SPECIAL ARTICLE

Layers in Globalising Society and the New Middle

Class in India
Trends, Distribution and Prospects
Anirudh Krishna, Devendra Bajpai

The means of personal transportation to which one has

access constitute an important part of ones relationship
with globalisation, limiting or enhancing the scope of
activity and area of influence. We define economic
classes in relation to different transportation assets,
considering as the lower middle class those who have
motorcycles or motor-scooters, and as the upper middle
class, those who own automobiles. Unambiguously
identifying a middle class is difficult; the term is
relational, context-dependent, and inchoate. However,
the lower- and upper-middle classes, defined in this
manner, are robust to alternative definitions: these
groups have substantially higher incomes than groups
below, own disproportionately large shares of other
physical assets, and do much better in terms of
education, health, media exposure, and social capital.
The middle class increased from 11% in 1992 to almost
double this percentage in the early years of the new
millennium. Subsequently, its growth has slowed down,
coming almost to a halt in rural areas. Fragility and
volatility are in evidence; many, formerly in the middle
class, have fallen back. It cannot be blithely assumed that
Indias middle class will grow much larger.

Anirudh Krishna (ak30@duke.edu) teaches Public Policy and

Political Science at Duke University, the US, and Devendra Bajpai
(devendrabajpaieco@gmail.com) teaches at the Birla Institute of
Management Technology, Greater Noida, NCR.
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new middle class has come to prominence since the

Indian economy became market-driven and better
integrated with the global economy. It has attracted
growing attention among academic scholars and market analysts. Identified as its chief beneficiary, the new Indian middle
class is also seen as a main support for greater global integration (Fernandes 2006; Sridharan 2010; Varma 1998). Many are
optimistic that the numbers of the new middle class will continue growing rapidly, benefiting from and further spurring
market-led growth (ADB 2010; Kharas 2011; McKinsey Global
Institute 2007a, b).
This paper presents a contrary view. We find that the earlier
rapid growth in middle class numbers has slowed down and
prospects for future growth may be modest.
Before presenting the argument and the data upon which it
is based, we briefly review diverse definitions and estimates of
the middle class in Section 1. We also defend our particular
definition, explaining why we have chosen to study economic
classes in relation to a particular type of asset.

1 Defining the Middle Class and Estimating Its Size

The term middle class is slippery because it is relational: the

middle is relative to what lies above and below. When the top
or bottom layers move higher or lower, the bounds of the middle class will also change. This variability makes definitions of
the middle class both time- and context-dependent. The upper
bound of the middle classes in a poor developing country may
be lower than the lower bound of the middle class in other
countries. There cannot, therefore, be any universal definition
of the middle class (Hacker 2006; Lahiri 2014). Alternative
definitions based on occupational categories, education, income levels, consumption patterns, and asset holdings are utilised, giving rise to diverse estimates of the middle class within
the same country.
Divided though it is in terms of definitions and measures,
the contemporary discussion of the middle class commonly departs from the notion of class in the classic Marxian sense. Neither control over means of production nor power relations vis-vis the production process is important in current-day calculations, which rely most often upon income or expenditure
measurements. For instance, Ravallion (2009) identifies the
developing worlds middle class as those whose daily consumption expenditures fall between $2 and $13, the poverty lines
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used respectively in middle-income and rich country contexts.

Easterly (2001) uses a different criterion, considering as
middle class those in the second, third, and fourth quintiles of
the per capita expenditure distribution; Birdsall (2010) includes
within her notion of middle class all those whose consumption
expenditures exceeded $10 per day in 2005 and who fell
below the 95th percentile of income distribution in their own
countries, while Banerjee and Duflo (2008) work with a definition based on per capita expenditures between $2 and $10. All
of these calculations, made in purchasing power parity (PPP)
dollars, are open to charges of arbitrariness, as needs must be
the case when one is dealing with a relational and contextdependent entity.
These alternative identifications have delineated what are,
strictly speaking, status groups rather than social classes, in
the sense implied by Weber (Deshpande 2003; Weber 1958;
Wright 1997). The main difference between these concepts is
that while classes relate to the production of goods, status
groups are stratified according to the consumption of goods,
as represented by particular lifestyles and certain assets
(Ferreira et al 2013).
Estimates of the likely size of the middle class in India form
part of this trend. They relate to status groups rather than
Marxian classes, and they work with different ranges of
household income or expenditure. Working with a per capita
income range of $8-$40 (in 2005 PPP dollars), the National
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) estimated that
the share of the middle class in the countrys population grew
from 5.7% in 2001-02 to 12.8% in 2009-10 (Shukla 2010).
Meyer and Birdsall (2012), working with a different range
($10-$50), come up with a lower figure: 5.9% of the population
or 70 million in 2010. Ravallion, using yet another range per
capita daily expenditures of $2-$13 found 264 million in the
middle class in 2009. Estimates vary; the middle class is a
slippery notion.
To predict its future one must be especially brave. Rosy pictures have been painted by some who portray how a rapidly
rising tide will by 2050 (or earlier) lift the majority of Indians
into middle- or upper-class status. Kharas (2011), writing for
the World Bank projects the Indian middle class growing from
4.9% of the population in 2010 to a stunning 70.9% by 2025.
Asian Development Bank (ADB 2010) defines the middle class
per capita income range between $2 and $20 (PPP), and
projects that it will grow to more than 75% of the Indian population by 2030. To put this particular projection in context, it
helps to note that at present close to 70% of the population
lives below $2 PPP, the lower bound of ADBs working definition. Some truly marvellous processes will have to get going in
order to effect a transformation of this size. Growth alone has
not been transformative to the same extent.
Other projections are more modest. The NCAER projected
the middle class growing to 547 million people by 2025, just
under 40% of the national population, up from below 13% in
2010. Using the same data set but employing a slightly different definitional range, McKinsey Global Institute (2007b) set
the middle class at 41% of the population in 2025. There is no
70

doubt in these and other projections that the tide raising the
Indian middle class will only grow, never ebbing.
Assets as Identifying Criteria

We take a fresh look at the middle class in India. Using assets,

instead of the more usual income or expenditure as our identifying criteria we examine trends over time and across different population groups.
There are a number of reasons why assets serve as a more
stable and reliable indication of material status. Incomes and
consumption expenditures tend to fluctuate substantially from
month to month and year to year among people, the vast majority in India who do not get regular monthly salaries. Seasonality plays a large part in the lives particularly of rural people, limiting the extent to which consumption expenditures
averaged over any fortnight or month can serve as a stable or
reliable measure of the usual condition. Assets are less susceptible to seasonal and day-to-day fluctuations, being bought
and sold only occasionally and held for longer durations.
Scholarly arguments have been raised in responsible forums
seeking to replace (or at least, to reinforce) expenditure-based
poverty lines with asset-based ones (Carter and Barrett 2006;
Krishna 2010; Sherraden 1991).
Another reason for working with an asset-based measure is
that peoples own understandings of poverty and status tend
to be expressed most often in terms of assets. Because they are
both stable and lumpy, assets tend to be intrinsically important for peoplewhile income is only instrumentally significant (Kanbur and Squire 1999: 10).
A third reason for preferring assets is especially relevant to
the particular context of the new middle class in contemporary India. Desirous of visibly advancing social status, individuals have pushed to acquire the requisite status symbols, assets such as motorcycles, cars, and home computers, acting out
a new version of sanskritisation.1 Varma (1998:40) remarks
how in an earlier period, just after national independence,
material pursuits were subsumed in a larger framework that
did not give them the aggressive primacy that they have acquired today Even the more well-to-do families felt that to
flaunt their assets was in bad taste, but in the period after liberalisation, a rush for consumer goods, such as cars, washing
machines, and colour television sets has displaced the older
ethos, producing a different image. The new imagery showing
the rise of a new middle class culture in the context of liberalising India depicts an affluent consumer who has finally
achieved the ability to exercise choice through consumption
(Fernandes 2000: 88). The new middle class in India is seen
thus as the site of commodity consumption, whose lifestyles
and buying habits, valorised in TV and print ads, give rise to
processes of status emulation that guide the conduct and channel the ambitions of others (Brosius 2010; Fernandes and
Heller 2006; Liechty 2003; Rajagopal 1999).
Using assets, instead of income or consumption, allows us to
tap different streams of advantage, using a more stable measure of value while also following commonly-held perceptions
and tracking common behaviours. Section 2 begins the task of
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identifying different status groups in relation to key assets with

the help of data drawn from the India Human Development
Survey. The distribution of the middle class among different
caste, religious groups, occupation types, and locations (urban
and rural) is also discussed. That our initial identification of
the middle class is robust is provided support by examining
alternative data sets in Section 3.
These data show that the former rapid increase of the urban
middle class has slowed down. There are worrying indications
that the share of the middle class in the rural population has
become static. We also find evidence of fluidity and flux: many
people who were in the rural middle class in 1993 were no
longer in this class by 2005 not moving above but instead
falling below, even as the economy was growing. Other indications add to these concerns, making us wonder how the most
optimistic projections are likely to come about. Section 4 looks
at different features associated by analysts with the Indian
middle class: higher education, knowledge of English, media
exposure, and social connectedness. These data show that below the middle classes there is a sheer precipice. Lower status
groups loom far below in each of these respects: education is at
a far lower level; knowledge of English is minimal; media exposure is very limited; social capital is impoverished; and diverse health indicators are also much poorer for lower status
groups. Their chances of climbing higher and becoming middle class must be assessed against these facts of their current
existence. That is the place from where new entrants to the
middle class will have to be raised. The means for effecting
such a transformation are far from obvious.

are consistently higher. Income levels and broader asset

ownership are also both closely aligned with this categorisation of status groups in terms of transportation assets, as
shown below.
This sequence of assets serves therefore, as a useful asset
ladder. Two-wheelers and cars are simply a representation, a
totem if you will, of a status group or class; the class itself has
much more than just motorcycles or cars.
Comparisons over time are additionally assisted because
ownership rates of two-wheelers and cars have been tracked at
different points in time. We can use this information to trace
the graph of middle class growth, and we can compare this
graph against reported trends and projections. We draw upon
multiple nationally-representative data sets assembled between
1992 and 2008, resulting in a very broad empirical examination. A word of caution is in order. We examined five separate
data sets (described briefly in Appendix A, p 77), keeping constant our defining criteria of the middle class. Since diverse
methodologies were adopted in the different data collection
efforts in particular, because of variations in the rural and
urban shares of the sampled households the numbers deriving from these data sets are not strictly comparable.
Status Groups and Transportation Assets

Table 1 begins the task of identifying status groups in terms of

transportation assets. It provides the percentage shares in
2004-05 of households categorised in terms of their best-available means of personal transportation.
Table 1: Status Groups and the Middle Class India (2004-05)

2 Lower and Upper Middle Classes

No Shoes

While assets, in general, are useful for assessing households

material status, assets of a particular type are especially useful,
serving as markers of status groups in an age of globalisation.
Transportation assets have this special value, limiting, or as the
case may be, enhancing ones ambit of operations. Those who
have not even a pair of shoes are usually confined to a limited
space. Those who have shoes but not yet a bicycle can look for
opportunities in a wider area. Those with motorised transport
can travel further, benefiting from still wider opportunity sets.
It helps to think of these opportunity sets as a series of concentric circles, with the smallest inside circle representing the status group with no shoes, the next one out representing people
with shoes but no bicycle, and so on, with the widest circle representing the tiny status group with personal airplanes.
Clearly, this way of demarcating economic strata is an abstraction, a stylised depiction of how things work. But so is
every other way of measuring the middle class. No single
measure can capture the varied attributes of the middle class
including income, wealth, education, English language competence and social connectedness.
Our measure is consistent, however, in keeping the classes
(or status groups) apart in terms of each of these attributes.
Higher status groups in our classification invariably have
higher (and in some cases, much higher) education than lower
status groups. English competence and social connectedness
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Status Groups
Shoes Bicycle Two-Wheeler
but No
(Motorcycle/
Bicycle
Scooter)
Lower
Middle Class

Car
Upper
Middle Class

Car and AC

Share in national
population (%)

4.0

34.1

42.7

17.1

1.7

0.4

Monthly per capita

income (Rs)

293

561

602

1,454

2,532

4,455

Source: IHDS 2004-05.

Reading from left to right in Table 1, we see how a sizeable

group of Indians 4% in all had not even the means to possess a pair of shoes. The next 34.1% had shoes but not a bicycle,
while a further 42.7% possessed bicycles but not yet a motor
scooter or motorcycle. Together, these three status groups
make up more than 80% of the population but it is hard to imagine how these people could be regarded as middle class. The
group with no shoes lives below the poverty line,2 while the
next two groups (with shoes and with bicycles) live only
marginally above the poverty cut-off. Their consumption
habits are not by any means the objects of widespread envy
and emulation.
The next higher status group is, however, qualitatively different. Notice how a large increase in monthly per capita
income (MPCI) separates the bicycle group from the twowheeler group.
Table 2 (p 72) shows further why motorcycles and cars serve
usefully as totem or marker assets: ownership percentages
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increase consistently for every other type of asset when one

moves up step by step from the lowest (no shoes) to the next
higher status group. Every higher status group not only has a
superior transportation asset, it also has more assets of every
other kind compared to the group below.
A particularly sharp increase in broad asset ownership occurs when one transitions from the next lower status group
(bicycles) into the lower middle class. The percentage for
cooking gas ownership nearly triples, rising from 25% among
the bicycle group to 73% in the two-wheeler group. Telephones
rise more than six times (9% to 57%) and refrigerators increase
eightfold (6% to 48%). It is a steep precipice into the lower
middle class in India, a range of assets to acquire and not just
a single motorcycle.
A second precipice, another jump in the bundle of assets
particularly the subgroup depicted in Table 2 as upper-class
assets marks the climb to the next higher status group. The
percentage of households owning washing machines rises
sharply from 11% in the two-wheeler group to 52% in the car
group (and to a further 89% among the upper class). Ownership of computers goes up from 2% to 19% to 62%.
For these reasons, we define for this analysis as lower middle class households who possess motor scooters or motorcycles. This status group was composed in 2004-05 by an estimated 17.1% of the population. The upper middle class, constituted by households in possession of motor cars, made up 1.7%
of the population in the same year. Since only a handful of
Indians possess personal airplanes, we leave out this category,
instead considering a fringe group constituted by the richest
people who had both air conditioners and cars. In 2005, this
richest group was constituted by 0.4% of all Indians, the
upper class.3

Middle class definitions are invariably context specific. In

the Indian context, it is not credit cards or Facebook accounts
that constitute appropriate markers of middle class status.
Motorcycles and cars are better suited for this purpose, validated by popular aspirations as much as statistical variation.
Few in India who do not own at least a motorcycle or scooter
would be considered by others to be part of the middle class
and few would count themselves among the middle class if
they did not possess at least a motor scooter.4
Defined in this manner, the middle class in India was constituted in 2004-05 by an estimated 18.8% of the national population, or a total of 205 million people. Higher than Kharas
(2011) figure of 4.9%, it is lower than Ravallions (2009) estimate of 264 million people and much lower than ADBs (2010)
estimate of 38%.

Caste and Religious Distribution: Table 3 shows how the

new Indian middle, defined in our asset-based terms, is distributed across caste and religious groups.
The first data column in this table presents the lowest status
group (no shoes). Relatively few upper caste Hindus (only
0.9%) but as many as 6.3% of all scheduled castes (SCs) and
12.9% of all scheduled tribes (STs) belong to this group. STs
are three times more likely (and STs are 50% more likely) than
the typical Indian to belong to the lowest status group.
Now consider the two status groups that constitute the
middle class. Upper caste Hindus are over-represented. On
average, 17.1% of all Indians are in the lower middle
class and 1.7% is in the upper middle class. Among upper
caste Hindus, the corresponding proportions are larger:
28.2% are in the lower middle class, and 3.1% are in the group
with cars. All other caste and religious groups are underrepresented. STs have the smallest
Table 2: Percentage Share of Each Status Group Possessing Different Assets (2004-05)
Status Groups
Basic Assets
Middle Class Assets
Upper Class Assets
proportional representation, folTwo Pairs Watch Fan
TV Pressure Cooking Phone Refrigerator Washing Credit Computer
lowed by SCs.5
of Clothes
Cooker
Gas
Machine Card
No shoes
Shoes but no bicycle
Bicycle
Two-wheeler (lower middle class)
Car (upper middle class)
Car and AC
Average

67
98
98
100
100
100
96.8

30
4
2
1
77 51
36 30
88 57
45 31
99 95
92 81
99 98
96 95
100 100
99 96
83.4 59.0 48.2 38.0

1
23
25
73
92
95
31.4

0
8
9
57
90
95
16.4

Source: IHDS 2004-05.

One other aspect of Table 2 is worth noting. The Indian middle classes, upper and lower, are not as well endowed with what
are often regarded in the west as typically middle-class assets.
Washing machines were owned in 2004-05 by only 3% in India,
credit cards by 1.2% and computers by less than 1%. A 2009-10
survey by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) found similarly that only 2.1% of all households had internet connections
at home. Those who think that computers and credit cards and
washing machines are widespread in India and those who believe that computers and internet connections are more appropriate markers of middle-class status suffer, as Gupta (2009:
79) alleges, from an optical illusion of prosperity [which] a
small, but highly visible, number of the richhave created.
72

0
4
6
48
83
94
13.3

0
1
1
11
52
89
3.0

0
0
0
4
18
61
1.2

0
0
0
2
19
62
0.9

Big City Dominance: Table 4 (p 73)

provides the rural-urban breakdown of the middle class. Consider first only the numbers provided in bold lettering. A total of
27.7% of urban Indians are in the
lower middle class and 3.2% are in
the upper middle class a total of nearly 31%. However, the
corresponding percentages are much smaller among rural
Table 3: Status Groups across Caste and Religion (2004-05)
(Percentage of Each Caste and Religious Group belonging to Each Social Layer)

Average (%)
Upper castes
OBCs
SCs
STs
Muslims
Others

No Shoes

Shoes
but No
Bicycle

Bicycle

Two-Wheeler
(Lower Middle
Class)

4.0
0.9
3.7
6.3
12.9
3.2
1.2

34.1
31.2
31.9
38.4
36.2
39.1
32.0

42.7
35.4
46.6
46.1
44.5
44.4
34.5

17.1
28.2
16.6
8.6
5.8
11.5
26.2

Car
Car
Total
(Upper Middle and AC
Class)

1.7
3.1
1.0
0.5
0.6
1.5
5.3

0.4
1.1
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.3
0.7

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Source: IHDS 2004-05.

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SPECIAL ARTICLE

households, respectively, 11% and 0.8%, making for a total of a

little less than 12%.6
The Indian middle class has a distinctly urban bias: 58% of
the lower middle class and 66% of the upper middle class is
based in urban locations, even though the urban share of the
Indian population is just over 30%. The odds that a randomly
picked Indian is middle class are thus more than twice as high
if she lives in a city (and not in a village).
Table 4 also shows that a share of the middle class follows a
distinct gradient, falling nearly consistently from the largestto the smallest-sized town and down further until the most

labour-market considerations, of risks and reversals of fortune,

and movements into and out of the middle class.
3 Broadening the Analysis and Examining Trends

Meanwhile, let us examine how the middle class is reflected

within diverse nationally-representative data sets compiled
between 1992 and 2008. We examined five separate data sets
(described at Appendix A). Not all of them provide information
related to the same set of assets, but fortunately for our purposes, each of them identifies households who possessed, respectively, two-wheelers and cars. Employing a consistent
definition, and mindful of the caveats mentioned above, we
Table 4: Status Groups in Towns and Villages of Different Kinds (2004-05)
(Share of the population in each category of settlement belonging to each social layer)
can track the evolution of the urban and rural middle classes.
No Shoes Shoes Bicycle Two-Wheeler
Car
Car
Total
Reinforcing our faith in these totem assets, every one of these
but No
(Lower Middle (Upper Middle and AC
data sets also showed how the social category we identified as
Bicycle
Class)
Class)
Average (%)
4.0
34.1 42.7
17.1
1.7
0.4 100
the middle class is substantially different in terms of a variety
Urban
1.4 30.0 36.5 27.7
3.2
1.1 100
of attributes.
> 1 million population 0.4
33.2 30.0
31.9
3.0
1.5 100
Table 5 shows how the relative size of the middle class has
5,00,000 -1 million
0.5
26.7 33.4
33.4
5.1
0.8 100
changed between 1992 and 2008, the most recent period for
2,00,000-5,00,000
1.0
23.6 38.5
31.3
3.5
2.2 100
which such data were publicly available at the time of writing.
50,000-2,00,000
1.9
27.5 42.3
24.6
2.8
0.9 100
Instead of parsing out a razor-thin upper class only 0.4% of
< 50,000 population 2.4
33.8 37.0 23.5
2.8
0.5 100
the population, as noted above we merged it with the upper
Rural
5.4 35.7 47.1 11.0
0.8
0.1 100
middle class (the car category). Adding the numbers for the
Within 5 km of
nearest town
4.3
33.5 49.9
11.2
0.9
0.1 100
two-wheelers and car categories, we define a new category,
5-10 km
4.5
32.7 49.5
12.3
1.0
0.1 100
which we term middle class-plus.
More than 10 km
6.2 38.3 44.7
10.1
0.6
0.0 100
Look first at the shaded columns in Table 5, giving the comSource: IHDS 2004-05.
bined figures for urban and rural India. They show how the
Table 5: Distribution of the Middle Class across Time and Space
share in the Indian population of
Status Groups
1992-93 NFHS
1998-99 NFHS
2004-05 IHDS-NCAER
2005-06 NFHS
2007-08 DLHS
the middle class (or strictly speak(N=88,559)
(N=92,486)
(N=41,554)
(N=109,041)
(N=720,320)
Rural Urban All India Rural Urban All India Rural Urban All India Rural Urban All India Rural Urban All India ing, the middle class-plus) inTwo-Wheeler
4 18
9
6
21
11
11 28
17
11 25 17
11 27
14
creased from 11% in 1992-93, to
Car-plus
1
5
2
1
6
2
1
4
2
2
8
5
1
7
3
13% in 1998-99, to 19% in 2004Total: Middle class+ 5 23
11
7
26
13
12 32
19
13 33 22
12 34
17
05, and further to 22% in 2005-06.
distant village. Where one lives in India has a lot to do with DLHS data for 2007-08 show a sharp drop in this share (to
ones chances of being in the middle class, a result observed 17%), but these numbers are not comparable. The difference
earlier by Krishna and Bajpai (2011) who call this a pattern of arises in large part from the relative weights given to the rural
and the urban parts of the sample. Compared to any other data
radial dissipation.
sets, DLHS gives a higher weight to the rural part, and since the
Formal Jobs: Occupational categories are not reported in a rural middle class is the weaker and smaller part, giving it
separate table for want of space. These data show that the higher weight reduces the average national figure.
Considering separately the rural and urban parts of each
chances of being in the middle class are twice as high for salaried employees with regular (formal) employment compared to sample makes the resulting comparisons more meaningful. In
the general population. Being able to count on a regular salary urban India the share of the middle class increased from 23%
by holding down a formal-sector job reduces the uncertainty, in 1992-93 to 32% in 2004-05. Thereafter it increased more
vulnerability, and volatility that so many other Indians experi- slowly to 34% by 2007-08.
In rural India the share of the middle class increased from
ence, making it easier to stably remain in the middle class. The
key distinction between the middle class and the poor, as Ban- 5% in 1992-93 to 12% in 2004-05, before stabilising, and then
erjee and Duflo (2008: 18-19) observe after examining a multi- it fell by 1% between 2005-06 and 2007-08. Not too much faith
country sample, is who they are working for, and on what can be reposed in such a small difference in numbers between
terms Those in the middle class are much more likely to be in data that were collected using separate methodologies. The
relatively secure, salaried jobs. In India, of the total workforce broader indication is worth noting, however: even as growth
in 2005 of 457 million, 92% had informal jobs, most with little in the urban middle class has slowed down, the rural middle
social security or legal protection (NCEUS 2007). The precari- class, small to begin with may no longer be growing.
In order to examine movements into and out of the new
ousness of existence that so many in India experience sets one
limit to how many can achieve and sustainably maintain a middle class, we looked next at results from the only largemiddle class existence. We will return to a discussion of scale panel data set publicly available at the time of writing.
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This panel of 13,459 rural households was interviewed in

1993-94 after being randomly selected in 16 states (which together constitute more than 90% of the population). The same
households were re-interviewed to the extent possible in
2004-05.
Table 6 is a transition matrix that shows how members of a
particular status group in 1993-94 had spread among different
Table 6: Movements Into and Out of the Rural Middle Class (in %)
Status Groups (1993-94)

Status Groups in 2004-05

Fan TV
Two Wheeler or Car
(Middle-Class+)

No Asset

Bicycle

13.5

7.6

5.6

8.0

1.7

36.3

Bicycle
7.3
Fan
1.6
TV
0.8
Two-wheeler or car
(Middle class+)
0.2
Rural India (2004-05) 23.4

10.4
0.8
0.4

5.2
3.1
1.6

7.7
6.4
5.3

2.7
2.6
3.4

33.2
14.6
11.6

0.1 0.5 1.2

19.4 16.0 28.6

2.3
12.7

4.3
100.0

No asset

Rural India
1993-94

Source: HDPI-IHDS Longitudinal Survey.

status groups in 2004-05. The no assets group represented

here combines the two lowest groups (no shoes and shoes but
no bicycle). The bicycle group, the largest one in rural India
has been split into three parts only bicycle, bicycle and fan,
and bicycle and TV enabling the examination of some finer
distinctions. Finally, the two-wheeler and car groups, small in
size in rural India have been combined along with the richest
status group to yield a larger status group, termed as middle
class-plus.
Consider the first (and lowest) status group (no asset), which
accounted for 36.3% of the rural population in 1993-94. Among
these households, 13.5% (less than one-third of the original
number) were in the same status group in 2004-05; 7.6%
moved to the next higher status group (bicycle); another 5.6%
climbed up two status groups (moving to fan); 8% moved still
higher (to TV); and 1.7% moved all the way up to the middle
class. Similar transitions in each of other status groups of the
starting year (1993-94) can be tracked by looking at successive
rows of Table 6.
Now consider the situation in 2004-05 by looking down the
columns of Table 6. In 2004-05, the no asset group constituted
23.4% of the rural population (down by 12.9 percentage points
from its 36.3% share in 1993-94), while the middle class constituted 12.7% of the rural population (up by 8.4 percentage
points from its 4.3% share in 1993-94).
There has been improvement overall in rural areas with
fewer people than before in the lowest status group and more
people in higher status groups. The share of the rural population in the next-to-highest status group (TV) also went up from
11.6% in 1993-94 to 28.6% in 2004-05, another indication of
overall progress.
Not every rural household has moved upward, however. A
large number of households moved from a higher to a lower
status group. The shaded area in Table 6 relates to those households who either remained within their original status group
or who fell to a lower position. The un-shaded area relates to
households who moved to a higher status group. A total of
50.8% of households moved to a higher status group, while an
74

almost equal number remained where they were or fell below,

with 34.6% remaining where they had been in 1993-94 and
14.6% fell into a lower status group.
To understand what has happened to the rural middle class
over this period, consider the row for two-wheelers-or-cars. A
total of 4.3% of all rural households were in this status group
in 1993-94, but of them only 2.3% (47% of the original number)
were still part of the same middle class in 2004-05. No doubt,
large numbers of new entrants expanded the ranks of the middle class during these 12 years. What is equally of note, however, is that of its original constituents in 1993-94 nearly half
had fallen out of the middle class 12 years later.
Accounting for such large-scale fragility is assisted by referring to the high-risk livelihoods of many in India. Very few
have jobs providing regular salaries. Most of the rest live from
one day to the next, not sure if there will be any earning tomorrow or what catastrophe might rear its head, depleting reserves and adding to debt. Large numbers fall into poverty in
India, possibly more than in any other country. Poor health
and high healthcare costs alone are responsible for putting between 3% and 5% of the population below the poverty line
(Garg and Karan 2005; Krishna 2010). Another element of fragility has been added more recently: the new sanskritisation,
an impulse to acquire consumer assets, even if they are unaffordable, by taking on debt. Investigating this phenomenon in
Mumbai, Nijman (2006: 772) found that
middle-class status is most commonly associated with visible consumption which creates a temptation for aspiring upwardly mobile Indians to spend even if they dont have the money as long as they can
get the credita sort of anticipatory socialisation These consumers
are not middle-class or upper-middle class (yet), but they are acting
like it. And the financing industry is there to help.

Our examination of rural households whose status fell between 1993 and 2005 showed that they had disproportionately
taken on debts.
A more thoroughgoing examination is necessary for determining the extent to which each of these candidate explanations irregular jobs, health expenses, unaffordable asset purchases, and high-interest debt is responsible for the observed
volatility and fragility. Sources of vulnerability must be rendered harmless before claims of regular rapid growth can be
sustained.
4 Education, Connectedness, and Health

Groups aspiring to middle-class status are further weakened in

other ways. Higher education, English-language competence,
media exposure and health status, are important attributes associated by scholars with the new middle class. Our analyses
showed that status groups below the middle class are considerably handicapped in relation to each of these attributes.
We started by looking at average educational achievements.
In contemporary India, more than ever before, ones educational credentials are critical for ones future well-being. Recent studies have consistently shown how a large and widening
gap in earnings and wealth separates higher-educated workers
from less-educated and less-skilled ones (e g, Chamarbagwala
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SPECIAL ARTICLE

2006; Sarkar and Mehta 2010). Attaining only primary or middle school education does not substantially enhance ones
earning capacity. High school is the critical threshold beyond
which education begins to make a real difference to income
and wealth.
Table 7 reports the percentage of individuals aged 15 years
and older in each status group who had achieved higher secondary (or higher educational qualifications) by the time of
each of these surveys. Data
Table 7: Percentage of Adults (Aged
15 and Above) Who Completed Higher
are drawn from three sucSecondary
cessive rounds of the NaStatus Groups
1992-93 1998-99 2005-06
(NFHS)
(NFHS) (NFHS)
tional Family Health SurNo asset
4.4
4.3
4.2
veys (NFHS). While the defiWatch
13.6
12.7 10.4
nition of the middle class is
Fan
21.8
18.9 19.3
consistent with that emTV
39.0
33.8 32.2
ployed in the rest of this
Two-wheeler 56.0
54.9 54.2
analysis, lower status groCar
68.7
69.9 73.2
ups are perforce defined
Average
20.6
23.0 28.7
somewhat differently.7
The largest increase in the percentage with higher secondary (or better) education was experienced within the highest
status group. In the group with cars this percentage went up
from 68.7% in 1992 to 73.2% in 2006. Among all other status
groups, the share of adults with higher secondary or better educational qualifications fell over the 14-year period, 1992-2006,
most considerably in the case of the status group, TV, from 39%
in 1992 to 32.2% in 2006, representing a diminution of their
chances for getting ahead. The spread of capabilities between
the highest and the two lowest status groups instead of narrowing has also grown larger, one indicator among others of
widening differences. To be sure, the population share of the
two bottom status groups has also fallen simultaneously while
that of the top two groups increased over the same period
(from 11% to 20%) giving rise to a higher average educational
capability for the country. However, a preoccupation with a
rising mean can obscure the simultaneously widening differences. The top and the bottom of the distribution have pulled
further apart even as the mean has grown, and the chances
that many will move up and become part of a stable middle
class have diminished, at least in terms related to education.
This conclusion is reinforced by looking at three other characteristics English language competence among children,
media exposure, and civil society participation (Table 8).
Among children of the three lowest status groups, Englishlanguage competence is virtually non-existent: fewer than 5%
Table 8: Connectedness English Language, Media Exposure,
and Group Membership
Status Group

English Language Proficiency

Exposure to TV,
8 to 11 Years Old (% of
Radio, and Newspapers:
Children Able to Read a Word or More)
(% of Households)

No asset
Watch
Fan
TV
Two-wheeler
Car
Average

1.0
1.7
3.1
9.4
16.9
39.4
7.4

Average Number of
Group or Society
Memberships

5.4
12.3
16.0
35.7
51.5
56.5
31.5

5.6
6.6
7.8
7.8
8.4
10.6
7.4

Source: IHDS 2004-05.

Economic & Political Weekly

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JANUARY 31, 2015

vol L no 5

can read or write even a word. Among the middle-classes,

lower and upper, these percentages are much higher.
Similarly, fewer than 20% among the three lowest status
groups have exposure to media of all three types newspapers,
radio, and TV whereas the majority of both the lower and upper middle-class has this kind of exposure. Lack of English and
low media exposure combine to circumscribe the economic
ambits of people in lower status groups, limiting their chances
of becoming middle class. Finally, similar to what Harriss
(2006) found, there is less participation in civil society by
lower status groups. Adding to their travails, health status is a
great deal worse for lower status groups compared to the
middle class, as Table 9 shows.
Table 9: Indicators of Health Status
Status Group

No asset
Watch
Fan
TV
Twowheeler
Car
Average

Number of
Prevalence of
Unable to do
Incidence of
Per Cent of
Households/ Cataract/1,000 Normal Activities
Diarrhoea/
Ever Married
1,000 Reported Population
in Previous 30 Days
1,000
Women (15-49)
Prevalence of (IHDS 2004-05) because of Morbidity/ Children
Aware of Messages
Tuberculosis
1,000 Population (DLHS 2007-08)
Related to
(NFHS 2005-06)
(IHDS 2004-05)
Sanitation and
Safe Drinking
Water
(DLHS 2007-08)

30.1
26.2
18.7
16.8

7.1
5.2
4.9
4.1

5.3
5.0
4.7
4.1

145
124
136
122

72
82
89
92

10.1
5.3
18.8

3.1
3.5
4.5

3.6
3.5
4.5

117
99
128

94
97
86

In multiple ways, therefore, whether one considers education, health, media exposure, English competence, or social
capital, there is a yawning gap between the middle classes and
groups below. This combination of handicaps severely limits
the chances that people in lower status groups have for upward
social mobility.
Small-scale surveys undertaken in different parts of India
among lower and intermediate status groups have shown how,
in fact, the scope for upward mobility is small. One such study
found no evidence of a significant expansion of the middle
class in terms of upward mobility from previous low-income
groups (Nijman 2006: 770); another returned a verdict of
limited and precarious upward mobility (Krishna 2013: 1015).
5 Conclusion: Securing a Middle Class

The middle in India lies between two global extremes, pithily

described by Dreze and Sen (2013: ix) as islands of California
and a sea of Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of dollar
millionaires has grown apace, even as more than two-thirds of
the population (69%) live below the $2 poverty line, appropriate for a middle-income country. The ratio of billionaires
wealth to GDP in India rose from around 1% in the mid1990s to 10 percent in 2012, among the highest and fastestgrowing rates in the world (Gandhi and Walton 2012: 10). But
India is also home to some of the poorest people, and there is
evidence of large-scale malnutrition. Stark differences in prospects connoting entirely different worlds, one of Facebook
likes and international travel, and another of mud huts and
75

SPECIAL ARTICLE

malarial infection, are what define the range of what is possible

in India.
Thus to speak of a middle class in India as if it were the same
as in the west with the same kinds of lifestyles and habits and
tendencies is to stretch the concept dangerously, depriving it of
much of its substance. It is better to think instead of the middle
social strata in India as a group of people, many of whom
live just above a global poverty threshold, a near-decent existence but hardly amply endowed with multiple modern conveniences and assets. We work with an everyday asset-based
definition that is relevant to this kind of context, applying it
consistently to examine different nationally representative
data sets.
Defined in this manner, the share of the middle class rose
from 11% of the Indian population in 1992-93 to 22% in 2005-06.
In terms of sheer numbers, this middle class increased from
81.5 million in 1991 to 129 million in 2001 and further to 228
million in 2011.8 These estimates, like all others, are approximate and based on contextually-relevant assumptions. They
fall within the range of other estimates that other analysts
have derived using income- or expenditure-based calculations.
Unlike others who have noted the fast growth of the past
and made similar projections for middle-class growth in the
future, we find that the growth of the 1990s and the early years
of the new millennium could be tapering off in recent years.
Particularly in rural areas, the share of the middle class in the
population has become static and may, in fact, be declining,
Notes
1

76

Sanskritisation was the term used by the sociologist, M N Srinivas, to describe the process
whereby ritually lower-ranked caste groups
changed their surnames and adopted different
rituals and practices in an effort to acquire
higher status. Asset acquisition in contemporary India is a kind of class-related analog to
these earlier caste-based status-improvement
tactics.
Average monthly per capita income (MPCI) of
the status group with no shoes was Rs 293 in
2004-05. The Planning Commission set the
poverty line in that year at MPCIs of Rs 356 in
rural areas and Rs 539 in urban areas.
It may seem odd to consider a group that lies
just below the richest 0.4% of Indians as in
some ways constituting a middle class. But if
we were to identify a group that has even limited resonance with a global understanding,
such a depiction is inevitable. As Milanovic
(2011: 118) notes, the richest [50 million] people in Indiahave the same per capita income
as the poorest people (as a group) in the United
States Only about 3% of the Indian population has incomes higher than the bottom (the
very poorest) US percentile. See also Bardhan
(1992) and Gupta (2009).
While this statement applies on average, it is
not true in particular cases, for example,
staunch environmentalists may prefer to use
public transportation, even though the state of
public transportation in most parts of India is
dismal, which goes into the making of this particular asset ladder, apart from the process of
status emulation.
Other analyses of the middle class have similarly found an upper-caste bias. See, for example, Fernandes (2006); Jaffrelot and van der
Veer (2008); and Sheth (1999).

and even in urban areas the growth rate of the middle-class

may be flattening out.
Fragility and volatility, rather than stability or continued
progress, appear to characterise the new Indian middle class.
Large numbers, formerly part of the middle class, have dropped
below.
The situation is made worse because aspirants to the middle
class do not have the capabilities that can help them make and
retain middle-class status in the future. Higher education, together with knowledge of English, has become critical for new
middle class status. In both respects, the differences between
the middle classes and lower status groups are not diminishing and may even be growing, producing a situation of higher
variance. Upward mobility for lower status groups is further
limited on account of the slow growth of formal sector positions. Secure jobs, particularly those of a white-collar nature
regarded by some as the defining feature of the middle class
have not increased as a share of the Indian workforce. More
than 90% of the workforce continues to be accounted for by
the informal economy. Because of poorer health, the risk of
downward mobility is higher for lower status compared to
middle-class groups, another indication of growing variance
and high vulnerability. Unless these attributes are fixed, until
the risk of downward mobility is lowered and prospects for assured upward mobility are substantially improved, the expectation that an ever-rising tide will keep lifting millions into
middle-class status can seem overly optimistic.

Considering, in addition, more rural assets

such as tractors and mechanised pump sets did
not substantially change these proportions.
Some of our earlier transportation assets, such
as shoes, do not form part of NFHS data. Defining the middle class as before, we redefined
four status groups below the middle class,
which are comparable across time periods in
these data sets. The lowest status group examined here No Assets does not possess any
of a watch, fan, two-wheeler or car. The next
lowest status group has a watch but not a fan,
TV, two-wheeler or car, and so on. Similar to
what we saw earlier, the ownership percentages for all other types of assets remain consistently greater among higher compared to lower
status groups.
These numbers were derived by multiplying
the percentage shares of the middle class presented in Table 5 separately for rural and urban India to the rural and urban populations
provided by the censuses of these years. 199293 percentages were applied to the 1991 Census
numbers, 1998-99 percentages to the 2001
Census, and 2007-08 percentages to the 2011
Census.

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Appendix A: Data Sets Consulted for This Study

Name of Survey

1
2
3
4

Year

National Family Health Survey I (NFHS I)

NFHS II
NFHS III
IHDS

5 HDPI-IHDS Longitudinal Survey

6 District Level Household and
Facility Survey III (DLHS)

Implementing Agency

1992-93
1998-99
2005-06
2004-05

Sample Size

Rural (% of Total)

Urban (% of Total)

88,562
9,11,96
1,09,041

59,740(67)
60,761(67)
58,805(54)

28,822(33)
30,435(33)
50,236(46)

41,554

26,734(64)

14,820(36)

International Institute of Population Sciences (IIPS)

IIPS
IIPS
National Council of Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) and University of Maryland

1993-94 and
2004-05 UNDP, NCAER and and University of Maryland
2007-08 IIPS

13,459(100)
7,20,320

5,59,663 (78)

1,60,657(22)

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