6. NIE 11-18-91, June 1991, Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures National inteligence Estimate ‘etn ets Beet ies Soest, wera broncos —Seoret- ysirze91 bir cor ALS 126. (Continued) _ — @ eee LY NIE 11-18-91 Implications of Alternative Soviet Futuresie Information avalable 38 of 27 June 199 was used inthe preparation of thi Nation ieligance Estimate The fowig incligencs organizations paripated in tno praparaton of tis Esa: ‘The Central ieligence Agency ‘Tho Detenseiligonce Agency The National Secunty Agency ‘The Bureau ot etligence and Research, Deparment of Stae ‘The Ofice of Ietigance Supe, Departmantof the Treasury ‘The itaagance Dvion, Federal Bureau of lwestigation abo panicipatng ‘The Ofico ofthe Daputy Chit o ta for Inttigen Department ofthe Army ‘Tho Ofte of tha Director of Nav ntligence, Department ofthe Navy The Ofice othe Assistant Chit of Saf, Intaligence, Deparment ft A Force The Dircter of Itetigence, Headquarters, Marine Comps ‘this Estimate was aggroved for publication by the ‘Nationa ForognInsigence Board Secret 1226. (Continued) Figure? Seenaris forthe USSR (Over the Nex Five Years Spe Cane rapmentaon Nees irate ten ta geome ‘Scene tla et years ‘nen pac with eat eee ‘Svc nd Cet Aan cor te: ele ial owe ‘ao pte en USS ai te, Gon, Area and Molin become independ eon of a oblong ay toward mst Generates 0 pope wil bly tse dls may, soa ses and CPSU pone ar Democrat lr and opubleinceentese ve aed zoey’ downer seats ‘Sime everest poplar wl es ne atocian(Continued) Key Judgments Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures (of ‘The USSR is in the midst ofa revolution that probably wll sweep the Communist Party from power and reshape the country within the ve-year time frame ofthis Estimate, The outcome of this evolution will be affected by a numberof factors, including the following A sharply declining economy and standard of living that will get worse forthe next few years no matter what e2onomiec program is adopted + The diffculties in implementing a market reform program and susti ing it aginst a likely popular becklash + Continued devolution of power to republic and local governments at the expense ofthe central goverament «The rising claim of nationalism on defining the state and legitimizing its policies + The increasing iniportance of pcpular expectations and aspirations, end the governments abilities to mest them, on a wide range of issues Including living standards and personal Treedom. soar [No one can know what the duratin or theultimate outeome of the ‘evolution will be—paricularly ir a soeiety where repression and central- iaed control have been the rule, andthe culture has been resistant to ‘change, but where evenly, democratic aspirations appear to have become widespread. (C#) (Of the many conceivable outcomes, we believe four scenarios span the ‘ange of possiblities: continuation ofthe curcent “chronic crisis” with no political resolution; a relatively peaceful “system change” into a smaller, ‘more pluralistic and voluntary union in whieh the central government relinguishes substantial power; a chaotic and violent “fragmentation” of the country resulting in many new states with widely varying political and ‘economic systems; and a “regression” through renewed repression into an ‘authoritarian state run by 2 combination of hardliners in the military, security services, and Communist Party (see igure 1)! omy "The aprosh taken by he Inteligence scenario we we wo deseibe these otcomes CCommsntyin his Estimate tinted 10 every arto four ted ia NIE Gein spcatie,an ie pete, 1.50 dma Nove 1990, ‘Garin previ esinteron polis doe. The Depo CsI he USSR: Pr Cente USSR. Wears on uct pss forthe Nex Year, ey are mea 12 [Tpouile wtb thir petons Seine” ede to rake he farboth he USSR and be Wet rater cons between them cla. The eal i than on curent developmens Aiboughthe ewan to be math more complied. et ii Seorot- tae 1246. (Continued) emmy 84 reso aj peu woe BO pened 00H, oma wnsea | reeespuy vou ne yenou sop ed oronuives | numa winery yay uneanaot imam ing Sno i ox | Pan 0 ony suswsaite o) 220¥ ‘uz anos ue Ave re aye mg Sena 25 "Nal ion pana tng suormatee 9 pee sy poaunw vos Sie tas epee sos we 01 08 IPO sumed cot evn SER ‘oyjod wasoyoo ons | _pront ov 380 pom na EM “seo 995 PINON, = = ee 1256. (Continued) ‘This Estimate’ focus is onthe consent and implications rather than on the telative probabilities of such seenasios. The USSR could pass through any ‘orall ofthese scenarios during the next five years. Nevertheles, we Believe ‘that, on the basis of curent trends and our assesment of the itil variables—pertiularly the Bleak prospects forthe evonomy-—the country ‘is much more likely tobe in a “system change” or “fragmentation” scenario five years from now than io remain where i is today in “chronic ‘its.” In our view, an attempt toimpote the hardline regime of the “repression” soenario becomes mere likely a the country verges on “system change” or “fragmentation,” bu, of the four scenario, this the leas likely tobe a lasting outoome In any event, we belive thatthe USSR nits present form wil ot exist five years from now. doer ‘There willbe profound effects onthe geopolitical balance in Eurasia whatever the outcome. “System change," the most favorable scenario for the USSR and the West, would leave the USSR somewhat smaller thn it istoday and stl a nuclear superpewer, but this Slavie-Central Asian state would have adopted a political anc economic system much more conducive to close tiesto the West. Even s, the dificulties associated with such a ransformation over the longer tem may be too heavy a burden for the ‘government and population to bear. em) ‘The geopolitical shift would be mest drastic in “fragmentation” scenario, where the country broke apart in chaotic fashion. Some form of Russian or Rusian-dominated state would eventually emerge out ofthe chaos, but for a good many years it would be afar less infiuential actor on the world scene than today’s Soviet Union, and it would be bordered by ‘many now countries of varying stbility and military strength, Lo} ‘The ability of Western governmerts to influence the course of evens inside the USSR is likely to grow in the “chronic criss” and “system change” scenaroe and in the aftermath ofa “fragmentation” scenario: + The county's crumbling evonomy wil increase the lkelbood that any government, except one led by hardliners, wll tur tothe West for aid And accept some degre of economic and political conditionality in ‘eur, The need for such aid would give most national and republic leaders an incentive to avoid repressive measures. + Even though the upper limits of what the West might realistically offer would fll far short of the coun:ry’stoal capital needs, such ad could play an important role in movirg the country toward “system change”; ‘that is, the transition toward a market economy and a more pluralistic paliial system, 1266. (Continued) + Western assistance could play an important roe in the ney indepen dent Batic eepublics, simply because oftheir much smaller size. On the other hand, loal and regional instabilities in the Transcaueasvs and Central Asia ae likely to limi: Western inclination to provide assistance to these republics (se) With the exception ofthe “system change” scenario, the West would face major obstacles in actualy exerting influence. In a “chronic erss” scenario, which the USSR isin oday, aid for political and economic feform would be hard to channe! into projects that would eof long-term growth and could get caught ina stugele for power between the center land the republics. In this, and perticularly in the “ragmentation” scenario, the gathering poiial and economic disarray would make it more dificult to determine whom to ai, how o get it to them, and how to follow up to censure the aided its intended effect. eae The afterefects of increased instability or repression would also pose challenges tothe Wes: + The East Europeans, the Turks, andthe Nordic countries would turn to the United States and other major Western powers for asistance in coping with refugees, instabilly on thei borders, ora military-ted ‘government in Moscow. + Ina “fragmentation” scenario, various Factions or republics could gain acces to and contrl of nuclear weapons and theaten to use them against interna rivals or other counties. Although any Wester involse- ‘ment would depend on a numberof variables, timely Wester offers of assistance in securing and/or disposing of such weapons could have pivotal effect + Seizure of control by hardliners in a “regression” scenario would lead to an increase in East-West tensions, a greatly diminished interest in arms control and other negotiation, anda slowing inthe reduction in the ‘apabilies ofthe Soviet miliary + Violence at home could spread to the Soviet troops that are due in Germany until the end of 1994. ery 1276. (Continued) Nconeaccousmucr Contents Sinem Change Inplcaton fore USSR Ilias fr the We Regression ________Implications for the USSR, plications for the West_ Fragmentation Implications for the USSR. oe TT tieatins for the West 1286 (Continued) Discussion ‘Chronic Crise io atures a cominvaton of the curent nether an entire calls othe sytem nor tial progress toward ressutonof the count problems, Gorbchev igh manage © hang on power ina weakened central government because either the left or the ght would have enough strength to cust him, bt, ven if be eft the scene, teiter side woald gun the upper had. The country {oe from one eystem-treatening crt 1 another. Desote the tural, much backtrackig, and politcal stalemate atthe to, the trend i toward more auton my forthe republics and a marketed econo but ina bottom-up and relatively chasic way. The ‘command economy verges on breakdown but some how manages to limp along = mpleations fr the USSR ‘The caren iuatin inthe USSR is bet described ‘by this soenario. This is highly unsuble scenario. ‘Although there would be some comimied movement ‘toward plural system, a voluntary union, and 2 ‘marke economy, gveramestal authety would ‘reaken, andthe potential or major pula upheay- sls would grow. Is unlikely this seenatio could prevail forthe five eas of this tite deed, {tanto o one af he ober three scenarion af “aptem change,” “fragmentation,” “regression” is ikl eater rather than ater in his period foe Gorbache remained in ofc, he vould become les and less powerful. Neither the le nor therght ‘would preva, but both would remain strong enough {o pote a serious treat to Gorbchev and to each ter. The potential for large-scale ietervention into ult by the security vervies and te miltary would tine to hang oer the country. Although less Wkly this scenario oul stil ext Gorbacher i removed constutionally, decides on his own to step down, or des «natural death, Whoerer in charge, the central gorerament would conte t lose authar- ‘1ysalttough without Gobacher this would ocar more quickly Jeaer 129 “Indicators af “Clronte Crile” + Beonomy continues to deterlrae, but com ‘mand economy doesnot collapse. + Cantrrepbiesdscusions on economic ‘ablzationreform pan drag out without ‘resoltion (or they agre and the plo falls ener pursuesinefecie ad hoe police; ‘epubles ry 16 implement india eco- rome rosrams. * Central government remains vabe but power ‘steadily erodes. : ‘. + Contrrepbles unable to resolve ey der: ences concerning power fnatonel andr ‘buble governments. + Pola polarization grows, but ther the tor lef are strong enough to become omina. z + Yolence continues but a relatively low lvls: period incidents of recon represion + Maltary and security services act more inde. ‘pendently but shrink from a coup Lowe “The republics would gutber a good deal of the author ity the center ot but stil would not be abl to govern effectively. None woud be ful independent, but ‘many-—the Balti tates, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldora—ould remain tethered tothe union only by the continued presence of Soviet troops andthe ‘vestiges ofthe central command economy. Russa ‘ould gain aeatr contol over ite own a6. (Continued) ‘and increased influence with other republics, butt ‘would not yet be tong enough to transform the ‘enter tots king o assume all of the central government's former authority within the RSFSR. ‘Yettsins strennthin Rusi andthe USSR would rom, at leat inal, but he would be hamstrung by the centers continuing ability to limit the RSFSR's ‘oononic sovereignty, by infighting within his own amp abettod by the KGB), and by demands of non Russans in the republic for greater autonomy or Independence. ‘With no reasaton of the centerrepubllc relationship, ‘there would be no hope of stabilizing or reversing the ‘economic lide, GNP would drop dramatically, and ‘the country would face worsening shortages of indus- teal materials consumer goods, and food. Inflation snd unemployment would skyrocket; strikes would proliferate. Signfcant human suering would de- ‘velop in some areas. Foreign eedits woud dry up as ‘the county filed to meet debt service payments; ‘Western companics—scared off by the growing poli- ‘al and eoonomicchans—would take their business ‘elsewhere. Nevertheless, the economy would avoid ‘olapse trough a major expansion of independent Arrangements and barter Gals hat republics, enter is, and individuals made with each otber. ‘The eoonomiedssray and growing republic auton ‘ay would accelerate the tend toward reduced mii- ‘ay capable. The military leadership woul ry to ensue thatthe drop in allocations othe military was ‘nt dramatic, but the tend woud stl be decidedly downward becuse the military eeaaomy would not be {insulted from tho sceleratingdetine, The republic’ ‘quest for greater autonomy or independence would ‘exacerbate the Soviet armed forces’ manpower and ‘morale problems, Modernization of Moscow's state- ‘le forces would continue within te iis of a START teay, bot even these forces would increas. ingly be affected by the economy's dismal pecform- ‘tmpiatons fr the West In this scenario, the ability to conduct foreign policy ‘by whocrer leads the central Soviet government would ‘be constrained bythe trol at home. Western governments would find Gorbachev oF a suecesor not ‘aly preoccupied by the domestic crisis bt also les ‘nd es able to ensure tht the USSR is capable of falling the foreign commitments it makes. Never- theless, any Soviet regime inthis cenria probably ‘would ail seck accomodation ona range of interne tional issues and almost certainly would want avoid confontation, The Soviets would be Hkely to continue: * Deepening the growing coaoaic and politcal rela- \nthip with the United States, Western Europe, 4, oa lesser extent, Japan. + Negotiating ongoing td new ans contzol agreements, * Geert in cating ew Earn scrty + Reducing miltary and eeomic commitments, while expanding cooperation withthe Unitd States, fa the Thed Wodd. Whatever the Soviet Goverumen’sItentfon, the zonamy’s rapidly decreasing ably to support smasve military, the likely increased involvement of the Soviet army in quelng domestic unrest, and the -goteral lack of cohesion within the country would seriously limit the USSR’s capably to threaten its rlghbors or the West. The Soviet Union would almost certainly comples is withdrawal of forces {tom Eastern Europe, possibly more quickly than schedaled. The leadership would have every incetive to adhere tothe terms ofthe CFE and START. ‘weaties and probably would sek furtber arma redue- ‘ton to igen the military burden onthe economy. In this cenari, Soviet as well as republic intern ia ‘Western economic invaremeat would continue to expand rapidly The deteriorating economy woul ensure that the central government would continue to seek aces to Western economic institutions and be ‘on the Were doostep for los, credits, and genera 1306. (Continued) Special rquet for consultations, techs asi: snc, emergency ad, and tet fom repubi nd Tocal government are ily to incase. Without lta reoltion ofthe enailt over who own ‘scue=s and contrals foreign ade, both US govern ‘mental and private business relations with te USSR. fod its epubis wl be complicated and harder sisal, Thve direct Western contact withthe pubis disapproved of by Moscow woul be perceive 131 ss ntererene and could result in attempts bythe ‘tral goverment to lock Westra sistance to republics and loalies foe System Change This seenari assumes that the extng politcal ss tem replace with eaively litle violence. This, cecrs with te od regime's dsaution a a result of ‘public or popula pesure—as in Czchonloraia in 1989—or trough agreement between the center and the republics. In either cae, ose federation ‘anfederation ofthe Slavic tnd Centr Asian copa lis emerges, end independence i granted to those republics secking it The politcal aod eomomi sye- tems that emerge inthe core Stavc-Ceatrl Asan Sate and the independent sate vary widely ere Inplctons forthe USSR. The evel of isablity in thi scenario wold depend nthe manner in wich the ester wae changed eit felipe due wo internal pressure, the istblty inal woul be greater new governing mechanisms ‘woul bve tobe created inthe mito revolution, sd many elements ofthe old stem —ile dete. ‘two remun capable and desirous of complet ing the transion toa new system. A voluntary shine af power by the center woud be mere stable, although vea in hs variant, the new systems that ‘emerged fom wht was the USSR would encounter problems much more serous than thse now being perience by pat-Communs regimes ia Eastern Barone low’ ‘The newly transformed ore state hat emery inthis scenario ould rete! the poll and economic trends in Rusia and, to lesser extent in the Usaine As suc, i-~partclerl is Save portion would bave at least inl, much more pluralistic political nel economic system than ever before. Te Would haves populsely eased parliamentary govern ‘ent with numerous pital partes While the rae of the sate would remain large, its authority would Aepend much more than heretofore oa popular ace tance. The government epee for usa tights,6. (Continued) Figures ‘Sytem Change: Loose Federation/Confederation ‘With Some Independent States acer would start to resemble that of Western governments, ‘The Central Asan regions, on the other hand, would remain basically authoritarian and have poor human, rights records. fer ‘The republics would have substantial autonomy, with the leading—though even here not forean, defense, fscal/monetary, ‘communication transportation policies. The presidency ofthe new union would have less scope and bea les powpful office than itis today. Tere would tbe strong push toward a market economy, although the central and republic governments would continue torn a lerge portion of major industry, and reforms vould be implemented nvealy in the republics, Progress would be much moe gradual andthe social pain much greater than has ben the cave in Poland. fem Russia's infuene in the new union could become a source of tension. Its leadership, most likely under ‘Yet'sin, would have played the leading rle in ereat- ing the new system giving greater power to the 1326. (Continued) Tadicators ef “Syriom Change” + Cemer/repubics sign and bein implementa- tion af won treaty and new constitution ‘devon sgnlican power 0 republes. ++ Repulies assume control oftheir economic and pola! lives undertake substan ‘eps toward market reform. (Ct) Or, alternatively: + Large-scale public proves, labor wares, and ‘republepresture couse the central gover ‘ment to collapse. + Reformersrepublesgve up hope of reaching replated setement with the center and Conclude lateral and muller agree- ents reserving mast powers o themselves and defining areas ofthe center's limited ‘author. (2x0) Individual epublis. Yet Russia would ‘more powerful primus intr pare than because of Yel’ prestige and bonus of the reeoures it would conto groving sense of, ‘atonal identity andthe pasbe emergence of "Russia rt” atte could aio undermine the new susion. Ukranian nationalism could alo lead this ‘republic to gots own way with similar effect esey= 'A Slavi-Central Asan state would bave most f the military potential tat the USSR bas today, although 1 probably wuld choose wo feld smaller and more ‘Slave armed forces. It would continue to be a nuclear superpower, bat its conventional forces would be ‘much reduced and ther posture largely defensive. The ‘market reforms that such a sate would underiake, Ihowere, would overtime (bt notin the Bve-ea?| time Fame of this Estimate give ita more eelinble ‘ecopomic base for developing miliary techanogies and medernizng the lity, shoul its leadership ‘nd people decide on such a couse. 133 ‘The biggest problem forthe six repables that would form independent states woud be economic because of thee meager ndustal and resource bases and ‘heir small populations. Most would move quickly toward market economies, But how well thee econo- ‘mes functioned would also depend heavily on the degre to which they cooperated with the Slave-Cen- ‘Wal Asian state, each other, ad hee other nighbors ‘The Bate states would be parliamentary democra- cle; the eter three—wle democratic in form— probably would tend more toward authoritarian state. fowrr| ‘The internal growing pains that the Savie-Central ‘Asan sate ab the oer experience would cami- ‘ate relations among them. Demaating the new borders alone would be enough o generate tensions. ‘The mos serious problems—which would ental some violence—would most likely be between Armenia and ‘Azerbaijan, and between the new union, on the one band, and Georgia and Moldova onthe oterokewer ‘Such problem among and inside the new egies ‘that emerged in "system change” could over the Tanger ran become serioo enotgh cause such a regime fall Reestablshment ofthe old Communist ‘order woald not ocar, but the military and searity services might beable resume contol (a inthe “reresion” scenario) or chaos and wideseale lolence could enue (inthe “fragmentation” ‘eenara) ue (othe fare of plies! and ezonomie felorm toner Implications for the West Despite the uncertainties such tensions among the forme components of the USSR woul create for the ‘West, this would be far and away the most favorable ‘outcome for Western countries. The Slavic-Central ‘Aslan cote state woud be sal ss larly powerful much more pluralistic, nd almost certainly ‘more deious of cloe relations withthe West han ‘vas the USSR. Especially inthe period fllowing its ‘eaton i would seck extensive Western involvement in developing ite politcal end, particularly, economic(Continued) structures. This probably would pve the West unpec- ‘dented opportunites to shape development ofthe new stat, but it woud also bing with i equests for far mare substantial economic id than Western countries would be wiling to provide. The West would face very hard choies in aportioring miedo omic assistance among the Siavie-Central Asian stat, the other newly independent states, and the democracies of Bastern Europe eet ‘The Slvie-Pentral Asian sat, while heavily Focused during the tne frame of this Estimate on creating 2 new sgstem at home, would sil bean important, aropean economic and security structres, posing dilemmas for Western governments. East European states already sek membership in these institutions, and some would worry thatthe new Soviet Union's scseptance int these clubs would diate the meaning {ulnes oftheir membership. On the other hand, East European fears ofa resurgent, militaristic USSR or of iuasive instability there would be substantially ce (ded in such a scenario, dowel ‘The Slavic-Cental Asian core state probably would seek a major expansion of arms control agreements withthe West. Tt would have an econom interest in Catting its military, and—pereeving the United States as a vital souee of asistance—probably would Seek significant reductions in strategie arms. This state Would no forgo nuclear weapons, since they ‘would continue to be important tits security and superpower status, but it probably would be willing to rake reciprocal, and perhaps even radical, ats in numbers of weapons {o-e). ‘The Allis probably woud see less justification for smainaining NATO and a US troop presence onthe Continent the Soviet Union disinteerated es delet fin this scenario. The Europeans would almost ‘xan invite the new states to jin CSCE. The Alles, however, would resist any efforts by these new states to jin NATO. (over Regression “This scenario assumes traditionalist froes aie con: ‘ro in order to break the bac ofthe democratic relorm movement and halt the republics’ move toward sovereanty and independence. Although Gorbachev ‘nul lead such a move, tis more likely he would be ample to go along ot be fored rom office. The Security serves and the military, who spearhead tis course, use force om large scale o reassert central tral. Widespread arrests of lading opponents, Including Yeltsin, occur. The new leaders attempt to 1346. (Continued) reinstate centralized control oer the eonomy, Ale ‘ough this avers ealupe ofthe command exoaamy foram, doe ite to hal the economy's contin Ing sharp decline 4) Implications forth USSR ‘This ceario would iavove a sere of harsh measures that soced in resabishing a measre of ental ‘ono. The ue of fire could proce paileal stably” fora fw years, gem the eeanizationa, weaknes ofthe domosratis forces and the lek of tty among the republiss bent on secession. This use might alo appeal signa portion of the Slavi-Central Asan publics ied of politcal debate nd seeking plea fdr and econo stay. ‘Seek popular support would prove short-lived, be er the new goverment aed to deliver Event Aly renewed political opposition and iil disorder ‘would probably develop) “The new leaders woul find it dita to in poplar legitimey for chee rule. The draconian sep of reintroducing the eommani-adminisrative eonomic ‘stem largely discarded under Gorbachey, woud at ‘able to rebuild the center-republc economic is Asrupted by the independence movement, A works ther eeonomi stats contining to deteriorate, they would become li lucant to engase in passive land civ esistance to the center's powers ion) “The new goverment would alo lack an desloge ‘sito justify ts actions sice Marisae-Lesiism has ben oly discredited, slong with the Commi- nit Party. An ape! to Resian nationalism bythe ‘omeriative leadership would be posible could taketh frm of national salvation sommitee— bat such e step would frtharantagonie the restive ‘epublcs oud provide the bass for an auth. Jan cepa in Resa, however, that flows a fist policy athe expense ofthe rest of the union, on ‘The biggest problem fer the leadership would be ng uioawide conta. The wea force to ald the union together woul most certainly lento ‘open cu confit within several republic, ptcu larly those having ther owe paraitary forces, such “is Geotgia and Aemeaia. Conlin such unreat 135 Indicators of “Regression” + Gorbachey, or successors, ute whatever free necessary Yo mainan the unon + Tratonaliss gale dominance, begin sting political and economic agen. «Regime consors media, suppresses individual Ireedoms;harssesfrress opposition rou + Regime rcserts ental control oer the economy. fewer would severly ax sceurity and miliary forces r= Tenge ont would threaten the interaalcobesion and dicpine ofthe troop, partially i they bad to be used agua Slavie grove deme) “his sconaio could unravel quchy ifthe contr were unable to quash the demeccati esstance, if Yeti or another poplar leader were able o escape the enter’ dragnet and rally popular resistance oi he niltary proved unreliable: Evea 0, reform and e publ eters ght no survive ei a shotaved ‘epresson leaving a politcal vacuum at the eester tod in many cepblice Sach widespread unrest would also exacerbte the ethnic, pita, and generational Sols within te armed forces and security series (omer 1 eeeessan fled, the result probably would be anarchy anda cote dsintegraton ofthe woo; ‘hati the"esementation” sera. In that event. ‘ont replies would break say Tram the center “This breakup ofthe union would mest key be sccomanied by el wars. em} Implications fr the West “This sonar, while let volatile than “frgmenta- tio,” would erate conditions east responsive to ‘Western infvens. The immediate outcome would be «more combative pasture toward the Wes, which the ew leadership would se as opposed tits seizure of Dower and is harsh internal me ‘Sum would uel "henker down6. (Continued) Secret leadership, further straining relations. The regime's probable politcal, exnomic, and military policies ‘would generate renewed concern in the Westover the USSR’ intentions and would frighten the Soviet Union's aeighbors, particularly in Eastern Europe, Such a regime, however, probably woud seek to avoid ‘confrontation wth the West because ofthe frailty of ‘the ateaion within the USSR. dese} ‘The hardin leadership would place arms contol negotiations onthe back burner, and is wilingsess to adhere to existing arms contol agresments—partic larly CFE would be increasingly doubtful as polit cl tensions with the West rose, There probably would bbe a greatly reduced willingness to cooperate withthe Wes in reducing regional tensions, although for cooomic easons the new leadership would be rlue tant to be drawa into foreign adventures. Neverthe- les, the regime would take an aggresive approach to ms sales tothe Third Word, complicating Western ‘efforts at promatingeerional security. 428) Such a regime would adopt a more asertiv attude tomard the counties of Eastern Europe and might ‘threaten to old up any remaining troop withdrawals unless Germany and Poland aceded 10 Soviet secu Fity and economic demands. Given its weakened condition and preoecupation with maintaining in ternal contro, however, a traditionalist regime would imost certainly remove these frees in the end eather an preciitate an Eas Wet ers. €-) “Atthough more confrontation, the reeime would be ‘unable, duet the changed social environment and the weakentd economs, 10 conduct an arms buildup similar tthe Brezhnev ea, eventhough it might place greater priority on heary and defeneindutr, Tt wou assert its rights as « military power, bt its sain focus would be on the USSRY'sintertalpesh- lems. so) _ Fragmentation ‘This scenirio assumes there it no etetive centel government Power resides inthe republics en in fome eases, ven in localities. Republics, alongwith ‘many ofthe ethnically based regions, secede en masse {rom the union. Ethnic and social tensions explode in many areas the security services and malitary are table te maintain ordee. The result i widespretd anarchy nd local evil wars made worse by the proliferation of paramilitary forces and the defection fut from the mitay. Atempts to establish tes among republics prove dificult due wo diferences in pica and economic agendas and the ineffective ‘ontrol a most governments. Many regional and local governments quickly rise and fll. The cllapse ofthe national sommand economy and its supporting ifta- seuctre leads to loeal systems of exchange largely based on barter. tone} Implications forthe USSR. “his scenario mot only would spell th end ofthe USSR ase unitary stat, it would also make it unlikely that the union could reconstitute itself asa federatie, or even a confederation, during the time feameof this Estimate The country’s fagmentation into a numberof nvidia politcal ust, many overtly ex potentially hostile toward one athe, ‘ould increase the likelihood of potonged civil wars, which would further sup the strength of eleady ‘besieged local economies. The econémic chacs wld lead to severe food shortages or even famine in parts ofthe ceuntey de ‘ ‘The power vacuum in Moscow would heighten Dxoy ects fora alitary seizure of power anda sucesion of cours, a senior military commanders tried to bold6. (Continued) Figure 4 ‘The Fragmentation of the Soret Uaton Into a Malltde of States usin Sot Fea Salt Repu | marian Soviet Union tagatber the apy collapsing woion ven if ele men in the malar and acuity services were Ineind to ntrvee in an effort to reaeu the union, ‘they would not be abl to ensre the laylty of any ofthe individual uni. Widespread defections and ‘muta woald make large-scale we of force to ‘table the situation inpntibe. There would be ‘ey rel dange that itary and security force units ‘would defect tothe ener ofthe republics, provide Jat rudy pool of men and ums with which 0 137 rvecute coc. aint ober republics ordi ‘Mectd clement within the republes, Some o thee once oud abo pose threat tothe leadership of the saw independent repablistexe- ‘puting the ld system back together again, bt new6. (Continued) Tndictor of “Pragmeatation” — + Cooperation beeween center and mort repu- lis ceases epublislnare center's dires- tied Inluding as military consription. + Contraland republic rovermmentsInreas- Inaly unable control Wolent protests over deteriorating economic and pltclcondi- ont but oppotion unable 10 nl, coord- rate ations. + tnterrepublic tes dvindle sharply epublles make polite, econamie, and territorial demands on one another. + Command economy collapses; attempts by republls and localities 0 establish alter {ive economic sptems fail: economlecondi- ons deteriorate sharply. + Miltary discipline Bains to uncavel + Ethie and labor disturbances spread rapidly ent) tempts at forging coperation among some ofthe ‘peoples of the former Soviet Union would be made ‘ssa would be the key. The establishment of strong snd effective leadership ia the Russian Republic could Stablize the politiea! and economic situation in telatvly short peiod (perhaps several years) depend ing onthe police i adopted sod is ables to tstablish economic tes moter republics and coun tees, Such a development would alo depend onthe Russian leadesho' ably to exerise contro ver is cn disafected etic gros, as well as its ability 10 {ain command of what remns of the armed forces. ‘An economically and plially viable Russia would ‘exercise a strong infuence on neighboring peoples stil ‘wresting with the eet ofthe calls othe USSR. Jone) Implications fr the West ‘This scenario is potently the most dangerous fo the ‘Wer because ofthe chs ard unpredictability of cents. Although the USSR would disappear a chesve military power, the prospects of mclear and later weapons of mass detection fling into the hands of some republics, mutiaous troops, o adial soups would pose a new se of risks. There would be ‘heightened ik of threatened or acidental use of Such Weapons inside—and much ls likly, outside— the Soviet Union, There woul also bea greater hance for nuclear material nd expertise nding their way to foreign states seking to develop sucess weapons 138(Continued) Wiese civil cont or war witht and between republics woald sl pse major dangers forthe West. Canc within the former terior ofthe USSR would have the poteata for sping ars borers, particularly in central and southern Euope and Southwest Asia, Western countries Would have to ‘sigh the mers of recognizing new governments ‘breakaway republics ori Rusia sel One o anoth- ofthe caendig actions would be kel appeal tothe West for economic and military aintane, no uti scury guarantees. (ey Beyond he dangers posed to the West bythe interne- cine aie would be the ery ea chaleage of dealing wrth te extreme ceo hardsip, eon fr "ns tel 1 lfc the bulk ofthe former USSR. Massive infra of state and capital would limos cet bo required lei sulering, but the ack of eel goverament or perhaps ven republic governments, capable of dieting the ‘of economic aid~as wll as ongoing volence—would ederine the elfetvenes of any eft. The West ‘rl alto be confronted withthe pose of masie umber of refugees fering the dsr, which ould 139 esate countries bordering the USSR. Despite ‘ese problems, Wester asstance probably wold be evil to the ability of the varius republics an ‘egions to move beyond the dificult associated ‘wth is senario wo more sable pla and soo omic tems “This scenario would alsa make any coherent Soiet ‘oeeignplicy extremely unlely. There would be no ‘cemealauthority i Moscow to concider conta egsations implement accords already reached, ot to ensue the completion of toa withdrawals fom Central Europe, Moreover, ina situation of anarchy sod el wars inthe USSR, Soviet forces remaining inthe region would ot bea militry threat bt woakd seat serious prblens fo heir oss should they ‘ef epatritans widespread harder among thee ‘Woops would be sy fet)