DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4.3.6 We must not think that, if we can decide between one course and another
without further thought (it seems self-evident to us, which we should do), this
necessarily implies that we have some mysterious intuitive faculty which tells us
what to do. A driver does not know when to change gear by intuition; he knows
it because he has learnt and not forgotten; what he knows is a principle, though
he cannot formulate the principle in words. The same is true of moral decisions
which are sometimes called 'intuitive'. We have moral 'intuitions' because we
have learnt how to behave, and have different ones according to how we have
learnt to behave.
It would be a mistake to say that all that had to be done to a man to make him
into a good driver was to tell him, or otherwise inculcate into him, a lot of
general principles. This would be to leave out the factor of decision. Very soon
after he begins to learn, he will be faced with situations to deal with which the
provisional principles so far taught him require modification; and he will then
have to decide what to do. He will very soon discover which decisions were
right and which wrong, partly because his instructor tells him, and partly
because having seen the effects of the decisions he determines in future not to
bring about such effects. On no account must we commit the mistake of
supposing that decisions and principles occupy two separate spheres and do not
meet at any point. All decisions except those, if any, that are completely arbitrary
are to some extent decisions of principle. We are always setting precedents for
ourselves. It is not a case of the principle settling everything down to a certain
point, and decision dealing with everything below that point. Rather, decision
and principles interact throughout the whole field. Suppose that we have a
principle to act in a certain way in certain circumstances. Suppose then that we
find ourselves in circumstances which fall under the principle, but which have
certain other peculiar features, not met before, which make us ask 'Is the
principle really intended to cover cases like this, or is it incompletely specified -is there here a case belonging to a class which should be treated as exceptional?'
Our answer to this question will be a decision, but a decision of principle, as is
shown by the use of the value-word 'should'. If we decide that this should be an
exception, we thereby modify the principle by laying down an exception to it.
Suppose, for example, that in learning to drive I have been taught always to
signal before I slow down or stop, but have not yet been taught what to do when
stopping in an emergency; if a child leaps in front of my car, I do not signal, but
keep both hands on the steering-wheel; and thereafter I accept the former
principle with this exception, that in cases of emergency it is better to steer than
to signal. I have, even on the spur of the moment, made a decision of principle.
To understand what happens in cases like this is to understand a great deal
about the making of value-judgements.