13. NIE 11-4-89, April 1989, Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge Soviet Policy Toward the West The Gorbachev Challenge ‘National Intelligence Estimate with the This Estimate ts the views ofthe Director of Conta UStntetigence ‘and asitance of Be Gomananiy 20713. (Continued) Director of Contra NIE 11-4-89 Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge (uy) Information avaiable as of 17 Aon! 1989 was used ‘in tre preparation of tis Esta. The fotowing imaligence organations paricpeted inthe preparation of ths Estimate: The Cenvartligence Agency ‘The Defense irteligence Agency ‘The National Seeurty Agency ‘The Bureau o Ineigenes and Research, Department ot St The Inteligence Dwsion, Federal Bureau of vestigation ‘ats panicipaing: The Deputy Chet of Stat for inigence, Department af the Army The Dircter of Naval ntti Doaarment of he Navy ‘The Assistant Chit of Sta, Inetigance Department of he Air Force ‘Tho Directo of ineigence, Headquarters, Manne Corps This Estimate was aporovedforpublstin by the National Foreign Itigence Board. 22813. (Continued) Key Judgments Dramatic changes in approach to the West under Soviet leader Gorbachev are driven by economic and social decay at home, 2 widening technological fap with the West, and v growing realism about trends i the outside ‘world. Fr the foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the West's principal adversary. But the process Gorbachev has set in motion i likely to change the nature of the Soviet challenge over the next five years o 0: + New Soviet policies will threaten th security consensus developed in the ‘West o combat Soviet expansionism, + The Soviet are likely to succeed to « degree in undercutting support bod for defense programs and in reducing politcal batters to ‘Western participation in their economic development. + Atthe same time new policies wil make Moscow more exible on egional issues and human rights and pave the way fora potetially significant reduction ofthe military threat + Alliance cohesion will decline faster in the Warsaw Pact than in NATO, aiving the East Europeans much greater scope for change. dent We lieve Moscow wants to shift competition with the West 1 largely political and esonomie plane. In order to prepare the around fr such 8 shift, Soviet leaders are making major policy changes and promoting ‘broad reassessment ofthe West doe) ‘These new policies serve dometic as wel at foreign policy needs: + They aim to create an international environment more conducive to domestic reform and to undermine the rationale for high defente budgets and repressive political controls. + They are sen as more effective than past polices in advancing Soviet forcign interests Jone) ‘There ac limits on hw far the new Soviet leadership wants to go inthe di- rection ofa les confrontational East-West relationship: * Vigorous efforts to protect and advance Sotet geopolitical interests and selective support for Communist regimes and revolutionary movements swill continue, + Moscow will continue to employ active measures and cover efforts to advance its objectives. Foreign intelligence activity is likely to inerease, 29