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Commonsense Knowledge,
Ontology and Ordinary Language
Walid S. Saba
American Institutes for Research,
1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Washington, DC 20007 USA
E-mail: wsaba@air.org
Abstract: Over two decades ago a quite revolution overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical,
corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat
justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and
that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects
our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In
this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of
challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.
Keywords: Ontology, compositional semantics, commonsense knowledge, reasoning.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Saba, W. S. (2008) Commonsense
Knowledge, Ontology and Ordinary Language, Int. Journal of Reasoning-based Intelligent
Systems, Vol. n, No. n, pp.4360.
Biographical notes: W. Saba received his PhD in Computer Science from Carleton University in 1999. He is currently a Principal Software Engineer at the American Institutes for
Research in Washington, DC. Prior to this he was in academia where he taught computer
science at the University of Windsor and the American University of Beirut (AUB). For
over 9 years he was also a consulting software engineer where worked at such places as
AT&T Bell Labs, MetLife and Cognos, Inc. His research interests are in natural language
processing, ontology, the representation of and reasoning with commonsense knowledge,
and intelligent e-commerce agents.
INTRODUCTION
44
W. S. SABA
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Simon is a rock.
The ham sandwich wants a beer.
Sheba is articulate.
Jon bought a brick house.
Carlos likes to play bridge.
Jon enjoyed the book.
Jon visited a house on every street.
Although they tend to use the least number of words to convey a particular thought (perhaps for computational effectiveness, as Givon (1984) once suggested), speakers of ordinary language clearly understand the sentences in (2) as
follows:
(3)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Clearly, any compositional semantics must somehow account for this [missing text], as such sentences are quite
common and are not at all exotic, farfetched, or contrived.
Linguists and semanticists have usually dealt with such sentences by investigating various phenomena such as metaphor (3a); metonymy (3b); textual entailment (3c); nominal
compounds (3d); lexical ambiguity (3e), co-predication (3f);
and quantifier scope ambiguity (3g), to name a few. However, and although they seem to have a common denominator, it is somewhat surprising that in looking at the literature
one finds that these phenomena have been studied quite
independently; to the point where there is very little, if any,
that seems to be common between the various proposals that
are often suggested. In our opinion this state of affairs is
very problematic, as the prospect of a distinct paradigm for
every single phenomenon in natural language cannot be
realistically contemplated. Moreover, and as we hope to
demonstrate in this paper, we believe that there is indeed a
common symptom underlying these (and other) challenging
problems in the semantics of natural language.
Before we make our case, let us at this very early juncture suggest this informal explanation for the missing text in
(2): SOLID is (one of) the most salient features of a Rock
(2a); people, and not a sandwich, have wants and EAT is
In addition to EAT, a Human can of course also BUY, SELL, MAKE, PREor HOLD, etc. a Sandwich. Why EAT might be a more salient
relation between a Person and a Sandwich is a question we shall pay considerable attention to below.
PARE, WATCH,
45
(4)
a.
b.
c.
d.
an old cat
a black cat
an even number
a prime number
: hungry( x :: Living)
: articulate( x :: Human)
: make( x :: Human, y :: Artifact)
: manufacture( x :: Human, y :: Instrument)
: ride( x :: Human, y :: Vehicle)
: drive( x :: Human, y :: Car )
a. t T (s)[sp(t, s) (s )]
b. s t (s1 , s2 )[sp(s, s1 ) sp(t, s2 ) (s1 s2 )]
c. s = t (s1 , s2 )[ sp(s, s1 ) sp(t, s2 ) (s1 = s2 )]
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
46
W. S. SABA
(x :: Human)(TEACHER( x)
df (a :: Activity)(teaching(a) agent(a, x)))
That is, any x, which must be an object of type Human, is a
TEACHER iff x is the agent of some Activity a, where a is a
TEACHING activity. It is certainly not for convenience, elegance or mere ontological indulgence that a logical concept
such as TEACHER must be defined in terms of more basic
ontological categories (such as an Activity) as can be illustrated by the following example:
(12) sheba is a superb teacher
(1 sheba :: Thing)(superb(sheba :: Human)
teacher(sheba :: Human))
(10)
(Qx :: s)(P ( x)),
(Qx :: t)(P ( x)),
Not recognizing the difference between logical (e.g., TEACHER) and ontological concepts (e.g., Human) is perhaps the reason why ontologies in
most AI systems are rampant with multiple inheritance.
5
We can use a to state that an object is possibly abstract, instead of
c , which is intended to state that the object is not necessarily concrete
(or that it does not necessarily actually exist).
(X :: t)(P (X c ))
(X :: t)(x)( Inst( x, X ) Exist( x) P(X ))
(x :: t)( Exist( x) P( x))
(X :: t)(P (X c ))
(X :: t)(x)( Inst( x, X ) Exist( x) P( x))
(x :: t)( Exist( x) P( x))
Furthermore, it should be noted that x in (13b) is assumed to
have actual/concrete existence assuming that the property/relation P is actually true of x. If the truth of P(X) is just
a possibility, then so is the concrete existence of some instance x of X. Formally, we have the following:
47
( x :: (s tc )) = ( x :: (s t)c )
( x :: (s t c )) = ( x :: (s t)c )
( x :: (sc tc )) = ( x :: (s t)c )
As a first example consider the following (where temporal
and modal auxiliaries are represented as superscripts on the
predicates):
(14) jon needs a computer
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: Computer)
( NEEDdoes ( jon, X :: Thing))
In (14) we are stating that some unique object named jon,
which is of type Human does NEED something we call Computer. On the other hand, consider now the interpretation of
jon fixed a computer:
(15) jon fixed a computer
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: Computer )
(FIX did ( jon, X :: Thingc ))
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: (Computer Thingc ))
(FIX did ( jon, X ))
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: Computer c )
(FIX did ( jon, X ))
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: Computer )
(x)(Inst( x, X ) Exist( x) FIX did ( jon, X ))
1
( jon :: Human)(x :: Computer )
( Exist( x) FIX did ( jon, x))
That is, jon fixed a computer is interpreted as follows:
there is a unique object named jon, which is an object of
type Human, and some x of type Computer (an x that actually exists) such that jon did FIX x. However, consider now
the following:
(16) jon can fix a computer
(1 jon :: Human)(X :: Computer )
(FIX can ( jon, X :: Thingc ))
1
( jon :: Human)(X :: (Computer Thingc ))
(FIX can ( jon, X ))
1
( jon :: Human)(X :: Computer c )
(FIX can ( jon, X ))
1
( jon :: Human)(X :: Computer )
(x)(Inst( x, X ) Exist( x) FIX can ( jon, X ))
(1 jon :: Human)(x :: Computer )
(x)( Exist( x) FIX can ( jon, x))
Essentially, therefore, jon can fix a computer is stating that
whenever an object x of type Computer exists, then jon can
fix x; or, equivalently, that jon can fix any computer.
Finally, consider the following, where it is assumed that
our ontology reflects the commonsense fact that we can
always speak of an Animal climbing some Physical object:
48
W. S. SABA
(X :: Snake)(Y :: Tree)
(CLIMBcan (X :: Animalc , Y :: Physicalc ))
(X :: (Snake Animalc ))(Y :: (Tree Physicalc ))
(CLIMBcan (X , Y ))
(X :: Snakec )(Y :: Treec )(CLIMBcan (X , Y ))
(X :: Snake)(Y :: Tree)
(x )(y)(Inst( x, X ) Exist( x) Inst( y,Y )
Exist( y) CLIMBcan ( x, y))
(x :: Snake)(y :: Tree)
(Exist( x) Exist( y) CLIMBcan ( x, y))
We first demonstrate the role type unification and polymorphism plays in nominal modification. Consider the sentence
in (1) which could be uttered by someone who believes that:
(i) Olga is a dancer and a beautiful person; or (ii) Olga is
beautiful as a dancer (i.e., Olga is a dancer and she dances
beautifully).
(17) Olga is a beautiful dancer
As suggested by Larson (1998), there are two possible
routes to explain this ambiguity: one could assume that a
noun such as dancer is a simple one place predicate of
type e, t
and blame this ambiguity on the adjective; alternatively, one could assume that the adjective is a simple
one place predicate and blame the ambiguity on some sort
of complexity in the structure of the head noun (Larson calls
these alternatives A-analysis and N-analysis, respectively).
In an A-analysis, an approach advocated by Siegel
(1976), adjectives are assumed to belong to two classes,
termed predicative and attributive, where predicative adjectives (e.g., red, small, etc.) are taken to be simple functions
from entities to truth-values, and are thus extensional and
intersective: Adj Noun = Adj Noun . Attributive
adjectives (e.g., former, previous, rightful, etc.), on the other
hand, are functions from common noun denotations to
common noun denotations i.e., they are predicate modifiers of type e, t
, e, t
, and are thus intensional and nonintersective (but subsective: Adj Noun Noun ). On
this view, the ambiguity in (17) is explained by posting two
distinct lexemes ( beautiful1 and beautiful 2 ) for the adjective beautiful, one of which is an attributive while the other
is a predicative adjective. In keeping with Montagues
a beautiful1 dancer
P[(x )(dancer(x ) beautiful(x ) P (x ))]
a beautiful2 dancer
P[(x )(beautiful(dancer(x )) P (x ))]
While it does explain the ambiguity in (17), several reservations have been raised regarding this proposal. As Larson
(1995; 1998) notes, this approach entails considerable duplication in the lexicon as this means that there are doublets for all adjectives that can be ambiguous between an
intersective and a non-intersective meaning. Another objection, raised by McNally and Boleda (2004), is that in an Aanalysis there are no obvious ways of determining the context in which a certain adjective can be considered intersective. For example, they suggest that the most natural reading
of (18) is the one where beautiful is describing Olgas dancing, although it does not modify any noun and is thus
wrongly considered intersective by modifying Olga.
(18) Look at Olga dance. She is beautiful.
While valid in other contexts, in our opinion this observation does not necessarily hold in this specific example since
the resolution of `she' must ultimately consider all entities in
the discourse, including, presumably, the dancing activity
that would be introduced by a Davidsonian representation of
Look at Olga dance (this issue is discussed further below).
A more promising alternative to the A-analysis of the
ambiguity in (17) has been proposed by Larson (1995,
1998), who suggests that beautiful in (17) is a simple intersective adjective of type e,t and that the source of the ambiguity is due to a complexity in the structure of the head
noun. Specifically, Larson suggests that a deverbal noun
such as dancer should have the Davidsonian representation
(x )(DANCER( x ) =df (e)(DANCING(e) AGENT(e, x ))) i.e.,
any x is a dancer iff x is the agent of some dancing activity
(Larsons notation is slightly different). In this analysis, the
ambiguity in (1) is attributed to an ambiguity in what beautiful is modifying, in that it could be said of Olga or her
dancing Activity. That is, (17) is to be interpreted as follows:
Olga is a beautiful dancer
(e)(dancing(e) agent(e, olga)
(beautiful(e) beautiful(olga)))
6
49
Note now that the type unification concerning Olga is trivial, while the type unification concerning a will fail since
(Activity Human) = , thus resulting in the following:
(22)
The sentences in (22) exemplify what is known in the literature as adjective ordering restrictions (AORs). However,
despite numerous studies of AORs (e.g., see Wulff, 2003;
Teodorescu, 2006), the slightly differing AORs that have
been suggested in the literature have never been formally
justified. What we hope to demonstrate below however is
that the apparent ambiguity of some adjectives and adjective-ordering restrictions are both related to the nature of the
ontological categories that these adjectives apply to in ordinary spoken language. Thus, and while the general assumptions in Larsons (1995; 1998) N-Analysis seem to be valid,
it will be demonstrated here that nominal modification seem
to be more involved than has been suggested thus far. In
particular, it seems that attaining a proper semantics for
nominal modification requires a much richer type system
than currently employed in formal semantics.
50
W. S. SABA
BEAUTIFUL(RED( x
RED(BEAUTIFUL( x
:: Physical) :: Entity)
:: Entity) :: Physical)
Note now that the type casting required (and thus the order of
adjectives) is valid since (Physical Entity) . This means that
we can now perform the required type unifications which
would proceed as follows:
(1Olga :: Human)(a :: Activity)
(DANCING(a) AGENT(a, Olga)
(BEAUTIFUL(YOUNG(a :: Activity) :: Physical) :: Entity)
BEAUTIFUL(YOUNG(Olga :: Human)
:: Physical) :: Entity))
Note now that the type casting required (and thus the order
of adjectives) is valid since (Physical Entity) . This means
that we can now perform the required type unifications
which would proceed as follows:
51
52
W. S. SABA
(30)
(31)
That is, we are assuming here that speakers of ordinary language understand read and burn as follows: it always
makes sense to speak of a Human that read some Content,
and of a Human that burned some Physical object. Consider
now the following:
(29)
(32)
(33)
Note that it is the Trip (event) that did not necessarily happen, not the
planning (Activity) for it.
Similar presuppositions are also made in a hybrid (connectionist/symbolic) sense modulation approach described in (Rais-Ghasem &
Corriveau, 1998).
As in the case of copredication, type unifications introducing an additional variable and a salient relation occurs
also in situations where we have what we refer to as metonymy. To illustrate, consider the following example:
53
lrap(s, t) = [ r, m, n | rap(r, sm , tn )]
The lists (of lists) lpap* (t) and lrap* (s, t) can now be
inductively defined as follows:
(38)
3.5
is more salient than RIDE, MANUFACTURE, DEetc. since the other relations apply higherup in the hierarchy; that is, the fact that we MAKE a Car,
for example, is not due to Car, but to the fact that MAKE
can be said of any Artifact and (Car Artifact) .
DRIVE
SIGN, MAKE,
While DRIVE is a more salient relation between a Human and a Car than RIDE, most speakers of ordinary
lpap* (Thing) = [ ]
lpap*(t) = lpap(t) : lpap* (sup(t))
lrap* (s, Thing) = [ ]
lrap*(s, t) = lrap(s, t) : lrap*(s, sup(t))
s = [r | r, a, b lrap* (s, t) (a m ) (b n )]
Assuming now the ontological and logical concepts shown
in figure 1, for example, then
lpap * (Human)
= [[ articulate,...],[ hungry,...],[ heavy,...],,[old,...],...]
54
W. S. SABA
a Human and a Car than ride, which, in turn, is more salient than manufacture, make, etc. Moreover, assuming
the above sets we have
liz is famous
(1liz :: Human)
(p :: Property)(fame( p) HAS(liz, p))
55
(54a) and (45b) erroneously entail (45c). However, we believe that the embedding of ontological types into the properties and relations yields the correct entailments without
the need for complex higher-order intensional formalisms.
Consider the following:
That is, any exercising Activity has a property, namely wisdom, which is a property that ordinarily an object of type
Human has. Note, however, that a type unification for the
variable a must now occur:
(1 p :: Property)(wisdom(p)
HAS(a :: Human, p))
(a :: (Activity Human))(exercising(a )
(1 p :: Property)
(wisdom(p) HAS(a, p))
(a :: Activity)(x :: Human)(exercising(a )
agent(a , x ) (1 p :: Property)
(wisdom(p) HAS(a , p))
Essentially, therefore, we get the following: any human x
has the property of being wise whenever x is the agent of
an exercising activity. Note now that (50), (53) and modes
ponens results in the following, which is the meaning of
jon is wise:
(1 jon :: Human)
(1 p :: Property)(wisdom(p) HAS(x , p))
Finally, note that the inference in (49) was proven valid
only after uncovering the missing text, since exercising is
wise was essentially interpreted as [any human that performs the activity of] exercising is wise.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
56
W. S. SABA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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