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The Asset Forfeiture Manual: Home Search Guest Book Contact What'S NEW Disclaimer Source Area
Contents:
(Note: Allow the full file to load before using the links below.)
Introduction
Disclaimer
Scope and Purpose of Manual
Some Notes on the Sample Briefs and Diskette
The Asset Forfeiture Strategy - Background
Asset Forfeiture Part 1: Theory and Examples
The Right Way L.A.W.
Disclaimer
RICO - Threat or Weapon
Rico: What are You Doing?
How Bureaucrats Presume You're "Guilty"
The Law: Guilt Doesn't Matter
Police Forces Keep the Take
"Looking" Like a Criminal
Paying for Your Innocence
Minor Crimes, Major Penalties
Ending the Abuse
The Bureaucrats' Feeding Frenzy / Red Alert
The Looting of America
Asset Forfeiture Part II: Ammunition
You're Best Off Keeping Your Property Private
Notes on Law Libraries
General Procedures to Consider: Step-by-Step
"Federal" Document #1: "Notice" to the "Federal" Bureaucrats for Unlawfully Seizing
Your Property
"Federal" Document #2: "Complaint at Law" that Commences Formal Action
"Federal" Document #3: "Memorandum of Law" that Gives Additional Support
"State" Document #1: "Notice" to the "State" Bureaucrats for Unlawfully Seizing Your
Property
"State" Document #2: "Complaint at Law" that Commences Formal Action
"State" Document #3: "Memorandum of Law that Gives Additional Support
Notice of Written Interrogatories & Notice to Produce Documents
"California" Document #1: "Notice" to the "State" Bureaucrats for Unlawfully Seizing
Your Property
"California" Document #2: "Complaint at Law" that Commences Formal Action
"California" Document #3: "Memorandum of Law" that Gives Additional Support
Notice of Lien
Notice of Written Interrogatories & Notice to Produce Documents
Introduction
[Editor's comments: In general, you are best off keeping your property private, by minimizing the
amount of your property bureaucrats know about and therefore might be tempted to seize to fatten their
coffers with ill-gotten gains. Minimizing the amount of information about your property that falls into
the hands of bureaucrats is one excellent way to do this. Of course, any such actions should be done
lawfully. See other materials for various ideas on how to do this. For example, consider the Pure Trust
Package and the Tax Reports.]
Disclaimer
This manual is intended purely as a communication of information in accordance with the right
of free speech. It does not constitute either general or specific legal advice. Anyone seeking legal
advice should consult a competent professional. Neither the author, editor or publisher guarantee
that using this information will result in success or protect the reader from harm. The reader
must accept that risk, and thoroughly study the law before using any of this material. Readers
must take full responsibility for the consequences of any actions taken based on the contents of
this manual. For most readers, you may well be best off reading this as a sort of "adventure novel."
You can learn of some of the actual documents and procedures being used by many freedom fighters. If
you were to actually use these documents and procedures you would probably be at substantial risk to
change your life in very major ways, some of which may be very unpleasant. The use of some of the
procedures described in this manual is EXTREMELY high-profile. For most readers, it may be
advisable to use some of the "lower-profile" applications of Freedom Technology. Generally, we think
that rather than fight existing systems it's much more productive, useful, and exciting to create
alternative new systems.
This disclaimer is especially important, because this is a relatively new strategy, and has not yet been
subjected to a Supreme Court challenge. Until that takes place, the soundness of this strategy cannot be
fully known. The strategy is still evolving, and new information is being discovered daily. If you use
this strategy, who knows? Your name may be on a famous Supreme Court case! Whether that prospect
thrills you or disturbs you depends upon your outlook.
These procedures should be treated with respect. We do not advocate the use of these procedures
against all government officials, nor to any official in particular. We honor the fact that there are many
virtuous people in government offices, who are truly striving to harm no one and to benefit as many
people in society as possible. The procedures described in this manual are not directed towards these
harmless officials.
Scope and Purpose of Manual
This manual is an introduction and primer to the asset forfeiture procedures. It does not pretend to be
the final word on the subject. The authors and editors have synthesized material from several sources.
We have organized it into a form that should be comprehensible to the average reader.
After reading this manual, you will know the fundamental principles of this strategy. This
understanding, plus the group listings in the Appendix, will allow you to do further research on your
own.
Some Notes on the Sample Briefs and Diskette
"Asset Forfeiture II: Ammunition" of this contains sample legal briefs, based upon actual examples
used by others. (These briefs are also available on diskette, which you may order separately. The briefs
on the diskette are in ASCII TXT format. This is a "lowest common denominator" format, which
practically all commercially-available word processing packages can read or convert.)
You will have to reformat these briefs using your word processing software, and you MUST adapt them
to your situation, and to the requirements of your state or locality. These are not and (in the nature of
things) cannot be "fill-in-the-blank" forms.
Asset Forfeiture Strategy - Background
Faced with corrupt lawyers and judges, no litigant can expect to win in court by simply playing
defense. To beat them, you must be able to scare them. You must be able to make them respect you, and
that means you must be able to take the offense - attack them personally.
Unfortunately, judges, lawyers, and other government officials enjoy various levels of personal
immunity provided by both law and "professional courtesy." How do you sue a lawyer for malpractice?
You hire another lawyer - if you can find one who'll take the case. How do you sue an IRS agent for
violating your Constitutional rights? Only with great difficulty. How you sue a judge for railroading
you in court? You don't.
As a practical matter, private citizens can't sue the President of the United States, a Governor, judge, or
even an IRS agent for failing to obey or enforce the laws. If we try to sue in court to compel our
government officials to obey the law and perform their lawful duties, the judges routinely ignore our
petitions and laugh us out of court.
Because legal and de facto immunities shield government personnel from being sued for committing
crimes against the People, the public is legally disarmed, unable to aggressively sue the government or
its agents and compel them to obey the Law. As a result, the public's legal posture is fundamentally
defensive: we try to duck, dodge, and hide in legal loopholes to defend ourselves against the
government and the courts. We try to escape, evade, and avoid, but we seldom counterattack against
our antagonists, largely because we think there are no lawful weapons to do so. However, it appears
that a powerful offensive legal weapon may now have been discovered, tested, and proven for common
Citizens - these asset forfeiture procedures. We don't try to sue a government official for failing to
perform his lawful duties. Instead, we simply file a lien that encumbers the official's personal property
and credit rating like a ton of bricks until he voluntarily satisfies our demand to perform his lawful
duty, and we, in turn, voluntarily agree to excise the lien.
seize all assets and personal property that could be even remotely connected with any part at all, in the
act of carrying out the crime. But is RICO the "legal highway" or just plain "highway robbery"? Let's
examine the record.
RICO appears to be a great success. The profits law enforcement agencies have acquired through the
RICO laws are astronomical. Let's understand what is being called profits and from whom these
agencies are profiteering.
Because the laws are so broad and vague, they rarely include or even target major criminals as
originally intended. Instead they seem to encourage the filing of marginal cases, particularly those with
potential for large cash seizures. With minimum controls over the process of asset seizure and property
forfeiture, it is possible for law enforcement agencies to realize the financial benefits based on the
value of the suspect's assets and property before an investment is ever warranted, let alone charges
filed. The value of the seizure can be predetermined and provides an economic incentive for agency
abuse, such as police putting money in their coffers instead of crooks in jail. "If you talk to law
enforcement people on an informal basis . . . they are more interested in money than they are in getting
drugs off the street," was a quote from a special reprint that ran as a "public service" in the Mesa
Tribune newspaper concerning an analysis of virtually every RICO case filed in Arizona, by nine local
agencies from January, 1990 to November, 1993. The nine local agencies included the Arizona
Attorney General's Office, the D.P.S. (Department of Public Safety), the Maricopa County Attorney's
Office, and the police departments from the cities of Chandler, Gilbert, Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and
Tempe. These were the reported findings:
Nearly three-fourths of the people who lose property in forfeiture cases are never charged with a
crime.
About two-thirds of the people who had property seized had no criminal records in Maricopa
County.
One of every six people whose property was seized was an uninvolved third party who was not
even present when the property was taken. Typically these were parents, siblings, boyfriends, or
girlfriends who entrusted their cars or other property to someone who was arrested on a
narcotics-related charge.
More than $4 million in cash - 54.8% of that taken - was seized from people who were never
charged with a crime.
More than 800 cars - 72% of those taken - were seized from people who were never charged
with a crime.
More than 500 guns - 65.6% of those taken - were seized from people who were never charged
with a crime.
Of the more than 2,400 people whose property was seized, only one in five was ultimately
convicted.
Only one in 20 went to prison.
One in 40 went to prison for five years or more, even though those are the people most likely to
be the kingpins at which the law is aimed.
For every person imprisoned five years or more, six uninvolved third parties lost property to
forfeitures.
Despite the law's stated aim of breaking wealthy crime organizations, the average cash seizure
is $3,063.
According to the Mesa Tribune study, the nine agencies raised $26.5 million in that time period.
Typically, forfeiture profits are divided among the agencies that contributed to the case.
So what happens if your assets are seized in a RICO case? Because RICO actions are civil and not
criminal, you are guilty until proven innocent. To get your property back, you will quickly learn you
must prove your innocence with a much higher standard of proof than the prosecution had to prove to
make the seizure. The prosecutor only has to show probable cause to believe "it" (meaning your cash,
car, home, etc.) was involved in a crime. Probable cause could be as simple as allegations made by a
paid informant and your "word" against theirs has no relevance. To get your property back, you must
prove with a "preponderance of evidence" that your assets and property are innocent of any part in the
crime. Today it is possible for a paid informant to call anonymously and report that illegal activity was
done on your property or that you gave a ride to a possible or potential criminal and probable cause is
established. Could just about anyone be categorized as a possible or potential criminal?
So how do you prove you are an innocent bystander and that you did not knowingly participate, with
any act or omission, in the alleged crime? Or what is the burden of proof required to vindicate your
seized assets or forfeited property allegedly gained as the result of the illegal act or in furtherance of
that act? The law establishes a four-part test for showing "innocent" ownership. These are the four
components that must be met in order for your property to be returned to you:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The person acquired an interest in the property before or during the criminal act.
The property was acquired legally.
The owner did not or could not have known of the illegal activity.
The owner was not married to the person committing the illegal act.
It is reported that property owners can request a hearing within fifteen (15) days of a seizure providing
they have paid a nonrefundable deposit of not less than ten (10) percent of the total net value seized. At
that hearing, the prosecution has the burden of proof to show they had probable cause to take the
property. As we have previously mentioned, that can be easily manipulated. If by fluke, the prosecution
cannot meet the burden of proof, the property is returned, but the forfeiture case can proceed.
With seemingly unlimited RICO powers, police and law enforcement agencies are put in position to
easily fall prey to the tremendous profits that can be obtained at the expense of innocent third parties.
So an otherwise honest and moral cop is coerced into compromising situations. They may have to look
the other way for job security. Current laws require that agencies only need to list the amount of money
they received when they sell a property, not the full value. They can keep cars, boats and whatever else
for their own use indefinitely without even reporting them. Reports have been stated of police seizing
personal wardrobes and sentimental items such as photographs or items of no apparent value to anyone
else. What could be the possible purpose of seizing someone's eyeglasses? Could it just be more
evidence of the law enforcement "bully" tactics that are running rampant in America today?
It is obvious that the RICO laws are not operating as it was originally intended by Congress and
literally every citizen is at risk. If you or your belongings are at the wrong place at the wrong time, well
that's just the way the RICO ball bounces!
HOW BUREAUCRATS PRESUME YOU'RE "GUILTY"
This article appeared in a box on the FRONT PAGE of The Pittsburgh Press, Sunday, August 11, 1991:
"PRESUMED GUILTY
The Law's Victims in the War on Drugs
It's a strange twist of justice in the land of freedom. A law designed to give cops the right to confiscate
and keep the luxurious possessions of major drug dealers mostly ensnares the modest homes, cars and
cash of ordinary, law-abiding people. They step off a plane or answer their front door and suddenly lose
everything they've worked for. They are not arrested or tried for any crime. But there is punishment,
and it's severe.
This six-day series chronicles a frightening turn in the war on drugs. Ten months of research across the
country reveals that seizure and forfeiture, the legal weapons meant to eradicate the enemy, have done
enormous collateral damage to the innocent. The reporters reviewed 25,000 seizures made by the Drug
Enforcement Administration. They interviewed 1,600 prosecutors, defense lawyers, cops, federal
agents, and victims. They examined court documents from 510 cases. What they found defines a new
standard of justice in America: "You are presumed guilty."
The main article appeared next to the above, also on the front page, and later pages.
"Government Seizures Victimize Innocent
By Andrew Schneider and Mary Pat Flaherty
Part One: The Overview
February 27, 1991. Willie Jones, a second-generation nursery man in his family's Nashville business,
bundles up money from last year's profits and heads off to buy flowers and shrubs in Houston. He
makes this trip twice a year using cash, which the small growers prefer.
But this time, as he waits at the American Airlines gate in Nashville Metro Airport, he's flanked by two
police officers who escort him into a small office, search him and seize the $9,600 he's carrying. A
ticket agent had alerted the officers that a large black man had paid for his ticket in bills, unusual these
days. Because of the cash, and the fact that he fit a "profile" of what drug dealers supposedly look like,
they believed he was buying or selling drugs. He's free to go, he's told. But they keep his money - his
livelihood - and give him a receipt in its place.
No evidence of wrongdoing was ever produced. No charges were ever filed. As far as anyone knows,
Willie Jones neither uses drugs, nor buys or sells them. He is a gardening contractor who bought an
airplane ticket. Who lost his hard-earned money to the cops. And can't get it back.
That same day, an ocean away in Hawaii, federal drug agents arrive at the Maui home of retirees
Joseph and Frances Lopes and claim it for the U.S. government. For 49 years, Lopes worked on a sugar
plantation, living in its camp housing before buying a modest home for himself, his wife, and their
adult, mentally disturbed son, Thomas.
For a while, Thomas grew marijuana in the back yard - and threatened to kill himself every time his
parents tried to cut it down. In 1987, the police caught Thomas, then 28. He pleaded guilty, got
probation for his first offense and was ordered to see a psychologist once a week. He has, and never
again has grown dope or been arrested. The family thought this episode was behind them. But earlier
this year, a detective scouring old arrest records for forfeiture opportunities realized the Lopes house
could be taken away because they had admitted they knew about the marijuana. The police department
stands to make a bundle. If the house is sold, the police get the proceeds.
Jones and the Lopes family are among the thousands of Americans each year victimized by the federal
seizure law - a law meant to curb drugs by causing financial hardship to dealers. A 10-month study by
The Pittsburgh Press shows the law has run amok. In their zeal to curb drugs and sometimes fill their
coffers with the proceeds of what they take, local cops, federal agents and the courts have curbed
innocent Americans' civil rights. From Maine to Hawaii, people who are never charged with a crime
had cars, boats, money and homes taken away. In fact, 80 percent of the people who lost property to the
federal government were never charged. And most of the seized items weren't the luxurious playthings
of drug barons, but modest homes and simple cars and hard-earned savings of ordinary people.
But those goods generated $2 billion for the police departments that took them. The owners' only
crimes in many of these cases: They "looked" like drug dealers. They were black, Hispanic or flashily
dressed. Others, like the Lopeses, have been connected to a crime by circumstances beyond their
control. Says Eric Sterling, who helped write the law a decade ago as a lawyer on a congressional
Tucson, the man who supervised the setup still believes it was worthwhile. It was "a success from a
cost-benefit standpoint," says former assistant attorney-general John Davis. His reasoning: It netted 20
arrests and at least $3 million for the state forfeiture fund.
"That kind of thinking is what frightens me," says Steve Sherick, a Tucson attorney. "The government's
thirst for dollars is overcoming any long-range view of what it is supposed to be doing, which is
fighting crime." George Terwilliger III, associate deputy attorney general in charge of the U.S. Justice
Department's program emphasizes that forfeiture does fight crime, and "we're not at all apologetic
about the fact that we do benefit (financially) from it." In fact, Terwilliger wrote about how the
forfeiture program financially benefits police departments in the "1991 Police Buyer's Guide" of Police
Chief Magazine.
Between 1986 and 1990, the U.S. Justice Department generated $1.5 billion from forfeiture and
estimates that it will take in $500 million this year, five times the amount it collected in 1986. District
attorney's offices throughout Pennsylvania handled $4.5 million in forfeitures last year; Allegheny
County (ED: Pittsburgh is in Allegheny County) $218,000, and the city of Pittsburgh, $191,000 - up
from $9,000 four years ago. Forfeiture pads the smallest towns' coffers. In Lexana, Kan, a Kansas City
suburb of 29,000, "we have about $250,000 moving in court right now," says narcotic detective Don
Crohn. Despite the huge amounts flowing to police departments, there are few public accounting
procedures. Police who get a cut of the federal forfeiture funds must sign a form saying merely they
will use it for "law enforcement purposes."
To Philadelphia police that meant new air conditioning. In Warren County, N.J., it meant use of a
forfeited yellow Corvette for the chief assistant prosecutor.
[At this point in the article there is a picture of three people in an empty apartment, with the following
caption: "Judy Mulford, 31, and her 13-year old twins, Chris, left, and Jason, are down to essentials in
their Lake Park, Fla., home, which the government took in 1989 after claiming her husband, Joseph,
stored cocaine there. Neither parent has been criminally charged, but in April a forfeiture jury said Mrs.
Mulford must forfeit the house she bought herself with an insurance settlement. The Mulfords have
divorced, and she has sold most of her belongings to cover legal bills. She's asked for a new trial and
lives in the near-empty house pending a decision.]
'Looking' Like a Criminal
Ethel Hylton of New York City has yet to regain her financial independence after losing $39,110 in a
search nearly three years ago in Hobby Airport in Houston. Shortly after she arrived from New York, a
Houston officer and Drug Enforcement Administration agent stopped the 46-year-old woman in the
baggage area and told her she was under arrest because a drug dog had scratched at her luggage. The
dog wasn't with them, and when Miss Hylton asked to see it, the officers refused to bring it out. The
agents searched her bags, and ordered a strip search of Miss Hylton, but found no contraband. In her
purse they found the cash Miss Hylton carried because she planned to buy a house to escape the New
York winters which exasperated her diabetes. It was the settlement from an insurance claim, and her
life's savings, gathered through more than 20 years of work as a hotel housekeeper and hospital night
janitor.
The police seized all but $10 of the cash and sent Miss Hylton on her way, keeping the money because
of its alleged drug connection. But they never charged her with a crime. The Pittsburgh Press verified
her jobs, reviewed her bank statements and substantiated her claim she had $18,000 from an insurance
settlement. It also found no criminal record for her in New York City. With the mix of outrage and
resignation voiced by other victims of searches, she says: "The money they took was mine. I'm allowed
to have it. I earned it."
Miss Hylton became a U.S. citizen six years ago. She asks, "Why did they stop me? Is it because I'm
black or because I'm Jamaican?" Probably, both - although Houston police haven't said.
Drug teams interviewed in dozens of airports, train stations and bus terminals and along other major
highways repeatedly said they didn't stop travellers based on race. But a Pittsburgh Press examination
of 121 travellers' cases in which police found no dope, made no arrest, but seized money anyway
showed that 77 percent of the people stopped were black, Hispanic, or Asian.
In April, 1989, deputies from Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana, seized $23,000 from Johnny Sotello, a
Mexican-American whose truck overheated on a highway. They offered help, he accepted. They asked
to search his truck. He agreed. They asked if he was carrying cash. He said he was carrying it because
he was scouting heavy equipment auctions.
They then pulled a door panel from the truck, said the space behind it could have hidden drugs, and
seized the money and the truck, court records show. Police did not arrest Sotello but told him he would
have to go to court to recover his property. Sotello sent auctioneer's receipts to police which showed he
was a licensed buyer. The sheriff offered to settle the case, and with his legal bills mounting after two
years, Sotello accepted. In a deal cut last March, he got his truck, but only half his money. The cops
kept $11,500. "I was more afraid of the banks than anything - that's one reason I carry cash," says
Sotello. "But a lot of places won't take checks, only cash, or cashier's checks for the exact amount. I
never heard of anybody saying you couldn't carry cash."
Affidavits show the same deputy who stopped Sotello routinely stopped the cars or black and Hispanic
drivers, exacting "donations" from some. After another of the deputy's stops, two black men from
Atlanta handed over $1,000 for a "drug fund" after being detained for hours, according to a handwritten
receipt reviewed by the Pittsburgh Press. The driver got a ticket for "following to (sic) close." Back
home, they got a lawyer. Their attorney, in a letter to the Sheriff's department, said deputies had made
the men "fear for their safety, and in direct exploitation of that fear a purported donation of $1000 was
extracted . . . " If they "were kind enough to give the money to the sheriff's office," the letter said, "then
you can be kind enough to give it back." If they gave the money "under other circumstances, then give
the money back so we can avoid litigation." Six days later, the sheriff's department mailed the men a
$1,000 check.
Last year, the 72 deputies of Jefferson Davis Parish led the state in forfeitures, gathering $1 million more than their colleagues in New Orleans, a city 17 times larger than the parish. Like most states,
Louisiana returns the money to law enforcement agencies, but it has one of the more unusual
distributions: 60 percent goes to the police bringing a case, 20 percent to the district attorney's office
prosecuting it and 20 percent to the court fund of the judge signing the forfeiture order. "The highway
stops aren't much different from a smash-and-grab ring," says Lorenzi, of the Louisiana Defense
Lawyers association.
Paying For Your Innocence
The Justice Department's Terwilliger says that in some cases "dumb judgement" may occasionally
cause problems, but he believes there is an adequate solution. "That's why we have courts." But the
notion that courts are a safeguard for citizens wrongly accused "is way off," says Thomas Kerner, a
forfeiture lawyer in Boston. "Compared to forfeiture, David and Goliath was a fair fight." Starting from
the moment that the government serves notice that it intends to take an item, until any court challenge
is completed, "the government gets all the breaks," says Kerner. The government need only show
probable cause for a seizure, a standard no greater than what is needed to get a search warrant. The
lower standard means the government can take a home without any more evidence than it normally
needs to take a look inside. Clients who challenge the government, says attorney Edward Hinson of
Charlotte, N.C., "have the choice of fighting the full resources of the U.S. Treasury or caving in."
Barry Kolin caved in. Kolin watched Portland, Ore., police padlock the doors of Harvey's, his bar and
restaurant for bookmaking on March 2. Earlier that day, eight police officers and Amy Holmes Hehn,
the Multnomah County deputy district attorney, had swept into the bar, shooed out waitresses and
customers and arrested Mike Kolin, Barry's brother and bartender, on suspicion of bookmaking.
Nothing in the police documents mentioned Barry Kolin, and so the 40-year-old was stunned when
authorities took his business, saying they believe he knew about the betting. He denied it.
Hehn concedes she did not have the evidence to press a criminal case against Barry Kolin, "so we
seized the business civilly." During a recess in a hearing on the seizures weeks later, "the deputy DA
says if I paid them $30,000 I could open up again," Kolin recalls. When the deal dropped to $10,000,
Kolin took it. Kolin's lawyer, Jenny Cooke, calls the seizure "extortion." She says: "There is no
difference between what the police did to Barry Kolin or what Al Capone did in Chicago when he
walked in and said, 'This is a nice little bar and it's mine.' The only difference is today they call this
civil forfeiture."
Minor Crimes, Major Penalties
Forfeiture's tremendous clout helps make it "one of the most effective tools that we have," says
Terwilliger. The clout, though, puts property owners at risk of losing more under forfeiture than they
would in a criminal case under the same circumstances. Criminal charges in federal and many state
courts carry maximum sentences. But there's no dollar cap on forfeiture, leaving citizens open to
punishment that far exceeds the crime.
Robert Brewer of Irwin, Idaho, is dying of prostate cancer, and uses marijuana to ease the pain and
nausea that comes with radiation treatments. Last Oct. 10, a dozen deputies and Idaho tax agents
walked into the Brewer's living room with guns drawn and said they had a warrant to search. The
Brewers, Robert, 61, and Bonita, 44, both retired form the postal service, moved from Kansas City,
Mo., to the tranquil, wooded valley of Irwin in 1989. Six months later, he was diagnosed. According to
police reports, an informant told authorities Brewer ran a major marijuana operation. The drug SWAT
team found eight plants in the basement under a grow light and a half-pound of marijuana. The Brewers
were charged with two felony narcotics counts and two charges for failing to buy state tax stamps for
the dope. "I didn't like the idea of the marijuana, but it was the only thing that controlled his pain," Mrs.
Brewer says. The government seized the couple's five-year-old Ford van that allowed him to lie down
during his twice-a-month trips for cancer treatment at a Salt Lake City hospital, 270 miles away. Now
they must go by car.
"That's a long painful ride for him. . . . He needed that van, and the government took it," Mrs. Brewer
says. "It looks like they can punish people any way they see fit."
The Brewers know nothing about the informant who turned them in, but informants play a big role in
forfeiture. Many of them are paid, targeting property in return for a cut of anything that is taken. The
Justice Department's asset forfeiture fund paid $24 mil. to informants in 1990 and has $22 million
allocated this year. Private citizens who snitch for a fee are everywhere. Some airline counter clerks
receive cash awards for alerting drug agents to "suspicious" travellers. The practice netted Melissa
Furtner, a Continental Airlines clerk in Denver, at least $5,800 between 1989 and 1990, photocopies of
checks show.
Increased surveillance, recruitment of citizen-cops, and expansion of forfeiture sweeps are all part of a
take-now, litigate-later syndrome that builds prosecutors careers, says a former federal prosecutor.
"Federal law enforcement people are the most ambitious I've ever met, and to get ahead they need
visible results. Visible results are convictions, and, now, forfeitures," says Don Lewis of Meadville,
Crawford County. (ED: a Pennsylvania county north of Pittsburgh by two counties.)
Lewis spent 17 years as a prosecutor, serving as an assistant U.S. Attorney in Tampa as recently as
1988. He left the Tampa Job - and became a defense lawyer - when "I found myself tempted to do
things I wouldn't have thought about doing years ago." Terwilliger insists U.S. Attorneys would never
be evaluated on "something as unprofessional as dollars." Which is not to say Justice doesn't watch the
bottom line. Cary Copeland, director of the department's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, says
they tried to "squeeze the pipeline" in 1990 when the amount forfeited lagged behind Justice's budget
projections. He said this was done by speeding up the process, not by doing "whole lot of seizures."
Ending the Abuse
While defense lawyers talk of reforming the law, agencies that initiate forfeiture scarcely talk at all.
DEA headquarters makes a spectacle of busts like the seizure of fraternity houses at the University of
Virginia in March. But it refuses to supply detailed information on the small cases that account for most
of its activity. Local prosecutors are just as tight-lipped. Thomas Corbett, U.S. Attorney for Western
Pennsylvania, seals court documents on forfeitures because "there are just some things I don't want to
publicize. The person whose assets we seize will eventually know, and who else has to?"
Although some investigations need to be protected, there is an "inappropriate secrecy" spreading
throughout the country, says Jeffrey Weiner, president-elect of the 25,000 member National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. "The Justice Department boasts of the few big fish they catch. But they
throw a cloak of secrecy over the information on how many innocent people are getting swept up in the
same seizure net, so no one can see the enormity of the atrocity." Terwilliger says the net catches the
right people: "bad guys" as he calls them. But a 1990 Justice report on drug task forces in 15 states
found they stayed away from the in-depth financial investigations needed to cripple major traffickers.
Instead, "they're going for the easy stuff," says James "Chip" Coldren, Jr., executive director of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, a research arm of the federal Justice Department.
Lawyers who say the law needs to be changed start with the basics: The government shouldn't be
allowed to take property until after it proves the owner guilty of a crime. But they go on to list other
improvements, including having police abide by their state laws, which often don't give police as much
latitude as the federal law. Now they can use federal courts to circumvent the state.
Mr. Tracy Thomas is caught in that very bind. A jurisprudence version of the shell game hides roughly
$13,000 taken from Thomas, a resident of Chester, near Philadelphia. Thomas was visiting in his
godson's home on Memorial Day, 1990, when local police entered looking for drugs allegedly sold by
the godson. They found none and didn't file a criminal charge in the incident. But they seized $13,000
from Thomas, who works as a $70,000-a-year engineer, says his attorney, Clinton Johnson. The cash
was left over from a Sheriff's sale he'd attended a few days before, court records show. The sale
required cash - much like the government's own auctions.
During a hearing over the seized money, Thomas presented a withdrawal slip showing he'd removed
money from his credit union shortly before the trip and a receipt showing how much he had paid for the
property he'd bought at the sale. The balance was $13,000. On June 22, 1990, a state judge ordered
Chester police to return Thomas' cash. They haven't. Just before the court order was issued, the police
turned over the cash to the DEA for processing as a federal case, forcing Thomas to fight another level
of government. Thomas is now suing the Chester police, the arresting officer, and the DEA. "When
DEA took over that money, what they in effect told a local police department is that it's OK to break the
law," says Clinton Johnson, attorney for Thomas.
Police manipulate the courts not only to make it harder on owners to recover property, but to make it
easier for police to get a hefty share of any forfeited goods. In federal court, local police are guaranteed
up to 80 percent of the take - a percentage that may be more than they'd receive under state law.
Pennsylvania's leading police agency - the state police - and the state's lead prosecutor - the Attorney
General - bickered for two years over state police taking cases to federal court, an arrangement that cut
the Attorney General out of the sharing. The two state agencies now have a written agreement on how
to divvy the take. The same debate is heard around the nation. The hallways outside Cleveland
courtrooms ring with arguments over who will get what, says Jay Milano, a Cleveland criminal defense
attorney.
THE BUREAUCRATS' FEEDING FRENZY
The Asset Forfeiture Manual is a part of the solution to the problems that Jarret Wollstein so grimly
points out in the following two articles. The need for this area of research to continue is highly
documented by the public record. The reports are in: Americans need protection from the law
enforcement agencies.
RED ALERT:
The Rising American Police State
By Jarret Wollstein
[Reprinted from I.S.I.L. Bulletin, International Society for Individual Liberty, 1800 Market Street, San
Francisco, CA 94102. (415) 864-0952. $20 per year. Jarret Wollstein is a Director of ISIL and the
author of 300 published articles.]
During the last few decades, a tidal wave of authoritarian legislation has been battering America. Little
by little, our freedom and our economic security are being destroyed. Here are just a few examples:
In January, 1992, the city government of Washington, D.C. passed legislation making gun
manufacturers civilly liable for massive damages if any person (other than a government agent)
uses one of their guns to cause bodily harm. If this law withstands legal challenges, most U.S.
firearms manufacturers could be bankrupted within a few years by damage claims just from
Washington, D.C. (which is the murder capital of America). Undoubtedly many other
jurisdictions will adopt similar laws if D.C.'s manufacturer liability law is upheld.
On September 1, 1992, 1600 pages of new Department of Health and Human Services
regulations went into effect. Among other things, these regulations banned most medical testing
by doctors in their own offices. These new regulations will dramatically increase the cost of
health care, greatly delay test results, and create a new class of crimes for physicians.
During the summer of 1992, the school board of Montgomery County, Maryland introduced
new "sexual harassment" rules which would require principals to discipline or expel students
accused of (among other things) "unwanted flirtations" and "graphic or verbal comments about
an individual's body or dress." Under these rules, if someone takes offense at your smiling at
them or saying "that's a lovely dress," you would be subject to punishment. Around the country,
other sexual harassment and stalking laws prohibit telling dirty jokes, repeatedly asking
someone for a date, or walking behind them. In some states you now can be imprisoned without
trial if someone simply accuses you (without independent corroboration) of "stalking." Such
laws are placing the most minute details of our personal lives under government control.
In Michigan, legislation is now pending giving police "no-knock waivers," allowing armed
SWAT teams to break down doors and enter homes without any advance warning. As John
Dentinger documented in his PLAYBOY article "Narc, Narc," thousands of Americans
nationwide are now being terrorized, beaten and even killed in their own homes as a result of
police drug raids at the wrong house.
One-fourth of our nation's elementary and junior high schools now have DARE programs (Drug
Abuse Resistance Education). During these 17-week courses, uniformed police officers teach
children the official government line on drugs. Correct answers to policemen's questions are
rewarded with small gifts and candy. Instructors encourage children to call police and turn in
their parents and friends "for their own good," if they see them using drugs. What police don't
tell children is that if they turn their parents in, their parents will be immediately arrested, the
children may be placed in foster care, and their homes can be confiscated under civil forfeiture
laws. The exact content of DARE is secret. Instructors refuse to let parents see teaching manuals
or sit in on classes. [Editor: This sounds a lot like what bureaucrats in the former Soviet police
state encouraged children to do starting a generation ago - spy on their parents.]
Another particularly disturbing trend is the rapid expansion of local, state and federal civil asset
forfeiture laws. In complete defiance of the Bill of Rights, these laws enable government
agencies to confiscate cash, cars, homes and businesses without indictment, trial or conviction.
Totally innocent people and others accused of minor offenses, are losing everything they own.
In the last three years, police in Volusia County, Florida (near Disney World) have seized over
$8 million in cash and property from motorists stopped for minor traffic violations (Orlando
Sentinel, 8/12/92). In New York City alone, 10,000 cars a year are seized and sold by the city,
which keeps the revenue. Nationwide, government seizures are now doubling every year. Over
$644 million in property was seized in 1991, and over $1.2 billion will be seized this year. Once
property is seized by the government, it is virtually impossible to get it back.
Every Constitutional defense against asset forfeiture is being abolished. Recently the "Justice"
Department has taken the position that once an illegal act occurs on some property (for
example, if someone sells drugs in an apartment building, hotel or restaurant), that property
belongs to the government from the moment of the illegal act, even if the owners knew nothing
about it and had no involvement with the "crime" (U.S. v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, NJ.
No. 91-781).
The rate at which totalitarian legislation is being introduced and passed is truly mind-boggling. Pending
federal laws include:
HR 1790 which would prohibit the manufacture or sale of most independent replacement parts
for cars, appliances or furniture (car repair costs alone would triple);
The 1992 Omnibus Crime Bill, which lists 52 acts requiring a federal death penalty, including
mailing an undefined "injurious device"; and
The Arctic Penitentiary Act which mandates the establishment of a U.S. prison camp (gulag)
above the Arctic Circle for drug users and sellers.
Laws now being passed in the U.S. closely parallel those enacted by Adolph Hitler during the early
years of his rule: Banning of firearms, confiscation of property without due process, and the
establishment of "shock incarceration centers." With millions of laws now on the books, there is not a
single person in America who hasn't broken some of them. In 1991 alone, the Federal Register
published 67,715 pages of new federal laws and regulations each of us is required to obey. This is in
addition to over one million pages of laws and regulations already enacted. (Remember, ignorance of
the law is no excuse!) Anyone in the U.S. can now be legally accused of a crime, "detained" in jail for
months or years without trial, and have all of their property summarily confiscated by the government
based upon mere accusation.
While politicians argue about details, the great majority of our political "leaders" support the substance
of these authoritarian laws - including George Bush, Bill Clinton, Ross Perot, and most members of
Congress and state legislatures. Totalitarian legislation is also supported by most federal judges, 80% of
whom were appointed by Reagan or Bush. So regardless of who wins in November, we can expect
legislatures to pass and courts to uphold more and more authoritarian laws.
Incredibly most Americans remain totally unaware of how government has destroyed their economic
security, and how few rights they have left. (The establishment media and government schools certainly
don't tell them!) And when most Americans become aware, they feel too isolated, weak, or afraid even
was never charged with a crime. But the police kept her mojey anyway. Nearly four years later, she is
still trying to get her money back.
Ethel Hylton is just one of a large and growing list of Americans - now numbering in the hundreds of
thousands - who have been victimized by civil asset forfeiture. Under civil asset forfeiture, everything
you own can be legally taken away even if you are never indicted, tried or convicted of a crime.
Suspicion of offenses which, if proven in court, might result in a $200 fine or probation, are being used
to justify seizure of tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property. Totally innocent
Americans are losing their cars, homes and businesses, based on the claims of anonymous informants
that illegal transactions took place on their property. Once property is seized, it is virtually impossible
to get it back.
Property is now being seized in every state and from every class of Americans. Seizures include pocket
money confiscated from public housing residents in Florida; cars taken away from men suspected of
soliciting prostitutes in Oregon; and homes taken away from ordinary, middle-class Americans whose
teenage children are accused of selling a few joints of marijuana. No person and no property is immune
from seizure. You could be the next victim. Here are some examples:
In Washington, D.C. police stop black men on the streets in poor areas of the city, and "routinely
confiscate small amounts of cash and jewelry." Most confiscated property is not even recorded
by police departments. "Resident Ben Davis calls it 'robbery with a badge.'" [USA Today,
5/18/92].
In Iowa, "a woman accused of shoplifting a $25 sweater had her $18,000 car - specially
equipped for her handicapped daughter - seized as the 'getaway vehicle.'" [USA Today, 5/18/92].
In December 1988, Detroit drug police raided a grocery store, but failed to find any drugs. After
drug dogs reacted to three $1.00 bills in the cash register, the police seized $4,384 from cash
registers and the store safe. According to the Pittsburgh Press, over 92% of all cash in
circulation in the U.S. now shows some drug residue.
In April 1992, Dr. Joseph Disbrow was accused of practicing psychiatry without a license. His
crime was providing counselling services from a spare bedroom in his mother's house in
Monmouth, NJ. Counselling does not require a license in New Jersey. That didn't stop police
from seizing virtually everything of value from his mother's home, totalling over $60,000. The
forfeiture squad confiscated furniture, carpets, paintings, and even personal photographs.
Kathy and Mark Schrama were arrested just before Christmas 1990 at their home in New Jersey.
Kathy was charged with taking $500 worth of UPS packages from neighbors' porches. Mark
was charged with receiving stolen goods. If found guilty, they might have paid a small fine and
received probation. The day after their arrest, their house, cars and furniture were seized. Based
upon mere accusation, $150,000 in property was confiscated, without trial or indictment. Police
even took their clothing, eyeglasses, and Christmas presents for their 10-year-old son.
The incentive for government agencies to expand forfeiture is enormous. Agencies can easily seize
property and they usually keep what they take. According to the Pittsburgh Press, 80% of seizure
victims are never even charged with a crime. Law enforcement agencies often keep the best seized
cars, watches and TVs for their "departments," and sell the rest.
How extensive are seizures in America today? In April 1990, The Washington Post reported that the
U.S. Marshals Service alone had an inventory of over $1.4 billion in seized assets, including over
30,000 cars, boats, home and businesses. Federal and state agencies seizing property now include the
FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Coast Guard, the IRS, local police, highway patrol, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, FDA, and the Bureau of Land Management. Asset
forfeiture is a growth industry. Seizures have increased from $27 million in 1986, to over $644 million
days if served by mail, return receipt requested) in his individual capacity (Attorneys for the
agency which employs him cannot answer for him) is in a state of default. See the clerk of the
court for the procedure to obtain a default upon a nonresponding defendant. Defaulting
defendants become liable for the amount demanded in the suit.
5. File a motion for default against any defendant who does not respond to your interrogatories
within 45 days after service of the Complaint and summons upon him.
BY DECLARATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
and Legal Offices of Representation:
FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERTY
YOU ARE HEREBY & HEREIN NOTICED THAT the undersigned continues to ATTEST AND
AFFIRM, under penalty of perjury in the state of [state], a Republic, that your offices under the "color
of official office," "color of Law," by arbitrarily and capriciously confiscating my non-contraband
property without benefit of a jury trial, have committed the following injurious and damaging acts:
1. Abused your authority; see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991);
2. Disregarded due process provision of Article 3 2 3, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the
mandatory prohibition of Article 1, Sec. 9, of the United States Constitution, against Bills of
Attainder in the form of "pains and penalties" legislated under Federal authority: see Fletcher v.
Peck (1810) U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138; Cummings v. Missouri (1867), 71 U.S. 277, 323;
Selective Service v. Minn. Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-841(1983);
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.437, 447-449; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed2d 867 (1977); Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341
U.S. 716,722 (1951); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1965);
3. Breach of Contract (violation of oath), and Trespass;
4. Total disregard for my personal health, welfare;
5. Harassment and intimidation of myself.
Bluntly, you owe me a jury trial prior to property deprivation under fundamental law, whether you
claim your jurisdiction is civil or criminal; see the Supreme Court in United States v. Lovett, 323 U.S.
303, 315-318 (1945); FRCivP Rule 38; Amendments 5 & 6 , United States Constitution. You have
already committed an actionable offense against me; this notice is required to afford you opportunity to
correct yourself before I take action against you. The undersigned herein states that this is a FINAL
NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERTY against continued "malum in
se" actions "under color of law" damaging me through permanent conversion of my property.
This notice fully informs you of the unlawfulness of your actions. This notice constitutes actual notice
providing sufficient facts to put a prudent man of ordinary intelligence upon reasonable inquiry as to
the above stated facts. It creates the same legal effect as your having actual knowledge; see California
Civil Code 19; Dolch v. Ramsey, 57 C.A.2d 99,105 [2] (1943). For this reason, this notice nullifies
"objectively reasonable reliance on the law" as a defense on your part. In any action against you, this
notice will be a prominent exhibit displayed to the jury.
Should the property you have unlawfully confiscated from my possession not be returned ON OR
BEFORE____________________ 19____, request for investigations shall be instigated with the
District Grand Jury offices in, and/or District Civil Remedies shall be sought against you in your
individual capacity in the Courts with trial by Jury under the Common Law.
FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT
Declarant, of legal age and sovereign capability to act in his/her behalf, has read the foregoing FINAL
NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERY and has heard the foregoing
statements and brief, and states under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the facts and law stated therein are true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge, information,
and belief.
Dated:__________________________
Signed:__________________________
Declarant
JURAT
STATE OF [STATE]
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COUNTY OF
On this, _______day of__________________, 19____, before me, the undersigned Notary Public in
and for the State of [state], County______________________ , [name of Plaintiff] personally appeared
and proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
above verification to the above FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED
PROPERTY and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his individual capacity, and that by
his signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,
executed the verification.
Witness my hand and official seal
Signature of Notary
My commission expires
Property and Failed to Return the Property Promptly After Being Given Due Notice to do so.
[name of Plaintiff]
[street address]
[name of City], [state]
a Republic [zip]
[phone # of Plaintiff]
As a Sovereign American, in pro per
Plaintiff(s) for (WE THE PEOPLE)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DISTRICT
COURT OF COMMON LAW PLEADINGS,
[street address and city of court][state],
in and for the___________ District of the
REPUBLIC OF THE state of [state],
County of______________________,
s/REPUBLIC OF [state]
FOR THE COUNTY OF__________________
WE THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY [name of Plaintiff]
Plaintiff(s)
vs.
[names of Defendants with their
official capacities]
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CASE NO.
COMPLAINT AT LAW
BY DECLARATION:
1. Plaintiff and Declarant, [name of Plaintiff], one of "WE THE PEOPLE" of the United States of
America, a Sovereign American of age and full capability to act in his behalf, herein ATTESTS
AND AFFIRMS that a conspiracy against the rights of Americans (citizens), and deprivation of
said rights under color of law is cause for this Common Law Action in trespass, special
assumpsit, BREACH OF CONTRACT is herein made pursuant to declaration of plaintiff in the
following common law pleadings at Law.
2. This is a complaint at law for recovery of property and for money judgment; see Pernell v
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Article III, Section 2
of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. 1331, and Amendment VII of the Constitution of
the United States of America.
3. Plaintiff confers, consents, accords only to Common Law jurisdiction; plaintiff does not consent
nor confer any other type of jurisdiction: admiralty, maritime, equity, statutory, or otherwise. "If
the common law can try the cause, and give full redress, that alone takes away the admiralty
jurisdiction. This is the principle on which the decisions rest from the remotest periods." United
States Supreme Court in Ramsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheat. 611, 631, 632 (1827).
PARTIES AND VENUE
4. Plaintiff and declarant, [name of Plaintiff] , in pro per; sui juris, of Sovereign capability to act in
his behalf, and Citizen de jure, without prejudice, [street address], [name of City], [state] [zip].
5. Defendants and respondents [names and known address of individual defendants]
6. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does1 through
4999, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is
informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of these fictitiously-named defendants is
making or has a claim to the personal property or funds or obligation herein described which is
conflicting with the claims of defendants herein and which may subject plaintiff to vexatious
litigation with respect to such property, funds or obligation.
7. All government officials, defendant parties to this action, are sued in their individual capacities;
see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
TRESPASS
8. By this instrument, Plaintiff accuses the above named Defendants of Trespass, Breach of
Contract, and Said defendants, on or about__________________, to the present in the County
of__________________, State of [state], Defendant parties, Federal Officials acting "under
color of law," are acting as individuals entitled to no protections under the doctrine of
"SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY"; see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
9. Said Defendants as described above have arbitrarily, and capriciously deprived Plaintiff, [name
of Plaintiff], of property [specifically describe property] (Exhibit A [Agency receipts and
documents regarding property]) under "color of law" without provision for a judicial trial by
jury by reason of the asset forfeiture provisions of Federal Law exceeding Congressional
authority under the Federal Constitution. See the prohibition against "Bills of Attainder" in
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution; United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315-318 (1946); Selective Service v. Minn. Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 491 (1965); U.S. Const. Art. 3 2 3; Amendment 6.
10.Said confiscated property may be, and ordinarily is used for lawful purposes. Defendants refuse
to charge Plaintiff with any offense, yet continue to hold Plaintiff's non-contraband property; see
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 C.2d 283 (1951) on in rem seizure actions against
property ordinarily used for lawful purposes. Plaintiff warned Defendants on [date] to return
Plaintiff's property, and Defendant's refuse to return it. Defendants may not assert personal
immunity defenses such as "objectively reasonable reliance on existing law" because they have
already been warned of the nature of their error and have refused to correct it (Exhibit B
[FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERTY]). Defendants
failed to answer or to comply, deny, or to even respond in the time designated. Therefore their
omission is to be construed as an admission of the facts stated. This is a fact which cannot be
denied.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT
11.Plaintiff has one valid consensual contract with each of the above-named Federal officials. The
Sixth Article of the Constitution of the United States requires, "... all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution..." The oath was taken by these officers freely and
without reservation as the only condition to holding their positions.
12.These officials have failed to perform their office under oath, specifically denying multiple
Constitutional rights or specifically acting against or in excess of their office under a color of
law: specifically, depriving Plaintiff of due process under the Fifth Amendment and depriving
Plaintiff of property under the color of a law which is a form of "pains and penalties" forbidden
by the "Bills of Attainder" prohibition in the Ninth section of the First Article of the Federal
Constitution. Such rights or obligations are secured, preserved or defined by the Constitution to
prevent such abuses of government officials by their oaths to support the Constitution. Violation
of this oath is a breach of contract with the Plaintiff. As stated by Black's Sixth: a "Contract" is
"An agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a
particular thing"; a "breach or contract" is "Failure, without legal excuse, to perform any
promise which forms the whole or part of a contract."
WHEREAS Defendants, individually and through the official authority of office did conspire
individually and collectively and did TRESPASS upon the Sovereign rights immediately,
directly, and by implied force thereby causing injury to Plaintiff's sovereign rights; and
WHEREAS Defendants appearing individually through "Color of office" TRESPASS through
acts of "malum in se" plaintiff has been damaged as follows:
1. General Damages: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each defendant;
2. Punitive or Exemplary Damages: $100,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money each Defendant;
3. Special Damages: to be pleaded as follows:
a. For Conspiracy against the rights of Citizens: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money,
each Defendant;
b. For Deprivation of Rights under "color of law, office, or under official capacities" :
$1,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each Defendant.
c. for deprivation of property under "color of law" without regard for the minimal
standards of Due Process: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each Defendant;
d. For breach of their individual contracts with plaintiff; the oath of office of each
official, the fiduciary responsibility of each bank official: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful
money, each Defendant.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff, the premises considered, requests and prays the court try, ascertain, the
TRESPASS and violation of contract perpetrated by Defendants, individually, through their
official capacities and representations exercising "malum in se" with total disregard for
Plaintiff's inviolate Sovereign rights; and to adjudicate such Trespass quantitatively and
qualitatively through determination from Trial by Jury.
Jury Trial Demand
13.Under Rule 38 of the FRCivP, Plaintiff demands a jury trial as a matter of right secured by the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Affirmed and respectfully submitted this______ day of__________________, 19____
Signed:____________________________.
[name of Plaintiff], in pro per
as a Sovereign American
FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT
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CASE NO.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
in support of
ACTION IN TRESPASS and
SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." - Article 1, Section 9, United States
Constitution
No legislature, State or Federal, may pass a Bill of Attainder. See U.S. Const. Art. I, 9-10. F.O.P.
Lodge No. 121 v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir., 1988)
A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.
In this form the power of the legislature over the lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly
restrained...
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162,178 (1810
...In 1810 , Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, stated
that "[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do
both." This means, of course, that what were known at common law as bills of pains and penalties are
outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Court's pronouncement therefore served notice that the
Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of
pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar:
Legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups. See also
Ogden v. Sauders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1964
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts a punishment without a judicial trial.
If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pain and penalties. Within the meaning
of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the legislative
body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in the
language of the text books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any
of the forms or safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether
conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance
with its own notions of the enormity of the offense.
"Bills of this sort," says Mr. Justice Story, "have been most usually passed in England in times of
rebellion, or gross subserviency to the Crown, or of violent political excitement; periods in which all
nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the
rights and liberties of others." Story, Com. 1344. Cummings v Missouri, (1867) 71 U.S. 277, 323
...On the same day the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, also
held invalid on the same grounds an Act of Congress which required attorneys practicing before this
court to take a similar oath. Neither of these cases has ever been overruled. They stand for the
proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial are either bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution....
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take
away the life, liberty, or property of particular named persons because the legislature thinks them guilty
of conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country from
punishment without trial by duly constituted courts. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304. And
even the courts to which this important function was entrusted were commanded to stay their hands
until and unless certain tested safeguards were observed. An accused in court must be tried by an
impartial jury [emphasis added], has a right to be represented by counsel, he must be clearly informed
of the charge against him, the law which he is charged with violating must have been passed before he
committed the act charged, he must be confronted by the witnesses against him, he must not be
compelled to incriminate himself, he cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, and even
after conviction no cruel and unusual punishment can be inflicted upon him. See Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 235-238. When our Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, our ancestors had
ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in
the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they proscribed bills of attainder... United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-319 (1946
The District Court held that 12(f) falls within the category of congressional actions that Art. I, 9, cl.
3, of the Constitution bars by providing that "[N]o Bill of Attainder...shall be passed." A bill of attainder
was most recently described by this court as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial."
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383, n. 30 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). Appellants argue
that 12(f) does not satisfy any of these three requirements, i.e., specification of the affected persons,
punishment, and lack of a judicial trial. [We agree with appellants that the statute does not single out an
identifiable group that the denial of Title IV aid does not constitute punishment. Appellants also argue
that 12(f) does not dispense with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of
disagreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the applicant has registered,
12(f)(4), and that the decision made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. Appellants' argument
is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those affected by the statute [emphasis added].
Selective Service v. Minn. Public Int. Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846, 847 (1983).]
Where Rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1965
Those terms "law of the land" do not mean merely an act of the general assembly. If they did, every
restriction upon the legislative authority would be at once abrogated. For what more can the citizen
suffer than to be "taken, imprisoned, deprived of his freehold, liberties, and privileges, be outlawed,
exiled, and destroyed, and be deprived of his property, his liberty, and his life," without crime? Yet all
this may he may suffer if an act of the assembly simply denouncing those penalties upon particular
persons, or a particular class of persons, be in itself a law of the land within the sense of the
constitution; for what is, in that sense, the law of the land, must be duly observed by all, and upheld and
enforced by the courts.
In reference to the infliction of punishment and divesting of the rights of property, it has been
repeatedly held in this state, and it is believed in every other of the union, that there are limitations
upon the legislative power, notwithstanding those words; and that the clause itself means that such
legislative acts as profess in themselves directly to punish persons, or to deprive the citizen of his
property, without trial before the judicial tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right, as
determined by the laws under which it is vested, according to the course, mode, and usages of the
common law, as derived from our forefathers, are not effectually "laws of the land," for those purposes.
Hoke v. Henderson, 25 Am. Dec. 677, 688, 689 (1833) Supreme Court of North Carolina
"...While property kept in violation of law which is incapable of lawful use and declared to be a
nuisance per se may be forfeited without a trial by jury under the police power, it does not follow that
property ordinarily used for lawful purposes - innocent property - may be forfeited without a trial by
jury where an issue of fact is joined as to whether the property was being used for an unlawful purpose
or is to be taken from innocent owner. There is no general constitutional right to a jury trial in actions
for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband articles. But property is not contraband or a public nuisance
merely because it was instrumental in the commission of a public offense.
"[5] It is argued that this proceeding for the forfeiture of property used in violation of law is a special
proceeding, equitable in nature... The right to a trial by jury cannot be avoided by merely calling an
action a special proceeding or equitable in nature. If that could be done, the Legislature, by providing
new remedies and new judgments and decrees in form equitable, could in all cases dispense with jury
trials, and thus entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution. The legislature cannot convert a legal
right into an equitable one so as to infringe upon the right of trial by jury. The provision of the
Constitution does not permit the legislature to confer on the courts the power of trying according to the
course of chancery any question which has always been triable according to the course of the common
law by a jury. If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it
is to that extent an action at law. In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common
law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and
the facts of the particular case - the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the
action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law...
"[6]... The constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed. It is not limited strictly to
those cases in which it existed before the adoption of the Constitution but is extended to cases of like
nature as may afterwards arise. It embraces cases of the same class thereafter arising. At common law,
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, a party against whom the forfeiture of property used in
violation of law (then a carriage, wagon, horse or mule, now usually an automobile), was sought to be
enforced was entitled to a trial by jury. Consequently such rights exists now. The introduction of a new
subject into a class renders it amenable to its general rules, not to its exceptions.
"[7] There were petty offenses against statutes or municipal ordinances which were not triable by jury
at the time the Constitution was adopted. As to them, the right of trial by jury has never existed; and,
hence they were triable without a jury when the Constitution was adopted; they are now triable without
a jury. Blackstone gives a number of illustrations. In none of the illustrations given by Blackstone was
the power sanctioned or upheld to enforce, in a summary proceeding, without a jury, the forfeiture of
property which may be, and ordinarily is, used for lawful purposes...
"[8] We conclude that this forfeiture proceeding by the State is the type of action which was cognizable
in a common-law court, and triable by a jury in the Court of Exchequer, according to the course of the
common law; that trial by jury was recognized as a right in the trial of actions for the forfeiture or
property seized because used in violation of law at common law at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of California, and that appellant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of
fact in this case.
"[9] The denial of a trial by jury to one constitutionally entitled thereto constitutes a miscarriage of
justice and requires a reversal of the judgment. (Cowlin v. Pringle, 46 Cal.App.2d 472, 476 [116 P.2d
109].)" People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 C.2d 283, 299, 300 (1951
"A decision is arbitrary or capricious when it is not supported by evidence or when there is no
reasonable justification for the decision." Canty v. Board of Education, City of New York, 312 F. Sup.
254, 256 [5] (S.D.N.Y., 1970)
"[3]... While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental
"policy or custom," Officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official
capacities, may assert personal immunity defense such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing
law. Id., at 166-167, 105 S.Ct., at 3105-3106." Hafer v. Melo, 113 S.Ct. 358, 362 (1991
"This Court has long assumed that actions to recover land, like actions for damages to a person or
property, are action at law triable to a jury. In Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151, for example,
we recognized that 'it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general rule which would
determine, in all cases, what should be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from an action at law...;
but this may be said, that, where an action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific real or
personal property, or for recovery of a money judgment, the action is one at law." "The distinction
between 'title to and possession of property, of course, was well recognized at common law. But
however relevant it was for certain purposes, it had no bearing on the right to jury trial. The various
forms of action which the common law developed for the recovery of real property were also actions at
law in which trial by jury was afforded." Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363
The Phrase 'common law' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and
maritime jurisprudence. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peter 433, 447 (1830)
If the common law can try the cause and give full redress, that alone takes away the admiralty
jurisdiction. Ramsey v. Allegrie, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 611, 631 (1827
A complaint may not be dismissed on motion if it states some sort of claim, baseless though it may
prove to be and inartistically as the complaint may be drawn. This is particularly true where the
plaintiff is not represented by counsel. Brooks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 91 F. Supp. 101 (1950
"A person may not have actual knowledge of certain facts, but if he has knowledge of sufficient facts to
cause a reasonably prudent person of ordinary intelligence to make inquiry, the law will impute
knowledge of those facts which may be easily ascertained by reasonable inquiry. When the law imputes
knowledge, it has the same legal effect as though there was actual knowledge." Dolch v Ramsey, 57
C.A.2d 99, 105 [2] (1943
"The Trial of all Crimes [emphasis added], except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." Article
3, Section 2, United States Constitution
"... Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Constitution,
Amendment 5
" In all criminal prosecutions [emphasis added], the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Constitution,
Amendment 6
DATE:________________________
x:____________________________
From:
[name of Plaintiff]
[street address of Plaintiff]
[city], [state]
a Republic [zip]
BY DECLARATION
To [State agent] and Legal Offices of Representation:
FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERTY
YOU ARE HEREBY & HEREIN NOTICED THAT the undersigned continues to ATTEST AND
AFFIRM, under penalty of perjury in the state of [state], a Republic, that your offices under the "color
of official office," "color of Law," by arbitrarily and capriciously confiscating my non-contraband
property without benefit of a jury trial, have committed the following injurious and damaging acts:
1. Abused your authority; see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991);
2. Disregarded due process provision of Article 3 2 3, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the
mandatory prohibition of Article 1, Sec. 9, of the United States Constitution, against Bills of
Attainder in the form of "pains and penalties" legislated under Federal authority: see Fletcher v.
Peck (1810) U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138; Cummings v. Missouri (1867), 71 U.S. 277, 323;
Selective Service v. Minn. Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-841(1983);
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.437, 447-449; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed2d 867 (1977); Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341
U.S. 716,722 (1951); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1965);
3. Breach of Contract (violation of oath), and Trespass;
4. Total disregard for my personal health, welfare;
5. Harassment and intimidation of myself.
Bluntly, you owe me a jury trial prior to property deprivation under fundamental law, whether you
claim your jurisdiction is civil or criminal; see the Supreme Court in United States v. Lovett, 323 U.S.
303, 315-318 (1945); FRCivP Rule 38; Amendments 5 & 6 , United States Constitution. You have
already committed an actionable offense against me; this notice is required to afford you opportunity to
correct yourself before I take action against you. The undersigned herein states that this is a FINAL
NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERY against continued "malum in se"
actions "under color of law" damaging me through permanent conversion of my property.
This notice fully informs you of the unlawfulness of your actions. This notice constitutes actual notice
providing sufficient facts to put a prudent man of ordinary intelligence upon reasonable inquiry as to
the above stated facts. It creates the same legal effect as your having actual knowledge; see California
Civil Code 19; Dolch v. Ramsey, 57 C.A.2d 99,105 [2] (1943). For this reason, this notice nullifies
"objectively reasonable reliance on the law" as a defense on your part. In any action against you, this
notice will be a prominent exhibit displayed to the jury.
Should the property you have unlawfully confiscated from my possession not be returned ON OR
BEFORE____________, 199____, request for investigations shall be instigated with the District Grand
Jury offices in, and/or District Civil Remedies shall be sought against you in your individual capacity
in the Courts with trial by Jury under the Common Law.
FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT
Declarant, of legal age and sovereign capability to act in his/her behalf, has read the foregoing FINAL
NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERY and has heard the foregoing
statements and brief, and states under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the facts and law stated therein are true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge, information,
and belief.
Dated:________________________
Signed:_______________________
Declarant
JURAT
STATE OF [STATE]
COUNTY OF
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On this ______ day of _________________ , 199____, before me, the undersigned Notary Public in
and for the State of [state], County of _________________ [name of Plaintiff] personally appeared and
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
above verification to the above FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED
PROPERTY and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his individual capacity, and that by
his signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,
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CASE NO.
COMPLAINT AT LAW
BY DECLARATION:
1. Plaintiff and Declarant, [name of Plaintiff], one of "WE THE PEOPLE" of the Republic of the
state of [state], a Sovereign American, of age and full capability to act in his behalf, herein
ATTESTS AND AFFIRMS that a conspiracy against the rights of Americans (citizens), and
deprivation of said rights under color of law is cause for this Common Law Action in trespass,
special assumpsit, BREACH OF CONTRACT, and notice of levy is herein made pursuant to
declarations of plaintiff in the following common law pleadings at Law.
2. This is a complaint at law for recovery of property and for money judgment under the common
law; see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C.1331 and Amendment VII of
the Constitution of the United States of America.
3. Plaintiff confers, consents accords only to Common Law jurisdiction: plaintiff does not consent
nor confer any other type of jurisdiction: admiralty, maritime, equity, statutory, or otherwise.
PARTIES AND VENUE
4. Plaintiff and declarant, [name of Plaintiff], in pro per; sui juris, of Sovereign capability to act in
his behalf, and Citizen de jure, without prejudice, [street address], [name of City], [state] [zip].
5. Defendants and respondents [names and known address of individual defendants
6. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does 1
through 4999, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff
will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is
informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of these fictitiously named defendants is
making or has a claim to the personal property or funds or obligation herein described which is
conflicting with the claims of defendants herein and which may subject plaintiff to vexatious
litigation with respect to such property, funds or obligation.
7. All government officials, defendant parties to this action, are sued in their individual capacities;
see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
TRESPASS
8. By this instrument, Plaintiff accuses the above named Defendants of Trespass, Breach of
Contract, and on or about ___________ , to the present in the County of________________ ,
State [state], Defendant parties, State Officials acting "under color of law," are acting as
individuals entitled to no protections under the doctrine of "SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY"; see
Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
9. Said Defendants as described above have deprived Plaintiff, [name of Plaintiff], of property
[specifically describe property] (Exhibit A [Agency receipts and documents regarding property])
under "color of law" without due process of law by the use of asset forfeiture provisions of de
facto [state] State Law that violate specific prohibitions in the United States Constitution.
10.Said property may be, and ordinarily is used for lawful purposes. Defendants refuse to charge
Plaintiff with any offense, yet continue to hold Plaintiff's property. This forfeiture cannot be
sanctioned without a jury trial under [state]'s Constitution; see Article 1, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution on prohibitions against any state legislating "Bills of Attainder" in
the form of "pains and penalties"; see also Fletcher v. Peck, (1810) 10 U.S. ( 6 Cranch) 87, 138;
Cummings v. Missouri, (1867) 71 U.S. 277, 323; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447
(1964); Hoke v. Henderson, 25 Am. Dec. 677, 688, 689 (1833); Selective Service v. Minn.
Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846, 848 (1983); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436,491 (1965). Plaintiff warned Defendants on [date] to return Plaintiff's property, and
Defendants refuse to return it. Defendants may not assert personal immunity defenses such a
"objectively reasonable reliance on existing law" because they have already been warned of the
nature of their error and have refused to correct it (Exhibit B [FINAL NOTICE AND
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CASE NO.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
in support of
ACTION IN TRESPASS and
SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." - Article 1, Section 9, United States
Constitution
No legislature, State or Federal, may pass a Bill of Attainder. See U.S. Const. Art. I, 9-10. F.O.P.
Lodge No. 121 v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir., 1988)
A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.
In this form the power of the legislature over the lives and fortunes of individuals is expressly
restrained... Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162,178 (1810)
...In 1810 , Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, stated
that "[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do
both." This means, of course, that what were known at common law as bills of pains and penalties are
outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Court's pronouncement therefore served notice that the
Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical reading (which would exclude bills of
pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar:
Legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups. See also
Ogden v. Sauders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1964
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts a punishment without a judicial trial.
If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pain and penalties. Within the meaning
of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the legislative
body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in the
language of the text books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any
of the forms or safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether
conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance
with its own notions of the enormity of the offense.
"Bills of this sort," says Mr. Justice Story, "have been most usually passed in England in times of
rebellion, or gross subserviency to the Crown, or of violent political excitement; periods in which all
nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the
rights and liberties of others." Story, Com. 1344. Cummings v Missouri, (1867) 71 U.S. 277, 323
...On the same day the Cummings case was decided, the Court, in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, also
held invalid on the same grounds an Act of Congress which required attorneys practicing before this
court to take a similar oath. Neither of these cases has ever been overruled. They stand for the
proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial are either bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution....
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take
away the life, liberty, or property of particular named persons because the legislature thinks them guilty
of conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country from
punishment without trial by duly-constituted courts. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304. And
even the courts to which this important function was entrusted were commanded to stay their hands
until and unless certain tested safeguards were observed. An accused in court must be tried by an
impartial jury [emphasis added], has a right to be represented by counsel, he must be clearly informed
of the charge against him, the law which he is charged with violating must have been passed before he
committed the act charged, he must be confronted by the witnesses against him, he must not be
compelled to incriminate himself, he cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, and even
after conviction no cruel and unusual punishment can be inflicted upon him. See Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 235-238. When our Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, our ancestors had
ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in
the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they proscribed bills of attainder... United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-319 (1946
The District Court held that 12(f) falls within the category of congressional actions that Art. I, 9, cl.
3, of the Constitution bars by providing that "[N]o Bill of Attainder...shall be passed." A bill of attainder
was most recently described by this court as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial."
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 383, n. 30 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). Appellants argue
that 12(f) does not satisfy any of these three requirements, i.e., specification of the affected persons,
punishment, and lack of a judicial trial. [We agree with appellants that the statute does not single out an
identifiable group that the denial of Title IV aid does not constitute punishment. Appellants also argue
that 12(f) does not dispense with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of
disagreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the applicant has registered,
12(f)(4), and that the decision made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. Appellants' argument
is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those affected by the statute [emphasis added].
Selective Service v. Minn. Public Int. Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846, 847 (1983).]
Where Rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1965
"...While property kept in violation of law which is incapable of lawful use and declared to be a
nuisance per se may be forfeited without a trial by jury under the police power, it does not follow that
property ordinarily used for lawful purposes - innocent property - may be forfeited without a trial by
jury where an issue of fact is joined as to whether the property was being used for an unlawful purpose
or is to be taken from innocent owner. There is no general constitutional right to a jury trial in actions
for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband articles. But property is not contraband or a public nuisance
merely because it was instrumental in the commission of a public offense.
"[5] It is argued that this proceeding for the forfeiture of property used in violation of law is a special
proceeding, equitable in nature... The right to a trial by jury cannot be avoided by merely calling an
action a special proceeding or equitable in nature. If that could be done, the Legislature, by providing
new remedies and new judgments and decrees in form equitable, could in all cases dispense with jury
trials, and thus entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution. The legislature cannot convert a legal
right into an equitable one so as to infringe upon the right of trial by jury. The provision of the
Constitution does not permit the legislature to confer on the courts the power of trying according to the
course of chancery any question which has always been triable according to the course of the common
law by a jury. If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it
is to that extent an action at law. In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common
law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and
the facts of the particular case - the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the
action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law...
"[6]... The constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed. It is not limited strictly to
those cases in which it existed before the adoption of the Constitution but is extended to cases of like
nature as may afterwards arise. It embraces cases of the same class thereafter arising. At common law,
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, a party against whom the forfeiture of property used in
violation of law (then a carriage, wagon, horse or mule, now usually an automobile), was sought to be
enforced was entitled to a trial by jury. Consequently such rights exists now. The introduction of a new
subject into a class renders it amenable to its general rules, not to its exceptions.
"[7] There were petty offenses against statutes or municipal ordinances which were not triable by jury
at the time the Constitution was adopted. As to them, the right of trial by jury has never existed; and,
hence they were triable without a jury when the Constitution was adopted, they are not triable without a
jury. Blackstone gives a number of illustrations. In none of the illustrations given by Blackstone was
the power sanctioned or upheld to enforce, in a summary proceeding, without a jury, the forfeiture of
property which may be, and ordinarily is, used for lawful purposes...
"[8] We conclude that this forfeiture proceeding by the State is the type of action which was cognizable
in a common-law court, and triable by a jury in the Court of Exchequer, according to the course of the
common law; that trial by jury was recognized as a right in the trial of actions for the forfeiture of
property seized because used in violation of law at common law at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of California, and that appellant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of
fact in this case.
"[9] The denial of a trial by jury to one constitutionally entitled thereto constitutes a miscarriage of
justice and requires a reversal of the judgment. (Cowlin v. Pringle, 46 Cal. App.2d 472, 476 [116 P.2d
109].)" People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 C.2d 283, 299, 300 (1951
"The legislature is without power to expropriate one's property by a mere legislative enactment."
Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 230 P.2d 119 127 [13-16], District Court of Appeal,
Second District Division 2, California (1951) Charner v. Rose, 70 C. 189, 191 (1886)
"Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due
process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct may be changed at will . . . of the legislature, unless
prevented by constitutional limitations [emphasis added]." Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury,170 Cal.
686, 696 (1915
"Thus there is recognized the incontestable proposition that the exercise of the police power, though an
essential attribute of sovereignty for public welfare and arbitrary in its nature, cannot extend beyond the
necessities of the case and made a cloak to destroy constitutional rights as to the inviolateness of
private property." House v. L.A. County Flood Control Dist., 25 C.2d 384, 388, 389 (1944
"[3] . . . While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental
"policy or custom," officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official
capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing
law. Id., at 166-167, 105 S.Ct., at 3105-3106." Hafer v. Melo,113 S.Ct. 358, 362 (1991
"This Court has long assumed that actions to recover land, like actions for damages to a person or
property, are actions at law triable to a jury. In Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151, for example,
we recognized that 'it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general rule which would
determine, in all cases, what should be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from an action at
law. . . ; but this may be said, that, where an action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific
real or personal property, or for recovery of a money judgment, the action is one at law." "The
distinction between 'title to and possession of property, of course, was well recognized at common law.
But however relevant it was for certain purposes, it had no bearing on the right to a jury trial. The
various forms of action which the common law developed for the recovery of real property were also
actions at law in which trial by jury was afforded." Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363.
The Phrase 'common law' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and
maritime jurisprudence. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peter 433, 446.
By common law, they (framers of the Seventh Amendment) meant what the constitution denominated
in the third article 'law,' not merely suits which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction
to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or
where, as in the admiralty, mixture of public law and of maritime law and equity was often found in the
same suit. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peter 433, 447 (1830).
If the common law can try the cause and give full redress, that alone takes away the admiralty
jurisdiction. Brooks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 91 F. Supp. 101 (1959
" A person may not have actual knowledge of certain facts, but if he has knowledge of sufficient facts
to cause a reasonably prudent person of ordinary intelligence to make inquiry, the law will impute
knowledge of those facts which may be easily ascertained by reasonable inquiry. When the law imputes
knowledge, it has the same legal effect as though there was actual knowledge." Dolch v. Ramsey, 57
C.A.2d 99, 105 [2] (1943
Those terms "law of the land" do not mean merely an act of the general assembly. If they did, every
restriction upon the legislative authority would be at once abrogated. For what more can the citizen
suffer than to be "taken, imprisoned, deprived of his freehold, liberties, and privileges, be outlawed,
exiled, and destroyed, and be deprived of his property, his liberty, and his life," without crime? Yet all
this may he may suffer if an act of the assembly simply denouncing those penalties upon particular
persons, or a particular class of persons, be in itself a law of the land within the sense of the
constitution: for what is, in that sense, the law of the land, must be duly observed by all, and upheld and
enforced by the courts.
In reference to the infliction of punishment and divesting of the rights of property, it has been
repeatedly held in this state, and it is believed in every other of the union, that there are limitations
upon the legislative power, notwithstanding those words; and that the clause itself means that such
legislative acts as profess in themselves directly to punish persons, or to deprive the citizen of his
property, without trial before the judicial tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of rights, as
determined by the laws under which it is vested, according to the course, mode, and usages of the
common law, as derived from our forefathers, are not effectually "laws of the land," for those purposes.
Hoke v. Henderson, 25 Am, Dec. 677, 688, 689 (1833) Supreme Court of North Carolina
DATE:________________________
X:____________________________
) CASE NO.
)
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PLAINTIFF(S)
v.
[names of Defendants with their
official capacities]
John Does x through 4999
All Defendants in
their individual capacities
DEFENDANT(S)
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, [name of plaintiff], requests the following interrogatories
be answered and copies of documents produced and mailed or delivered to the Plaintiff's address at:
[Plaintiff's address]. This request is made pursuant to discovery rights under Federal rules. Thank you
for your cooperation.
DATE:__________________ X:__________________
1. Under what statute, and under what regulations and administrative policies was this asset
forfeiture established?
2. Have you read the Constitution of the United States?
3. Have you taken an oath binding you to support the Constitution of the United States, as required
for all State officers by clause 3 of the Sixth Article of the Constitution, and by 4 U.S.C. 101,
102?
4. Do you believe you have authorization from some other person to violate your oath?
5. Have you ever taken an oath to any entity or organization which you believe supersedes your
oath to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
__________________? If so, what organization?
6. How much money do you expect your office to retain from this seizure?
7. Do you know the meaning of the term "Bill of Attainder"?
Notice to Produce Documents
1. Please send a photocopy of the paperwork justifying your taking of my property, a copy of the
statute that allows you to take my property, and a copy of your oath of office.
COUNTY OF
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On this_____ day of__________________ 199____, before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and
for the State of California, County of________________, [name of Plaintiff] personally appeared and
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
above verification to the above FINAL NOTICE AND REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED
PROPERTY and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his individual capacity, and that by
his signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted,
executed the verification.
Witness my hand and official seal
Signature of Notary____________________
Date of Document________________
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CASE NO.
COMPLAINT AT LAW
ACTION IN TRESPASS and
SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT
Demand for
Trail by Jury at Common Law
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
NOTICE OF LIEN
CCP 700. 015
CCP 699.540
BY DECLARATION:
1. Plaintiff and Declarant, [name of Plaintiff], one of "WE THE PEOPLE" of the Republic of the
state of California, a Sovereign American, of age and full capability to act in his behalf, herein
ATTESTS AND AFFIRMS that a conspiracy against the rights of Americans (citizens), and
deprivation of said rights under color of law is cause for this Common Law Action in trespass,
special assumpsit, BREACH OF CONTRACT, and notice of levy in herein made pursuant to
declarations of plaintiff in the following common law pleadings at law.
2. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Article VI, Section 10, Paragraph 2 of the California
State Constitution; and Amendment VII of the Constitution of the United States of America.
3. Plaintiff confers, consents, accords only to Common Law jurisdiction; plaintiff does not consent
nor confer any other type of jurisdiction: admiralty, maritime, equity, statutory, or otherwise.
PARTIES AND VENUE
4. Plaintiff and declarant, [name of Plaintiff], in pro per; sui juris, of Sovereign capability to act in
his behalf, and Citizen de jure, without prejudice, [street address], [name of City], California
[zip].
5. Defendants and respondents [names and known address of individual defendants
6. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does 1
through 4999, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff
will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is
informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of these fictitiously named defendants is
making of has a claim to the personal property or funds or obligation herein described which is
conflicting with the claims of defendants herein and which may subject plaintiff to vexatious
litigation with respect to such property, funds or obligation.
7. All government officials, defendant parties to this action, are sued in their individual capacities;
see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
TRESPASS
8. By this instrument, Plaintiff accuses the above named Defendants of Trespass, Breach of
Contract, and Said defendants, on or about __________________, to the present in the County
of __________________, State of California, Defendant parties, State Officials acting "under
color of law," are acting as individuals entitled to no protections under the doctrine of
"SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY"; see Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991).
9. Said Defendants as described above have deprived Plaintiff, [name of Plaintiff], of property
[specifically describe property] (Exhibit A [Agency receipts and documents regarding property]
under "color of law" without due process of law by the use of asset forfeiture provisions of
California State Law which exceeds the State's authority under the California State Constitution.
10.Said property may be, and ordinarily is used for lawful purposes. Defendants' refuse to charge
Plaintiff with any offense, yet continue to hold Plaintiff's property. This forfeiture cannot be
sanctioned without a jury trial under California's Constitution; see People v. One 1941
Chevrolet Coupe, 37 C.2d 283 (1951) on in rem seizure actions against property ordinarily used
for lawful purposes. Plaintiff warned Defendants on [date] to return Plaintiff's property, and
Defendant's refuse to return it. Defendants may not assert personal immunity defenses such a
"objectively reasonable reliance on existing law" because they have already been warned of the
nature of their error and have refused to correct it (Exhibit B [FINAL NOTICE AND
REQUEST TO RETURN CONFISCATED PROPERTY]).
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT
11.Plaintiff has one valid consensual contract with each of the above named State and local
officials. The Sixth Article of the Constitution of the United States requires, ". . . all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath
of Affirmation, to support this Constitution. . ."; the oath of office is required before taking such
office by the State Constitution, Article xx Section 3. The oath was taken by these officers freely
and without reservation as the only condition to holding their positions.
12.These officials have failed to perform their office under oath, specifically denying multiple
Constitutional rights or specifically acting against or in excess of their office under a color of
law: specifically, depriving Plaintiff of due process and depriving Plaintiff of property without
due process which is described under the provisions of the California State Constitution. Such
rights or obligations are secured, preserved or defined by the Constitution to prevent such
abuses of government officials by their oaths to support the Constitution. Violation of this oath
is a breach of contract with the Plaintiff. As stated by Black's Sixth: a "Contract" is "An
agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a
particular thing"; a "breach of contract" is "Failure, without legal excuse, to perform any
promise which forms the whole or part of a contract."
WHEREAS Defendants, individually and through the official authority of office did conspire
individually and collectively and did TRESPASS upon the Sovereign rights immediately,
directly, and by implied force thereby causing injury to Plaintiff's sovereign rights; and
WHEREAS Defendants appearing individually through "Color of office" TRESPASS through
acts of"malum in se" plaintiff has been damaged as follows:
1. General Damages: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each defendant;
2. Punitive or Exemplary Damages: $100,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money each Defendant;
3. Special Damages: to be pleaded as follows:
a. For Conspiracy against the rights of Citizens: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money,
each Defendant;
b. For Deprivation of Rights under "color of law, office, or under official capacities" :
$1,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each Defendant.
c. for deprivation of property under "color of law" without regard for the minimal
standards of Due Process: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful money, each Defendant;
d. For breach of their individual contracts with plaintiff; the oath of office of each
official, the fiduciary responsibility of each bank official: $10,000.00 U.S.D. in lawful
money, each Defendant.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff, the premises considered, requests and prays the court try, ascertain, the
TRESPASS and violation of contract perpetrated by Defendants, individually, through their
official capacities and representations exercising "malum in se" with total disregard for
Plaintiff's inviolate Sovereign rights; and to adjudicate such Trespass quantitatively and
qualitatively through determination from Trial by Jury.
13.Plaintiff demands a jury trial as a matter of right secured by the California State Constitution:
"The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial
may be waived by the parties, in all civil cases, in a manner to be prescribed by law." Article 1,
Section 3, California Constitution 1849, Declaration of Rights
Affirmed and respectfully submitted this_______ day of____________, 199___
Signed:___________________________
[name of Plaintiff], in pro per as a Sovereign American
)
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CASE NO.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
in support of
ACTION IN TRESPASS and
SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT
DEFENDANT(S)
)
)
"All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property
[emphasis added]; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." California State Constitution,
Article 1, Section 1.
This inalienable right has been established in the due course of law under the provisions of our State
Constitution:
"Where a right to trial by jury has been established under state law, the state cannot deny a particular
accused that right without violating even the minimal standards of the due process clause. See Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct 1639, 6.L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th
Cir. 1978); Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975). . .; Braley v. Gladden, 403 F.2d 858, 860-861
(9th Cir. 1968)." Klimas v. Mabry, 519 F.2d 842 848 (8th Cir. 1979
"England, from whom the Western World has largely taken its concepts of individual liberty and of the
dignity and worth of every man, has bequeathed to us safeguards for their preservation, the most
priceless of which is that of trial by jury. This right has become as much American as it was once the
most English. Although this Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand the use of
jury trials in a State's criminal procedure, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261; Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, every State has constitutionally provided trial by jury. See Columbia University Legislative
Drafting Research Fund, Index Digest of State Constitutions, 578-579 (1959). In essence, the right to
jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors.
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process
[emphasis added]. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510. "A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136." Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 721-722 (1960
"The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all [emphasis added], and remain inviolate forever; but a
jury trial may be waived by the parties, in all civil cases, in manner to be prescribed by law." Article 1,
Section 3, California Constitution 1849, Declaration of Rights
"A person may not by deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law [emphasis added]
. . ." Article 1, 7, 15, California State Constitution
"Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all [emphasis added], but in a civil cause
three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." Article 1, Section 16, California State Constitution
" . . . While property kept in violation of law which is incapable of lawful use and declared to be a
nuisance per se may be forfeited without a trial by jury under the police power, it does not follow that
property ordinarily used for lawful purposes - innocent property - may be forfeited without a trial by
jury where an issue of fact is joined as to whether the property was being used for an unlawful purpose
or is to be taken from an innocent owner. There is no general constitutional right to a jury trial in
actions for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband or a public nuisance merely because it was
instrumental in the commission of a public offense.
"[5] It is argued that this proceeding for the forfeiture of property used in violation of law is a special
proceeding, equitable in nature . . .The right to a trial by jury cannot be avoided by merely calling and
action a special proceeding or equitable in nature. If that could be done, the Legislature, by providing
new remedies and new judgments and decrees in form equitable, could in all cases dispense with jury
trials, and thus entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution. The legislature cannot convert a legal
right into an equitable one so as to infringe upon the right of trial by jury. The provision of the
Constitution does not permit the legislature to confer on the courts the power of trying according to the
course of chancery any question which has always been triable according to the course of the common
law by a jury. If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it
is to that extent an action at law. In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common
law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and
the facts of the particular case - the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the
action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law. . .
"[6] . . . The constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed. It is not limited strictly
to those cases in which it existed before the adoption of the Constitution but is extended to cases of like
nature as may afterwards arise. It embraces cases of the same class thereafter arising. At common law,
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, a party against whom the forfeiture of property used in
violation of law (then a carriage, wagon, horse or mule, now usually an automobile), was sought to be
enforced was entitled to a trial by jury. Consequently such right exists now. The introduction of a new
subject into a class renders it amenable to its general rules, not to its exceptions.
"[7] There were petty offenses against statutes or municipal ordinances which were not triable by jury
at the time the Constitution was adopted, they are not triable without a jury. Blackstone was the power
sanctioned or upheld to enforce, in summary proceeding, without a jury, the forfeiture of property
which may be, and ordinarily is, used for lawful purposes. . .
"[8] We conclude that this forfeiture proceeding by the State is the type of action which was cognizable
in a common-law court, and triable by a jury in the Court of Exchequer, according to the course of the
common law; that trial by jury was recognized as a right in the trial of actions for the forfeiture of
property seized because used in violation of law at common law at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of California, and that appellant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of
fact in this case.
"[9] The denial of a trial by jury to one constitutionally entitled thereto constitutes a miscarriage of
justice and requires a reversal of the judgment. (Cowlin v. Pringle, 46 Cal.App.2d 472, 476 [116 P.2d
109].)" People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 C.2d 283, 299, 300 (1951)
"The legislature is without power to expropriate one's property by a mere legislative enactment."
Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 230 P.2d 119 127 [13-16] District Court of Appeal,
Second District Division 2, California (1951), Charner v. Rose, 70 C. 189, 191 (1886)
"Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due
process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct may be changed at will . . . of the legislature, unless
prevented by constitutional limitations [emphasis added]." Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal.
686, 696 (1915
"Thus there is recognized the incontestable proposition that the exercise of the police power, though an
essential attribute of sovereignty for public welfare and arbitrary in its nature, cannot extend beyond the
necessities of the case and made a cloak to destroy constitutional rights as to the inviolateness of
private property." House v. L.A. County Flood Control Dist., 25 C.2d 384, 388, 389 (1944
"[3]. . . While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental
"policy or custom," officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official
capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing
law. Id., at 166-167, 105 S.Ct., at 3105-3106." Hafer v. Melo, 113 S.Ct. 358, 362 (1991)
DATE:____________________
X:________________________
"Notice of Lien"
[name of Plaintiff]
[street address]
[city], California
a Republic [zip]
[phone # of Plaintiff
in pro per, de jure, sui juris
as a Sovereign American
SUPERIOR COURT OF COMMON LAW PLEADINGS
[street and city address of court] California, in
and for the REPUBLIC OF THE state of California,
County of_______________, s/REPUBLIC OF California
[NAME OF PLAINTIFF],
Plaintiff,
vs.
[name each defendant
with his official capacity]
John and Jane Does x through 4999
ALL Defendants individually,
Defendants
) CASE NO.
)
) NOTICE OF LIEN: CCP 699.540
) CCP 700.015
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BY DECLARATION TO : [names of known defendants] and to all other persons known and unknown
who may be similarly situated and all other concerned persons and parties yet to be known in the
future.
YOUR ARE HEREBY notified that a Common Law Lien and Writ of Attachment on Real and Personal
Property is now in effect. Real or Personal Property is currently held by and located at defendants
addresses as indicated and at places not known or to be known.
Plaintiff, and lienor, [name of Plaintiff], claims the ATTACHMENT OF THE COMMON LAW LIEN
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY is in the amount of ten million
U.S. Dollars, or in numbers, ($10,000,000.00 U.S.D.).
This notice of Common Law Lien shall be valid notwithstanding any other provision of State or Rule
regarding the Form of Content of a (Notice of Lien) nor shall it be dischargeable for 100 years, nor
shall it be extinguishable due to my death whether accidentally of purposefully, nor dischargeable by
my heir, assign, or executors, except by a Common Law Court.
The object and intent of this action is to enable Plaintiff, Sui Juris, [name of Plaintiff], to secure
sufficient surety for injuries and for restitution and recovery of Money damages claimed against the
above-named Defendants/Respondents and to secure and exercise Plaintiff's Rights, Privileges,
Immunities, Liberties, and Duties as expressly declared by the Declaration of Independence and
secured by the Ordained Constitution for the Union of several Republican States of the United States of
America. The particular property described in the attachment hereto styled "Property Description," and
all property of Plaintiff in possession of Defendant, or any of them, is and will be subject to attachment
and execution to satisfy judgment[s] in these Case "At Common Law."
That date of recording and service of this instrument will be "Prima Facie" evidence of the
commencement of an action "At Common Law." The neglect, refusal, or failure of the sheriff to
convene a Common Law Court within 90 days of date of filing of this instrument will be deemed to be
prima facie evidence of an waiver of all defendant(s) rights to the below described property:
All properties real and personal known and as yet to be known now and in the future which are or are
to be properties, wherever situated, of ALL defendants, individually, and in their official capacities.
A Court of Common Law (12 good men and true) is called to convene pursuant to order of the elected
sheriff under Amendment VII of the Bill of Rights, of the United States Constitution, sine qua non of
the Judicial system extant in the United States of America. Such Common Law Court forbids the
presence, participation, or presiding of any judge or lawyer or practitioner of equity law.
TO: ALL Banks, Credit Unions, Savings & Loan Associations, Individuals, Associations, Corporations,
Partnerships, Trust Organizations, Estates, et cetera, Public or Private, foreign, alien or domestic, in or
out of the county of Los Angeles, State of California, or in any of the respective several States of the
Union of the United States of America, or operating therein with and/or under permission, license,
certificate, employers, trustees, fiduciaries, representatives, receivers, associates, delegates, officers,
employees, servants, slaves and/or agents of said Defendants
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendant[s] has/have one or more of the following assets or
valuable properties, and are and have become a part of and subject to his Common Law Lien, to wit:
(x) Checking Account(s)
(x) Savings Account(s)
(x) Time Deposit(s)
(x) Safety Deposit(s)
(x) Cash
(x) Future Market(s)
(x) Bonds
(x) Stocks
(x) Platinum
(x) Mutual Funds
(x) Remuneration
(x) Gold
(x) Salaries
(x) Certificate(s) of Deposit
(x) Silver
(x) Wages
(x) Pension(s)
(x) Royalties
(x) Commission(s)
(x) Jewels
(x) ALL movable and/or immovable objects, being mechanical and/or electrical, in the possession,
custody, and/or control of the above-named Defendant(s)
(x) ALL Lands, Real Estate, appurtenances thereto, and Any and All Right, Title and/or Interest therein,
including but not limited to ALL Water, Timber, Gas, Oil, and/or Mineral Rights and Interest, of
2894; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678; Belknap v. Schild,161 U.S. 10; U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196; Bivens v.
6 Unknown Agents, 400 U.S. 388.
Public employees that attempt to modify, circumvent or negate this Common Law Lien shall be
deemed Common Law outlaws and felons or may be prosecuted under Title 42, U.S.C. 1986.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The Common Law is rooted in the Constitution of the United States and may not be uprooted by the
whims of government. Common Law Liens/Writs of Attachment are a Common Law Remedy being an
auxiliary attachment, essentially denoting a proceeding according to the course of Common Law
[Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 62 L.Ed 1171]. The Common Law Lien Supersedes
mortgages and equitable liens [Drummon Carriage v. Mills, 71 N.W. 99; Hewitt v. Williams , 17 So.
269; Carr v. Dail, 19 S.E. 235; McMaham v. Ludin, 58 N.W. 827], and may be satisfied only when
sufficient Tender in payment of debt and/or sufficient property is taken in lieu of the monetary value
and thereby fully satisfy the judgment creditor's remedy and extinguish the Debt. The ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in Rich v. Braxton, 39 L.Ed. 1022, 158 U.S. 375, specifically denied the
power or authority of a judge to invoke Equity Jurisdiction and procedures to remove Common Law
Liens or similar "Clouds of Title," even if a preponderance of evidence displays the lien to be void or
voidable. The Common Law Jury being the trier of the facts, and not a Commissioner/Magistrate or
Chancellor in Equity, and the usurpation and/or abrogation of the providence of the Jury and the Right
of the litigants MAY NOT BE ASSUMED even if the preponderance of evidence displays the lien to be
void or voidable. The Courts of Equity still may not proceed, or enter judgment thereon until the
moving party comes before the court with "Clean Hands," based upon the "Clean Hands Doctrine" and
"Power of Estoppel" [West v. Washington, App. Div. 460, 138 N.Y. Supp. 230] and should it appear
from the Pleadings that the acts of the party evoking Equity Jurisdiction have been unconscionable,
oppressive, iniquitous, or based upon omissions or mistake in agreement, misrepresentation,
concealment, or any unfairness, will stay the arm of the court, and cause the case and controversy and
Party claiming some benefit from such acts to be turned over to a Court "At Law" of prosecution, trial,
judgment, and punishment according to Law. [Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 36 L.Ed. 426, 144 U.S.
414]. It is further established that judges may be enjoined from interfering with a Citizen's rights
[Bramlett v. Peterson, 307 F.Supp. 1049; Pierson v. Ray, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 386 U.S. 547], and includes
individuals wrongfully exercising the vested Powers and Authority of the Office of commissioner,
magistrate, and/or judge who commit unlawful acts under color of office. [Duke v. State of Texas, 327
F.Supp. 12189; Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757; Vickery v. Dunivan, 279
P.2d 853 (1955); 18 U.S.C.S. 241, 242, 645, 912, and 1001] (Also see: Constitution for the United
States of America, Preamble, Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, Article IV, Section 2).
Plaintiff/Demandant is in fact a Citizen of the Republic of the State of California, inhabiting the County
of__________________, within the Union of the several Republican States of the United States of
America, and does hereby exercise the same status and capacity, and claims the above-described
property, real and personal, belonging to the said Defendant[s], whether held in trust or other artificial
fictitious character, whether in whole or in part, to secure all costs incurred by and accrued to the
Plaintiff in obtaining proper adjudication and execution of the Law, in a properly set Judicial Power
Court of Lawful, Constitutionally Enumerated, Specified, Competent Jurisdiction and Delegated
Authority.
NO FURTHER NOTICE OR WARNING WILL BE AFFORDED YOU
Plaintiff, of legal age and sovereign capability to act in his behalf, has read the foregoing statements
and brief, and states under penalty of perjury that the facts and law stated therein are true and correct to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
) CASE NO.
)
)
) Notice of Written Interrogatories
)
and
) Notice to produce documents
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff, [name of plaintiff], requests the following interrogatories
be answered and copies of documents produced and mailed or delivered to the Plaintiff's address at:
[Plaintiff's address]. This request is made pursuant to discovery rights under Federal and State Statutes.
Thank you for your cooperation.
DATE:___________________
X:_______________________
Interrogatories
1. Under what statute, and under what regulations and administrative policies was this asset
forfeiture established?
2. Have you taken an oath binding you to support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of California, as required for all State officers by the Sixth Article of
the Constitution and by the requisite provision in the California State Constitution
3. Have you read the Constitution of the United States?
4. Have you read the Constitution of the state of California
5. Do you believe this oath binds you to refuse to obey any order of any superior officer which
may result in your violation of this oath
6. Have you ever taken an oath to any entity or organization which you believe supersedes your
oath to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California? If
so, what organization
7. How much money do you expect your office to retain from this seizure
Notice to Produce Documents
1. Please send a photocopy of the paperwork justifying your taking of my property, a copy of the
statute that allows you to take my property, and a copy of your oath of office.
APPENDIX
GROUPS FIGHTING ASSET FORFEITURE
Citizens For the Bill of Rights, PO Box 646, Falls Church, VA 22040. (703) 204-1136. $25/year.
Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, 2000 L Street NW, Suite 702, Washington, DC 20036. (202)
835-9075. $90/year.
Common Law Education Application and Research, c/o 211 S. State College #130, Anaheim, Calif.
92806. Allen Mathews and Rich Forest - consult them for assistance in applying the methods suggested
in this manual. (714) 635-4109. Best time to call: after 8 p.m.
Drug Policy Foundation, 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20016. (202)
895-1634. $35/year.
Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 200 South,
Washington, DC 20004. (202) 457-5790. $35/year.
FEAR (Forfeiture Endangers American Rights), PO Box 513, Franklin, NJ 07416. (908) 873-1251.
$35/year.
ISIL (International Society for Individual Liberty), 1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102.
(415) 864-0952. $20/year.
NORML (National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws), 1636-R Street NW,
Washington, DC 20009 (2020 483-5500. Dues $25/year.
THE RIGHT WAY ... L.A.W. - consult them for assistance in applying the methods suggested in this
manual - see Report #LAW01: The Right Way ... L.A.W.
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