Globalization and the Study of International Security Victor D. Cha Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), 391-403. Stable URL htp:/flinks.jstor-org/sicisici=( 122-3433% 28200005%2937%3A3% 3C391%3AGATSOIG3E2,0.CO%3B2-P Journal of Peace Research is currently published by Sage Publications, Ltd, Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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CHA Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University la sit ofthe plethora of leratue on security an globalization, there is elaively tle work weiten ‘by sccaniy specalitsthat interconnects there nthe ease of scuty ios this hasbeen ino small ‘pare because the fl semains entrenched in the Toad’ of competing elt, ier and cost Hionis esearch programs: In the case of the globakvation itera, st has stemmed fom a elatvdy rong feu onthe social and economic process of globalzation. This easy explores how the po ‘esses of globalization have fundamentally change the way we think about secant Targus that non Physical secunty, dersScaion oF threats, and the sence of entity are key ects of globalization in the security seal These secunty effect tanslae ito ecran behavioral tendencies in a tate’ orsign poly that have thas fr nor bon stain the rrr ir, globalization eaten intrpencteston ‘of orsign and domertcCintcemestic) iss such that national goveenmcntsinreasiagy operate in pace fined by the intercon of internal and extemal ecu. Second lobalation pts unpre ‘ened bureucatic novation pressures on goverment thee seach for secu and exeates mul lateral pressure to cooperate wih subwtate and tanenaional partners rather than tidtonal alex “Third, slobabation makes the clculation of relative capabltice extremely complex and non-incae nally, plobalzation compels contemplation of new modes of fighting as well as renders commonly accept moder of ses thinking and extionaldetcrence increasingly ieelevant. The "ew cc ‘vimentin the 2tt century wll operate increasing im the space define by the interpencteasion between two spheres: plbalzation and national oti Introduction At the threshold of the 21st century, two top- jes have dominated the study of international relations in the USA: globalization and the “new” security envionment after the end of the Cold War. The latter has been the object, of intense debate, largely dominated by those arguing about the relative importance of structural, institutional, and cultural variables for explaining the likelihood of global or [Tanks wo Samuel Kim, Robe Taco and Rob Gates for comments nd Balona Hsing for earch regional peace! The former dynamic has been discussed so widely in scholasly and popula citces that it has reached the ignoble status of buzzword’, familiarly used by many to refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trend in the world, but hardly understood by any? This essay explores how the processes of globalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. In spite of the plethora of litersture on security and Lebow & Risse Kappen (1995), Brown (1995, 1990) Kasensicn (199605 LyanJonee (193); Buxan et al vary 2 Fora sant insightful work ia the non ead ers tary sce Fridman (199), 391392 journal of PEACE RESEARCH globalization, there is relatively little work ‘written by US security specialists that inter- ‘connects the two. In the case of security studies, this has been in no. small part because the field remains entrenched in the foodfight’ of competing realist, liberal, and constructionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, this has stemmed from a telatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globali- zation. The ‘new” security environment in the 2ist century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity. Security and Globalization Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon.’ It is not an ‘event’, but a gradual and ongoing expansion of interac tion processes, forms of organization, and forms of cooperation outside the traditional spaces defined by sovereignty: Activity takes place in a less localized, less insulated way as ttanscontinental and interregional patterns criss-cross and overlap one another “The process of globalization is analytically istinet from interdependence, The latter, a8 Reinicke states, denotes growth in connec tions and linkages between sovereign enti- ties, Interdependence complicates external So Hel (197 253), Ae Rosen (19%: 251) write refers metro values mor structures Bu to sous ‘hac unfold tes the mind oe havo, to ntracion proces that erove at people and onganiaions go bout ti aly tasks and sec co reaive the parle Soc Mitiman (1994 427. Oras Goldblatt al (197 271) oe “Glbakiation denotes shift in the spa fom and extent of huan organization and interaction 1» a tanscontinnal of interegjonal etch Te voles a secching of soil rations sero time and space such that dystouhy acter ate eresingyinfacned by ‘rents happening om dhe theese of the globe an the pe and Frntatons ea have gican gba everberins? (etc and deceione af highly Voie! solune 37 J number 3 | may 2000 sovereignty in that sovereign choices have to bbe made to accommodate these interdepend- cnt ties. Globalization processes are not just about linkages but about interpenetration As Guchenno noted, globalization is defined not just by the ever-expanding connections berween states measuted in terms of move- ment of goods and capital but the circulation and interpenetration of people and ideas Guehenno, 1999: 7). Tt affects not only external sovereignty choices but also internal sovereignty in terms of relations berween the public and private sectors (Reinicke, 1997). Contrary to popular notions of globalization, this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to exist in the traditional Weberian sense (.e monopoly of legitimate authority over citi zen and subjects within a given territory). Instead, globalization is spatial reorganiza- tion of production, industry, finance, and other areas which causes local decisions to have global repercussions and daily ife to be affected by global events. Comparisons are often made between globalization at the end of the 20th century and the period before World War I when the developed world wit- essed unprecedented high volumes of uade across borders and movements of capital thatled tothe dissolution of empires and ta- ditional structures of governance. However, these analogies are not accurate because the process of change at the turn of the 20th century was driven by, and had as its final ‘outcome, nationalism and the consolidation ‘of statchood. A century late, statehood and notions of sovereignty are not so much under attack by so-called ‘globalization forces’ as empites were, but are being modi- fied and re-oriented by them. In short, the nation-state does not end; it is just less in conteol. Activity and decisions for the state increasingly take place in a post-sovereign space (Reinicke, 1997; Rosenau, 1996). In this sense, globalization is both a boundaty- broadening process and a _boundary- ‘weakening one (Rosenau, 1996: 251)Vietor D. Much of the literature on globalization has focused on its economic rather than security implications. In part, this is beeause the secutity effects of globalization often get conflated with changes to the international security agenda with the end of Cold War Superpower competition Its also because, unlike where globalization’s effects are manifested and measured every- day in terms of things like international capi tal flows and Internet use, in security, the effects ate inherently harder to conceptualize and measure. To the extent possible, the ensuing analysis tiesto differentiate globali- zation {rom post-Cold War effects on secu tity. As a first-cut, one can envision a ‘plobalization-security’ spectrum along which certain dialogues in security studies would fall For example, the notion of selee- tive engagement, pre-emptive withdrawal, democratic enlargement, or preventive defense as viable US grand strategies for the coming century would sit at the far end of this spectrum because they are predomi- nantly security effects deriving from the end of bipolar competition rather than from globalization.’ Progressively closer to the ‘middle would be arguments about the ‘debel- licization’ of security or the obsolescence of war which do not have globalization as their primary cause, but ae clearly related to some Of these processes." Also in tis middle range 5 ample of the acu bis inthe US ture ‘on gbuation nce Mitcian (194 Goldblatt a {97}; Renihe (UT; Rowena (194, Nye &e Ovens (09985 Talore (1997); Falke (1997; Obmae (19935; Hel avn. © Representa of works looking at charging dito ‘of sce a he end the Cold War are Wal 1991s Gory (1992, Desdney (PM Chipman (992 Nye (0985; Lapses (1995. 7 Woe detaes on selective engagement and pre-emptive enwhack sat se Layne (097) Rage (197) Se sho Hunungton (1999) Bens (198, On preventive Gefene se Cater & Peery (1995), Kuropean intermona slats Iitcrstute that has Wook at the post-Cold Wae fete of recur (a+ dnc from balan’ fists ‘om acu) inlade Kirchner &Spetng (19H) eaten man & Vasynen (195) Bran (1997) Cha GLOBALIZATION AND S curry would be discussions on ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states a this term is a function of the end of the Cold War, at the same time, however, the spread of information and technology expo- nentially raises the danger of these threats. Similaely, the end of the Cold War provides the permissive condition for the salience of weapons of mass destruction as the Soviet collapse directly affected the subsequent accessibility of formerly controlled sub- stances such as plutonium or enriched ura~ ium. But an equally important driver is globalization because the technologies for creating these weapons have become easily accessible (Falkenrath, 1998). Finally, at the far end of the ‘globalization-security’ spec- trum might be the salience of substate extremist groups or fundamentalist groups because their ability to organize transnation- ally, meet virtually, and utilize terrorist tacties has been substantially enhanced by the glo: balization of technology and information, While the US security studies field has made reference to many of these issues, a mote sys- tematic understanding of globalization’s security effects is lacking? ‘Agency and Scope of Threats “The most far-reaching security effect of glo- balization is its complication of the basic concept of ‘threat’ in international relations. This is in terms of both agency and scope. Agents of threat can be states but can also be non-state groups or individuals, While the vocabulary of conflict in international secu- sity traditionally centered on interstate war (ee, between lange set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalization, terms such as global violence and human "Bethe seminal work, oe Mur (198) Se al Man earn (199; Van Creel (1990, "Bor a more comprhenave and wsfulcharacizaton ‘ scury sun ee Bran (19973), hough hs cate fofeaton takes the post-Cold War ether than gobi tan asi pit fart 393394 journal of PEACE RESEARCH security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular substate units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly targets are not exclusively opposing force structures oF even cites, but local groups and individuals (Buzan, 1997a: 6-21; Klare, 1998: 66; Nye, 1989; Vayrynen, 1998; Waver et a, 1993). Similarly, security constituencies, while nominally defined by traditional sovereign orders increasingly are defined at every level from the global to the regional to the individual. Or as Buran (19972: 11) notes: ‘What can be clearly observed is that the state is less important in the new security agenda than in the old one. It still remains central, but no longer dominates either as the ‘exclusive referent object or as the principle embodiment of threat. Thus the providers of security are still nationally defined in terms of capabilities and resources; however, increasingly they apply these in a post: sovereign space whose spectrum ranges from nonstate to substate to transstate arrangements, For this reason, security threats become inherently more difficult t0 measure, locate, monitor, and contain (Freedman, 1998a: 56; Reinicke, 1997: 134), Globalization widens the scope of secu- sity as well. As the Copenhagen school has noted, how states conceive of security and how they determine what it means to be secure in the post-Cold War era expand beyond military security at the national level! Globalization’ effects on security scope ate distinet from those of the post- ‘Cold War in that the basic transaction pro- ‘esses engendered by globalization ~ instan- taneous communication and transportation, exchanges of information and technology, flow of capital ~ catalyze eertain dangerous phenomena or empower certain groups in ‘ways unimagined previously. In the former © See Baza (1974), Fo apts se Ho (195 cma i977, olome 37 | number 3 / may 2000 category ate things such as viruses and pollu tion, Because of human mobility, disease has become much more of « transnational secu- rity concern.! Global warming, ozone depletion, acid rain, biodiversity loss, and radioactive contamination are health and ‘environmental problems that have intensi- fied as transnational security concerns pre- cisely because of increased human mobility and interaction (Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998; Vayeynen, 1998; Zurn, 1998). Globalization also has given rise toa ‘skill revolution’ that enhances the capabilities of groups such as drug smugglers, political ter- rorists, cximinal organizations, and. ethnic insurgents to carry out their agenda more effectively than ever before (Aquila & Ronteldt, 196; Brown, 1998: 4-5; Godson, 1997; Klare, 1998; Rosenau, 1998: 21-25; Shinn, 1996: 38). [tis important to note that the widening scope of security o these trans- national issues isnot simply a short-term fix- ation with the end of bipolar Cold War competition as the defining axis for security. The threat posed by drugs, terrorism, trans- national crime, and environmental degrada- tion has been intensified precisely because of globalization. Moreover, the security solu- tions to these problems in terms of enforce- ment of containment increasingly are ineffective through national or unilateral Globalization has ignited identity as a source of conflict. The elevation of regional and ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue has generally been treated as a function of the end of the Cold War, However, itis also a function of globalization. ‘The process of lobalization carries implicit homogeniza- tion tendencies and messages!” which in combination withthe ‘borderlessness’ of the 7 For camp, the reemegeace of tubercle and nai heah hated ben ated to the dew trent of ressant stain inthe Seth because of ck ‘mack abyss of inovltion tems, which then ater the developed Now thai aan moby.Victor D. globalization phenomenon elicits a cultural pluralist response." [At the same time, globalization has made us both more aware and less deeisive about our motivations to intervene in such ethnic conflicts, Real-time visual images of horror and bloodshed in far-off places transmitted through CNN make the conflicts impossible to ignore, creating pressures for interven- tion. On the other hand, the hesitaney to aet is palpable, as standard measures by which to determine intervention (ie. bipolar competi- tion in the periphery) ate no longer appropri- ate, forcing us to grope with fuzzy motivations such as humanitarian interven- tion Non-Physical Security Globalization has anointed the concept of non-physical security Traditional definitions of security in terms of protection of territory and sovereignty, while certainly not itelevant in a globalized era, expand to protection of © Ag Matthew & Shambaugh angi mt the kaary cof he Sov clap tha eobles sto vate the por tance of tenanatial ecu but dhe advance in burn moby, communication, nd thoy that Fc See Matthew & Shambaogh (198: 167), slated exam ple of how seeuny agency and scape have danged the Devan army. These one ae not anew phenomena in iterasional polite, dating tack the US revolution sy war 6c Botan’ hin of Hessn sole) andthe in iy wates ofthe Tah century (he the wad weve, their eance ty i fntton ofthe changes vera by the gbaztion of echoes Increasing rational amis are retold t0 Fight highnensiy,gh technol confles and le upped gh ow ine fy conte in peer arens among ethnic groups whore the objec i eneing bale are unlea T Akslopmen, coupled with the deresing Cold War et tmphass om the periphery and dhe absence of domestic ‘upon for canals in sich pices har made the bingo of war iereasing salen. See Shoes (1908; Seetein (1997; Tees (194), 1 ample of homogenization impulesincide thet fasion of standardized consume od nel Fm the Akveloped Newth; Wester forme af ep nd ot [Asin crony capi); and Wore Ibe democracy (con libeed denoerg). Cha DBALIZATION AND SECURITY information and technology assets. For ‘example, Nye & Owens (1998) cite ‘infor- mation power’ as increasingly defining the distribution of power in international rela- tions in the 21st century. Ina similar vein, the evolution in military affais highlights not greater firepower but greater information technology and ‘smartness’ of weapons as the defining advantage for future warfare." "These non-physical security aspects have always been a part ofthe traditional national defense agenda, Indeed, concerns about the unauthorized transfer of sensitive technolo- gies gave rise to such techno-nationalist insti- tutions as COCOM during the Cold War. However, the challenge posed by globaliza- tion is that the nation-state ean no longer control the movement of technology and information (Simon, 1997). Strategic alli snces form in the private sector among lead- ing corporations that are not fettered by notions of techno-nationalism and driven instead by competitive, cost-cutting, oF ‘cutting-edge innovative needs, The result is transnationalization of defense produetion that further reduces the state’ control over these activites." More and more private companies, indi- viduals, and other non-state groups are the 1 at (1977 181-132) ates "Te ejeton ofthese ohalng tendencies in purest forms is asc ‘vith and exposed bythe eungece of regione aah ‘ie police in vasous extemstconfguions. Revel ings only by rereaing 10 premoders, traionalt ‘onctatons dos om seem posible al off nove ‘gn ters, prtialy at east, rm encroachment a5 ted with global eles and tasnes operations See ao Mitelman (19%: 432); Guchenno (199 1) 20d Waver (1998) °° Thee ae defined temo thingy cha ISR Ge gence cllection, sures, and econ), CH, ara precision fos that con pode aspirational sorencarcapablies (eg, damian’ batlespace hoot ‘les e-em ranspareney}), See Nye Owens (198, enon (196); Freman (18D), Lard Ae My (1999) Freinan corel points ou tha the emphasis om infor matin and endothe of bat in ean thy superior piel miltary ast. The former eno ompenste fe the later, See Feednan (1999: 51-82). 395396 journal of PEACE RESEARCH producers, consumers, and merchants of a 'US$50 billion per year global arms market (Klare & Lumpe, 1998). The end of the Cold War has certainly been a permissive condi- tion for the indiscriminate, profit-based incentives to sell weapons or dual-use tech- nologies to anybody. But globalization of information and technology has made batri- ers to non-state entry low and detection costs high. Moreover, while enforcement authorities still have the benefit of these technologies, wo critical developments have altered the equation: (1) Absence of discrim- ination: over the past two decades, the pri- vate sector, rather than the government, has become the primary creator of new technol- ogi, which in essence has removed any rel- ative advantages. state agencies formerly possessed in terms of exclusive access £0 eavesdropping technology, surveillance, and encryption.” Governments once in the posi- tion of holding monopolies on eutting edge technologies that could later be ‘spun off” in the national commercial sector are now con- sumers of ‘spin-on’ technologies. (2) Volume and varity: the sheer growth in volume and variety of communications has overwhelmed any attempts at_monitoring or control (Mathews, 1997; Freedman, 1999: 53)!" As Ae Golda ot a pnt out, MNCS mn acim for 1 dspropoctimately lage share of global technology feast a4 ronlt of FDL jin ventures iteration Pantin lcosnge and knowhow apse. This reams they ae mene in contre of teneering dtc Technologes thin tadional sate Sec Goldblatt (O997.277-279, On the pring commercial pressure for Heaton of encryption tcchogy, ace Freeh (197). See ah ene (99% 56-87} Coreoran (IDK 13) On the rowing ence of the US Defense Deparment on com feria technlegealadkancs compe wth the 1950 17, see Carter ey (199-197-198, "The eu of ths are wel known ntatancous com munication by fein, ctr phone, satelite phon ‘ekconfenseing, alpha numeric papers emai, computer modems, computer bulletin boas and fede expres are the orm. Apposinately 2888 Global Positioning Sytem satliemaigtion recive re ol a mot for ‘commercial ue volume 37 J number 3 | may 2000 noted eater, these phenomena of glo- balization most dangerously manifest them- selves as the threat posed by substate actors with violent intentions. Through the Internet and the privatization of formerly secured national assets (eg. plutonium or highly centiched uranium), these groups are now able to start substantially higher on the learn- ing curve for building a weapon of mass destruction. Building an inefficient fission ‘weapon capable of killing 100,000 in an urban center or cultivating cultures for bio- logical use is childs play relative to the past (Falkenrath, 1998: 54-55; Carter & Perry, 1999: 151)."” Thus in a globalized world, information and technology increasingly are the currency of non-physical security. Propositions for Security Behavior If non-physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key cffeets of globalization inthe security realm, then how might this translate in terms of a state’ foreign policy? The literature on glo- balization in both Europe and the USA remains conspicuously silent on this ques- tion, Globalization authors might argue that this ettcism is inappropriate because i sug- gests an ideal endstate at which a ‘globalized? country should arrive, However, the point here is not to suggest that there will be a sin tle uniform model, bu tht as globalization processes permeate a state’ security agenda, this might be manifested in certain gencral inclinations and contours of behavior. Put another way, we should observe globalia- tion processes altering in some cases, and In the eae of boll weapons etecive dlvery spire sme Gren fares pay technology. Bat che Pont that such technology i were peter wold ‘os ly be the ru of commercial need and ther Foce cay availible wo anyone. In cated vi, Homan (0997) has foun potive orcs two the pon oFinformaion and vehnoloy and the lal of eonVietor D. creating in other cases, new sets of security interests for states. Intermestic Security First, the globalization and security literature asserts but does not elaborate how security decisions ineseasingly take place outside the traditional purview of sovereignty. Global zation cxeates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues that national govern- ments must recognize in developing policy ‘One example of this ‘intermestc’ approach to security policy might be an acceptance that the taansnationalizaton of threats has blurred traditional divisions berween internal and external security (Kavzenstein, 19962) The obverse would be the frequency with which a state adheres to “delimiting” security, formulating and justifying policy on the basis cof ‘national security’ imerests rather than ‘universal/global interests (Moon Chung-in, 1995: 68). Examples ofthe former are Euro- pean institutions such as Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accord, which represent an acknowledgment that domestic issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, and immigration increasingly require trans- national cooperation. TREVI was composed ‘of ministers ofthe interior and justice of EC member states whose purpose was t0 coor inate policy on terrorism (at Germany's nie tiative in 1975) and international crime, The Schengen Accords also represented a con- vergence of internal and external security ‘with regard to common standards border controls, pursuit of eriminals across borders, asylum procedures, and refugees (Katzen- stein, 1998: 11-14). In Asia, one might see cavironmental pollution and anspational cxime as issues where international and dlomestie security converge (Special Focus China and Hong Kong’, 1996). However, in the near Future, maritime piracy is the most likely focal point. These are cases where sub- state actors atmed with sophisticated weap- Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY ons, satellite-tracking technology, and cutting-edge document-forging equipment Iijack vessels in the South and East China seas with millions of dollars worth of cargo (Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999) These groups operate transnational; pla ring may occur at one destination, tracking of the ship at another, the attack launched from another port, and the cargo offlonded at yet another port. These aets fall under the purview of local law enforcement, but they ae cleatly ‘intermestic’ security issues. The atacks occur in overlapping sovereign waters or international waters, and some- times receive the tacit consent of govern- ments where the pirated clandestinely ported. Moreover, if targeted cargos move beyond luxury autos and video cassette recorders to strategic goods such as plutonium, then distinctions berween exter ral and internal secusity and criminal and strategic threats disappear (Falkenrath, 1998; Guchenno, 1999: 11) vessels are ‘Multilateralism Second, the globalization literature acknowl- ‘edges that security is increasingly conceived ‘of in post-sovereign, globalized terms, but does not delineate how the modes of obtain- ing security should change. As noted above, ‘lobalization means that both the agency and scope of threats have become more diverse and non-state in form. This also suggests that the payoffs lessen for obtaining security through traditional means. Controlling pollu- tion, disease, technology, and information transfer cannot be easily dealt with through national, unilateral means but can only be effectively dealt with through the application of national resources in multilateral fora or through encouragement of transnational cooperation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intimated, US bombing of targets in Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings of two US embassies in Africa is a unilateral 397398 Journal of PLAC RESEARCH piecemeal approach far inferior to concerted slobal efforts at denying terrorists sanctuar- ies financing, and technology and encourag- ing thei extradition and prosecution 2 "Thus one would expect globalized secu- ity processes reflected ina state's striving for regional coordination and cooperative secu iy. It should emphasize not exclusivity and bilateraism in relations but inclusivity and multilateralism as the best way to solve secu- rity problems. At the extreme end of the spectrum, globalization might downplay the importance of eteenal iton-clad alliances and encourage the growth of select transnational ‘policy coalitions? among national govern- ments, nongovernmental onganizations (NGOs), and individuals specific to each problem (Reinicke, 1997: 134), In conjunction with multilateralism, glo- balized conceptions of secusity should be reflected in norms of diffuse reciprocity and international responsibilty. This is. admit tedly more amorphous and harder to operationalize. While some self-serving instrumental motives ie behind most diplo- macy, there must bea strong sense of global responsibilty and obligation that compels the state to act. Actions taken in the national interest must be balanced witha basic princi pile that contributes toa universal, globalized value system underpinning one's own values Bureaucratic Innovation “The globalization literature as not done jus- tice to the role bureaucratic innovation plays in tesponse to the new challenges of global zation. On this point, indeed, the Iterature has not kept pace with the empixics. For example, in the USA, the Clinton Adminis- teation created the position of Undersecre- tary for Global Afhirs, whose portfolio included environmental issues, promotion of democracy and human tights, population 2 Sc comments by President Cinton and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ae cit in Conte (198), solume 37 J number 3 | may 2000 and migration issues, and law enforcement (Talbott, 1997: 74). In a similar vein, the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute now has a new core course for FSOs on natcotics-traffcking, refugee flows, and environmental technologies (Talbott, 1997: 75). In May 1998, the Clinton Administra- tion put forward its first comprehensive plan to combat world crime, identifying drug. taf- ficking, transfer of sensitive technology and WMD, and trafficking of women and chil- dren as threats to the USA (Washington Post, 1998) One might also expect to see foreign service bureaucracies placing greater empha- sis on international organizations and NGOs in terms of representation, placement, and leadership if these are recognized as the key vehicles of security and politics in a glo- balized world Implicit in each of these examples is the tend toward greater specialization in the pursuit of security. As globalization makes security problems more complex and diverse, national security structures need 10 be re-otiented, sometimes through elimina- tion of anachronistic bureaucracies oF through rationalization of wasteful and over- lapping ones. In the US system, for example, while combating the spread of weapons of ‘mass destruction is widely acknowledged as a key security objective in the 2st century, various branches of the government operate autonomously in dealing with these threats. Hence, there are greater calls for renovation and coordination to eliminate the overlap, inefficiency, and lack of organization among, State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA, and FBI in combating proliferation ‘Another trend engendered by the security challenges of globalization is greater cross The degice 0 which this is “pi? oF mbantive Hora deel ct of recommendations on how oe vate and crete nations or deal with these poe, see Carter & Beery (199" 143-176, See alo Schrit 0%.Victor D. fertilization berween domestic law enforce- ‘ment and foreign policy agencies. This rela- tionship, at least in the USA (les the ease in Europe), is at worst non-existent because domestic law enforcement has operated tra- ditionally in isolation from national security and diplomatic concerns, or at best is a ‘mutually frustrating relationship because the two have neither inelination nor interest in cooperating, States that understand the ehal- lenges of globalization, particulaely on issues of drug-trafficking, environmental crimes, and technology transfer, will seek to bridge this gap, creating and capitalizing on syner- gies that develop between the swo groups. Foreign policy agencies will seek out greater interaction with domestic agencies, not only ‘on a pragmatic short-term basis employing law enforcement’: skills to deal with a partic- ular problem, but also on a longer-term and regular basis cultivating familiarity, transpar- fency, and common knowledge. On the domestic side, agencies such as the FBI, Customs, and police departments (of major Cities) would find themselves engaged in for- ign policy dialogues, again not only at the practitioner’ level, but also in academia and think-tank forums One of the longer-term effects of special ization and cross-fertilization is that security also becomes mote “porous” Specialization will often require changes not just at the sovereign national level, but across borders and with substate actors ‘Boilerplate’ secu: rity (@g dealt with by “hardshell” nation- states with national resources) becomes increasingly replaced by cooperation and coordination that may still be initiated by the national government but with indispensable partners (depending on the issue) such as NGOs, transnational groups, and the media. ‘The obverse of this dynamic also obtains. thi vein eight ae be unusual the Ft ae the comminsonce of New York Gy Paice or the ead of I parting dseurome ofthe Coun om ore ‘en Reliions the Brookings Isso, Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY With globalization, specialized ‘communi- ties of choice’ (eg, landmine ban) are empowered to organize transnationally and penetrate the national security agendas with issues that might not otherwise have been paid attention to (Guehenno, 1999: 9; Mathews, 1997), Aggregating Capabilities ‘The globalization literature remains relatively silent on how globalization processes sub- stantially alter the way in which states caleu- late relative capabilites. The single most important variable in this process is the dif- fasion of technology (both old and new). In the past, measuring relative capabilities was largely a linear process. Higher technology generally meant qualitatively better weapons and hence stronger capabilities. States could be assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-for- tank, jet-forjet comparison in terms of the threat posed and their relative strength based ‘on such linear measurements. However, the diffusion of technology has had distorting effects. While states at the higher end tech- rologicaly stil retain advantages, globaliza- tion has enabled wider access to technology such that the measurement process is more ‘dynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilities are more frequent and have occurted in cex- tain cases much earlier than anticipated. Sec- ‘ond, and more significant, the measurement process is no longer one-dimensional in the sense that one cannot readily draw linear associations between technology, capabili- ties, and power. For example, what gives local, economically backward states regional and even global influence in the 21st century is their ability to threaten across longer dis- tances Globalization facilitates access to sclect technologies related to force projec- tion and weapons of mass destruction, which in turn enable states to pose threats that are asymmetric and disproportionate to their size. Moreover, these threats emanate not 399400 journal of PEACE RESEARCH from acquisition of state-of-the-art but old and outdated technology. Thus countries like North Korea, which along most traditional _measurements of power could not compare, can with old technology (SCUD and radi. mentary nuclear technology) pose threats and affect behavior in ways unforescen in the past (Bracken, 1998) Strategies and Operational Considerations Finally the literature on globalization is nota- biy silent on the long-term impact of globali- zation processes on time-tested modes of strategic thinking and fighting In the former vein, the widening scope of security engen- dered by globalization means that the defni- tion of security and the fght fort wil occur not on battlefields but in unconventional places against non-traditional security adver- saries, As noted above, when states cannot deal with these threats through sovereign means, they will encourage multateralism and cooperation at the national, tansna- tional, and international levels However, the nature of these conflicts may also require new ways of fighting, ie. the ability to engage militarily with a high degree of lethality against combatants, bt low levels of collat- eral damage. As a result, globalization’ wid ening security scope dictates not only new strategies (discussed below) but also. new forms of combat. Examples inchadeineapac- itating crowd control munitions such as blunt projectiles (eubber balls), non-lethal crowd dispersal cattridges, ‘stick “mm? and ‘sick ‘cm’ traction modifier, oF ‘stink’ bombs ‘Smart’ non-lethal warfare that inca- pacitates equipment will aso be favored, including sig foam substances, and radio frequency and microwave technologies to disable electronics and communications (CER Task Force, 1999) Regarding strategy, as the agency and scope of threats diversifies in a globalized sumer 3 | may 2000 world, tnditional modes of deterrence become less felevant. Nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, for example, was based on certain assumptions. Fis, the target of the stategy ‘was another nation-state. Second, this decerred state was assumed to have a degree ‘of centralization in the decisionmaking pro- cess over nuclear weapons use. Third, and most important, the opponent possessed both counterforce and countervalue targets that would be the abject of a second strike While this sort of rationally based, existen- tial deterrence will sill apply to interstate security, the proliferation of weaponized non-state and substate actors increasingly renders this sort of strategic thinking obso- lete. They do not occupy sovereign ersito: sual space and therefore cannot be targeted With the threat of retaliation. They also may operate as self-contained cells eather than an organic whole which makes decapitating strikes at a central decisionmaking structure ineffective. In short, you cannot deter with the threat of retaliation that which you can not target. Governments may respond to this in a variety of ways, One method would be, as noted above, greater emphasis on the spe- cialized utilization of whatever state, sub- state, and multilateral methods are necessary to defend against such threats. A second likely response would be greater attention and resources directed at civil defense prep- aration and ‘consequence’ management to minimize widespread panic and pain in the event ofan attack. A third possible response is unilateral in nature. Governments may increasingly employ pre-emptive or preven tive strategies if rational deterrence does not apply against non-state entities Hence one might envision two tiers of security in which stable ational deterzence applies at the state-state level but unstable pre-emptive/ preventive strategies apply atthe state-non- state levelVietor D. Conclusion What then isthe ‘new” security envionment Jn the 2st century that the globalizaion/ security literature must strive to understand? Te is most likely one chat sits at the intersee- tion of globalization and national ident. In other words, as globalization processes com- plicate the nature of security (Le in terms of agency and scope), this effects a transform: tion in te interests that inform secusity pol icy. Globaliza domestic level and should be manifested in some very broad behavioral tends or styles of security policy. Manifestations of this transformation are inclinations toward inter rmestic secu, multilateralism, and bureau cratic innovation and specialization. However, it would be shortsighted to expect that al states will respond similarly. In some cases, policies will emerge that directly meet or adjust to the imperatives of global ‘ation, but in other cases the policy that ‘emerges will not be what one might expect to Tineaty follow from globalization pres- sures. The latter outcomes ate the «pes of anomalies that offer the most clear indica- tions of the causal role of domestic Factors in the ‘new* security environment (Desch, 1998: 158-160); however, these alone only highlight national identity as a residual vari able (.e. capable of explaining only abersa- tions) im the ‘new’ security environment. (One would expect, therefore, that the Former outcomes would be as important to process- tsace:Ifpoliey adjustments appear outwardly consistent with globalization but the under lying rationale for such setion is not, then this ustrates that the domestic~ideational mediation process is an everpresent one. ‘The new security environment would there- fore be one in which plobalization pressures fon security policy and grand strategy ate continually refracted through the prism of national identi ns imperatives permeate the Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY References Arquilla, John & David Ronfeldt, 1996. 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CHA, b. 1961, PRD in Political Science (Columbia Universi, 1994); Assistant Professor, Georgetown University (1995-); Hoover National Fellow (Stanford University, 1998); Fulbright Scholae (Korea, 1999), Most ecent book: Algement Despite Antagni: The United States-Kerea-Jopan Security Trang Sta. ford University Press, 1999). 403