Int Ontology Metaphysics (2010) 11:1737

DOI 10.1007/s12133-010-0056-0

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics

of the Ontological Proof
Pierfrancesco Basile

Published online: 26 February 2010

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinozas highly

original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead
of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from
Kants critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper
explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of
Spinozas proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinozas
definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence,
and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues,
it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that
Kants objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by
another of the ontological arguments most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally,
several interpretations of Spinozas proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on
all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging.
Keywords Kant . Russell . Spinoza . Ontological argument . Ideas . Possibilities

...conceive, if you can, that God does not exist.Spinoza, Ethics

1 Kants Critique of the Ontological Argument

It seems safe to say that, notable exceptions apart (see for example Malcom 1960;
Hartshorne 1962; Plantinga 1974), ontological arguments are nowadays generally
dismissed as obviously invalid. It seems equally safe to say that, historically, the
responsibility for this is mainly carried by Kant. Thus, it would seem that no attempt
P. Basile (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Bern, Lnggassstrasse 49a, 3000 Bern 9, Switzerland
e-mail: pierfrancesco.basile@philo.unibe.ch

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P. Basile

at discussing any one version of this classic argumentin the present case,
Spinozascan avoid taking into consideration what he had to say against it. In the
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant condemns all attempts to derive the existence of God
(Dasein) from the concept (Begriff) we have of Him. According to the German
philosopher, the core idea behind the ontological argument is that the statement
God does not exist entails a contradiction; from this it follows that God exists is
not merely true, but necessarily true. As Kant views things, the advocates of the
ontological argument reason as follows:
1. God does not exist is a self-contradictory statement, and therefore necessarily
false.
2. The negation of a necessarily false statement is a necessarily true statement.
3. Therefore, God exists is necessarily true.
As against this line of argument, Kant makes two main criticisms. The first
concerns the logical status of statements that assert or deny Gods existence:
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while retaining the subject,
contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to
the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction;
for nothing then is left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to
reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in
rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the
concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject
the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then
arise. (Kant 1961: 502 [A595/B623])
According to Kant, philosophers believe that the statement God exists is
necessarily true because they take it to be of the same logical kind as the statement,
A triangle has three sides. Kants objection to this is that God exists should not
be compared to A triangle has three sides but to There are triangles:
Logical Status

Mathematics

Necessary

A triangle has three sides

Philosophy/Theology
God is almighty

Contingent

There are triangles

God exists

There are no triangles

God does not exist

The logical counterpart of A triangle has three sides is God is almighty.

Kant argues that they are both necessarily true; the reason why this is so is that
they are analytic: the predicate (having-three-sides, being-almighty) is
included in the concept of the subject (triangle, God). This is why, in the
passage quoted above, Kant says that to posit a triangle, and yet to reject its
three angles is self-contradictory. A statement such as There are triangles,
however, belongs to a different logical type. According to Kant, what it says is
that there are objects (Gegenstnde) that instantiate the concept (Begriff) of a
triangle. Analogously, God exists should be read as The concept of God finds
exemplification in reality. Grammatical appearances notwithstanding, God
exists is not a statement about God, but about the concept of God, and it is not

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

19

analytical. On this interpretation, it becomes possible for Kant to say that there is
no contradiction in rejecting the triangle with its three angles. Mutatis mutandis,
there is no contradiction in rejecting God with all of its properties (omniscience,
omnipotence, etc.).
Kant supports the above considerations with a more general reflection about
the logical status of predicates asserting existence. In a well-known passage, he
writes:
Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of
something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely
the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in
themselves...If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates
(among which is omnipotence), and say God is, or There is a God, we
attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject
in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that
stands in relation to my concept. The content of both must be one and the
same... the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real
thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers.
(Kant 1961: 505 [A 600/B 628])
Otherwise stated, if we read existential statements as statements about things
and not about concepts, then they are empty of content. What are we ascribing
to a thing when we say that it exists? Like Hume before him, Kant contends
here that there is no real property of things that answers to the predicate
existence. The real function of the grammatical predicate is that of positing
the thing, rather than to say something about the things actual constitution.
Misled by superficial grammatical appearances, those who advance the ontological
argument fail to see that existence is not a genuine property; eventually, this failure
leads them to overlook the difference in logical kind between the statements God
is almighty and God exists.
It is important to notice that these criticisms are independent of Kants
overall epistemological project. Rather than as a consequence of the theory of
the limits of human knowledge exposed in the first Critique, the refutation of the
ontological argument is meant to provide independent support and confirmation
for the thesis that knowledge out of pure reason is impossible. One might not
endorse Kants critical philosophy, but still reject the ontological argument on
Kantian grounds. And this is, arguably, what most contemporary philosophers
actually do.

2 The Ontological Proof and the Metaphysics of Perfection

There is little doubt that the above remarks amount to a powerful critique of
the ontological argument, as this is understood by Kant. But Kant also provides a
different reconstruction of the ontological argument than the one sketched above,
as when he remarks that the basic idea underlying the ontological argument is that
God would not be the ens realissimum if he did not exist. (Kant 1961: 503

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P. Basile

[A 597/B 625] This approximates to what has become the arguments canonical
formulation:
1. God has all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God necessarily exists.
An argument of this sort can be found in the fifth of Descartess Meditations, but
his rationalist heirs, Spinoza and Leibniz, may also be read as appealing to it.
Leibniz famously tried to prove that no two perfections are incompatible, which he
took to be a necessary precondition for the ontological argument. Spinoza is not
mentioned by Kant, and yet in the Ethics he says:
...there is nothing we can be more certain than we are of the existence of an
absolutely infinite, or perfect, Beingthat is, God. For since his essence
excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it
takes away every cause of doubting his existence, and gives the greatest
certainty concerning it. (p11s)1
This passage provides some prima facie evidence for ascribing to Spinoza the
ontological argument in its prototypical form (although the evidence is perhaps not
as compelling as one would like to have it, since Spinoza does not say here either
that existence is a property or that it is a perfection). This is not, however, the only
version of the argument one finds in Spinoza, nor is it the main one. There is a
widespread agreement among interpreters that in arguing for the existence of God
Spinoza appeals to the concept of substance, rather than to that of perfection.2
Hence, two questions arise: do Kants critical remarks have any validity against
Spinozas original formulation of the ontological argument? And, granted there is a
way of saving Spinozas proof from Kants condemnation, does he succeed in
providing, if not a proof, at least a plausible argument for the thesis that God
exists?

3 Spinozas Ontological Argument: a Preliminary Survey

It might be useful to recall that Spinozas ontological argument occurs as a part of a
larger attempt at proving that there is only one substance, his Deus sive Natura. The
basic outline of the argument for pantheistic monism, which runs through the first 15
propositions of the book, is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

There cannot be a substance with no attribute. (implicit premise)

There cannot be two substances of the same attribute. (p5)
God, the substance that possesses all attributes, necessarily exists. (p11)
Therefore, God is the only substance. (p14, Spinozas substance-monism)

1
All references to the Ethics (Spinoza 1966) adopt the standard conventions: p stands for proposition,
s for scholium, d for demonstration. Thus, 2p11d refers to the demonstration of the eleventh
proposition in Book II; for the sake of simplicity, the books number is not specified in case of Book I.
2
The peculiarity of Spinozas version of the ontological argument is emphasized by J. Bennett 1984: 72.

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

21

Spinoza moves on to use the conclusion of this argument to derive his allegedly
pantheistic3 thesis that everything is in God:
1. God is the only substance. (p14)
2. Except for substances and modes there is nothing. (axiom 1)
3. Therefore, whatever is, is in God. (p15, pantheism)
The logic of the first part of the argument is clear enough: if substances need notshareable attributes in order to exist, and if one substance possesses all available
attributes, then that substance will be the only existing one. It is Gods very
magnitude that makes it impossible for other substances to exist. In this part of the
argument, serious difficulties of interpretations arise, especially in connection with
the notion of attribute. Some of Spinozas basic ontological assumptions will be
discussed in what follows; however, attention will be focused upon those concepts
that are needed to understand Spinozas justification for p11, the conclusion of his
own version of the ontological argument. In this context, the pivotal notion is not
that of attribute, but of essence. The outline of Spinozas argument for pantheistic
monism also illustrates the vital role the ontological proof plays in his thought; if the
proof fails, his whole metaphysics remains unsupported.
For the purposes of the present discussion, the basic definitions to be recalled are
d6, d3, d1:
d6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance
consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal
and infinite essence.
d3: By a substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through
itself...
d1: By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or
that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.
Other relevant concepts will be introduced and explained as the discussion
proceeds. One proposition to be mentioned at the outset, however, is p7:
p7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.
This proposition is of crucial importance. It establishes a link between the notion
of substance, d3, and that of a thing that is a cause of itself, d1, that is, the notion of
a being whose possibility entails its actuality. In effect, p7 says that a substance
cannot fail to existthat is, a substance necessarily exists. Thus, taken together with
d6, which says that God is a substance, p7 would seem to imply the existence of
God. Here is a first, standardized version of Spinozas ontological argument:
1. God is a substance. (d6)
2. A substance necessarily exists. (p7)
3. Therefore, God necessarily exists. (p11)

The term pantheism is here used for the sake of convenience; the questions whether and in what sense
Spinozas infinite substance deserves to be called God and, if yes, whether his metaphysics is a form of
pantheism lie outside the range of the present paper.

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P. Basile

Apparently, Spinoza is here attempting to derive the existence of God (p11) from
his definition (d6). What is, however, a definition? This is a crucial question to be
considered later. One natural answer is to say that d6 formulates Spinozas idea of
God. Hence, there is prima facie justification for classifying Spinozas argument as
ontological in the Kantian sensethat is, as one that tries to deduce the existence
of God from his bare idea.
As Descartes himself recognizes, ontological arguments have a sophistical air around
them (Descartes 1986: 4546), and Spinozas is no exception. The problem is to provide
an accurate diagnosis of the logical fallacy involved. One way to begin is by asking:
How should the first premise be interpreted in order to ensure the arguments validity?
On a Kantian interpretation, God is a substance states that the concept of substance
is included in the concept of God. Thus, a possible Kantian reading of the statement
is: If something instantiates the concept of God, then it must also instantiate the
concept of substance. (Such a reading captures what Kant means with the phrase
positing a thing, with the proviso however that the positing here is not categorical, but
hypothetical). This yields the following reading of Spinozas ontological argument:
1. If something is God, then it is a substance.
2. A substance necessarily exists.
3. Therefore, if something is God, then it necessarily exists.
Could this be what Spinoza wants to argue? Clearly not; the conclusion does not
state that God exists necessarily; it states that, if God exists, then He exists
necessarily: this would be true even if God did not exist. Russells theory of
descriptions provides an alternative interpretation (Russell 1905: 479493). On this
theory, God is a substance must be analyzed as:
There is one and only one x that is God, and this x is a substance.
Since this incorporates the statement that God exists, it cant be used as a premise
in the ontological argument without introducing a vicious circularity. Thus, here is
the problem: Kants interpretation of the first premise yields a non sequitur, with
Russells we are guilty of a petitio principii. Is there a third way of analyzing the first
premise, God is a substance, so that Spinozas argument can be construed as a
valid argument?

4 Are Spinozas Definitions Stipulative Definitions?

The way out of this impasse is to clarify the status of Spinozas definitions. What is d6 a
definition of? There are three possible answers to this question. Spinoza might be
defining:
(a) the common usage of the word God;
(b) a novel usage of that word, or the concept or notion that should be associated
with it;
(c) the thing (whatever that is) that that word/concept supposedly refers to.
Since Spinoza is not engaging in lexicography, this leaves (b) and (c) as the
sole candidates. Although in a context different from the present one, R. J.

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

23

Delahunty raises the question as to whether Spinozas definitions are nominal or

real. He writes:
If the definitions of Ethics I are intelligible, they must be nominal (i.e. of
words), not real (i.e. of things). But Spinoza declares elsewhere in the Ethics
(I, 8S2) that true definitions are of things; and the form of words he adopts at
the outset of the First Part indicates that it is substance, not substance,
which is being defined.
The question whether Spinozas definitions there are real or nominal must
be distinguished from the question whether they are truth valued...There
are good reasons to think that the definitions of Ethics I are stipulative;
and if they are stipulative, then they are non-truth-valued. (Delahunty
1985: 91)
These conclusions are difficult to share. It seems wrong to say that the question of
whether a definition is truth valued should be distinguished from the question as to
whether that definition is real. If a definition purports to be real, it can only be
accepted if it provides a true description of the thing defined. In the second scholium
to p8, moreover, Spinoza says:
...the true definition of each thing neither involves nor expresses anything
except the nature of the thing defined.
Although Spinoza is explicitly talking of his definition of substance when he
makes this claim, it is only natural to think that what he says applies to the other
definitions at the beginning of the Ethics as well. Delahunty has two reasons to deny
that Spinozas interpretations were meant to be real. One is the form in which the
definitions are cast (By God I understand a being absolutely infinite...). By itself,
this does not suffice to show that Spinozas definitions are stipulative. Since Spinoza
wants to make sure that we think of God in the way he does, it is just natural that he
should use the locution by...I understand... in his definition. Spinozas correspondence also contains some important methodological clues. His second epistle to
Oldenburg makes it clear that it would not be inconsistent for him to use this turn of
phrase while also believing to have provided a real definition. In this letter, he uses a
formulation quite similar to the one provided in the Ethics, yet he also goes on to say
that there is little doubt that his definition of God is the true one: Verm, qud haec
sit vera Dei definitio, constat ex hoc, qud per Deum intelligamus Ens summ
perfectum, & absolut infinitum (Spinoza 1925b: 8). Interestingly, this passage
suggests that the definition of God as a being having infinite attributes does not
stand in contrast with what we usually mean by God (intelligamus). Based on the
scanty evidence provided by the second epistle, Spinozas definition would be an
analysis of the ordinary conception of God as an infinite being, i.e., d6 expresses
clearly what we already, yet confusedly think when we think of God.
Delahunty also appeals to the role Spinozas definitions are meant to play:
If Spinoza had advanced real definitions purporting to be true at the outset of
the Ethics, they would indeed have been combated by many of his readers.
(Delahunty 1985: 95)

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P. Basile

Yes, they would have. But why should this show that Spinoza did not intend his
definitions to be real? He would have been equally open to attack if he had advanced
his definitions as stipulative ones. For a reader dissatisfied with Spinozas
conclusions, it is as easy to ask How do you know what God truly is? as it is to
ask Why do you want to define God in that way? (As will be shown shortly,
moreover, Spinoza does even answer the first question in the Ethics.) Upon the
whole, Delahuntys explanation of why Spinoza could not have meant his definition
to be real is unconvincing. Most importantly, Spinozas definitions can perform the
logical role they are supposed to perform, only if they are taken to be real. Consider
what would happen to Spinozas ontological argument if d6 were only nominal.
What kind of information would d6 convey? It would not be a definition of a real
thing; hence, it would have to specify logical connections between concepts. But this
would mean analyzing d6, God is... a substance, as If something is God, then it is
a substance. And it has already been shown in the previous section that, on this
reading, Spinozas argument turns out not to imply the existence of God.
But there is a further possibility that needs to be considered. In his Tractatus de
intellectus emendatione Spinoza explains that it is possible to teach the concept of a
sphere to a pupil by showing how it can be geometrically constructed by imagining
that a semi-circle rotates around a fixed point. (Spinoza 1925c: 27) Such a definition
could be called a constructive definition; although no real sphere has ever been
constructed in this way, imagining that it could be generated thus helps us to form
the right mathematical conception of a sphere. Analogously, Spinozas d6 could be a
constructive definition that shows us which concepts we must put together to
achieve a correct metaphysical notion of the Deity, one that is wholly purged of
misleading associations inherited from tradition, prejudices, or false metaphysics.
This might explain Spinozas turn of phrase (by... I understand...) and would
not be inconsistent with the main tenet of the present interpretation, namely
that to understand d6 is to have formed a clear notion of something real. A
constructive definition leads us to see what something is, in Spinozas example,
a sphere, but does not generate the geometrical entity whose nature we come to
grasp by means of it.

5 Things and Their Essences

But if d6 is a real definition (or at least a constructive definition that leads us to form
a clear conception of a real something) of what real thing is it a definition? The
answer is given in a passage from the Ethics that has been already quoted: ...the true
definition of each thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of
the thing defined (p8s2); since nature is a synonym of essence (as it is made
clear by d1), d6 is a real definition of Gods essence. Interestingly, in the first book
Spinoza defines God, mode, substance, and attribute. He does not define essence.
Why is this so? One answer is that he simply assumes that there are essences, that
they are required in order for there being real definitions in the first place.
What is, however, a Spinozian essence? Since Spinoza distinguishes between
essence and existence, one might conclude that these are just two distinguishable aspects of an existing thing. There is no reason to think, however, that Spinozas

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

25

essences are abstractions from more concrete realities. On the contrary, the most
fruitful way of thinking of an essence is to think of it as being itself a real thing,
something which truly is. But just how does an essence relate to the thing it is an
essence of, if it is not just an abstraction from it? One answer is that the essence of a
thing is the thing itself, considered as a mere possibility.4 In the present case, the
essence of the individual substance God is God itself (is meaning here nothing less
than numerical identity). This point must be considered carefully. It is not as if there
were two Gods, a possible God or detached essence described by the definition and a
real one whose existence is yet to be ascertained. The idea is that there is only one
God, but that this can be real in two different ways, either as a possible existent or as
an actual existent.
Consider, as a way of illustration, a work of art such as Michelangelos statue of
David in Florence. On Spinozas understanding of essences, that statue would have
occupied some place in reality even prior to its actual realization by Michelangelo.
If, for some unfortunate circumstance, the David should be destroyed, it would not
disappear from reality altogether, but would go on existing as Davids unactualized
essence. This is pretty much how Spinoza himself explains the distinction between
essences and existing things in his Cogitata Metaphysica (Spinoza 1925a: 239).
Here, he asks the reader who cant grasp the distinction to visit a sculptor. The
sculptor will be able to describe the work he wants to realize in all its details before
actually realizing it. According to Spinoza, one could not ask for a more concrete
illustration of the distinction between essence and existence, of the essences
independency from actual things, and of the essences availability to the human
mind. Spinozas fourth letter to Oldenburg is also illuminating in this respect. At one
point, he asks his friend to consider that human bodies are not created, but
generated; they were, in a different guise, even before coming into existence.5
The view that an essence is the thing it is an essence of might seem strange.
Surely, on this interpretation, the phrase essence of is a highly misleading one, as
it suggests that an essence is something qualifying the individual it is an essence of,
and hence in some way distinct from it. However, this interpretation does nothing
more than take Spinoza at his word, since d6 is a definition of God and at the same
time he says that definitions are definitions of essences; hence, there must be a sense
in which God and his essence are one and the same thing. One recent interpreter that
rejects the identification of an essence with the thing it is an essence of raises
precisely this doubt: The essence of a thing cannot be just the thing, otherwise there
would be absolutely no distinction between the two. Hence, there would be no
reason to differentiate between them or to employ the term essence when it would
simply mean the thing itself. (Devaux 2007: 106) The answer to this is that, if one
recognizes a distinction between possible and actual existence, then there is a reason
to differentiate between essence and the thing itself. Only the former term refers
to the thing insofar as it is a possible being; the latter leaves its existential mode
wholly undetermined.
4

This is consistent with the way essences are understood in Bennett 1984: 357358 and Sprigge 2007:
2829.
5
quaeso, mi amice, ut consideres homines non creari; sed tantm generari, & qud eorum corpora jam
antea existebant, quamvis alio modo formata (Spinoza 1925b: 14).

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P. Basile

Another source of worry for this interpretation is 2d2:

2d2: I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the
thing is [NS: also] necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing
is necessarily [NS: also] taken away...
Spinoza would seem to claim here that a things essence is a things sufficient and
necessary condition, which again suggests that the essence is not identical with the
thing it is the essence of. However, 2d2 is surely not inconsistent with the thesis that
the essence and the thing are one and the same, since, trivially, if they are identical,
then if the essence is given, the thing must be given as well, and if the essence is
taken away, then the thing is taken away too. It should be admitted that this reading
would seem to make 2d2 empty; but if the thing and its essence are two, what
accounts for their necessary connection? One advantage of the identity-thesis is that
the reason for this becomes evident at once. (Note that we cannot model the relation
between God and His essence as a part/whole relation, since Spinoza is explicit as to
the fact that an infinite substance is indivisibile (1p13), that is, that it has no parts.
Hence, God is not its essence plus something else.)
Another advantage of acknowledging that God and His essence are one and
the same, more generally, that an essence is the thing it is an essence of, is that
this identification helps to dispel another perplexity some readers might feel
while reading the Ethics. Having introduced a whole series of ontological
categories in his definitionsthe notions of substance, mode, attribute, and
essenceSpinoza goes on to say in axiom 1 that whatever is, is either a substance
(in se) or a mode (in alio). What happened to the attributes and the essences? Were
they not supposed to be real after all? On the present interpretation, the
explanation of why essences are not mentioned in axiom 1 is that, if an essence is
an essence of a substance, then it is that substance itself. Since the same applies to
modes (modes must have essences as well), there is no reason to make an explicit
reference to essences in axiom 1; they do not constitute an additional, independent
category of being besides substances and their modes: they are these substances
and modes themselves. (Alternatively, the perplexity could be dispelled by limiting
the validity of the axiom to actual beings; limiting the axiom in this way, however,
also requires that one acknowledges a distinction between actualities and
possibilities.)

6 The Task and Structure of the Proof Clarified

It remains to be seen how taking Spinozas definitions as definitions of essences
helps to understand Spinozas version of the ontological argument. The ascription to
Spinoza of the view that essences are real things that lack, but might acquire
actualization, has two major implications. (1) In the first place, it implies that the
reality of God (in the existential mode of possibility) is already introduced with d6;
this is not something that is up for debate or that stands in need of a proof.
According to axiom 6, A true idea must agree with its object. The very fact that
there is a true real definition suffices to show that God is, for otherwise the definition
wouldnt be a definition of anythingthat is, the essence couldnt be defined

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

27

(described) if it did not exist at all. And since an essence is the individual substance
it is the essence of, the substance must be there as well. (2) Secondly, it becomes
clear that it would be quite misleading to say that Spinoza infers the existence of
God from a definition (although he does occasionally put it this way in the
correspondence; see for example Spinoza 1925b: 8). Spinozas problem is whether
God, whose existence as a possible thing he is taking for granted, also possesses the
other existential mode of actuality. Thus, the transition in Spinozas ontological
argument is not from a mere concept to a real thing, but from a things possible
existence to a things actual existence. Given
(a) God exists (as a possible being),
the arguments task is to derive:
(b) God exists (as an actual being).
Obviously enough, one needs to know that (a) God exists as a possible essence
before one can go on to ask whether (b) he also exists as an actuality. But how does
one get (a) in the first place? Apparently, Spinozas ontological argument
presupposes another line of reasoning:
1. There is a real definition/true idea of God.
2. If there is a real definition/true idea of X, then X is real (as a possibility).
3. Therefore, God exists (in the existential mode of possibility).
One might be puzzled by the fact that Spinoza should begin by assuming the truth
of his definition of God. As an answer to this, however, one might quote 2p43,
where Spinoza says: He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a
true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing. In other words, d6 stands in need
of no justification for someone that really understands it: to ask for a justification
would just be to display ones failure in grasping the idea expressed by the
definition. Admittedly, this sounds question-begging; in case of a disagreement,
Spinozas claim that one who clearly apprehends the true idea of God cant fail to
know that the idea is true would seem to make rational debate about the divine
nature impossible. But the situation is not as hopelessly question-begging as it might
look at first sight. The opening definitions could be validated in the eyes of the
skeptic by the fact that they make it possible to construct a metaphysical view that
nicely explains the overall nature of the universe and our place in it; considering that
the books aims are not merely theoretical, but practical as well (the book is called
Ethica after all, and not Metaphysica), the definitions might also be validated by the
fact that they lead to what Spinoza took to be a satisfactory answer to a question that
greatly troubled him, namely the ancient question How should I live? All this,
however, is conjectural. The safest thing to say is that Spinoza is not much worried
by the epistemological problems posed by his definitions (as also recognized by
Nadler 2006: 48).
One might also wonder why we should accept a theory of definition (in truth, a
theory of intentionality), that comes with such strong ontological commitments.
There are two distinct questions here, one concerning epistemology and the
philosophy of mind, the other more purely metaphysical: (a) Why should the
ideatumi.e., the intentional object of the idea of God expressed in d6be

28

P. Basile

conceived as a reality existing independently of the apprehending mind? (b) Why

should essences, provided that they are, be conceived as having a mode of being that
is independent from that of concrete actualities? These are deep, long-standing
philosophical perplexities and it is not obvious what the right answer should be.
Spinozas correspondence with Oldenburg, and especially the fourth epistle,
confirms, or at least strongly suggests, that Spinozas conception of a true definition
is virtually identical to Descartes conception of a clear and distinct idea. Here he
explicitly links the notions of definition, clear and distinct perception, and truth in a
way that implies their identity (omnis definitio, sive clara, & distincta idea sit vera;
Spinoza 1925b: 13). Now, the evidence Descartes provides in the Meditations for the
claim that the object of a clear and distinct idea is an objective fact would seem to be
phenomenological. According to Descartes, the mathematician who clearly and
distinctly grasps some previously unknown property of a triangle experiences
himself as cognizing an objective truth, one that holds independently of its being
cognized:
But I think the most important consideration at this point is that I find within
me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere
outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be
thought at will, they are not my invention but have their true and immutable
natures. When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no such
figure exists, or has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still a
determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and
eternal, and not invented by me or dependent on my mind. (Descartes 1986:
45-46)
Mathematical truths are not created, but discovered. But the objectivity of
essences and of eternal truths is not recognized as the conclusion of a philosophical
argument; rather, it is immediately grasped in the very act of apprehending them.6

7 The Atheists Challenge

For the purposes of understanding Spinozas proof, the important fact is that d6
comes with an existential commitment, that is, the existence of God as a possible
being. Since the ontological argument can be launched only on the assumption that
we have a distinct grasp of Gods nature, it would now seem that an easy way to stop
6

It could be objected that there is another class of ideas in Spinozas Ethics that has a claim to be
identified with Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, namely what Spinoza calls adequate ideas. An
adequate idea is such as to possess all the marks of true ones, but all internally: By adequate idea I
understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the
properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea (2d4; my emphasis). As Spinoza also explains
immediately after having provided the definition, talk of intrinsic denominations is meant to exclude
the agreement of the idea with its object. This is tantamount to saying that adequate ideas do not refer to
their ideata, whereas true ideas do. Two questions need to be distinguished here: Should Cartesian clear
and distinct ideas be identified with Spinozas true ideas or with adequate ideas? Is the idea conveyed by
d6 adequate or true? The correspondence with Oldenburg suggests that, at least in the eyes of Spinoza, a
clear and distinct idea is identical with a true one. What truly matters here, however, is to recognize that,
for Spinoza, d6 expresses Gods true idea.

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

29

the argument is by protesting that one lacks Gods idea. Strangely enough, this
possibility (which was raised by Hobbes against Descartes in the third set of
objections to prevent the latter from inferring the existence of God from the
existence of His idea in us) does not seem to worry Spinoza. But there is also another
form of atheism that is damaging for his position. The atheist could claim to have a
clear and distinct conception not solely of Gods nature, but also of Gods nonexistence. In a sense, this is a more challenging objection, as the atheist grants an
essential part of what Spinoza wants him to grant, namely the possibility of
conceiving Gods essence in a clear and distinct way. In the second scholium to p8,
Spinoza writes:
If some were to say that he had a clear and distinct, that is, true, idea of a
substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such a substance existed, that
would be indeed the same as if he were to say that he had a true idea, and
nevertheless doubted whether it was false.
Spinozas response to this kind of challenge will be discussed at the end of this
paper, after we have a better hold upon his ontological proof.

8 Can We Turn a Paralogism into a Valid Argument?

Is there a way of construing Spinozas argument as a valid one? In Kants analysis,
the ontological argument involves an illegitimate transition from the conceptual
(intensional) to the real (extensional). On the present reading, this diagnosis is
mistaken: the transition is from possible existence to actual existence; whatever
happens in the argument, it happens at the extensional level. What makes this move
possible is Spinozas distinction between two levels of extensionalitythe realm of
essences and the realm of actual things. If these considerations are sound, then
Spinoza could have easily answered Kants objections as they have been
reconstructed above:
(1) God exists/does not exist. Kant argues that God exist means The concept of
God is instantiated. As against this, Spinoza could object that his argument
presupposes a very different semantic analysis, since God exists means God
exists in the mode of actuality. (Is this interpretation as bizarre as it looks at
first sight? It is more in tune with our linguistic intuitions than Kants; it seems
natural to say that God exists is about God, not about our concept of God.)
(2) Existential statements. Kant argues that existential statements are empty if
interpreted as statements about things, because existence is not a property things
might or might not possess. As against this, Spinoza could reply (a) that the
predicate existence is ambiguous between existence in the mode of
possibility and existence in the mode of actuality; (b) that these are not
special properties of things, but rather ways of being; (c) that since a thing could
be merely possible, it is not empty or uninformative to say that it is actual.
The crucial consideration here is that Spinoza does not think of existence as a yesor-no matter, while Kant (and modern logic) apparently does. Kants critique can be
reformulated in Russellian terms as the charge that Spinoza fails to distinguish

30

P. Basile

between two possible meanings of is, namely the copula and the existential
quantifier. But there is no evidence that Spinoza is guilty of such a mistake. The
conclusion to be drawn is that Kants critique fails to engage Spinozas ontological
argument, as this was meant to be understood by Spinoza. Interestingly, Kants
failure to come to terms with Spinozas argument comes clearly to the fore in a
remark he makes, almost casually, at the beginning of his discussion of the
cosmological proof: The attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the
existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural procedure and a mere
innovation of scholastic sublety (Kant 1961: 507 [A 604/B 623]). Surely, if there is
something Spinoza denies, is that his definition of God expresses a purely arbitrary
idea. Incidentally, this raises the question whether there is still much justification
for referring to Spinozas proof as ontological; strictly speaking, the relevant
logical transition is not from concepts to real things, but from a mode of existence to
a mode of existence of a different sort. It might be of interest in this respect to notice
that the founder of this genre, Anselm of Canterbury, begins his own proof in the
second chapter of his Proslogion with the assumption that something than which
nothing greater can be conceived [i.e., God] exists in the intellect. Does that
something also exist outside the intellect? (Anselm 1995: 84) This suggests that
Spinozas argument might be called ontological by appealing to tradition rather
than to Kants definition. But whether, or in what sense, Spinozas argument can be
called ontological is a relatively uninteresting question; it still remains to be
ascertained whether it is valid.
Consider the argument first premise, God is a substance (d6). On Spinozas
metaphysical assumption that an essence is the thing it is an essence of, the term
God as it occurs in this sentence refers to Godthat is, it is a name for God.
Interpreting God as a proper name, a way of rendering d6 would be: Substance
(God). Note that this does not import any vicious circularity in the argument, in the
way in which, for example, Russells interpretation does. Contrary to Kants
understanding of the argument, Spinozas question is not whether the noun God
has or has not a reference; this is given for granted. His question is about the
references existential modewhether God exists as an actual or as a possible being.
The ontological argument now runs as follows:
1. God is a substance. (d6)
2. A substance necessarily exists. (p7)
3. Therefore, God necessarily exists. (p11)
Undoubtedly, once it is clear that God has a reference, this begins to look like a
valid reasoning.

9 Spinozas Explanatory Rationalism and the Concept of Substance

There is a loose end: we still havent analyzed the argument second premise, p7. This
is best done by considering the argument in its support, which is extremely brief:
A substance cannot be produced by anything else...therefore it will be the
cause of itself, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence.

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

31

Spinoza is here appealing to what, in Leibnizs terminology, has come to be

known as the principle of sufficient reason. The principle is at work throughout the
Ethics. In the second scholium to p7, Spinoza writes that there must be, for each
existing thing, a certain cause on account of which it exists; unexplained facts are
simply not an option. Axiom 2 also approximates to an explicit statement: What
cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself. If being
conceivable is read as can be made intelligible, then Spinoza is ruling out that
some things may lack an explanation.
As these passages make clear, Spinoza is committed to a strong explanatory
rationalism. This must be seen in two ways: epistemically, the claim is that an ideal
reasonerGods divine mindwould be able to understand all of reality;
metaphysically, it says that reality is intrinsically transparent to the intellect. (If we
fail to understand things, this is only because our intellects are short of being divine;
still, reality remains trough and through rational, i.e., it conforms to the criteria of a
perfect rationality.) Taking this into account, Spinozas argument for p7 can now be
recast as follows:
1. There must be a reason why a substance exists. (principle of sufficient reason)
2. A substance cannot be produced by another substance (so we cant appeal to
other substances for an explanation). (p6)
3. Therefore, a substance is a cause of itself (i.e., its existence is self-explanatory). (p7)
Based on Spinozas own formulations of the principle of sufficient reason,
the most straightforward way to make sense of this is by assuming that Spinoza
is here envisaging a hypothetical situation in which a substance actually exists.
Spinoza is clearly thinking of the question as to the actualization of a substance,
when he writes that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal
truth. His illustrations of possible applications of the principle of sufficient
reason, moreover, all point in the same direction. Hence, for instance, he explains
that if, in Nature, a certain number of individuals exists, there must be a cause
why those individuals, and why neither more nor fewer, exist (p8s2). The focus
here is not on why there is the essence of humanity, but why this essence comes to
be actually instantiated in the particular way it does, that is, why actual existence
contains those men it contains, and not others that would have seemed to be
equally possible. When he uses the word existence in this proof, Spinoza must
therefore mean actual existence; if this is so, then his argument for p7 can be
reformulated thus:
1. There must be a reason why there is an actual substance. (principle of sufficient
reason)
2. A substance cannot be produced by another substance. (p6)
3. Therefore, an actual substance is the cause of itself (its self-explanatory). (p7)
This seems acceptable; formulating the argument for p7 in this way, however,
helps one realizing that the distinction between actual and possible existence comes
with a parallel distinction between actual and possible substances. It might seem
that, if a thing is identical with its essence, then whatever can be predicated of the
one can be predicated of the other. But consider: in what sense can we say that God
is a substance at the outset of the ontological argument? At that point, we know that

32

P. Basile

God is a substance, but we do not yet know whether he actually exists; hence, we
should not merely say that God is a substance, but specify that God is a possible
substancethat is, a substance existing in the mode of possibility. This leads to the
following statement of Spinozas ontological argument:
1. God is a possible substance. (d6)
2. An actual substance necessarily exists. (p7)
3. Therefore, God necessarily exists. (p11)
This argument is invalid: since the middle term substance occurs with two
different meanings in the two premises, the reasoning is vitiated by the fallacy of
equivocation. Thus, Spinozas ontological argument failsalthough for very
different reasons than those urged by Kant. As against this, Spinoza might protest
that the proposed reading of p7 is too restrictive and that his claim was meant to
include possible substances as well. The rejoinder is that the thesis that a possible
substance necessarily exists is not entailed by the argument he provides, nor is it
self-evidently true.7
Alternatively, Spinoza could object that the claim made in the first premise, d6, is
that God is an actual substance. On this reading, he would begin by assuming (a),
i.e., that God actually exists, and not merely (b), i.e., that God exists as a nonactualized essence. This generates a significantly different version of the argument.
What the ontological argument now proves is not Gods actual existence, which is
already assumed with d6, but His necessary existence, inferred by means of p7:
1. God is an actual substance. (d6)
2. An actual substance necessarily exists. (p7)
3. Therefore, God necessarily exists. (p11)
This interpretation has the significant advantage that the argument can be
reconstructed as formally valid, i.e., it does not charge Spinoza with a fairly obvious
logical blunder. It must also be admitted that it does square well with his own
formulation of p11.8 Nevertheless, this reading has the major disadvantage that
Gods actual existence would be assumed right from the start; there are then no
arguments for Gods existence in Spinozas philosophy?
A further question needs to be asked before concluding this section. As it has
been argued, Spinozas commitment to the principle of sufficient reason leads him to
demand an explanation of an actual substances existence. But what accounts for the
existence of a possible substance such as God is supposed to be? Spinozas own
formulations of the principle of sufficient reason (axiom 2 and p7s) strongly suggest
that its validity is to be restricted to actual existents, yet a consistent rationalist
would want to push this demand for complete intelligibility to the outmost limitso,
why is there even such a thing as Gods essence? The answer might turn out to be
perplexingly simple. It seems natural to think that the only constrain on the realm of
the possible is the principle of non-contradiction. Hence, granted the assumption that
Spinoza writes at one point that p7 is obviously true: if men would attend to the nature of substance,
they would have no doubt at all of the truth of p7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for
everyone, and would be numbered among the common notions (p7s2).
8
This reading is provided by Marcus 1993: 173: What is asserted in Proposition XI is that he exists in a
certain waynecessarily. His existence simpliciter is never in question.
7

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

33

possible beings are real things, what explains an essences existence is that it can be
conceived without contradiction. It might not be immediately obvious that this is an
answer; we tend to expect something more concrete. But since essences are not
actual things, ordinary concepts of causation or of creation do not apply at this
ontological level. If we accept this explanation, then we see that Leibniz was only
being a consistent explanatory rationalist when he urged that all ontological
arguments should be prefaced by a proof that the notion of God is a coherent one.
Spinoza claims (but does not attempt to prove) that Gods essence does not
involve contradiction. But does he believe that the realm of essence and the realm of
the logically consistent are one and the same? Consider the following passage, in
which he contrasts the essence of God with the essence of things that do not
logically necessitate their existence:
...the very nature of a square circle indicates the reason why it does not exist,
namely because it involves a contradiction (rationem, cur circulus quadratus
non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat). On the other hand, the reason why a
substance exists also follows from its nature alone, because it involves
existence. But the reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it does not
exist, does not follow from the nature of these things... (p11d)
Spinoza distinguishes here between: (a) essences that necessitate the actual
existence of the things they are the essences of, such as the essence of God; (b)
essences that necessarily preclude the actual existence of the things they are the
essences of, such as the essence of a square-circle; (c) essences that neither
necessitate nor preclude the existence of the things they are the essences of, such as
the essence of a triangle. Category (b) is a puzzling one: Spinoza seems to be
admitting the reality of self-contradictory essences. This generates a Quinean
problem: apparently, the realm of essences is larger than the realm of possibilia
but how could there be self-contradictory beings?9 This is a Meinongian selfrefuting position and it is surprising that Spinoza should have expressed himself in
this way.

10 Spinozas Refutation of Atheism

We are now in a position to deal with an exegetical problem that has been left
untouched so far. The standardized form of the ontological argument that has been
discussed in the previous sections is not explicitly formulated by Spinoza in the
Ethics, although it is obviously there. Instead, Spinoza gives his explicit argument
for p11 the form of a reductio ad absurdum. Some critics have wondered why this is
so. In this connection, D. Garrett writes: The form of the argument [for p11] is
dictated by two considerations: Spinozas expressed preference for reductio
arguments, and his desire to utilize both of the alternative definitions of cause of

Quine1953: 119; see pp. 45 for his rejection of contradictory entities such as the square-circle. The
passage stands in striking contradiction with W.A. Earles contention that for Spinoza unrealizables will
be mere fictions of the mind or composition of words (Earle 1951: 550).

34

P. Basile

itself given in d1. (Garrett 2001: 8) But there is an alternative explanation:

Spinozas choice might be dictated by the polemical need to reject the atheists
claim, identified in section 7, that Gods non-existence can be distinctly conceived.
Spinoza writes:
If you deny this [the conclusion of the ontological argument, i.e. that God
necessarily exists], conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Therefore (by
a7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by p7) is absurd.
Therefore, God necessarily exists.
This is a brief as it is elusive; besides p7, Spinoza invokes axiom 7:
a7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve
existence
The notion of conceivability is a notoriously slippery one and Spinoza does not
say much to make it clear. If the Cartesian interpretation of Spinozas theory of the
mind that has been adopted in this paper is correct, it is to be understood in terms of
a subjects ability to form clear and distinct ideas. On this theory, if we could form a
clear and distinct idea of God as non-existent, we would know that God does not
exist. On any analysis of the concept of knowledge, a person wouldnt know that p,
if p werent true. Hence, trivially, if someone could conceive that God does not exist,
then God would not exist. Spinoza must therefore deny that the atheist can have what
he claims to havea clear grasp of his definition and at the same time a transparent
idea of Gods non-existence.
As against this, Spinoza argues as follows:
1. God is a substance. (d6, premise)
2. I can form a clear and distinct idea of God as non-existent. (hp to be rejected)
3. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, then it does not necessarily exist.
(axiom 7, premise)
4. God does not necessarily exist. (2,3, MP)
5. What does not necessarily exist is not a substance. (converse of p7, premise)
6. God is not a substance. (4,5, MP)
7. Therefore, God is and is not a substance. (1,6, &).
Since Spinoza obviously takes all other premises either to be self-evident
(d6, a7) or to have been previously proved (p7), he concludes that thesis (2)
must be rejected; it is therefore inconceivable that God should not exist. It
could be said that this reconstruction is not faithful to the text and that the
premise to be rejected should not be the above proposition (2), but simply
God does not exist. Contrary to what some have argued (Doney 1980: 41-42),
however, this is not the most natural reading of the text. Spinoza is not asking us
simply to assume that God does not exist, but to conceive of his non-existence
(si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deum non existere). In the context of a theory of
clear and distinct ideas, this is a more demanding task than the mere entertaining of
a hypothesis.
It could also be objected that, on this analysis, the argument does not lead to the
required conclusion. What Spinoza actually says in the passage quoted above is that
God necessarily exists. So, how does one get God necessarily exists from It is

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

35

inconceivable that God should not exist? Two further argumentative steps are
needed to reach this result:
1.
2.
3.
4.

It is inconceivable that God should not exist. (rejected hp)

What is inconceivable is logically impossible. (suppressed premise)
It is logically impossible that God should not exist. (1,2)
If a statement is logically impossible, then its negation is necessary. (suppressed
premise)
5. Therefore, God necessarily exists. (3,4)
This line of reasoning is perfectly valid, but it has the disadvantage of
having to ascribe to Spinoza a suppressed premise, (2), that he does not
explicitly endorse in the Ethics. In ascribing this premise to Spinoza, however, no
injustice is done to his ability as a philosopher since, if correctly understood, it is
neither implausible nor controversial. Considering that conceivability is to be
explicated in terms of clear and distinct ideas, the premise does not state that
human thought can set a limit to logic. This would indeed be a difficult position to
defend, as there are obviously many things human beings might fail to conceive
and which are nonetheless possible. What the suppressed premise says is that the
limitations of human thoughtwhen it satisfies the requirement of an ideal,
perfected rationalityexpress genuine logical impossibilities. And this is a quite
different claim.10 (If there is something controversial here, this is not the premise,
but the whole theory of clear and distinct ideas.)
But is the proposed integration really necessary? On the basis of the foregoing
analyses, it seems reasonable to maintain that Spinozas main argument for p11 is the
more straightforward one that takes d6 and p7 as its premises. The argument now
under discussion need not be viewed as Spinozas main proof for Gods necessary
existence, but rather as a way of reinforcing a conclusion already achieved by
rebutting the atheists alternative suggestion that it is possible to have a clear and
distinct conception of Gods non-existence. What the reductio really shows is that
claiming to be able to conceive Gods non-existence is claiming to be able to
conceive that God is and is not a substancewhich is absurd. Indeed, a philosopher
who would advance this objection would be, in Spinozas own words, like someone
who claims to have a true idea [i.e., an idea of God as a substance, and therefore as
necessarily existent], and nevertheless doubted whether it was false [i.e., claimed to
be able to conceive that God might not exist, hence that He is not a substance].
Whether we adopt the longer or the shorter version, Spinozas argument looks
valid. As it has been shown in a previous section, however, our reading of d6 and p7
is altered in a significant way if one takes notice of the distinction between actual
and possible existence:
1. God is a possible substance. (d6, premise)
2. I can form a clear and distinct idea of God as non-existent. (hp to be rejected)
10
This worry is expressed in Doney 1980: 42: The principle that what is not conceivable is not
possible, seems to me to be by no means an unexceptional, or trivial or obvious principle. Interpreted in
certain ways, it is a substantive principle which can be taken to have rather far-reaching and disturbing
consequences. If conceivable is interpreted in the right way, that is, by reference to clear and distinct
ideas and therefore rationality per se, the principle is unproblematic.

36

P. Basile

3. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, then it does not necessarily exist.

(axiom 7, premise)
4. God does not necessarily exist. (2,3, MP)
5. What does not necessarily exist is not an actual substance. (converse of p7,
premise)
6. God is not an actual substance. (4,5, MP)
7. Therefore, God is a possible substance but not an actual substance. (1,6, &)
The conclusion of this argument, proposition (7), is not a contradiction anymore:
it is just a statement of the atheists position.
One final remark: Spinozas second demonstration for p11, the last of his a priori
proofs, is also best understood as a reply to the skeptic rather than as an independent
argument for that thesis. Assume that God does not exist. Consistently with
Spinozas explanatory rationalism, there must be a reason why God does not exist;
this cannot be Gods essence, for this is not incoherent like that of a square-circle.
The reason of Gods non-existence must therefore be searched in another substance.
But another substance, if there were one, would have to be radically different from
God, for according to p5 no two substances share a common attribute. Hence, since
substances with no common attributes have nothing in common (this is Spinozas
p2) and cannot therefore act on one another, such a hypothetical substance would be
unable to prevent God from achieving actualization. Since there is no internal or
external reason that could prevent God from existing, Spinoza concludes that God
necessarily exists.
This argument works only on the assumption that Gods essence is not incoherent,
an important point that is left unproved. Moreover, the step from the mere absence of
an obstacle to Gods actualization is problematic. By itself, the fact that nothing
prevents an essence from being actualized does not provide a sufficient reason for
concluding that the essence is actualized; some positive ground is needed in order to
draw this conclusion. The argument becomes intelligible, however, if it is interpreted
as a means to dispel residual skeptical doubts. Granted that we already have a proof
of Gods necessary existence, why should we hesitate in accepting this conclusion?
If nothing could prevent God from coming into existence and if Gods nature as a
substance suffices to explain his existence, then there is really no reason to deny that
God exists.

11 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed Spinozas ontological argument and defended it from
Kants general condemnation of this kind of reasoning by showing that the two
philosophers work with different ontological categories. This leads them to interpret
the argument in radically different ways, which generates a problem of incommensurability. Kantians will have to provide different objections than those of the first
Critique to show what is wrong with Spinozas reasoning. Does this mean that
Spinoza has succeeded in providing a plausible argument after all? A closer
examination of Spinozas proof shows that it is loaded with controversial ontological
and epistemological assumptions; most importantly, it can be rejected as invalid even

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

37

if these assumptions are granted. The overall philosophical moral to be drawn is that
one needs to understand the metaphysics to get the semantic right; to think otherwise
is to be cut off from understandingand from criticizing fairlythe great masters of
the past.
Acknowledgments A previous version of this paper was read at the ETH, Zrich, in November 2009; I
am indebted to the participants and especially to Prof. Michael Hampe, for the critical discussion and for
important suggestions, and to Pauline Phemister for comments on an earlier draft.

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