16. NIE 11-14-89, February 1989, Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact ‘Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s Contra Intelligence Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments and Executive Summary ‘These Key Judgments and Executive Summary ropresent the views of the Director of Contra! Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intotigence Community. ~Seeret- cw 364 26516. (Continued) NIE 11-14-89 Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s (vy) Information availble a of 1 March 1989 ws used inthe preparation of hs Navel haligence Estimate. The fofowing ineligence organiationsparcioted in thoproparavon of ths Estimate: ‘The Cental lnaigance Agorcy ‘The Delense Iniligance Agency The National Securty Agency ‘The Bureau of nteligence and Resesrch, Deparment of State 20 paneipating The Deouty Che of Stat for ntellgonce, Depactan of the Arey “The Director at Naval ntligence Department of he Navy The Assistant Cho! of Stl Iteligence, Department of he A Force This Estimate was approved fr publication by the atonal Foreign inteligence Bad 26616. (Continued) Key Judgments ‘We judge thatthe Soviet leadership's security policies wll produce, uring ‘the period ofthis Estimate, the most significant changes in Soviet general, purpose forces since Khrushcher’s drastic force reductions. We further assess these policies are designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership revitalize the Soviet economy by shifting resources from defense to civilian sectors. We also believe decisions already undertaken signal a sharp divergence from existing force development trends, and they have necess- tated a dramatic alteration in out forecast of future Soviet general purpose forces exewey— ‘When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited techaolopcally backward economy that had experienced a decade of slowing growth characterized by industrial botlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and declining labor productivity, and decreasing eficiency of capital investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, be began to establish the political and ideolosial foundation for imposing bis ‘wn priorities for resource allocations, clearly signaling a more intense competition between civilian and military needs. In doing +0, he: + Realimed the traditional party authority for formulating military doctrine, which the Brezhnev regime had allowed to booome dominated by the professional military hierarchy. + Promoted a debate carried out in doctrinal terms over “reasonable sulfciency” and “defensive sufcieney,” but which reflects a more fandamental examination of “How much is enough?” for defense, + Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending by using arms ‘ontel forums and foreign pli initiatives to reduc enteral throats + Broadened the Soviet concept of national security as part ofthe “new thinking” policy to give grester weight to its economic and politcal components. + Embraced vigorously the postion adopted by previous Soviet leaders that ‘he impossibility of vitory in nuclear wari basic tothe political dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and thatthe pursuit of capabilites associated with achieving victory i (00 elusive and costly. aoe Gorbachev’ initial “ground-laying” objectives were largely achieved dur- ing hs frst few years inofee. The egime didnot order cutbacks in military progeams immediately, however, prefrsig instead to reduce the "Se itr, efec InligenceAgeey strain key joe oo page (NC) 26716. (Continued) burden by attempting to increase the efficiency ofthe defense sector, Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describe asa “ers” in the economy, after four years Gorbachev has filed to bring about a re- bound in economic growth. Determined to succeed in his revitalization ‘campaign and recognizing that the defense industrial sector offers an important source of additional help for his modernization program, Gorbachey, in 1988, decided to take stronger action to invest more in consumer oriented proiecis. He evidently decided to ac at that point ‘because, in addition tothe obvious lack of progress on economic programs and the rise in consunver dissatisfaction, the regime was faced with some key deadlines in the preparation ofthe 1991-95 Five-Year Plan. The fesults have become most vividly evident with announced policy initiatives designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership reinvigorate the economy by shifting resources from defense tothe civil sector: + Unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviet general purpose forces that will eut 500,000 personnel from peacetime forces by January 1991, including 240,000 persoanel from Soviet forees west of the Urals and 50,000 personnel from those in Central Europe. Fores remaining ‘opposite NATO will be converted into a “clearly defensive” structure, + Cuts in overall defense spending of 14.2 percent and defense production levels of 19.5 pereent ote the next two years that clearly reflect plans for 1 reduced force structure and reductions in rates of equipment ‘modernization, + Increases inthe defense industry's direct contribution to production of ‘consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into defense output Despite these dramatic actions and their apnarent far-reaching implica tions, there remains considerable uncertainty about the durability and consequences of Gorbachev's initiatives on military matters. The amount of ‘ogee that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbachev’s ability to sustain his reforms, his wilingres to undertake Additional initiatives, bis standing with the party leadership, the support he receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability 4 control the impact of external factors that could impinge on his objectives. ove} [Nevertheless we believe it is highly likely that further dessions fo reduce planned defense spending and to shift investment from defense to the civil “sector will ecome apparent during the coming 13th Five-Year Plan (1991 95). We reaffirm the recent assessment in NIE 11-238 Seere+-NE-NC), December 1988, Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead, 26816. (Continued) ‘that Gorbachev will divert adiional resources from the defense sector to ‘the civil sector. Over the longer term, Gorbachev prabably will continue to impose constraints onthe defense budget, and we judge that Soviet defense spending wil continue to decline as a portion of GNP through the turn of Ue century. fer} We believe that the doctrinal concepts of “reasonable suficency” and “defensive suficiency" have been articulated primarily to stenathen Gorbache’s control over defense resource decisions to support economic revival. We also believe that, by the turn ofthe century, these concepts probably wll have Become lasting features of Soviet national security policy, helping ensure continued party control over defense policy and defense spending deverc) Devsions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact alles to reduce their general purpose fores and eut defense spending over the next two years would reverse the long-term trend of continuing growth in size and offensive ‘capabilities ofthese forces. As consequence ofthe planned cus, the ‘offensive capabilities of Wars Pact theater forces wil decline through {he fist half of the 19908, ewe ‘We judge that the USSR will maintain large general purpose force in the ‘Aalantie-t-the-Urals zone to reinforce its stats 38a superpower, o deter aggression, to carry out wartime missions, and to underwrite its political objectives in the region. Within emerging economic constraints, we also believe the Soviets wil modernize ther sil formidable general purpose forces. Furthermore, the Soviets will want to minimize the erosion of their relative military position due to both Warsaw Pact force reductions and ‘continuing improvements in NATO miltary capabilities, Absent a far reaching conventional arms corral agreement, the Soviets will maintain the eapabiltyto conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO territory but only after general mobilization. For the period ofthis Estimate, Warsaw Pac frees, led by the USSR, will remain the largest aggregation of military power inthe worl, and the Soviets will remain committed tothe offensive asthe preferred form of operations in wartime. errr) [Even with reductions in defense spending and procurement, the Soviets will ‘continue to maintain the worl’s highest level of weapons production, through the turn of the century. Although Soviet weapons projected ‘through the 1990s will involve mostly evlutionary improvements over present 1ypes,a steady sream of beter military technology will be available fo Soviet force developers throughout this period. Indeed, the rilitary expects perestroyka to yield significantly improved mili technologes-feer-Rt) 26916. (Continued) In addition to reductions in procurement funds, the significantly increased unit costs of high-technology weapon systems will further reduce traition- ally high Soviet procurement rates. The increased effectiveness ofthese weapons, however, wil reduce the numberof such systems required to ‘maintain the combat capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces. These factors wil almost certainly lead (oa less than {-for-1 replacement rate for ‘more advanced Soviet weapon systems over the cours ofthis Estimate. As ‘consequence, we expect to See a continuation in the recent trends of declining production rates and deployment patterns for high-technology ‘equipment. eer XC} ‘Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have improved their capabilities to ‘conduct longer and more intensive conventional operations against NATO, including increased training for defensive operations against attacking NATO forces. The Soviets assess NATO to be a tougher military opponent fon the conventional batlefld today than in past decades. Furthermore, they believe improvements in NATO docine and projected force mode. ization will make NATO an even more formidable conventional opponent lover the course of this Bstimate-fererey Soviet pessimism regarding the utiy of nuclear war and NATO's increased conventional capabilites have caused the Soviets to prepare for the possibilty that a NATO-Pact war might remain conventional’ But they belive they must also prepare for nuclear war both to deter it and to wage it fit happens. Indeed, we judge that the Soviets sil believe a INATO-Pact war i likely to escalate tothe nuclear level due to NATO's octrine of flexible response. Therefore, we expect the Soviets to maintain sizable nuclear forces subject to limitations imposed by current and future farms control agreements, Furthermore, we believe that, should an agroe- ‘ment with NATO governing quantities and modernization of shor-range nuclear forces not materialize, the Soviets will continue to expand and ‘modernize their tactical nuclear missile force by the mid-1990s.4eseeeCT Following a trend we identified in IIMIMMNINML we believe the overall peacetime readiness posture of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces ‘opposite NATO during the period ofthis Estimate will be designed to accommodate the following: + Primary emphasis will be placed on the ability to mobilize and deploy large reinforcements before hatltes, not on the ability of forward forces to initiate a quick, unreinforced attack 27016. (Continued) + Taine with the Warsaw Pac's recent decision to reduce and restructure its theater forces, these forces will be maintained at suficient readiness to defend against a sudden attack and act asa defensive shold to allow forthe fll mobilization and deployment of Pact forces. erc— We consider Pact initiation of hostilities without mobilization to be ‘extremely unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out the possibilty thatthe Pact might initiate hostilities from a condition of partial motilzaion if it perceives an opportunity to achieve decisive results against NATO, or @ ‘eed to forestall NATO from achieving decisive results agaiast the Pact. seve ‘Our judgments regarding Warsaw Pact sustainability ina fture war with NATO differ substantially fom those made several yeas ago In 1985 we stated unconditionally thatthe Warsaw Pact logistic structure in Central Europe could support 60 0 90 days of theater offensive operations against NATO. We nowt judge that overall Pact sustainability isa function ofthe resilience of NATO's forward defenses. If NATO's forward defenses were to collapse within thece days of intensive operations, aramun ton stocks in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO) would be suliient 19 ‘upp the Pacts Theater Steateais Operatian for upto 90 days. If, onthe ‘other hand, Pact forces were to require at least two weeks of high-intensity ‘operations to uchieve a docisive breakthrough, the Pact would not have ‘enough ammunition inthe Western TMO to sustain a theater strategic operation beyond total of about 30 to 4S days IFeontronted with the respect of some shortfall in ammunition supply, the Pact would move ‘ditional amamuniton socks from elsewhere to the Western TMO, of ‘adjust war plans to avo or atleast minimize any adverse impact on ‘combat operations ewewe) Soviet general purpose forces are fielding new weapon of virtually every type, and we belive this trend will continue through the ene of the century, Motivated by the need to counter NATO's deep-atiack, high technology conventional weapons and extended-batlfield concepts, for ‘example, the Soviets have been able to match or exceed NATO's capabili- ties in nearly every major ground forces’ weapons category. Rates of ‘equipment modernization probably will decrease through the end ofthe fentury as the Soviets reduce defense production to free resources or the civil sector. However, we expeet thatthe Soviets will esis utting substantially research, development, testing, and evaluation in an effort to close the military technology gap with the West. As in the rast, Soviet Forces in the Western TMO will likely be the ist to reesive new cquipment-feneneh am16. (Continued) ‘The Ground Forces are the largest element ofthe Soviet armed forces, and their development determines the overall direction of Soviet theater forces development. We see no evidence that this wil change. We now judge, ‘based on the plans for reductions in force levels, defense spending and nilitary procurement, that a 25-year period of Soviet Ground Forees ‘erowth has ended, and the decline in their overall size could go beyond that already announced. We furcher judge that a resumption of growth in the ‘Ground Forces is highly unlikely before the turn ofthe centuryfrerrc} Im order to meet the targets for edutions set by Gorbachev for January 1991, Soviet Ground Forces willbe considerably restructured over the next to years, but we cannot confidently predict thelr final form. Before ‘Gorbachev's cus, the Soviets had begun to mave toward combined-arms formations. Although the final balance of tanks and mechanized infantry is still n Hux, we believe that eombined-arms doctrine wll guide Soviet force restructuring through the 1990s {Ssu6) Despite cus in defense spending and procurement, we judge the Soviets will continue to modernize theit Air Forces, albeit more slowly than in the past, Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing through the turn of the century, the Soviets are expected to introduce light, medium, and Stealth ‘bombers, Stealth and non-Stealth fighter-bombers, and atleast one new fighter. The announced reduction of 800 comb aireraft from the Air Forces, however, signals «significant change in the pattern of force ‘expansion ofthe past two decades, We now judge thatthe Soviet Air Forces will remain at their post reduction levels until after the end of the centuryfeene) Soviet naval general purpose forces continue to have the major missions of protecting the Soviet missile launching submarine force and defending the USSR against NATO strategic and theater forces. Although the Navy can bbe expected to beara shate of spending reductions, major emphasis will be placed on improving antisubmarine and antisurface combatant operations, sradually medernizing Soviet naval aviation, and increasing the availabi- ity of sea-based airpower as larger airraft carriers enter service during the 1990s, Support for land TMOs remains a primary wartime tsk of naval theater Forces, and we project a slow continuation of several orgsnizational ‘and weapon trends that should provide land theater commanders with more ‘capable naval forces for combined-arms operations fsmwe} [Non-Saviet Warsaw Pact defense industries have been expanding and producing a larger share of the NSWP miliary inventory. But announced ‘defense spending cuts and the weakened state of NSWP economies will ‘cause mibtary production in the NSWP countries to decline during the period of this Estimate. We also judge that NSWP forces wil fall further m216. (Continued) ‘behind Soviet force in technology and organization during this same period. The relative contribution of the NSWP armies to overall Warsaw Pact military capability is aso likey to decline somewhat aver the ext few years. (exec) ‘A major objective of the Soviet leadership's current foreign policy i to reduce politcal support inthe NATO countries for increased defense spending to support NATO's force modernization program, Gorbachey will continue to negotiate Tar conventional arms control agrecments to slow Western military modernization and facilitate his own defense program. In addition, Warsaw Pact foreign policy over the period of tis Estimate will seek to weaken the positon of the United States and Canada within the [North Atlantic Alliance, (@owesch— Alternaive Key Judgment. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, while recognizing the significance of the ongoing changes in the Soviet Union, believes the likelihood of large unilateral reductions in military expenditures beyond those already proclaimed by Soviet leaders isnot a8 high as implied by the mayority view inthe Estimate, parieulary for the longer term. Notwithstanding the potential importance of new develop» ‘ments in Soviet military policies discussed in this Estimate, the Director, DIA, believes present evidence and Future uncertainties make the elements ‘of continuity in Soviet military policy as important as the changes for US national security and defense planningaiewene} 2B16. (Continued) Executive Summary ‘A Time of Change in Soviet General Purpose Forces and Potcy ‘We judge that the Soviet leadership's current security polices will produce duving the peviod ofthis Es rate the mot sigaieant change in Soviet general rpote Fores since Khrutbeh’s asi oes redue- ton. We further anes that thee polices are de- sinned primarily 10 help the Soviet leadership evita. Ine the Soviet economy by shifting resources from Aetense to evil sectors. We also belive decisions already undertaken signal a sharp divergence from ‘sisting force development trends, and they bave necestated dramatic alteration in our forecast of ature Soviet general purpose forces” ferry When Gorbachev eame wo power in 1985, he inherited «8 technologieally backard economy that hed exper need a decade of slowing growth characterized by indostialbotlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and decining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of eaptliavestnet. Almost immediatly ter becoming General Secretary, he began 0 estab ish the politica and ienogical foundation for impos: ‘ng hin on priors for rezoureealeatons, clearly Sienaling a more intense competition berween civilian ‘and miltary neds. nding s, be: + Reafirmed the traditional party authority for for rmulatng military doctrine, which the Brezhnev rerime bad allowed to become dominated bythe profesional military hierarchy. Promoted debate cari oat in dosti ers over "reasonable sufleney” and “defensive sl ‘Seney,” But that reflects « moce fundamental ex ‘mination of "How much i enough?” fr defense + Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending ‘by using arme contol forums and foreign ply initiatives to reduce external threats +S Dir Oke alae Am erties 24 + Broaned th Soviet concep of aatonal security a5 pet ofthe new thinking” policy to give greater ‘eight tits economic and political components. + Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previ ‘ous Soviet leaders that the impasblity of weary in fucleat wari basi tothe pital dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and thatthe pursuit of ‘apsbilites associated with achieving very i 00 elsive ad cathy eoerecy Gorbache’s intial “ground-aying” obseives were largely tcieved ding his fist Tew years in of, “The regime did ot order cutbacks nmr re trams immediately however, preferring instead to Feduce the burden by increasing the efieney of the defense secor. Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet ofcils describe a “ris i the economy, alle four years Gorbachev hs failed to bring aout 2 bound ig economic geowth, Determine to succeed ‘in his revitalization campaign and reeogizig that the defense industrial sector offers an important scarce of additonal help fr bis modernization peo- tram, Gorbachey, in 1985, decided to take stronger Action to invest more in consumer-oiented projec “He evidently decided to act at that point because in audition tothe obvious lack of progres on economic ‘rogram and the rise in consumer dssatsactio, the Fegtne was faced wih sme hey deadlines inthe Preparation ofthe 13th Five-Vear Plan (1991-95). “The results have become most vvily evident with announced policy initiatives designed primarily to he the Soe eadeship reinvigorate the e2onomy by shifting resources fom defense tothe cvlian + Unilateral redvetion and restructuring of Soviet, ener purpose forces that wil cat 300,000 person- fe rom peacetime forces by January 1991 iacud ng 240,000 personnel fom Soviet forces west ofthe16, (Continued) Urals and 50,000 personne rom those in Cental europe. Fees rmaiting oppoite NATO wil be converted into a “lealy defensive” structure. + Cuts overall defense spending of 142 percent and defense production levels of 19.5 percent ove the neat two years that clearly reflect plan for reduced fore sleucture ad redactions in rates of guipment modernization, + Increases in defense indusry’s direct contebuton to production of consumer and clan investment foods that wl cut signicantl into defense output eer Despite thet dramatic astons and their apparent fa seaching implications, thee remains considerable ut- certainty about the durability and eansequences of Gorbachev's iniitveson military eaters. The mount of progres that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbacer's ability to sustain his reforms, his wilingnes to undertake ad tional initiative, hs standing withthe party leader- ship the support he receives in pursuig related programs, and his ability to contro the impact of ternal factors that eoulé impinge on his objectives, sere Nevertheless, me believe itis highly likely shat further ecsions to reduce planned dfense spending ad to Sf investment from defense othe cil sector wil become apparent during the upcoming 13th Five- Year Plan, We eafirm the even sessment i NIE 11-23-88 fovererH-NG}, December 1988, Gorbo- ‘he's Economie Propams: The Challenges Acad, that Gorbachoy wil divert aditona sources fom the defense sector tothe evil sector. Over the longee term, Gorbachev probably wl continue to impose costeants onthe defense budget, and we jue that Soviet defense spending will eoninve to decline as a portion of GNP through the turn of the century seve Gorbachev andthe Formation of Defense Policy GGorbachev’s decision to inclie the mil target of his perestryka (restruturng") campaign has brought into sharp ele his attempts to igen party contol oter the Soviet armed fores. Soon afer taking ofce as General Secretary i erly 1985, Gorbachev and his ales moved quickly o tearm party control over military issues, in particular its Authority for formulating eitary doctrine. Although mos atcention has focused on the defense sending implication of Gorbachev's programs, it has become ‘ear that he is alo using peresiryka a a tol 10 tighten the party's grip onthe military’ palitieal, sccountabiliy. The mids1988 19th Party Conference and subsequent remarks by Foreign Minster She ‘ardnadze calling for oversight ofthe Soviet military by nationwide elected bodies provide strong indica- ton ofthe leadership's determination to broaden and Intensify review ofsational security matters, espec |y defense spendingonech ‘Reasonable and Defensive Stdicieny. Te concep of reasonable suicieny” is emerging 25 «mae ‘announced theme of Soviet secu bing linked closely to Gorbachev's new formulations of mltary requirements. Suficieney hasbeen gene ally defined by Gorbachev and other party oflalss& ‘level of military power adequate "to reps agaes- son, bt insufficient to conduet offensive operations: ‘The concept remains under discussion inthe Soviet Union, and the debate has largely focused on tee cexntal sss + A contest or resources a8 Gorbachev seks 2 octinal bass fr strengthening his contro over Aetense resource decisions, + The need to inuence Westecn audiences ia 2 Aiection favorable 19 Soviet defnee nnd senor poly obiectives. +The belief by atleast some leaders that Sovot ‘national security canbe etter ensured if bath sides reduce their military forcesseenench— ‘We judge that in presenting this concept the Gort: ‘cher leadership is atempting to establish 2 new ba for determining “How much is enough?” for detese. Teas been linked two other announced policy outlooks: that oecll defense posture should be judged by “qualitative” as wel ae quantitative mes sores; an, that further increases over existing force 21516. (Continued) levels do not necessarily result i greater security. By advocating these concept, Gorbache seks to pro ‘mote pois that wil benefit his economy by redve- fing the burden of altary spending, mitignte the effets of reduced spending by attempting to manage the future military threat through aggresive arms ‘contol policies, and reap poi benefits that would ‘contribute his goals by reducing the Western perception of the Soviet threat. We belive tha the ‘onoep's long-term implications ae inextscably linked tothe fate of Garbacher'sreforzn programs. ‘We further judge that, as lng a leadership backing “within the party for his emphasis on industal mod ‘ernzaton holds up, and brcing an unforeseen dete- ration in US-USSR relations, Gorbachev's concept of suficincy will provide the hiss for Soviet security policy. (rer) ‘Over the last ow yeu, the principle of easonable sullen hat also been linked to the term “defensive ‘uleienc” alo translated as "defensive defense) Tn this cones it hs ben propose by Gorbachev and other high-ranking Soviet oficial as a bass fr ‘determining the organization, size, dipsiion, and tettegy of Pact and NATO forees in Europe. Not sorprisingly, even many Soviet military sources have ‘been particularly skeodcal about defensive doctrine, and several high-ranking officers have asserted that, while defense ean prevent the enemy from defeating {he USSR, it doesnot delet the enemy-terecT Although usually nlce by Soviet spokesmen inthe context of its mutal applicability to both alliances. Gorbachev lake his late 1988 unilateral oop redue tion and reorganization announcement to Soviet. forces adopting a “clearly defensive” structure. The leadership's championing of reasonable and defensive saeney derives much oft impetus from esonamic requirements, and we blee is success ultimately willbe determined by the pliy agenda and politieal Dower of the party leadership rather than by reso tion ofa dactrina disourse between milittey an civilian writers, We farther aes, nevertheless, that, bythe turn ofthe century, these concepts probably will have become lasting feature of Soviet nations security policy, helping easue continued party conta ‘ver defense policy and defense spending torre) 276 Alternative Judgments The Director, Defense Insl tence Ageney, believes that Soviet objectives in pro- ‘uleatine the concept of reasonable sufieney are designed nat oy to avoid the costs of on unabated fontnuaton ofthe ats eae, but are primarily to ‘sxtablish the basis for atms reduction proposals, to raise Wester expectations regarding the prospects for substamtal force redutions, and vo undermine ‘support for NATO modernization. Its longer i= portance will depen primarily on how the West Fesponds to Soviet ntiatives and the progress made in the arms contol arena, Should Gorbachev fal 9 achieve his minimum goal by the mid-1990s, the Soviet most likely would, deapite the extremely igh feasts, fever 0 thet tradignalresource-intensive “proach to develop the next generation of weapons fn anodernize thei forces, toewe} ‘Arms Controt In pacallel with the doctrinal changes involving Sul ciency Gorbachev has advocated "new thinking” oa foreign pliey. This “new thinking” emphasizes the politi! and economic dimensions of national scutty And the mis of military power. An important cl ‘ment ofthis "oew thinking” bs been an aggresive public pursuit of conventional arms conto singe early 1986, The Warsaw Pac’ efor at conventional sm contol have featured numberof peopel by Gortacher, bythe Warsaw Pacts Political Consela- tive Commie, and, ation, hundreds of tate ments and pres artces by lower-ranking oficial, al ‘Sresig the Soviet Union's desire fora conventional ns reduction agreement ern ‘We judge tat the Soviets and ther allies have a umber of interrelated militar, palitical, and eco ‘omic reasons to engaze the Westin conventional free conta + To improve the corelaton of forces and retuce what they perceive as NATO's capability to launch 2 sep attack + To impede NATO's force modernization pans and peeveat oe impede NATO's deployment of ac ‘anced-echnology weapons, thus reducing the16. (Continued) ‘urgency onthe prt ofthe Soviet Union to match batter NATO's highechology modernization + To make it politically easier to allocate economic reroures within the Soviet Union from the defense Sector to the clin sector io eaty out peresropka + Toappeal o publi opinion at home aod abeoad ina generalized way, whe adding to Moscow's overall, Sims contol posture and ening the USSR's image as rstworty ad rational player i the international arena dewey In early December 1988, Govbachev announced ma or unilateral eats in Soviet military manpower and ‘ivipment to osc daring the net two yes. A ‘moat later be announced major reductions in defese Spending and defense production ee the able), While ie bsiee that ante of economic pola, and miltary considerations went nt there dion, in ‘ur judgment, economic eomideratons providing fesources and manpower tothe clan eoonomy— vere the primary factor. Had the cuts been designed folly for pot or propagandist eect, we belie the withdrawal ofthe si tank isons from Cente Eorope would have teen suficeat, Politely, the eductions are designed to put pressure on NATO to ‘ove tomard conventional arm corso negotiations that would involve mullatera fore reduction. The tniaterl cut are ak intended to infisence NATO electorates to withdraw suport for new weapons procurement programs and expanding rita bu eb Tien oer the ong ten the ptt ae Sowing NATO's maeniation i pobably a more Important factor Moscow's ealeulations than the ioc savings expected fom the unilateral force cus Slowing ot reversing NATO's moderization reduces {he pressure to develop matching programs and per- mite the Soviet leadership to concentrate omits eo omic problems. frre Depending onthe West's response, Gortacher might advance other initiatives, expecially inthe context of the conventional ams redection talks, designed fo ep piel pressure on the West while boing ona the defenge burden at home. We believe further riajr wmiaterl force redutions would generate strong oppottion wich would coalesce within the fee extablihinen and among is ales in the politcal leadership. This opposition could be largely ‘neutralized, however, if Garbache could demonstrate that NATO's military frees were also beng reduced nately denerReF Soviet Doctrine on Theater War Against NATO [Nauare of Future Wer. We bliove that Soviet views ‘on the ature and ele of «theater war between [NATO and the Warsaw Pact have changed in recent sears. Soviet planing through the mid-1970s was tated on belief that NATO's cocventionlexpab- tie were relatively weak and the alliance mas almost certain tointiatemlea warfare early in conf {nan effort 0 avoid conrentional deestdextesrey “The Soviets now persive that NATO's conventions! forces have become substantially mre dificult o defeat. Consequently, NATO has become mote cas ‘lof delaying and perhaps averting te eallpse ofits ‘conventional defenses, and the neces for NATO t0 fesort to carly us of nuclear weapons has decrease, ‘The Soviets mat also believe thatthe USSR's ability to at least match NATO's nuclear strength atthe tactical theater, and statgi letls hs reduced [NATO incemive to initiate mclear se early [Neverteles, we judge tha, even under conempo rary conditions, the Soviet generally assess a NATO- Pact war as likly to esalate tothe miler level, and ‘hey continue to ler that esalton to general nuclear wari iksly tobe the outcome ofthe we of ‘any mucleat weapons inthe theater. ($F NC) ‘The Soviets may als have come to belie, however, that a NATO-Poct wat might terminate bloc the ts of nucear weapons 2716. (Continued) ‘Announced Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions ‘To Take Place During 1989-90, aes ene Ae 2 eins Bigs THN, 8 ‘iy ‘Sis ge Canin Dees Sisem! Mie" Rte Bade aT Saree ae aeagen 1 ComhEope toes Cochran Germany. ey. Pa. Putman srecrth “hee sone ne ec. 278 hte on he ance eign of ene Jeri sini as any te Woe Stents a mune eatin 2000 wen crotch se prac aoe16. (Continued) x ‘hough ou evidence inctes that te Soviets wok rether begin a NATO-Pret conventional war for Timited gals nor conduct ntl operations with tint ed goal in ming, they may be wling to aceeppaial ‘ehievmeat oftheir objectives rather than nea the risk of nuclear eseaation (ewe [Nuclear Doctrine. There i 0 indication that the Soviets have ever bon sangute about the cose quences they would expect to sue in 2 nucla® var ‘Mereover, evidence fom the 1980s indieats the ‘Soviets doubt they could prevail in any traditionay ‘meaninfel militar. pots! sente because ofthe ‘expected high levels of damage bah ses would stain from nuclear ataks. Since the ary 1986, Soviet leaders have exlicilyeesouneed the pss 1 of achieving victory in a geeral nuclear confi. ‘We judge that the “no vitor in mucear war” pestonpublily endorsed by Gorbacher and ince porated in the 1986 27h Party Congres Programs basic to the polea dimension of Soviet military doctrine rrr) ‘The Soviet leaders’ public portrayal oftheir moe: poliy clearly serves thee polit intrest and it oes not mean deemphasis of Soviet nclear wey ‘ons development. The Soviets continue to eeognize hat ctcurstaness might compel them to ght = fuclear war—rogardes of whether they think & {eaditonal victory canbe achieved—aed they intend Rene cee en ni eae den a my tot ey ene er cian ad sii toachive the best posible outcome if it ever happens. ‘Atthe sume time, th Soviet leadership believes the best posible nucleatowat- Sighting capability will ro ce the best possible icine deterrent aswel For {hte resons, subject tan arms contol agreement, we expect the Soviets o maintain a sizable nuclear Aaivery force and to continue to improve tore weap fon ystems tha constitute this foceneeaich— We have not detected any changes inthe iary> technial dimension of Soviet mlitary doctrine that tlearly demonszate that the Soviets have changed tel nuclear war-fighting doctrine under Gortachey ‘The coming 13th Five-Year Plan presents key opportunity for hi to aet decisions naling tbe Future ofthe Soviet armed Forces, Conequent9 i the Soviets determine that the pursuit of expubies sssocated with traditional Soviet means of victory is too ese and cos, we woul expec, by the mito ate 1990, to aqui evidence of basi changes inthe structure and development ofthe USSR’ nuclear forces. fewer) Conventional Doctrine. The Soviets have devoted ‘onsderable emphasis during the 1980s tothe chang ing nature of conventional warfare. Tht interest has largely centered on the themes: + Shoulda war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ‘occu, it might be e protracted, worldwide confit fou with convendonal weapons and coatoung for weeks or months, perhaps eves lnge. + Conventional weapos are becoming so accurate tnd lethal tht the destrctivenes of sme no Sppeoaches that of low-ysid nuclear weapons. They fan be emploved, therefore o destroy many treet that previously required maclea stikes, Their we, towever, does at neceseuily incur the ek of tseaation to general neler ar inherent nthe we if even a single nuclear wespon. + Miliary advantages forded the USSR by is ‘ummerial advantages in conventional aces gait [NATO may be mitgnted by Wester progress 27916. (Continued) aadvancod-techaology conveational weapons, esp Ciallyprecison-qided, long-range weapons. sewer The acquisition of ae conventional batlefeld tec solgie bythe West would create wo problems fr Pact operational planners during a war. Fist, the development and widespread lding of such weapons ‘by NATO coud increase significantly the loses ‘stained by the Pact n conventional combat, ths ‘aising the possibility of even otherwise suctessfil ‘opecatons becoming prohibitively expensive Instend ofthe prevots expectation of rapid Breakthroughs tnd high speed exploitation operations, the Soviets ‘te now concerned that offensive operations would sssume the agoniing character of “gnawing throurh” ‘numerous defensive lines. Second, long-range ish {echacloy weapons could be used to olathe European battlefield from Pact reinforsements. With ‘out substantial, early reinforcement by moiized Trees from the USSR, the Soviets believe that thy ‘might not attain a suicientcotelaton of altars ocees to ensure a rapid eat of advance eaten In oar view these concerns have led toa vigorous audvocacy by Soviet itary leaders oer the ast, Several years for modernizing conventional lores through greater exploitation of ew technologies. The riltary’s concern forthe high-technology conven: tional Batted ofthe future ave given them 3 strong incentive to support Gorbache'sindusteal ‘modernization strategy, whichis intended vo keep the Soviet Union from lagging even frthe bind inthe developtent of new weapon technologies. We belive, therefore, that through the mid-1990s the military will accept the promises of future benefits and wil {efcain from pushing for Vigorous development sn full-sale felding of weapons incorporating cs technologies RFR) ‘Soviet Doctrine on War Iniation Outbreak of War. We judge the Soviets believe that a period of crisis possibly af very shore duration but probably lasting werks and even months~ il pe fede a war. The Soviets generally dismiss the notions ‘ofan accidental outbreak ofa major wat ora masive ‘tack launched outside the context af a major exis, However, 8 resltof NATO's improved caabil: ties the Sones have expressed a growing concern 280 hat thee opportnity to detect enemy preparations Foran atack may have groin shorter. Soviet emp sis om defensive operations in thei taining, while Undertaken fora variety of reasons, s consistent with the asessment thatthe Pact may have less waraing and mobilization time than it previously believed "Nevertheless, we believe thatthe Soviet military stil has confidence in its ability to detect enemy nrepar tions for war ata preliminary stage—early enough to take effective ation to derive the West of eining ‘Sgnificant advantage from Surprise fene Force Mobilization. The ability to mobilize large forces rapidly instead of maintaining immediate com ‘bat readines ofthe entre force isthe gol of Pact, planters, based on thee perception that a war in Europe wll be pfeeeded bya prio of eis. The Soviets expect thatthe free of both ses wil be Fully or almost flly mobilized and prepared for combat before the set of bostlites. We judge that ‘Warsaw Pact theater forces positioned in Cetra Europe are maitaied at sulicint readiness in peacetime to defend against a sudden atack and to clas a defensive sbild tallow forthe furtber rmoblization ad deployment of Pac forcesnfescaie) ‘The Pact would take steps during a period of tension toallow for a faster snoiliation and transition © higher stages of combat readines asthe station became more theesteiag. We estimate that the Soi cts cuerently nee st least 0 10 tree weeks 0 fly prepare thee eureent forces in Central Europe for Sustained offensive operations at authorized wartime strength seem) We judge that, a the sme time, situations could ‘eer din the peebotities phase that would con ‘ine the Soviets launch a preemptive attack before Feaching full mobilization, Suck cumstances might Include the bli that thee mobilization progress ad permitted them a decisive albeit temporary advan tage in relative force preparedness. Alternatively, ‘coneetn that NATO's buildup was sifting the core lation of frees aginst the Pact coud persuade the Soviets to attack, Alter the announced force rede: ‘ios are completed by 1991, however, Soviet apabil tiesto atack Tem 3 condition of partis! mobization16. (Continued) il be significant duced. Therefore, by the erly 1990, the likeinoed thatthe Warsaw Pac would xercive such an option wil decline accor. ease In addition to diminishing Soviet capabilities for conducting a short-warting attack, Gorbache’s pro: pote force sections inthe Atlantictothe-Urals ‘zone particularly the 50-percent tank eut i Cental urope—wil have a sigan effet op the prepare in time required forthe Warsaw Pact to conduct. offensive operations against NATO. Substantial rein forcement of Soviet ores Cental Europe by unite feom he western USSR aad the mabilton ofthe Tops suport structure are already required to luneh sustained theater ofesive operation. Tale redetins inthe forward are on the announced scale wil eeate the need forever greater enforcement. ‘The sal of the reinforcement ruled to conduct x deep theater offensive operation wil vary with the structure selected fr the frees remaining in Cent rope, Although forces fora theater eflesive oe tion wil all be avaiable the bulk of two fone wil ave foe moved forward from the Soviet Union before the onset of oensve operation. This move: sent wil increase th preparation time beyond the toto three wesks we curently axes the Soviet equi to prepare thee forces or 4 sstned theater ‘ofleasive few-Re) Resource Allocations to the Miltary Although he esme to power intent an resuuctring the Soviet economy, Gocbaches didnot intially order tacks in military copra, In fe, our estimates (of Soviet defense spending since 1985 inaste tat ‘has contioucd to grow i el terms by about 3 percent pet yea. Ths fat, we have not sen any Scaling back or setching Qt of majo weapons ‘evelopment or production programs that can be ‘icc inked to Gorbachev's economic iitiatives. Gortachers announcement, however, that oral de- fense spending wil be reduced by 142 percent and lays for arms and equipment by 19.5 percent over the nex wo year indices a sgnficant change in the couse af ature defeasespenng In addition, the defense industry hasbeen directed wo accelerate is ontribtio to the preducton of consumer and civil: fan investment goods. Thecus ate clearly mean help alleviete the economic buen of defese, and they could provide a meaningful boost to the civilian ‘canon ovr the longer tern tere) Soot In ransfering eosources from defense to evn programs, Gorbachev probably wll not lini the impact to any particular service oF mission. A host of military, economic, domestic plat, and foreign iy considerations wl inuence the implements: ton of spending cuts, and we Believe tat go element ff the fore will remain totaly unscathed. We belive ‘thar we wil get fail clear signs early on of broad ‘based cuts in Soviet weapons procurement o changes in miltary activity, bot measuring precise changes oF the exact level of defense spending wil be ave sient emener Weapons Moderazation [Even with a reduction in defense spending, the Soviets sil continue to maintain the worl highest level of ‘eeapon production thvough the turn ofthe century. A Steady seam of improved Soviet miltary technology developments wil be naiable o Soviet planers and Assign engineers throughout this period Indeed the iltarys Future develoment of high-technology ‘weapons i dependent on te same technologies which peresiroyka is intended to improve, Nevertheless, we Juda the majr portion of Soviet systems projec ‘hrough the year 2000 wil involve evolutionary im provements i systers now in sevice, ater thas Sramatic technologieal breakthroughs te=e7F Manpower Issues ‘Since 1980, the number of daf-age males has de ‘lied eflcting the demographic "eco" ofthe ower ‘jtvate during World War Ul The draftage on serpton aol reached ie nadie in 1087, bowerer, ad, forthe rst time since the war, the USSR caa count ‘on a basically stable youth population. The sunken ‘inert poal,aevertheles, has caused the Soviet. rary serious problems. I has had 1 lower ts ‘mental and physical standards significantly inorder {0 provide the same numberof drftes. naditon, the problems of managing a ulate military ha become inreasngly prominent. Soviet military writ Ings have cited minor’ lower eduratonlschive- ‘ment, Russian language deficiencies, snd higher levels eh tension within units. The announced redue- tion of $00,000 personnel in the Soviet military — ‘early 10 percent a the 5.5 milion extimat of Soviet. nilitary manpower-should alleviate somevbat the miltary’s dificltis in nding suitable conscripts to Tatil manpower reoirement_feaeae= 28116. (Continued) Warsaw Pact’ ops strucire in Central Europe ‘ould support 60 {090 days of combat operations taint NATO. We no judge, however, that overall het sustainability wil depend Yo a sgiieant extent ‘on bow long NATO's defenses Hold and whether [NATO cat ssl off ny breakthroughs: + Pact frees break through NATO defenses in three day and geach their immediate Fortalobjec tives by D-F14 oF 15, we judge that suicient ftamunition socks exit within the Western TMO {o support fully such x caraptign fr 60 10 90 days + IF Pact forces eeguice about a week of high intensity operations to achieve a major breakthrough he het total stocks i the Western TMO could up- ort combat operations for approximately 60 10 75 ays + UrPact forces require about two weeks of hg ‘tensity operations to achiev a Urakthvough ori [NATO manages to seal any earlier major Pact, breakthrough, the Pact would not have enough Amnuntion inthe Western TMO to sustain combat onertions beyond 30 10 45 das. (SME NC) 1 confronted with the prospect of a shortfall in snmunition supply, Pact leaders would adjust war time plans to svoi, or atleast minimize, any adverse Inmpact on combat spertiae train, the Soviets ‘would move sock from elsewhere, suchas the Strate: the Reserva othe Westra TMO.4enrecy atu Soret General Purpose Fores ‘Although the Soviets have ansouneed that they wil ‘ut thelr general purpose ores, defense spending, fn defense production over the next two Years, We Tlive that the Soviet sre determined to maiiain large generl purpose orcs though the period of his [Estimate In adi supporting the clam to bea superpower the Soviets bere such frees are neces sty to deter aggression, to carey out wartime mis sons and to underwrite thei political objectives in the region. We judge tat these factors wil continue to guide Soviet force development inthe ature ‘Absent «far-reaching conventional arms contol ‘erezment the Soviets will maintain the capability to ° 282 conduct largesele offensive operations dee into NATO tertory, but only ater general mobilization Furthermore, fr the period ofthis Estimate, Pact, forces, ed by the USSR, wll emn the Largest aggregation of military power in the worl, and the Soviets wl eomain commited to the oflesive asthe prefered frm of operations in waste eer Ground Fores. The Soviet Ground Forces ate the largest element of Soviet general purpose frees, and their development largely determines the overall d- rection of theater forces development. We se no cience that either ofthese conditions wll change. Cats inthe sizeof the grouad forces announced by the Soviets, however, signal significant change in the ‘yerall developmental path af the force. Before the ‘announcement, the Soviet ground forces were expect: ‘8 to grow gradually i tei eral size. The cuts the mat saabe since the early 1960s—divergeeon- Siderably fom existing trends, and they ale sigif- nly out forecast of future Soviet forces. Ambiguity persists concerning the actual implementation ofan nounced force cus and the restructuring of fees ‘emmaning after the withdrawal nto what the Soviets term “clearly defensive” orientation. We now judge, ‘nevertheless, that 25-year period of Soviet ground force growth has ended, and that the force wil experienc «decline in its overall ie that could very Wellgo Beyond the magoitudeof that already an nounced bythe Soviets. We further judge a resump- tion of free growth, baring an unforeseen deteriora tion inthe international environment, tobe highly Unlikely Before the turn ofthe century. tenes ‘Our assessment of current trends in Soviet forse evelopment leads us to conlude tht eestrutured ‘combined-arms formations tased on mechanized in- faniry and tanks supported by artillery have replace predominastly tank formations asthe main ompo ‘ent of land combat power. We belo tis read toward combined-arms formations wil continue, bet we cannot predict with any certainty the inal rea Zation of thes units-enene= "The Soviet eround fores at ld aew equipment in virally every weapon ctcpory. This pattern of ‘weapon modernization will eontine forthe forse abl future but a a slower pace than in the past: + The Soviets probably have begun fing «tank refered toby the Intligence Community as the secret16. (Continued) ature Soviet Tank (FST, with the capability to fe antitank guided mises through its main ‘nun A new design, the FST-TI i expected to etch Serial production by the mid-19905. 1 wil key incorporate incremental improvements oer pee ‘ous designs and may, in addition, havea larger caliber gun! + In edition to improving the firepower and peote> ‘ion oftheir current infantry fighting vehicles, the Soviets should eld a new IFV within the nex yer. ‘Aroew armored personnel carte alo is under ‘evelopment. These new stems are designed to have improved poteton and firepower and reflect the iereasing role for these systems in Soiet, combined-arms operations against NATO. + The Soviet wil eld several new model of tube arillery by the end ofthe century. Prissy i Drovements wil aclade fly automatic ammunition Teaders, new Site-ontral systems, increased armor protectin, improved metallurgy forthe eannon snd ‘hati, and a longer ube for greater ange in some ‘models. In adstion, the Soviets are developing improved artilery munitions + The Soviet wll continue thir ambitious short- «ange baltic isle (SRBM)tesearch and devel ‘pment program, and we project that they wll ‘ontnue to expand and modernize thei tactical nuclear forces by improving the accuracy ofthe’ ‘issies and fielding an extended-range SS-21 sad 8 ‘slid-feled follow-on tothe Seud. A series of lemproved conventional munition warheads aso ste ‘ing developed to improve the effectiveness of 'SRBMS in conventional operations + The Soviets ate projected to fl several new a defense weapons to maximize their future air de fense capabilities against helicopters and high {ormanc alzcraf. Improvements wl include in- proved seekers for beter low-alttude engagement “apability, motile engagement radar, and more lethal warheadsnfewech * he gy Chi of St or lige. US Am beet Alt Forces. Even bloce Gorbachev's ansounezment ‘of free cuts, we had expected the sizeof the Soviets ‘Tore to remain celatively constant a they at Tempted ta catch up with the West qualitatively. We now judge that the air forces will be maintained st thei postreduction levels uti afte the tua ofthe entry. We also jodee tht the Soviets wil continue to modernize thir alr forces, albeit more slowly, uring the period ofthis Estimate in an attempt to arrow major technological gaps withthe West Thee ix considerable uncertainty, nevertheless, over tow the Soviets wil implement the announced reduc- tion in aireraft and how the ir forces will implement spending and procurement cuts. Senior Soviet il tary leaders have placed erat importance on retain ing approximate ar pat inthe Central European sirbalance, and they baveeraphasized the importance ‘of ew weapon systems in developmental programming: + Modernization ofthe Soviet ghtr force probaly wil be based almost entirely on variants ofthe Folerum, Foxhound, and Flanker. We judge tht the frst follow-on gtr to appear would probably bea Fulerum replacement. + The Soviets will mos likely cotine 1 modernize their medium bomber free with proved variants ofthe Backire, and we estimate that a new medi, ‘bomber wll succeed the Backie about the urn of the century We futher project that anew ah TD bomber begin to replace strategic aviation Fencer ert in the mid-1908, +The Fencor probably will continue to rplace les ‘eapable eter-bombers in font aviation ground attack unit int the eaty to mid-1990. We et tate that the Soviets wil develop a aew fg bomber around the ten ofthe century. This azcratt ‘old roby hives uti vn improve its survivability, and be equipped with advanced navigation and weapons delivery avionics.16. (Continued) + The Mati high-altitude reconnaissance arerat is expected to enter service in the early 19906, The Soviets are also augmeating thir arial resonnas Ssance capability by flding a fail f drones, inctuding the soon-o-befelded DR-X-4 + The Hind continues 10 be the workhorse of the Soviet stack helioptr fore, and variant with ‘improve capabilities continue wo replace alee mod cls, Two new armed tlicopters, the Hokum and. Havoe may begin deployment in the early 1990s Developmental programs are underway fr & medi umtrotr and a heayy-tiltrotor helicopter, but they are unlikely tobe felded in significant numn- bers doting the period of this Estimate. + Anew V/STOL aircrafts underdevelopment, and ‘may enter sevice with the Svit ar forces. The Soviets ate alse developing Stealth aceraf includ ing bomber and a fighter-bomber, rere ‘The Soviet strategic bomber fore is curently under ving ils second reorganization ofthis decade. While ‘we do not yet have enough evidence to firmly deter tine the intent or operational sgaifcaceof the Tatst reorganization it appears designe to give the Soviets greater fexiiity in allocating heavy bombers between theater and intercontinental missions fenrn) Soviet Homeland Air Defense Forces ‘The Soviets are continuing to modernize their State- aie Air Defense Fore including the ar surveillance ‘etwork, the iatrcepor force, and the surface missile (SAM) force, This efor, with is emphasis on systems with good capabilities against low-alitude targets, appears tobe Toeused on two min objectives the development of a long-range capably to shoot, ‘ven crite mise earirs before they can eelease their weapons, and the development of ¢terinel defense to intercentpenctrators thst make it through the outer barrier. In addition to improving the ean Diltis oftheir curtent ntercepor force, we expect the Soviets to deploy fllow-ons tothe Fulcrum, Flanker, and Foxhound over the next 10 1015 years, Performance improvements onthe fllowons wil include a radar capable of tacking multiple targets swith small radar crass sections in lookdown opera ‘ions, beter manewerability, and—in the Foxhound u 284 followon-—a capability to intercept crise missile ‘arryitesteraft before they can launch thee mis ‘les, The SA-10 system, including ture modifica tions, will dominate strategic SAM force ‘modernization through te next 10 yeas. An SA-S followon is projected to begin deployment in te 1990s but we are unsure whether it wll be a modi cation ora new desien, tn addition, the Soviets will, ‘develp one or more lasers with an air defense pplication, including those capable of causing struc tural damage and damage to electro-optical sensors deaeuch The Soviets have reorganized their Swrateic Ale Deetse Force in the peripheral seas ofthe USSR. by pivng them back tothe national air defense systen, This probably was broventaboet by national sir defen authorities to ensure that they contaled the forces required for territorial defense, and perhaps sso to improve the responsiveness of Soviet ar de Fenses a peacatime airspace Velatons ewer” [Naval Forces. Although we do not know how the personnel and budget cuts announced by Gorbachev wil ke apportioned among the fie servis, these ‘eduction could have a significant eet on the Soviet Navy’ size and ix of forces. The Navy may tbe tying ily 10 met some of its personnel and ‘overall budget eduetions by further reducing ‘operational tempo and retiring oder combatants, sd the Sovote have already accelerated the rate at which they sre serapping older surface combatants and submarines. Retirements, however, wil have no i pct onthe Navy's need to eu procurement expend tures, and sme major rogram may have tobe reduced, steiched out over Hime, or eliminated alo- tether. Surface combatants at ie 1 take the Target share of “hardware” cuts because of the teaitonal Soviet bias in favor of submarines and the fact tat surface combatants are the most manpower Jnterive naval systems, Despite such reduction, we expat tose the Soviet continue to make qualitative {improvements in their Navy tha focus ois mort. important sion ates, femewer16. (Continued) We se n significant opeatanal bane in Soviet aval support for lad TMOs. We anticipate the dow Continuation of several naval organizational and ‘weapon trends tha should provide land theater ca rmnnders with more capable flores for combines operations asa major wartime ask ofthe Soviet, Navy. Chie among these ae + Integration ofthe newly developed SS-N-21 lng range land-ttacksuceaesubmarnelaunched cruise mis ia theater clear srk plans. The hiehsaltude SS-NX-24 ne in development and itil ao have a theater mission when iis intaly Aeplyed inthe early 19%, + Continuing efforts co develop moe eetire sea bore ir defenses agaist enemy aircraft ames with erlaunched erulse miles or improved aitto turface mses + Continued gradual replacement of oder naval ‘Tul Badgers with Tu-22M Backlre-C bombers, ving Soviet naval aviation greater potential fi Theater maritime seks 4e-0-RC) [Non-Sevet Warste Pact Forces Following the Soviets’ ead, and undoubtely with Moscow's approval. ll non Soviet Warsaw Pact (SWE) counties, excep Romania, announced free snd defense spending rodocons in January 1989. As inthe Soviet case, there is a mintre of economic Pulitcal nd miiary considerations to these de Sons. Nevertheless, we judge that weaknesses ie NSWP economies constituted the primary motivation for their dein eat ores and dlense spending The reductions, however, do not represent 25 Sha a departure in force and spending trends a represented bythe Soviet cuts. NSWP mltary procurement ‘began lowing inthe mi 9705, ani hs roped Sipnieany since the early 1980s. NSWP force size ‘ns been large state since the 1970, For these reasons, we had projected force gromth and sw rate of modernization even before the euts were Anmounced. rer) [NSWP force cts range beeen Sand 20 percent of carenlyasesed force levels and me jug tat ‘tally ll equipment ets wll be taken is older ‘ezuipmen hat dominates the NSWP inventory (86 the table on page 5), While considerable uncertainty ‘exists rerarding the indvidval impact of delense Spending and procurement cuts onthe ard forces! quisition of newer equipment, we project that rates ‘of modernization wil ow beyond tec alread ara al pce. This may be offset somewhat by the reduced Size ofthe NSWP forces and the elimination of he dest equipment in their inventories. me} [NSW countries maintain important defense indus- ‘wes, and hoe tle i weapons production has ceased substantially. They now account for about fone-fith of otal Pact lod arms production (a mch yaltboagh the ‘uipment they proce tends o be relatively less Sopistiated and exer to manuetue than spters Simultaneously in production in Soviet plants. We bie tht, over the nex decade, the Soviet expect [NSWP industy to relieve Soviet industry of wore af the burden of equipping NSWP forces while provide tng increated suppt forthe modernization of Soviet. industry. see We foresee moest improvements ia NSWP forces uring the projections period that, while isuiient to else the modernization gap beeen thi oees tnd Soviet force standards in Eastern Europe, wll table them toll important roles in Warsaw Pact laa for war agaist NATO. We project NSWP forces will sradually modernize thei equipment and reorgunie along Soviet ines through the end of hs + Ground force equipment moderszation wl eonsist, primaniy of 72 series tank, self propelled wl ley, surface-to-air mises, nd newer info Aahiing veils. Major eestruturing may occur in ‘the ground forces eich could ol the Hines adopted by the Hungarian ground force + NSWP airforce modernization wil be» eraduat process, The ground attack replacement the Fi ter, while the air defense ores wil be improved through the felding ofthe Fler 2 285,16. (Continued) + The NSWP countries with naval ores do not sppear willing 0 able to sigaicanly increase their ‘aval expenditures. Over the longterm, oer and Tes capable weapon systems in the inventories of the [NSWP navies gradually wil be replaced by more ‘capable systems, though on 2 es than -fr-1 Basis due wo budge constraints. ase ‘The Soviets almost certainly are resigned to accept [NSWP force inadequacies, and me judge that they wil contin to tolerate such deficiencies while in {ng that the most glaring faults be recifed, The Soviets almost certaily are aware of the operational ‘rice they wil pay if their NSWP alles are notable to perform tei assigned missions alongside Soviet forces. The impact of these force defences on ‘operational planting will became moe apparent to the Soviets after thei force euctons in Cental Burope and the western USSR are competed. (n ener, we forecart thatthe uneasy, and at Genes ‘etined; relationship that exists between th Soviets and thei ales regarding free modecnization and Teorganiation wll emain forthe foreseeable future frst) Soviet Policy Toward NATO. The major obeetive of Soviet poizy toward NATO is to reduce European goveramental and popula sup ot for increased defense spending that woul sup- port NATO's force modernization program. I this poi is succesful it would reduce intereal Soviet Perceptions ofthe NATO threat, thereby enabling Gorbachev to make major shits of resoures fmt the ‘Selene othe etl sector without Being accused of reducing Warsaw Pact security. {sara Soviet and Warsaw Pact policy toward NATO forthe forezeablefture wil key fll two interrelated ‘racks First, the Pact wil engage the Westin arms ‘contol negotiations tall evel, Second, wl pursue fan aggresive couse of public dipiomacy, ative mes ‘res, and unilateral initiatives timed at intvencing [NATO governments an electorates to reduce defense spending and slow NATO modernitation. Warsaw Pact public diplomacy will abo exsotpopuatoppos: tion in Western Europ o current NATO puto ‘country basing polices and publicly burdensome NATO military waning programs. 13 286 ‘Warsaw Pact foreign policy ove the peta ofthis Estimate can also be expeced to support another Soviet objective vis-a-vis NATO: the weakening ofthe ‘poston. of the Unite States and Canada within the ‘North Atlantic Alliance tn adn to reducing the ‘apparent threat from the Soviet Union in the eyes of ‘West Europeans—thus reducing the need for [NATO's continued dependence on the United States—the Soviets will eenurageotber NATO ‘members to deal ietly wit the Soviet Union ‘Warsaw Pact foreign policy wil als complicate NATO's efforts to reach agreement om position for the Conventional Stability Talks (CST. An apparent ly acecnmodatine Soviet seewity policy wil unde. ‘ine bugh Wester barpaning postions inthe CST a ncease pressure on the NATO ales to meet Soviet negotiating concerns, sch as NATO ground tack ireraft and forward based Systems deere A criti sue confronting NATO over the next ‘decade i 10 entify, interpret, and react cotetly 12 ‘evclonnets in Warsaw Pact general pupae forces [AS deuision onthe size and eompeston of Pact future general purpose frees become apparent, [NATO will have sot ou the eal from the declared changes in Warsaw Pact capabilites and intetions. Furthermoce, NATO will ave to accomplish this in ‘an emiroament of inereasng pu skepticism about "he Warsaw Pact “thvea™ and saging suppor for NATO defers spending. feweney [Even ander the mot favorable conditions of Bast- West relations over the course of tht Estima NATO can expect to face « formidable Pact Fores We ee that military fres will ema, the USSR's perspective the primary bass oft superpower stats. Thus, despite significant shifts of fesoutces from the defense sector, the Soviet Union wil catinue to plan fr and ives heavily in its enerl purpose lores wile seeking 1 Build & more apatl economy to underin Soviet military eapabi- Vis inthe fture. tere Alteratve Judgment. The Dicestr, Defense Intell fence Ageoc, while recognizing the significance of {he ongoing changes inthe Seviet Union, believes the16. (Continued) likelitood of larg usilteral reductions in military expenditures beyond those alteady proclaimed by Soviet leaders isnt as high as implied by the ‘majority view inthe Estimate, particulaey for the longer tem. Notwithstanding the potest ipoe- tance of new dereloprests in Soviet mltary policies liscused i this Estimate, the Director, DIA, believes that present evidence and Future usceraites make the elements of continuity in Soviet military plicy 35 Important ab the changes for US ration security and defense planing. enewey 287