DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4.2.1 The relation between the two premisses may perhaps be made clearer by
considering an artificial example. Let us suppose that a man has a peculiar kind
of clairvoyance such that he can know everything about the effects of all the
alternative actions open to him. But let us suppose that he has so far formed for
himself, or been taught, no principles of conduct. In deciding between
alternative courses of action, such a man would know, fully and exactly,
between what he was deciding. We have to ask to what extent, if any, such a
man would be handicapped, in coming to a decision, by not having any formed
principles. It would seem beyond doubt that he could choose between two
courses; it would be strange, even, to call such a choice necessarily arbitrary or
ungrounded ; for if a man knows to the last detail exactly what he is doing, and
what he might otherwise have done, his choice is not arbitrary in the sense in
which a choice would be arbitrary if made by the toss of a coin without any
consideration of the effects. But suppose that we were to ask such a man 'Why
did you choose this set of effects rather than that? Which of the many effects
were they that led you to decide the way you did?' His answer to this question
might be of two kinds. He might say 'I can't give any reasons; I just felt like
deciding that way; another time, faced with the same choice, I might decide
differently'. On the other hand, he might say 'It was this and this that made me
decide; I was deliberately avoiding such and such effects, and seeking such and
such'. If he gave the first of these two answers, we might in a certain sense of that
word call his decision arbitrary (though even in that case he had some reason for
his choice, namely, that he felt that way); but if he gave the second, we should
not.
Let us see what is involved in this second type of answer. Although we have
assumed that the man has no formed principles, he shows, if he gives the second
answer, that he has started to form principles for himself; for to choose effects
because they are such and such is to begin to act on a principle that such and
such effects are to be chosen. We see in this example that in order to act on
principle it is not necessary in some sense to have a principle already, before you
act; it may be that the decision to act in a certain way, because of something
about the effects of acting in that way, is to subscribe to a principle of action -though it is not necessarily to adopt it in any permanent sense.