Is it really fair to blame de Valera for the outbreak of civil war in Ireland in

1922?
The Irish Civil war followed directly after the end of Irelands war for
Independence, republicans were split down the middle, and had now turned
their attentions away from the British and towards each other. The Irish Civil
war would have been unexpected only a year earlier. However when
discussions began to end Irelands war against Britain, it became apparent
that the British would not accept the republic they had been fighting for.
Irelands unofficial republican government at this time was politically led by
Eamon de Valera, who himself corresponded with the British in the hope of
ending the war. However as it became apparent that the republic would not be
given, in a last hope de Valera controversially sent a delegation that didnt
include him, to discuss the treaty. This is seen by some as de Valera setting
up others to take a fall for him, the failure of the treaty to achieve everything
that the IRA had been fighting for, led to a bloody split between them and a
Civil war.
Following de Valeras return from his American trip in 1920, he resumed his
position at the forefront Irish Republicanism. However, it was now a different
republicanism to the one he had left behind. Michael Collins, who was young
and had claimed his own position at the helm of the IRA, was greatly
respected and admired by the people of Ireland. If de Valera wished to return
to his previous position, it would have to be along side Collins. Their
partnership, although filled with jealousy and sometimes-threadbare relations
as shown by Hoppen Michael Collins enjoyed the dominant influence over
the IRA, something which did nothing to improve relations between the two
men1, was a fruitful one. They had led the IRA along with Sinn Fein and
Ireland in its war of Independence from 1919 to 1921. Collins and de Valeras
leadership had led to the British Government under David Lloyd George
proposing talks and an end to the war. Lloyd George and de Valera began
correspondence in June 1921, with the eventual aim of both sides to be a
treaty and a new beginning for Ireland. Despite this, they both had opposing
views on how this treaty should be worded, and what it should entail. The
British, unwilling to lose any grasp whatsoever on their empire refused to even
contemplate the idea of giving Ireland the republic it craved. This would be the
base to the later split within Sinn Fein, and within Ireland. In Lloyd George and
de Valeras correspondence it was clear on the British side that there would
be no treaty, if the Irish didnt relent on a republic. This is made clear by Lloyd
Georges letter on the 13th August 1921 we must direct your attention to one
point upon which you lay some emphasis and upon which no British
Government can promise- namely, the claim that we should acknowledge the
right of Ireland to secede from her allegiance to the King 2. Despite this
knowledge, de Valera eventually agreed to proceed with treaty agreements.
Therefore making the ultimate aim of a Republic defunct before discussions
had even begun. Although it was eventually agreed to under different wording:
to work out how the association of Ireland with the community of nations
1 K Theodore Hoppen, Ireland since 1800 Conflict and Conformity,
Longman, New York, 1999, page 151
2 http://www.ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-007/

known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national
aspirations3. Despite the wording, as stated de Valera was greatly aware that
the republic upon which the last two years of fighting had been based on,
would not be part of any agreement. With the knowledge that Civil War would
follow the agreement of the treaty, and de Valera himself opposing the treaty,
you can see that de Valera was trying to avoid himself being the one
responsible for bringing the treaty that the British all along were planning to
present, back to the Irish people. With de Valera realising the consequences
of bringing back anything less than a republic to Ireland, he decided himself to
stay in Dublin during the following treaty negotiations. Instead, he sent
Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith, Robert Barton, Eamonn Duggan and George
Duffy. Collins himself was hesitant to go, seeing himself as inexperienced for
such discussions, as well as wanting de Valera himself to go. Collins
reluctance was due perhaps to his knowledge of what outcome the treaty
would get, as well as unquestioned popularity with Irish people, something de
Valera was keen to quash. It was asked of the delegation that before signing
any treaty, they would relay the details back to Dublin and de Valera. However
as talks progressed it became apparent that this would not be achievable. The
delegations asked for de Valeras proposal of external association, which
would of essentially made Ireland a republic within the commonwealth.
However as pressed by Lloyd George to de Valera himself, Ireland as a free
country, would have to remain within the empire, with an oath of allegiance for
their parliament. The British stressed that they were doing as much as they
could within the realms of an Empire, and a kingdom. Collins himself was a
staunch republican, and merely saw the treaty as a means to eventually
achieving the ultimate aim of an Irish Republic. After weeks of talks, on
December 5th 1921 its was made clear that if no agreement was signed, then
it would be a continuation of the war, and one the Irish knew they could not
continue with. Although going against the insistence of de Valera that any
treaty must be relayed to Dublin, Collins and Griffith felt no choice but to sign
the treaty. It was known in Dublin already by de Valera that the British were
not going to give the republic within the treaty; de Valera himself later stated
that he already knew Griffith would accept the crown under pressure4. This
only makes the choice of delegates to send to Britain more unusual, if de
Valera was so set on a republic, why would he choose to stay in Dublin, and
send someone he felt would succumb to British pressure. When the treaty
was returned to Dublin it set the course for Civil War, de Valera who knew of
conditions in the treaty before discussions had formally started, came out in
complete opposition to the treaty. Announcing: I feel it is my duty to inform
you immediately that I cannot recommend the acceptance of this treaty 5. The
reaction would echo others in Dublin, which led to the split within Sinn Fein
and between Collins and de Valera. Although de Valera was aware of what
would be in the treaty, he himself did not sign it, therefore leaving Collins to
return to Ireland to be seen by some as a traitor to the republic he had fought
for. While leaving de Valera in the envious position of choosing which side to
3 Charles Townshend, The Republic The fight for Irish Independence,
Penguin Books, London, 2014, page 331
4 ibid
5 ibid

take up, as well as being able to portray Collins as a puppet of the British
Government.
The returning treaty led to splits throughout the republican movement that had
been so united throughout the fight for independence. Each side was so
strongly in favour of what they believed to be the right action for Ireland, which
left discussions between the two as nothing more than stating what they
believed in, with no attempt to come together again. Despite the Dail voting in
favour of the treaty, those who opposed it refused to accept the will of
parliament in this instance. It is evident that this split intentionally or not, was
the result of de Valeras actions during the treaty negotiations. By the
president not going to treaty discussions, the treaty was made easier to be
displaced in the minds of some republicans, who saw it as the will of Collins
and Griffith but not the will of the Irish people. By sending Collins the leader of
the IRA, and well-respected man, it was inevitable that there would be a split
should Collins return with anything less than a republic. At this time in Ireland,
if you were devoted to someone in the republican framework, you would
follow there every move. Therefore leading to many who saw Collins as hero
siding with him, and those who were perhaps unwilling to work politically for a
republic kept the same mind-set as before the republic. Collins and de Valera
tried putting an end to the split by calling a general election. This was a tactic
that was accepted by de Valera as he felt his positioning was the same as the
people of Ireland. However this greatly backfired on him, in the elections held
in June 1922, 58 pro treaty candidates were elected to 36 anti treaty
candidates. This showed that Collins and the treaty had the backing of the
country. However for the radical republicans such Rory OConnor who before
the election had hinted, any attempt to hold a general election would be
stopped by force. Asked if that meant the establishment of a military
dictatorship, he replied; you can take it any way you like6, the election meant
nothing for them. They would continue to fight for an Irish Republic no matter
what.
The IRA that Collins had led during the war of Independence was
greatly split over the treaty. By April Rory OConnor and Liam
Mellows both key figures in this new IRA, had taken control of the
Four Courts in Dublin. Although Collins had accepted it, the British
were more anxious about them being there. The taking of the Four
Courts would eventually go on to have much significance. In London
members of the IRA and IRB killed military leader Sir Henry Wilson.
Although though not ordered by the IRA, the British saw it as an act
of war, and ordered Collins to storm the Four Courts. It would later
be accepted that Collins himself had ordered the killing of Wilson, a
long period before, however the hit had not been called off. As
Collins followed the orders of the British and took the Four Courts,
the civil war had begun. The Irish Free State army fighting against
the IRA was a battle between ex comrades. The refusal of the IRA to
leave the Four Courts left Collins with no choice but to enter in a
6 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland, Gill and Macmillan,
Dublin, 2005, page 5

fight, the British once again had left him with the inevitability of war
should he not of followed their orders.
I believe that de Valera was responsible for the outbreak of Civil war.
His actions following the beginning of discussions with Britain only
lead me to this conclusion. The correspondences between de Valera
and Llyod George clearly state what Britain was willing to offer, and
to what extent they could offer proposals to Ireland. Before sending
Collins in particular to London to discuss the treaty, I believe de
Valera was under the understanding that the British would not relent
on their proposals for the treaty. Apart from de Valeras idea of
External Association, which the British also made clear was out of
the boundarys for reform, de Valera had sent the men blindly in to
negotiations, and started them off on the back foot. Although de
Valera had no control of the IRA following the split, therefore
unattached to their occupation of the Four Courts, it was de Valera
who led the course for the split to be possible. Rory OConnor and
others were fighting against a treaty, that had been in place long
before it was signed, and de Valera knew this, all he had done is
escape the ridicule of signing the treaty. The Civil War may have
been inevitable following the terms of the treaty, whether de Valera
agreed with it or not, however it de Valera who had put Ireland on
course for such a separation following it. Had it been made clear by
de Valera that an Irish republic was well beyond what the British
were willing to offer, then maybe the treaty would have been better
understood by republicans on each side and war avoided.