K.V.DHANANJAY.

B.Com. LL.B
Advocate

Date: 19-Mar-2010
To
Sri Manmohan Singhji
Hon’ble Prime Minister
Government of India
New Delhi

Sub: The Constitution (One Hundred And Eighth Amendment)

Bill, 2008 (also known as the Women’s Reservation Bill)
does not require ratification by States.

Respected Sir

I am an advocate in practice across several High Courts and

the Supreme Court of India.

Before I begin, I would like to express my heartfelt

congratulations for your tireless efforts to secure approval by
2/3rd of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) to the Constitution
(One Hundred And Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2008 (referred to
hereinafter as the 'Women's Reservation Bill' or simply, ‘Bill’).

The Parliament appears to be thoroughly convinced that the

Women’s Reservation Bill requires ratification by States as
enjoined by Article 368 of our Constitution. Thereafter, this
very conviction has been reflected in every newspaper of our
country. Foreign newspapers, as only expected, have similarly
reported on the ratification requirement.

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I write here, respectfully, to state for your valuable

consideration, that the Women's Reservation Bill neither
requires nor merits ratification by the States.

I recognise that my competence to discuss a topic of profound

relevance to the business of our Parliament may very well
come in for doubt in your mind - I welcome it. Without
intending to dispel such doubt, I would like to make a small
reference to a few of my cases that involve questions of law
that have a profound bearing upon the interpretation of the
Constitution of India. For instance:

Whether the Government of a State possesses a competence

derived from the Constitution to mandate that the official
language of that State shall become the compulsory medium
of instruction for primary education in that State? And,
whether in doing so, the State is entitled to discount scientific
opinion by resorting to the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi?1

Whether a State of our Union possesses the competence under

the Constitution to disfavor and impose a higher rate of
entertainment tax upon films produced in languages other
than the official or dominant language of that State? Whether,
in order to circumvent a decision of the Supreme Court, a
State is entitled to adopt as criterion, ‘region of production’

1
Special Leave Petition Nos.18139-63 of 2008 before the Supreme Court
of India – State of Karnataka v. Associated Managements of Primary And
Secondary Schools, argue for 1100+ or more than 65% of the affected
educational institutions from Karnataka.
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instead of ‘language’ for the sole purpose of perpetuating such

discrimination?2

Whether a Housing Authority of a State is required, even in the

absence of a direction by its charter, to prescribe and to insist
on ‘domicile’ in the matter of administering scarce housing?
Whether a Union Territory, deluged by migration, is free to
disregard Article 341 of the Constitution and to administer
scarce housing to ‘Scheduled castes’ in relation to the entire
country instead of ‘Scheduled castes’ in relation to that Union
Territory as mandated by our Constitution?3

Whether the jurisprudence evolved by foreign courts that a

certiorari court ought to direct a petitioner who comes before
it to instead pursue a appellate remedy provided by statute
has been erroneously adopted by High Courts in India under
circumstances where a High Court, acting as a certiorari court
under Article 227 of the Constitution, is also the appellate
court under the relevant statute? Whether it is competent for a
petitioner to jointly invoke Article 227 of the Constitution and a
statutory appeal provision – say a petition to the High Court
described as ‘a Article 227 petition read with Section 10F of
the Companies Act, 1956’?4

2
Writ Petition No.484 of 2009 at the Supreme Court – Aashirvad Films v.
Union of India; argue for the petitioner – Respondents are the Union of
India and the States of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka,
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal.
3
Writ Petition No.112 of 2009 at the Delhi High Court – Prem Chand v.
Delhi Development Authority; argue for the petitioner
4
Company Appeal No.26 of 2008 at the Delhi High Court – Deepak Khosla
v. Union of India; argue for the petitioner
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B.Com. LL.B
Advocate

Whether a High Court may, under Article 226 jurisdiction,

resort to a sheer declaratory relief so as to hold a citizen
immune from consequences of non-compliance of a Statute
where the non-compliance is primarily caused by the
Government refusing to abide by Orders of the Court; so as to
protect educational rights of the citizens?5

Whether a judicial Order made under Article 226 of the

Constitution is valid to the extent it proposes to accomplish an
objective other than the extinguishment of a cause of action?
Whether a High Court is competent to issue a gratuitous Order,
in discharge of its judicial function under Article 226,
specifically when such Order results in the levy of a tax upon
citizens under circumstances where neither party sought such
Order?6

Whether a High Court of State B is constitutionally competent

to determine the linguistic relations between the Government
of India and States A and C? Whether the High Court of Madras
may enquire into the justification for the Government of India
to accord ‘classical language status’ to Kannada and Telugu in
response to representation by the States of Karnataka and
Andhra Pradesh respectively?7

5
Writ Petition No.14458 of 2009 at the Karnataka High Court – Karnataka
Unaided Schools Management’s Association v. State of Karnataka; argue
for the petitioners
6
Writ Appeal No.1631 of 2008 and 555 of 2009 at the Karnataka High
Court – Cauvery Theatre v. State of Karnataka; argue for the petitioners
7
Writ Petition No.18810 of 2008 at the Madras High Court – R.Gandhi v.
Union of India; argue for the Andhra Pradesh Official Language
Commission- Respondent No.16.
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B.Com. LL.B
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Whether the Delhi High Court, in choosing to not provide for

audio recording of oral arguments, despite spending more
than 42 crores annually on itself, is under a legal duty to
recognise that a litigant is injured by the failure of the court to
reform itself? Whether the Court should therefore allow a
petitioner to compensate for the failure of the Court by
facilitating recording when sought by the petitioner?8

So, how do we determine whether the Women's Reservation

Bill is required to be ratified by the States in terms of our
Constitution?

The procedure for amendment of our Constitution is stated in

Article 368. The said article occurs in Part XX of our
Constitution that is titled as ‘Amendment of the
Constitution’.

Article 368 provides that:

1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may

in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition,
variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in
accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.

2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by

the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of
Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a
majority of the total membership of that House and by a
8
Writ Petition No.12787 of 2009 at the Delhi High Court – Deepak Khosla
v. Union of India; argue for the petitioner.
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Advocate

majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that

House present and voting, it shall be presented to the
President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon
the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the
terms of the Bill:

Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in

-

a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241,
or

b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of

Part XI, or

c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or

d) the representation of States in Parliament, or

e) the provisions of this article,

the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the

Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by
resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before
the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to
the President for assent.

3) Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made

under this article.

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4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of

Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this
article whether before or after the commencement of section
55 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976]
shall be called in question in any court on any ground.

5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there

shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of
Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal
the provisions of this Constitution under this article.

As is evident from a bare reading of the above provision, the

essential function of Article 368 is to specify the procedure for
the amendment of the Constitution.

The procedure involved in the amendment of the Constitution

was extensively described in the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India9
a short while after the issue of our Constitution (05-Oct-1951).
The Court said:

17. Now, the Constitution provides for three classes of

amendments of its provisions. First, those that can be effected
by a bare majority such as that required for the passing of any
ordinary law. The amendments contemplated in articles 4, 169
and 240 fall within this class, and they are specifically
excluded from the purview of article 368. Secondly, those that
can be effected by a special majority as laid down in article

9
1952 (1) SCR 89
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368. All constitutional amendments other than those referred

to above come within this category and must be effected by a
majority of the total membership of each House as well as by a
majority of not less than two thirds of the members of that
House present and voting; and thirdly, those that require, in
addition to the special majority above-mentioned, ratification
by resolutions passed by not less than one-half of the State
specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule10. This class
comprises amendments which seek to make any change in the
provisions referred to in the proviso to article 368…

Therefore, an amendment to the Constitution is

required to adhere to the procedure stipulated under
Article 368 and no further. And, an amendment is
required to be ratified by half of the constituent States
only where the amendment affects the subject matter
of sub-clause (a) to (e) to the proviso to clause (2) of
Article 368.

Essentially, our enquiry here is to determine ‘whether the

provisions of the Women’s Reservation Bill affect the
subject matter of sub-clause (a) to (e) of the proviso to
clause (2) of Article 368?’

Now, let us examine the provisions of the Bill in order to

ascertain what provisions of our Constitution are sought to be
amended or modified by this Bill.

10
(The earlier distinction as to Part A or Part B States came to be abolished by the
passing of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956)
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Section 2 of the Bill amends sub-clause (b) to clause (2) of

Article 239AA. Article 239AA speaks of a Legislative Assembly
to the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. As you certainly
are aware, the NCT of Delhi is one the 7 Union Territories of
our Union. Because Article 239AA makes a special provision
enabling a Legislative Assembly to the NCT of Delhi, Section 2
of the Bill accordingly amends sub-clause (b) to clause (2) of
Article 239AA so as to substitute for the words ‘Scheduled
Castes’, the words ‘Scheduled Castes and the Women’.

Section 3 of the Women's Reservation Bill is the substantial

part of that Bill. It inserts a new Article 330A into the
Constitution. Primarily, this new article 330A stipulates that
there shall be reservation for women in the House of the
People and provides for the extent and manner of such
reservation - you are certainly aware of the extent of
reservation for women. It is secured at 1/3rd.

It may be noted that Part XVI of our Constitution deals with

‘Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes’.

Article 330 deals with ‘Reservation of Seats for Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People.’ The
Bill makes reservation for women in the existing reservation
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the
People.

Further, Article 331 deals with ‘Representation of the Anglo

Indian community in the House of the People’. Section 4 of the
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Bill modifies Article 331 by providing for reservation for women

within the existing reservation for the Anglo Indian Community.

Article 332 deals with ‘Reservation of Seats for Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assemblies of
the States’. Article 333 provides for ‘Reservation of seats for
the Anglo Indian Community in the Legislative Assemblies of
the States.’ By inserting a new Article 332A, the Bill provides
for reservation for women in the Legislative Assemblies of
States and modifies Article 332 and 333 so as to incorporate
reservation for women also into the existing reservation for the
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Anglo Indian
Community.

Article 334 stipulates that all reservation of seats under Part

XVI shall expire upon a period of Seventy years from the
Commencement of the Constitution (the 95th Amendment to
the Constitution extends reservation under this part to
‘seventy years’ from the previous stipulation of ‘sixty years’).
The Women’s Reservation Bill provides that reservation
assured by this new Bill shall lapse upon expiry of 15 years
from the commencement of such reservation for women.

The essential question to be asked today is – Which part of

the Women’s Reservation Bill affects sub-clauses (a) to
(e) of proviso to clause (2) of Article 368?

A simple and a straight answer is – The Bill makes no

change whatsoever to provisions covered by sub-
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clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to clause (2) of Article

368.

Well, then, why are so many people talking about ratification

by States in the first place? Or rather, is ratification of this Bill
by the States necessary at all under our Constitution?

The answer is - ‘NO’.

Let us take a closer look at sub-clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso

to clause (2) of Article 368. Let us examine whether the Bill
affects anything stated there.

a) ARTICLES 54, 55, 73, 162 OR 241

Articles 54 and 55 speak of election to the President and of the

manner of election to the President. The Bill makes no change
in the constituents who elect the President or to the manner of
election of the President.

Articles 73 and 162 speak of the extent of executive power of

the Union and of the States. The Bill makes no change
whatsoever to the extent of executive power either of the
Union or of the States.

Article 241 deals with High Courts for Union Territories. The Bill
makes no change in this regard.

(b) CHAPTER IV OF PART V, CHAPTER V OF PART VI OR

CHAPTER I OF PART XI.
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B.Com. LL.B
Advocate

Part V deals with the ‘Union’. Chapter IV of Part V deals with

the ‘Union Judiciary.’ Essentially, this chapter deals with
matters relating to the Supreme Court. Chapter IV comprises of
Articles 124 to 147. The Bill makes no change whatsoever to
any of the provisions contained in Articles 124 to 147.

Part VI deals with the ‘States’. Chapter V of Part VI deals with

the ‘High Courts in the States’. Chapter V comprises of Articles
214 to 232. The Bill makes no change whatsoever to any of the
provision contained in Articles 214 to 232.

Part XI deals with ‘Relations between the Union and the

States’. Chapter I deals with legislative relations or what is
generally known as the ‘distribution of legislative powers’
Chapter I comprises of Articles 245 to 255. The Bill makes no
change whatsoever to any of the provisions contained in
Articles 245 to 255.

(c) ANY OF THE LISTS IN THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE.

As you certainly are aware, the Seventh Schedule comprises of

three distinct Lists:
• List I – Union List
• List II – State List
• List III – Concurrent List

Each of the above lists contains entries specifying the fields of

legislation reserved exclusively to the ‘Union’ or to the ‘States’
or reserved concurrently to ‘both’.
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The Bill makes no change whatsoever to any of the Lists in the

Seventh Schedule.

(d) REPRESENTATION OF STATES IN PARLIAMENT.

Now, there is no provision of our Constitution that carries the

heading ‘Representation of States in Parliament’. So, what
then is the meaning of ‘Representation of States in
Parliament’?

Obviously, the Council of the States or what is generally known

as the Rajya Sabha is the division of our Parliament where a
State may be said to be represented.

Article 79 of our Constitution stipulates that there shall be a

Parliament for the Union and that the same shall consist of the
President and the two Houses thereof to be known respectively
as the Council of States and the House of the People.

Article 80 speaks of the composition of the Council of States. It

says:

80. (1) The Council of States shall consist of—

(a) twelve members to be nominated by the President in

accordance with the provisions of clause (3); and

(b) not more than two hundred and thirty-eight

representatives of the States and of the Union territories.

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(2) The allocation of seats in the Council of States to be filled

by representatives of the States and of the Union
territories shall be in accordance with the provisions in that
behalf contained in the Fourth Schedule.

(3) The members to be nominated by the President under sub-

clause (a) of clause (1) shall consist of persons having special
knowledge or practical experience in respect of such matters
as the following, namely:-
Literature, science, art and social service.

(4) The representatives of each State in the Council of

States shall be elected by the elected members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State in accordance with the
system of proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.

(5) The representatives of the Union territories in the Council

of States shall be chosen in such manner as Parliament may
by law prescribe.

The reference to ‘Representatives of States’ has been

highlighted in the provision above. So, the phraseology used in
Article 80 to describe elected members of the Council is that
these members are ‘Representatives of States’. The natural
inference that one draws when the proviso to Article 368
speaks of ‘Representation of States in Parliament’ is to recall a
reference to ‘Representatives of States’. And where are these
‘Representatives of States’ seated in the Parliament? Article 80
furnishes the answer - in the Council of States.
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Now, is the Women’ Reservation Bill making any change

whatsoever to the Council of States or to the provisions of
Article 80?

The obvious answer is – ‘NO’.

Further, is the Women’s Reservation Bill making any change

howsoever to any other provision of the Constitution that has a
bearing upon the election of members to the Council of States?

None howsoever.

Therefore, it may be seen that the Women’s Reservation Bill

does not affect ‘Representation of States in Parliament’.
Neither directly or even by implication.

In fact, the understanding reached by the framers of the

Women's Reservation Bill suggests that the framers held no
belief whatsoever that the 'Representation of States in the
Council of States' was even remotely affected by the draft of
the Bill. Section 8 of the Bill states:

8. The amendments made to the Constitution by the

Constitution (One Hundred and Eighth Amendment) Act, 2008
shall not affect any representation in the House of the People,
the Legislative Assembly of a State or the Legislative Assembly
of the National Capital Territory of Delhi until the dissolution of
the House, the Legislative Assembly of a State or the
Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi,

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as the case may be, in existence at the commencement of the

said Act.

As is evident from the above, the framers of the Bill took great
pain to dispel future controversy over whether the passage of
the Bill should result in the dissolution of the House of the
People or the Legislative Assemblies of States so as to
reconstitute the same in accordance with terms of the
Amendment. If only the drafting committee thought that the
amendment was to also act upon the Council of States in any
manner howsoever, it would have been expected of the
drafting committee to express its reservation in like manner.
The fact that the drafting committee has not done so simply
proves that the notion that the Bill should be dispatched to the
States for ratification is not traceable to any exercise of the
drafting committee.

(e) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE

Does the Women’s Reservation Bill affect the provision in

Article 368?

Not at all. That is, the Women's Reservation Bill is not about
modifying the procedure for the amendment of the
Constitution.

Therefore, in view of what has been observed above, the

Women’s Reservation Bill, as it is passed by the Council of
States, steers clear of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368.

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Advocate

As such, the question of dispatching the Bill for ratification

does not arise at all.

The above statement may also be presented in a table form:

Provision of the Whether the Women’s

Constitution sought Reservation Bill affects the
to be amended by proviso to clause (2) of Article
the Women's 368?
Reservation Bill. That is, whether any of the
following articles are sought to
be affected?

Articles 54, 55, 73, 162, 241;

Articles 124, 125, 126, 127, 128,

129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 134A,
134A, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
139A, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145, 146, 147;

Articles 214, 215, 216, 217, 218,

219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,
224A, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,
230, 231;

Articles 245, 246, 247, 248, 249,

250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255;

Schedule VII, Lists I, II and III

Representation of States in

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Parliament

Article 368
Article 239AA. Sub- NO
clause (b) to clause (2)
Insertion of Article NO.
330A
Insertion of proviso to NO.
Article 331
Insertion of Article NO.
332A
Insertion of proviso to NO.
Article 333
Insertion of Article NO.
334A

Further, from an examination of the jurisprudence surrounding

the 'ratification clauses' in other Constitutions of the world, I
must state here, in my own words, that:

A Constitutional amendment is not to be ratified merely

because the Parliament wishes to do so. Nor is a ratification
sought merely for the purpose of pre-empting a judicial
challenge to the amendment. A Parliament is not expected to
invoke its procedure for the sole purpose of pre-empting a
future judicial challenge – the invoking of its procedure must
accomplish a substantial business for the Parliament. If the
Women’s Reservation Bill were to be dispatched to the States
for no better reason than to ensure that it will not invite a
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judicial challenge before a Court of law on the ground that the

‘ratification clause’ was not complied with, the dignity of the
Parliament is bound to be breached because its business came
to be directed by unfounded apprehension instead of being
guided by an unimpeachable understanding of the
Constitution.

And a Constitutional amendment is not to be dispatched for

ratification merely because States wish to participate in the
process of ratification. Nor is a ratification required merely
because constitutional scholars propose as such.

A constitutional amendment merits ratification only where the

Constitution itself so provides for. And a constitutional
provision that mandates ratification should always be strictly
construed.

A constitutional compulsion for ratification is always expressed

in a plain and clear language. If ratification cannot be inferred
in a situation except by elaborate and extensive reasoning, the
requirement for ratification must be held to be mired in doubt.
And, when in doubt over the applicability of a ratification
clause, every doubt should be resolved by holding against
‘ratification’.

An amendment of the Constitution is almost always considered

a difficult business for a Parliament in a federal constitution.
Because an amendment to a Constitution carries with it,
profound consequences to all people governed by that
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Constitution, the procedure for amendment is always expected

to be expressed in a plain and simple language. All
constitutional scholars agree that a written constitution should
and indeed exhibit simplicity and clarity in relation to
procedure for amendment. Our founding fathers were clearly
aware of these frontier principles of Constitutional law.

The scope of power available to the Parliament to amend the

Constitution in terms of Article 368 has been frequently
discussed by our Supreme Court. That is, Article 368 has
become the subject of extensive discussion by our Supreme
Court in relation to ‘how much power does the Parliament, in
its constituent capacity, possess in the matter of amendment
of the Constitution in terms of Article 368 of the Constitution’. I
would like to submit, however, that the judgments of our
Supreme Court that are rendered in relation to ‘how much
power does the Parliament possess, in its constituent capacity,
in the matter of amendment of the Constitution in terms of
Article 368 of the Constitution’ are not materially relevant to
the topic of this communication.

Because we wish to discuss here, ‘not the scope or extent, but

the procedure prescribed under Article 368’, a small number of
judgments of our Supreme Court that shed light on the
procedure prescribed under Article 368 become relevant to the
topic of this communication and are reproduced below to the
relevant extent.

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An apt summary by the eminent scholar, Sri H.M.Seervai on

the history of litigation concerning Article 368 in the first few
decades of our republican nation may be noted:

It may be said at the outset that in Shankari Prasad Singh Deo

v. Union of India11, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 was not
‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a). The Court
distinguished between a ‘law’ made in the exercise of
legislative power and a law made in the exercise of constituent
power and held that Article 13(3)(a) applied only to a law
made in the exercise of legislative power. This distinction was
affirmed by a majority of 3 to 2 in Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan 12;
Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ observing that they wished to
consider the matter further before accepting it. These cases
were overruled in I.C.Golak Nath v. State of Punjab 13 but Golak
Nath was decisively overruled in Kesavananda v. Kerala14 and
the view that ‘law’ did not include an amendment of the
Constitution was reaffirmed. However, the matter was set at
rest by the Constitution (24th Amendment) Act, 1972, which
inserted a new sub-Article (4) in Article 13 which expressly
excluded an amendment of the Constitution from Article 1315.

11
1952 (1) SCR 89
12
AIR 1965 SC 845 : 1965 (1) SCR 933
13
AIR 1967 SC 1643 : 1967 (2) SCR 762
14
AIR 1973 SC 1461 : 1973 (4) SCC 225
15
Constitutional Law of India – H.M.Seervai. 4th Edition. Pg.408. Volume 1
(Universal Publishing, India)
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Article 368 is an original provision of our Constitution. The

changes effected to article 368 by the Constitution
Amendment Acts, over the years may be noted:

Amending Before Amendment After Amendment

Act

Constitution Article Heading read as Article Heading was

(Twenty – changed to read –
Fourth Power of Parliament
Amendment Procedure for to amend the
) Act, 1971 amendment of the Constitution and
Constitution procedure thereof

Constitution None Clause (1) was

(Twenty renumbered as Clause
Fourth (2). A fresh Clause (1)
Amendment was inserted to say:
) Act, 1971
(1) Notwithstanding
anything in this
Constitution,
Parliament may in
exercise of its
constituent power
amend by way of
addition, variation or
repeal any provision of
this Constitution in

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accordance with the

procedure laid down in
this article.

Constitution Clause (1) said: Clause (1) renumbered

(Twenty and slightly modified
Fourth as Clause (2) says:
Amendment
) Act, 1971 (1)An amendment of (2)An amendment of this
this Constitution may Constitution may be
be initiated only by the initiated only by the
introduction of a Bill for introduction of a Bill
the purpose in either for the purpose in
House of Parliament, either House of
and when the Bill is Parliament, and when
passed in each House the Bill is passed in
by a majority of the each House by a
total membership of majority of the total
that House and by a membership of that
majority of not less House and by a majority

than two-thirds of the of not less than two-

members of that House thirds of the members
present and voting, it of that House present

shall be presented to and voting, it shall be

the President for his presented to the
assent and upon such President who shall
assent being given to give his assent to
the Bill, the Constitution the Bill and
shall stand amended in thereupon the
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Advocate

accordance with the Constitution shall

terms of the Bill. stand amended in
accordance with the
(the part deleted by terms of the Bill.
amendment is struck off
as shown above) (the part inserted is
highlighted in Bold)

Constitution The concluding part of Consequent to

(Twenty the proviso to clause (2) abolition of distinction
Fourth said: between States as to
Amendment Part A or Part B States,
) Act, 1971 the change was
effected as under:
…States specified in
Parts A and B of the
…States by
First Schedule by
resolutions…
resolutions …

Constitution Clause (3) did not exist Clause (3) was inserted
(Twenty earlier to say:
Fourth
Amendment (3) Nothing in article

) Act, 1971 13 shall apply to any

amendment made
under this article.

Constitution Clause (4) did not exist Clause (4) was inserted
(Forty
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Second earlier to say:

Amendment
) Act, 1976 (4) No amendment of
this Constitution
(including the
provisions of Part III)
made or purporting to
have been made under
this article whether
before or after the
commencement of
section 55 of the
Constitution (Forty
Second Amendment)
Act, 1976 shall be
called in question in
any court on any
ground.

Constitution Clause (5) did not exist Clause (5) was inserted
(Forty earlier to say:
Second
Amendment (5) For the removal of

) Act, 1976 doubts, it is hereby

declared that there
shall be no limitation
whatever on the
constituent power of
Parliament to amend

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by way of addition,
variation or repeal the
provisions of this
Constitution under this
article.

It would be immensely profitable to look at some of the

momentous decisions of our Supreme Court to ascertain the
procedure described in Article 368.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that 'Parliament is free to

adopt any normal procedure consistent with its own statutory
requirement’ when acting under article 368'. In Shankari
Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India16, the Court held:

20. Somewhat closely allied to the point discussed above is the

objection based on the bill in the present case having been
passed in an amended form, and not as originally introduced.
It is not correct to say that article 368 is a 'complete code' in
respect of the procedure provided by it. There are gaps in the
procedure as to how and after what notice a bill is to be
introduced, how it is to be passed by each House and how the
President's assent is to be obtained. Evidently, the rules made
by each House under article 118 for regulating its procedure
and the conduct of its business were intended, so far as may
be, to be applicable. There was some discussion at the Bar as

16
1952 (1) SCR 89
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to whether the process of amending the Constitution was a

legislative process. Petitioners' counsel insisted that it was not,
and that, therefore, the 'legislative procedure' prescribed in
article 107, which specifically provides for a bill being passed
with amendments, was not applicable to a bill for amending
the Constitution under article 368. The argument was further
supported by pointing out that if amendment of such a bill
were permissible, it must be open to either House to propose
and pass amendments, and in case the two Houses failed to
agree, the whole machinery of article 368 would be thrown out
of gear, for the joint sitting of both Houses passing the bill by a
simple majority provided for in article 108 in the case of
ordinary bills would be inapplicable in view of the special
majority required in article 368. The argument proceeds on a
misconception. Assuming that amendment of the Constitution
is not legislation even where it is carried out by the ordinary
legislature by passing a bill introduced for the purpose and
that article 107 to 111 cannot in terms apply when Parliament
is dealing with a bill under article 368, there is no obvious
reason why Parliament should not adopt, on such occasions,
its own normal procedure, so far as that procedure can be
followed consistently with statutory requirements….

21. These observations have application here. Having provided

for the constitution of a Parliament and prescribed a certain
procedure for the conduct of its ordinary legislative business to
be supplemented by rules made by each House (article 118),
the makers of the Constitution must be taken to have intended

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parliament to follow that procedure, so far as it may be

applicable, consistently with the express provisions of article
368, when they entrusted to it the power of amending the
Constitution.

In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab17, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

declared that Article 368 should receive ‘strict interpretation’.
That is, ‘in matters specifically dealt with by Article 368, one
has to look to Article 368 itself and not beyond.’ The Court
held:

108. It is urged in this connection on behalf of the Union of

India that even though the assent of the President is required
under Art. 368, the President must assent thereto and cannot
withhold his assent as is possible in the case of ordinary law in
view of Art. 111 of the Constitution, for the word 'that he
withholds assent therefrom' found in Art. 111 are not to be
found in Art. 368. It is however difficult to accept the argument
on behalf of the Union that the President cannot withhold his
assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is
presented to him. Article 368 provides that a Bill for the
amendment of the Constitution shall be presented to the
President for his assent. It further provides that upon such
assent by the President, the Constitution shall stand amended.
That in our opinion postulates that if assent is not given, the
Constitution cannot be amended. Whether a President will ever
withhold his assent in our form of Government is a different
matter altogether, but as we read Art. 368 we cannot hold that
17
AIR 1967 SC 1643 : 1967 (2) SCR 762
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the President is bound to assent and cannot withhold his

assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is
presented to him. We are of opinion that the President can
refuse to give his assent when a Bill for amendment of the
Constitution is presented to him, the result being that the Bill
altogether falls, for there is no specific provision for anything
further to be done about the Bill in Art. 368 as there is in Art.
111. We may in this connection refer to the different language
used in clause 5 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution which says
that ‘a Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this
Constitution shall be signed by the President forthwith upon
his being satisfied that the provisions of this Article have been
complied with in respect thereof’. It will be seen therefore that
if the intention under Art. 368 had been that the President
cannot withhold his assent, we would have found language
similar in terms to that in clause 5 of Art. 46 of the Irish
Constitution.

109. We thus see that in one respect at any rate Art. 368 even
on its present terms differs from the power of the President in
connection with ordinary legislation under the Constitution and
that is if the President withholds his assent the Bill for
amendment of the Constitution immediately falls. We cannot
accept that the procedure provided under the proviso to Art.
111 can apply in such a case, for this much cannot be disputed
that so far as the procedure provided for amendment of the
Constitution is concerned we must look to Art. 368 only and
nothing else…

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Consequent to the above judgment, Article 368 was amended

by the Parliament to supply the omission pointed out by the
Court. The Constitution (Twenty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971
removed from Article 368, the words 'for his assent and upon
such assent being given to the Bill' and substituted in its place,
'who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon'.

In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India18 a change to a Parliamentary

statute, the Representation of People Act, 1951 was
challenged before the Supreme Court on diverse grounds; one
such ground was that, in order to reach such a result, the
Parliament should have amended the Constitution itself (and
not an ordinary statute) in terms of Article 368 and that such
amendment ought to have been ratified by no less than half of
the States as stipulated by the proviso to Article 368(2). In this
case, the Parliament had principally sought to dispense with
the domicile clause in the Representation of People Act, 1951
so as to provide that a person need not reside in State A in
order to be elected by the MLAs of State A to the Council of
States (Rajya Sabha). It was urged before the Court that such
change affects the 'Representation of States in Parliament' and
that, in terms of sub-clause (d) to proviso to clause (2) of
Article 368, such change was neither approved by 2/3rd of
both Houses of Parliament nor thereafter ratified by one-half of
the States and that the change should therefore, be struck
down by the Court.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not agree. It held:

18
AIR 2006 SC 3127 : 2006 (7) SCC 1
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1. By this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of

India, petitioner seeks to challenge amendments made in the
Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short, 'the RP Act',
1951') through Representation of People (Amendment) Act 40
of 2003 which came into force from 28th August, 2003. By the
said Amendment Act 2003, the requirement of ‘domicile’ in the
State Concerned for getting elected to the Council of States is
deleted

Restrictions under Article 368

60. It has been submitted that Section 3 of RP Act, 1951, as it

stood before amendment, read with Article 80, had ensured
the ‘representation of States’ in Parliament. Referring to
proviso (d) in Article 368, it has been argued that even a
Constitutional amendment making any change in
representation of States in Parliament cannot be effectuated
without the ratification by one half of the States Legislatures.
On this premise, it has been submitted that it should follow, as
a necessary corollary, that the change made in Section 3, RP
Act, 1951 is one that no longer ensures, by Parliamentary law,
the representation of States in Parliament, or in any case one
that makes a change in the existing law, and thus an
amendment that could not be effectuated simply by amending
Section 3 of the RP Act, 1951.

61. Article 368 relates to power of Parliament to amend the

Constitution and the procedure therefore. The Proviso in

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question puts limits on the power of Parliament to amend the

Constitution…

67. Article 80 prescribes the manner of voting and election of

the representatives of States for Council of States in the
following terms:

The representatives of each state in the Council of states shall

be elected by the elected members of the Legislative
Assembly of the State in accordance with the system of
proportional representation by means of the single
transferable vote.

If the above-mentioned prescribed manner of voting and

election is sought to be changed, for example, by including
members of Legislative Councils in such States as have
legislative Councils or by change in the system of proportional
representation, that would also have the effect of changing the
representation of the States.

Article 83(1) provides as under:

The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolution, but as

nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire
as soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in
accordance with the provisions made in that behalf by
Parliament by law.

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If the duration of Council of States as provided in Article 83 is

sought to be changed such amendment would also affect the
representation of the States.

68. Fourth Schedule to the Constitution lays down the number

of persons who would represent each State in the Council of
States. This balance between the various States is not at all
affected by way of the legislation impugned in the writ
petitions at hand. In the instant case, the amendments made
by the impugned Act relates only to the residential
qualification of the 'representatives' and is not concerned with
the ‘representation of the States’ in Parliament. The argument
that the impugned amendment affects the ‘representation’ of
the States in the Council of States is not correct. The States
still elect their representatives to the Council of States through
the elected members of their respective legislative assemblies
as provided in the Constitution. There was, therefore, no need
for a constitutional amendment as has been contended.

As may be seen from the above, a legal scholar is bound to

incur an impossible burden to discharge should he set out to
prove that 'the Women's Reservation Bill somehow affects
'Representation of States in Parliament' in terms of Article 368
and that, the Bill therefore requires ratification by one-half of
the States.'

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that 'where two
interpretations are reasonably available in relation to an
amendment made under Article 368, the Court will adopt that
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interpretation by which the amendment could be saved and

will reject the other interpretation that would have shelved the
amendment'. In Kihota Hollohon v. Zachillu19, the Court held:

1. In these petitions the constitutional validity of the Tenth

Schedule of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution
(Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, is assailed…

11. On the contentions raised and urged at the hearing the

questions that fall for consideration are the following:

(A)…

(B) Having regard to the legislative history and evolution of the

principles underlying the Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 7 thereof
in terms and in effect, brings about a change in the operation
and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India and, therefore, the Bill introducing the amendment
attracts the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution and
would require to be ratified by the legislative of the States
before the Bill is presented for Presidential assent.

24…In the present cases, though the amendment does not

bring in any change directly in the language of Articles 136,
226 and 227 of the Constitution, however, in effect paragraph
7 curtails the operation of those Articles respecting matters
falling under the Tenth Schedule. There is a change in the
effect in Articles 136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of

19
AIR 1993 SC 412 : 1992 (2) Supp 2 651
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Clause (b) of the proviso to Article 368(2). Paragraph 7,

therefore, attracts the proviso and ratification was necessary.

Accordingly on Point B, we hold:

That having regard to the background and evolution of the

principles underlying the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act,
1985, in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in
the Constitution of India, the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the
Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in terms and in effect bring
about a change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the
amendment would require to be ratified in accordance with the
proviso to sub-Article (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution of
India.

28. Is there anything in the procedural limitations imposed by

sub-Article (2) of Article 368 which excludes the doctrine of
severability in respect of a law which violates the said
limitations? Such a violation may arise when there is a
composite Bill or what is in statutory context or jargon called a
'Rag-Bag' measure seeking amendments to several statutes
under one amending measure which seeks to amend various
provisions of the Constitution some of which may attract
Clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Article 368(2) and the Bill,
though passed by the requisite majority in both the Houses of
Parliament has received the assent of the President without it
being sent to States for ratification or having been so sent fails
to receive such ratification from not less than half the States
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before the Bill is presented for assent. Such an Amendment

Act is within the competence of Parliament in so far as it
relates to provisions other than those mentioned in Clauses (a)
to (e) of proviso to Article 368(2) but in respect of the
amendments introduced in provisions referred to in Clauses (a)
to (e) of proviso to Article 368(2), Parliament alone is not
competent to make such amendments on account of some
constitutionally recognised federal principle being invoked. If
the doctrine of severability can be applied it can be upheld as
valid in respect of the amendments within the competence of
Parliament and only the amendments which Parliament alone
was not competent to make could be declared invalid.

29. Is there anything compelling in the proviso to Article

368(2) requiring it to be construed as excluding the doctrine of
severability to such an amendment? It is settled rule of
statutory construction that 'the proper function of a proviso is
to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment, and its
effect is confined to that case' and that where 'the language of
the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can
have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main
enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly
falls within its express terms'. [See Madras & Southern
Mahratta Railway Co. v. Bezwada Municipality (1944) 71 I.A.
113 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore v. Indo-Mercantile
Bank Ltd. 1959 Supp. (2) SCR 256 ].

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The proviso to Article 368(2) appears to have been introduced

with a view to giving effect to the federal principle. In the
matter of amendment of provisions specified in Clauses (a) to
(e) relating to legislative and executive powers of the States
vis-a-vis the Union, the Judiciary, the election of the President
and the amending power itself, which have a bearing on the
States, the proviso imposes an additional requirement of
ratification of the amendment which seeks to effect a change
in those provisions before the Bill is presented for the assent of
the President. It is salutary that the scope of the proviso is
confined to the limits prescribed therein and is not construed
so as to take away the power in the main part of Article
368(2). An amendment which otherwise fulfils the
requirements of Article 368(2) and is outside the specified
cases which require ratification cannot be denied legitimacy on
the ground alone of the company it keeps. The main part of
Article 368(2) directs that when a Bill which has been passed
by the requisite special majority by both the Houses has
received the assent of the President 'the Constitution shall
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill'. The
proviso cannot have the effect of interdicting this
constitutional declaration and mandate to mean that in a case
where the proviso has not been complied -- even the
amendments which do not fall within the ambit of the proviso
also become abortive. The words 'the amendment shall also
require to be ratified by the legislature' indicate that what is
required to be ratified by the legislatures of the States is the
amendment seeking to make the change in the provisions

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referred to in Clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso. The need for

and the requirement of the ratification is confined to that
particular amendment alone and not in respect of
amendments outside the ambit of the proviso. The proviso can
have, therefore, no bearing on the validity of the amendments
which do not fall within its ambit….

30. During the arguments reliance was placed on the words

'before the Bill making provision for such amendment is
presented to the President for assent' to sustain the argument
that these words imply that the ratification of the Bill by not
less than one-half of the States is a condition-precedent for the
presentation of the Bill for the assent of the President. It is
further argued that a Bill which seeks to make a change in the
provisions referred to in Clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso
cannot be presented before the President for his assent
without such ratification and if assent is given by the President
in the absence of such ratification, the amending Act would be
void and ineffective in its entirety.

A similar situation can arise in the context of the main part of

Article 368(2) which provides: 'when the Bill is passed in each
House by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members of
that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the
President’. Here also a condition is imposed that the Bill shall
be presented to the President for his assent only after it has
been passed in each House by the prescribed special majority.
An amendment in the First and Fourth Schedules referable to
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Article 4 can be introduced by Parliament by an ordinary law

passed by simple majority. There may be a Bill which may
contain amendments made in the First and Fourth Schedules
as well as amendments in other provisions of the Constitution
excluding those referred to in the proviso which can be
amended only by a special majority under Article 368(2) and
the Bill after having been passed only by an ordinary majority
instead of a special majority has received the assent of the
President. The amendments which are made in the First and
Fourth Schedules by the said amendment Act were validly
made in view of Article 4 but the amendments in other
provisions were in disregard to Article 368(2) which requires a
special majority. Is not the doctrine of severability applicable
to such an amendment so that amendments made in the First
and Fourth Schedules may be upheld while declaring the
amendments in the other provisions as ineffective? A contrary
view excluding the doctrine of severability would result in
elevating a procedural limitation on the amending power to a
level higher than the substantive limitations.

32…We accordingly hold on contentions 'C and 'D':

That there is nothing in the said proviso to Article 368(2) which

detracts from the severability of a provision on account of the
inclusion of which the Bill containing the Amendment requires
ratification from the rest of the provisions of such Bill which do
not attract and require such ratification. Having regard to the
mandatory language of Article 368(2) that ‘thereupon the
Constitution shall stand amended’ the operation of the proviso
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should not be extended to constitutional amendments in a Bill

which can stand by themselves without such ratification.

That, accordingly, the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act,

1985, in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in
the Constitution of India, to the extent of its provisions which
are amenable to the legal-sovereign of the amending process
of the Union Parliament cannot be overborne by the proviso
which cannot operate in that area. There is no justification for
the view that even the rest of the provisions of the
Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, excluding
Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule become constitutionally
infirm by reason alone of the fact that one of its severable
provisions which attracted and required ratification under the
proviso to Article 368(2) was not so ratified. That Paragraph 7
of the Tenth Schedule contains a provision which is
independent of, and stands apart from, the main provisions of
the Tenth Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy
for the evil of unprincipled and unethical political defections
and, therefore, is a severable part. The remaining provisions of
the Tenth Schedule can and do stand independently of
Paragraph 7 and are complete in themselves workable and are
not truncated by the excision of Paragraph 7.

At this juncture, it becomes necessary to point out and to

lament at the inadequacies that one faces when engaging in a
study of 'what Bills were previously dispatched to the States
for ratification and what became the outcome thereafter'. Even
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has had to, at times, labour
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with incomplete information. In Builders Association of India v.

Union of India20, the Court said:

28. The first contention raised before us regarding the

constitutionality of the 46th Amendment need not detain us
long. This contention was based on the assumption that the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States which were
in existence during the relevant period had not ratified the Bill
which ultimately became the 46th Amendment before the
President gave his assent. It was argued that such ratification
was necessary since the provisions contained in the 46th
Amendment had the effect of enlarging the scope of Entry 54
of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by
empowering the Legislatures of States to levy sales-tax on the
turnover relating to the transactions referred to in Sub-clauses
(a) to (f) of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution
which they could not have done before the 46th Amendment.
It was contended that irrespective of the fact whether the
amendment of an entry in any of the lists of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution had the effect of either curtailing
or enlarging the powers of Parliament or the Legislatures of
States, a Bill making provision for such amendment had to be
ratified by Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States
by resolutions passed to that effect before such a Bill was
presented to the President for assent in view of the express
provisions contained in Clause (c) of the proviso to Article
368(2) of the Constitution.

20
AIR 1989 SC 1371 : 1989 (2) SCC 645
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29. At the hearing of the above case the learned Attorney-

General for India produced before us the Memorandum dated
the 31st January, 1982 signed by the Secretary-General of the
Rajya Sabha which reads thus:

Rajya Sabha Secretariat Parliament House, New Delhi. No. Rs.

1/21/81-B Dated the 31st January, 1982 Memorandum

In pursuance of Article 368 of the Constitution of India, the

assent copy of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Bill, is
presented to the President. This Bill has been passed by the
Houses of Parliament and has been also ratified by the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States in
accordance with the provision of the proviso to Clause (2) of
Article 368 of the Constitution. Legislatures of the following
States have passed resolutions ratifying the amendments: -

1. Haryana 2. Himachal Pradesh 3. Karnataka 4. Madhya

Pradesh 5. Maharashtra 6. Manipur 7. Meghalaya 8. Orissa 9.
Punjab 10. Rajasthan 11. Sikkim 12. Tamil Nadu

A copy each of the letters received from these Legislatures is

placed below.

Sd/-

(Sudarshan Agarwal) Secretary-General

To The Secretary to the President, Through the Secretary,

Ministry of Law)

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The Attorney-General has also produced before us the file

containing the resolutions passed by the Legislatures of the 12
States referred to in the Memorandum, set out above. We are
satisfied that there has been due compliance of the provisions
contained in the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution.
We, therefore, reject the first contention. Before proceeding
further, we should observe that there would have been no
occasion for an argument of this type being urged in Court if at
the commencement of the Act it had been stated that the Bill
in question had been presented to the President for his assent
after it had been duly ratified by the required number of
Legislatures of States. We hope that this suggestion will be
followed by the Central Secretariat hereafter since we found
that even the Attorney-General was not quite sure till the case
was taken up for hearing that the Bill which had become the
46th Amendment had been duly ratified by the required
number of States.

Finally, I summarise below, in my own words, the conclusion

made in this communication - that the Women's Reservation
Bill neither requires nor merits ratification by States.

A constitution should inform on ratification by a plain and

simple language. It should be noted that federal constitutions
always propose onerous procedure for effecting a
constitutional amendment. Where a federal constitution
mandates that a proposed amendment to the Constitution
should be ratified by some or all of the constituent States, it
must be presumed that there can arise no doubt over the
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circumstances that call for such ratification. And in a case of

doubt, it must be presumed that the ratification clause is
inapplicable. Article 368 provides for the amendment of the
Constitution and prescribes two distinct procedures – the first
procedure involves the approval of the proposed amendment
by not less than 2/3rd of the strength separately of both Houses
of Parliament. The other procedure involves the completion of
the first procedure and thereafter, the dispatch of the Bill to
the States for ratification by one-half of the States of our
Union. As is clearly evident, of the two onerous procedures
stipulated by Article 368, the procedure stipulated by the
proviso is more onerous than the first. Further, for the proper
appreciation of any provision of a constitution, due regard
should be had to the original set of circumstances that
prevailed at the introduction of the provision. Some
constitutional scholars are inclined to suggest that a
ratification by one half of the States is not particularly onerous
in view of the fact that voting in the State Legislatures or
Parliament is controlled by 'whip' or 'direction' issued by
political parties to its members and that grave consequences
attend disobedience to such direction. But the essential
consideration that these constitutional scholars omit to note is
that, when Article 368 was originally introduced into the
Constitution, the Tenth Schedule was not even conceived and
that, voting in the State Legislature or Parliament before the
advent of the Constitution (Fifty Second Amendment) Act,
1985, that brought in the Tenth Schedule, was subject to
conscience and prone to dissent. As such, in evaluating a

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‘ratification clause' in a written constitution, regard must be

necessarily had to the original circumstances under which the
ratification was required to be effected.

Therefore, where the provision governing a Constitutional

amendment prescribes two procedures of which, the less
onerous procedure is also incorporated into the more onerous
procedure, the more onerous procedure cannot begin unless
the language of the more onerous procedure is clear and
unambiguous. There is nothing in Article 368 of our
Constitution to suggest that any of the sub-clauses (a) to (e) to
the proviso to clause (2) are even remotely affected by the
Women’s Reservation Bill.

As such, any decision of the Parliament to dispatch the

Women’s Reservation Bill to the States for ratification would be
a decision that detracts from the essential business of
Parliament of India unless the Parliament itself is aware of a
direct necessity gathered by its own reading of the
Constitution of India.

In the final analysis, I wish to state that, should the Hon'ble

Parliament of India reach a satisfaction, hereafter, that the
Women's Reservation Bill does not require ratification by
States as mandated by the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368,
the world would decisively expect the Hon'ble Parliament of
India to proceed to transact the balance of its business at the
House of People in relation to the Women's Reservation Bill.

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 K.V.DHANANJAY.
B.Com. LL.B
Advocate

Should only the Parliament of India choose to demonstrate its

solemn’ will to the people of the world, the Women's
Reservation Bill could become the law in India in less than
three weeks from today.

Sincerely

K.V.DHANANJAY
Advocate

No.296, Kamakshipalya
Magadi Main Road
Bangalore 560 079

No.43, Ajantha Apartments

(No 36), I.P. Extension
Near AVB Public School
New Delhi 110 092

Mobile: 09902909390

dhananjaylegal@gmail.com

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