21, NIC M 90-10002, April 1990, The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact National Intetigence Councit Seeret- ‘Memorandum The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact je-xey~ Seeret wom 900002 A538 cor 680 31921. (Continued) National Intetigence pesslirencned Cound NIC M 90-10002 The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact en Information avalabl as of 1 March 1990 was used inthe ‘ofthis Memorandum. The Memorandum was drafted and coordinated ‘within the intaigence Community By the National Inteligence Officr for General Purpose Forces, ‘to.whom comments may be drectod at secure sat ye Soceat ‘Ae 1880 32021. (Continued) Key Judgments Recent political events in Eastern Europe will further erode Soviet, confidence in their alles, Moscow can nor rly upon non-Soviet Warsaw Pact fores; it must question it ability to bring Soviet reinforcements ‘through East European countries whose host is no longer disguised or hnld in check. On the bass of completed urilateral Warsaw Pact cuts without NATO reciprocation and consideritg eurtent politica turmoil, we ‘ow belive that the capability to conduct an unteinforeed conventional Pact attack on NATO would be virtually eliminated. ‘Should current CFE proposals for both sides be implemented, we belcve that Soret defense planners would judge Pact forces incapable of eonduct- ing a theater strategic offensive even aftr full mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forees within the Ailantic-to-the-Urals ATTU) Zone. Conduct ofan attack upon NATO in such conditions would reauire keneration of addtional foroes and equipment. ‘The unilateral reductions begun a year ago by the Soviet Union will probably be completed on schedule. The recent Soviet agreements to remove all forees stationed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary by mid-1991 will nearly double the originally announced unilateral withdrawal in ‘round forces (at feast 11 rather than six division) ‘The large unilateral reductions in Soviet forces due tobe completed by the nd of 1990 are forcing widespread restructuring of military units, substantially reducing the armor in Soviet ground force division, eliminat- ing some specialized assault units, and reducing ground attack capabilities of tactical air units The orginally announced Central European reductions (nearly 10 percent in manpower, 20 perent in aircraft, and $0 percent in tanks) will reduce the offensive capabilites of Pact Forees and, along with sweeping Soviet CCFE proposals, are convincing indicators of Soviet intent to eut their military burden and are consistent with « movement toward ¢ defensive doctrine. a Seerer 32121. (Continued) In the aggregate, the above changes lessen the state “combat potential” of forward Soviet units. We believe that Soviet planners recognize that these ‘reductions (assuming n0 change in NATO forees) would require substan. tially greater forees tobe brought forward from the USSR for the conduct of sustained theater offensive operations. On the basis ofthese military changes alone, in September 1989 we judged that NATO would have 40 to 50 days of warning ofa four-front Pact attack, Current political changes would probably increase this warning time. Phi tnformiation is Secret Nalacn Nacontnaet-WHINFEL 32224. (Continued) Contents ground - ‘Traditional Soviet Views of Operations Aguinst NATO. The Soviets Modernize “The NSWP Lags 7 ig the Doctrine “The Warsaw Pact in Transition ‘Soviet Cutbacks - The Halfway Point ‘Restructuring ae ieee of the Changes = ‘Combat Potential How the Changes Affect Soviet Perception of the Balance ‘Annex: Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions 323,21. (Continued) ee Figore 1 Soviet Tanks, Armored Troop Carvers and Arillry inthe Westera TMO (In wits) — w —_—— Infant Mghing Vee ar ——EE ‘ailery Set ppt Mp Re tre ere Bite Mes ee ay =e — 32421. (Continued) Discussion Backgroond ‘radltional Soviet Views of Operations Agunat NATO ‘The Soviet General Staff based its war pans onthe ssumption that, (it had to ght a war with the ‘West the Soviet Union would beable to achieve las itary vitry through the destruction of| [NATO fores and te occupation of NATO territory, incgally Western Enrope, Occupation of Germany Sod the poliscal imperative for cont of Eastern ‘Burope le to the stationing of substantial Soviet forces inthe forward area ‘By the mddle-tlate 1970s, however, Soviet perceptions of thee abilty 10 real were changing. Where once Soviet forces, ‘ing nuclear weapons, could otal panned objec tives with relatively litle assistance fom their sal fess well-equipped ais, the prspect of war with least an initial conventional phase changed the situation tone that required the prtipation of East, European forces and relied upon the lng lines of ‘omerication that fd supple from the USSR Uhough Eastern Euzope to tacking Soviet forces, Influenced toa large degree by thet perception of agreally improved NATO convention defen, the Soviet General Staff considered eve the large Soviet. {ore in the forward area no longer adequate tothe task, and foresaw the need to draw adltonal forces ‘tora the Soviet Union for its planned Theater State- {i Operation Thus, bythe wi1980s, Soviet sta ‘lamers forecast a prolonged conveational war with [NATO invhich aon-Sriet Warsaw’ Pac ores were Incled in the inital attack and which lied upon ‘major renforcements from the Soviet Union fr sue oi “The Soviets Maderize ‘When Mikhail Gorbachev took over as party Gener Secretary in eary 1985, the Soviet military already ‘vas inplementing a long-term program of force ‘estuctring, expansion, ad modernization: + Resiaciring of 36 sive divisions fom the late 19706 through he ead of 1984 had made them larger, more mobile and more Nese, with, 325 enlancedcombined-arms capability and increased Arepower, + Ground force mobilization bases—unie created by ‘he Soviets ia the 1940 a slockpile alder eulpment forinactivedivisions—were gradually bring atv nth smal adr element that ould fciitate ‘agi expansion to wartime steneth and readiness, More than 20 such bases were activated between 1955 and 1984, while the overall number of active fk, motorized ie, and sisboee dvsons Increased fom 176 to 200. + Ground equipment modertzation, begun x5 catty 5 the mid-1960, had deoome persitet snd even paced. For example, the quantity an quality of tanks, armored Woop eariers and arly ia the Western Theater of Miltary Operations (TMO} opposite NATO's central region had been inezeas: ing dramatically (se Bre 1) + Auack helioper leo inerenced sigicently—by ‘mor than 60 percent from 198] to 1985 nthe ‘SntiotostheUrale Zane (ee figure 2 + Al forees modernisation itrodsed the Su-24 Fence ght womber and Tw-22M Backire medium bomber in the 1970s an fourth geneation MiG-29 alerum and Su-27 Flanker fehterimeroeptors in he 19806 (ce Fre 3) Jo The NSWP Lags ‘The son-Sovet Warsaw Pact (NSW) forces lagged the Soviets in fore modernization, yet the Soviets ‘depended on them to play a slancant, perhaps ial, role ina war with NATO IE NSWP for: were no Tonge available, Soviet sas would need to stink ‘operations apsinst NATO. Soviet confidence inthe reliability of non Soviet Pact forces wat the esl of seat interests general share with East European Communist eaderships, 8 well asa carefully pied Sovie-dominated command and contra stevctre to21. (Continued) Figure 2 Soviet Attack Hellopters ‘ATTU Zone® “cides Hip E, Hod DB, and F heteopes hich the East Europeans aseded Although that architecture gave the Sovet General Staff exctive suthority or wartime deisionmakiog and command eneration of Warsaw Pact forces, it elie upon atonal general staffs to pass orders Therefore, the Pact command and conta structure was, ad re- ‘mang, dependent upon the cooperation ofthe highest political and military leaders in each act county Since it was clear that thet interests in mow crisis 80s would be congruent terest, we formerly assessed and believed that Soviet planners al asesed that the ast European forces were atleast inital reliable and would respond fo commands to ght. ere ‘Reasesing the Doctrine By 1985 Soviet theater forces were structured for fat-race,ofensive operations lasting for an extend period of time (weeks—perhaps month) in a ‘onnuclear environment Soviet and Pact exercise alters tended to confirm that they planned on such ‘scenario In building to tis capability, were, the Soviets had traded deceased readines for increased combat power aftr fll preparaion Soviet free in Central Europe were manne sone 170,000 below fall wartime trength and were asseued to require to (0 "hee weeks oozepue for ofemive operations Jef Soon ater coming to power, Gorbachev be talks ith his military leadership. He agreed with the ned to madernize Soviet coaventonl frees but unde ‘stood that conventional modernization would be enot= ‘ously expensive. He probably concluded tht the [USSR could not alford «buildup of both nuclear and sonventonl forces In 1986 and 1987, there was ‘mounting evidence that the Soviets were reassessing {heir itary doetrne. High-level Svist military leaders od thei Western counterparts that Sorict/ ‘Warsaw Pact doctrine had changed, and that ev ence of such change shouldbe ett observers of Pact exercises and taining patterns ‘There were a0 ications that che “defensive doctrine" beng tres by the Soviets was nat urdersood oe wecepted emt sha ie Sort ry nein “The Warsaw Pact in Transition Soviet Cutbacks {in December 1988, Gorbachev announced a the Urited Nations tht significant unilateral reductions of Sovict forces would take pace in 1989 and 1990 His statement vas followed by various explanation of ‘Soviet eduction plans and additonal announcements concerning cts in defense spending and production (Ge inset). Soon after Gorbacher¥ announcement, ‘each ofthe USSR's Wacsaw Pac, Als except, ‘Romenin announced force and defense spending cus ‘These cuts—to be completed bythe end of 1990 ‘oughly parallel the Soviet cute i types ead propor: ‘ional amounts of equipment, maspower, and expen: iures (se tale I) These announcements of extn, ‘hich almost certainly had Moscow's prior approval, ‘contradicted earlier indications tat the Soviets ould ‘equre thei ales to make up any unter! Soviet fore reductions ye 32621. (Continued) Seceat Figures Force Composition inthe ATTU Zone, 1979 and 1985" ‘aor of Ragin 959 af Regis 1085 — 7 Pe sen Spee Dae rremenary Set al tc ga inh pinion) ‘Soret Unilateral Force Reductions Announced ‘by President Gorbache on 7 December 1988. (To Be Implemented by 1 January 1991) In Cert Euroe sone, Grbschev’s announced Soviet reductions would ental + A ul of 50,000 men and 5,000! tanks to be withdrawn from Soviet ores in Easter Barone, At part ofthis reduction, six Soviet divions-—four feom East Germany, and one exch from Czechs vali and Hungury-were tobe withdrawn, The renova of $0,000 Soviet military persnael woald Reduced from the Sovlet $00,000 personel ‘Armed Forcer Wudrawn from Eastern Stx tank divisions ime S000 prom! | fax Sovistength frat te yey S00 tans” | TOperen The ital of 9300 ns woud ‘svn ending | cual Soi ok ont fn Cental aren ons bat oes fue) “eat ering see + From he foc, 320 coma rca be reo fm Cantal Eu thw Spero Reivced inthe lant 1000 tants ‘eden Sov combat stato a theta Zon SS erlnyore | Gata Euro 00 combat a — | Late nc 3 i ci St rs td, rot 32721. (Continued) Thi Sct fre WNINTEL, + A total of 1.000 tanks, 8,500 arly systems nd 800 combat airraft to be eliminated from the ‘Allantiotosthe Urals (ATU) Zone. A 10,000-ank "ection inthe ATTU 2ove would cat the number of Sove tans in opeationa uit by aboat one- fourth. Cutting 800 aircraft represents a reduction of more than 8 percent ofthe Soviet combat aircraft in units opposite NATO. + A “inajor portion” of ops in Mangala to be withdrawn, later lrited ut in ground forces (of 75 percent, with the sir forester to be limited or Although wiateral Navy reductions wee aot pat of Gorbachev's spech, the Soviets have embarked on & rogram of naval measures In 1989, 46 shipe and submarines parted Soviet naval alist be scrapped in foreign yards, Al but one were atleast 30 ears cd only one was operational We have ident fed am aiional 120 nie tat are candidates or ‘crapping in 1980, The Sorits hive aio reduced out ‘ob area deployments by both ships and Soviet naval slreraft. AT tbe same tne, the Soviets continue with oe i i099) — ’ Tus ee 2 TO) foree maerizaton and construction of srr, sub- ‘marines and surface combatants, ining tree ‘convetional eal and landing (CTOL) aicraft ‘uri although there i debate within the USSR, ‘ore the need fr ears es) ‘The Halfvay Pont One yea into the two-year unilatea|withérawal/ fedveton period announced by Gorbichey, the ist Dias ofthe program i complete eins, Moscow bas withdcama at least 50 percent ofthe tanks and pprosimately 60 percent ofthe compat area fom atern Europe that Gorbachev sid would be ‘removed, andit as withdrawn about half ofthe tks and a quarter ofthe combat steraftt be removed {fom Mongol In Rastecn Europe, the tk Soviet tank divisions tobe withrawn bythe end af 199, Moscow hus witha (vo from East Germany, one fom Hungry) The ‘umber of Soviet tata! aviation uit or which 20 ‘eduction wore announced) remsins abut the sae, bat the units are losing atsined irra. exer) 32821. (Continued) Figure 4 ‘Savet Ground Forces in Central Europe, March 1990 5 Be ws ee 5 Pei aoe see Doe a . =o Cane = re a == 32921. (Continued) “Assessed Unilateral Soviet Force Reducte {January 1990 Withdrawn from Thee tank divisions Eastern Europe (ator elements) 2600-2,775 tanks Four al assault wit Two ansult crossing ‘Reduced inthe Atlan- 3,260 tanks Uetoihe-Urals Zone 2.120 arlery sy $80 combat aireratt Reduced from the So- Total 26 dvsons Viet Armed Forces” ATTU Zone 16 dive sions disbanded and three deactivated Nom ATTU Zone four divisions die ‘banded and three deactivated Soot af WOES Restrctring ‘To accommodate such radical equipment changes and aimed changes in doctrine, many units are being resractored + Ground force resiruturtng. Nbou two-thirds of the 21 Soviet divisions that remuined in Easter Eatone atthe end of 1989 are probably being restructured (gure 5, a8 are upto four divisions i the USSR: ‘—Tank division, which bad tree tank rime and one motorized ie epiment, wil now have ‘vo tank resimente and two mooraed rile rei- ents. Most divisions wl oe 69 tanks, of 22 percent of thei orginal holdings Motorized rie dvision, which bad on tok iment and tree matrzed rife regimens, wil now have four moorzed se regiments They are aso losing tans from otber divisions ements These changes reduce the number of tanks by 105 per avision in moet motelzed rifle Aivsions in Fastera Europe and by 65 per division in the USSR—40 and 30 perentreapetvely of ‘hei rail bodings. Sone ofthe personel end mast ofthe armored ‘woop caries and alr frm the unis being withdrawn ae being used wo meet the neds of the esrututed divisions remaining in Eastern Europe Additional armored toopcuriers some 4450 observed ths far—-havesrived from the USSR, Some 2.000 aditions! armored troop ‘carriers would be eequired to restructure the 24 Soviet divisions inthe oritaly panned resid- tal fore in Eastern Europe Ailey battalions ery battalion apes tobe being eed tothe arilery cegimenteof tank dvsions in adition, some river-cossing anda atsule ‘nis ae o be wthdrawa t tie USSR Tactical air force restructuring igre 6. Foo units are being dabandod instead, the aver ge strength of tactical ar regents being reduced by about 10 aircraft each, Overall there willbe about 17 percent fewer aierat opposite NATO (ars 1 ard) The most modern ofthe displaced sireaft are sing tcegiments wth older srrat(MiG-21/ (MiG-23/Su-, which ate leaving active sevice, The predominance of ground atackcegiments ‘ver iter epiments in East Germany bas ‘hanged to# more bance face, “Half the lah bombers (Fence) in the formard sates have been relocate tothe Western USSR. ‘These sireraft could be apily reintrodsced into Bnstern Europe 33024. (Continued) “al gaps 20 ae (2-3 geet eet) So ase A ent fe —_t 1 coh [ene town |Ene } |S Sm om cy oan * Soviet an vis aterm Bape Mave hd 190 36th nd 2 IFVS/APCS, ot nig ‘Moworied Rite Dson™ Tol gupta eA pen Se) Sem STARS ac) loaseuw/nor "Soi mod it vio i Ean Eugen ad 20 and 77 wits an 455 FV ARC, sig Vater epg eee ie UP BR ey. so sn Een ae tt he Sen eared av wo gu een an So BTR Supp mc —e 33124, (Continued) Figo 6 Reduction and Restructuring, 1988 and 1990 Soviet Air Fores in the ATTU Zane ‘Number of Regiments ‘Number of Ait + The certiny of complete withdrawal from Czecho- sloraka and Hungary and the hgh ikelibood of other reductions beyond those orginally announced ‘aise the prospect of further changes in Soviet plans for restructuring dessa Effects ofthe Changes Reductions and restructuring wil sigiiantly degrade the ability of Soviet fores to concentrate combat power, particularly for offensive operations. ‘Armored striking powe, in particular, i redwood and fragmented. The now motorized site division are well suited for defensive operations ut are not org nized specially to condset large-scale attacks or ‘counterattacks. The now tank dlision are "bal: anced”—thus, beter suited for haling ground than the previous standard tank dvsione-but they retain sbstantal ofensive punch.4eash— (Combat Potential ‘To gauge the probity of misson success, Soviet ‘Mall ofcers often compare the relative strength of ‘opposing forces interme oftheir calculated “oombat potenti.” How the Soviets come up with combat, His wef to ‘say a Sovietsylecombat-poteata analysis to see how the Soviets might view the carelation of forces in Europe folowing thir wilatral reductions ad te structuring oa Application of such analysis otk potion ofthe Soviet Western Group of Forces WGF) in East, Germany shows (ee figure 7) tht the £991 force wil 33224. (Continued) Figwe7 Western Group of Forces, 1988 and 1991 eee ‘Contat Potent Pont, 19 ‘be lage, modern, and wil possess maior combat ‘potential. But twill poses Fess offensive combat poteatal than th Itligence Commmanity seed it ‘Would have ha in the abuene ofthe ultra! edutions. In fet, a redced and restrctured WGF lin 1991 has fess combat poten than the 1988 LW, eventhough some modernization wil have taken place, The projected WOF structere for 991 (without reductions) woul have derived verbal ts tffensive combat potential fom tank, bat the force projected for 1991 afer edctions wil draw es than 40 poreet of ts fersve potent frm tetas a ‘The air ansesment ident, The Soviets probably expect most ofthe effec ofthe unilateral eduction: in ar forces tobe oft by modernization by the Inte 1990s. We tlic, using Soviets combat-poen til calculations, ha he Soviets expos he onlteral Force reduction to rei n'smedest sift inthe 333 (Contra European ae balance to the advantage of NATO, but th current situation of nea party would ot be upset (se Bgure 8. These changes in Warsaw acta forces probably would na substantially aler the Pat's overall prospects in am air war in Cental Europe tones How the Changes Affect Soviet Perceptions othe Balance Taken together, the eduction nnd retracting rein- fore ar mids1980s judgment thatthe Soviet General Siaff id not have high conden int ability to ‘conduct # deep atack on NATO witout introducing Significant reinforcements from the Soviet Usion before D-Day After reducing the shock power af forward are feres by 5300 tank, the General Stat would sonsier the Pact evr lee capable of conduct ing an attack withoot substantial enforcement to24. (Continued) a Soviet Air Forces in the ATTU Zone, 1988 and 1990 bring four fronts into the oeasive (ze Sgute 9). The need to bring forward tanest frees from the Western USSR extends Soviet timelines 0 taniton to war and vitally eliminates Soviet capability to execute a successful short waringatack (241048 ours fees ‘While the infor of armored troop carrer and ati ery creates a mote talanesd fre in the forward ea, t would not make en uareinforced thre rom) tack option appear more attractive tothe Gesere Stall The General Stat would persive an even eater ned to bing forces forward from the estes USSR before D-Day to restore the ofeasive cmbnt ower lit withthe removal of those anks a wel the considerable reduction in Bast European frees Tn tara this would reuie the Soviets to shift ‘omparable aur of divisions Irom the sree reserve tothe second stategeecbelon—the llow-o0 fronts necessary to carey an offensive wo strategie objectives beyond the Rhine into France ns Considering only the eects ofthe originally an- sounced Soviet unilateral withdrawal, we believe thet {he residual Soviet fores would be unable to mount “short wacning” tack aod tht the Soviets wold not be even maverately conden ef sce i pursuing deep theater objectives unless ther attack was proce cf by a lengthy mobilization period. But events in Easter Europe have ancien yeaer effect. By ‘mid-1991, Soviet forces wil be completly withdr ‘om Casshoslovakia and Hungry, Moreover, the fundamenal pla! changes sccrsngin the ine vidual Warsaw Pact ations aed thei fet onthe Fela of the aon Soviet Warsew Pact military forces led us to conclude tat the Warsaw Put does ot at this time represent a siaicant offensive treat NATO, The rate and scope of plitial change in astm Europe in recent mona have outpaced out billy to assess completly the consequence for East aropean military capabilites, We judge that Soret, lasers face the same uneersintie fe Recent and continuing politcal development in East: ‘cm Europe have undoubtedly eroded the confidence ‘of Soviet war planners. Not Soviet Warsaw Pact forces traditionally have made ap nealy $0 perent of the Pac’ fist strategic echelon in Cental Europe, snd loal transportation and seit series would ‘be crucial in moving Soviet ose into the forward tea, NWP forces were counted ont play eitcal roles in operations on both fas in « NATO-Pact var Now, the nonavalaity of NSWP fore for Soviet offensive war ples andthe increased potential of iil resistance to Sve raza the rest of recta political changes wil hee far-eacing and adverse impacts on Soviet free commitenent, disp Sows, and objectives. ‘The miltary changes otic in ths memorandum ‘hve led to important lengthening of extimatedprepa- ‘atin times for Soviet attack onions ie table 2 and, or more deal the annex) Wien the effects ofthe announced cuts underway in mato the NSWP ates and the engoog pole development in East em Europe are coupled with Sevet unilateral edue- ‘ion and restructuring we belive hat Wars Past 33424. (Continued) Figure 9 Projected Warsaw Pact Fehelons France ev es 335 , Hangar angary21. (Continued) es Tez Estimated Preparation Times fr Soiet Attack Options Tieton intnteehaes 19.9 Fo (sonnei Beatie eee capability to conduct an uncenfored conventional attack against NATO is vreualy eliminated (assur ing that NATO reminsat current force level) esa ‘We assess that Soviet General Stl planners wll, probably conclude that—without reinforcements from the western USSR roughly equal 9 atleast two froats—theie forces remaining in Eastern Europe afer the unilateral ents would nor possess the advan tage needed oinitiate and sustain offensive oper tions othe depth ofthe theater against current NATO forces. On the basis of this arscesment, we ‘concluded in September 1969 that NATO would have 840+ to $0-day warning time to prepare for 2 conventional force attack. Th curent politcal, changes in Eastern Europe, not considered in that sessment, would probably increase warning ine, fos ‘The arms reduction proposals unvalied by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO forthe Conventions] Armed Fores in Europe (CFE) negotiations would ‘eau in further subatantil curs in Pact conventional forces in the Atlantcs‘o-the Urals (ATTU) Zone (ee {able 3). Moscow would posses by far the largest ‘atonal fore strcture in pot-CFE Burope but has already agreed to 30,000 more US than USSR sta- toed frees, in recopiton ofits large force ava tage onthe Continent. After sch cuts and assuming ‘hat equipment is destoyed aod that NATO main. tains parity, we believe tat the Soviets would judge Warsaw Pact Pos-CFE Fores inapableevenaier Lull mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forces within the ATTU Zone of achieving the politial-military objectives traditionally soda of wih Soviet strategy fra thaterstrategic affen- sive. The CFE proposal serves as one of the mat convincing indicators a date ofthe efesie reorien- tation oftheir military doctrine and their intent to decrease the economic burdcn ofthe Soviet theater force structure through agressive persutof conven ional aems controle 33621. (Continued) Tes —— Post-CFE Warsaw Pact Force Structure Mlantcto-therals Zoe 33721. (Continued) Annex Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions 2:3 “The announced reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and East Foropean national fret, i fully ‘plemented, wil igaicantly loner Put force levels in the forward area Six Soviet tank divisions, pus critical combat support units uch s bridging, aod Substantial amounts of aditona quipnent are Scheduled to be withdrawn Scheduled tank cedue- tons amouat to about haf the Soviet tank in Eastern Europe Non-Soviet Warsaw Pct forces, which cur. ‘enily comprise a large proportion of the frees in Este Europe, ate albo wo be reduced) Moreover, forees inside the Soviet Union are tobe restructured tnd ae to lose tanks and posibly ater fom their structure Equipment modenization and resructur ing of remaining Soviet forces ia Fasten Europe may offset some extent the los of combat capi. but Non-Sovit Warsaw Pat forces are not takings epson ‘These reuctons—which are well under way-—prob- ‘By will render an uneinfored Pact atack practically impossible ad wil requize the Pact to rly more heavily on currently noncendy divisions to support ‘ther ato, thee Tour Font attack Past lan ners will probably conclude that without renforce- ‘ment from the westers USSR roughly xual to to ‘ronts—theie forces remaining in Easter Europe after the unilateral cuts would ot poses the advan- "Baa fm Menara Holden NIE 1-4 NE NG) Scotter 188, ry of War urepe on Reset Femme ed nc i ‘te Eastern Europe Seems 90 Pas tse ne ‘Mer tently ene ae eprint 16 338 tage overcurrent NATO forces needed to iitinte end ‘sustain offensive operations tothe depth of thenter The Soviets probably would belive tht, to atin sufient combat power inthe thea, they would have to gencrate eongh at-eady divisions 1 replace the withdrawn Soviet ivson, ae well asthe disband ef East European Tasmatons Such greater reliance om the early commitment of eure nt-eady iv sion rom the Sovie\ Union far sustsined ofesive ‘operations would stretch aut Pact prepartions to 0 to 50 days We cannot ule out the roby that the Soviets might judge circumstances ae compeline ‘them to commit their forces witout the minimum ‘ostmoblization tasing necessary fr offensive aper- tons in as itl as 181025 dys ce table 4) fone — Our assessment of preparation and warning times alter the Pat's unlaeral rection are comple ‘sues that NATO remains at current fore levels The extent of Pact pepartias—reinforcement of fores in Eastern Euope and training—reauited to conduct a potentially sueeafl offensive ctrmpoign is driven in large measre by Pact assesment of [NATO military capability. Ava real, unilateral NATO reductions ouside the content of «cnvention- sl fore reductions agreement could diminish the Pac's assessment fis force requirement or suoces tnd thus reduce the preparation time needed forthe Pact and the warning time avallable wo NATO ok21. (Continued) ‘ 16