STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES

Construction, defined
Caltex v. Palomar
Construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors
of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.
Legislative Intent/Ratio Legis Dura Lex Sed Lex when
the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for
interpretation/Plain Meaning Rule/Spirit and Purpose of
Law
RCBC v. IAC
When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its
true intent. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of
two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court
is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions,
which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
Regalado v. Yulo
The intent of the Legislature is to be ascertained and
enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the
statute. The courts cannot assume some purpose in no
way expressed and then construe the statute to
accomplish this supposed intention.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
The principle of statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is
written; whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedial by an adherence to its avowed objective.

Del Mar v. Pagcor

In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or
permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced
the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are
disclosed by the statute itself.
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals
Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be
applied according to its plain and obvious meaning,
according to its express terms.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is
fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil
and injurious consequences.
Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines
construction of a provision of law it is a cardinal rule in
statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning
and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of
the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the
law, must be made.
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. The proper interpretation
of a constitutional provision depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers
understanding thereof.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
JMM Promotions and Management Inc., v. NLRC

In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every

part be given effect. Construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as
parts of the harmonious whole.

Gorospe, and declaring that the Bureau had no

disciplinary jurisdiction over said employees in view of the
provisions of the University charter, constitutes
contemporary
interpretation
of
highly
persuasive
character.

Wisdom/Practicality of Law
RCBC v. IAC
The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a
corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as
the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with
the SEC may, to some, be more logical and wise but
unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language
of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical
and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative
prerogative to define the wisdom of the law plainly
judicial legislation.

Enrique v. Court of Appeals

Great weight accorded to interpretation or construction of
a statute by the government agency called upon to
implement the same.

Lacson v. Roque, et al.

Mere silence of the statute with respect to notice and
hearing will not justify the removal of such an officer
without knowledge of the charges and an opportunity to
be heard.
Quintos v. Lacson, et al.
As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
it is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise and salutary. If
the law is deemed unwise and detrimental to the
discipline and efficiency of public officers, proper
representations and requests may be made to the
Legislature.
Executive/Administrative Interpretation
UP v. Court of Appeals
The previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service
authorities in endorsing to the University for action the
administrative cases of Hospital employees Fernandez and

Literal Interpretation
Bello v. CA
This Court has cautioned against narrowly interpreting a
statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and
stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result (of
injustice or absurdity) and that therefore a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
to absurd results. In the construction of its own Rules of
Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally
construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and
unfairness and to supply the void that is certainly within
the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy
and inconsistency.
Salaria v. Buenviaje
Construction by Executive Branch of government of a
particular law although not binding upon courts must be
given weight as the construction comes from that branch
of government called upon to implement the law.
Valid in part, void in part
Barrameda v. Moir
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand
and be enforced.

Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy

A separability clause states that if for any reason, any
section or provision of the statute is held to be
unconstitutional or (invalid), the other section(s) or
provision(s) of the law shall not be affected thereby. It is a
legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one
provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the
act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the
courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute
where what is left, after the void part, is complete and
workable.
Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it
Reyes v. dela Cruz
If there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the interpretation
and meaning of a contract, the same shall not favour the
party who cause such ambiguity or obscurity.
Ildefonso v. Sibal
Agreements must be construed according to the intention
of the parties.
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Company
Ltd.
The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not
for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in
fact, it is more so for the latter, since its dominant
bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility, By
reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company
over the terms and phraseology of the insurance contract,
the ambiguity must be strictly interpreted against the
insurer and liberally in favour of the injured, especially to
avoid a forfeiture.
Baylon v. Court of Appeals

If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as

to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control.

Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish

Colgate Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Gimenez
General terms may be restricted by specific words, with
the result that the general language will be limited by
specific language which indicates the statutes object and
purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases where,
except for one general term, all the items in an
enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
The rule of construction, that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when
used in connection with them, does not require the
rejection of the general term entirely. It is intended merely
as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent and is to be
considered in connection with other rules of construction.
Phil. British Assurance Co. v. IAC
There should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated. For courts are not
authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as
they think it ought to be but as they find it and without
regard to consequences.
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it.
Mandatory and Directory
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre
The provision in the Local Government Code providing for
such release uses the word shall and as a rule, the term

shall is a word of command that must be given

compulsory meaning.
Marcelino v. Cruz
Constitutional
provisions
mandatory, where they
procedural.

obtaining at the time of the accuseds appointment as

secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol.

Brehm v. Republic
Mandatory provisions prevail over directory ones.

Ejusdem Generis
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSS

The rule of ejusdem generis applies only when there is

uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose
and intent of the lawmaking body would thereby hindered
and defeated.

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius

City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others.

Mutuc v. COMELEC
Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being applicable
only to things of the same kind or class as those
specificially referred to.

People v. Moro Macarandang

Peace officers are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.

Statement of Individual Legislator

Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of
the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House
of Representatives.

are
directory,
and
not
refer to matters merely

Peope v. Mapa
The fact that a person, found in possession of an
unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial
governor does not exempt him from criminal liability. The
law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.
People v. Santayama
At the accuseds apprehension, the doctrine then
prevailing is enunciated in the case of People v.
Macarandang, holding that the appointment of a civilian
as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently
puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879. The case of People v.
Mapa revoked the doctrine in Macarandang case only on
August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board

In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a
statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written
document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the
intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to
see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed
in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. The
legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements an
internal and an external one; it originates in intention and
is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat
the former.
Noscitur a sociis
Nagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or pharse

should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated, and, since
the word gambling is associated with and other
prohibited games of chance, under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, the word should be read as referring
only to illegal gambling.

AND/OR
Romulo, Mabanta v. Home Development and Mutual Fund
The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to
both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or
that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as
one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended
by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The
term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of
the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of
several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive
and will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone. It is accordingly ordinarily
held that the intention of the legislature in using the term
and/or is that the word and and the word or are to
be used interchangeably.
Retroactivity
Espiritu v. Cipriano
Statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a
retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings
unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and
necessarily implied from the language of enactment.
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
People v. Manantan
The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established.
Computation of Time

Viray v. CA
The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the
same be a holiday, refers to the performance of the act
prescribed or required. But it does not apply where at the
end of the period no such act is to be done.
Liberal or strict construction
- statement of a rule when there is ambiguity
- if procedural: liberal
Holographic wills: Ajero v. CA
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result
in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
Naturalization Laws: Ong Chia v. Republic
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant.
Labor Statutes: A.L. Ammen v. Borja
Labor: liberal construction in favour of labor statutes.
Tax Exemptions: Esso Standard v. Acting Commissioner of
Customs
Exemption from taxation is not favored. Exemptions in tax
statutes are never presumed. Exceptions from taxation
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favour of the taxing authority.
Taxation: Manila Railroad v. Collector of Customs
It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions
beyond the clear import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly
against the Government and in favour of the citizen,
because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to
be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and
clearly import.

Pleadings and Rules: Del Rosario v. Hamoy

Rules of Court mandates a liberal construction in favour of
the rules and pleadings to effect substantial justice.
Domalanta v. CA
On certain occasions, this Court has allowed liberality in
the construction of the rules. The present case, however,
does not warrant such liberality because the decision of
respondent CA is satisfactorily supported by the records.
Quibuyen v. CA
Pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed
liberally, in order that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a
possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal
techincalities, may be avoided.
Contracts of Insurance: NPC v. CA
Contracts of insurance construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in
the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted
in favour of its beneficiary.
Corporation Law: Home Insurance Co. v. Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc.
The objective of the law was to subject the foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The
Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an
unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the
development of trade relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
Probation: Pablo v. Castillo
Probation law is not a penal statute and therefore, the
principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. The Court
has pronounced that the policy of liberality of probation

statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions

of the law.
Retirement Laws: Request of Clerk of Court Tessie L.
Gatmaitan
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the
retiree.
Interpretation of laws: Buenaseda v. Flavier
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives which it was
created.
Interpretation of Peanl Statutes Retroactivity
U.S. v. Cuna
Penal laws are to be given retroactive effect only in so far
as they favour the defendant charged with a crime or a
misdemeanour, and that, when a penal law is enacted
repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect
of relieving the offender in whole or in part of penalties
already incurred under the old law, unless the new law
favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing
away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to
which the new law is favourable to the offender.
People v. Tamayo
The doctrine was clearly established that in the
Philippines, repeal of a criminal act by its re-enactment,
even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal
liability.
U.S. v. Go Chico
It is clear from the authorities cited in the Act under
consideration that the legislature did not intend that a
criminal intent should be a necessary element of the

crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no

word implying that the prohibited act shall be done
knowingly. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to
interpretation.
U.S. v. Estapia
All the words of a statute should, when possible, be given
some meaning, and when the legislator makes use of
words of limitation, he must be presumed to have
intended to limit and restrict, in some way, the word or
idea with reference to which such words of limitation are
applied.
State Prosecutors v. Muro
Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it
becomes effective. A law which is not yet in force and
hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge
capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.
Effects of Repeals and Amendments General and Special
Laws Implied Repeal
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty
Special laws or charters may not be amended, altered, or
repealed by a general law, by mere implication.
Repeal of laws by implication is not favored. The mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear in
order to warrant the court in holding that the later in time
repeals the former, when it does not in terms purport to
do so.
It is well settled that a special and local statute is not
repealed by a subsequent statute unless the intent to
repeal or alter it is manifest, although the terms of the
general act are broad enough to include the cases in the
special law.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the
later general the terms of the general broad enough to
include the matter provided for in the special the fact
that one is special and the other general creates a

presumption that the special is to be considered as

remaining an exception to the general one as a general
law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws
or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such
being the case, the presumption against implied repeals
and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
Almeda v. Florentino
Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended and courts are
duty bound to adopt a construction that will give effect to
every part of a statute, if at all possible.
Sanchez v. Rigos
In construing different provisions of one and the same law
or code, such interpretation should be favored as will
reconcile or harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict
between the same.
Exceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the
contrary is clear.
Mecano v. Commission on Audit
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first
is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject

matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the

extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied
repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when
the two statutes cover the same subject matter; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction
that repeals by statute by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.

City of Basilan v. Hechanova

Whenever there is a conflict of an ordinance with a
statute, the former must give way.
Arenas v. City of San Carlos
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general
language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on
the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature.