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Devolving Command Decisions in Complex Operations: L Dodd and JQ Smith
Devolving Command Decisions in Complex Operations: L Dodd and JQ Smith
Devolving Command Decisions in Complex Operations: L Dodd and JQ Smith
Correspondence: L Dodd, CfASS, DISE, Craneld University, Defence
Academy of the UK, Room MH101, Shrivenham, Wiltshire SN6 8LA,
UK.
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explicitly place all or very great weight on the higherlevel command objective at the expense of risking severe
tactical losses;
focus attention only on the attributes of the situation
that give weight to the course of action that feels most
comfortable;
create a novel course of action that they hope might
satisfy both objectives and might also hedge against the
uncertainty.
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20
V
(illustrative)
d
Super
aggressive
Totally
benign
Intensity of engagement
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where
r1 log k1 log k2
r2 logu1 1 u1 0 logu2 1 u2 0
and where for i 1, 2, ui 0 inf d2D Ui d; d i d and ui[1]
supd2D Ui d; d i d denote the worst and best possible
outcomesas foreseeable in the eyes of the commander
for each of the objectives. For technical reasons, it will be
convenient to reparametrize k so that there is a one-to-one
function from k to r; k 0 2 R L 0 . Heuristically, k0 simply
spans the parameters in L other than r. From the
constructions above, it is clear that P1(d|k), P2(d|k) can
be chosen so that they are only functions of k through k0
and thus henceforth will be indexed as P1(d|k0 ), P2(d|k0 ).
Note here that P1(d|k0 ) and (P2(d|k0 )) are, respectively,
simply an increasing (decreasing) linear transformations of
Ui d; d i djk: the commanders expected marginal utility
i 1, 2 on making what is considered to be the best possible
decision consistent with choosing an intensity d of engagement. From the denition of d, note that the functions
Pi(d|k0 ) are each distribution functions in d: that is, nondecreasing in dAD, with
Pi inffd 2 Dgjk 0 0; Pi supfd 2 Dgjk 0 1
3.2 Resolvability
Ideally, a C2 regulatory agent should be adaptive enough
to alternate between devolving decision making to the
commander in the eld and taking a top-down approach
Assessment of outcome
deemed to be:
(as in special case)
Very
OK
Region of likely
total success
Region of likely
total failure
Not
OK
low
high
outcome
Consequences of decision
22
V
(illustrative)
Interval defines
a region of
compromise
Super
aggressive
Totally
benign
Intensity of engagement
23
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distribution function. Further, by an analogous argument, if d 0 4d and d 0 is not preferred to d when r r0,
then d 0 is not preferred to d , when r r1, when r1pr0
either. In this sense, a rational commander will choose
to engage with non-decreasing intensity as r increases
whatever the circumstances. We shall henceforth call this
property r-monotonicity. Let
D r; k 0 fd r; k0 : d r; k 0 arg sup Vd jr; k0 g
denote the set of optimal intensities d (r, k0 ) for a
commander whose parameters are (r, k0 ). Note that
r-monotonicity implies that if D (r0, k0 ) contains pure
circumspection, then so does D (r, k0 ) where ror0.
Similarly, if D (r1, k0 ) contains pure aggression, then so
does D (r, k0 ) where r4r1. When for some xed value k0
and for r lying in the closed interval [r0, r1], D (r, k0 )
consists of the single point {d (r, k0 )}. Then the monotonicity condition above and the strict positivity of
p1(d |k) or r2(d |k) on their support then tells us this
d (r, k0 )AI(k0 ) is strictly increasing rA[r0, r1]. So the
larger the r(k0 ), the higher the priority placed on mission
success. From the above, this will be reected in the
choice of intensity: the larger the value of r(k0 ), the
greater the choice of intensity.
Recall from Equation (4) that the daring r(k0 )
r1(k0 ) r2(k0 ) decomposes into two terms. The term
r1(k0 ) is an increasing function of the relative weight
placed on the mission against the campaign objectives;
that is, their prioritization. Note also that it is the only
term in V affected by a commanders criterion weights.
This term may be potentially very unpredictable to a C2
regulatory agent, especially if no formal C2 education is
practised or provided about how to balance mission
and broader campaign objectives. Even with such C2
training or experience, the personality and emotional
history will colour the commanders choice of this
parameter.
The term r2(k0 ) is an increasing function of how much
better the commander believes they can achieve mission
over campaign objectives were they able to choose an
optimal intensity for either. This, of course depends on
the scenario faced and their competencesomething
that a C2 regulatory agent might hope to estimate
reasonably well. But, since it is based on their own
evaluation of their competence it also reects their
relative condence in their ability to achieve mission
success or be sensitive to the campaign objectives. A
commanders lack of training or difcult recent emotional history may well have a big affect on this term.
Note that a large positive value of this parameter
encourages the commander to focus almost entirely on
the mission objectives, while a large negative value
would encourage them to neglect the mission objectives
in favour of the overall campaign objectives.
that is, P2 stochastically dominates P1then all commanders will have a Bayes decision either pure combat or
pure circumspection, their choice depending on their
daring, that is, act just as in an unresolvable scenario. Call
such a scenario pseudo-unresolvable. Pseudo-unresolvable
conicts have the same difcult consequences as the
unresolvable ones for C2 regulation and are therefore
where fi(d|k0 ) log pi(d|k0 ), i 1, 2 where a necessary condition for this stationary point to be a local maximum of V
is that the derivative Dv(d|k0 )X0. Therefore, in conicting
scenarios the commanders optimal decision d AI (k0 ) will
either lie on the boundary of I(k0 )as in the unresolvable
scenarioor satisfy the equation above.
Let x1(k0 ) (x10 (k0 )) and x2(k0 ) (x20 (k0 )), respectively, denote
the mode of p1(d|k0 ) occurring at the largest (smallest) value
of d (and hence the largest (smallest) maximum of f1(d|k0 ))
in (a1(k0 ), b1(k0 )) and the mode of p2(d(k)|k0 ) 0 occurring at
the smallest (largest) value of d (and hence the smallest
(largest) maximum of f2(d|k0 )) in the open interval (a2(k0 ),
b2(k0 )). Note that when P1 and P2 are both unimodal
x1(k0 ) x10 (k0 ), i 1, 2. In this case, because x1(k0 ) is a point
of highest incremental gain in mission, we call this point
the mission point and the intensity x2(k0 ) where the threat to
campaign objectives worsens fastest the campaign point.
When x1(k0 )px2(k0 ), for any dA[x1(k0 ), x2(k0 )], v(d|k0 )
is strictly decreasing. It follows that there is at most
one solution d to Equation (8) for any value of r and
Dv(d|k0 )X0 so this stationary value d A(a(k0 ), b(k0 ) is a local
maximum of V. Call a (primal) scenario pseudo-resolvable
if
x1 k 0 pa2 k 0 pb1 k 0 px2 k 0
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26
a40, b40
10
11
ao0, b40
ao0, bo0
27
5. Links to catastrophes
5.1 Catastrophes and rational choice
Df1 d 0 jk 00 Df2 d 0 jk 00
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13
14
15
16
28
29
17
18
n
o
1b1 b dc1 b dc1 40
fd2 ; b
2
is strictly decreasing in d2.
Note that when 1oco2, fd2 ; b
The cusp points also need to satisfy
0
Dcd2 ; b
n
o
, c 1b2 d2 b dc2 b dc2
n
o
2d b dc1 b dc1
30
r 0 0 r
g2 e2 g1 e1 log 2
Differentiating and reorganizing, we nd that in the fold
points in I(k0 ) must satisfy the cubic
i1;2
3
X
cj d j 0
j0
where
c0 1 c2 e1 g2 1 c g1 e2 1 c
c1 e1 g2 1 c2 g1 e2 1 c2
c2 e1 g2 1 c g1 e2 1 c
c3 g2 e2 g1 e1
This situation is therefore slightly more complicated than
the boundary on we discussed earlier, because there is the
possibility that two local and potentially competing maxima
appear in the interior of I(k0 ). However, when a commander is
comparably certain of the effect of chosen intensity on
mission and campaign objectives, then g1 e1 g2 e2 the
fold point becomes quadratic and we recover the geometry of
the single canonical cusp/dual cusp catastrophe. After a little
algebra, the cusp points related to the modes through the
equation.
x2 x1
c2
x2 x1
When c 0 our earlier casethis equation degenerates into
requiring P1 P2but otherwise such cusp points exist and
are feasible whenever x24x1. This demonstrates how our
original example can be generalized straightforwardly away
form convexity to a situation where compromise appears as
an expression of the cusp catastrophe.
6. Discussion
There are several conclusions, concerning C2 regulation,
that can be drawn from this analysis about how to
organize, train and communicate intent and freedoms for
decision making to commanders; indeed, a number of these
conclusions are already being accepted as good practice
under the principles of command agility. Here, we will
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Appendix
Writing u[0, k] infdAD{U(d|k)}
and u[1, k] supdAD
{U i(d|k)}, to obtain Equation (3).
Note that U(d|k)
is an increasing linear transformation
of a01(k)U01(d|k) a02(k)U02(d|k) where, for i 1, 2,
U 0 djl fUi0 d; d i djk u0; kgfu1; k u0; kg1
U 0 djl fUi djk u0; kgfui 1; l u0; kg1
i
and
a0i k ai kui 1; ku1; k1 :
Note that these renormalizations simply ensure
that a01 (l) a02 (l) 1, sup U0(d|l) sup U01 (d|l) sup
U02(d |l) 1 and inf U0(d|l) inf U01(d|l) inf U02(d|l) 0.
For each xed value of d, a rational commander chooses
the decision di (d) maximizing U0 i(d|k), i 1, 2, respectively,
and then chooses d so as to maximize
a01 kP1 djk a02 k1 P2 djk
where P1(d|l) U01(d, d1(d )|k) and P2(d|l) 1U01
(d, d2(d )|k). On substitution this can be seen to be
maximized when V(d|k) of Equation (3) is maximized.
Theorem 8 If V(d0(l), l) is continuous in d at all values
kAL and d (k0), dened above, is unique and there exists, for
a xed value of k0, an Z0 40 such that V(d, k0) is strictly
increasing in d when d (k0)Z0 odod (k0) and strictly
decreasing when d (k0)odod (k0) Z0 , then d (k0) is
continuous in k at k0.
Proof: For d40, let V (k0) supdAD{V(d, k0)} and
A(k, d(Z0 )) {d: V(d, k)4V (k)d} where
dZ 0 maxfVd k0 ; k0 Vd k0 Z 0 ; k0 ;
Vd k0 ; k0 Vd k0 Z 0 ; k0 g
Then, from the uniqueness of d (k0) and the monotonicity
conditions above, for all e40, there exists an Z0 (e)40
such that A(k0, d(Z0 ))B(d (k0), e(Z0 )) where B(d (k0), e)
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which implies that, for all e40 there is an Z00 (e) min
[Z0 (e), Z(o)]40 such that if ||kk0||0oZ, |d (k)d (k0)|o2e:
ie d (k) is continuous at k0. &