‘The subjective phenomena of objects are the consututve ele zens of consumes contents AL the sane time, the elation between these subjective phenomena and the realty they intimate fs interpreted as a causal relationship—the only ‘lationship admitted: by naturalism. Sensatons, perceptions, and ideas are the result of a causal action of reality on conscious. ress." Knowledge can only be a e2usl process between matertal ‘beings and peyehic beings, both are part of the same nature. 43. 1. vip a Se Sera np ast.) as eH 5p 6 ba14 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION Besides consciouness, naturalism is also obliged to natural fae everthing which is elber Ideal or general "number, geo meted esences, tei wants attrbute to them any Yel | By at al. Nature's type of realty ts dodeod individual, I J, Slavduszed in dine and made accesible through sensible x eenee (ntral or extemal), If anything general exist, | faust be in some way indvides, since It mst be prt of nate. ‘Dut nature isthe werd eusde af consciousness and, ones cn seiounest has beon naturalized, i Yon is part of notre. Since {deal eects apparently do net exist in external nature, ty ‘must be found in conscournes lence genera objets can be nly contents of conscious fe and thus sndividual chjects ha {ng inviduat properten" Ther Healy cannot be ¢ ede ccstence tat belongs to ther own nature bt can only be 2 ‘Proper ofthe poycelopcal state o which ea! objects ae fe ucel, One can thus understand the existence of these theories 2 abstaction that ae vo frequent in naturalism, the theres of ‘Looks, Bercy, Hume te" They ate all confronted wth what ‘ems to the inconceivable: "an ideal existence hele Prob Jem consists in reducing the dealt ofan object toa eantcat of ‘opcholoical Ife. Let us pot aguin that the mturellation of onsccusnes isthe condone the natralition of exeences?™ Indeed, we shall se that. ence the former has been overcome, we aa be abet rehabitaeeaseces'= Homers, we donot think nly of ideal cbjects but also of claws founda on thote objects ich a8 mathematica lav. ‘he deduction of Pythagoras theorem is founded inthe enone: of sight ange agure ec Tes because ofthe nese of one {another premise that we can, ina eyllogam, deve conc son. To account for this natural, which dies te enstenct of essences, need only follow its owa ought to Is ule af gf line of thought to it ul ce ate paychologiea natural fais ‘hurr relation exists between thm can lye th relaon ae Siri tet $B len fan b geed6s,p. 220 8 daa ae ji Sf Sins of tn 11, 18-209 pp. a9 52 Mz. p 107 sar) Te ead BE. Sotelo, chap ef? S81 ‘The Naturalistic Theory of Being / 15 ominen to all nturalfats—the relation of causliy. Mahe ‘hatea nd lia concuson ar he reduc of theses {nthe same manner se waters podoce by te ion of hyo. wea and ong” ‘ona jst presented the paychologit consequences of naturaben, If phtonophyas te natoralie old hate ‘dy of Knowige t's ale abject can be Sdontied with ycholgy, wich in tunis conered one ofthe natal a Enter Lape canbe only an at which i based on that part of ycholgy wich Pos he laws of thought As forthe ree okt inode poychlopsm laces subject end ebjet he ‘Se wri hh an tre a pe he ean 12 Felon ef aus order t know ow a subject reaches an hject which ease ee mt ok Fr cases Which Bing Sho Knowledges exctatone of sensory organs by eteral ob fee reues Secon ofthe nani, Wen naan —teastc= which does rat change ts ehsnceitbeomes 2 Sueston of Knowing how the fm consousnes produced, ‘hse cane ne te fa ot come it ia, thar evidence apeats aa certain remont this thse dence, or poychuop, i only a feling andl we of 20) be feet value ® Te whl fconeous ie on fox o ete Ste, of pyc sms etience am tm ong thet ‘Soma, Tru fs nly fing of evidence Far such a concepdon of pony, the nly possible meetin tn etn sat ee xp in the pre Gee senile sense of the ecm, We have deseribed Ks extend eto 1 ca OT ening ba ego Petcepiion We have i 3g bale othe Such, in the tof a puliple and changing realty, _ “Hee eausalty which ie bekiad it one mist war fom what “edna gven and ey back oat realty whic econ for hati ven: The moverent of science isnot so much the pas- Sage frm the parucular fo the general ast isthe passage for the concrete senile to the hypothetical superstructure which, Slain to reaize what nmated nthe ibjecive peromen In ether word: the estate! movement of a trathorinted| ‘ought consists inthe construction of @ supremely real wo 5g. 1,1 1009 top, 120-94 Iti p ae tpl a atin Br iit Bp Tela ipp. 208 Hen, #245 00| OPthe bass ofthe concrete weld in which we He. Tis maha , |e econ of eesyhing this Immediate cnet an Urea nde! prepin cause te world of perrpaoe |i piven ap rate, Becsune i refers back to sea whlch [ide behind ths preps has no scene ale an snes tn as pt of departure fer a paces of renoning eich end em tl ell i scour fo appearance, sins te later ve emseie 24 sone which must be accounted for. " oa by ito, one ough one roughly understands immediate and &- |r ood, hen for natal intuldon camet sien ‘ic method becsive mht mmc es ae soot tr now the pth tate ald ow We ave nn how harm as funded catain conection of ek. {xe and peopel mathodand we have shes tte Ye Beart of naturism from which everyhing follows ss ‘oncepton of exence We ust now hoe anes ie ‘omlogy, i orrcomes nara onaogy se leads 2 another conception of the phowophial method and of tut i 2 / The Phenomenological Theory of Being: The Absolute Existence of Consciousness eto be means to exist the way nature does, then every ‘hing which ts given. a8 refractory tothe categories and to the ode oF existence of nature wil, 2s such, have no objectity i wil. bea pelol and unavoldably, reduced to something na a. The characteristics of such objects wll be reduced to purely Subjective phenomena which, with dhelr-mulfarious stractre fare the products of natural causalty. Let us-llstrate this with ‘an example, The beauty which is manifested in an aesthetle ex perience presents itself ax belonging tothe realm of objectivity. ‘The beauly of a work of at Se not simply a “subjective feeling” ties of tho work which, in ‘ve beautfucat leat this isthe intense meaning AC ‘hee experience. But tis objec, value, or beauty, wth ut Seer ode of extn, ieampatble wth the caters ‘pplied to t by natralfom: If els ranted that these categories, {2 fhe only none of rely, then neural, which stiempis {otedice watever selina see expeince wich ae fori, coud pony prverve the meaning of such an expe nce, but this experience would still be considered as being in Uinscally a paychological poenomenon in mare. AS Tong 2 he naturaisde frtlogy is actepte, existence, including the exist fence of nature, set determined by the meaning of ite, Rather Iie itself mus, in ender to ext, De conoeved on the mode of nature. That, fe must be integrated in eausal chains and! 1 Hen, § 252. 318 tl18 / THE THXORY OF INTUITION Scere tt ti en ie Sane cr apie geen manana i Sa cea oe sera age at ey rot Sees Cys roe aren 7 re ee cua ee 2 Mid, § 29,9 96 3 Sch cares et ae vee ie motes hte ce and tree (oii PA SI eo wn se peta geo oh ional ity aie fe ‘The Absolute Existence of Consetousness/ 19 tn Se ey ans of a ee menu np od ma! {oe Sn Gentine pean wae spars mene ae oy ca rs abe peice tee oases Tere an mages to ie et Seat a a cdo wt co cca of soni ,sness includes more than the central Ce en in SES hors as nee ees eta Sens ico Ears ‘ception is an ex-ception [jedes Erfassen- ee Hera fone Seer ena ad a my i ll aera a a a Sees inert? ‘Semned the inellect See chap: & fo. eis § rsp. ase von “Each pet ow, despite the “ential” of the various er etic Hose aw ot 0-20 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION my seman cara cate. ot She maze possiblity of out ii ek ply ply enue a each present ST eppenion between cetal and marginal cnaciousess ‘snot proper to percep lone, and is memufstatn in he fuse Heraufesun by ones atenton is but a praca TIC I canbe fund in he acs ef eonacincss sets of ‘nema imagination, learoe ly et" the Duckgrotnd a Semscus lle here is multe of cogtatons, Tan beck {Bound i ot vagueness yond the resco of says 2st A og wiki consioesneny kis ld aeay fleet. ‘ne ear distinguish in itvarious peso acts al of ble (ie Awning of genie bees ae tat jocoss booms coy at ete dpi of de Semen he teinve ats are pent bef the sts themslvens ana Igmens, peanuts, dae, ett Thee ae ee decors tf Sipe whe own “hte cur scp of ¢ yc eer gy Ss savy ang. De Fathi neh eta fh sacar, can op esc cnscouscs tthe sec of posi leh See fentaned inlay n the acta feof comcioonns ta ‘4 notyet-actualized or potential consciousness * : ots and potential concious ty the mar Tspndenee let whlch we Bh: Laer Ho Sash 35 Md) ase The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 21 ‘back tothe same thing end reidentifyng it This.canception 5 steven greater philoophicel interest because the potential sphere owe nt belong to conscToustesscontngenly but a8 necessary Dart of is ercture, and so doss the postblty forthe varius iofnents of the potential sphere to become actual and tobe, in tum, surrounded by potenlallues. “The flux of consciousness tannot be made of pure actuality" It is necessary “that @ coi tinuous and. progressive chain of coptations be always sur. rounded by a sphere of inactualty whichis always ready 1 be Sonne tin he xc af on np met ing cus PRES Sh chee eons pg nat ou cena TOALIEET Pm he et ay we Spry aan etna arta late i mse ead eae ea he pute pss ap pei een Demet rine Tei Se wae ss oh Tiny ohh al peed en tt oe mae oe shy es i ing Feat en tl Lily ened (sears eater patra ha sce oe moras So far we nave poten a he eee ofthe ple fects relative to consciousness, Now we want 16 mae later ‘another character of their existence. oro bo existence saute wrong af appct in whic they are inne Ser. morcover thes appt never exhaust age 6 QML Thar ‘user line" soporte which we #66 tay BME: TES oe ec te the aistincton of vious eyes of poet, see ‘hid. § 140, p. 293. Philosophie phé- vo org a Pg weet nteneaa gare gamba he Caen Renae¥. nest nyt further aspcs and so n-Things ae never nown in thir ality an eoventa character of our pereepton ofthe shat of eg nade” * Into ing etre tt ble reat. Or the ene ea tings eve fo onsets yt ees toy that it mers eansciouness”" On the other hand. since the sn blcne eames sme compl, eaeres ‘ain rene te ope of coplen of the secs of | phenamena,"and forder experi 2 | abdreduce oa halucnation hat had seed be reqs Y Nees tags hale ee “Ths chtactistion of the exsence of mater things i ‘mat by He ob oy tmp sts Sele ere Sse fhe main rant of plenomenngy = eo lot ands ow, a Hann whe x one! ep henna fon" ee dings sver neon reed ya lg Feu ave ns can may sages ada Ho ged ots nt pe al a nt inally, it allows ws te understand Husser!'s ass - \ "the dubitable character of wanscendent perception "Wis obvious that this thsi doesn sea dha th _ang a See a te hea otro trae Bn ba ais tees the tell wl ts ntl es Wess Character te nadeguiton go pang Si tn megan es pent Ses cel ost ase Spposte wo tat af nde aude, ites on these ee as hao ae se park, 861420, $9.P.20;§ 46, pp. Bo-Bx;§ 198, pp. 286-87; and | Mein! BE eR a», Bote 8 Pots comstihtive: paz ‘Hosserl, everything which ~) Py am a fe Se acorn Ce, P| 38M ag pg a bets, ; 2p Nh oe 3. I og V2, p. 56-57: and expecially § 55, p. 207. ‘The Absolute Existence of Consciousness 23 then philosophy would merely deny everything which i aserted inthe natural atitude, We would be discussing the existence tbe nonexistence of the world, but we would sll presuppose an Ancasfed coneept of existance. We would fll to question this cep or we would rely implclyon a pretheoreieal noni concept of existence. “The novelty of the analyses which we have just described is precaty that, instead of making assertions about the certain oF -Eircottaln existence of things, hey a asserting theses concera- ing the very mode of exstence of extemal things, and thi puts {hE problem’ on now lve. We could formulate the result of our alyses im te following way: the existence of materia things ‘Contains in self a-naluugness, a posiiity of aoe-being, This her not moan that things do not exist but that thele mode of CRisung contans precisely the posible negation of ite This Fegutch Ie noe merely-a characteristic of knowledge, a if we ‘hobs oily aafing that Bhovrleege of the physical world can never Poult with eersiny the existence of the World, Instead, one mast ike this possible negation as a constitutive element of the wery existence of things. "To avoid any misnderstanding, we must add chat the con: i tingency of material things that we assert here should not be tales t@ moan that existenoe not included in the essence of material things, ae i 8 in th essence of God, according to the Famous onteogical argument. ‘The negation or_ contingency, tc is nbeent in existence, expresses no more than the duality q Trtoy cateanal things reveal themselves and exist. Ths duality (Basins inthe facts that a being is intimated, but i intimated See ee aTP suet phenomena; thatthe et fh a oti sre fo the concordance af Tose phe ee of tin Sncrdance snot necessary bebe, he ako. — Teast Satie thw phenomena wich, toy of ing on cadare Contingency, hee 6 ot cy eee omc ed te ene of a ob LD Giterninaton of the exten TET nak | Ser Ic of cera thingy hes Ka dtr Sharace of th ge chngr i themselves pests bee cee mt acterminacen of ths extence. pe £ tbe, § 48.087: 149. oF: 5298.0, 286-27. gu thi $4687; Soe adie of peeepon ofa thing depends on he thing specie meaoing”a4 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION Further, conngnty nto be understeer by cpp oe nen of te eile spurt teeceaty of he ete of cnaoutnes, when We ha ‘Snip esp and ShSN opposed the eongeeY ofthe ovell nd atop plopay wed Save be under Echt inthe nef te ontoupell argument: Bot Huse erie es nly Noting ane the shes. Oe he canary, be orgin snd vu tekons fate aus fatten 28 ete inthe sive hacia he-eenee St mer tng we fd tc funda theo Step etre eeu Dy tng a Seine nl the cf he scyectte Perinra oetsene, whe cling brewed ty same Sijetne renee eft of See becsng Noni ‘Sate intimate gn in pina aes te omer wich conse lpi sem fn the ms tx tat wed notin ia ht eae ena i ich or emer at epi recy spel eens Sie ot esp th wl neg wha weno te foley an eae hing ich Spree te, eaence of Eng oy ene way, ny in wh ing le ea ‘the henomens oh atte em, Pee et et Fans conepn te seen te hs stag ant Ce heweenogial ering yon perecloneey woke no Site the exence of ex ngs at nthe pon ‘hat ty ae oars: te apr et eh thes een cones ccna Ie When ch as ve nit ety en de tet appear anges ins thresh word of pecans itself mse up the bing ot cut cancrte i, Wl worl of pram ht have ny eed St an taal ce ey ae fa me eaten eng vagaries at ‘We cn pee hom, wih sch ana, oe can oe yer sy peop hh skate Te ey ot know 8 hy of eur Tal of owing in ede © iow het can eh oe eae 2 i. teem se-o7 3 sm 6, 35 THE oto St nosy ie ntreduced in sb, § a, pp. 8r~ The Absolute Existence of Consciousness) 25 knowledge presupposes, indeed the existence of an object and of ‘subject tat must come in contact with each other. Knowledge ‘is then defined as this contact, and this always leaves the prob- lem of determining whether Knowledge dees not falsify the _being which it presents tothe subject, Dut this problem is exposed ‘ae fictitious once we understand tht the origin of the very idea fof “an object Isto be found inthe concrto life ofa subject: that Stsubject is not a substance n need ofa bridge, namely, know! fdge, in order to reach an ebject, Dut thatthe secret of its sub- ~ jeetiiy is ts being present in front of objects. The modes of Eppeating of things are not, therefore, characters which are Superimposed on existing things by she proces of eonsceusnes They make up the very exstence oF things. ‘Unll now, however, we have proceeded negatively, We have shown that existence doesnot necessarily mean existence in the ‘manner of things snd thatthe existence of things im some way Fefers back to the existence of consciousness. What meaning floes the being of consciousness have? How can it be posiively fetermined? We must clarify these matters in order to reich fhe very heart of Hussets ontology. ‘The fundamental intuition of Husseran pilosophy consists of atsboting absolute existence to conerete conscious Ife and ‘cansforming the very nodan of conscous life. This conscious Iie, which has an absolute existence, cannot be ¢e sic ‘Waits meant by consciousness in Berkleian Wels, ott of Closed werld which has in fat the same type of existence 38 that oF ings, Conscious life must be decried ap Kfe in the presence of transcendent beings. must be understecd that fren we speak ofthe absolteexsience of conecounness, when tre assert that the external werld is solely canetuted by con, ‘Souenes, we donot fll back to Berean rater, we See going back (aa nots original phenomenon af-exstence that, lone makes posile the subject and object of radiionl phileeo. ‘hy. Those two terms are only abstractions based en the concrete Phenomence, which is expressed by the Hosterian concept of We shal fist describe the absolute character ofthe existence ot consciousness snd then shaw = how tht existence cont i Being intentions. Tr wl then follow that consciousness the fngin ofall being and that GET deen by hein 36. See below, chap26 / THR THEORY OF INTUITION mer, Thus we shall be ina position to Understand how the std of conscious life, when understood in {certain way, may have a philorophial value." "To determine the estence of consciousness, Musser) starts from ihe ‘tality of those phenomena which are included in the Carteslan opt ‘We a6 taking a «staring point “onslousnss” in he pregnant ene of te tenn, inthe sen. hich frst comes (0 mind and ‘Tish cin be most ea expresod asthe Cartesian cogto, aT TRink~ Ar we know, Desates understood the costa in a wide fens, in such a way ae inchide any sate such tT perce {remember Imagine 1 ude desire, Lan and, sir, all anlage oe sate helt) in ther innumersle ster Those states of fe, those Enebnisse, donot form a region of eal whichis simply bade the world of metare”= Its only i {er of “empty categorie © that we may use the word “beng” tt reapect fo both the wold of things tnd the world of com Sclousess. The Erlebis have 4 dilrent mode of existence ‘We insist on this from the begining, “Consciousness has felis proper being. Ieeonties «region of belng orig alin provepe "Elster: Husserl says, even more expel, “There emerges an esenial and fundamental diferenoe, De tween bem qua consciouress and being gua dking" tn this ‘ay intimated a diferenee in glngiple Renee the modes cf fxttence of eonsclousness and of realty he most important ftrence that thee iss itv concerts on he mann in whch conscinnes rave reflective ionght we shall noe thn te pee?” on of conslosness arse ninanent perception Fue sets terminology), tere is no dus been whats Sevealed sod what tony inated, sin exlemal uamcendene pence 37 Sebel, chap ah, een, V34, 8, bo. See also § 29, go, The concent of ‘cline bets doe nx get the poteral phere, TH thy Huss speaks of consdousnese “in the pregoaat scree tHE 99: Bid. $36, 9.7058 49.9. 93 $2 THE ANG ans S 9p a 1a 33. 8.58 co ai. 23:98 5. By Caan see seo 25.962, ‘The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 27 don * “Ein Eriebnis schattet sich nicht ab" Por any Belng sa Uhis fegion it is nancense to speak of appearance (erscheinen| ot of representation by Abschatngen.” Psychic being, being as “phenomenon paelple not unity {ht could be expecinced in several separate perceptions as ind dually identical ot even in pereplons of the same abet 1 the psychical sphere there l,m other words, 20 distinction be fect apearance an bang nf nate ns Bing Oat sper [appetrances sl appearances themselves (which the Pye ‘st coranly looks upon as peyeeal do noe constr a beng Shichiteelf appears by means of appearances lying being ft “The flux of consciousness i always given In immanent per. ceptlcit as something absolute, something which is what 1s, fd not as an object which Ss anticipated on the basis of @ se {quence of phenomena which may further contradict or destroy (he another and consequendy disappoint our expectations. Un- like the perception of external things, immanent perception is sdequate “The perception of an Brleis isa det vison [shlches, Er Seiten) of someting ch sven (or coal be een) i Dereon as something abate Sido a that which es: RSTn many abwchatengen A Teling. des. notappest through Abchettangen, Whenever conser it 1 have Something absolote which has no sides thet could be presented ‘cen oe way once another™ ‘Thet they may always turn out to be nothing is a character late of ie existence of material things and is allen toa bene ‘which revealed direct rather than in a sequence of Aschat Longer. in this absolute sphere -- there is no room for di cordance ™ or mete appearance, F forthe possibilty of being 444 For dhs terminology, ee iL 8, P. 68 SS that aap. 77: baa 8 36 tad boa 4g 9-99. {Pha ara, ae zap 100) $B taeem aa: 8 4p. Diccrdats nay take place between sce cape reisken be fest ofthe experience, which shows that as Fs Tita pred he eh ‘Rup abe iat Gur examine te pa acta a tee) Ie Sly nee ine way exter ngs peaa8 / THE THEORY oF INTUITION something se Ieis a sphere of absolute position" The analy. Sr of immanent pereepioa leads us to the absolute postion of ‘consciouenes, to the impossibility of denying Ss existence When reflective perception edeectad toward my Brleis, what i pefsied in an sbsclte if absouen Sebel, the existence of rich cannot in pelle, be denied that is im peel iw Dsl to soppse that coes not exit"To say of an ENG fiven in sech «way that I doesnot exist would be nonsense. \We sem toe in the presence ofthe Cartesian cog; there ‘20 doubt bout the relionshipfetneen the on eae, and Ha a eal ‘We shall tra tthe connection that can be found between ascets stede and that of the Caretan cot, but tus 8a) now that by sutching the connection to fan; ne Could Gistort themest origina thought ofthe Geman pilose, Indeed, or Hse the hsltnes of eoacousnete ments mae tna BE indubablty of imternel pererpig, Tis sbclutenese dors not encern only tit wats pertaining to Smsctousness and Det tanya algo the vey exons of conecousone tal. To Fost at abilute the exntenee of conslousnete means ote {han ie fact hes aur ode "ts important to show that Hosee has done mere cham render comprehen the able evidence of te cog BY Apeaing 1 the fact that internal perception 1 adequate, Ft iBall he ase of sine hel wk ‘shes Fesble an adequate perception The stslue evident of he tis funded on the mae of being of eomcgusneas “Only forthe ego. and forthe ux of expire ins vlan 10 isl, do we find this exceptional austin: only here er 4d there most someting ke immanent Ferran Jes ot only a bj of een that cpscenanea, being sive adequately, ccsoarly exes, te mesning ol we oxetene assis precisely In not euiting as an objet of Feflction only 50. Ste preceding note 5 Ide 6.9, Be ai ae § 4m § 45.89, an expression such eit ee ete" Simany. 4 79. B 2 gts Sige wensiasag tne. Cegetenneowe ‘The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 29 conscious fe exists even when itis not an objet of ees Sn perceived in tefesoo preity chat Sheng cence td ean cryin en. bt ung isen’aeaty tere before Seooming sles of Peeep {on eet exten of conseloumes reveals nde ‘eden ein recto nual perception, an apposed 0 {Sha act whe very existence ars. back oeoncooe tan" no longer eecten on corocousnes at const is exteeo ie former wade pn y the later Turon we have wondered whether the aserton that consiousoes san sett existence remain, for Hose & free thas tate dows not temp occ. tnded, we Sovsoy that he clacton af the meeing of hs abslenee is ever bon attempted enplly by Hoste. This etaily Go of thes srtar gop inhi thor, He wl ey &e 20 fon of estence proper tothe vrous regions of being; bo the case of consconoss, back fo whi ll regione fee, he wen ny ite ence et eae Ba fee at lena he bepnming ofan analysis which ges that (Son His rate sen cates Sd ts Independence fri rel by saying tat eonscoys tess“ ready tobe percelved[Wahrnchrmungsberit]”* But for Cre! yearn eo eng ey se peeled sway means to be aeady In some ay 28 hjec ot consciousness-—if only implciy, as & part of the ‘aon of an acl pectepne Consciousness on the other ants aly tobe exceed in quite ferent manner Foe {onciosean, to be frclvble das not meant be eady 2h Sbjct of eames ut oe prey. extn is ei sees ic opus io he ode of preeence of objets Subjects Conscousnose Ja teady to be percelved “trough the Sebi ada of te eens fr De ef 1 Which SERGE ine penbilyoftingptceed, «possi which IP enrene te very exstene of concious dees ending another to, frm the facta “all Blais ae a he sf ependent” and SE TE concerning the notions of “dependent indenters see below pp 109 ‘SF Sec bstow, erp chap. 7 5p. eon. 443. BB. Sec above pp ata, 5p, Maen, 4 45D 84go / THE THEORY OF INTUITION onion" Ect at conscious. They know themssives in Stes manne, bu Oe census Ro analogs te Perception of exteoal jects or vento the srmanen perce [solemn we seen, and we ca only ake 2 ef, hath exes of those expen I ele {Soest in he Inmanet concours of onscoutess «of time functions at tive consciousness.” * But Husser] adds: pee ‘This univers etumfauende} consciousness of time i obviously ‘ot a easunubie perception, in the poegnant sense of he term notes words, feeble ot conus Internal ‘zion for which Erlebtse woud be objec, posted inthe sp ‘lie meaning of the term and appended as exeing ‘The specific mode of existence of consclousness—its absolute ‘es and is independence from refecton—censss int exis 3g fer itself, prior to being taken in any way as an object BY ‘reflection. Consciousness exe Canaeousness exits in such a way that it cons wet ce Ghat ts constantly ‘All eal Evebrise, qua exiting and present, o, a8 we could aio ‘29, gu temporal unity centtited th the Phenomenol Con sues of Une, cry Ive sense, heme, Ct CA scwrofbeingtn away onalogous wo perceived oject'= But that the “exstenes of Erebise sin pinipe conscious hss not mean tht consious fe exists and then Becomes com ius of itself. “Iti certainly an absurdity to speak of content “osm: cnet aa sphe specie sence Tutrstete Gomenee cay eecs the inate of the cogio but also, qua, postive SEES ao, eine SF Re foe a8 8. pe acres sett yap ea ‘The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 31 ee eran aoe soporte os SE ie usaty concept oe co ae ne es, at mee ee dat sateen teas eee tana te Sr eal say an ah Sea eee a ae cate See ey re Zou onmeathe a er ee ea Ppbeiatede one mopping iy ee re Rice Te darned ee || SE ame a ie man ants || poem Fc a ut Din contin ames dom St cae ret ie, Te at of ae Feat i mie See “aAcaul ote eee rr ae reeered soe ee ee ini fa war oe seer ere a ta Fae ot eo ee eae ace gece mo Dears os Dt Sai in orn ee ct Set ace oie ae a Cece sie Aes phy aan te AE td ener tay ea a era ha be ea SE ds ee a i Sanam a a sou gigs ots Se itt av le ae en tit toe ae fn te cn at latent ae ere potas te cane mete tag Star tgs moo eet eae lec Se ii he on, te os smn Sere ee a Snot outa ih | En -unclanted idea of existence borrowed from the existence Bacar ein ngs abd ten eps le Ef ie a hurl | See aoe at iio be, ptt iow wh ‘hich and such an object exists. Against such theory, skepticism| ga / THE THEORY OF INTUITION has an enya whan rece the tty of sing oop rasta f we adm tat ects foe the mane Sip ten we are forced fo admit hn sch an eistence I Singhs pret, Of ste: ne novelty af Cate poe fy sku in waning ogo beyond step by abandoning Indigent exhence enced om te ml of extemal tng f wht spear ot ewe ate a lest coral hate te peg ts Bu Des i ot oon he dcovey ire co Ome he had reached, conse, 2 onan ot Sect essences he de teat ie te “eae Seu thas wih gute dite meanag tom the ene I at sesame wef pans, He ined {eet me fie ni The soe Desai distance wich bat an existence pra io tht of extended ‘stan ands tng Fo them sey by the early wrebave of i extol The specie care of te cot ot erent y Dascats the eral cane of te Stvantay a cones “ine whee Hoot hat made progres, The evidence of the con ia pounded on he mote ct Ensencs of consusnst hese 8a at sppeting haracees the very eng of isa ag Te fn been tse ws of Knowing nat med wth depee of cing: ss 2 ference in nature. An ayer toparats the adequation ef intel Fetceytion and tie nnadegston of extemal prep Ha ‘etfs sep forward beyand Descaries consists in not separating the iowie of. an pet™or, ote generally. the de of _qseresing tn led tos Mtg aang, aon ot ting the mode af ts bing know we ote a he hari oma bag. Ths ie yh Hust ily thes fre fst ea pros of posing a th of homes th tng End tau latter will consist of deel studying the eayene of bog that ae revealed to conscious ne en and of studying the modes of existence in the diferent regione of objects, Lat un aay, it dentally, chat with the Ia of «diferent exlscnce for exseral ‘things and for consciousness, there a We have Wied to characterie the absolute ex enn Hed 7 absolute existence of con SEOUREE Dy ncicatng the conscious sharacicr of Brice ter by sive of which they are always present to thet Ar. ‘The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 33 selves. This absolute exlstence should not be understood a i ‘would be in an “ontological argument” ‘Hluser] explicitly states Oat, for him, the existence of con- sciousness is simply factual, “Clearly, the necessity of the ex fstence of each actual Brlebnds isnot & pure essential necessity, fey a pure eldeic © particolarization of an eldetle law. Tt 15 1 facual necessity.” * The Seetsnotwendighot of consciousness ‘ust mean something quite diferent from an existence that follows necessary fem an estence. It concerns not the fact that consciousness exists But the mode of lis existence. Toes. hot mean that consciousness necessarily exsis bur that inas- ‘uh se ft exlste its existence does nt contain the posibiRY of {is net being whlch is the characterise of spatial exlatence, To “axis in the case of consciousness, does not mean fo be proaized in a series of subjective phenomena, bal fo be cntinacusly pes ent to itsel, which is what the term “consciousness expresses. ‘Now we ean understand how Hussrl could meet the objec- don raised by Hesing in Phenomenologie et philosopiereligiewse. Herings objection concerns te imposstility of passing from the Induitability of the cotta to ube assertion of I necessary ex Sstence, “Indeed,” saye Hering, fn this case dhe fact in question derives ie indabitabiity not fom the des of the cogio (a eth eas fr the Heal existnee of aa ‘Secnce of in the cae of the setal existence af God for the oD {Slogte but from the partially favorable stuaton of the ob- free So Paul ould pecfecly well Sagine a word n which toe oucoanens of ere would not exs.™ sng is petecdy ight in saying that te exer af the cop ttn han the tesa" estence of God {or the omagote® sins, no ne have ted to thom, Hse Inns ednt ts However, e neces of emeclousness isvaccerding to our interpretation, # characters ofthe mode aia not of the Zc of ls eistene, one can no longs Sl to ‘is prieger ston woe ws ic reflect upon fae Sr o lope tho neosary character of the cxstence of Shei re poy ad rach prileged situation I foocely thn chrdcerzs be existence of conscousoese. In 4. Concerning thi term, te below, P. 104 SE fae § 46:9. 86, Be. Jean idee “Phenomenolople et phlvophie ritiieuse (par: Alcan, 1995) P-85 gka4 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION the beng of consciousness 18 founded dhe very posi of Fefeeon “Only fot the ego and forthe lx of experience in {teaton to le do we find this exceponal sition, only thre dhe sa ore mast be, someting ike immanent pe ception "The analyses of dhe existence which is proper to external ‘Wingy indo conactousness ave hot shown, as 4 superical reating of Hosters works ould lead one to believe, that only Conilousness exits and tha the external wor does no. Both in, bot scoring foto diferent modes. However, we unt now emptasze 2 certain primacy of donscousness which eri forthe whale of Huset's poo. i and which, above als vial for understaneing the felon {End the place of intuition im hi system. Consciousness exits ‘Brolutely this Is guaranteed by every moment of ies enstonce™ But to say that conciousness, inthe concrete totaly of ts course, caves wih Ite puaraice of hs being amunts (0 Stying that existence should not be looked tor somewhere be ‘nit but hat, with al the wealth of ts dtals and meander ng, 1 ial Ping, and that ie here thst the notion of fecdence most be sought. Huser snertion in bgg of. 1deen that consloesess nulla re indiget a exstendum dats not we lnlee, sean anything ele. Tes i this primacy of conscious te that naturalism is dednvely supersoft set objection gaps‘ fr which the nine meaning of ou conscious fe bears witness cood cnsst, as we have sown, in Presenting AAU PIE cans aa purely subjective phenomenon incapable of saying anything aout bern. We have ted to eatablsh that the norm of being used by naturalism des not apply to al be ings, 2nd What consciousness ext In ferent way. Pure "Ke Ut analyses have shown. hat the exsonce of conslour nes is absolute and that consciousness caries In itself the fitianieof iG Being, while the being of naturalism returns {2 conscoisness, which it presuppore asi source, Oy catscousness can mate inaliie us he meaning 0 Oe ~—beiag of she wold whichis certain mode obamecting conscious” ess of of appearing fi" The word of nature, fom which ‘turin derives i Hatin of existence, only ext ell Ih 20. Hen, 46,9. 05-86 fe ta Fe Tt Fe nan The Absolute Existence of Consciousness / 35 {he measure in which it enters the life of consciousness.” But Dpreclely because concrete life contains fn diferent manners Eifernt regions of object, be dass not mean the same hing foreach of thove regions, Ther proper mode of being met, oF fenstated for, consciousness nt became te abject of ux hy. and, s+ we shal scm, must, according to Huser, com fuse philosophy’ central problem ™ "Homever by presenting the idea of a sphere which ie the svign of al being and prompts uo tanaform the very concept af bring, seeing no longer as the Idea ‘of tubstance but a3 {hat sbjeciey, do we nt fll hack Into a form of Berklsin ‘deal mire te be Contained In consciousness Ia the tll ‘measure of realty? THis clear enough from our previous considerations tha we aze not desing re itn an eto fr which he aetion f the purely phenomenal existence of the external weld means 2 tony of The external worl xa, es what ti, and to seit a5 being only a phenomenon i to clarity the sense of is existence eis fo shu, alter having looked atthe fe fn ‘which i given, hat ts mode af ocatrng in fe is." Theres anrer mater which separates Hossein alm from that et someone ke Berkey. For Hose tis nota mat terof reducing the word of spat ejects to contents of con Slusness adn fae of ttl o these contents the mode ‘of existence of te material jets which have been drowned tn them, On the conta. the pot Isto show—and we have Indetagsy emphasiaedHe=toat the. spore to whch al ‘istence refers Back has 4 speite manver of ensing, This Specie existence lets us suite that we are not nthe presence He of a mbjece opposed to an object, of a being which 1s nut! to objet en, for that rosso, is precisely on the fame level as them. For Hoste coscousnes 8 primary main which alone renders potable and comprehensible an “Sect and a “aubjet were that ae already deriva eis im this lat point, whichis the cbject ofthe fllowing ‘haptc,hat te ain erence between Hossel and Berklean ldolisn les, Genscousncss for Husted and consciousness for Britsh emp (high tinted with naturalism) have nothing id. § 4. pp 88-80, Fy Sede Bap an Conlin. 18 Haeon, P 55. 207 78. thi ba 28.6 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION fa common but the name, So far me have characterized the txisenoe of the abeolite sphere of life as consriourness, Le, 28 sting by being proc to any reflection, present io lself. But we Su must establish a characters of the otber structural ele en of conscousbess, which ae a important asthe Bs 3 / The Phenomenological Theory of Being: The Intentionality of Consciousness Conscrousnss, whose existence we have established fn the procling chapter, ea temporal flow Conscious fe takes Pace fn immatent tine, wich ib vey diferent from cosmic ime, from te time ofnature® The consttution of consciousness dn'ine, the structure of tne fel the internal consciousness tf cme, andthe historicity which thus characterizes consciour- ‘es, ato subjcts which have much prsccupied user in the Cours of his phenomenologealinvegatons* Thelr examina- {lon hae great deal to contbute 0 the darian of the fact hich re have expressed by saying: "AI Evebie are cam "However, hee, where we are manly concerned within ton, e must abeicact from the cnstfution of immanent Ge Sa Ganifr congcousneseo being ereadyconstitited in tine. A chara of the existence of consciousness ait ie then ess i thing ie, related to_an oblast. We shall begin eae ‘Enlebnis) which, at fist, may Seem at least unrelated to intentionality. deen, § 8.7.36 Thad ros zetbewustacn p90 P23) Tees? bron sora, and iene, deen 430.2, son ei rin A, § 218, 9p 245-46 (ol es = s38 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION by nbn, in a wide sense, we understand everything, whieh Clee pace ta te Mow of ovacionmess, and consequently, not nly tntenonal Evebutee, seal or potential cogitations fa everyhing that i eal n the fow of consciousness and in once part» Not every real clement constinive of the once ity ofa nentonal Evade Ise Intentional 2. As the propery of being comsccurnest of something. Ths ste for exauiple ofall the aeoae data [Empfindumedaten] which pay fc an important ole inthe peeve intulton of a thing” In another passage, some examples make cloarer what we must understand by sensation. They are ata of color, sound, and tac fosing, et, and must not be con. fed with och cement f things a olor oughnes,e which tue veperened in consis life through these daa They are aso ‘he sensuous enpesions ef pleasure, pln, dee, ete: and Oe ene moments in the per of ipo” We lar, moreover, that thse cements which are deprived of Intentional consists spa material or hye level which ‘8 the eject of « phenomenolgial discipline, the Myletc de ttplin, which deserts the strate of tt level "We must therefore deal wit sensations (or with phantasms? in the case of imagination) wich have a suing smularity to those simple elements by means of which empiri payhology "ean acento itl le However, thee 8 at ene bet the to Let us beh ‘Special aon ten to the folowing pastage nthe shove Gooclon ath. {which] must not be confused sth och element of thing 25 ale, roughness, which are represented in conscous fe Shrough thse data "As Huser himoal says elsewhere" he Inet data to which the gualiasve memens of tinge come ‘ond are deepy diferent io tem, On by denying hs wold Huser go tack to the sensual coneepoon of consciousness and deny intertonaly ora leas, go back to he sncton ‘een ral obets andthe mental images which ae heer: tom in conecoumess Mower, objec are not calcio af 6. Bid. § 36,9. 65,00 also § 48,7.75 PRbleptem sete 1, § Bb, p 278. 9 Senctig the rdatgn between phantasm and sensations esti usa. Baa, albewnasct, pr. 441 IPD 6b, 15 th, 346-49 ip. 597: Heen,§ 81, pas 4 gh pao =” l= n= l= rl rue TT ‘The Intentionalty of Consciousness. / 39 “eenstions.” It would be mistaken to believe that new characters superimposed on -sensations,” or a new viewpoint on these con- tents of conscious life, could transform them into “extemal bjecs.” There fs a difference of nature between reas a subjec ‘We and experienced sensation apd zed as objective and rep. resented." “The sensedata which faction as Abichattngen of color, gos, or ‘pe must be datingushed fr color, gles, aad shape them feive, Ley from any cmoment” of things. An Abechatong, a though ie bears the saine name, in plsipe ofa different type {han what trepnesent. An Abschattung isan experience, Bu an ‘experience ie possible only asa experience aad nots anything pata Du, what i given in an Abachattang can in plnpe only ‘Beep ouch et erence) and cannot be an experience ‘To oppose the hyletic data to the sensations of the sensual, ‘we must stil emphasize that the character which gives unity (© those contents whlch are grouped under the concept of hile is ‘ot the purely extrinsl character of beg provided by the senses. ‘This was suffcient for empiricism, But for us tls unity proceeds fram an internal character which permits us to extend the notion of hple beyond sensedata to the sphere of affecuvity and of will" The flow of conscousness, however, does not consist ‘only ofthe hyleie level "We can distinguish in consciousness an animating act which fives to te hylete phenomena a wanscendent meaning: "they Eignify something from the external world, they represent i Aesne tle it ete. This act an element which has a mode of ‘visting identical to that of hyletic data, Le, iis conscious and onsltted in immanent time st knows isin de implicit man- her which is charceteratic of Erlebrisse. Yettgives.2 meaning to the flow of consciousness." It ntenls something cher. than Nels transcends itsll.— ~ “The abject toward which consciousness tends when It tran- sconds itgelt in an intention Is not areal element, 2 content of 1 erat sia 2 erent ae ienego / THE THEORY oF INTUITION consciousness, as would be assumed in a Berkeleian Sdealism. AX'Berkelian idealism oes not distinguish between quales Gr objects and hylele data, end ie teats the transcendence of Sbjecte with rexpeet to consciousness as a mene subjective ap- pearance, Intentionality i, for Husserl, a genuine act of tan eendence and the very protatype of ay transcendence, This introduces us fo the study f intentonalty, which we shall com plete in detail because St Se a8 important @ character of the Existence of Erebnsse as the fat that they are conscious. “Tis Inensonalry which characterizes consciousness inthe pregnant sense of the term, and walch at the same time allows for the ‘characterization of the whole flw of experience as a conscious fw and asthe unity of one consciousness" ™ "Tne etm intention must be taken na larger sense than the cone it has ih expressions such 28 "geod intention” or “having {he intention of doing this or that" Te expressos the fact, which at fret does not seem original” that each act of conscloustess ‘-conecous of something. each perption i the perception of & peteelvod object, cach deste the deste of desired object, cach Jadgment the judgment of a “state of affeie™ (Sachoevhalt) bout which one makes pronouncement, ete” But we shall toon realize the plesopical interest of thls property of Om Setousness and the prefound transformation that it brings 10 {he very notion of consciousness. Tn order to make more precise the notion of intentionality, ‘Huser says in the Logische Untereuchumgen, erence poset. hen ci and sought om Se on ale el ae Sic asd ac ie“cnay pct he te pe ‘mean precisely the samme.” a _papipee petite nj ry Raph ty rere sa no Sa nner tg Sei as cern eee rae octet Sipe tac Te ge re ere TanienSicey aioe ye ls a 68 — 20. Mid: Bap 68 ~ 2h. LOsit ayia sh ‘The intentionality of Consciousness 42 rodalty of the contents of consciousness. It is precisely the ‘ery mde of existence of coneciousnest that the hoon ln Tetlonality ties o characterize. But user also attacks a theory which would se in inten Lionalty a ew clement, a bidge between the word and con- Stiousnes. When one speaks of ieadanabty, the question fs ‘ot “the connection between some psychologial event named ‘Speience and another real being med abject, nor ini 8 paychopbysiealselaion between the to wich takes plas in objective realty” In this hypotbess,intendonaliy ‘would be a means of explaining the way conslousnes relates tothe works a way of anawering the question: “How docs Sonject reach a wanseendent objec” in this cas, Unless ne ‘iw in intentionality purely verbal solution, 0 speak of tens {ionally would ameunt 10 admiing that consctoumess exits faba stance and that one of is ateibutes its intentionality, ‘Which allan this substance, as eject, fo enter into contact tith another reality. However intentionality net the way In Irhich» subject tis to make contact with an object thet exits ede is Ineutonaty Se what mah up the very subject | (subjects Te very sealty of subjects consists tn thelr tan ‘Sending themacivax The problem ofthe ation between subj, nd chet wan jung by eubrtanlistomology which con! Gelved existence on the model of things resting in themselves ‘Then any relation to something allen was extemely mysterious ‘Ase hive shown, Husser. by overcoming the Subsantalist ncept of exbtnce, war abie to demonstrate that a subject is ‘ot something that fs ete and then Testes to objects, The ‘elsdon betwecn subjecta sn objects constutes the genuinely Primary phenomenon in which we can Gnd what are called seer "and “objest”™ The fact that Hussed has, from the aa, In Albert Sper, La Penade conerdte (Pass: Alcan, 1927) SemNet tia ace Pune Because spaie’s work ir one Of the rare took in France di Eo ise 3S Thhonde tela, determined by the itinle meaning of te dows Hanser te go Bond the rebar theory of manta oe Jats according to wich fgrentsonal objects afe only subjective linac real beings If wat le ealed mental Sage hed tn con Slauiners the mesning of “image of something ele me could peak of images But percelvedbjects are presented an Vlog Per42 / THE THEORY oF INTUITION er ( eng ey tee hg me (ephemera e eros Cease ort et a | Untersucharngen.* It mast have seemed to him that the idea of chen ema hn ee i te He ce ey ta lay remy alge ee sae ie meet root a Huser from Brentano, who had remained, however, on a empiricist and naturale ground." Brentano had obtained the ‘hela fom scholaste ‘Scholatelats knew that, wit ‘out adjudicating existence or nonexistence fo an object of thought (this, because of tir substandaliat conception of being, creates 4 pec poblem), we can, while remaining inde th manent spel polem), we can, wl im The Intentionality of Consciousness / 43 ‘So far We have characterized intentionality a8 relation to objects, Tis character doesnot affect ony the purely theoretical Iie of te mind. In fact, al he forma of our lif, affective, pract cal, and sestheti, are characterized by a relation to an object” Every valuation ie a valuation of « Wertverhalt (state of vale), ‘ery desea ea eae oft Warschoerall ete. Acting i a ‘ete atthe don, love at what loved, saafaction at what ts tting, ete In each of these acts, ‘our gaze I rected ike ary from the pure og 0 Ge ole exe felted tothe relevant sat of comscouess (ing, state of ‘ings, etc) and schieves the conscoumess of ths object which ‘ay be very diferent from cae tcase™ ‘The end of this quotation emphasizes an important point: “which may be very different from case to case This means that intentionality isnot an act whlch is always identical, which 4 present in all forme of contclousness, and which alone exer ‘ses the function of relating to an objoct, while specifically af- {ecive or voluntary coeficients relegated to the rank of purely fubjective phenomena, are added to an always Menticalinten- ‘on: Intentionalty acf ts different in each of these cases. In tach act che vohintary and affective elements are special ways of being directed toward an ouside object, special ways of an- fcending oneslf,Hussd stats this explicidy elsewhere: ‘The manner in whlch a mere representation refers to is object iter frm the manner of Jodgment which cea the sme 30 mia. BE Mid tap age 32 id § harp 35. Mada ‘Yionality didnot constitute its very mode of existing. What 1s Interesting about the Hussgallan copcepton is ts having. put act Mtb id atthewexy beat he eg of Sn44 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION state of aftr a8 tue o fale, Quite diferent again i he manner fa sume or dobt dhe manner ofa be o fear Despite the prcisions (and reservations) which we will have to add fo these femarks in the next chapter, what we have jst Sad it of primordial importance for under fand the Husserlian spirit in general. We “ented, apt boing and that conrelu ie is dental With _the source ofthe idea being. We see now that concrete fe “mut be taken i all te forps tnd not marly in the theoretical orm. Colas the real word is not simply a word of things corelave fo percétve acts (purely theoretical sts), the rel So's ord of objets of praccal wee and waves” The {uae that make thing important ous (Bedewtambeteprad itor dara, tat made os fae em ot want tern, ae intrinsic characterises whlch must ot be exched rom the constraton of te world and must not be atbuted solely tothe “subjecue reaction” of men thet ae inthe worl" Since these characterises are given in Out fe se corlater of ine: tions they mun be conaldeed as belonging to te phere of ob- Jectviy™ Lett be well understood the Fat thatthe atibotes aluable. “useful” or “being wanted belong fo the sphere of bjectiity des not mean that they are given In a theoretical ‘epreventatn Cl prely the very we extension ofthe Hus fetan nodon of intenonaty tat makes i interesting eX [resis only the very gncral fact that consclovenee transcends ff, tat i ales tell toward something oer than a, at ie has sense But “to have a sense” does not mean the sn np The eo ove has x mney Bt Oh les not mean tat ic inlades & representation of the cbect loved togetier with a purely subjecte® feeling which has sete and which accompanies the repeesentaden "The char ‘tere of the loved objet precy to be ven ln 2 Tove 34 Ht 3, an neta 588.5 2 HBL deat ate. as Sree Paap sul ete Laeteaecnce te teen (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1882), XIII, 13. ne ‘experienced object has, through its Very mode of being exper ‘The Intentionality of Consciousness / 45 Antenion, an ntendon whlch eeducible to a purely dhearetical representation” "Value ov afectveprodicates therefore belong to the existence of dhe woild, whichis not an Sindiferent” medium of pare rep fesentations: The existence of & book, for lastance,canrot Be ‘educed wo he simple fac of being thee, in font of us, as 2 {et of pligseal properties. Iti, rather, #8 practical and useful Gharacler whic consute its existence, Hes glven {0 us In a Shanner quite diffrent from a stone, for example. Concrete Hf, the cbuce of he existence of the word fe not pute theory, hough for Hussr he later haba apoctal tus (cis aie of ction ond fecling wil and. aertedie odgment Interest and « indiference, ett follows that the woed Which i caelative to this fet sensed or wanted word, 2 werd of acon, beauty. tiglnes, und meanness, aswell a an objet of theretialcoo- {Sroplation, All thevenelons conte inte se measure the txistence ofthe mond: Ty constitute ts onologlalsrutares In the same measure Gn for lnstanc, the purely theoretieat Categories of spatial, Ti sone ofthe most Interesting con- SSquences of the Husterianatitude, This is why, a5 we have sfien sald and as we shall se in deta in our lst chepier the {xistenee of te word nota erty form that could be epi {bal Ue domain of being, Wi size, etc, aze intentions which, long with representations, constitute the existence of The ord. They are ot element of cnscousness void of all feladon to objects, Becaue of this, the existence ofthe word otic stare which dies in each dierent domain.” Tue preceding shoms tat itertionalt constitu forms of conssiovnese, We have 8 f od only exp” Srakened: or sctve Gnscousnes, eid of conscious fe isnot limited to the fll arty and dis- {incon in which each act i aarp acuTaed eth potent ‘phere also inenional?= Hue answers aftmativl. Poten- tal consciousness appears ao as “consciousness of some- hing = "the background of actual conacousness is nether & Contnt of consciousoees nor iy mater isnot vod of inten- ftnalty as are sensations wich are given a= present but pe ‘4h See Alexander Pfinder, “Zor Papebologl der Geinnangen in leith Me'PUlrophie wad phenemencaphche Forschung, Vl Tigra) and 26) "G2 bee show, chap. ten, $36.9.46 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION (fom no objective apprehension” “The background of conscious. {ness is a sphere er objeclvity. Differences in sewality and poteitalty presuppose intentionality and. are only its modal. eg" Atenton, according to Huset's analyses, isnot a distinct ‘pe of act, as perception fs distinc from vil, but isa possible rode of all cis, It nelther transforms nor erates intentionality buts in some manner a “tubjective madication” of it Within cach type of intentionality, attention expresses the manner in ‘hich the ego relates to ls object. Inthe act of attention the ego lives actively; it isin some manner spontaneous and free In acts ‘old of attention, in the potential ephere, the ego is not directly ‘busy withthe given things Its not aedvely and epontesneously directed toward objects Lat us remark ere that formulae such as the ego lives spontaneously” “the ego fs, of isnot, busy with Aes object,” have only a descripave meaning which Is already ‘within the sphere of intentionality. In summary both the potential cogta and the actual augveonstoss of ameting*Teninalty aqyeny othe ‘very exsence of consciousness" cer are dm od eed Ho ieee io Shy Al ceragiiie Sega cies Sroeaiegtnreme! Gemcinah al esnips ear fee hea eee ea ae aia tree aie eee ie ovina ister geese nee tide ahr ope ra Seo _-i herein how of consciounes let eel which ‘ld of tatonaley and must be anate by Intention 7 site a meaning and. 7 TIGRE, st we notled back toa radidenal omcondee ok ee, Ee SR ‘The Intentionality of Consciousness / 47 ness, considered as a substanco resting in itelf and having a ‘mysterious relation to objecte? Despte the contrary assertions ‘hich we have just quoted, does not intentionality play the role (of a bridge cht relates subjects and objects? Ia it not Berkleian ‘Wealism Which reappears inthis gulse? “The spirit of Hussers system, and the role played in it by the idea of intentionality, are clatly eppoted to Such & support ton. itt, the hyetic data, as ie demonstrated by the Husserian congttution of time, are already constituted by 2 deeper inten: Yonality proper to consciousness, one from’ which we have abstracted in this study" An Empfindung is something material nly from the point of view of an already consisted Row bat 2 sensation fs comprehensible only as corelative to an act af Sensation, an act which Is deeper and has a very special stuc- ture. Therefore, intentionality is at the heart of consciousness. Tt 1 the ist and ist element of contcloumnes, which Is no longer an object for anything else. We must... understand appebeoin fufleung] * bee in2 {rota ne! tha wes Inmanely conta, ad ab {Earwhih elgg tothe manent consraon, to he pst a the jimora fix Toe, te imal opyeeenion Wi no Jemglrconsed™ However, if the intentional character of consciousness ts now beyond doubt if ntemal intentional as an ultimate rea: iy hich Is'no longer consitted, creates Hts own. existence; hd, consequently, even ifs sensalst thes i excluded fom units theory of senation, our Inia problem concering {ho relation between consciousness and the werld stl remains: Isnot the internal itetuonaley Which forme he very character of consciousness setuficien!? Dees Jntenionalis, when dk ‘eted towards transcendent object congtiu pew phencine: Son ie ruimol scout” "Huss never stope repeating that intendonaty isthe very cevence of conacousnoes™ However, in Teen there paage ens i283 Up. 17-77: Hew, § 8 Fa "Sa Dethensstzen, 4 pp. 178-77) ‘3k Talelo anther werd for mention Zatbewasccin p44 P-200h 58. Keen, $140, 3094 BaTO 48 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION which would suggest the opposite. When he elaborates the con Uae GFhateandf the mete form or intentionally which anit SEE. ie ate, Hussel leaves epen the question 9f koowing ‘Mhther "a matter without form or a form without matter” are Yoooble it sems. therefore, thatthe separation of Pyle and Tptenionalty i Considered at least concelvable, This tex, how ter dos not decide he mater. a ‘Another passage of ders scems clearer AS.a necessary con plement to Ui analyse ofthe existence of consetousposs, Hussetl the hypothesis of the posse existence of a conscious Eton without © word, a consclousnest edced 10 pure m- Tmanence* However, this isin the famous section of 1deen {Teag) which led to so many reservaons and so many accusa- {iat of dean” Wo agee with Herings refusal to follow Hu Sent in Oat dieeuon, tut the ground on which we challenge THusens these isnot ao much bis assertion that ings have tly = phenomenal esstence the aserton which Is the main fous of Herings rekctance We do not blieve that things Should have an existence Independent of consciousness, singe their dependences ascontng te eur inerpetatica, Ss not co Ceited atthe negation of transcendent existence but ass chat dete. We do z0U bate that conacoueness needs things in ce 1 ext, albough tite DOS somsclourpess* There, Me Sire with Hesse. Bett we fallow Huse on this Tam plat ine find that our agement is zesblepredely because he does ot cone of econ a a eel wert woul ate Sense to speak of ie dependence O indepedence with respect ie the word. The peste fnceon of inetonay sf cau acterize cansciousress a 4 primary end orginal phenomenon, irom which the subject and the object of traaionsl philsophy ae only abiactions. nother words isms to us that if HU Serl Meals shud ot be followed, ite not because te SP ‘deals but because It is preudiond against the, mode Ol ‘istence of coneclossness as intentionally. nals ove held wot we 49 2 asc text a Heving a already said Tnasmach as one sts, in 4g, negation OF the fundamental tle of intendonallty, ne Gan ane that sg Mid. $85, p ara 3B. Wad 848 bon 3. ee jean iting, Phewoméncogle et phlowpie release \(Patis: Alcan, 1925), pp. 83 ff ern o. This the pln Height, pp 85-96. ‘The Intentionality of Consciousness / 49 {in no way presupposed by all the other works of ussel. One should probably even interpret § 49 on the basis of the whole systom, taking the central vole played in the system by inten: onal ite account One could then note that th text of § 49, Which asserts the possibility ofa consceusness without a word = ‘docs not ray explicitly that the flow of consciousness may lack fany anscendent intentionality. At most, it shows that this ow ‘may not constitute this being which we cal "world" and which fea transeendent being with 2 welldetermined structure, We sxe also prompted sto interpret this text by asserons ike that ‘In the paseaze below, which concludes another discusion of the Ihypothess of the posible destucten of the world: "It does noe ‘change anything fo the sbsolute existence of Eviebriss; on the tontrary, the later are presupposed by it” = Does not this asser- ton they] ae presupposed by it mean thatthe destruction of the world ig a phenomenan that has a positive meaning. and necessarily implies a consciousness which, consequently, would fll have a tanrcendent meaning once the world hd been ‘destroyed, atleast that of "estryed world"? ‘Morcover, there is another text, earior than the teen yet 4guite conclusive, in which Hossel expllely asserts the impos ‘Sig ofa eonsclousness without intentionally. re tmp ap ae tn fess exp form, there are merous sar assets in Iden i 61, "Dean Verlchrang der Wee ett Zora ales andres ats ds bio Enuiiom s getae grodnce Esau Stsumnenange ond ements ah nach been sch ovnseen Sey'Ziblnmethange shectedecer Vemunf suspescleten maven Donn he tet nthe se andere Esebntse gd Eebnsram ‘eafang® auspscleien wisest hse Eieniscar smeahande seat shaved inti tetas being tena, Du They are ot charset st al ‘es Hieow top 8 8 LOTT SEG aga. The moins of at and memact mick ve hie Saphadced gunn ae equvalet fo tov OF {Shon and forsintertan 0deen, $84.7 170 fa, Taeen} 841095485 P1188 8B 276 § 48, P33: snd pan —e.05 a sort of “Har of the se iat toward ie gun’ Husser therefore re ccampany all my representations." Ti $80, pp The 467, pags, Be 4B. to. P 258 9.0.86, § 5.200 ‘160; $57, p. 09 ¥9a-prtgs, se / THE THEORY OF INTUITION A description ofthe structure of conscousness and of inten Nona cant overlock the pervonel characte of genstousnes. Pape life isnot an anonymous flow in tine. Expatoners al vay belong to anego! Jn the Logiche Untcroucarigen Tae ser denies ha the eg isan element of che intention, The eg B denial with the tay ofthe ntentons which Ala ceatn Aine and which are mutually complementary. In Idcen some ‘oges Is made, and the ego appears as tn iveducble cement Conscious fe Acs eign. ao to speak from We 4p bch ives in these gets Tes aconding tote mode in which I Lives in hese acs that one distinguishes the rcepiy from the spntanelty of consciousness and from intencnality. Te 80. {iy ofthe sal when it estate, in ace of cesve udp ‘nent and syhesis of asserdon and negation = te spntanel of she ef in all ts forms, must be faithfully described before ‘ring interpreted In sme ofthese “posliona” scr te sll ies, not ab passively present in tem but as 2 center of Tala, on, “as the fst souce oftheir production” ™ There in these But though the ego is active and can be grasped in an actual ego itis sll ot without relation to the potential epee of aisciousness, precisely because ft is, n'a sense, turned aay from this sphere. This fact of being “tumed avay” posively resupeses that thie eld eonge ince tte sa. The ackpound of condone es {o the tif as his own; is, speak, the held of Is reedom asoers the Kantian proportion that “1 al an empty form, impossible to deter ine This conception has changed inthe course of the evo. forthcoming publications will make 359-66: § 81. p. 163; § 82, p. 265; and pani, ‘The Intentionality of Consciousness / 51 acces to the publi, In these studies Huse! considers the var in al Us concrete aspect, giving the begining of ‘henomenologiealclaifeaton tthe old problems ef penalty, theatre hin, nt wen, dhe oy en gt Teducrd to an empsy, purely formal plat frm which aes ‘gmat, itr coneaved st “personaly.” Before speaking more ‘xy ofthis, we must wal forthe publcaon ofthese works ‘ere me are intrested in the velaton between ntenanally and th sl. The sl smote real" part of colton, a ens tone are for instance. Ts al! intimated in acogiaon in & ‘ery special manner which allows Hussel to consider St prev ce in consciousness at va certain wanscendence In th me Ianente of consinuness"The pate ego anon BrleDi ike theothers nor ists constiutv part of an Evlbul”™ ‘The manner in which the eo relates os acts mst be the cdject of pnomenologealdoscrpions™ But we should im ‘modiatly pnt out tht ope should ot misunderstand the BBrse, the ego estes tos acs" as i ha relation were slat {otha obtaining tetwoen objets or Between consciousness and ‘objects; "ls -trunscendenee within immanence Is a peste and imeductle srvture ‘We insist on the specify of dis transcendence within snmaeice” @ enipatle ha the notion of oge dow mot in any way prejudice the intentionally of consciousness. With the inzoducdon ofthe ego, conecournes doesnot apa Become 2 “Substance resting nai which would oad intentionality in order to wanvceed Ieell, coneclousest i fest ofall Intew {Nona es only within dhe phere of intetionl conscious, i eg ward de ne aca Esunguitn a mbjecve and. an bjcive-cde_ am nga ant an ‘object Iie only as an interaal character of intendionalty hat foe can speak ofan ef, of plat fom which act orginal Let ut summarize. "Te notion af the eg, mich belongs subjectiviy in a manner quite diferent from the hylete data, {sit no wey oppoed tote notion of tntenionalty a8 Ue fonda: ental srucure of consciousness, om the contrary, 1€ resp poses. “ra Real meana here “cnatiotve of something’ reali.” Ig, Hees, 57 p-s08 76. Did, 80,9 160 7 told, pee 2 na!4 / Theoretical Consciousness ‘We wave sat that intentionality is not che mere rep. resentation of an abject, Hussel calls states of consciousness Erlebisse what ie “tived” in the sense of what Is expertenced— and this very expression connects the notion of conscioumess te that of life Ley it leads us to consider conscousness under the rich and maliform arpeets characteristic of our conerete ‘existence, The practical and aesthetic categories are, a8 we ha tered, part ofthe very consticulon of being in tbe sume way 238 the purely theoretieal catagories, However, it would be twisting Hussers thought somewhat to speak here of equivalence In Hussrt' philosophy (and this ‘may be where we will have to depart from i), Knowledge and representation are not om the same level as other modes of lf, tnd they are not secondary modes, Theory and representation Play 3 dominant role in Ie, serving as a basis forthe whole of ontcous life; they are the forms of intentionality thet give & foundation tall ober. “The sole played by representation in consciousness affects the meaning of inition, Ele whet causes the intelectalistc Character oper to Husserian Intuitonism. We cannot avid here the say ofthe role of representation. Hessen users the primacy of theoredcal conscousess from the very beginning of his philosophy when be elaborates the concept of inventonalty* Although we bave adopted here the pone Siew of ieen, we must go bac tee elaboration of 1. LU, Hit tneatgnin.54 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION pce mucin a nie ar Sng a gt Gara ime ip aes deat inal acd wenn os si Serna Ta LES he teeter apt ven es cy nce of oneg fet nes n aatak et ere en Mine ate hange ase sso Smt Cg etn a Senn ese nde hse i tin Py eee ino coco gle na ana a inom tibetan Sey an ray Sree ps fe ional e's ete he Se i nce, be oe cn hare at es ee, TG rota cma Snel ne apn a et hee eco arene ine Sige hana there Secours a Sno ae crn oes ane ee eit ear he ho SESS ete geet sat cites ii ase at ee Sten dvar ae etna tae See soa deals ee soto oars ee pene i REISE ea ‘Theoretical Consciousness nino of gi, grr cb te tan at Sats eee See, cee ogy i stor ees cera aa es rg co ct ders ba tenes tate ed he emer We eat cn rere i gare Cenc va hein Sea Tee hy RTS Seat Sh heen ceraee’s se cr he ed een irre her thle Sr ayo om ee See an eat once Sosa Geta’ fe pee mh 8 ae eet acy be eb See Feet ee aetna one Se en a eit ciate Soak utara Shea EEL ees alacant te ine trea thot Pa ee rc a a a Top Fo. ajar Sede oe ae ance sgt hacia nb me aS a ai secede age a ee re nt efnsay an ms Teco ore the ©. 1d, Porep- 1095 § 120.7 268. 4 th 4 2eitpp. aor Ei pare 9, Ie: Par tn Tap 208; § 129,927 26 Tha: § Yap pp aobeso. 4 53H-P-27 thd 38 a. "it pon; sea $90, B 208, gy56 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION tek), te. Tet us note that thie lst type of character doesnot belong ony to noacs bt aio to noemata. The words "eon? ercepion anne co ot apy only othe sujeete Ticcl an insenon nt aio charter the chet tnrlves ‘hich, inasmuch so tey ate concave to tows act have te {ules of being remembered ered, o naked“ cs wih these quale tht objects forina nema “Te lat of che prelates tat expres th intended quid with the marks andthe eatgoril forme atrbuted felled tater tne Lepsche Unterschungen andthe sence (dor Sins) of he nem Iden’ We mt dsingsh to noon of senve from that of coe; dhe er expresses rene ealied 0 incon.” “he sens, conser in the ftaiy of ite modes of being conscious, fra what Hose calle the “complete norma” (dat tole Nowra)” Since the dstneton beeen norma and moss tas hot jet ben mass exp in he Logache Untersuchungen, Acie mainly the mow clae ofthe sense which Hussel hay stud the under the tem mater” ts a fer nl by ltr mater sent, since ier ntact may have the sume sense A percoplan a tetany, OF $< 0f iaghation may be ccd toward these abe Geet inte spe way” toward te sme “ra Teng Wa Aisinglshes these aca in he manser pope to enc ther hich they pol dee eject tink ofan enting= The fact of the acts ping ts ject scaled In Ten the thes of the noes Fhe diferent acs which we have wed an seamples have Aiferen hse. The nove Conclteof ess com Fost of those characters wich form the empl sooma and ‘xyes the manner in which the jet overs Ta the Loge Untersuchungen where the noctate typ of acs has ot po been considered, the theses are studied under the “quality of “eben me Id, 491, P. 189; § 03. p. 190: § 99, p. 208, § x29, p. 268; See Es Sera ‘Theoretical Consciousness 57 a beet ah aire ieee eee ere Sa geeee eit tate Bae arse tenors pune adden taece mre’ mae Eiuish aoa sar ra or ateera Esta ne peas Chieu a ee See ee eee oes mg ene cream amsin ers sets shecydnecta it tha csretrmmen armaments phe ea oeelopehne kit En artae rattan Sei denen ae eae Se Year aera Soran Severe ie Sowa aes aiartonntions Tet esregutgercomermnemete ora ta giana ras me ate fe ohiahaoriraegen oatoceae Soyer naa tater one Seemann iene Soa lpamaa enero fedting, conadered in etwas nthng tenons, tha SSUES Guin Reyna toa tos fee jects har only He wn 550) Ths representation as at, and not at nj ef vepectatsbin See F Brentano, Papehloie om empl ‘kt Stank Hamburg. Fel Meier 1874), B73 Se EU-H ae (pss) Brentano, Pycholog . 0B 36 Won a898 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION ‘wih a preseotation gies i certain relation to an objet, «rela ‘on oly intentianal by way ofthis eoanestion and not aitally Huser! mentions Brentano's conception of the intentional char- acter of Feelings ‘But we donot merely havea presentation, with an added fling ‘stocavely tacked onto and nt intinallyfelated tof, Dut ‘leasure or distaste dee themasves tothe prveented object and (nud ot eit witout sch a dteton Let us return now to Brentano's notion of representation, Ac carding to Husser, by representation Brentano means the act ‘which Hiussel later calls a “neutralized act,” whose nature com sists in presenting « mere image ofan object in which the object, ‘appears independently of any claim to exist or not exist” Any Humean character of “belio?” i missing. The image floats before ss iio our decng about i existence x nonestence. ito Huser, however, the analysis of intenionalty shows that complex acts do not contain in themselves a repre: sentation in the sense defined above of “pure representation” ‘A judgment not the result of adding our agreement to & mere presentation of this type and does not contain one in tse. A Jerigment has only the same sense or the same matter a @ “pete representation.” But matter dees not exist independently of any quality, and a pure representation has itself quality. It ‘isthe latter which, in a judgment, for instance, is replace by the ‘gality the thests of the judgment. We must thefefore dit: {ul Between the notion of “representation as, matter” which Ee sry a 2 permease he ott Weal See ek i eae gan eee he Groce (end tesa See rt of etme pec a a (lis rant eee ee Nei ies pnt eee oe SEER pan, va ig oat ot tat 36 Did nope aaa: fr, Be LU ase ip aaa TE ‘Theoretical Consciousness / 59 This theory, atthe stage which we have just described, has not yet made the decisive step toward the assertion of the pi macy of theoretical consciousness overall the other modes of reaching realty, over all the other typos of intention. Indeed, that which in am act characteris is particular mode of relating to an objec, and correlatvely the particular mode of existing of fn object, is not the matter but Ue quality, the thesis, and the “complete noema,” det Gegenstand in der Weise wie er gegeben fst" If Brentano proposition i reduced tothe assertion that any ct fs based on s epresentation understood as mater, a8 sens, then it does ltd more than assert the intentional character of acts of consciousness, without prejudging the mode ip wich reality fe given. The theoretical mode of posting an object as Cristi is then ofthe same degree as any cthe, since isso In need ofa representation inthe sense of matter” ‘But Huseer! goes further. Even if a “pure representation,” as a complate act, cannot be found in perception or Judgment, land if Brentano proposition must be rejected when interpreted in ts sense, Huser thinks that be can sl preserve Brentano's formulation in ite entirety by considering another meaning of ‘he term “representation” ‘udgment and percoption, as well as Brentano's “pure rep- resentation,” are but species of Husser's new concept of repre- sentation. ‘But we can employ the term [eprsentation] to over acts which omething become ebjertne to ws [oe welche wns ebva® gc ‘Sandlch wird) in 2 certain narrower sent of the word, one be owed from the manner in which percepts and siailarintons (ap thelr bjects tna single “enatch” er ina sng “ay of mean- fg or boromed, Ukewie from tbe oneterm subject in ce (pric rtatements a rom ac hypothesis (ahte De Ncilchin Voraustetene ering at antecedents (Vorderale. ‘der in acts of ypotbteal assertion ‘Hussecl calls these acts nominal, but he does not want to identify the mode of representation wis te grammatical notion af name. ‘The specie manner in which an ebject is thought inthe act of ‘naming it characterizes a wider sphere of acts, a aphere that goes beyond that of names, 2. Memery an agian. ee next chapter fe Loti aaoip eat60 / THE THEORY oF INTUITION eee ene sei ToL aay ten rere ee Pe pee ooet eacee e ik noe Bh er Pt ete ta Wm Saal ee oie he spe cet en, aed a tg hk sf zor ne vee Risch SRG apiece mien sen eespeniemsenucnaeneenae on seeing ge bees en a rae Geese SS ots lama eee eee sng teva of names of propoaicons, behinds that tei pete eg sapere tote ti ie Boe een otra spate fo ae pee iy anol eo ‘ne may say “Each aes eliler Nit a Petes oF oe a eso el Se ee cman 2 Sachuerhat ram the act which names st penile tn seinen oe etd nee i SS eee nt ot art ee ea Sopra eg ve i of PednnaareT abet aL mon tea eed Say eke omar ae Come) eat Sie Sd Te arse teem a wt Ck ite hei pala ane rae ee own eh Sse ng ne trent lip a eae ono oh ing Ea ug te, i aie meena geet oe onal cecum cance ay ee pet ur tie glx Ppt anne tgs de many —— Perera 2 laren aay gee 30. Taken Tip. pagh ‘Theoretical Consciousness / 61 thesis canbe transformed into a single ray * without affecting the quailty of the act. ‘Fedgments and nominal acts belong othe same type of acts, called cjectying acts (objektierende Akte). Tels wn tis {op ht ene dings betwee are” an jen ‘itrespect tothe quay of objecting acts, one lsungulshes ween thede act and act with a euwalized thesis We econize under the Iter term th “pre representations” whic Brentano wanted to puta the basso ll conscious Le, even of judgment, The representations ae not distinct parts in an act of Jtegment but can be thelr neutralization. The have no primacy ‘nt respct to Judgment, since they bo frm a speie ofthe Same gens of abjetfyng act ite identify the concepts of “epesenator” and of “ob Jecdlying acta” we can, aosrding to Musser, preserve in it {ality the value of Brent's propel. Tis proposition then Each intentional experience is either am ebjectying actor hat fur basa Sn such an Sot, must, inte later ease, coninn 2 thjectfyng ace among its conetocns, whose total matter is Sr ‘italy the eae ae total mater ‘This primacy of objecting acs, or theoretical acts (since this ‘notion fs borrowed fom the fed of assertion), is explcly a serted by Husser. ‘The reference to an objct i, in general terms, conse In 2 ‘eter Baal acer, acerdng mt pens, & he Imatier of objectfyng act and only vough the ltr cam i ‘ecome the matter fora new act-quallty founded pon this We ‘ust after a fashion distinguish beewesh secondary and primary ‘tention he later owing thee intentionality to their foundation (nthe former Huset's conception of consciousness inthe ith iver tion seme to oni fo imp te primacy of heretical conscious. tess ut aap toe in tthe sale access what makes Ge being Of cher Of courseand we aed fue othe Should noc forget thee passage which eset the intentional ‘Surecer of monthecreca tcl Acs of Wil, dese, afeedon, ot ww Bas ale bahes ned roe cet. Bt, long te atte ofthe Tipahe Untrchanpes was caadertony eee ae ecto tn is dai enh te se a wo \ Tan thot seen chert Set ne \sate Lagu Unercchengen, copeing yeas ee ch es iden of occas ak cea eat af acothcpeg wearin then cmbutag yoga conseon ne ly sep Sera ses fear bu mar ieee ate Soyetig Het te mode af senna wet reeled tesa to eee ck Gout orl aan Th ea ord hewn ae tage The chars of veges ee ied age trend them byw do oe es eho Ais he sad of te eon pes Untrchengen Ti vy ie hed aon la wegen, ex jie ne ec nason Hanon Set eens ea ese oral expe someting tat engi hee af he Forni, Woe props are nec ae ee tn ebjecyng fo having ence we a get rab ale ef we se 0 peak era in he reed sng chapter, its because Huse! later rejected there these The [Be vies hs bcome cantante eng tas shih stay aaron a ee i eos ong ints experenet an he een rate ep vate inal te wean kanes ss Ter de cmp wt pute secs aes e Becting act amcng te chris of tee a Sth ode fea han tat of ae eee idea allows us to cant A Pa 0 beyond the attitude of the Logische Unter- We bave spent some tine dacssing the athe of the Lagische Untersuchungen cause te asin of the deine role of theory. pecepitn, and Judgment in or fet ete {orl iscoatue athe tat Hanser hes never ase Far hin, repreeoaton wil always be te foundation fal fe. ‘ven if he ebects of complex acs, auch a wil, dee, et, 2, See 1. 1, foreword, vt ee lao the new tn og A, eremord, pvt p64) ee also che new theory ‘Theoretical Consciousness / 63 exist in another manner than do the objects of simple representa tion, they stl must hae ta som extent the mode of existence of theoretical objecta* We mut even add that n out opinion there {Bs aifculty her in Hsee pilosophy, the problem of under Sanding how reconcile tows two meanings ofthe exstence of tne and the ame object ora theory of inti, the primacy of theoretical conscious: ‘nes bof the ast importaic, as we shal ce later. The act of Intuldon, which brings us Into contact with belng, wil be Rist fd forcmost 4 theoreUeal act, an objectfying act, and 1 Iain: so Zeopite the modistlon that [een wily to ntrodice In thenoton ofan objecting 2 “Thenotion of an objecting acs borrowed from the sphere cf goserdons and therefore tint Husser’sintltionism with {tllectualiom, However, placing judgment and perception un der the same (pe of tet and sing Judgroent 2s only a ne" tiga formaon whch asthe ee galt a pereepton ‘Sod amtng prepare tne way fr the ntunsst theory of truth, ia'sbich we hal dete the next chaper. Fox the frst me “nd perception are brought togeber and. put on the 1 Tab os os surmise tat tt must be Seta fn ch of these acts and that the nication ofa Judgment has Smcthing n common wit the josdBeaton ofa pererpon. 46 Hen, § 95:0. 198. 48 Serel aE aso5 / Intuition ‘Tne enrcronve cuavren bas shown that only an ob- Jeoutying act has the pevilege of giving us an ebject and that our Contact ith reality has the structure of @ representation. But ‘ot all representations have the same right to posi thelr object fs existing’ We may be dealing with purely imaginary objects ‘or with objects that ae "merely hought” Thought, for example, ‘undarstocd at a mental play that accompanies the comprehen son of words, also intentional; is directed toward the object Itzpeans. But this does nt say that thls object exists, and thought cannot by itelf posit the objects existence. The mode of con- Sclousness or of representation rough whlch we enter into eoa- tact with being hat & determinate sructre; 1s, let ws declare atonce, ination. Th order better to understand the structure of intuition, it may be useful to characterae “the meray signifying” mode of though, which isthe opposite mode of representation in which objects ae meant without being given. "Huser! borrowed the concept of a “sgnifying act from the realm of linguisle meaning. Any werd or name has a meaning (Bedeutung), which 's not a mere representation associated 10 "he word but something to which the word or dhe name refers by means of a special intention. In vite of such acts, the expresen $+ more than a mercy Sounded word mount eomediing (er met etwas) and, Instat 1 Hen, 3135, 5p- 280-8. {6s}66 / THE THEORY OF INTUITION 0 means something, relates to what i objective fauf Cegen- indices)” The intenon of «word doesnot necessary cause the objet tebe det seen a8 isin imagination ce perception. Far 2 bord tohaves meaning, ts enough thet an cect meant. ‘We must remember this characterise of sgrlying ste tht ject eno seen o reached, only spean. Ar a eater af fc, igalfying ats ae the ruin ordinary dicoure, Uns ‘muchas we have no image or perception, we Content ours tit the mere at of aiming at'an abject, atleast provided hat We understand what auld fous and hat we ouscves say If-we absinct from what Huser! calle te “level of the Loge which a added characters of te exprensive 2 hich Hone aes a stasing pin), we end up wih more general notion of signing act which incodes all acts aiming Hobutnot reaching tbr objet ‘slgsying nino I empty or, 0 to speak, unzeazed* “oeve, an be realized in an age ors peeepion, Ano type of act can tnd refer othe sate abject sss aloed a BY 2 eignlying intention.“ realzes (erful) conto, ane trate more or less adequately the St of siming, and therefore Actus is relation tis beet: ob cette ine ac wih sa abject nd a iglying 2k, which only eins att the difference between more or less clear al cor less explicit ‘ets. Nonintuve tendons is more tan an mpl allo {© an intutive thought, «shor cut to te fuly realized act. We se no desing wih diference in degre, ts If we wore O- 2» Wty ate 3. Ke conyers, we sac fom what Hom ant ele gan wis Se Daf Cars at sy lpas enon ae Eve inode obs ean hing eine xpress ie rsa sees for oj Gegae eee atl en commegeniy be tinguished fem te fm Bab ate alae tena es 1 Elna abn me teen 4136 5 OAL aug ih Tew ely emma okt Hae ie a Tie a Et aoe «mel Intuition / 67 sing «vague sketch or «ple image to iid and alive paint Ings To ay that ntidon tual the mere intention whch tis a th objeto te say at in intone relate dry f0 ihnctfec we rene te Thi the ene ifeence between ar ingattomething and reaching iA signing intention das wok esses rset any way tony think The flowing “Gontrats that «sign Steno ent confused ina ttn: whon we hak abouts tathemata!propetten, wee Steet Ws meaning and analy te weno ardceation= wrhout however seag with evence ‘he relations end the Teal objec which expres, “To make clear 4 thought Ghee Can be achive by signing pres. tation Therefor, ts neler this Confsion net 0 Seanty that distinguishes sping intetions Crom intutons {Craters an we Rave abel shown, tbl emptines. They ae Shar ty thr ned fort fll (Fae) wih oper to inulon” A spaying itemton oly inks aout an jer borin gets sma of the ec el Even sds of perception Coe plged coe of nto). he Ste finn, fotlGon repent ts ebject by anaogy. ‘Site spying Intention sooo “isi realy no presente tintin noting the object comes to Me™ Viowever, the aed character of empty itentons that we have mendoned nay lead sto ble that an empty inte {on only the expectation of the apparition of an objet dv, expectations are intentions, Ba not all ntentens ae ‘Spectro ewene be deed fue a ‘etanceelakinfges Ertreten|=" When we look atthe pt Xeon ofa nuy that eapears ane the furntar, we pecive oly put off cred the expe intentions ected rom he [ercned part toward the Men part ofthe peter do pot fn ayy cette an epetaten The epee of sign aca ntudes the wl of consclous, representative: We in diferent frm of which core ‘Tad all te frm of ejecting act: perception, Judgment, UEP conjancton Coe exanpes A'snd By. We shall se tat wm ne 1 thd p88 [p 7221 © map vip rah 9, th bah So. tba’. 40.70