CIGRE 2012

B5 - 00
SPECIAL REPORT FOR STUDY COMMITTEE B5
(Protection and Automation)
Rodney HUGHES (for PS1) and Mladen KEZUNOVIC (for PS2)1
Special Reporters
The CIGRE Study Committee B5 covers within this scope principles, design, application and
management of power system protection, substation control, automation, monitoring,
recording and metering including associated internal and external communications and
interfacing for remote control and monitoring.
Two Preferential Subjects are presented in this Special Report:
o
o

PS1: Impact of Future Network Components on coordination of Protection and

Automation Systems.
PS2: Utilization and Application of Remote Access for Protection and Automation
Systems.

Keywords:
Future Networks, IEC 61850, Architecture, Process Bus, Protection Algorithm, Control
Algorithm, Asset Management, Setting Management, Data Analysis, Smart Grid, Distributed
Generation, Power System Protection, Automation, Islanding, Power System Stability,
Automated Analysis, Cyber-security, Fault Disturbance, Fault Location, Intelligent Electronic
Device, Metering, Power Quality, Remote Access, Standards, Substation Automation.

____________________________________
1

rgh@rodhughesconsulting.com and kezunov@ece.tamu.edu

1

1 PS1: Impact of Future Network Components

coordination of Protection and Automation Systems

on

The last thirty years (significantly less than the lifetime of a substation) has seen a massive
swing in the types of technology applied within the protection and control industry. Several
stages of evolution over this time frame has resulted in the single fixed function
electromechanical devices being replaced by comprehensive multi-function devices now
operating with ever higher degrees of capability, and even reliance on communication
systems.
The power industry is now awash with the requirements for driving efficiency,
responsiveness and flexibility of the power network whilst delivering higher reliability and
lower costs. These drivers combine under the concept of Future Networks that demands
new solutions which themselves demand new technologies to provide them.
This rapid change (at least in power systems terms) in operational requirements and
technology solutions is complex and requires a vast range of new skills associated with
systems and communication engineering. Not surprisingly this leads to discussions on
maturity of the technology, or perhaps more accurately, how quickly the vendors bring
products with uniform compliance and easier interoperability to the market as well as how
quickly the market invests in the new skills to be competent in the use of the new
technology.
This Preferential Subject gives the opportunity to explore both existing and potential
solutions for how Protection and Automation Systems must continue to evolve to encompass
the new requirements brought as a result of Future Networks.
Specifically the industry has been challenged to present experiences and future directions in
the areas of:

Local and system wide coordination of protection and control for FACTS / SVC /
Power Storage and DER

Dynamic relay coordination and verification

Sharing and allocation of protection , control and automation functions

Communication requirements

Nineteen papers have been submitted providing a comprehensive range of valuable

experiences, not surprisingly with a high degree of overlap between the power system
operational drivers, the capabilities and management of the devices themselves and the
communications systems.
Five themes seem to arise from the submitted papers:
1. Protection and Automation issues related to design and operation of power systems
2. Modelling, Protection Settings, Adaptive protection
3. Applications / Functions
4. Process Bus: Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers & Merging Units and
Intelligent Switchgear
5. Communications, Networks and Information

1.1 Protection and Automation issues related to design and operation of

power systems
B5-103 (Italy) discusses the problems associated with the introduction of Renewable
Energy Resources (RES) into distribution networks in respect of frequency and voltage
requirements. It suggests that these issues are introducing a requirement for decentralised
control systems but associated with hierarchical automation system management to manage
overall dispatching. The particular example includes a Congestion Management system to
identify overloaded lines deep in the distribution system and an iterative process to manage
the individual RES to bring loadings within limits.
B5-107 (New Zealand) addresses the concept of changing of distribution network topology
from largely radial feeders to meshed arrangements. The new protection system implication
is a reliance of differential or phase comparison protections which naturally would require the
use of telecommunications. It is cited that the advent of Fibre to the Home/Premises
networks now in roll out in many countries gives the opportunity for such consideration
given an analysis of the bandwidth required by the protection services. This also introduces
the issues associated with protection systems potentially relying on leased lines, varying and
differing propagation delays in different direction and the potential for cyber-security issues
not just affecting billing processes but directly the performance reliability and security of the
protection system.
DC systems are increasingly being considered for improved management and control
flexibility of power systems. Paper B5-108 (CN) discusses the application of Multi-terminal
DC systems, in particular the choice of Current Source Control versus Voltage Source
Control. Modelling of these systems has shown that the interaction and effects of a fault can
last for several seconds.
B5-115 (Japan) describes the need for full and partial Substation Automated Restoration
Systems (SARS) using three examples in Japan covering coordination with fault clearance,
fault location and Special Protection Schemes. The paper highlights that significant
improvement in continuity of supply is possible using innovative systems in addition to the
traditional protection schemes.
B5-116 (UK) describes two novel applications for improved power system operation. The
first is a Dynamic Line Rating calculation based on inputs from meteorology sensors at the
substation which determine the variance in line rating. (This is particularly topical in light of
the imminent release of IEC 61850-90-3 Technical Report for Condition Monitoring
applications). The second is a mechanism for detection of Loss of Mains islanding conditions
based on a Phase Angle Displacement calculation between the two systems.
B5-119 (Switzerland) talks about a system using WAMS to estimate system damping in realtime and based on this allow studies of the expected damping after a disturbance in critical
areas. This real-time estimation of the damping levels across the system can also be used to
control power flows using generator excitation, FACTS, etc. in such a way as to improve the
damping and so improve the expected response of the power system.
These six papers present operational conditions covering Wide Area Control for Renewable
Energy Resources, change from radial to meshed network protection solutions, wider use of
DC power, specialised SARS, Dynamic Line Ratings, Loss of Mains and WAMS for dynamic
system damping. Distribution system meshing and renewable energy sources throughout
the network creates greater challenges due to changing fault levels, bi-directional power
flows, in zone generation, tapped transformers etc. These new operational requirements
may require more sophisticated protection and control mechanisms based on more than
direct Voltage and Current measurement and derived Impedance and Frequency values.

B5_PS1-1: What other experiences or possibilities can be presented of these or

other protection or automation applications as a result of changing network
operation philosophies?
Indeed the protection IEDs are increasingly being seen as the source of vital power system
operational data suggesting a far more Utility Automation System based architecture. The
UAS will encompass traditional protection, control, automation, power quality, revenue
metering, and the new IEC 61850-90 series describes integration of Condition Monitoring,
Distributed Energy Resources and even Electric Vehicles. The UAS therefore introduces a
greater degree of organisational interaction, system design management and
documentation. In some areas this will require changes to organisational structure,
processes, tools, service provider contractual arrangements and overall responsibilities.
CIGRE Working Group B5-391 is addressing documentation practices and there are significant
requirements for improvements in graduate and existing staff education and skill
development as being investigated within CIGRE Working Group B5-402.

B5_PS1-2: What examples can be presented of the type and extent of new
organisation, documentation systems and skill developments required to support
higher and more integrated UAS functionality?

1.2 Modelling, Protection Settings, Adaptive protection

B5-102 (Germany/Romania) describes the increasing complexity to provide secure
protection settings in ever increasingly complex networks. The paper discusses the
possibility to simulate protection equipment performance over large scale networks with
hundreds of lines, buses, generators at various voltage levels and thousands of devices. The
simulation studies identified that whilst devices settings were applied for the protection of
the specific line, several instances can be identified where the fault trajectory remains inside
the operating characteristic of the back-up zone 3 long enough for other lines to trip causing
widespread blackout. Solutions can then be derived using setting changes load blinders and
other solutions. The complexities of the modelling are based on reasonable modelling of the
operating characteristic of the protections but not necessarily of the particular protection
algorithm.
B5-105 (Egypt) describes the results of analysis of faults where some 20% of distance relay
tripping was attributed to unknown causes. Subsequent investigations identified that
variances in the applied k0 factor compared to actual measured values on some 52 cables
indicated the potential for severe under or over reach of the distance elements. The report
identifies a number of different methods for calculating the k0 factor. Further analysis
indicated the variation in actual k0 could also be attributable to ageing of the cable itself.
The report recommends a comprehensive approach to validating and maintaining k0 settings
relevant to the actual conditions, also incorporating per phase values and the impact of load
current.
B5-106 (South Africa) discusses the requirements to use advanced protection modelling and
simulation techniques to identify protection application issues in complex grids particularly
1

CIGRE Working Group B5-39: Documentation requirements from design to operation to maintenance
for Digital Substation Automation Systems
http://www.cigre-b5.org/Site/WG/pa_wl.asp?IDWG=641
2
CIGRE Working Group B5-40: Education, Qualification and Continuing Professional Development of
Engineers in Protection and Control.
Terms of Reference: http://www.cigre-b5.org/Site/WG/pa_wl.asp?IDWG=642

those with series compensated lines. Somewhat disturbingly these simulations have
identified that in some cases, particularly where MOV are used with the series compensation
capacitors, Zone 1 elements would need to be switched off being somewhat counter
intuitively against providing high speed fault clearance. The solution suggested uses over
current elements to supervise the Z1 element.
B5-117 (UK) describes the testing requirements to prove appropriate response of adaptive
protection schemes. Adaptive protection is a concept that has been discussed for many
years but always with a limitation of how these systems are easily tested. The paper
discusses the range of adaptive protection systems from predetermined Setting Groups
through to the potential for dynamic setting calculation. Among the core criteria of
protection is security and dependability. Traditional systems were designed with a single
fixed solution or at least predetermined Setting Groups of very precise conditions. The
increased range of variability based on information provided by communication systems does
introduce new criteria on telecommunications system reliability and performance on each of
the duplicated systems in order to ensure there is no mal-operation of the X or Y system.
This CIGRE forum has often discussed the increasing need for comprehensive system wide
and, in some cases, IED modelling in order to optimise protection settings. These papers in
particular indicate changes to traditional Zone 1 and Zone 3 distance protection philosophies.
Of course whether the model is a small section of the power system or a wide area model,
the results are only as good as the model of the individual elements of the system. Prior to
any consideration of whether IED models are available, accurate models of generators,
transformers, SVC, Statcoms, wind farms etc. are often reported as difficult to obtain.
However, such modelling reported over the last several years almost invariably concludes
that traditional 3-zone distance protection is inappropriate in its own right. The solution
often is simply to switch to line differential provided a suitable telecommunications link is
available, which in itself is far less of an issue than say 30 years ago. This then challenges
the cost/benefit justification of system/IED modelling if the general objective is primarily to
validate distance protection based systems, versus the obvious simplicity of the line
differential solution. As the networks become more complex, it remains to be seen if
changing utility policies signal the end of the era of the distance relay as the general
transmission protection technology.
There is already a wide body of experience of modelling these new power system elements,
arguably the precursors to the formal concept of Future Networks, which confirm there are
system wide phenomena that havent existed previously. This suggests the purpose of
modelling is likely to change from purely validating a specific distance relay setting to more
control related issues where wide area automated control systems may be required. This is
already happening to some degree at the transmission level as reported in the papers
grouped under the first theme of this Report.
The sub-transmission and distribution networks are also changing from simple radial supply
systems to more meshed systems, embedded generation, 2-way power flows, variable fault
levels and many complexities associated with Distribution Automation Systems with
automatic switching and restoration. This may lead to complex modelling requirements of
distribution networks and indeed may have results that reflect to the transmission network
models.

B5_PS1-3:
What examples can be shown of the cost (effort)/benefits
justification of wide-area/multi-voltage system modelling leading to alternative
individual protection solutions or generic policy changes?
Two of the fundamental requirements for protection systems are Security (not operate when
not required) and Dependability (must operate when required). Traditional fixed system
designs have therefore provided appropriate solutions to both these requirements but are
increasingly giving cause for concern as the networks do become more complex themselves.
Due to the inherent dynamic behaviour, it is much harder to verify correct performance and
potential settings of on-line adaptive protection and control systems under all operating
conditions. This is further affected on the reliance on the communication systems (local and
wide area) and their effect of failures on the protection system security and reliability.

B5_PS1-4:
What other examples can be presented of on-line adaptive
protection or control solutions along with the necessary mechanisms to validate
their dynamic behaviour?

1.3 Applications / Functions

B5-101 (Romania) identifies that line differential protection schemes are a well-known
commonly used method for minimising power system disruptions. Phasor Measurement
Units are relatively new devices in the substation which identify the individual current
phasors. These PMUs can therefore be used as the basis of the current differential
protection and can provide some enhanced security with adaptive algorithms. A possible
implication of the use of raw phasor values is that the proprietary current differential and
time synchronisation processes may be possible in the future to be replaced with generic
hardware which is not constrained by requiring the same manufacturer of IED at each end.
B5-104 (Argentina) discusses the Argentine experiences of reviewing the performance of
20-year old WAP and WAC systems compared to modern system requirements. As the
network has evolved the requirements have changed from a radial system to a meshed
system with significantly different characteristics that will demand different WAP and WAC
philosophy. The paper leads to the potential for PMU and the need for sharing of IEC 61850
GOOSE information between substations. The paper suggests a 5 stage process to
evaluation of new requirements and available solutions.
B5-113 (Canada) provides a summary of the activity of the IEEE Power Systems Relaying
Committee Working Group K5 "Ancillary Protective and Control Functions Common to
Multiple Protective Relays. The WG is dealing with the issues for implementing certain
substation functions where duplicated systems may be involved, such as initiation of a
common or duplicated breaker fail function, common or duplicated auto-reclose function or
even just multiple disturbance recorder capabilities. The paper also identifies other aspects
associated with operation/testing and ultimately even the documentation of these functions.
These papers highlight the potential for changes in the traditional protection and control
solutions. This largely enabled by the availability of high speed communication networks and
IEC 61850. Part of the consideration of new systems must be on the reliability requirements
leading to potential duplication of these systems or some redundancy mechanism to ensure
on-going operation of the power system

B5_PS1-5: What other examples can be shown of real-time / automated

protection control requirements and solutions using PMUs?
B5_PS1-6: What existing or future solutions, and resulting benefits, arise from
the use of IEC 61850 in providing advanced and possibly duplicated or redundant
wide area and local protection and control solutions?

1.4 Process Bus: Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers & Merging

Units and Intelligent Switchgear
B5-110 (Spain) elaborates needs to build new substations more efficiently (time and cost)
from material end engineering view point. Using optical fibre connection and IEDs related to
switchgear including merging units for instrument transformers are being advocated. It also
discusses range of applications on substation and control centre levels to enable network
optimisation and to facilitate grid operation and stability. A single communication standard
IEC 61850 has been identified as key technology to facilitate efficiency efforts from utility
enterprise level.
B5-111 (USA) describes the requirements of a calibration system for proving the accuracy
of phasor measurement units including the primary sensors.
B5-112 (USA) The paper describes the use and experience of Rogowski coils on an electric
arc furnace application. The advantages of Rogowski coils is described including size,
linearity, no saturation, and summation (no saturation) whilst providing the necessary speed
and selectivity even in the presence of harmonics and transformer energisation inrush.
B5-118 (UK) describes the methods being used to evaluate IEC61850 9-2 for use on the
UK's 400kV network. The paper details how the network architecture was selected using
reliability and cost analysis. The effects of network load were then considered and tested
highlighting the need for effective traffic management.
These papers indicate that Sampled Values and Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers
continue to attract a lot of interest but wide spread deployment is slow. Some schools of
thought suggest that the move from wire based substations to adoption of IEC 61850 and
the broader concept of a fully digital substation will only be fully justified when this apparent
lack of maturity/availability is resolved. Certainly there is a demand for case studies dealing
with performance comparisons, cost/benefit justification, application lessons learned,
associated technology (e.g. Time synchronisation 1PPS/IEEE1588-C37.238), general
specification and integrated interoperability testing requirements.

B5_PS1-7:
What examples of Sampled Value CT/VT applications can be
described that would indicate this area of technology is both technically and
commercially viable and available?
On the broader scale of Process Bus covering all interfaces to primary systems such as
intelligent Switchgear, Condition Monitoring and even the specific Logical Nodes associated
with Wind Farms, Hydro Power Plants, Distributed Energy Resources all suggest much larger
systems will evolve with specific protection and control functionality becoming just one
amongst many applications essential to the operation of Future Networks.

B5_PS1-8: What are the benefits and requirements for replacement of hard
wired trip signals to the switchgear (IEC 62271-3 interfaces) as a complete
digital substation?

1.5 Communications, Networks and Information

B5-109 (Spain) describes the redundancy of substation Ethernet communications networks
in order to maximize system availability and reliability. Device level and system level
redundancy are considered for the communications network and the substation automation
systems at station level. Consideration is also given to recovery from hardware failure and
the effects on the concurrency of data in automation or SCADA databases, along with a
proposed solution to this problem.
B5-114 (Brazil) describes a system proposed to optimise data flow through all levels of the
information hierarchy, starting from the IEDs through to high-level SCADA and asset
management systems as used by a national grid operator. A Data and Information Structure
(DIS) is described that is intended to minimise the number of measurements made and the
amount of data that must flow in the communications systems and still provide all the
requirements of all functions that require data.
Availability and security of data communications is critical to the operation of these modern
schemes and is not surprisingly a common aspect across each of the four previous themes
presented in this report.
Traditional protection systems have generally been implemented as fully duplicated and
segregated systems allowing one system to be partially or fully out of service without loss of
overall functionality.
These new communication system capabilities provide a means to focus on Availability
criteria as a measure of the likelihood of the system to remain in operation. This is based on
identification of failure modes and continuity of the function by redundant common or dual
network mechanisms not necessarily relying on fully segregated duplication.
The
virtualisation of functions and their inputs/outputs via communication networks provides new
opportunities for increased reliability using bump-less paths and even dynamic functional reallocation amongst IEDs (hot stand-by spare IEDs) on the network. Naturally these
capabilities require different investments in the communications equipment, the IEDs
themselves, the configuration of the system and the facilities that support maintenance and
testing.
Network architectures and functions must therefore be analysed for the application
requirements and cost/benefits for the use of RSTP/PRP/HSR communications redundancy
systems rather than fully duplicated and segregated protection and communication systems.

B5_PS1-9: What processes and results can be presented of the analysis of

availability, reliability, redundancy and duplication requirements of functions and
networks?
B5_PS1-10: What new facilities, equipment, tools and procedures are necessary
for operation, test and maintenance of communication based systems?
The change from wire-based to digital systems introduces new considerations of what may
be considered as IED and network device failure modes, identification and treatment of ill

formed/corrupt messages, virtual interconnection of previously duplicated and physically

segregated systems, and even cyber-security interference with the system.
CIGRE has produced two previous Technical Brochures3 dealing with cyber threats and has a
further Working Group B5/D2-464 identifying cyber-security measures as parts of the
protection and control specifications and designs.
The IEEE 1686 Standard deals with application of Role Based Access Controls as part of
equipment procurement specifications. However this can only work if supported by
appropriate governance procedures associated with staff joining and leaving the organisation
and its contracted suppliers as well as device level procedures for changing default access.
The Stuxnet virus has demonstrated that messages can be spoofed or replaced to appear as
valid system messages or even change device configurations. Virtual Perimeter Intrusion
systems generally deal with access to the LAN as discussed in Preferential Subject 2.
However the sub-millisecond, real-time, minimum latency, peer-to-peer operation of the
protection systems require appropriate mechanisms to identify cyber attacks against the safe
and reliable operation of the system. IEC 61850 does have various capabilities in relation to
message integrity (sequence, source health and quality) and identifying changes to
IED/network configurations; however these new requirements must be specified by the asset
owner and implemented by the systems integrator.

B5_PS1-11: What corporate governance measures and system functionality are

being deployed to identify and control potential cyber interference with the peerto-peer real-time operation of the protection and control systems?
Alarm handling, filtering and drill-down has been a focus of attention for system operators
for many years as the number and types of available data points has increased. It is not
uncommon for utilities to report 5-10 fold increases in SCADA data points alone over the last
15 years. As intelligent devices become more prevalent and move from proprietary systems
to being more fully and directly integrated into the Substation Automation System, the
extent of data will expand even further. The new IEC 61850-90 series identifies applications
where the system will encompass many new applications and data. As an example IEC
61850-90-3 identifies amongst several Condition Monitoring applications, some 155 Data
Objects, and therefore hundreds of attributes, associated with various transformer sensors.

B5_PS1-12: What other philosophies, policies and mechanisms can be described

for effective data collection/collation and presentation as information across the
Utility Automation System?

1.6 PS1 Conclusion

Protection and automation systems have evolved over many decades to be generally
considered as "good industry practice, arguably derived from many bad industry
experiences! On the other hand, community and industry expectations for Future Networks
demand even better solutions.
The challenge for Protection and Automation is therefore to identify the nature of the new
power system operational requirements and provide appropriate new solutions whilst not
3

CIGRE Technical Brochures: www.e-cigre.org

419 Treatment of Information Security for Electric Power Utilities (EPUs)
427 The Impact of Implementing Cyber-security Requirements using IEC 61850
4
CIGRE Joint Working Group B5/D2-46: Application and management of cyber-security measures for
Protection & Control systems
Terms of Reference: http://www.cigre-b5.org/Site/WG/pa_wl.asp?IDWG=652

forgetting the fundamental principles that have guided safe, secure and reliable power
system operation to date. This requires an open mind to the new requirements and a
willingness to investigate how the new technology will provide even better results than we
have previously achieved.
The papers submitted in response to this Preferential Subject cover a wide range of issues
that will serve as a good reference in their own right. Certainly there are dozens of matters
arising which can be further described in response to this Special Report.

2 PS2: Utilization and Application of Remote Access for

Protection and Automation Systems
The remote access to substation automation systems is a relatively new development that
has taken place for obvious reasons of being able to upload data from substation IEDs and
change setting in relays and other IEDs doing it all from offices away from the substation.
The concept of remote access is further developed to accommodate and utilize unique
features of modern IEDs expressed through multifunctional capability for data management,
as well as advanced communications. The need for cyber-security and standardization of the
substation communication and remote access procedures became more important than ever
before. What is new is the ability to do it in a standard way using one set of communication
protocols and procedures, as well as automating it to the extent possible. As a result of this
new development, several applications previously done with many different software tools
can now be somewhat simplified and unified allowing for interoperability of remote access
applications. While we are still not at the point where standardized approaches to remote
access are a prevailing practice, certain uses of the remote access are quite frequent:
The SAS data may be uploaded and analysed at remote sites for many purposes
Settings in substation IEDs that are part of SAS may be updated from a remote site
Maintenance and diagnostics function may also be done through the remote access.
Particularly remote access procedures for performing automated analysis of fault and
disturbance data and remote change of IED setting seem to be exercised in several utilities
around the world. Related CIGRE activities such as the 2003 Colloquium in Sydney (PS#2:
Automated Fault and Disturbance Data Analysis) and Technical Brochure reporting on the
work of WGB520 (New Trends for Automated Fault and Disturbance Analysis) illustrate such
efforts.
This part of the Special report raises a set of questions stimulated by eleven papers
submitted by the authors from ten countries (Belgium, Brazil, China, Egypt, France,
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland and USA). The papers are written by either utility
company alone (three) or in combination with a vendor (four), or various combinations by
vendors, consultants and R&D institutes (three), and in one case by a university in
cooperation with utilities and a vendor. This represents a very good mix of various views
taken from a different perspective. The papers cover many topics, for this purpose
arbitrarily grouped under four broad categories:

Application requirements,
SAS Solutions Using IEC 61850,
Cyber-security issues
Standardization

10

Almost all the papers make reference to IEC 61850 requirements or design features except a
few involving utilities that did not have 61850-based installations available yet. For each
category, an introductory discussion points to the main trends expressed in the papers
followed by the questions raised by the special reporter. The questions relate to both the
issues raised in the papers and the ones formulated in the PS2 call for papers.
Since some papers submitted for this session address several topics from the list above,
questions raised in this report may refer to the same paper multiple times when discussing
various topics.

2.1 Application Requirements

Two papers coming from utilities, one from a vendor and three with multiple co-authors from
utility and their R&D organization, vendors and a university are focused on the requirements
related to specific application of remote access to the digital fault recorders and protective
relays.
B5-201 (Egypt) raises an interesting question whether stand-alone digital fault recorders
should be used in addition to more integrated SAS solutions such as the one supported by
IEC 61850. The fault analysis studies illustrated in the paper demonstrate unique recording
requirements that may not be met through the current product offering under IEC 61850.
B5-205 (France) explores the non-real time applications of the remote access and
elaborates on future needs and plans for the use of non-operational data. Besides the
commonly mentioned setting coordination and event analysis needs, the paper also mentions
software version and asset management as the applications worth exploring.
B5-206 (USA) looks at the overall opportunities of using non-operational data for
operational purposes and introduces several applications to illustrate the potential of such
uses. The prior experience with automated analysis of non-operational data indicates that
fast processing and result dissemination allow users to take full advantage of the extracted
information in performing real-time operational decisions.
B5-208 (Mexico) emphasizes the need to have versatile remote access features that may
serve different utility groups reducing the time to physically access remote substations that
may be several hours away from the main offices.
B5-209 (Brazil) focuses on digital fault recording and discusses how such data may be
utilized today and in the future. The focus is on automated fault analysis and opportunities
to use relatively new dedicated IEDs such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to enhance
the analysis.
B5-210 (Japan) co-authored by utilities and vendors elaborates on the remote access
history, present practice and future plans for connecting protective relays. It has been
recognized that this technology has matured over the years and now serves multiple
purposes such as relay diagnostics, setting management and event analysis.
As a result of the various application requirements and solutions discussed in the papers,
several questions regarding some specific application issues have been identified below.

11

B5_PS2-1: What the issues are when integrating data from IEDs embedded in
61850 solutions and standalone recording systems consisting of digital fault
recorders?
B5_PS2-2: How automated event analysis solutions may be transported from one
generation of fault disturbance equipment to the next without major redesign or
additional investment?
B5_PS2-3: What specific type of asset and software version control management
applications the user should embrace to take full advantage of the remote access
capabilities?
B5_PS2-4: How one deals with large number of relays (hundreds and potentially
thousands) if failure monitoring and setting coordination are to be managed
through remote access?
B5_PS2-5: How the IED triggered non-operational data can be integrated with
real-time scanned (SCADA) or streamed data (PMUs) for operational purposes?
B5_PS2-6: What other experiences of remote access applications are and how
61850 may be used to solve various application issues of remote access?
While this section focused primarily on the application requirements for the use of the
remote access and utilization of SAS data, the next section deals primarily with the papers
and related questions on the implementations using IEC 61850.

2.2 SAS Solutions Using IEC 61850

The focus here is on how the remote access needs may be met by implementing solutions
that take advantage of the IEC 61850 design principles. These papers examine many
different aspects of the IEC 61850 solution implementations as discuses next.
B5-203 (France, Germany and Belgium) looks at requirements through several use cases
and concludes that the requirements should cover the interfacing between SAS and SCADA,
SAS and Engineering offices, SAS and Protection engineers, and SAS and Wide-Area
solutions.
B5-204 (China) describes a master/slave system designed to coordinate remote access
between the centralized location and distributed SAS. Special attention was paid to the
integration between IEC 61850 and non-IEC 61850 devices and protocols and their
integration. In that context the semantics of the IED data is extended to overcome some
perceived IEC 61850 constraints.
B5-211 (Switzerland) focuses on tele-monitoring aspects of the remote access. It has been
recognized that many remote access applications have been in service for a long time but
the uses of SAS as a complex Remote Terminal Unit of a SCADA system is rather recent.
As a result several questions about specific implementations of IEC 61850 based solutions
are discussed next:

12

B5_PS2-7: What communication channel Quality of Service (QoS) and SAS

processing latency is to be expected for various types of users and applications
that utilize remote access?
B5_PS2-8: How the semantic correlation between SAS and SCADA data should be
defined and maintained understanding that the objects description may undergo
changes over time?
B5_PS2-9: If the remote access is used in addition to classical remote control
interface, how the interaction between the two should be managed?

2.3 Cyber-Security Issues

Cyber-security becomes one of the main concerns when remote access is proposed or
implemented. Almost all of the papers made reference to this issue and offered some
insightful observations and solutions. Two papers in particular (202 and 207) have been
devoted to this subject almost entirely, and several other papers touched upon this issue,
205 in particular.
B5-202 (Germany) gives an overview of cyber-security issues related to remote access and
offers some advice regarding hardening of the solutions. The Ethernet protocol with IP
access is considered a standard solution in the future. The proposed solutions contain
cyber-security measures embedded in the devices as well as at the communication levels.
B5-207 (USA) addresses a secure communications between SAS and the rest of the utility
users. It proposes a pro-active cyber-security life-cycle model to assure that all aspects are
correctly designed and possible changes anticipated ahead of the time.
B5-205 (France) talks about importance of cyber-security and suggests that cyber-security
is implemented using secured gateways and security server.
The discussion in the papers leads to the following questions:

B5_PS2-10: How the physical and cyber security protection policy needs to be
implemented to prevent vulnerabilities to both cyber and physical compromises
of the remote access?
B5_PS2-11: What the best guidelines for designing a proactive cyber security
model are, particularly what standards besides CIP 002-009, IEC 62351 and
NISTIR 7628 are recommended for the remote access?

2.4 Standardization
In several papers IEC 61850 is mentioned or an IEC 61850-based implementation is
described. While the use of IEC 61850 substation SAS standard is widely spread and pretty
well documented, several issues still remain unanswered. Some papers also mentioned
extensive use of COMTRADE standard for transient data representation. It would be
interesting to know the extent of use of other similar standards. It was somewhat surprising
that the use of remote access to communicate GPS synchronization signal according to the

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IEEE Standard 1588 (profile C37.238-2010) has not been mentioned by any of the papers. A
few papers mentioned the need to resolve data semantics incompatibility between IEC
61850 and IEC 61970.
Based on the discussions in the papers the following question is raised:

B5_PS2-12. Is the IEC 61850 standard fully specified when it comes to high
resolution recording triggered by faults including the time stamping, sampling
rates and data formats?

2.5 PS2 Conclusions

Based on the ideas presented in the mentioned papers and related questions, the following
conclusions regarding the remote access may be drawn:

Application requirements. Many examples of the applications that can benefit

from the remote access are given. It remains to be seen whether the standard
solutions based on IEC 61850 and other prevailing standards can accommodate all
the needs;

SAS solutions using IEC 61850. This prevailing SAS communication standard has
many advantages that are illustrated in several papers when it comes to remote
access. The implementation of the transfer of GPS time-synchronization signal from
a remote site, cyber-physical security policy and requirements for time stamping and
high resolution recording remain subject for further implementation evaluation
Cyber-security issues. The remote access has become of particular concern when
cyber-security issues are considered. Many practical solutions that can remove such
concerns exist but life-cycle model and standard recommendations are not widely
available.
Standardization. A major requirement for standard solutions is that they meet
interoperability criteria. The remote access assumes that interoperability between
SAS systems and solutions that are provided at the remote site are met. It is not
entirely clear what are the best practices for achieving interoperability of end-to-end
solutions.

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