Professional Documents
Culture Documents
93115, 2010
0160-7383/$ - see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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doi:10.1016/j.annals.2009.08.002
INTRODUCTION
Business research and practice often presents consumers decision
making (DM) as a sequential process involving a series of steps from
need recognition (awareness) to final choice (purchase) through the
evaluation of products. In other words, decisions arise from cognitive,
affective, and conative stages that lie at the core of hierarchy-of-effects
(e.g., Lavidge & Steiner, 1961) and most consumer behavior models
(e.g., Engel, Kollat, & Blackwell, 1973; Howard & Sheth, 1969).
Researchers may use product alternatives and/or attributes as a reference point when working with such models. This paper focuses on
alternatives. Howard (1963) was the first to suggest that alternatives
are grouped in an evoked set which includes the brands consumers
consider acceptable for the next purchase. More broadly, consideration or choice set models focus on the way consumers first consider
product or brand alternatives and then evaluate them in order to come
to a final choice (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Howard & Sheth, 1969).
These models assume a funneling categorization process through
which consumers narrow the number of brand alternatives they are
aware of down to a single choice. Choice set (CS) is used throughout
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95
are not directly observable (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Shocker et al.,
1991). Consumers tend to reduce the number of brands in consideration due to the limitation of cognitive capacity (Miller, 1956) and to
the want to save information (Stigler, 1961). Authors such as Hauser
and Wernerfelt (1990) and Roberts and Lattin (1991) view CS formation as a tradeoff between utility and cost. CS models also benefit from
considerable attention in the marketing literature (Brisoux & Laroche,
1980; Hastak & Mitra, 1996; Howard, 1977; Howard & Sheth, 1969;
Narayana & Markin, 1975; Nedungadi, 1990; Spiggle & Sewall, 1987;
Turley & LeBlanc, 1995). Most authors suggest two typical stages. First,
the brand-consideration stage involves retrieval (a function of both
memory and brand accessibility) to form an evoked set (Belonax,
1979; Howard, 1963, 1977; Howard & Sheth, 1969), a consideration
set (Roberts, 1989; Roberts & Lattin, 1991; Wright & Barbour, 1977),
or an action set (Spiggle & Sewall, 1987), most of the time through
the use of a simple heuristic. Next, the brand-evaluation stage pertains
to the evaluation of brands to arrive at a final choice (i.e., selection of a
single brand) on the basis of more elaborated heuristics.
A few authors (e.g., Brisoux & Laroche, 1980; Shocker et al., 1991;
Um & Crompton, 1990) add a brand-awareness stage before the consideration stage, which represents a perceptual stage wherein the consumer includes all the destinations s/he knows to arrive to an
awareness set. Such a conceptualization works in a hierarchical manner: It is now a truism of marketing that brand awareness is a necessary precondition for choice (Nedungadi, 1990, p. 264); the
consumer has to evaluate these brands before making a final choice.
In addition to the concepts of awareness set and consideration/evoked
set that were the first to appear in the literature, researchers introduced other types of sets which are defined in Table 1. Shocker
et al. (1991) present a series of alternative models of CS formation
and change. They show that CSs are real, dynamic, changing with time
and occasion, and affected by consumer contexts and purposes.
Tourism research models of destination choice are either in the
form of CSs in input-output approaches of DM (Crompton, 1977;
Um & Crompton, 1990; Woodside & Lysonski, 1989) or in the form
of cognitive processes (Mathieson & Wall, 1982; Moutinho, 1987; van
Raaij & Francken, 1984). CS models focus on the evolution of vacation
destinations and/or plans in a series of CSs. Those models are in line
with the two- or three-stage conceptualization presented above. The
consideration set (evoked set) is part of the perceived opportunity
set (awareness set) and comprises all the destinations the vacationer
is contemplating for his/her current vacation. As the latter is not omniscient, the awareness set is itself only a part of the total opportunity set
which entails all possible destination alternatives (Goodall 1991; Woodside & Sherrell 1977). Choice then consists in an evaluation and selection process through which the vacationer compares the destinations
included in the consideration set on the basis of alternatives and/or
attributes.
Crompton and his colleagues (Ankomah, Crompton, & Baker, 1996;
Crompton, 1992; Crompton & Ankomah, 1993; Um & Crompton,
96
Definition
Authors
Universal set
Evoked set
Consideration set
Action set
Inert set
Foggy set
Howard (1977)
Belonax (1979)
Wright and Barbour (1977),
Roberts (1989)
Roberts and Lattin (1991)
Spiggle and Sewall (1987)
Inaction set
Hold set
Reject set
Inept set
97
98
99
crete events to the most abstract processes. We used memos and diagrams as well, to assist in interpreting and establishing connections
among concepts.
EMERGING FINDINGS
Four themes are discussed in this section, that is, types of CS, the
continuity of evoked sets, sizes of evoked sets, and the dynamics of
CS formation. Each theme is introduced or illustrated by quotes that
help better appraise how the findings progressively emerged from
the data through our analytical process.
Types of Choice Sets
Interviewer: What about your vacation plans for this year?
Martine (single, teacher, 37): As I already told you, Im considering
going to Denmark and the Faroe Islands because I really loved visiting
Island last year and the year before, no sorry the year still before (thus
three years ago when I went to Norvegia) and thus. . . [. . .] Or alternatively, if it really appears that I cannot leave at all [because Martines
mother suffers from health problems], there is a chance that Ill go to
Paris for one week-end but it will not be for a vacation then. . . It will
only be for two or three days.
Interviewer: So, it seems that you have an overall preference for Northern
destinations?
Martine: In summer, yes. Because I dont like big heats. Now its
done, I will have to travel again. Maybe next year, that could be Peru
or Bolivia because I also have those ideas in mind since a long time
and because these are countries you can also visit in June, July,
August. In contrast, I cannot do Asia at all: thats the monsoon time,
so I cannot leave. So its true that Im always constrained to look at
countries where its possible, which means a part of South America
and North America.
Interviewer: Does it mean that you choose your destinations depending on the
climate?
Martine: Not really, it depends on anything that can show up. Sometimes, its an infatuation, its. . . No, in this case, one should again
remember that I had health constraints, thats why I couldnt make
up my mind. If I cannot make up my mind, I have to choose a country
where I can make a last-minute decision. This means that I make it by
myself and therefore. . . If I take the Eastern countries, because I really
could have gone to the Eastern countries but traveling alone in Eastern countries becomes very difficult, then . . . And yes, secondly, there
is the problem of language, the problem is that you are never sure to
be able to book beforehand, you can hardly trust people etc. I did not
see myself backpacking alone in the Eastern countries, thats why I
chose something easy...
In this opening quote, one may see that a series of destinations naturally emerge in Martines discourse. These may be categorized in different types of CS. First, Denmark and the Faroe Islands appear to be
100
the evoked destinations that are available this year although Paris is
mentioned as well as a kind of spare or replacement destination in
the event Martines mother health would deteriorate. Moreover, Peru
or Bolivia are already considered for next year as dreamed destinations
for a long time. In contrast, Asian countries are discarded and fall into
a kind of exclusion set because of poor climate conditions (i.e., the
monsoon in the summer when Martine is traveling). South America
and North America further appear to be possible destinations she is
aware of. Finally, Martine considers the Eastern countries as another
option but those destinations appear to be temporarily unavailable because as a single she is afraid to travel alone in those countries. So,
when analysing the quote above, no less than six different CSs appear
to coexist in Martines mind, i.e, an available set, a surrogate set, a
dream set, an exclusion set, an awareness set, and an unavailable set.
Table 2 further describes the different types of CSs that progressively
emerged from data analysis. The last column of Table 2 parallels each
emerging type with similar types presented in the literature discussed
previously. Each set contains none, one, or more destinations. When
Table 2. Types of CSs in Vacationers DM Processes
Type of CS
Awareness Set
Emerging definition
Awareness Set
Evaluation (+)
Evoked set
Evaluation (-)
Constraint
(structural)
Constraint
(situational)
Aware unavailable
set
Constraint/
final choice
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looking at the relative importance of each set in the interview data (in
terms of how often the informant mentioned destinations), the evoked
set proves to be the most important. The exclusion set and the unavailable set are also important, although to a lesser extent. In contrast,
informants less often mentioned destinations in the surrogate set
and the awareness set.
In order to avoid lexical confusion, the difference between surrogate
set and exclusion set needs further explanation. The difference between surrogate set and exclusion set is a result of the evaluation of
destination alternatives (see third column of Table 2). The surrogate
set involves destinations that are positively evaluated but are not prioritized by the vacationer. They are temporarily shelved as spare alternatives
that could be chosen in the last resort if a better solution is not found,
as illustrated by Martines words in the opening quote: alternatively, if
it really appears that. . ., there is a chance that. . . In contrast, the
exclusion set contains destinations permanently rejected by the vacationer because they are negatively evaluated. Most of the time this rejection is the result of a general lack of interest (New York does not
interest me at all) or of an excessive weakness of the destination on
particular attributes (such as climate for Asia in Martines case) that
informants highly value. Motives and disliked activities may also lead
to the exclusion of particular destinations (e.g., a few informants avoid
any beach destination, like Spain). Variety seeking and emotional factors also come into play. Finally, exclusion may be a function of the
type of trip which is considered. For example, an interviewed family excludes destinations like Poland and Russia for vacationing (relaxing)
but would not reject them for traveling (visiting).
The distinction between unavailable set and dream set also requires
further comments. This distinction is a reflection of the intervention
of constraints in vacationers DM process (see third column of Table 2) and more precisely of the difference between situational and
structural constraints/inhibitors (Decrop, 1999). The unavailable set
is composed of temporarily rejected destinations due to the intervention of situational constraints. These pertain to a particular decision
situation and become more important when summertime is
approaching. For example, in the third interview of Jacqueline and
Roger below, the couple no longer considers going to Bretagne or
Auvergne because of their childrens poor school results. Time (related to occupation), money, and accompaniment (e.g., being alone
in Martines case) are the major momentary situational inhibitors. Of
course, this is not to say that those destinations will not re-enter their
evoked set another year. In contrast, the dream set includes destinations that are permanently out of reach because of enduring structural
constraints. An alternative that falls into the dream set is not likely to
re-enter the vacationers evoked set in the following years, at least as
long as the structural constraint is present. For example, an older single female informant would love to go to India but is not able to
achieve that dream because of her poor health. Occupation, family
situation, and economic status are the major structural inhibitors in
our data.
102
Memory and learning (through experience) thus appear to contribute to the continuity of evoked sets. In the same way, plans and destinations do not always pertain to the current year but also to the coming
years as illustrated by Martine who considers traveling to Peru or Bolivia next year (see opening quote). Furthermore, most informants do
not only have vacation ideas and plans for the summer vacation but
also for other periods of the year. In short, more projects in different
states of progress coexist in vacationers mind. Instead of speaking of
different evoked sets, data suggest DMUs possess one ongoing
macro-evoked set. Indeed, the destinations included in one evoked
set do not pertain to only one and the same consumption situation
(or purchase decision) bounded in time and space. One should define
the macro-evoked set as a set of product alternatives which are all possible in the near future. This finding is probably typical of vacation and
travel decisions which may involve planning and variety seeking over
extended time periods. Macro-evoked sets allow consumers to solve
tradeoffs more easily and not to give up desirable alternatives forever:
if it is not this year, it will be for next year. In contrast, a minority of
DMUs are considering only one vacation project at a time:
Marie-France (couple, retired, 53): Personally I dont do very much
planning. I have friends who plan a lot in advance: trips next year
and then in two years, well put a bit of money aside, so we can go
to such a place. . . But I dont do that at all: the vacation comes
and I plan a bit beforehand but these are not precise projects. I dont
live in the hope of realizing. . .
103
t1
t2
t41
t3
Projects
Evoked
set
Projects
Evoked
set
Projects
Evoked
set
Projects
Evoked
set
3
2 (+)
NO
YES
YES
2 (-)
1 (-)
NO (\)
3 (+)
YES
1 (-)
0
2 (+)
2
1
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO (\)
NO (\)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
2 (+)
YES
NO
YES
YES
2 (+)
YES
3 (+)
NO (\)
YES
NO
NO
YES
-
3
4
5
6
7
1
1
0
0
1
3
1
2
1
1
2
0
0
3
8
9
10
0
1
0
0
2
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
1
2
1
1
4
2
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
2
1
2
2
2
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
2
1
3
2
18
19
1
2
1
2
20
21
22
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
23
24
25
1
2
1
1
1
2
3 (2 )
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
(+)
(-)
YES
1
YES
1
1
1
2
(+)
1
2
(2\)
(-)
(-)
(\)
(2\)
(-)
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
-
YES
1
0
YES
1 (-)
-
1
2
(+)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(\)
3 (2\)
1 (-)
1
1 (-)
(-)
(\)
(-)
(-)
(\)
1
1
1
1 (-)
2 (1\)
1 (\)
(+): Extension of the evoked set in comparison with the former interview.
(-): Reduction of the evoked set in comparison with the former interview.
(\): Modification of the evoked set in comparison with the former interview (number of
alternatives that have changed).
: Combination of different alternatives in the same vacation plan.
YES/NO: indicates whether or not an evoked vacation project/destination has actually been
achieved.
1
Informants were contacted again after the summer vacation in order to check whether or
not they actually carried out the project and destination they evoked in the former interview.
104
When looking at their evolution, evoked sets sizes are relatively stable between the first (mean t1 = 1.93 destinations/DMU or 1.62/plan)
and second series of interviews (mean t2 = 1.96/DMU or 1.58/plan)
but they decrease slightly in the third series (mean t3 = 1.72/DMU
and 1.29/plan). Overall, data show that the number and evolution of
evoked destinations is a function of involvement (the higher the
involvement, the larger and the less stable the evoked set), and decision timing (the earlier the final decision, the smaller and the more
stable the evoked set). Further analyses lead to a distinction among
four groups of informants with different patterns described in Figure 1.
The first group is made of DMUs with a large evoked set (three or four
destinations), which decreases over time (sub-sample size: n = 6).
These vacationers are highly involved, they have less personal constraints (singles, couples, or older families) but make their decisions
very late (less than one month before departure). The content of plans
also shows less stability: newer plans or destinations often appear over
time. The second group of DMUs have an initially small evoked set
(one or two destinations), which decreases to zero or one destination
in t2 or t3 (n = 7). Early DM characterizes this group (i.e., they choose a
destination once and for all or they make the decision not to go on
vacation). These vacationers are older singles, highly involved in traveling. The third group of informants include DMUs that have an initially
small evoked set (t1) that expands (t2) and then decreases (t3) (n = 5).
These informants show little stability regarding the content of their
vacation plans, most of the time because of children. The final decision
t1 (February)
t2 (April)
t3 (June)
mean=1.62
mean=1.58
mean=1.29
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1. Highly involved,
less personal
constraints, late
decisions
2. Highly involved,
older and single
vacationers, early
decisions
3. Families, lot of
constraints
(children), late (or
no) decision
4. Low involvement,
lot of constraints,
early or last-minute
decisions (loyalty)
106
From this opening quote, we see that in the first interview, Jacqueline and Roger mention dreamed or absurd destinations (Mexico
and Brazil) that seem out of reach because of price and temperature.
107
They evoke more reasonable destinations as well (Turkey, Italy, Iceland and Ireland). Alternatives are also already excluded at that stage
(South-eastern Asia because of climate and ethical concerns). In the
second interview, plans have changed: Bretagne and Auvergne are
evoked and further appear to be the two available alternatives left. Turkey is now part of their unavailable set because of Rogers health problems and budget constraints; Italy is shelved because the couple is
already going on a city-trip to Rome. During the third interview, it appears that plans still have changed: a surrogate destination not mentioned in the former interviews (i.e., the Belgian North Sea) emerges
as final choice. In conclusion, for Jacqueline and Roger, as it is also
the case for more DMUs in our sample, the final chosen destination
has little to do with the destinations mentioned during the first (and
sometimes even the second) interview (see Figure 2).
Two major explanations of such turnarounds emerge from data analysis. On the one hand, plans show an increasing level of realism over
the three series of interviews. In t1, informants are inclined to dream
aloud when mentioning possible summer vacation destinations. While
aware of actual and potential constraints, they try to convince themselves that the project is still feasible. That dream dimension is far
less present in the next two series of interviews. Considered destinations become more realistic as consumers take situational inhibitors
into account to a larger extent. As a consequence, the unavailable
set grows during the DM process whereas the size of the available set
decreases. Moreover, the unavailable set appears to be less stable over
time than the exclusion set and than the dream set. Sometimes, situational inhibitors even lead vacationers to choose a surrogate destination that was not part of evoked sets.
On the other hand, opportunities may arise such as an invitation
from relatives or an advertized special offer. Such opportunities result
Evoked set : t1
Mexico, Brazil,
Turkey, Italy,
Iceland, Ireland,
(t2 Bretagne,
Auvergne)
Awareness
set
Surrogate set :
t3 Belgian
North sea
Dream set :
t1 Mexico, Brazil
Unavailable set :
t2 Turkey, Italy
Available set:
t2 Bretagne, Auvergne
Final
Choice: t3
North sea
Exclusion set :
t1 South-eastern
Asia (e.g.,
Thailand)
108
in the sudden awareness of previously unknown destinations. The vacationer may finally prefer these new alternatives and choose them over
other alternatives, as illustrated by the following quote:
Thierry (couple, medical rep, 28): But if an opportunity comes out
from now to the end of the year (from now to vacation time, sorry),
it is very possible... that we will take this opportunity. I dont know,
if we have an opportunity to go... to Italy because for one reason or
another, we have a house, or rather there is a friend who rents one
house and who proposes us to go with him, well we will go to Italy.
Unawareness
set
All existing
destinations
Dream set
+
Awareness
set
Consideration
Unavailable
set
Available set
MARKET
Evoked set
Final
Choice
Exclusion set
Evaluation
Constraints
Choice
109
marketing and/or social environment (see the dotted arrow from the
unawareness set to the awareness set in Figure 3). Finally, vacationers
may choose an opportunistic destination rather than an alternative
from the available set or surrogate set (see the dotted arrow from
the awareness set to choice).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the formation and evolution of CSs. The
emerging typology of Table 2 partly confirms and extends the traditional conceptualizations of Narayana and Markin (1975), and Brisoux
and Laroche (1980) adapted in tourism by Um and Cromptons
(1990), and Woodside and Lysonskis (1989). One may parallel the
presentation of an exclusion set, respectively with Brisoux and Laroches reject set and Narayana and Markins inept set. In the same
way, the concepts of a surrogate set and of an unavailable set are not
far from Brisoux and Laroches hold set, and Woodside and Lysonskis
unavailable aware set respectively. However, the surrogate set involves
more processing and the formation of positive attitudes towards product alternatives, which the hold set does not. In contrast, extant literature has never considered ideas of an available set and a dream set
before, although these two types of sets may play major roles in destination choice such as described earlier.
Moreover, our study shows that the number of destinations is quite
stable over time and ranges from zero to four with means close to two
destinations/DMU (1.5/plan). Such a finding is in line with the general
idea that most evoked sets are small, ranging from three to six depending on the product category (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990) and with the
specific contention that vacationers evaluate only a few destinations
(i.e., four two) among a much larger set of available alternatives
(Bronner & de Hoog, 1985; Perdue & Meng, 2006; Woodside & Sherrell, 1977). Evoked sets sizes may be even smaller in this study due to
the naturalistic method employed, as informants were to evoke alternatives for an actual rather than hypothesized DM situation.
Traditional conceptualizations present the formation of CSs along
two typical sequential stages: the brand-consideration stage and the
brand-evaluation stage (Brisoux & Laroche, 1980; Hastak & Mitra,
1996; Howard, 1977; Howard & Sheth, 1969; Narayana & Markin,
1975; Nedungadi, 1990; Spiggle & Sewall, 1987; Um & Crompton,
1990). However, the emerging conceptualization of Figure 3 is a little
more subtle since it suggests that three stages or dimensions rather
than two may lead consumers to their final choice. More specifically,
our model adds a constraint dimension as third stage: after destinations have been considered and evaluated, structural constraints and
situational factors are taken into account; this reduces the number of
evoked destinations to an available set which includes only the alternatives that are feasible.
Moreover, our emerging model suggests that the choice process may
be shortened through direct connections between awareness set and
110
final choice or between surrogate set and choice. This straight recourse
to the awareness set highlights that evaluation is not always necessary
for choice. Focusing on the stage of CS formation prior to evaluation
and choice, Nedungadi (1990) provides empirical evidence that brand
choice is significantly altered outside the traditional evaluation-based
route, through variation in the retrieval and consideration of brands
(p. 273). He suggests a memory-based choice dependent on brand
accessibility. For a brand to be included in the CS, the consumer must
recall that brand and fail to recall other brands that s/he might otherwise prefer.
Theoretical implications
The papers findings entail four major contributions to extant literature. The first contribution is to generate an empirical model of CS
formation that refines traditional conceptualizations by Narayana
and Markin (1975), Brisoux and Laroche (1980), and Turley and Leblanc (1995). In contrast with those purely conceptual hypotheticodeductive models, the papers Figure 3 has been generated inductively
and analytically from empirical data related to actualas opposed to
hypotheticalDM processes. Moreover, our emerging model is specific to tourism; it involves local and substantive theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) empirically rooted in a destination choice setting. In
contrast, authors such as Um and Crompton (1990) or Woodside
and Lysonski (1989) have borrowed and adapted the general/formal
theory of traditional CS conceptualizations to a tourism context.
Second, our findings indicate that to a large extent, the formation of
CS is a constraint- and opportunity-driven process, which has been neglected by the CS literature so far. Constraints consideration leads
consumers to categorize evoked brands as part of either the available,
unavailable, or dream set. Such a distinction has not been introduced
by former models. A few authors already investigated the role of constraints in vacation DM and destination choice (e.g., Gilbert & Hudson,
2000; Hong et al., 2006; Perdue & Meng, 2006). However, they did not
introduce constraints consideration as a stage in itself in the formation
process of CS. Moreover, our data suggest that opportunities are
responsible for the appearance of new alternatives that consumers
may finally choose. Such results are in line with the idea of adaptive
decision making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) which has been
underused in investigating vacation DM.
Third, this paper helps better understand the dynamics of CS formation. As far as we know, this research is the first to examine the formation of destination CSs longitudinally as the same informants have
been interviewed up to three times. Such a longitudinal approach
highlights the growing level of realism in vacation plans and destinations over time. A shift from dream to reality is at play in the formation
of CSs, which is comparable to Mansfelds (1994) adaptation of the
value stretch concept (Rodman 1963). Vacationers may move from
a preference/ideal value level (dreamed but not necessarily available
111
destinations) to an expectation level (realistically available destinations) and finally to a tolerance level (surrogate destinations that represent an acceptable minimum) as far as plans evolve and summertime
approaches. The longitudinal data also suggest many turnarounds in
vacation plans and destination CSs. Evoked sets composition and size
fluctuates in time (see the four patterns of Figure 1) and cannot be
limited to a linear reduction such as often presented in extant
literature.
Finally, the CS perspective used in this paper highlights the continuity of vacation DM. More projects are considered simultaneously with
different time horizons, multiple DMUs, and so forth. The coexistence
of those projects in the vacationers mind leads to the formation of
macro-evoked sets of destinations. So destination choice proves to be
a continuous process where thinking, dreaming, talking about vacations, and gathering information is ongoing. Such a finding enhances
the hedonic and experiential dimensions of the DM and CS formation
processes, which is far from the vision of a (bounded) rational decision
maker depicted in most CS models (Brisoux & Laroche, 1980; Hauser
& Wernerfelt, 1990; Howard & Sheth, 1969; Narayana & Markin, 1975;
Spiggle & Sewall, 1987).
Managerial Implications
Travel professionals are likely to make better predictions from
choice models that recognize different types of sets rather than focusing on the consideration (evoked) set only. The predictive validity of
evoked sets considered alone proves to be very limited indeed. Shocker
et al. (1991) stress that research on the formation of CSs helps improve
the likelihood that products receive consideration. The cueing of specific product alternatives by contacts with friends and acquaintances or
with promotional and other marketing activity (e.g., sales personnel)
may also affect retrieval from memory and thus the formation of choice
sets (p. 190). Managers should enhance their brands accessibility
(ease of retrieval) and desirability at the same time.
Moreover, practitioners should try to develop effective plans and actions in order to facilitate the transfer of their brands from the dream
or unavailable set into the available set of their target customers. For
example, the cruise industry has made considerable efforts these last
years to change the perception that a cruise is an expensive elite product
that only rich people can afford; operators have lowered prices, they have
offered families children-friendly packages, and they have extended distribution channels. Furthermore, destination managers should make
sure that their country, region, or city is part of vacationers surrogate
set of destinations. For example, one could use a slogan such as Why
not the Belgian coast? in advertisements targeting Belgian vacationers
who may choose that nearby popular spot as a surrogate destination if
they realize that they lack the time or the budget to go abroad.
Tour operators, travel agents and destination managers should also
consider the opportunistic and constraint-driven way in which potential
112
tourists form their CSs. On the one hand, operators and agents could
benefit from the opportunistic nature of many vacationers by keeping
in touch with them, and making them offers such as early booking or
last-minute discounts. Active steps are particularly beneficial because
vacationers are waiting for and not purposefully searching for information. On the other hand, managers should also help remove particular
vacationers constraints. They could understand how those constraints,
imposed by individual goals and other personal circumstances, interact
with available alternatives and other environmental factors. Moreover,
travel agents should not overwhelm vacationers with propositions and
alternatives as destination evoked sets are of limited sizes.
Finally, industry people should incorporate the dynamism and continuity of many CSs in their marketing strategies and decisions. Most vacationers are involved in more than one vacation project at a time with
different needs, desires, and expectations, which leads to the formation
of a macro-evoked set entailing both available destinations for the current project and unavailable or dream destinations that they could reconsider in future plans. Consequently, vacationers should not be put in
exclusive segments: an alternative that has once been rejected may re-enter the evoked set at a later time or in another choice situation. For example, parents with young children could have shelved Egypt at one time
but might evoke that country again as a possible destination a few years
later when children are older or have left the family nest.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Of course, this study entails a few limitations which open avenues for
future research. First, set models may oversimplify the reality of choices.
Set models imply a binary logic in which a (destination) choice alternative is part of a set or not. While good conceptual and operational reasons
lead to using such models, fuzzy classifications could be more realistic
and outperform set models from a methodological perspective. Of
course, a mathematical modeling approach would then be needed.
For example, a probabilistic model could be developed wherein the alternatives likelihood of being chosen would depend on explanatory variables such as awareness, availability, and/or congruence with criteria
of a dream destination. Moreover, as in other conceptualization efforts,
the number of and the names given to the different CSs may seem somewhat arbitrary. In this paper, we tried to limit such subjectivity by generating the various CSs systematically and analytically from the empirical
data and by giving readers the opportunity to validate the typology by
themselves through the interview quotes. Moreover, the particular numbering and naming of CSs are of lesser importance than the way they help
to better understand the processes through which consumers come to
select or reject choice alternatives.
Next, a series of factors influencing the formation of CSs, such as the
contextual variables listed in Figure 3, should be investigated in more
depth. For example, the length and type of trip may affect the level of
planning and hence the composition of the CS: a long-distance trip
113
could increase the research requirements and thus lower the number
of alternatives in the CS when compared with a short-distance trip.
Focusing on choice heuristics or strategies underlying the formation
of CSs at different stages of Figure 3 is another possible extension of
this research. Of course, such a focus on decision heuristics would require a merging of the product alternatives approach to DM chosen in
this paper with an (multi-)attributes perspective.
In tourism, a few authors (Perdue & Meng, 2006; Turley & Leblanc,
1995) suggest that the attributes affecting the selection of destination
alternatives may be different from those affecting rejection. Turley and
Leblanc (1995) assume that inclusion in the CS is based on a satisficing
rule (i.e., meeting a minimum level on a few primary attributes) while
rejection is then based on facilitating attributes such as availability and
price. In the same way, Perdue and Meng (2006) show that the reasons
mentioned by respondents for destination selection differ from the
reasons cited for rejection, and contend that a non-compensatory heuristic is used in ski destination choice. They close their paper by suggesting a duality in the formation of CS: the observed reasons for
selection may be necessary conditions to get into consideration sets,
while the observed reasons for rejection reflect the actual choice
(Perdue & Meng, 2006, p. 347).
As a final limitation, this studys emerging propositions are qualitative, interpretative and context-bound. The papers findings, tables
and figures have been built inductively from the study of a phenomenon situated in a particular context. Refering to Strauss and Corbin
(1990), this is a local and substantive theory, in contrast with a general
and formal theory. A substantive theory emerges from the study of a
phenomenon situated in a particular situational context, whereas a formal theory develops when the phenomenon is being examined under
many types of situations. If the analytical generalization of emerging
findings is possible to some extant, statistical generalization is not possible because of the theoretical (non-random) sampling procedure
and the small sample size. The papers emerging propositions could
be tested on larger representative samples if statistical generalization
were desired.
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