19. NIC M 89-10003, October 1989, Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals National lteligence Councit ~Beorot. ‘Memorandum Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals “—™ 632 30319, (Continued) NIC M 89-10003 Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals (uy) Information available as of 1 September 1989 ‘was used in the preparation of this ‘Memorandum, which was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose. Forces. The Memorandum was coordinated with representatives of the Defense Intelligence ‘Agency and the Central intelligence Agency; coordination was chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. ar19. (Continued) Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawalsur + Soviet reductions in Eastern Europe are proceeding in « manner ‘consistent with Gorbachev's commitnent; they will result in a significant reduction in the combat capability of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, + Current Soviet activities comprise four simultaneous processes: withdrawal, reduction, restructuring, and modernicati + In Eastern Europe the Soviets, at roughly halfway through the period, have withdrawn about 50 percent of the equipment and units promised. Percentages are much lower for reductions in the ‘overall Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and for east af the Urals. + Sonier restructuring and modernization activities will produce a smaller, more versatile standing force optimized for defense, but still capable of smaller scale offensive operations. Phivinformsioniesecrot Nofors— Ww Seeret-19. (Continued) Discussion “This paper presents the lates assessment ofthe ‘ongoing unilateral Soviet withdrawal of frees fom Ester Europe and reduction ia the soiled ‘Allantiots-the Urals (ATU) ne It provides the latest gues af ores withérewa and vee the current understanding af he rentestoring ofthe forces remsning, ad the best estimates othe factors affecting the combat capabilites ad potential mis los of those residual orcs. ‘We have reached mo bottomline judgment. Fi sv believe that the Soviet withdrawal rela iw seul ina reduction in th cota expat of the remaining Soviet forces in Eastern Europe ec ‘ond, ll ofthe changes we ate seeig, and tore we Antcpate, re consistent with our understanding of General Secretary Gorbacher paiy objectives — ‘educing Wester perceptions ofthe Warsaw Pact ‘heat, inducing a relaxation in NATO's defense sffrs, achieving an agreement on Conventions! Fees in Europe (CFE) and lowering the detente conomic burden onthe USSR Although “withdeawal oe redaction” are the terms ecaealyacited with the curent Sort atv, ‘here are actually four poceses occurring sla: neously: sta withdrawal of Soviet unit and eip- ‘ment from the adiional “orward areas in Eastern Europe second a reduction a tbe veal Soviet force posture, with a patel emphasis on thse arse facing NATO: tied, resractaring ofthe retaining eres intended to rig thee capabliis et line with aniciated missions, ebjecties, and conditions; {nd ur a continuation of programatc modern ‘cation intended to as the combat eflectivenss of Soviet feces All ofthis activity is ttalyuiateral, The Soviets are under so oral obligation teary through and are free toads the process a they proceed Nevertheless, Gorbachev hase ner- ‘tin demonstrating that he fling his promises 306 In assessing what is going othe bes place to start is withthe dramatie 7 Deeomber 1988 speech at te UN Dy Gorhachev, He made the following key statements ‘of Soviet intentions, that over the net two years the Soviets woud + Reduce the overl ss of tei armed Fores by 500,000 personel + Reduce the ie oftheir forers in ast Germany, ‘Caschosioakia, and Hungary by 50,00 persons ‘and 5000 tanks Thiswas later increased to 3300 tanks wit the inclusion of eductins in Soviet. Fores in Polen + Reduce 10.000 tanks, 800 arly systems, and 4800 combat asc fom Baster Barope athe ‘Western USSR (the ATTU zoe] + Wuhdraw an disan sx tsk divisions from Bast Germany. Czechsiokia, nd Hungary + Withdraw assault acing formations aad uit ant assault ever erossng fees, Resructare the remaining forces to presen an “unambiguously defersive” pate He made adiiona promites concerning Asia, Gorbacher's speech was met with any auestions and such kei in the West Between ate December tnd le Febuary, offi Soviet spokesmen asserted thatthe si Soviet dvs to be withdrawn fom Ensten Earoe would be witht in their entirety, ‘hat all of ter combat auipment woud be de- stroyed, and tht the tlt tank moved fom stern Europe would bs destroyed or oaveted Secret19. (Continued) ‘As the withdrawals and restructuring have pro- fressed, i has beome increasingly clear that, > {hough the Soviets are generally moving toward meet ing Gorbachev inital commitments they are not ‘being implemented in the manner detribed by some subsequent spokesrnn, The tank regiment, other ‘unite and all ofthe tanks of the three divisions {cheduled for removal in 1989 have been withdraw, ‘lone with many tanks fom other divisions, ther Slte—and lmoe al ofthe artillery and armored ‘Woop carriers—however--ate being used in ther structuring ofthe remaining divisions, each of which islesing two battalions of tanks aon tank regiment is converted tos motorized ie regiment. Moreover, the tanks Being emoved from Eastern Europe arent bing destroyed. ‘The Soviets are bepinnng to acknowledge deviations from some of ther statemeats, bt they have sill nt been entirely forthright abou some of the conse- ‘quences, notably "That the artsy in she remsiing disions i being increased by the addition of one artillery battalion in tank divisions and thet artillery battalions in Avision are being expanded fom 18 to 24 guns. + That the restructuring ofthe remaining divisions ‘may etentually require the introduction of some 21000 addtional armored too cartier. Most of what the Soviets are doing makes alitary sense. Indeed, tis generally what we would have tapected unt the Soviets began making additonal atementa, Despite these deviations, the orrall result ‘lls be avery significant reduction i the ofler- five combat power of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe How close have the Soviets come to meting Gorba- chevs 7 Decemter promises as we appeaich the ‘midway point? Tables 13 illustrat our answer. Table ‘provides the sireard for forces withdramn from Etstern Europe, Column ove gives the reportable ‘tems; clu two, the total numberof thse items in ‘at area as of 1 January 1989; clue three he seis reductions announced foreach ofthe tems; eum four, the reductions the Soviets have an ‘ounce 25 of 1 August 1989; calumn five, our assessment of reductions asf I Sepember 1989; snd, finally column sx provides the percentage that our assessment represents ofthe total announced reduc tion. At halfway through the period, the esceaages arc in the neightorhood of $0 percent complete We ‘alee that up e 2.800 tak; 180 combat irra four ai assault elt; and two assault crossing vite have been withdraw and thee tank divisions have been removed fem the force structure. No pereetage in olflered for atilery because no specific withdrawal of alry from te forward area was promised in Gorbachev's speech ‘Turning to table 2, we see similar picture, althoush the percentages are somewhat reduce. For example, we have not detested thatthe Soviets have reduced {he total number of tanks in the ATTU zone to the same degree thal they have withdrawn the promised ‘umber of tanks from Eattern Eurore. Fal, table 3 provides a picture ofthe status of he feduc- tions from east the Urals. Overal the Soviets, within the limits af ou ality to observe and aes, ‘em to be procesding with the unilateral withdrawls as outlined by Gorbachev. (Questions have aizen concerning the spirit and etter of their promise. Are they doing what they nomial” 1s the force size realy changing? Even if i, ae the ial Soviet frees more capable? In shot, is there less bore than mets the eye? Let ws look a the tank issue ist Following Govba chev's 7 Decemter speech, statements by Soviet af ‘las inicated tat most eal ofthe ofthe 5,300 tanks to be withrawn from Eastern Europe would be esiroyed and that most af the 4,700 others tobe ‘reduced inthe western USSR would be converted to Civilian use. Some subsequent statements have ind ated that tanks would alo be placed in storage or Used to upgrade units. The inconsistency and ambigh= iy ofthese statements make it dificult to determine how meny tanks the Soviets now intend to dismantle ‘or destroy, bat veal lof them wil be older models from witin the USSR and not the relatively more modern tanks being withérawn fom Eastern Europe. Moreover, some evidence indicates tht Mot- ‘ow i planning o store sgnicant numberof the tanks removed from units in the ATTU zon east of 30719. (Continued) = eS foe oc wt de he pono tee fess “freee a teh Ta Don (FD) aed Gets thet ce Mon ste aiery aod intel al motel ‘ten an Ysa CWO py en "aba i tel on Ee oe "Ths for all Soo ary 10 en oe nding mrs maine cet ann pe "he Urals Tete i sb evidence thatthe Soviets will “upgrade divisions inthe USSR, ineluding those inthe ATT zone, with more moder tanks withdraw {rom Eastern Europe In general, we believe that tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe are replacing older tank that bad been in cadre uit storage in the USSR To the 308 From Bastegn Europe tothe USSR ea Siemolictesal Giesifare” mise Laue 99% Suna Wie =a. Comptes Tener namin "Bosnia ements exept ll - soe cea ua a ae *Sove gokeanen ine sed en 3 0162 cmt Ebina fae cau unmet os best of our knowledge the Soviets ar aking the ‘opportniy created by this withdrawal to retain their ‘ost modern equipment in their esta forces Thus, ‘in East Germany, the residual force wil be entirely quipped with T-80s. The withdrawn T-645 replace T-10s,T-555, T-545, aed the oldest 6s that had19. (Continued) Table? Soviet Force Reduction nthe Atantco-the-Urls Zen» > SS SS = (ae/tvonoy Semteteinct Ge Sestnder Nese Rel ns = ian ‘sconce iat Foe ie ts “Tp 50g = = er inp ia ie ‘ey ‘Sse 0 he ra ona cat i508 to Ey a sce 2d" nae Ector ce Tale fone) Mast eee slams esp Ts and 9 n- wet rence om ‘been eld for many years in cade ui or in ong: term depo storage inthe interior ofthe Soviet Union and cast ofthe Urls What does this mean for Soviet capabilities? Thee hasbeen no at inrease inthe numberof T-72 and "T-0 tas inthe forwatd area, and only modest increases are anticipated inthe next few years There fore, the overall umber of "most modern tanks” to affected by the restructuring, In fat the oet umber of tanks s being reduced by a significant numberof oder ye fully capable T-4 tanks Where 435 the Soviets had 30 divisions with 120 maneuver “eal mcr ‘paint reac Forces 38000 the regimens before the withdrawal began, after the withdrawals are concluded they wil have 24 divisions with 96 maneuver regiments ‘The manner in which the Soviets are cacrying out thei restructuring has, however, provoked serious ‘questions that bate not yet been answered. Clearly, although they hase adhered to their promise 1o wit raw tanks and have removed theee divisions from thei fore structre in Eastern Europe, equoment other than tanks rm tore unite i being used to modernize and expend the equipment holdings of he remaining divisions “The inconsistency of eetain fenturet ofthe reduction and restructuring programs with some Soviet scip- ins of thee aetitis probably refess adjustments made bythe General Staff as the programs have 30919. (Continued) Secret Tabies — ‘Soviet Fore Reductions East ofthe Urals= Taio Keven alas and Relic Peer ae Cee Fiomes esitoteinain (re Sune” Aantal Rete. ‘oom mecett ‘at eo eden ee y Sm ear ae z = ‘ros fe ais e Bae Bane ar Sew tase thee” F ise and ee eee a ee ater. 30" 10 z este St 3908 Biaiege sama eg SS ‘ieee ‘tat of eeprom ‘ieee USSR They henselae Sen fae Tecate ects ‘volved With the withdrawal program originally hay ‘ng been imposed from above, the General Stal robably hasbeen given considerable exiility in ‘rearing remaining Swe forces within the co Sein imposed by “defensive” resrutaring ‘The character of the retracted cesidvl force, ‘etefore is major question To deus that fore, however, reauites same explanation of he enerall Soviet motivation fr the process We Bene thatthe ‘ongoing unilateral reductions and restructuring te ded Tarely 1 foster a perception of reduces ‘heat the West and to maintain the momeneu toward a CFE agreement that woud allow Gorbachev 310 ‘waee Peemamak nae ae Sih ie ee Teele am nen USS ete 'o rece his fores further, reap potential economic benefits, and simultaneously reduce NATO force capability We believe the Soviets remain commited {oth end game and will ot eoprdie iin an efor {0 obainshrtiem itary advantages tat almost ‘eerainly would be quickly discovered bythe West, Gorbachevs economic agenda is an overiing consid eration as we assess the scape ofthe Soviets rede ‘ions and withdrawals But what of he vestructuring 1d modernization? As long go a8 the middle late 1970s, the Soviets recsgnzed thatthe type of wat "hat would probaly be fought in Ceatral Europe had19. (Continued) "Key Statemens on Soves Tank Reductions 22 December 1988 ‘Major General Lebder ofthe Soviet General Staff states that entre units with hee materiel wil be withdrawn fom Eastern Europe. The units Wil be disbanded, ad much oftheir equipment — Including the latest model tnks—will be sapped ‘Tank engines and ausliary equipment wil be turned er tothe cui economy (Labedev’s Statement was referring specially tothe tanks in the sx divisions tobe withdraw; homer, the ‘content of hi emarks indicate he may have beon referring ol tak units removed frm Eases Europe) 16 January 1988 Marshal Atbromeye stats that six tank divsons willbe withdraw from East Germany, Cazchoso ‘aki and Hungary In addition, 3,300 tans will ‘be removed from Soviet motorized ride divisions fd other unite in Eastern Europe All 000 tanks to be withdrawn wil be destroyed, and mast ofthe tank to be reduced west of the Urals wil be dismantled 17 January 1989 “Marshal Kiko asserts that “withdrawn forse” wil not be stationed in the western itary de ‘ees, although some would be stationed est of the Unt 18 January 1989 General Secretary Gorbachev announces that half ofthe 10,000 tanks will be destroyed and half wil be converted to el se 24 January 1989 Deputy Foceign Minister Karp sys that, of the 10,000 tanks tobe reduce, elf would be Srapped and the other all converte to clo training ‘The reduction involved 5,300 of the “most modern” tanks and, of these, 3,300 would be fom Avision remaining in Eastern Europe The 2,000 tanks inthe se tank divisions withdrawn from Eastern Europe would be “dismantled” 17 April 1989 ‘Army General Snetkov, commander of Soviet, foxes ia East Germany, sates that the tanks removed from the GDR will be seat beyond the Urals: some wil be “mothballed and some med ‘ed for ute i he national econo 5 May 1989, Lieutenant General Pursin, Chief of Staff of Soviet, forees in East Germany, announces that 1,000 tanks are alealy beyond the Url, where they rl be trned into bulldozers 12 May 1989 CColanel Genel Chervoy ofthe Soviet General Staff states that, ofthe 10,000 tanks tobe elimi rated, 5,000 wil be destroyed and 5,000 will be tse as towing vehicles o targets fr fring practice 19 May 1989 Soviet Genera Salf Chie Moseye sys that Moscow eserves the option to retain rather than estoy equipment withdrawn from Easera Europe 23 May 1989 General Markeloy, Chie ofthe General Staff Press Center announces tt older, wormout tanks wil be smelted, and that newer tanks wil be Femteled to sre tractors fr civilian purposes He alo states hata see works at Chelyabinsk in the Urls is already smelting tanks 319. (Continued) ‘Key Statements on Soviet Tank Redaction, (continued) 23 May 1989, Major General Shohepin, Cie of Staff f the Soviet Central Group of Forces, stats that some ofthe T-72 tanks removed from Czechoslovakia wil be serapped or caverted for civilian use at the Black Sea por of Novorossiysk inthe North Caueasus Miltary Distric, 3 June 1989, General Staff spokesman Lieutenant General | Peto states that more than 2150 tens end alley pices have ben dispatched to storage ‘bases or for destruction 30 June 1989. Colonel General Ometichey, First Deputy Chief ofthe General Staff states hat more than | 5,000 tanks bave been withdrawn frst Eastern Europe and Mongolia He adds that units being withdrawn wil be disbanded and sme oftheir ‘auipment will be destroyed, some transfered to storage bases, and some wed inthe national ‘sono 3 July 1989 Defense Minister Vaso states that sme tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe are being wed to epgrade units in the USSR, some are Heng ‘mothballed, and “old tanks mde inthe 1950s and 1960s are being destoyed 53 July 1989 Colonel General Krivosheyev ofthe General Staff states that the sting of tanks Begun that thee engines andor components ce being used in the economy ther tanks are bing converted for civilian use In 1989, 5000 | ill be serapped and 2,00 willbe converted, “Those being serapped are henvy tanks ike the 7-10, which are unsuitable for eivilian wie 312 changed. Were once the use of nuclear weapons was expevted, causing the Soviets to plan for rapid break rough and exploitcon, the Soviets began to freiee 8 largely or wholly eomveational war, where both sides’ nuclear arsenals might be checked by parity At ‘he se ime, they sw changes in NATO conven tional forces that made the free nore and more capable of withstanding a conventional Sovit break ‘rough operation. With the advent of densely ce~ ployed, relatively cheap, and highly effective antitank weapons systems, the Soviets began f tak sbout “gnawing” rather than “slicing” trough NATO de fenses As Soviet Gereral Staff attention turned {oward the demands ef a high-tech conventional ‘atl, the Soviet reeagnized an increasing need to tin for defensive operations They ao saw that their heay tank frees were Becoming mre vlnrs le, but only after the Desember initiative did they alte the planned expansion oftheir tank fort In ener terms, the urent Soviet military respons to NATO cooventional capabilites is ore infantry ad tiller upfront, backed by tank forces isthe reduction in the force andthe change inthe missions itis structured to perform that reflect Gor tachev’s impact, Gortache hs reaerted the Party's leading role in determining the sociopolitical content of Soviet military dotin. The Communist Paty snd its leaders decide mater of national security dete, ‘mine the potential opponent, the sates litlbood of war, andthe resoares tbe allocated to defense Gorbacher’s views of Soviet economic problems. and his essessment that near-o-midtem confit withthe ‘West was unlikely le him to conelade tht educ- tions were a feasible method of contributing fo his ‘conomic and polite objectives,19. (Continued) ‘The Soviet leadership's rtuctios and retracting programs wil produce ore the net fe years the ‘mot sgnfcant changes in Soviet general purpose forces oposite NATO since Khrushcher's dasc force reductions ofthe late 195s ad erly 19608: + sa consequence of decisions bythe USSR and ite ‘Warsaw Pact allies toon thee general purpose fores over the net two years, the oflesve cpabi ites of Pact theater forces wi eine trough the frat hal ofthe 190s. + The announced withdrawal of Soviet fres fom Central Europe, when completed, wl sigicatiy ‘educe Soviet prospects for attacking rm es than ily pepared farce posture and leegthen considerably the amount of time reaued forthe Pact to prepare end positon frees for sustained esi operations tainst NATO. + Residual forces would be sient to mount hastily constituted bot til effective defense agaiat [NATO foress unl relaforcements could be moi Tied and moved forward ‘As the Soviets move to an infantry. bey force struc ture trough estrcterig, tere may bea dramatic incrate inthe numberof BMP infancy febtne veces. Althourh effective in combat operations, BMPs are not ani, and we judge: + Regardless of how the Soviet choos to restructare Athi fore, the fos of half the tanks previosly stationed in Easten Europe wil signicanty de trade Pact offensive capabilites + Bvea alge addon of wellcviped infantry would not totaly oft this as of arnrelstking The Soret, never, hae no iteton of dis: reg themselves, wrote fled tonal ‘brlet fore. Quite contrary, Gortacer's eo ‘oni forms, if sexs, would peat such utomes. consistent with stated objective, there- ore, smulancoslyt withdraw tans, educe the sie of feres oral od restructure and modernize ‘esl frees exng esting equipment to maximize thei potential etectvenes against NATO. Although we havea pet god perspective on the coral impact ofthese changes, thre are sill ae portant unertanti. We do ot know th atu shape that Soviet fers wil take. Wil Soviet abee- tives for thal strated feres change? They seam ‘unlikely to hae a eapcility to conduct breakrough ‘opens without wablizton—wil that chang? Will the ei for be maintained a higher loyel of readiness? Onl hese questions, onions il sound, bt until evidence o weads pea, ‘nclsions ae prewanre ‘We conlae thatthe Soviet withdramale and reduc tin observed to dat are genaly consistent with (Oorbacho'sinital stxement. We sto concude that Sov resteucturing al oderizatin sctty—cie- Stent with emerging Soviet itary dociaal views ‘of war in Europe and th nature ad capability of NATO rel ina amaller stadia fore ont nized for dfese, butatilepable of smaller sale ‘MTesiv operations. Such sfc woul equi « massive and lengthy mabilation in overt perform Aeepsuatgic fem operations against NATO. 313