Ruth Barcan Marcus LF we are to talk about things in a public lan- agua ge, if we are to entertain the possibility that thing might aot have had properties which in actuxal fact uniquely describe it or if 2 thing remains what it is through many vieisinudes but ceases to exist altogether through others, then there is « semana role for genuine proper arms which is different from the semantical role fof singular descriptions. I clled this directly refer~ ‘ings role tagging’ beyond which those names have ‘no. meaning. Singular descriptions can as Russell explains in Principia Mathematica be surrogate for igen ine proper names in suitably restricted exten sional contexts ~ where taking them 25 flanking an ‘denny sign instead of wnpacking them in accord- ance with the theory of descriptions will nt, on Substitution, take ws from traths to falsehoods. 1 pointed out that it often happens, in 2 growing, changing lan~ fpuage, that 2 descriptive phrase comes to be used 48 a proper name ~ an identifying tag ~ and the descriptive meaning is lst or ignored ‘Sometimes we use devices such as capitaliza- tion with or without dropping the definite art- {cle to indicate a change in use. Capitalization ike the artifice of single quotes is ‘cornmonly used to deny independent meaning to those parts of an expression ordinarily taken 25 constributing to the meaning of the whole. “Against those recollections consider Quine’s segruments about the Evening Star and the Morn ing Star which is supposed to render modal logic incoherent. It is interesting to trace che arguments through ‘The problem of interpreting modal logic! in 1947 and the 1953, 1961 and 1980 versions of Reference and modality” In the 1953 and 1961 versions he acknowledges Smulljan’s proposed solution which purports to employ the theory of “descriptions but Quine ertcies the employment fs ‘an alterntion of Russell's familiar logic of descriptions’ because ‘Smullyan allows difference fof scope to affect erat value even in cases where the description concerned succeeds in naming" Bat of course it was a mistake for Quine to claim that Smullyan had ‘altered’ Rossel’s logic of descriptions. Tt was in fact an exact employment fs aid out fn ‘On denoting’ and exemplified there Dy. Russell in his analysis of apparens eubssintion failures in contexts of epistemological attitudes. It {g central point of Russel’ theory that in such ‘contexts even singular descriptions which succeed eb in denoting one thing must be unpacked. Quine's claim in 1953 and 1961 that for Russell ‘change in the scope of « description was indifferent to the truth value of any satement, however, unless the scription failed eo name’ was falee and missed ‘what Rustell regarded as an innovative feature of the theory. In the 1980 revision those passages bout Smullyan's purported misemployment of the theory of descriptions are deleted and replaced. Now the solution of Smollyan is represented 3s “taking a leaf from Russell’, and it is seen that ‘scope is indifferent to extensional contexts. But Sean sill matter in intensional ones.” In summary, by 1980 itis finally seem that by fully employing the theory of descriptions and allowing fer fixed reference of ordinary proper names the substita- tion failure is dispelled. But now Quine points out ‘thacthe sucessful analysis places a modal operator in the scope of quantifier and in fron ofan open sentence which means ‘adopting an invidious atti tude toward certain ways of uniquely specifying [an object} 2 and ‘favoring other ways. a8 some- hhow better revealing “the essence” ofthe object’. * So the issue is now the spectre of essentialism: 2 sorting of properties as essential or non-essential 10 ‘objects which have them. ‘Some further comments on the arguments from substinusion failure and essentialism. As Quine actually presented it, ‘the Evening Sta’ and ‘the ‘Moming Star’ are capitalized. Ifthe descriptions have thereby been converted into proper names thea there isin accordance with the necessity of identity (NI) no substization failure. Substitutvity ‘of proper narmes goes through in modal contexts sales veritate. So ere Quine would have to ques~ tion direct fixed reference for ‘genuine proper names’ of the plausibility of necessity of identity or both. ‘One of Quine's early criticisms was directed against the necessity of identity (ND. In 1953 be claims that NI forces a shift from extensions to imensions, What went unnoticed is that one of the powers of the theary of descriptions is that it unpacks so-called ‘contingent’ identities generally requiring at least one singular description inco ‘material equivalences which cannot be intersubst- tuted within the scope of the necessity operator. Indeed, the Srmullyan solution to the substitution puzle falls under the general substitution the- trems for biconditonals mentioned above ‘By 1961 the claim that modal contexts generally and NI in particular force a replacement of exten- sions by intensions has been abandoned. Instead he