Glenn Rey Anino

Juris Doctor 1
THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
A. Similarities, Distinctions and Limitations
Similarities: Police power, taxation, eminent domain
1. They are inherent in the State and may be exercised by it
without the need of express constitutional grant.
2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The State
cannot continue or be effective unless it is able to exercise
them.
3. They are methods by which the State interferes with private
rights.
Differences
1. The police power regulates both liberty and property. The
power of imminent domain and the power of taxation affect
only property rights.
2. The police power and the power of taxation may be
exercised only by the government. The power of eminent
domain may be exercised by some private entities.
3. The property taken in the exercise of the police power is
destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose. The property taken under the power of taxation and
imminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and
is therefore wholesome.
4. The compensation for the person subjected to the police
power is the intangible altruistic feeling that he has
contributed to the general welfare. The compensation
involved in the other powers is more concrete, to wit, a full
and fair equivalent of the property expropriated or protection
and public improvement for the taxes paid.
Police Power
Definition:

The power of the State to enact legislation which may

interfere the rights of liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is

the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
(MMDA v. Garin).
It is embraced in the public welfare which police power
tries to promote are public morals, public safety, public
health, general welfare, and economic security and
prosperity.

Scope:
This is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three powers of the state. (Ynot v. IAC)
Characteristic:
1. Police power cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a treaty or a contract. (Ichong v. Hernandez)
2. Taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power. Stated otherwise, police power may use the
taxing power of the state to attain its purpose or
objective. (Tio v. VTRB).
3. Eminent domain may also be used as implement of
police power. (Association of Small Landowners vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform)
CASES:
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155 [Purpose: to promote the
economic security of the people]
Facts:

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Juris Doctor 1
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business was passed.
The said law provides for a prospective prohibition against
foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from
engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the
petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the
international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the
Philippines and China was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of
police power.
Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police
power. It was also then provided that the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to
remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty,
the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope
of the police power of the state.
Syllabus:
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police
power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight.
Limitation of Police Power:
1. Equal protection clause- The equal protection of the law
clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality.

2. Due process clause: The due process clause has to do with

the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is
public welfare involved? The police power legislation must
be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
a. Requisites of Reasonableness
i. The classification rests on substantial
distinctions
ii. It is germane to the purpose of the law.
iii. It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and
iv. It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
Ortigas and Co. v. CA, GR 126102, 12/4/00- Retroactivty of law
as exercise of police power
Facts:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to
Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land, located in Greenhills Subdivision
IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot be used
exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one
single-family residential building will be constructed thereon. The
BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor
advertising purpose. No single-family residential building shall be
erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave been approved
by the SELLER. Restrictions shall run with the land and shall be
construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall
cease and terminate.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive
Zoning Area for the National Capital Region reclassifying as a

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Juris Doctor 1
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to
Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III
leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp..
The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial
building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against
Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and sought
for demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated
the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III moved to set
aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion.
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari. The petition was granted and the order of
the lower court is nullified.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
1.
WON the MMC ordinance shall be given retroactive effect.
2.
WON the ordinance impairs a contract.

could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair

vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable
not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses
will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the
State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read
into every contract.
While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so
that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,
nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise
such stipulations would be deemed null and void.
In the case at bar, when that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from
Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial
zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the
restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso,
limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family
residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no
longer be enforced.

Held:

In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having

only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally
settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract
are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which
enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties
to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be
given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions.
One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police
power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions

PRC v. De Guzman, GR No. 144681, 6/21/04 [Police

Power/Public Health; The right to practice profession]
Facts:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of
Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the
Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter,
the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in

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Juris Doctor 1
the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and
Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and
exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in BioChem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in
Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College
of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the
results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but
unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found
that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition
for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give
them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21,
1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the
respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and
recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be
nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its
decision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to take the
physicians oath and to register them as physicians. The same was
appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the
RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But
like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,
and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite

to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular

pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among
those who would practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to
the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the
board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physicians license, or
revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the
examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing
authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he
shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. As
such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to
issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine. The
petition is therefore granted.

Who May Exercise Police Power

General Rule: The legislature in general is the branch of the
government that is charged with its exercise.
Exception: Pursuant to a valid delegation, the following could
exercise police power:
1. The President
2. Administrative bodies
3. Lawmaking bodies of the LGU
4. People at large through initiative

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Juris Doctor 1
CASE:
MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, 4/15/05 [Not Valid exercise of
Police Power]
Facts:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.
Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and
his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following
statements were printed on the TVR:
You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic
Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of
apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal
case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days.
Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of
apprehension.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the
respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman Prospero
Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his
preference for his case to be filed in court.
Issue: WON Rep. Act no. 7924 vest MMDA police power/
Held: No, Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating
the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government
unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and,
unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in
the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to
open the street was invalid.

Syllabus:
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a
motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the
state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise
of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare,
subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is
consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on
the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry and
Oposa v. Factoran on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao
Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao on a legislative
franchise to operate an electric plant.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it
is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the
power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor
vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
The MMDA is not vested with police power.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however,
may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards
as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.
[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve

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Juris Doctor 1
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people's organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.

Tests of Valid Exercise (Limitations)

Lawful Subject: public interest

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation

(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that
no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of
the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing
Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional
Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within
the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the
BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 7742 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
operation.
On December 29, 1981, petitioners instituted an action to the
Supreme Court.

Police power could be exercised for the interests of the public in

general, as distinct from the interests of a particular class or
individual. This is based on the time-honored principle that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

Issue: WON the implementation and enforcement of the assailed

memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to
equal protection of the law, substantive due process, and protection
against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

CASES:

Held: The administrative regulation is a valid police measure in

consideration of the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the
exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation,

119 SCRA 597
Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.
(TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators,
who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon
accessible to vehicular traffic.

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Juris Doctor 1
Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 [to protect movie industry]
Facts:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner
on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as
the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and
took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or
rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of
a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the
tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
(50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared
equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
Issue: WON the tax imposed by the Decree is a valid exercise of
police power.

Held:

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was

imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive
which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one
industry over another.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select
the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
"inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation".
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police
power.
Dept of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533
Facts:
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 issued that:
A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the
East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, DECS rejected his
application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test. He challenged the constitutionality of the rule
invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.

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Juris Doctor 1
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on
July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.
Hence, this action.
Issue: WON the three-failure rule is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the
State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Rationale:
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer
the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they
are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources

must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good
while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719
Facts:
As far back in 1977, Makati, Metro Manila has always been
plagued by traffic. For this reason, during that time, Mayor Nemesio
Yabut of Makati ordered that studies be made on ways on how to
alleviate the traffic problem, particularly in the areas along the public
streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the
subdivision plan of Bel-Air was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on the condition, among others, that its major
thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be
opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by
the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to
open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit
and Pasco de Roxas streets. As a result, the gates owned by BAVA at
Jupiter and Orbit were ordered demolished.
Mayor Yabut justified the opening of the streets on the
following grounds:
1) Some time ago, Ayala Corporation donated Jupiter and
Orbit Streets to Bel-Air on the condition that, under certain
reasonable conditions and restrictions, the general public shall
always be open to the general public. These conditions were
evidenced by a deed of donation executed between Ayala and BelAir.
2) The opening of the streets was justified by public
necessity and the exercise of the police power.
3) Bel-Air Village Associations (BAVA) articles of
incorporation recognized Jupiter Street as a mere boundary to the
southwest thus it cannot be said to be for the exclusive benefit of
Bel-Air residents.
4) BAVA cannot hide behind the non-impairment clause on
the ground that is constitutionally guaranteed. The reason is that it is

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Juris Doctor 1
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
of police power.
BAVA, on the other hand, contended:
1) Rufino Santos, president of BAVA, never agreed to the
opening of the said streets
2) BAVA has always kept the streets voluntarily open
anyway
Moreover, BAVA claims the demolition of the gates
abovementioned was a deprivation of property without process of
law or expropriation without just compensation.
Issue: Who is correct: the Mayor or BAVA?
Held: The Mayor is correct, for the reasons mentioned above. The
opening of Jupiter St. was warranted by the demands of the
common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public
convenience. There is no merit in BAVAs claim that the demolition
if the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amount to deprivation of
property without due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The act
of the mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police
power. The concept of police power is the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.
Police power, unlike the power of imminent domain, is
exercised without provision for just compensation.
Art. 436 of the Civil Code.
When any property is condemned or seized by competent
authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner
thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that
such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. It may not be done
arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is
unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
A nuisance could be legally abated by summary means.

Del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521

Facts:
On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was
published in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its
publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of
Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76
dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the
effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law,
provided in Sections 6 and 12of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and
7 of the Administrative Order.
Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national
organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their
professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit
requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal)
of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative
Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and
void.
The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and
(b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of
government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and
those in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of
prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly
required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the
latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the
generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and
veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class
legislation.
The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief,
over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in
view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a
petition for prohibition instead.
Issue: WON the Generic Act is constitutional.

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Juris Doctor 1
Held: The Generic Act is not unconstitutional. It implements the
constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no
substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a
valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to
the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its
generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the
generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is
allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the
patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic
equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still
developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy
minority.
The objective is "to promote and require the use of generic
drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name
counter-parts" for "the therapeutic effect of a drug does not
depend on its 'brand' but on the 'active ingredients' which it
contains." The medicine that cures is the "active ingredient" of
the drug, and not the brand name by which it has been baptized
by the manufacturer.
In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient
may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that
are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order,
comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can
neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and
property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed.
They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would be
toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists
and veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and
prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the

physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no

different from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Court
inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and
the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys v. Comelec, 289
SCRA 337 The law was a proper regulation by the State of the
use of airwaives.
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened
injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the
other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations
in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No.
881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,
the franchise of all radio broad casting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall
be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that
Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC

Glenn Rey Anino

Juris Doctor 1
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air
time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to
petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide
at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and

television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking
of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held:

Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting,

whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other
things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that any such franchise or right
granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies,
which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them.
Since a
franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service.

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions

may validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for
this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for
the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does
not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and
television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the
COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Ople v. Torres, supra (293 SCRA 141)
President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 entitled
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System on December 12, 1996. It was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the InterAgency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, the court issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
The petition is based on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. The implementation of AO No. 308
insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the
Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution.
Held: WON the A.O No. 308 has a lawful subject in the exercise of
police power.
Held: No.
The President is vested by the constitution the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power
over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge
his duties effectively.

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Juris Doctor 1
Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the
first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc.
Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.
It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its
scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in
the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations
are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.
Lawful Means

The means employed are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and not duly oppressive on
individuals.
Additional Limitations when police power is exercised by virtue of
valid delegation:
o Express grant by law
o Within the territorial limits of the enacting body
o Must not be contrary to law.
CASES:
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 [Not a valid exercise of police
power: as he may see fit]
Facts:
President Marcos issued EO No. 626-A which amended EO. No.
626. It provides that:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that
henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the

Glenn Rey Anino

Juris Doctor 1
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now
come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:

No. EO 627-A as it amended EO 626 has the same lawful

subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there
be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing. There is no connection on how
the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,

finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers

mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272
Facts:
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772,
which reads in part:
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper
of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and
from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said
newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine
or periodical of said province or city.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission,
free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on
the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against
the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter
directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec
Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it cameraready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the
provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the
press and of expression.

Glenn Rey Anino

Juris Doctor 1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to
various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court
also required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.
On behalf of the respondent Comelec, he Solicitor General argues
that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter
directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be
valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
Comelec over the communication and information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and
ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
1. WON Section 2 of the said Resolution compels publishers to
donate Comelec Space.
2. WON Comelec Resolution is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
1. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of
the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not
less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal
property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property
for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).
2.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling
publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was,
however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration on
our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on
the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a
power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to

respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may

indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power
of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant
case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and
without regard to the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to
take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No
attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent
necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and
that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of
the State.
B. Eminent Domain [Also Read Rule 67 (re
Expropriation) of the Rules of Court]
Definition and Scope
Distinguished from destruction from necessity
CASE: American Print Works v. Lawrence,
23 N.J.L. 590
Who May Exercise
Elements
Necessity of the Exercise
CASES: Republic v. La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646
City of Manila v. Chinese
Community, 40 Phil 349
Private Property
CASES: Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620
PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717
Taking
Requisites

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Juris Doctor 1

445

CASE: Republic v. Castellvi, 58 SCRA

336
Examples
CASES:
U.S. v. Lynch, 188 U.S.
256

U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S.

NPC
v.
AguirrePaderanga, 464 SCRA 481
Taking under Police Power
CASE: Richards v. Washington Terminal
233 U.S. 546
o invalid taking under the police power
CASES: City of Quezon v. Ericta,
122 SCRA 759
Phil. Press Institute v.
COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272
Public Use
CASE:
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA,
222 SCRA 173
Just Compensation
Definition
CASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, GR No.
146062, June 28, 2001
Who is the owner who shall receive the
payment?
CASE: Knecht v. CA, 297 SCRA 754
Determination of JC: Judicial Function
CASES:
NHA v. Reyes, 123 SCRA
245
EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA
305 (1987) (reversing NHA v. Reyes)
form of JC
CASES:
Assn
of
Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian, 175 SCRA
343

Land Bank v. CA, 249

SCRA 149 (M.R. Resolution, 258
SCRA 404)
time of assessing JC
CASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, supra
Hda.Luisita v. PARC, Resolution,
G.R. No. 171101. 11/ 22/2011 (see
also the
discussion on just
compensation in the dissent of J.
Sereno)
entitlement of owner to interest
CASE: Urtula v. Republic, 22 SCRA 477
right of landowner in case of non-payment
of JC
CASE: Republic v. CA, GR No. 146587,
7/2/2002
C. Taxation
Definition, Nature and Scope
Who exercises
vested with the legislature
constitutionally given to LGUs
Related Concepts (requirements in the exercise)
Due Process
Equal Protection
Double Taxation
Public Purpose
Tax Exemptions