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Motion To Quash
Motion To Quash
For: Murder
JOB HUTT,
Accused
X------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MOTION TO QUASH
(Accused) Jobb Hutt through counsel, and unto this Honorable Court,
most humbly and respectfully file this Motion to Quash.
In accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
we move for the quashing of the information that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and Section 3 (d) of the same Rule that the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so.
The rule of law is about form . . . A murderer has been caught with
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blood on his hands, bending over the body of his victim; a neighbour
with a video camera has filmed the crime and the murderer has
confessed in writing and on videotape. We nonetheless insist that
before the state can punish this miscreant, it must conduct a full-dress
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The court has defined Probable Cause in Quintero v. NBI as such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the object sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. It must be within
the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce
and not based on mere hearsay.
Furthermore as the high court held in the case of People vs. Cubcubin
where the arresting officers merely relied on the information given by an
informant who called in the police station, the court ruled that:
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim
was killed. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that
accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was
probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others; to wit:
by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30
in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along
Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accusedappellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano,
waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was
lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair
of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them
that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accusedappellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived
and accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others.
the same set of facts and circumstances in the case of People v. Del Rosario,
the arrest came a day after the offense was committed and thus, the offense
had not been just committed. Furthermore, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense, since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of the driver of the
getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
As shown above, the arresting officers did not have personal
knowledge that the crime had just been committed for they were not present
or close to the crime scene, they did not even made surveillance on the
accused but instead, merely relied on the unsubstantiated tip given by an
informant. Thus, it cannot be said that the officers had a probable cause that
led them to a reasonable suspicion in good faith that the accused really
committed the crime.
Consequently, the officer should have secured a warrant when they
arrested the accused. The illegality of the detention was not cured even if a
complaint was subsequently filed because a violation had already been
committed before the information was filed.
Henceforth, the constitutional accuseds right against unlawful and
illegal seizures was violated. Thus, he shall be released without prejudice to
the liability of the investigating officer to be prosecuted for Arbitrary
Detention.
II.
signed a waiver of his rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
But the accused did so without the assistance of a counsel. This is contrary
to the rule provided by the law, and shall be deemed to be null and void.
Section 7, Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides for the instructions to be followed in the proceedings:
The law requires that the waiver must be made in the presence of a
counsel in order that the accused will be informed effectively of his
rights and to ensure that he will not be coerced to make unsolicited
admissions. Even if the waiver has reduced into writing, the other
indispensable requirement of the presence of a counsel to assist the
accused was not complied.3
Hence, the waiver was not valid and did not produce any legal effect.
Thus, the prosecutor shall have instead made an inquest proceeding to
determine the validity of the warrantless arrest in order to ensure that the
person is not unlawfully detained.
The inquest establishes whether evidence is sufficient enough to seek
court approval to keep the person in detention. Thus, the accused was
unlawfully detained and was denied of due process when he remained at the
custody the police and was charged even if no inquest proceedings was done
or the preliminary investigation was invalid.
Because of the lack of assistance by a counsel, the accused was also
not able to present a counter-affidavit and evidence to controvert the
information. This has led to the deprivation of the accused of his right to due
process.
Meanwhile, preliminary investigation is always necessary because it
is a statutory right. The absence of which is also tantamount to the
deprivation of the accused of his right to due process. This is highlighted in
the case of Victor Jose Tan Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman where the court
said ruled that:
preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on
trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive
trials. Thus, while the right is statutory rather than
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Counsel of the Accused
Kwaii Gonn
Submitted by:
Jayford O. Powao
EH 408
LLB-1
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