FIRST DIVISION

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605

FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
FERNANDO M. MANOTOK,
FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA.
MAMERTA M. MANOTOK,
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA
L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III,
MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK,
MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA
MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO
MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK
III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL
A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP
L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE
L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L.
MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE
MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L.
MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok,
Petitioners, Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,

represented by TERESITA Promulgated:

BARQUE HERNANDEZ,
Respondents. December 12, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335,
the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision[1] of the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended
Decision[2] of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute
respondents
TCT
No.
T-210177
and
the March
12,
[3]
2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals[4] are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late
Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name
of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax
receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative
reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title
TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of
petitioners predecessors-in-interest is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting

officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177[5] on grounds that:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473

Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No.
210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of
342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of
Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No.
Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as
categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys
Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19,
1997.[6]

Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied

order dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.

in

an

[7]

The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required
the submission of documents other than the owners duplicate certificate of
title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with
the owners duplicate certificate of title.[8] The LRA further declared:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by
clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of
the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners
duly presented the original of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT
No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No.
210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177
was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted
the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and
boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to
the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as
indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form
No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity,
authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established
indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances,
the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is
mandatory.[9]
.

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan

FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief,
Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository
of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region
including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and
Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by
Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96
.... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty.
Bustos confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in
the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in
his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed
the existence and authenticity of said plan.
.
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that
his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied
by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau
of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the
microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned
Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No.
1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer printout is duly supported by an Offical Receipt .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as
it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof.
The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be
simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and
concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. [10]

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners title was

fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently
reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents title may only be reconstituted
after a judicial declaration that petitioners title was void and should therefore
be cancelled.[11]
The dispositive portion of the LRAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.

shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481

(372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by

respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration and
respondents prayer for immediate reconstitution were denied.[13]
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review[14] with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the
LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being
subjected to the condition that petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.[15] Petitioners
likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision[16] on September 13, 2002, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed
Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the
petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondents moved for reconsideration.[18] On November 7, 2003, the

Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an
Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and
the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners valid,
genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CAG.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,[20] hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No.
162605.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[21] on October 29, 2003, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of
the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[22]

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the
LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution
since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents
title.[23]
Respondents motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division
of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby

GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is
RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and
directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T210177.
SO ORDERED.[24]

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions
for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No.
162335, respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:
I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS EXISTING
TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF
SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE
DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER
REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT
CAN
ORDER
THE
ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY
ALLOWING A SHORT CUT, THE MAJORITY JUSTICES
DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING

OF
THIS
HONORABLE
COURT
IN ORTIGAS
V.
VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING
OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF
THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF
MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS
HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS
RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE
RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS PROPERTY. HENCE,
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINAS
TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO
SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH
WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF
PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.[25]

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD
DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF
PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER
AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY
DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER
THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL
ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF,
REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD
DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED
DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO
CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOKS TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR

POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING
ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24,
1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN
LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT
THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH
LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS
EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.
IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER
BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE
TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE
ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT
SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF
FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO
OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE
DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED
OUT OF TIME.[26]

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with
the petition in G.R. No. 162335.[27]
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul
their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents Torrens title would be a
collateral attack on petitioners existing title; (c) they were not given the
opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of
their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the
LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title; and (e)
the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined
himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution.
Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26[28] clearly provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of
the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

....
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted
in support thereof the owners duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax
receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than
sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26
which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following
the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of
the same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and
technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution
is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:
Section 12. Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this
Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken
from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.[29]

Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate

certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the
submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the
submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of
sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give

more weight and preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over
the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents title is authentic,
genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners title is sham and spurious, as
affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before
this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even
finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no
longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule
that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that
this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.[30]
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or
whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing
and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions
of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and
analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be
said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents
presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of
protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule,
confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.[31] A
petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable.[32]
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,[33] this Court
categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a
factual finding that petitioners title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is
bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case

to the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents',
is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed
by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative
reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is
adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles
submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or
spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration,
then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the
reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the Court of
Appeals.[34]
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from
the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and
existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.
Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed
only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction
over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or
final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the
RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and
thereafter appeal the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the

LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that
petitioners title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,[35] we ruled that:
Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of
sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos favor should be
had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the
Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court,
and it is not within de los Santos power in any case to alter those facts
at any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts,
for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings be
yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be
needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination
of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the
adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further
proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an

issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised
again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of
the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on
the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand thereof.[36]
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The
doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et
al.[37] does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:
[L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles cannot be
the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment
the cancellation of such existing titles. The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties forreconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by
duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners.
The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the
Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two
certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. [38]

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the

existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title
subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant
case, it cannot be said that petitioners title was duly issued much less could
it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of
Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in
refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared
in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:[39]
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand
of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with
instructions that Ortigas and the Solicitor Generals appeals from the
judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due
course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This,
in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas.
Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molinas theory or
cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand
and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly
circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molinas cause to prosper.
To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed,
the validity of respondents and petitioners title have been squarely passed
upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et
al.,[40] where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title
over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein
is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.[41] There
was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the
property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject
of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of

their property without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered
the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the
RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC
for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and
petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and
affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution
and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners
acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the
LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass
judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by
these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence
of due process.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:[42]
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous
petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in
submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition,
and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of
the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented
was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue,
the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners title

which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.[43] As pertinently
held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:[44]
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed
valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not
apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that
her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption
that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is
overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report that
TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis
.

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate

of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest
title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus,
while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has
no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title,
it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious
controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly

reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation
cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.[45]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. 210177;
and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners
TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute
respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred
in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[2]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissented.
[3]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.
[4]
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.
[5]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 87.
[8]
Id. at 90.
[9]
Id. at 91.
[10]
Id. at 92.
[11]
Id. at 94.
[12]
Id. at 95.
[13]
Id. at 97.
[14]
Id. at 99-121.
[15]
Id. at 119.
[16]
Id. at 236-240. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
[17]
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 240.
[18]
Id. at 273-293.
[19]
Id. at 65.
[20]
Id. at 73.
[21]
CA-G.R SP No. 66642, Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 106-111. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G.
Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[22]
Id. at 110.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id. at 117.
[25]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 22-23.
[26]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 35-37.
[27]
Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 386.
[28]
AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED.
[29]
Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title
was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
[30]
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corp. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 193, 204 [1997].
[31]
Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636-637.

[32]

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439, 449.
G.R. No. 133465, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58, 62-63.
[34]
Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
[35]
G.R. No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508, 514.
[36]
Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994, 229
SCRA 15, 29.
[37]
201 Phil. 727 [1982].
[38]
Id. at 744.
[39]
G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 500-501.
[40]
215 Phil. 430 [1984].
[41]
Id. at 436.
[42]
149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].
[43]
Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].
[44]
Supra at 63 & 66.
[45]
Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA 735, 741.
[33]