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    Nie1112 9 88

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    of 28
    8. NIE 11/12-9-88, May 1988, Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev Director of Secrets Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev ‘atonal TeteigenceFstinate Secret ane 1st 8. (Continued) NIE 11/12-9-88 SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE UNDER GORBACHEV (e-F]— cman au of 35 108 wa Aecroved by the Nt Foc Intellrce doh 152 8. (Continued) -seeter NOEGRRHOEONTERTT CONTENTS: Page KEY JUDGMENTS. 1 DISCUSSION. 5 Eastern Europe in the Mid-1080s. 5 ‘Economies in Decline 5 Aging Leaderships 6 Challenges to Soviet Authority 6 Gorbachev's Policies Toward Eastern Europe. 6 Foreign and Security Policy Coordination 7 Eonomie Pressures 8 Succession Dilemmas. 8 Outlook: Growing Diversity, Sharper Confit uw Growing Diversity n Strained Economie Relations. 18 Succession Scenarios, roe MA Sharper Confit : 15 Potential Challenges to Soviet Control. 15 Popular Upheaval 15 Sweeping Reform, 1 Conservative Backlash : 17 Prospects and Variations 18 Implications for the United States. : 18 ANNEX: KEY SOVIET OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR EASTERN EUROPE. 8 e ssscest 153 8. (Continued) KEY JUDGMENTS General Secretary Gorbachev's policies have increased the poten tial for instability in Eastern Europe. But they have also expanded the scope for diversity and experimentation, affording new posibilities for ‘evolutionary reform in the region. Gorbachev bas set an ambitions agenda for Eastern Europe. His aims are to secure East European support for the Soviet molernization drive, promote broader Soviet foreign policy objectives through closer ‘Warsaw Pact coordination, and stimulate a deeper process cf economic ‘and politcal regeneration in the region. Aware ofthe region’ diversity, hae has set general guidelines for reform rather than detailed plans. But he faces East European realities—severe economic problems, aging Teaderships, and mounting social discontent—that conflict with Soviet objectives Soviet policy under Gorbachev has sought to belance the compet ing objectives of encouraging change and promoting stability. Although Gorbachev has avoided a hish-rsk strategy of forcing change on these fragile political systems, continuing Soviet pressure, as well as the ‘example of the Soviet reform program, has introduced new tensions into the region Growing Diversity, Sharper Confict For the next throe to five years, Eastern Europe's outlook is for rowing diversity—in responding to reform pressures, crafting ap- proaches to the West, and managing relations with Moscow: — Eeonomically, Eastern Europe cannot deliver what Gorbachev wants As the gap between goals and results grows more acute, Gorbachev is likely to exert stronger pressure on his allies to forge closer economic ties, upgrade performance, and imple ‘ment domestic economie reforms. — While the recent leadership change in Hungary probably comes close to Gorbachev's preferences for Eastern Europe, prospec live successions elsewhere are not likely to yield the dynamic, innovative leaders Gorbachev needs to achieve his more ambi- tious goals in the region. Consequently, his pressures for chenge will continue to be aimed at regimes illequipped and, in some cases, unwilling to respond. 154 8. (Continued) sector noromnocontenet “Thus, at best, Gorbachev's approach can achieve only evolutionary proatess toward political rejuvenation and improved economic perfor- mance in Eastern Europe. Continued, and probably heightened, Soviet pressure will lead to sharper conflicts, both within Fast European societies and between Mescow and its alles, Potential Challenges to Soviet Control ross-pressures emanating from Mosoow, coupled with severe economic and political dilemmas in Eastern Europe, could yield mare serious challenges to Soviet interests. Three extreme scenarios are possible: — Popular upheaval in Poland, Romania, or Hungary, involving a broad-based challenge to party supremacy and ultimately to Soviet control —Sweeping reform in Hungary or Poland, going well beyond Gorbachev's agenda and eventually threatening to erode party control Conservative backlash, involving open repudiation of Soviet policies by orthodox leaders in East Germany, Romani, oF elsewhere. ‘Of these, popular upheaval isthe most likely contingeney. Gorba- chev will expoct his allies to act decisively to end any polit for major unrest, Indeed, East European leaders are at least the need for vigilance as Gorbachev is, and they have at their disposal powerful security forces that have proved effective in containing unrest ‘Should events spin out of their control and beyond the limits of Soviet tolerance, the ultimate controlling factor on change in Eastern Europe will be Soviet force: —Gorbachev faces greater constraints than did his predecessors against intervening militarily in Eastern Europe; his foreign policy and arms control agenda, and much of his domestic rogram as well, would be threatened. A Dubeek-like regime would have much greater latitude to pursue reforms now than in 1968, and Soviet intervention to stop it would be more problematic. In extromis, however, there is no reason to doubt his willingness lo intervene to preserve party rule and decisive Soviet influence in the region, 155 8. (Continued) -secner MORORRIOCOMIRAGT Implications for the United States Gorbachev's sanctioning of diversity and experimentation have expanded the limits of the thinkable in Eastern Europe, presenting new ‘opportunities for US and Western policies: —Feonomie dilemmas and high-technclogy requirements will Jend strength to US call for internal reforms of the kind already legitimized by Moscow. Gorbachev's active European policy and the generally more ‘dynamic period of East-West relations will offer new opportuni ties for the West to engage even the more conservative East European regimes At the same time, Gorbachev's policies will complicate the coordi nation of Western policies toward European security. Differing West- cern approaches will make it harder for Westera governments to reach a politcal consensus on dealing with Moscow an¢ its allies, and harder for NATO to maintain a security consensus Gorbachev's policies also call into question some of the assumptions upon which the US policy of differentiation is based, in thatthe twin US ‘soa of diversity and liberalization increasingly collide. Those regimes most at odds with Gorbachey’s approach alo tend to be the most orthodox and repressive, and the reform-minded Hungarians and Poles are now closely attuned to the Soviet line. In practice, however, our ability to influence the grand alternatives—reform or retrenchment, isis or stability—will remain limited; we can at best encourage evolutionary movement toward internal liberalization and greater independence from Soviet tutelage ‘This information ts Secret Nafasne 156 8. (Continued) igure 1 et Forces in Bester Europe otic Soa =. Soviet Union Ace weeny ; t : \ \ 137 8. (Continued) DISCUSSION 1 Not singe te early Khrushchev year have paiey changes the USSR had so profound an impact on Eastern Barone as thse now being pused by General Steelary Mikhall Gorbachev, These new winds blow Ing rom Moscow, a well a serious ltoroalexoomlc snd polial dieemas, have ushered in an era of ‘oniderable unceraint—and potently of sien tant chango—in Eastern Karope. With the npending pang ofa etre geeratin of leaders in the region, Sale plicy over the net tree to five years i ely to be decisive in determining the see and direction of change and, ultimately, the say of the Soviet empire Laser” 2. Por Gotbachey as for he predecesors, the impor: tance of Easter Burope can hardly be exaggerate: it serves ata bu, mltary and Wleclogleal, between the USSR and the West, «base for projecting Soviet ower and infunoe throughout Europe, «condut of ‘Western trade and technology, and key enteral pillar of the Soviet system Hell. The Sovet Union ‘atlas to exert declve influence over the region through a compler web of polities, economic, and amltary and scully is, and there Is no reason to doabt ulimate Soviet witingnes to emoloy armed orcs to matstain party rule and preserve the Soviet potion Inthe reson se) 3. At the same time, however, Eastern Europe s 2 region of ‘creole italy, recurrent ets, and towing diversity; the tasks of Soviet line manaee- ‘ent have grown. peotrestvely qoater. Suoousive ‘Soviot leaders have Sout both cobeson and vabilty In Eastern Barope; they have fled to achieve them simultaneously. Gattuso, wile mindful ofthe need for sab, har ted the balance toward an agenda of change and reform inthe inlerst of regime ‘isbity, Some veteran East Buropean official ken ‘he current situation to Khrushchev’ de Stalization campaign and the subsoquect upheaval in Hunsary Sd Poland in 1956; they feat thatthe Soviet refer Ths inte ai rato he Sve Ui ad ‘a Wana ut shart Gera, Pld, aha, use Romani sd Baise tt fe {ero he ge ssn of St pl he acne et ive will leash potentially urcontrollable presares for change in Haste Hurope de} astm Europe in the Mid-19808 4. The sew Sovot ladenhip under Gorbachev Inherited en Eastern Eorope who seeming gules ‘once was beled by serious problems jst bensth the trlace Tobe sure, the challenge posed by Salidarty im Poland had been sucrfaly contained with the ‘mmpesiton of martial la in December 108, and the Jaruelst regime bad made sme progres toward restoring party contol and neutralizing Is domestic ‘copontion. Yet, throughout Eastern Europa, severe ‘conomie problems, sing social dsontent, end pol fal stagnaon among the aging party Tendersips ‘reted an antabe situation. few" 5. Eoonomier in Decline. When Oorbechey at sumed pover in 1985, Eaten Europe had endured early dreade of economic decline aod stagnation “Most obvzay, the rexion-wide nancial criss ofthe carly 1080: contrbutd to the end of an era of Eas ‘Wet ecoonmie detente: tude ith the West declined sharply, new credits were sate, and several of the Est European regimes were compelled to enter into ‘extensive rinancing negation with Wester ced torn Trade relations with the USSR fred itl beter, ‘Soviet al proes reached new peak i 1082-5, belatedly rlesing the fll Brot of the 1978-78 ‘ncteses in the wold markt (asthe five-year avers- {ng mechs for Soviet ol Slveris caught up with peeling wold rates) owe 6. Thee reversals took a heavy tll on standards of living, as the East Europeans sued wth large foxelgn debts and deteriorating economic perfor mance In Romania and Polod, shortages of ence td base ests raised the prospect of economica- fy tnduced polial tnstablity elsowhere, problems ‘vere ls atrous bat sll acute, Faure vo dliver {he beomled improvements In living standards—the Tinchpin d rexie statepies In the 19705—furhee ‘undermived pital lstimacy and deepened societal lenaton, Reduced investments and growing lags in the sient tecncogieal revelation had aso weak ened East European competivenes on world mar ess, frthr mortgaging the region's economic future. sem 158 (Continued) seeter NaoRayMocorTeRt 7. Aging Leadership. Adding to Eastern Europe's dlecine wat the stagnation and immobility of ai ‘arty leadeshis. By 1987, the average age ofthe ix top arty leaders was well over 10, their average tenure alice more than two decades. Only Plas (Genaralarcii,x relative yourater a, and ast, {German patty leader Eich Henecher, till spy at 75, seerned capable of energetic leadership: most of the ‘thers were in poor health, presiding ovr leadershize berlt of new Sea. The were hardy the men to rape with the difiealt pole sues of the 1080s see 1 Political malaise in Fastern Burope had been sccntuated by a long period of enfecblement 0 Mascow, stretching from the later years of the Break ‘ev eta trough the itrrogna of Yast Andtopov and Konsantin Chernenko Thre Soviet sce in the space af as may Years, coupled with mized policy Seal heightened tncetantis snd complieated sue eso demas in astern Europe. The absence of ‘lear and decisive Soviet leadership alo contributed to ‘period of dit in Eastern Europe, as each reine Tsun to adi it own aporoaches, even on some senate foci play ues owe 8. Challenges to Soviet Authority. Leolsies! ‘erosion in Eastern Europe—aceclerted by the ers tng of Solidarity i Poland eave re to new inden: ent soil groure and, above al to reurzance of tinal cascouses throughout thereon. In some ‘ies, the regimes responded by atempting to eoopt Talia sentiment, as in he Honecher exioe’s sppreriton of Marin Luther, Frederick the Great, td others as prcutioas ofthe Eat German state In ‘thers ofc nally played on exci, chauvinis- {ue nonlin: the Burin rime mounted abr: tal asimfation campaign agaist is Turkish monty, td Romanin's Presdent Ceauceu increned reo ‘Son against the Hungarian minonty In Transivania out 10. More worrisome from Mesow's peripectve wete new sg of nalloalsl-asertiveness among ts li, patil inthe aftermath of INF (interme ‘erange nuclear force} deployments i Western Ex rope i ate 1983 and I9K4. East European oncorn tout the Soviet wallout from the Geneva dinar ‘ment alls in ate 1985 betrayed deep sites oer the erason of Eucopean detente. Duting the fll of 1054, there was an unprecedented, semipabie display ‘of Warsaw Pact dsyity—the Soviet and Caechal. ‘aries called for toutes linea else ra, While the Fst Gerrans, Hungarians, and Romanians ‘eased for improved Fast West rations and steed the special role of small sates so promoting detent 1. For most of the East European rege the reservation of European detente was n0 longer it Aesable; it had become an essential ingrdion of their ecoromie and polis seats. alo core sponded to rsing pressures {rm below for national sellexpeession and sel-asertion and for aficming the “uropeanness” of the Est Buropean sats. Unlike Aid not directly threaten Sot pvmacy inthe retion but were aimed at achieving gzater scope for divers ty in the interest of economte and plies! “opether with ounting internsl peeblems, they add ced up tw comideable dsaray ie. Moscow's ast European empie dome} Gorbachev’ Pals Toword Eostrn Europe 12 Ip Fastrn Rurope at ehewhere, Gorhaches’s Intl approaches were extension of hs broader do ‘mat and arms contol aende: —Domestcally, Gorbachev was coking to reial- tae Soviet power and presige throu economic “retractring (presto) and a eatfuly rx ulated ‘campaign of “openness” Glaros), de- ‘signed to stensthen Tageng economy, over come bureaveratle resistance, and breathe new life nt sacety at lave. Externally, Gorbachev coded a respite from ‘Eng: Wes tension snd the dbltaing ems ace withthe United Sates He also sug ovelace the ri, ideological word wew of his pedece sors with a mote sophisticated parul of Soviet egional interest, particlcly fo Western ope and Eas Aa leh 1 As fr Eaters Europe, Garachev pobubly dt rot have a fully developed conceoton os nreblems Abd, at at home, lacked char and detailed plan of Actin. Improved seonomie performance was high brioity—to tranforen Fasten Euro from a dra ‘on Soviet reroueas to a at in the Sovt moet tion drve-and to promote economic and plies! vinblty Gorbachev viewed with bvios dain the hidobound faders im Prac, Sofa, and Buchs fest, which ralacted the corruption, inelcency, and ‘ogatis of Brezhnev’ ater years. Given hi smb ius foreign policy program, be als reauited e- neweddixipline and greater cotdination among the Eat Esroneane ‘In pursuit ofthese objectives, Gorbachev neadd to gress change on the East Euopents, pact Tany in ecouomie policy. Bat be alto need 159 (Continued) secner woromynocormecT- stability inthe reson, so as not to jepardae his ‘more urgent priorities at home ~ Alhovth Gorbachev was not lind wo embark ‘on @ high strategy, be alo saw dangers tn entinoed stagnation and hence was mote ready than any Soviet leader since Khrascev to en courage diversity and experimentation as the keys to lng-tee vabilty inthe reson —And, of couse, Soviet approaches to Basern Europe were not Gorbachev's alone. As on do- mes pally, Covbachev also had to take into acount the views of ater key Soviet oficial (See annexe) 1. Foreian and Security Policy Coordination. GGorhacho’s ast tusk was to reassert fem lead ‘over Warn Pact fcean poley and improve ceedi- tation support hs far-reaching ams contol anda This he achieved thvoush a series of Warsaw Pact summits—st im hist two years-and the adoption ‘of something spresching acon syste, whereby the East Enropeans were briefed before and aftr maior Soviet foeizn policy initiatives. More impor tant the Soviet sf rom confrontation t dialogs on ‘ans contol ses helped allay East European com cerns of being caught inthe mile of ring tenons, factating a natural convergence of Soviet and East European approaches on Eat West foes.) 15, Gorbachv's ambitious foreign agenda ab en talled s much greater role forthe Bast Esropeans Saruelski and Honecker paid early ists to China med at restoring normal interstate and ioterpaty tes, and several East European governments began eplerne the prespacs for normalizing relations with Tue. Soene—notably the Poles and East Germans— Abate new arn contol and eter secuty preps. ‘And Hovesker® vist to Born exemeliied « more setive Western pai by the GDR. Ge 16. In Haht of srowing East European dilomatie setivty, should not be surpesine that Gorbachev Tid great tres on ezordination and acting In Warsaw Pact councile The renewal of th Pat itself wus intrctve, With alter dv to expe fn May 1985, the Romanians an other ine that they favored certain changes to the texte watering down of mutual defense oblgtions and more preci prov Son forthe Fae eventual inoltionand hat they ‘wanted only 10-year extension. In the event, tb Pat ‘wat renewed without «snl change nd Goebsche, then only two mont on the 5, had achioved Malt! Sune Matos of Soviet ond eat Exopeon Pry Lenders, 196587, ns oe ae = ital beh == = emia mee diem fenton Et =. = eee ae enone crak = a we Se So se ss = bo oun a — =o =o Demi het = = Tm tea finpesveshow of unit. (Gorbachev reputedly aan smered out this areemeat atthe time of Chernenkos funeal—Ierally his fist day In ofce—but only at the price af ofeing new Soviet enerey delivers in return forCensecusegecment) Gorbachev alo has ‘moved to expand the infrastructure ofthe Warsaw Pact a Nay 1987, two new Pact bodes wae created to facltae ongoing coordination of Sovlet and East 160 8. (Continued) secner NoromrnotoneT European arms contol postions and supervision of East Europe foreign vist and contacts eae 11. At the sae time, however, Gorbachev bas wad the Blo's consultative bodes for substantive poley dcusions eather than tule endorsement of pre- cooked reoltions. Soviet infvence remains para. ‘eount, but Cobuchev's new atest on conutaton and onsensubullding recs his understanding that the East Buropeans have enenive and wef oeign ie oftheir oun and that an effective Soviet approach 10 the Wet atthe these elite into account Once 2 ‘omen potions eached, Gorbachev hs ised on ‘dazed ranks and alliance dsioline and even the loyal Bulerins have been called to task for falling to endorse Soviet aums contrlinatives with suficent ‘enthislaam. Gorbachev ao nsrcted the Poles to Todraft the “Jaruzes Plan” for aes rections in CCenteal Barone, and he played «hey vale in conta ling the pace and timing of inter German relations sone 18 Bconomic Prenurcs. The second majoe tem ‘on Gorbachev's agonda was to link the East European conomies t the Soviet modernnation drive. Bath ‘iteraliy and through CEMA (he Counal for Bo. omic Mutual Avista), Gosbachev moved tore dross the tae dats the East Europeans ran up in ‘he 187s ranting a freeze on Soviet ol deliveries at thle easly 1080 lovel and demanding increased ‘import of highar quality East European goods, partie ‘lary consumer items aod high technology machivery sod equipment: The bray fdebted Poles, Roma: aus, and Hungarians were eajlned to reduce their ‘conomie dependence onthe West the Bulgarian and (Caechoslvak regimes were exhorted to revive the stoguan economies and upgrade performance. And all were presed to jan the Sovtied "Comprehensive Pros” fr siete tecrial cooperation thoush the year 2000-"CRMA 2000," for short thous Joie vertures and eaordnated production nay hh technology ares: To enforce these strees, Gorbachev rest ‘pew alit-conrl inspections and delivered ‘lune messge 1oveveral East Bropean leaders Gorbachev lobbied personally forthe svi im lemeatationof the CEMA 2000 program nate 1086 and, in doings, moved CEMA toward new agenda chase a he Sel Cinema! Oven 161 He ako pubed through ew biter agreements on seeniGetechuolgeal cooperation and. se. ‘ited new lepton in the Eat ones eo {oes 1 facitate eoprodction adit ventures bo 18. The actual conduct of Soviet-Fast European economic relations tn Gorbachev Gat two years vealed less change tha the easy sbutore eer 6 ‘promis, Indeed, the Fast European ade deft with Mascow robe sharply i 1986 o 26 blonrobles—the largest annual Wade sap since 1981. About ede or 1987 was nearly balanced the Favorable tends were Aue chit tos decline nthe vale of Soviet ol thee than ioerewed East European deliveries. In export performance, as well as demenie "reseuctueing” the ‘veteran Bast European leaders tempodaad with the anlar fot dessins that bat fama Soviet lead strom Khvusicev on dems 20. The Bast Foropcans were panicuany wary of batng drawn into Sowet sponsored (aed Soviet dam rated) ait ventures in hightecholory reas, and ‘esstance wat evident inthe elaboration ofthe CEMA 2000 program. Owing tos toda power and tniaye acces to Woster technology va “ne. Ger sman" trade, the GDR war the bey East Buropean ariipant but the East Garmans ike th Hungarians sod Romanians, were reluctact to jeopardize thet ‘own carefully clad rade relations with the West in support of Gorbachev's domestic aged Soviet ast European diference werr evident tthe instly convened November 1986 Mowcow suit on CEMA, integration, which yield only minimal consensus on the new sage of sient tocholeial ecoperation "Even Soviet planners now concede CEMA 2000 goals ae to epimitio ee 21, Succession Dilemmas. ‘These frntations ented to Gorbachev's more base dilemma: how to lap some of his oy dynamin o Estrn Europe without a whole shakoup of tho osited party leadershipe in Prague, Sofa, and ebewhece. Corba. chey evidently secogized, However, Hat any duce, attempt to itgate an East European succesion ‘woul entail great rss. Consent, Soviet ef have been largely indict aimed at shaking up the ruling establshmens by pojeing eons eas and the example of Mescow's own domestic Inovation, ‘Tse eft ab aed at stig the internal party Achatsin thre countries toward the prefered Corba chev agenda, ain 9 doing altering the contest and fsecelrating the pace of presicosion maneuvering fm 8. (Continued) secter NOFOMMNOCONIRAEE 22. Such presse was evident In May 1967, when Soviet Foreign Minkter Shevardnadze vised Bude st to convey Gorbache's diatifaction with he ingaran aden’ procrastination on further ex ome reform. ott Inter, Karly Gros, reputed to be an able and enoreete administer, was eamed loner Pine Minister. And in Tuy fer a anick ‘at to Moscow by Gro, the Hungaria leadership ‘unveiled a lona-dcased, lon petponed set of oo omic reform (and austerity) measures A year tet, ‘he succasion proces tok a much more deve tur: = Ata ecial prt conference fn Mey 1088, Grose ‘war named purty General Secretary, orl ot Jano Kadar, who had served in the tp party ost sac 168, Mos of Kada's oroteaes were alo dramatally removed from the lop ledashi, replaced by strony reformist roup of younger oil, Arthoush the intitve for these deions was peo by Hungaran, Soviet presure clea forced the pace aud dvetion of change (se 23, Bven without diet Soviet eal for change in astern Europe, the demonstration effet of Gorba chevs domestic departures was ureting: The very ‘eritenc of relormminded Soviet leader, oop Sth his erique of Bredhnevera mismansgement, {ecved to undermine the authority and cobs ofthe tore orthodox East Euopean repeas. Ard the new legacy secocded to economic “resuturing” and pole “opennes” Ynetened to unlensh wideprend ‘able expectations for rap ehaage. Nowhere we {heie tdi more evident than in Caschoovaka hace the seeing vindieation of reformist and even ident Idea wnt shock waves through the divided party leadesbip. Those presures, cambined with the ecining belt of party leader Gustav Husa la to tis abcupt resignation in December 195. ee ssl iar 10) ise) 24, The Crochoovak succession eonfreod Gorbs chews determination to remote chaste without ‘hrcatoninn stubity- Though song, flare ind rest, prose on the divided Prague leadership, Go backew Belped secure the removal of Hush, the ‘evonteaton of Brehney-ea conervati—otly cept asa, almost Chernen ike coer Miles Taker. Indeed, Soviet peso for change becky ‘ld ot have succeeded had Govbahey attempted Dash + refrmit socesor on 2 alonrerative CCeecbosovak leadership. Jakes, then, was probably omoromise choice for Moscow a wel as rag; the The Hangin Suc Karly Grow ee 57... General Sexetay of the Horgan Seeilit Werke! Panty (SWE) sce 2 May 1968, Premier nee Tone 106, Faltbae mero ance 195. May party conferees gave + mane to Instat both osm and patil chines om ritment to conomi elem omer, soompi fnetr at Pemler nit. repced by busine lender 2 domi, eno exnte wil ok ‘oubh decane. Bade pry sera 98487 hae 78 removed as pty Isr, Pltbro member stat SW? Predet dace 22 May 198% ti ale 1986 rslaton, ged etal xcs based on rosetta and rll tom betwen arty and people abiy to vowace Soviet of Hveacan Kyat and salty contd to log ‘gn reel en 8 pede tena ‘te! ore teem of wowillgson 19 expand ferns of tale dc every ech eres Sve bok rblens Smet 162 8. (Continued) Casas Hank's Dacomber 187 coleman at ‘cnc arty leer (le retain the sy Kener nate preiency) cme nthe wae fone Sovetcuaign to ph the Carbachev agenda In Frome th eating eer vce emeourged "We Concha aot ove ening Hs. i steer Mb Jabs bouet tothe pty eae ‘ued bof eredeale Jake ged the lagege of pos-1068 “poral Paton” having ben aman the at Desk cn ‘unto and bine sted the 109-70 pare ot tony mere sated withthe Pape Sorin He had seed sce 198 a pay sear for teonamic afin td recently seemed to hve Sted with raga elements eps ves ingenious neon slarm seni. bone tht ecoom caner mt ake ace ender ‘it erty cota 9) Though burly a qeen leh for roto, Jess clean wil hl mvs the veins lov ng over (in ccnomie change sed pelea reorenation, a tesdy eda by the Az 1088 shane Yo the ‘Cental Comte wert And sk 4 Bre Mew: ‘ow lal be ore opie to Sve el for tern ecicgererate, cl apron Sone spossred i vestrs 1 heel fn and meni "enrctarng” He a Mey 0 ‘eve fre ebages i the party lender, “sted br bldovere fom th 190-70 nrmali: Yon” pel a ow how toe tance by the overepetton of Cac lop tein Pas ‘ne vr ‘Thas change ar tly o park anil wheal, ser ml hey la to gene beralsing ror a Cschovaia Bot they may eral Tonga thangs in economy te encores apston tous to Became mre ative fay to ot te is rnc under the aks ee CCuscoslovak wes undertoced the limits of the achievable in Soviet pally i dealing withthe more ‘conservative esimes in Easter Europe ise} 25. The gap between Gorbachev's ultimate cies tives as utined in mumerous soceches and docu rent, and the actual polls ho has pursued ret, the fundamental contradiction tween his dese for ‘hinge and the imperatives of nay comtrl in Eastern Europe: = Gorbachev basset an ambitious senda for Eas rn Europe that adzeses many of the resion’s brokers, but tenelther broad nor deep enowzh {o remedy underiingsystemle weaknesses 163 The Canchonovek Sccnon i cay Ae ‘enter ace tated CU Her oy Moe ‘Gags, oem spas fa Rasen ‘ech eae sented eat chet eine nemo eloraig etd hy ea on sv Set Sik ~ He bas expand the seope of pei expe smevtation foe reformist ree, such as Hung 1, and has suceeded in pulse some of the more conterentive East Enopes® rests to wad long overdue, hough il mi, reforms In the proces, he has accentuated. divisions within the East European ladershps and awake ened a cmbization of popular hopes and ai ties about impending change, These trends, coupled with severe economie problems, have heightened uncertainties inthe eeion and i ceased the potential for ers f= 8. (Continued) ‘seerer Moron NO CONTENT ‘Outlook: Growing Diversity, Sharper Conict 28, Soviet pliy toward Eastern Barope i key to continue along the loos already established under GGorbaches. Is key elements wl be: Within the Framework of Sem party contesl, sanctloning of doerty and experimentation as the kes to econo and palit! vey ~ Continued presare for reform wibout dating specie messes or demanding avis emul tion of Soviet practices. —Iasitence on foreign oley coordination, where: bythe Bast Europeans are afforded greater rom for tactial maneuver bat are expected to ew lou tothe Broad lies se In Moscow. Mounting presure for improved Bast Buropean feconomte performance and Inresed coopers {on in high echolory areas. Longer trm efforts toward stenathoned inst tutional ws, coupled with aliance maragerest techniaues that feltate Soviet eontal and Ia Alueoce tough a moe partifostory system of ive-andtake fe) 21, These broad contours of Soviet paliy wl re: ‘main in place so long as Gorbachev's damastcpston ft aeeure and Eastern Europe reals quisceat. A major change in Mosoow would ebviuly ler the uation: = Gorbacke's outer would carta the Soviet re form deve and heighten uncertainties in Fasern Burope a8 the new regime sorted itl out. His removal on pliteal grounds would sed anther ew signal to the divided East European re ‘imes—this time x sharply enieFormist one— and undereut Soviet authority, at least temporarily. = Retronchment Moxcow (with Gorbaebe sll {in ofce) would stregthen the exiting ethodox leaders in Eastern Europe without ly szeting the presures for change, Percelvd lack of unity 4 the Kromlin would further polarize Easera arope, with conservatives seking to retor the state ao ante and refer contin to push for change. More daring Sovet reforms ret, pechaps ‘of Gosbacher’s need 1 overcome bureaucratic resistance through radial policy and pervonnel hangs—woul further destabllie Eastern Eur rope aa stein lations with Moscow. Rising breauies within the East European vegies ‘might prompt some of them to implement ‘oreping reforms or fore out existing leaders ae 28, Gorkachew has played a skilful politcal ame 10 fr, pling back when necessey while gathering support for the next push forward. Although the cdhnces of domestic showdown have Inceaed, Gorbachev sem to have the upper hand and appears ‘neve to push his rfore agenda Further and moe forcefully.) 23. Growing Diversity. For the next three to five years, the culo in Baste Europe 1s for growing vertyin responding to teem pressures, crafting ‘peaches tothe West, and managing relations with Moscow. Diveso East European arms conta propos- slsand economic approaches tothe West wil feiitate Some Soviet objectives, but they wl ako complicate the tas of alliance management and run counter to the jlnt action needed for slentiictechnalogical cooperation. In Gorbachev's broader view, meroove ‘ivesty no ed in isalf ut rather vehicle for connie and poles! regeneration. Theso gals are nowhere in slat in Eastern Europe. Except pehaps in Huneary, they are not likely even to be seiouly pursues) 80, Glasncet and poreszoka wil continu to yield mined rents. Barring ledership change, Romania fd Fast Germany will contnae to reat reform bresre; Bulgaria wil continue to experiment at the ‘maraas but wil rooeed only balay toward real “restructing” The new Caschoslovak leadership un- der Takes will push more forefully for economic change, but seis movement toward economic and polite reform reas «distant prospect. Huneary and Poland could be mor interesting "= The appointment of Kraly Gros tough, sl confident rik taker i the Gorbachev mold—as General Seeretary ofthe Hungarian party and the promotion fete the ladenlp of outspoken reforoadvoostes marks an important turing ont. The new leadership i ily to be much ‘ote agursive In presi economic and pot cal reforms, bat it faces severe problems—in ‘ding workers unhappy with austerity inelie- ‘uals demanding mor freedom, and an economy that 6 stagnatiog and burdened with a beavy foreien debt, Fale to develop « more radial 164 8 (Continued) son eee Tite Ran oe Ent ah sot Henne, Gea aw EE re Santee need Sra eee clo i leat go well beond Mscow's The disastrous feonomic situation and social. dante —at Shown by the recent wave of slekes~make acon reaiation ofthe reforms unlikely, but the urgency of domestic problems may so pas the regime toward the socal dislozve i has reject Upto wow fe) SL tn foreign ply, the East Buropean resis have reason tobe stsied with Gocbachew’s sul ‘enagemont of the Wes and re own increased room for maneuer So long as Mescow maintains a cou tory aporeech tothe Wes, Soviet and Eat European lies wil romain yevealycongrvet. At the sme tine, Corbacher’s enesorgement of a more active role forthe East Europeans will inreae the chances for open conficts of interest st CSCI (Conference on Stealy aod Cooperatian in Europe) tals and in elbee Pan-Esropons forums. There wil alo be ictesed kof farther embarrasenens to Moscow asin fom, Vingarian-emanian polemics ox public airing of ast Europea human rihts ito, Hence foreign lly coordination wl equ mote lf manase- ‘ment and Gorbache wil ned to pred the Czechosi- ‘ak and Balearian regis toward more active dip. ‘acy while retaining the oxasioal independent- ‘minded of the Romanians, Hungarians Pols, nd Ext Germans se) S2 AL the sume tine, East Europea reales wil Ue gutters of yma Soviet lative. Not ‘ly mus Gorbachev weigh the consenuenees of ‘Soviot plies on polit stability n Eaten Europe, bat he mast abo ake et acount the percetions snd ely reactions of Bast European leaders Thee views are aot ely ta deter hie from polices he comers ‘tal to Soviet interests; But, on matters as pte lotailiring ster Genma elations, his epion are mite, Indeed, orbaces's campaign fora sommes “Buropean howe” of growing ines European cooper. ation implies degre of patina atonomy in Eastero rope lar beyond bathe or ay aer Soviet eer would countenance. Moscow will God inereasnaly ‘kel to promate hs nein the West without Introducing new division into Eastern Europe o well (The Bern Wall wil stay, whatever teil advan taars Gorbacher igh ein removal sort Conde esa aga ‘sun soso 03 oie a aoe “au tau am ao Geom ae Baa a Naa ‘sto ks a) ome ‘Note eet adage ree Int mens main a ye ‘movment ete tse eg ht er re Fert ected he a et oe the kab bt secu 165 (Continued) ~seeret “Hote MSC ONTHAE Tables Esstom Ewope's Economie Outlook: Average Annual ‘Growth by FiveYear Man Period (to livia aig esol eonemsion Goon ted act Fel emeti ee "stn 56 wre ba naa of od, ‘enlt o comets modal sod sont th ney “Rinna Nae 88. Sirained Economie Relations. Eastern Europe cannot delver what Gorbachev wants snicat ia Drovements in ade performance, patiany ia hightechnleey eas Poland and Hungary will r- rai sade with enormous debt fo the freseable future, with Bast Germany and Bulgaria alo facing cbt problems The Romanian coon, dealned to ‘pay Wester creditor, wil romain devsated for years to come, ad Coechorovaia's indus and {ehnololal bas as ben rendered bse by years of neglect. Throuhout the rion, proieted srowth rater and shares devoted to tavesment will remain Suppresid, loving the ast Huropean economies with ‘only ited expat toast nthe Soviet moderna Won dive. Nor are the Bast Europeans likely to eopardie economic relations with the West or stk farther redotions in doeestic ving tandards forthe ‘ke of Gorbachev's cconomle sends (8) 4. So fan, Corbache's economic presures— ike thote of Soviet Tears before him—have yielded few tunable seals aside fom improved deliveries in some afaik machine teks. Foreign tade plans for 1986:90 are inconsistent with ortachov's ain gal, calling for an average annual growth of oly 5 percent {1 Soviet-Fast European trado~the wes growth in planned trade i the ast 15 years. Smiley, mot of the CEMA 2000 technical pols appear unattainable ‘only a handful of joint ventures have boon erated, fd the ash for “dec inks” batweon enterpeses Femains hamstrung by economic and burearatic 166 8. (Continued) seeker MakoAiM CSC Sampedients that hae estate Sov planes from the beaming: Moreover, Soviet-ast Europes ters of trade have bern to shift ait Mescow. 35 the fve-yent averaging mechanism for Soviet ol ries ar caught up with declining pies on the word racket i world oon ld rouly steady forthe eat few yenrs—o even f they neease somewhat th Est Boropean rble del il ea o disappear, further weakening Moow's economic. bargaining omer ee) 5, Gorbachev wil ace «growing gap botwoon bis ‘conomio gal and recs over the ext nes to Bve ‘ars, atthe very tne that his domcstic moderna: Yon plan all Yor sigaicantHeerease in Eat Enropean ints and tant progres i the CEMA 2000 program. Fllowig the pattern of his domestic pair, Gorbachev has come to realize that his wl {n Sovit-Eart European eonomi relations caeat be ‘met without systole economic and ison r= form. At the October 1987 meatng ef tho CEMA ‘rime miniters, the Soviets reopened sore of the Tanamentlprblems raed ealer by the Bas Euro: ean themaelves: lack of convertible currency, rade- ‘auny of diet links among Sem and absence of ‘atonal peeing mechanisn. And Gorbachev wil son Jeary he hs not lard already, that reforming Inte: CEMA trading prosedures sft without dep tHructural reform Inthe domestic eonomie seme seer 96 Thy, the dlemme of promatiog change with- ‘out proving tsablity in Rastern Europe wil ow ‘hore acute Faced with an almost certain need to Tnerete the pace of reform at bome, Gorbachev is likey to step up preware the Fast Europes to {nodes peretota and eoaomic reform abt not swith the tame intensty or spac as Ia the USSR sem) 1. Succession Scenarios Lesdeship chases in Eatern Europe present both rls and opportunites for Gorbachev. On the one band, iis inezesingly clear tat change ofthe kind Gorbachev wants wil ot take place under the cuneat crop of leader: The ‘ropestive departure of several veteran leaders wes Gorbachev an unparalleled epparturity to inence the selection of tote energetic and ianoative pasty Teadersigs On tho other hand, several Fast Eoropean sceusons some alicady under way—pose 1k or politeal stability and hence for Garbache’s broader ‘nena doe) 38. The Hungarian succession of May 1968 dramat- telly sere the top leadership and rased poplar enpecttions for reform, but the attendant astety ‘eases likely to gen denestio tensions. Nor Inthe sucesion proces complete: furl leadership ‘changes, ining the rang of» new pte mini ter areal ahead. In Czschelovakia a wll, Ho replacement by Takes i at the begining of tre ver ofthe etre past-1968 leaders, with the need fer CoechSowaksrosoronlty adie tothe distup- tion Elbowbero,imoending successions promise to be Saely unset ~Thivkow bas been ia power for more than tee decades: is departure wll everbeate throush tout the Bolas apparat With seven Faltbaro members ver 70, the East, Gorman party faces 8 lor turnover of the emalning leaders ofthe ware sertion ~The pos-Genusescu succesion in Romania will Introde considerable ancertaoie fo. that bihly peroalzed leaderip ard ay icvite Eas West svaly as Moscow attempt reasert Infsence with nieoosor venient 38, Gerbache's task will be to mazage several leadership vaste, pethars simulans, ta sve that plete, or atleast sepa, sucess fe named and tnt resi authority & peered in the process Hs silty to-do so wl depeod on his soceess in defeating conservative forces in his own leadership. The options and conszalots confonting lim i Baten Europe are fil lea: “He will need to work with the exiting top Jeadeships Soviet references wll be important but nat deve There wil be «short it of thee to Be Suter nach party whose senionty ves them ree aim tothe ob —Breluding the Ceausescu cla, neary all thee fares met the minimus qualeations of ex erence ad relbilty — Except in Hungary, none has demerstrated the Lind af dynamism Gorbachev sans though & few have reformist credential While the Hungarian suecesion probably comes lose to Gorbachev preferences for Esters Bute, oo ‘pective leuersip chars esowbere ae not key to ‘eid the dynam, innovative leaders Gorbachev ‘ews to abiove his more ambitions oa in the reaion {64 whole He wil probably have to ste for series tf transtionallederbips and then work to ensue {hat a new seteratinn of reform minded Leaders i roomed ant secret 167 8. (Continued) secret NoKoANPMOEONTERET 40, This cautious and gradual approach as the advantage of minimizing the disruption Inherent in East Eoropean succesions. If earful managed, it may lo falitate the evental tafe af power toa now and more forwarlooking generation of leaders. But it will not soon yield the dynamic, imoative Jeaderships Gorbachev needs to achieve his more ambitious economic end. plteal goals in Eastern [Borope, It ao means that Gorbachev's vefonn pre sores will continue to be aimed at leadehips Ul ‘eauipped and, in some cases, unwilling to respond. dove 4, Sharper Confit. Tha, a bet, Gorbachay can achieve only evlutionary progress foward pla! ‘ehwvenation and improved economic petfoeance ‘ter Berope. And currently contemplated reforms wil ‘ot sole deepaeated political and economic problems As the aap between objectives and resus becomes more evident, Gorbachev will be inclined to ah mote agsresively for deeper changes a5 the ecesary precondition to economic and pital rev {alzaon. To doso wil requie a careful ealibration of Soviet pliey: he wll need to pasb hard enough to ‘achieve tangible results at nat 0 hard as to provoke ‘ystom-threatening inability. The dangee of miseal- culation wil erase Lowe) 42. Already Gorbachev has introduced new databl- ‘ain erences into Eastern Europe through his open critique of past flues of sols, heightened eco omic presure on is alles, and, above all, the ddemeostation eet of his domstc reform program Sharper cooflet is Ukaly even if Gorbachev doesnot Inrease tho pressure on his alles. The longer the Soviet reform dytamic coins, the stronger willbe the internal presures for change onthe ast European regimes. eae) 48, The crow-prssures, coupled with severe ceo omic problems and leadership uncertaates, il Treishten poplar unrest in Eastern Europe In Pland, newly implemented austrty measures have Jed ak ready to widespread seks, protests, and demonsta- tions Hurgary sed Romana alo face growing unrest. ‘There will be a genral increase of antregime ative ism, owing to the climate of “openness” and greater willingness to tet the limits of regime tolerance. Human righ, resis, pacifist, environmentalist, and other sroupe—already active tn mest of Eastern Europe—ill grow move asontive. The patern of ‘cooperation among, Hungarian, Gooch, and Polish igen sao ily to expandefer-— 44. These developments slove wil not threaten purty rule, bt ealetively they wil — Weaken regime authority, — Undermine ecocamic recovery peepee — Lay the roundwork for moe seis challenges ote Potentil Challenges to Soviet Control 45, Thoze ae at let three more extreme scenarios that cou lead to serous challenges to Soviet contol over Eastern Earooe low 46. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the 1958 Prague Spring, and the Polish social revelation of 1050-51 alone with rumeroas leer wasvall) pro vide ample evidenoe of the inherent insabty of Moscow's Fast European empire. Each ofthese had its ‘own dynamic, but each led ultimately to a broad- ‘based challenge to marty supremacy and Soviet contol {nthe zeion. And exch Jed to crisi~mesing i the at European context the actality or imminent heihood of Soviet military intervention fre) 1 However, Gorbuchew’s tation of reform and experimentation implies « moze Uberal Soviet detation of “es.” itealciogrefowm (of the Kind tspousod by tho 1968 Cochsivak leadeshi) may ‘bo longe lea so wily and automaticaly ta “eriss situation” in Moscow's eyes? 48, Popular Upheaval. Several of the anual int Laity indicators—dincontent over iving standards, weak ani divided leadership, soeial wares are ev ‘lent in several countee, and all ace pressures ema ttisg frm Moscow. Now sbocks—svere austerity ‘measures, the death o ouster ofa to pay leader, of the emergence ofan organic and emboldened oppo- sition—eould bring about senius istablity almost anywhere, wth Poland, Romania, and Hungary the ‘mos likely candidates for trouble: ~The Hikktood of malin, simultaneous woheav: tle higher tan i has hoen in more than 30 ‘years In the late 19805 ae no he easly 100s, ‘etualy all the East European counties face 18 secre 168 8. (Continued) wseener MoRORNPNOCOMIRACT Ramon: Inperding Ci? ‘The ie reine etnies rower i Ronny the oty le alerted by Gotan Pele and mat dee of Soe setae Rowan’ Prolene are bomeeows, owing tothe Cres Fase sore any mazar aed Secon db tasty ir it nasa eta 00 10.00 wetter in Bes in November 1987 wa the at le mansion rome abe Ue wh Ur ween roe anne ses, demons ed ce of ate. Soar, ue has coma ltd {nd Joe th a eeaied oppeston nd Sit fre te wal nud to gel pete Shih tcle offadeas wala trandeon Ede ao gon erm with tbe party tireschy sult Dhsnlanen thin the ask Se, fad by nepal pts a Cates pe fest the pat fe econo fale, hs et Kim bolted’ Gatachevs ple ten of Case ‘limo and wierd noel of Cones ‘Sit mf olen are acleratng ths tend. sb ‘esl thoi thn testy to dance theo ‘ches tom onto sd ble aah wp In bo easeeshaselenine Dioner within the eat Secon dil up two ed Cones ing hey leaders te peeled th emerge of a ‘hese conus pal presres ad upto a Insessnay velse itera Staton, however, td stv! pil emai sou ing abot flee Crs Conary deh or tceactatin. Cease ‘ir rom panera ar ily weak ‘inthe past ne (bough he aia 2 ‘irr shel I e were odie In fee he ‘ald ebay be retacd by acalcte ae ig he ile Elem andthe tal sch 0 ‘xine wel ebay be embeded iy ‘wander Sueceson sole A place comp The ot Mey ert seaio ‘eal tae growing poplar net silting Sit we deacon ‘ig e stage or Coe’ cater. wo oly be suceeded by 9 clive of furs erent within the pty leesp, Elen sd theses othe lan woud be oe ny sone ‘th Cau Misl. = trie of sop ost. Stotanou ot Sea of pate mul parks mone widesprend sing, overmilning Soeur eure nd Tenia to'sbeeakdowy of pac oer “The rouling teornaey ul el to 2 ete of ‘wey the mats. Seve, ce elon Romaia didnt decend it compte eden Moxon would ory fave met 8 tha Te fr cn. gst ae {ho would ler opportuni foe sero a nt ‘rend Rea’ poplin economies ‘ould rnin severe omer 90 se sssear Te ‘nee Bache Muar erento wold at even be «au contingent ere iepet aahy it Romana orth ven fw necceer Iden eat {tated oor Rana fr the Wa Pac Nair ly plover in Eos Exope Short of» Sve imo eets a Rand wold tot have wide repercnions deere Nor wl! hey Spee co Gorbachev's bead ott i that & fsmeot tht ly demands conan aed ale ‘eho However ~tHunaian-Romanian aos would be eveely ‘noe f doce viene to Roma wee 0 thr in etbie vl eed at he Hage ‘sn lori Tana, = And Yuva woudl need if Boake o ‘hos Romani posed sn eds of Rex ‘rani seking rele seo a Yoon ralgous sts of problems: stagnant economies, Teaenbip sicesion, and rlormist pressures from Movcow Asin tbe pas, however, eae scenarios woul be highly country esd Only tn Romanla is there a sniicantposublity of widespread vo lene; eae, the ereatr iklhoed would be 169 1 broa-besed, onan challenge to rexine Sathosty (ln Poland However, this te cena to could abo lead to cele of capes and ialence emer 40. For Corbchov, a posible ushaal in astern rope contitts the greater exter that tothe ‘Soviet relorm progam and his own continued tenure 8. (Continued) stent _Moromnoconmmer Despite the eater tolerance he has shown fr exper mentation, be wll expect is alles to tke swt, ec atin to end any palitcal lenge oF mae ‘unrest Indeed, tho East Buropean leadeis ae at least at aware as Gorbacher ie of the need for lance, ad thoy hve a thar disposal ergewecity ores that have been elective thus fr in eonsning liurbances Should events overwhelm the enact of loca leaders, thre ino reason to dsbt that he would take whatover ation wos required, neuding itary Intervertion, to preserve party rule and Soviet author ity in the resin. Like bis predecesrs, Gorbachev would exhaust all other options before undertaking Soviet military intervention. Indeed, e faces even seater contains A Soviet invasion of en allied couney would do Ieparble damage to his image in the Wes nd undermine the entire edifice of his orien pally — An upheaval in Eastern Europe, partially one attributable to Corbache's reform routs, ‘ould alo threaten hit domestic sanding. 1 ‘would ad to domes plial presures fr his emoval fom power and the crtallent of his reform veoera lower 50. Sweeping Raform. Gorbachev has expanded the limits of accepable reform. In Hungary and Poland particle, reform blueprints ere beng crear lated that go well Beyond anything now on the agenda fn Morow And ow the Hungaria have put nace a'Teadeihip team contaiaing radial veformes, so 2 lmze Poasay, bead of Hungary's Patvoi People’s From Although Grsz has more conservative leanings than the neweomers, hei action-oriented snd willing to take wme chances to get the party out in fot of the reform proces. Init ofthe foming economic decline and eoletonce of disident and esteblshmect rossre around a reform package he could be pulled bby his new Politburo toward more radial sltions to Hungary probloms. Given the fat of previous re form movements. there would be strong elite and popular inhibitions assist dzet challenges to party fuoremacy and the Soviet allance sytem If Eastern urope' pat any aula, however, «genuine reform ‘movement in Hungary or ebewhere would tend iney- Tay toward maton si determinaton aod stony. ds Si Such a senaro would be the mest hopeful for astern Europe ad the most problematic for Meso, patenlary if public dioline were maintained, ‘Thare would bo no inlent anarchy to facts Soviet suppreson, few pro Soviet colaoraors to call, on, and no cataclysm event to spur Mezcow to take ‘aly and dev ation. By the time Garbachev had ‘ecied tha the course of events had sore too far, he ‘oul be faced with a relatively wae reform leader ‘hip and ecsplined and determined population; tho ‘oats of inervention would be much higher then tuner a scenario of seis internal instability, Cob ‘hey would have to choos between psppreiing. « tenuin rer movement—inpited by hi own ale for glasnos and perestroa—or countenancina at least a pata erosion of Soviet conv His colce—by ‘bo meats foregone conlusion—would hinge cn the scope of change and the perceived challenge to Sole, Infleoce othe eons 52, Comercatioe Backlash, Gorbachev's pressure for reform sls could lead to stronger and more open

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