17, M/H NIE 4-1-84, September 1989, Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces (Key Judgments only) @ Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces ‘National Intotigonce Estimate ‘Memorandum to Holders, This Memorandum to Holders the wos tho Bisctr of Contr telgonce io and acsatar USintotigence Community 627 28917. (Continued) Director of ~Soerat- Contra. Ieealligence NIE4-1-84 Warning of War in Europ Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces Information availble as of 28 September 1989.was used {nthe preparation ofthis Memerancum to Holds. The folowing intetigence organizations participated {nthe preparation ofthis Memorandum: The Cental intaligence Agony ‘The Defense inteligence Agency “The National Secuity Agency Bureau of Intligence and Research, Department of Stato ats participating The Deputy Chi o Staf for inteligence, Department ofthe Azmy “The Director of Nava Inteligence, Department of the Navy “The Assistant Chet of St, Ineligence, Department of the A Foree ‘The Director of inteigence, Headquarters, Marine Compe This Memorandum was approved for publiaton by the ‘Navona Foreign Intligance Board. ‘Sem 1989 29017. (Continued) Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces (u) + The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in 1984, (-Ne}- + Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely 10 attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving fire to six fronts with Sour fronts in the frst strategic echelon. We should be able to ‘provide about four to fire weeks of warning of such an attack-(6-xs) + We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and ‘movement, but before completing the postmobilization train necessary for minimum affensive proficiency. The warning times would be shorter, but the Soviets would judge such an attack as highly risky. foe) + Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral reduc- tions, if completed, and given no reduction in NATO capabilities, should significantly extend preparation time because of the great- cer need in the first echelon for currently low-strength di from the western USSR(s35)— w —Seseat— 29117. (Continued) France "wows wdnaery 29217. (Continued) Key Judgments ‘The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe heve increased significantly from thote set forth in NIE 4-1-84. These changes are a direct consequence of Soviet assessments of improved NATO military capability, our improved tnderstanding of the Soviet process of transitioning to war, and changes in Soviet peacetime readines. Accordingly, before unilateral force reduc- tions, we assess tha + Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well: prepared attack involving fie to sx fronts with four {rons in the fist strategic echelon. We should be able to provide about Tour to five weeks of warning of such an attack, The increased time needed to prepare this attack option restlts from increased reliance inthe fist echelon on “not ready” divisions from the western USSR. + An attack with three fronts in the first echelon remains a possibility in some circumstances. We should be able to provide about two to three weeks of warning of such an attack. Our assessment ofthe increased time needed to prepare these fronts for sustained offensive operations results from new judgments about the time required to prepare Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe, + We recognize that circumstances ould cause the Pact 1 commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement ‘but before completing pottmobilization training necessary for minimum proficieney for offensive operations. I 0, we could provide a least two ‘weeks of warning of a four-front attack or atleast one week waraing of « less likely three-ront attack. We belivs, however, the Soviets would Judge attacks before completion of postmobilization training as highly risky because ofthe reliance on reserves lacking such training. 29317. (Continued) Rees ) Bate Sea oS _ | Soviet Union hk Taek ation ‘eHachante/meteed ote dvson Yugosiavia 29417. (Continued) ‘Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral force revc- tions if completed, should significantly extend preparation time because of| ‘the greater need ithe first echelon for currently lowstrength divisions From the western USSR. Warning of our assessed most likely attack ‘option four fonts inthe fst echelon—would increase by about wo ‘weeks If the Soviets elected to attack after only mobilization and ‘movement, warning times would inerease by almost a week These preparation and warning times after unilateral reductions assume that NATO capabilities remain at eurrent levels. Unilateral NATO reductions could diminish Pact perception oftheir requirements for success and, therefore, reduce warning time ‘The ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks are likely to result in an agreement establishing numerical party between NATO and ‘Warsaw Pact forces below current NATO levels within the Atlantic-o> the-Urals zone From peacetime parity, the Soviets would have to eeestab- lish maior forces inorder to generate the capability to attack successfully and sustain the offensive to the depth ofthe theater. This requirement ‘would increase reparation time considerasly over what we have assessed inthis Memocandum Alternatively, the Soviets could inevease the eeati- ress and combat power of residual forces through higher manning levels and acquisition of modern equipment This would require reinvesting the savings achieved by reducing their frees under CFE into defense and restructuring their forces and redistributing their equipment These small- «forces would be eapeble of launching atacks for limited objectives with ‘warning times more like we are accustomed 10 today We do not believe such attacks for limited objectives would te attractive to Pact planners because the risks, include escalation to nuclear wat, would far outweigh fang potential short-term gains, We are confident that forthe period ofthis Estimate me willbe able to de- tect and report significant disruptions ora reversal of present political, Social, and economic tends in the Warsaw Pact countries Although these Indicators will main ambiguous with regard to actual national war preparations, they wil continue to signal thatthe potential fra criss had increased This telormatin ix Secest Nef vi Secret 295