Fred Sommers B= “isa philosopher,” B= “philosopher”; and 0 on for the rest of the terms of the set. Now let any pair of terms (X,Y) represent some sentence which conjoins the terms X and Y. Thus (X, 1) will be a sentence like “X i” “Some T's X,” “All non-Y'is X" and 0 on for all the logical forms of sentences conjoining the two terms X and 1 Let us suppose that (X,Y), represents some one sentence with X and Yand that (X, 1), represents some other sentence whose logical form differs from that of (X, Y),.. We now state the syntactical equivalence. For any term X and and for any forms i and j: ¢ (X, 1s significa ‘This equivalence expresses the simple fact that when a sentence (X,Y) is significant it remains significant under all the normal logical operstions such as conversion, negation, contraposition, and so forth. And, similarly, if che sentence is category nonsense, then all such transformations are also ponsensica ‘The significance or nonsignficance of 2 sen- tence (X,1), is therefore independent of the ‘omnibus operator “i.” Whether the sentence is significant depends only on what X and Y are. We may therefore ignore the logical form of the sentence and concentrate only on the compatibility cor lack of compatibility ofthe two terms. Let us say that two terms which can be used together to form significant sentences are U- related terms. To indicate this we prefix the value U to the pair of terms* The U-relation ‘may be defined thus Y)jis significant (A Mjis nota category mistake = U(X, Ny. (X, 275 a category mistake = N(X, Y) not-U(X, Ny, For example, the value forthe pit (all, philoso pher) is U and we therefore say: U (philosopher, tall). And if we are given a set of terms ~ “Socrates,” “philosopher,” “even prime,” “all” “fence” ~ we would write down the fellowing ten values for the pairs: U(S, P), (S, By US, Dy 4S, BNE, By UP, 1, HP, Py MED UT, D, WEA “The properties of the U and "relations form the formal hear of the thery of types. For X and Yo be Ucrelated means that they ae significantly conjoinable. And (I) asure us that of the sym retry ofthe U-rlation, chat i, UX, 1) = Uh 1X). Clearly the U-relation is also reflexive so that U(X, X) holds for any term in the language. We shall see that one major source of trouble concerns the question whether the U-telation is transitive But our immediate task is the definition of Btypes in terms of the Usrelation. This we cin now do. A tet of terms S constitutes a B-type ofa languoge fall the terms of § are mutually U-related :9 that ‘any pair of terms in has the value U and thee is no larger se Sin L whose terms are mutually Unrelated and suck that St ncluded in I, In other words, the B-types of a language are the largest sets of mutually U-rlated terms. And to say that two terms are of the same B-type is ‘equivalent to saying tha they are U-related ‘The notion of a set of terms having mutual use ‘may be found in Black as well asin Ryle. It under lies his tentative formulstion ofa “negative criter= ion” for establishing that two expressions are of different types. Black's formulation, like Ryl’s is wider since he intends his criterion to apply to all sorts of expressions, not merely those expressions ‘we here cal terms or monadic predicates. But if we confine Black's remarks to terms, we sce him mak- ing use of the idea of a set of mutually U-related terms. We must, says Black, interpret the theory of types negatively as sentially an instrument for establishing differ ences of type... The new procedure consist in asserting that 040. ypographicaly distinct, words are syntactically dissimilar if there i ot least one context in which one ant be sub- stituted for the other without generating non sense italics his.” ‘Thus let C be some linguistic context (..., C). We can, says Blac, establish that ewo terms 4 and B are of different types if we notice that U(4, C) while WB, ©). Black uses the notion of mutual U-tet of terms fora negative criterion because he does not— as we do ~ consider mutual U-relatedness to be a suffi- cient condition for establishing that two terms are of the same type. On our definition of a B-type it is, for example, sufficient to know that U (philo- sopher, tall) in order for us to say that “phileso- ppher” and “all” belong to the same B-type. But {or Black, this isto ignore the fact that UT (ence, tall) will slo establish ehat “tal” and “fence” are ofthe same type, and yet we should not wish to go on to say that “philosopher” and “fence” are of the same type. For this reason Black ignores the