18. NIC M 89-1002, September 1989, The Post-CFE Environment in Europe "National intoigence Counell Secret ‘Memorandum The Post-CFE Environment in Europe 29718. (Continued) National Intelligence nororeenconaeaT Counet NIC M 89-10002 The Post-CFE Environment in Europe Information avallable as of 1 September 1989 \was used inthe preparation ofthis ‘Momorandum, which was propared by the National Intaligonce Officers for Ganeral Purpose Forces, USSR, and Europe 4" Secret 29818. (Continued) Soe ____ Key Judgments + The es folling the Conventional Foes in Burope CFE) als wll b ‘transitional period in Europe, marked bythe reevaluation and redefni- tion of longstanding economic, political, and military relationships ‘between and within the existing alliances a5) + The overall threat to NATO will diminist in a post-CFE environment, and barring a precipitous decline in NATO, the currently unfavorable balance of forces wil be largely eliminated, Remaining Warsaw Pact forces wil need even longer and more maisive mobilization to be able to carry out deep stratexic operations in Central Europe -eass}~ + West European publics and leaders already pereeve a reduced military threat from the Warsaw Pact and will expect continued attempis by the Soviet Union and its East European alles to focus on politial and ‘vonomicrelationshis with the West, recuce the size oftheir military forces, and shift resources from defense to civil production. <=¥er + Continued US leadership of NATO will be challenged by the emergence ‘of a stronger Eurocentric approach emphasizing the importance of politcal and economic over military matters as West European concerns ‘bout the Warsaw Pact threat diminish, and domestic pressures for reallocating defense budgets to civilian needs, sch asthe environment, And emphasis on East-West cooperation rather than confrontation in crease. me) + There will be an increased prospect of instability in some East European ‘countries if their economies fail to improve significantly —a likely prospect if they are unable to profitably exploit their greater access tothe West ee}18. (Continued) Discussion’ Inielligence Community analysts belies that the ext decade—following the Conventional Fetes in Europe (CFE) talks —wil ikely se long-established etary, polite and economic relationships between end mong European nations and thee superomer pt ‘ets rectaluated and redefined. CFE i an importa ‘lment ina larger roses of enhanced West Europe: an economic iteration, the asertin of independent european pltal intrest, and the paliel and ‘economie reforms and realecations under way in asters Europe and the Soviet Union Excepting upheaval in Eastern Europe, Commanity analysts foresee more direct policy eaecrns forthe United States emerging from the changes ix Western Europe ‘han fom thos in either Eastern Europe o the Soviet Union a) Pos-CPE Warsaw Pact military fore will be inea- able, without significant, costly, and ime consuming mobilization, of earrying out the dep strategic orera= ‘ins in Central Europe that have beea characteris ‘of Soviet military planing for several decades Both the East andthe West wil be forced to revise their iw of war in Europe: current Soviet military redue- tions and resruturng probably retet the erly stages of such a eovaluation proces Although Soviet. Settegy and doctrine are eletry changing in reaction {0 new politcal instructions and economi impera- tives, their ial shape isnt yet discernible Neve. theless, Soviet military objectives against NATO ‘would be likely to be much mre ite, replacing those ofthe traditional Theater Steere Opertion, hich projects Soviet military operation throughout Western Europe as) ‘hea Eafe Eon ithe US, he tn alo Post-CFE Soviet forces although smaler—may be ‘on average beter equipped, depending on the Sove’s linge to reirvest potential savings nt the il ‘ary. Some analysts elev tha trough this nr Fenton and restucturing the Soviets readiness os ture is likely to improve: Despite potential improvements, however, the overall miliary threat to [NATO will diish, and ules there i prec tous decline in NATO force, the currently unfaor able balance offrces would be largely ctiminated Under the Warsaw Pac's peopssla CFE agreement vould force the Prt to give up nearly half a reinforcement arability inthe Alaticto-the-Urals 2one; NATO's reinforcement capability, however, ‘would be sgncany less affeted Further, the Soviet Union will not likely be able wo repensrte "rapidly the force structure required fo dep offensive ‘operations Strategie surprise in Europe, therefore, wil be even Hels, altbough tacisl surprise ‘ould remain posible for example, to obtain inied objectives 4) (Overall here will be continued shift n Soviet, ‘emphasis away fram alitary power and toward poli: cal and economic interaction withthe West Through (CFE, Gorbachev appareatly intends to validate the basic assumption a his "ew forsign policy ie hat atonal security wil no longer be founded inary on military strength baton Broader based comin tion af diplomacy, negotiation, exnomie owe, and military strength dow On the NATO site, pola and budgetary con straint together with pereption ofa reduced Soviet ‘threat wil result ina decreasing commitment by European nation tothe maintenance larg stan ing frees, leading to continued frce redactions, beyond thre agreed tat the CFE Talks Depending ‘on where such adatonal cuts were taken and how fa they went in relation to Pat Toes, seh reductions18. (Continued) would probably force major changes in NATO's defense strategy. Simultaneously 2 CFE agreement ‘woul contribute tothe political momentum toward Aenuclearization in Europe and lead to changes iv Alliance nuclear use policies. In general, the pst (CPE situation wll b dynamic as both mary alliances develop new objectives and strategies and Assign and fld forces oimplemeat them. evr {Ina post-CFE Europe, the Soviet Union's doin role in most of Eastern Europe wil decline signi Cantly and dopend primarily on formal adherence to the Warsaw Pat end eooomi te, East European ounces wl alo become inresingly independent, “This could weaken the military rationale forthe ‘Warsaw Pact and precipitate increased East Europe an presute to rein! the Pact loward moe of politcal aliance er) Moscow's East European allies, lacking strong Bloc ‘entity, wll probably prefer wo establish individual bilateral relations with West European nations With Soviet military preseace and politcal infuence in Eastern Europe reduced the relbity ofthe politcal underpinnings ofthe current military and economic selatinships suchas the Warsaw Pact and CEMA Wil be called inte question. Traditional national ‘nimostes and historical grievances among the East Enropean countiee—already emerging 38 the it psd Bloc identity reoetes—wil worsen inthe pst- (CFE era If lity drandowns throweh CFE pro ‘eed Loo auckly—contibating to mounting internal fd exteaalpesures for reform-—this coal lend to Social and political unsest in one or mae ofthe East European regimes and rest ina regime crackdown that cou tall Eats Wet elation fen In contrast, events within the European Commusity (EO}notabiy 1992 markt integration ad seit ‘ant progres toward European politcal eoopea tion~are bolstering and broadening the West Buro- pean sense of common purpose and community. AS ‘West Europea countries move avy fom hee de pendence on a US-led Allatic Alliance and toward a tore intra-Earopean perspective they wll Become increasingly parochial in thir vcurity coneers and lest prone take 2 US view. They may atempt © cata "Comen European Houte™ bul to EC rather than Soviet or US specifications. EC member State vested intrest i an economically rong, Politalycaesive EC woud prevent the admision ‘of any current CEMA state daring the next decade, ‘The Council of Europe isthe more likely venue for teans-Buropean policy dslgue and cooperation, fone (CFE will strengthen widely held perceptions among West Europea ofa dimiished threat. Inthe afer math ofa CFE agreement, there wll be an neensed numberof plicaly powerful vices inthe West calling inte question the need for military alliances But at long as thee terns a eubeantal—even, thouth reduced-—US military presence in Europe, hhowetes, he broad feandations of NATO wil sen- tilly remain ntact Even in countries where ant nuclear sentiments and po-arms-contal views are sSrongst the majority ofthe public toy stl favors membership in NATO. (On the economic side CFE will contribute to « more postive environment for East-West trade, although the continued presence of cumbersome bureauerases snd trade barriers wil hinder peospects for signif aly increased trade. The East Europeans are ana ious to expand economic ration, singly and in frou, with the Burepean Community. Tey are Unlikely, however, ether to inereaee trade reply oF to take advantage of echalogy wanes to oe verse economic emiitions Some analyse fee that the West European mtoas ae already beginning 30118. (Continued) Astermine what they could dot improve the Eas, European economies and would contin 1 d0 30 ‘Most believe, however, thatthe EC aations, hough conscious of East European need for enone ase. tance and outside investment, now appear unwiling snd unable to provide investment or ecnomic ase "ance in lange enough quantities 1o achieve long-term fundamental changes in the economic ratonhip. Despite some interest onthe prt ofthe West Europe- ‘ans, most belive that they ae unlikely to make the ‘masive investment acedd to ait East European cconomies, Individual East European nations wl so have to contend with the unifed decison apparatus epreseted by th EC with 0 counterpart seonomic ‘alton to represent thei imeest Inceed, CEMA wil become increasingly ineffective nthe projected vironment, a individual Eat European nations ‘seek to expand their own relations bated on economic reeds and potentials “The likly effets of CFE on the Soret Union's ‘ecomomy ate less ler. CFE could have enormous implications ore time forthe Soviet economy, partie: ularly in terms of educed resources Seveted to d= ease production. Because the Soviet Union sends ‘more thas thee times mare on conventional forces ‘han itedoes on sete offensive neler forces CCFE accord fers te potential for much erester esoute savings ad industrial reorientation than the INF and START agreements combined Stvings can be realized in procurement, force structure opertions and maintenance expenditures, and manpower uilaae tion Overall, a CFE agreement coud allow the Soviets 1 save upto 18-18 billion rable pr yeas, or about 15 precat of total ivestment and operating expenditures To pu such savin ilo perspective, the amount i almost equal to Soviet investment in the itil machie-biling sector and over half he amount invested in ousiog {sth [At the se time, yoblems inthe Soviet esonomy tnd the eauremens of future forces wll probably prevent the Soviets realising the fll economic bones of CHE Theres consigerable doubt about {he ability ofthe Sviets to efetvely reditibute resoures from defense to evan uss. Factors inhib: iting conesin neue reluctance to reorient il ‘acy research and development programs: dificult in ransfersng skilled workers feom military indus tries and absorbing released miltary manpower into the already inefficient and underemployed Soviet industria abor poo and the tehnia! problems involed in converting speialized industrial proces, Moreover, an unknewn percentage ofthese savings, in ‘the early years, wouldve tobe spent on moderna. tion and resiractariag stemming Irom shit Ia Soviet strategy and weapos requirements For example, some Soviet oficial have sated that, in Keeping with the new defensive doctrine, erate emphasis wl be placed on “efensve™ weapons. Other madernization nd potential increases inthe costs of intining residual Fores at higher levels of teainess— should the Soviets do so could alo eat nto the projected sovings 4.