Nuclear Agreement India between America 2008

• Introduction

In August 2007, India and the United States reached a bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear
cooperation as envisioned in the joint statement released by President Bush and Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005. The deal, which marks a notable warming of U.S.-
India relations, would lift the U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India, provide U.S. assistance
to India's civilian nuclear energy program, and expand U.S.-Indian cooperation in energy and
satellite technology. But critics in the United States say the deal fundamentally reverses half a
century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, undermine attempts to prevent states like Iran and North
Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and potentially contribute to a nuclear arms race in Asia.
“It's an unprecedented deal for India,” says Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. “If you look at the three countries outside the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—Israel, India, and Pakistan—this stands to be a unique deal.”

What are the terms of the deal?

The details of the deal include the following:

o India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA),
the United Nations' nuclear watchdog group, access to its civilian nuclear program. But India
would decide which of its many nuclear facilities to classify as civilian. By March 2006,
India promised to place fourteen of its twenty-two power reactors under IAEA safeguards
permanently. India also promised that all future civilian thermal and breeder reactors shall be
placed under IAEA safeguards permanently. Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asia
program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says these will now include
domestically built plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before now. Military
facilities—and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now—will be exempt
from inspections or safeguards.
o India commits to signing an Additional Protocol (PDF)—which allows more intrusive IAEA
inspections—or its civilian facilities.
o India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
o India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.
o India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the United
States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.India agrees to
prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't possess
them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.
o U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for
its civilian energy program.

What kind of technology would India receive in return?

India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment
that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for
nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.

What do proponents say about the deal?

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Proponents of the agreement argue it will bring India closer to the United States at a time when the
two countries are forging a strategic relationship to pursue their common interests in fighting
terrorism, spreading democracy, and preventing the domination of Asia by any single power. Ashley
Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—currently serving as an adviser to the
State Department on Indian affairs—says in congressional testimony that the deal recognizes this
growing relationship by engaging India, which has proven it is not a nuclear proliferation risk. Other
experts say the deal lays out the requirements for India to be recognized as a responsible steward of
nuclear power. "This is part of a process of making India a more durable and reliable nuclear
partner," Schaffer says.
Other experts say the deal:

o Would encourage India to accept international safeguards on facilities it has not allowed
to be inspected before. This is a major step, experts say, because the existing
nonproliferation regime has failed either to force India to give up its nuclear weapons or
make it accept international inspections and restrictions on its nuclear facilities. "President
Bush's bilateral deal correctly recognizes that it is far better for the nonproliferation
community if India works with it rather than against it," writes Seema Gahlaut of the
University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security in a CSIS policy brief.
IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei has strongly endorsed the deal, calling it a
pragmatic way to bring India into the nonproliferation community.
o Recognizes India's history of imposing voluntary safeguards on its nuclear program.
Proponents of the deal say India has an excellent record of setting credible safeguards on its
nuclear program for the last thirty years. After the safeguards on the U.S.-supplied Tarapur
nuclear facility expired in 1993, for example, India voluntarily established a new agreement
with the IAEA to continue the restrictions.
o Recognizes that India has a good record on proliferation. Although it is not a signatory to
the NPT, India has maintained strict controls on its nuclear technology and has not shared it
with any other country. Proponents of the deal say this restraint shows that India, unlike its
nuclear neighbor Pakistan, is committed to responsible nuclear stewardship and fighting
proliferation. In May 2005 India passed a law, the WMD Act, which criminalizes the trade
and brokering of sensitive technology.
o Rewards India's decision to adopt similar nuclear export standards as those imposed by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India has thus far chosen to abide by the strict export
controls on nuclear technology set by the NSG, a group of forty-five nuclear-supplier states
that voluntarily coordinates controls of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. Experts
say if India chose to lift these voluntary restrictions, it could easily sell its technology to far
less trustworthy countries around the world. The U.S. deal would reward the Indian
government for its voluntary controls and give New Delhi incentive to continue them, against
the demands of Indian hardliners who question what India gets out of placing such limits on
itself.

What are the objections to the agreement?

Critics call the terms of the agreement overly beneficial for India and lacking sufficient safeguards to
prevent New Delhi from continuing to produce nuclear weapons. "We are going to be sending, or
allowing others to send, fresh fuel to India—including yellowcake and lightly enriched uraniumt—
that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs
than they would otherwise have been able to make," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving
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awareness of proliferation issues. While India has pledged that any U.S. assistance to its civilian
nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, experts say India could use the
imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel to
weapons production. New Delhi has done similar things in the past; India claimed it was using
nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. A
Congressional Research Service report (PDF) on the agreement states, "There are no measures in
this global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons program."
Other objections raised by experts include:

o The safeguards apply only to facilities and material manufactured by India beginning
when the agreement was reached. It doesn't cover the fissile material produced by India
over the last several decades of nuclear activity. The CRS report says, "A significant question
is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that
U.S. peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes."
o The deal does not require India to cap or limit its fissile material production. This comes
at a time when nearly all the major nuclear powers—including the United States, France,
Britain, and Russia—are moving to limit their production.
o The deal does not require India to restrict the number of nuclear weapons it plans to
produce.
o There are far more cost-efficient ways to improve India's energy and technology
sectors. These could include making India's existing electricity grid more efficient,
restructuring the country's coal industry, and expanding the use of renewable energy sources,
Sokolski said in congressional testimony. All these steps would involve much less dangerous
transfers of technology that would not be dual-use, and therefore not convertible to nuclear
weapons production.
o The agreement was rushed and takes unnecessary risks without adequate preparation
or expert review. The agreement "appears to have been formulated without a
comprehensive high-level review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant
engagement of many of the government's most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear
plan for achieving its implementation," writes William C. Potter, director of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, in
Nonproliferation Review. "Indeed, it bears all the signs of a top-down administrative
directive specifically designed to circumvent the interagency review process and to minimize
input from any remnants of the traditional 'nonproliferation lobby.'"

Who needs to approve the agreement?

The final terms of the nuclear deal need approval from several sources before they can be
implemented. The bodies required to approve the deal include:

o IAEA. India has to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under which all nuclear
material and equipment transferred to it by the United States as a part of this deal shall be
subject to safeguards. The Board of Governors of the IAEA has to approve this India-specific
safeguards agreement. In Febuary 2008, Indian negotiators and IAEA officials met in Vienna
discuss their differences and complete the agreement.
o India's Parliament. While the deal does not require a formal vote by the parliament, the
coalition government has faced a confidence vote over it. Many parliamentarians oppose the
deal, arguing it will limit India's sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear
experts are protesting what they see as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of
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 India's nuclear facilities to define as civilian, and open to international inspections under the
plan.
o The Nuclear Suppliers Group. The NSG tries to restrict the spread of nuclear technology
that could be used in weapons programs through export controls. The United States will try
to convince the group to make an exception for India, which may be a difficult case to make
when the United States is simultaneously trying to prevent Iran and North Korea from
gaining similar access to nuclear fuel and technology.
o Congress. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which regulates the trade of nuclear material,
congressional approval is needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the nuclear
deal to be implemented. Members of Congress are showing resistance, with some calling for
India to commit to strict limits on its nuclear weapons program before the deal goes through.
"Congress needs to address the many troubling questions raised by this deal before it
considers changing longstanding nonproliferation laws," David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security, said in congressional testimony (PDF) in
October 2005.

What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT?

It could gut the agreement, experts say. Article 1 of the treaty says nations that possess nuclear
weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them. Albright says that
without additional measures to ensure a real barrier exists between India's military and civilian
nuclear programs, the agreement "could pose serious risks to the security of the United States" by
potentially allowing Indian companies to proliferate banned nuclear technology around the world. In
addition, it could lead other suppliers—including Russia and China—to bend the international rules
so they can sell their own nuclear technology to other countries, some of them hostile to the United
States. On the other hand, experts like Gahlaut argue the NPT was already failing in its mission to
prevent proliferation. She says many countries—including North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq—have
cheated while being signatories of the NPT.

What role does China play in the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?

It is a motivating factor in the deal, some experts say. China's rise in the region is prompting the
United States to seek a strategic relationship with India. "The United States is trying to cement its
relationship with the world's largest democracy in order to counterbalance China," Ferguson says.
The Bush administration is "hoping that latching onto India as the rising star of Asia could help
them handle China," Sokolski says.
But other experts say the growing economic relationship between China and India is so critical to
New Delhi that its interests in China cannot be threatened or replaced by any agreement with the
United States. Indians "have no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe
this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible
relationship with China," Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council
meeting February 23. Other experts worry U.S. nuclear aid to India could foster a dangerous
nuclear rivalry between India and China. Though India has a strong interest in building economic
relations with China, New Delhi is still wary of China's military rise in the region.

What effect will the deal have on U.S. and Indian relations with Pakistan?

Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, who has suffered fierce criticism at home—and survived two
assassination attempts—or his strong alliance with the United States since 9/11, has not received a
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similar deal on nuclear energy from Washington. Some experts say this apparent U.S. favoritism
toward India could increase the nuclear rivalry between the intensely competitive nations, and
potentially raise tensions in the already dangerous region. "My impression is that [the Pakistanis] are
worried this will feed the Indian nuclear weapons program and therefore weaken deterrence,"
Blackwill said. Other experts say the two countries, both admittedly now nuclear, could be forced to
deal more cautiously with each other. Pakistan is already a proliferation risk: Pakistani nuclear
scientist A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear network, revealed in 2004, shocked the world with its brazen
trade of nuclear technology. Some experts worry the U.S.-India deal could prompt Pakistan to go
elsewhere for similar terms.

What’s the history of India’s nuclear program?

In the 1950s, the United States helped India develop nuclear energy under the Atoms for Peace
program. The United States built a nuclear reactor for India, provided nuclear fuel for a time, and
allowed Indian scientists study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT,
claiming it was biased. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could develop nuclear
weapons with technology transferred for peaceful purposes. As a result, the United States isolated
India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to convince other countries to
do the same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build a "strategic partnership" with
India, increasing cooperation in fields including spaceflight, satellite technology, and missile
defense.

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THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT
BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bhairav Acharya
Rajeev Dhavan

I.NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CRISIS

1.1
This paper concerns the nuclear cooperation interactions that took place
between India and the United States of America [“US”] from the period 2005
to 2007 and beyond. These treaties have proved to be controversial both in
the US as well as India. In the US, concern over the treaties was translated
into the Hyde Act of 2006 which laid down various conditions and concerns
which were to be followed in respect of the implementation of the treaties.
On the other hand, concern in India canvassed a large number of issues
including (a) the manner in which the interactions were negotiated without
reference to Parliament; (b) the imperious tone of the Hyde Act; (c) the
intransigence of the US which sought to display its imperial purposes in what
was a treaty concerning peaceful use of atomic energy; and, (d) the
compromises entered into by the Indian government both during its prefatory
negotiations as well as in terms of the final result.
1.2
Eventually, Indian concerns exploded with the ‘left’ parties wanting to put
the negotiations on hold so that matters could be discussed before India
proceeded to the next step of further negotiations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This resulted in a crisis. At one stage, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh dared the left parties to bring the government
down – to which the left parties responded, strongly, with the stand that they
were acting bona fide and should not be challenged in this way on points of
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principle. On its part, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) watched these
exchanges with glee. The present Congress­led UPA government consists of
217 Members of Parliament in the Lok Sabha and has the support of 60
members from the Left. The BJP saw its chance to topple this government
and force a mid­term election. It would have liked the treaties to be put to
vote; and, took the view that India should respond by amending India’s
Atomic Energy Act, 1962 so that the safeguards to the treaty would be
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determined by the amended statute and not on the text of the agreements.
Fortunately, the Lok Sabha Speaker, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, sensibly took
the view that the treaties had to be debated in Parliament; but, that the
debate would be under Rule 193 (not requiring a vote) rather than Rule 184
which requires a vote. Such a decision was constitutionally correct. The
Indian Constitution permits the executive to negotiate treaties [Article 73
read with the Entry 14, Schedule VII] in the light of Ram Jawaya Kapur’s case
AIR 1955 SC 549. There is no provision for a ratification of the treaties by
Parliament – as in the case of the US Constitution [Article II, Section 2]. But,
the Speaker took the democratic view that entering into treaties as part of the
executive power was subject to democratic discussion and accountability.
What followed was the usual disruptive tactics of the BJP which has
consistently, since the UPA assumed power, stalled Parliament by disruption
in lieu of discussion. Such tactics are unconstitutional, but added to the
drama which started as confrontation and drifted into crisis.
1.3
In order to truly comprehend the root of the crisis, we need to enter into the
world of treaties generally and the treaty making power under the Indian
Constitution before we examine the compulsions of the Hyde Act and the
123 Agreement proposed by the US as flowing from Section 123 of the US’s
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
II.
T
HE

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W
ORLD OF
T
REATIES AND THE
T
REATY
M
AKING
P
OWER
(A)
The World of Treaties
2.1
Treaties are a part of governance that have acquired a larger than life
connotation which can only be understood in terms of the politics of power.
Conventionally, the term ‘treaty’ seems to denote a grand exchange between
national plenipotentiaries. However, treaties are necessarily exercises of
political power. Ostensibly negotiated at arms length, the more powerful
nation State is able to exact provisions, compromises and concessions which
are agreed to by the weaker nation State. Sometimes, this power is exercised
purely for symbolic purposes so that the stronger State can flaunt its superior
strength both in respect of the weaker nation State and the other nation States
who watch these exercises with concern – and sometimes dismay. Although
a distinction is sometimes made between law making treaties (traites lois)
and contractual treaties (traites contrats), we should not be too obsessed by
this distinction. All treaties are structured by power play – including treaties
that created the League of Nations, the United Nations and other law making
treaties – amongst which the World Trade Organisation [“WTO”] is a
controversial example. This emphasis needs to be made because a ‘treaty’ (of
whatever kind) must be dispossessed of the aura that is created around it
both for national and international purposes. Nationally, the aura of a treaty
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3
is paraded to make it a sacrosanct exercise of power which is sacrally
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entrusted to the executive and should not be questioned by courts or the
political process except in extreme circumstances. Internationally, treaties
have been clothed with a sanctity to take them beyond the reach of
realpolitik once they signed, sealed and delivered. This aura of a treaty needs
to be unmasked and decoded.
2.2
This is particularly important in the context of the present treaty interactions
which cannot be assessed without taking into account that the treaty is being
signed by an imperial power (the US) with a fast developing nation (India) in
the light of America’s imperial policies both generally and in relation to the
geopolitics of the sub continent.
We cannot treat the negotiations, the Hyde Act and the 123
Agreement in terms of simply the letters and words that are used but the
exercises of power which are imbricated in them. Therefore the questions: is
the US ‘bullying’ India; and, should India allow itself to be bullied by
imperial the US are matters not just of form but of substance. This has
particular importance to the fact that India has a policy of non alignment and
the independent pursuit of its foreign policy.
2.3
Before 1980 (when the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
[“Vienna Convention”] came into force), treaties were governed by
customary international law. This customary international law was evolved in
colonial times and used emphatically by imperial States. The US, in
particular, has a long history of the misuse of the treaty making power. After
1980, treaties have been defined by the Vienna Convention as follows:
“…an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation” [Article 2.1(a)]
Since treaties are negotiated between sovereign States, it is generally
assumed that they have negotiated under arms length. Treaties are not set
aside because they are unconscionable. The Vienna Convention is not
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concerned with the content of treaties, but only the procedures to be
followed. Once a treaty is put into place, it becomes pacta sunt servanda
which requires that a treaty is binding upon the parties and must be
performed in good faith. In terms of our present crisis, it has to be borne in
mind that any treaty which India accepts must be implemented unless there
is a material breach, an impossibility or a fundamental change of
circumstances. Thus, the law of treaties creates a cast iron situation. No
doubt, as far as general treaties are concerned, reservations can be imposed.
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In all other treaties, it is the terms that are important. For this reason alone, it
is important for India to get the terms right.
2.4
At this stage, India needs to get the terms right. No doubt, India’s Atomic
Energy Act, 1962 can be amended. But it would not be an exercise in good
faith to pass an amendment which seeks to nullify the treaty itself once its
terms are agreed. The juristic technique available to both India and the US as
far as its domestic law is concerned is that they can explicitly or implicitly
make the treaty subject to their domestic laws. It is here that Indian concern
has been expressed about the nature of the treaty that has been negotiated
between the US and China and the present treaty negotiated between India
and the US. In the case of China, the relevant clause reads as follows:
“…the parties recognize, with respect to the observance of this
agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.” [Article 2.1]
This means that the 123 Agreement with China cannot be subordinated or
subverted by any domestic law. On the other hand, the 123 Agreement
between India and the US indicates in Article 2(1):
“Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its
respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations…”
Prima facie, this seems to suggest that the implementation of the treaty is
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subject to the domestic laws of both sides. However, this concerns only the
implementation of the Agreement and not the substantive provisions of the
Agreement itself. The distinction between the substantive obligations created
by a treaty and its future implementation is an important one. It has to
understood in a manner consistent with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention,
which reads as follows:
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
In other words, insofar as implementation is concerned, a future breach
cannot be justified on the basis that the internal law has modified the treaty
or rendered it impossible to perform. Indeed, if this were so, every treaty
signed by a country would be vulnerable to future legislation. Every treaty
would be unilaterally re­determined. Indian concerns were that the US
should not use its domestic law as a justification for its failure to perform the
treaty. In one sense, this is implicit if the Vienna Convention is read into the
treaty as far as implementation and future breach are concerned. This should
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take care of future changes of even the substantive provisions in that any
change in the substantive provisions cannot afford a justification for failure to
perform. However, what India seems to have wanted but not secured is a
‘China style’ provision which would have made what is implicit explicit to
tie the hands of the US both explicitly in the treaty and implicitly through
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. This may be necessary because of two
factors. The first is that in the US a treaty is also a part of the law once it is
ratified. The second is that the US is an imperial power and India has no way
of seeking recourse against the US under this treaty other than to flounder
and fume if the US justifies its recalcitrance by reference to its domestic law
and points to the difference between the Indian and the Chinese treaties.
That is why the double protection of the Vienna Convention as well as a
specific clause in the treaty was necessary to plug the loophole to fully
confront the arrogance of an imperial power which has never allowed

11
legality to prevent it flexing its imperial muscles.
2.5
All treaties involve a surrender of sovereignty. This factor has to be borne in
mind while that considering treaties are an exercise of executive power and,
in most countries like India, subject only to doses of democratic critique but
not accountability.
(B)
India’s Treaty Making Power
2.6
Despite the increasingly important role that treaties play in governance, the
Indian executive has generally exercised its power to enter into treaties free
of parliamentary intervention to sidestep democratic accountability. This
power arises from Article 73 of the Indian Constitution which states that
“…the executive power of the Union shall extend…to the matters with
respect to which Parliament has power to make laws”. The legislative power
of Parliament is specified in List I [“Union List”] of the Seventh Schedule of
the Indian Constitution. Entries 10 to 14 of the Union List read:
“10. Foreign affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation
with any foreign country.
11. Diplomatic, consular and trade representation.
12. United Nations Organisation.
13. Participation in international conferences, associations and other
bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat.
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14. Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and
implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign
countries.”
Hence, the Union has the exclusive power to deal with foreign affairs and
enter into international treaties and agreements, such as the nuclear
cooperation agreement with the US. The Union Parliament is empowered to
legislate, inter alia, on the procedure for entering into treaties; a power that it
has not exercised to enact any statute to lay down standards for the executive
12
to abide by while entering into treaties. Such a statute may, arguably, include
the requirement of parliamentary ratification. In Ram Jawaya Kapur’s case
AIR 1955 SC 549, the Supreme Court settled that the width of the executive
power of the Union is coterminous with its legislative power even if
supporting legislation in that area of exercise has not been passed. Thus, in
the absence of statutory law, the executive exercises its executive power to
enter into treaties.
2.7
Further, Article 253 of the Constitution states:
“Legislation for giving effect to international agreements. –
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,
Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of
the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or
convention with any other country or countries or any decision made
at any international conference, association or other body.”
When read together with the relevant Entries of the Union List in Schedule
VII, these provisions submit to the Union the power to legislate to give effect
to international treaties notwithstanding that the subject matter of the
international treaty and subsequent enforcing legislation may be within the
exclusive legislative competence of the States under List II [“State List”] of the
Seventh Schedule. Therefore, to use an example, although ‘agriculture’ is
within the legislative domain of the States to the exclusion of the Union [See,
Entry 14, List II, Schedule VII], the Union acceded to the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture by virtue of its exclusive treaty making power. The power of the
Union to enter into treaties and subsequently legislate on them even though
the subject of such treaties and legislation lie within the exclusive
competence of the States subverts Indian federalism.
2.8
The traditional view of the Indian judiciary on the applicability of India’s
treaty obligations on domestic law was that treaties do not create rights in
municipal law unless they are specifically incorporated [See, Maganbhai
Patel AIR 1969 SC 783]. This is known as the doctrine of incorporation and

13
arises from Article 253 of the Indian Constitution. In Maganbhai’s case, a
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7
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine of
incorporation thus –
“…the law obligations arising under the agreement or treaties are not
by their own force binding upon Indian nationals. The power to
legislate in respect of treaties lies with the Parliament... But making of
law under that authority is necessary when the treaty or
agreement…modifies the laws of the State.” [See, pr. 81].
However, the law in this regard has been substantially altered by the
Supreme Court in various respects, especially in relation to human rights
enhancing provisions of international conventions even where they have not
been specifically incorporated into Indian law by legislation. It is now
generally well settled that,
(a)
international law norms which are not contrary to Indian law
are recognised as legally enforceable.
(b)
treaty obligations which are rights­enhancing are to be read as
part of the life, liberty and due process provision.
Both these principles are applicable while transposing the rights recognised
by international conventions into domestic law. Even where India has signed
but not ratified international instruments recognising human rights, let alone
incorporate them through domestic legislation, the Supreme Court has been
willing to read the provisions of these treaties into the fundamental rights
chapter of the Indian Constitution as long they do not conflict with domestic
law [See, Vishaka (1997) 6 SCC 241 and People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(1997) 3 SCC 433].
2.9
As India comes closer to the world in globalisation and foreign and
economic relations, treaties will increasingly play an important role in Indian
governance. This cannot happen to the exclusion of a democratically elected
14
Parliament. The present system of the Union executive entering into treaties
unchecked is unsustainable and open to the abuse that accompanies lack of
accountability. Treaty making can no longer be carried on in a cliquish
manner by the executive, without informing Parliament sans public debate.
A nineteenth century system of governance by treaties will not pass muster in
a twenty first century democracy. There is a need to democratise the treaty
making process to rescue it from the fog of exclusive and often secret
executive power. While there is the potential of accountability in the treaty
making process through statutory safeguards, Parliament has not exercised its
legislative power to create any such regime. It is in the narrow interest of
governments to seal their powers from public scrutiny, even from Parliament.
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8
This is true of both the current UPA and the previous BJP­led governments.
Clearly, the manner in which India exercises its treaty making power must be
reviewed.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
3.1
The India – US nuclear cooperation agreement cannot be seen as a single
treaty, but as a number of statements, policy decisions, agreements and
legislation that have been made both in India and the US over the last two
years. Both in India and the US, the official reason for entering into the
agreement is to address India’s growing energy needs in a manner that does
not intensify global warming.
(A)
India’s Energy Crisis
3.2
India’s economy grew at 9.4 per cent in the financial year 2006–2007
making it the second fastest growing major economy in the world. An
enormous amount of energy is required to sustain this growth, and more is
needed if India’s economy is to grow at a faster pace. In 2006, more than 70
per cent of India’s energy needs were met by coal, most of the remaining 30
15
per cent being met by oil and natural gas. The bulk of Indian coal­powered
thermal energy is made from low­grade coal that is highly polluting and
directly causes global warming. Energy is a crucial requirement for transport,
industry and everyday life. In terms of electricity alone, 65 per cent of Indian
electricity is generated by burning coal, gas and oil; around 25 per cent from
hydropower projects; and, 7.6 per cent from renewable sources such as wind
and solar power. The smallest fraction of India’s electricity needs – only 3.1
per cent – is generated from nuclear power. India is the world’s sixth largest
consumer of energy with a projected consumption growth rate of 4 per cent
every year at the current economic growth rate. At these rates of growth,
India’s reliance on thermal energy is not sustainable. Although India has one
of the largest coal reserves in the world, burning them to sustain economic
growth would exhaust Indian coal in 200 years or even less. If Indian
economic growth rises, then the rate of coal exhaustion will also rise. The
other important source of thermal energy – oil and natural gas – is fraught
with similar problems. India does not have large reserves of oil and natural
gas. Yet, their demand in India keeps growing. At present, about 60–70 per
cent of the oil used in India is sourced from West Asia. If the current situation
of supply and demand continues, India will be 90 per cent dependent on
West Asian oil by 2025. Clearly, there is a need to diversify India’s energy
sources.
3.3
The search for energy security has come to play a significant role in shaping
Indian foreign policy. Driven by the need to consolidate energy sources
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9
faster than China – whose economy is growing at a rate faster than India’s
economy and is currently the world’s fastest growing energy consumer –
India is forging closer ties with a number of countries. In India’s
neighbourhood, engagement with the military junta in Myanmar is
intensifying as India competes with China for the right to control a share of
that country’s significant reserves of natural gas. To the west, India and Iran
16
began a new relationship in the 1990s after the mutual aversion created by
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Iran has vast reserves of natural gas and
oil that India wants to use. India’s recent push into gas­rich Central Asia is
also a product of its pressing energy needs. India’s foreign policy is to keep
all the energy supplying nations happy and not to get trapped within the
labyrinth of US foreign policy.
3.4
However, oil and gas are fossil fuels that release greenhouse gases and are
polluting and environmentally unsustainable. In August 2002, India acceded
to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change that seeks to reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions
across the world. Under the principle of ‘common but differentiated
responsibility’ of the Kyoto Protocol, it is understood that the largest share of
historical and current greenhouse gas emissions originated in developing
countries, whose emissions have led to the current global warming crisis.
Since developing countries such as India have contributed little to the
present crisis, they may continue to grow unhindered until 2012, when
Kyoto Protocol restrictions will come into play. Hence, India has to prepare
its economy for the 2012 deadline date when India will be expected to bring
its greenhouse gas emissions in line with international standards. However,
India’s dependence on fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and gas will cause major
economic consequences if they are suddenly subject to restrictions in 2012.
The US has refused to accede to the Kyoto Protocol.
3.5
With global warming now dominating the worldwide environmental agenda,
several countries are turning to nuclear energy to meet their energy needs.
The European Union, which actively promotes the Kyoto Protocol, meets
around 30 per cent of its energy needs through nuclear power. In western
Europe, where the Industrial Revolution of last century relied on thermal
power to emit greenhouse gases, most countries have drastically cut their
emissions of greenhouse gases to use nuclear and hydropower energy
sources instead. In France, for instance, nuclear power accounts for 80 per
17
cent of electricity generated. The French decision to move to nuclear power
followed the worldwide oil crisis of 1974 when oil producing countries
formed a cartel to control the price of oil. India sees lessons to be learned
from the experience of Europe. Anxious to meet its Kyoto Protocol
restrictions from a position of energy stability, the Indian government has
been looking at alternate sources of energy. Hydropower, the largest
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10
renewable energy source in India, suffers limited use in light of its high social
and environmental costs. In its Report of August 2006, the Expert Committee
on Integrated Energy Policy of the Planning Commission noted: “Nuclear
energy theoretically offers India the most potent means to long term energy
security.” Sympathetic to Indian energy needs, the US and India launched an
‘energy dialogue’ in May 2005, In July 2005, a statement on the ‘energy
dialogue’ released by both countries acknowledged the need to lessen their
dependence on fossil fuels and look to, inter alia, nuclear power generation
as a solution:
“Growing concerns about energy security have prompted the U.S.
and India to launch a new Energy Dialogue that reflects the
transformed strategic relationship between the world’s two largest
democracies. Adequate and reliable supplies of energy at reasonable
cost are essential to fuel India’s rapidly growing economy. The U.S.
and India are becoming increasingly reliant upon oil and natural gas
markets to satisfy their energy needs. Both nations depend heavily
upon domestic supplies of coal for electric power generation and
seek to increase their utilization of natural gas, renewable energy and
nuclear power as well as pursue energy efficient practices to ensure a
balanced and sustainable energy economy that helps preserve a clean
environment.”
3.6
However, nuclear power also poses risks to the health of both humans and
the environment. The danger of nuclear radiation was revealed by the
18
accident at Chernobyl in 1986, the effects of which are still borne by humans
today. There are also concerns regarding the storage of nuclear fuel, both
before and after they are used for power generation and the disposal of
nuclear waste. No less, there are significant concerns regarding nuclear
energy stem from the possibility of diverting nuclear power technologies to
make nuclear weapons.
(B)
Nuclear Proliferation
3.7
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons and the technology
or knowledge related to such technology to non­nuclear weapon States. The
division of the world into nuclear weapon States and non­nuclear weapon
States was made in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968 [“NPT”] that
was adopted in 1968 and opened for signature in 1970. The NPT itself
represents the culmination of global fears regarding the diversion of civilian
nuclear technology to military uses. When the NPT was adopted in 1968,
only five countries had openly tested a nuclear device – the US, the United
Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China. These five countries were, by
virtue of their overt nuclear displays, designated as ‘nuclear weapon States’.
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11
Other countries with significant nuclear weapon technologies were not
included in this nuclear club. Under the NPT, nuclear weapon States are
prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons to any other State irrespective
of its nuclear weapon status [See, Article I]. Nuclear weapon States are also
prohibited to assist, encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such
weapons [See, Article I]. Non nuclear weapon States are enjoined from
receiving nuclear weapons from any transferor
1

as are they prevented from
manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons themselves or receiving any
19
assistance in this regard [See, Article II]. Hence, the NPT establishes a
substantial distinction between nuclear weapon States and non nuclear
weapon States. To enforce this distinction, the NPT mandates all non nuclear
weapon States to submit themselves to a regime of safeguards and
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [“IAEA”]. An
“inalienable” right to research and develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy is
contained in Article IV for all States, but the determination of whether such
development is peaceful is left to the IAEA.
3.8
Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament have long been central tenets of
Indian foreign policy. In April 1954, former Prime Minister Nehru was one of
the first world leaders to propose a “standstill agreement” to limit nuclear
testing, following the radioactive fallout of a US nuclear test in the south
Pacific ocean that affected Japanese fishermen. In the 1960s, after losing a
border war with China in 1962 and following the first Chinese nuclear tests
just three years later, India began a nuclear weapons programme. In 1965,
India proposed a framework for universal non proliferation based on
disarmament that was ignored by the nuclear powers who, instead, adopted
the NPT in 1968. The NPT purported to stop nuclear proliferation; but,
instead, allowed the five nuclear powers to retain their weapons while
preventing other States from developing their nuclear technologies. India
protested this discriminatory scheme of the NPT and, after failing to win
security guarantees from the nuclear powers, walked out of the negotiations.
On 24 May 1974, four years after the NPT was opened for signature, India
tested a nuclear device. However, instead of recognising India as a nuclear
weapon State, the nuclear powers, through the NPT Conference of Parties,
withdrew all nuclear cooperation with India. In a speech before the United
Nations General Assembly on 9 June 1988, former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi articulated India’s fundamental objection to the NPT:
“We cannot accept the logic that a few nations have the right to
pursue their security by threatening the survival of humankind… Nor
20
is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of
1

Note that the prohibition against receiving nuclear weapons in Article II of the NPT does not extend
only to other States but to any transferor, including black marketeers, individuals or organisations.
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12
all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against
their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron
laws: that men are superior to women; that the white races are
superior to the coloured; that colonialism is a civilizing mission, that
those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible powers and
those who do not are not.”
3.9
In 1995, the NPT turned 25 years old and came up for review. India and
other developing countries pushed for a more equitable international effort to
stop nuclear proliferation but, in the face of the unanimous determination of
NPT nuclear weapon States to extend the NPT, India once again withdrew.
At the same time, negotiations for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests
were underway. On 29 September 1995, India’s External Affairs Minister
voiced India’s apprehensions about the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty [“CTBT”] on the floor of the UN General Assembly:
“Two years ago, the international community at last agreed to
negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We are glad that
negotiations are in progress, but we also note that nuclear weapon
states have agreed to a CTBT only after acquiring the know­how to
develop and refine their arsenals without the need for tests. In our
view, the CTBT must be an integral step in the process of nuclear
disarmament. Developing new warheads or refining existing ones
after a CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies, would be as
contrary to the spirit of CTBT as the NPT is to the spirit of non­
proliferation. The CTBT must contain a binding commitment on the
international community, especially the nuclear weapon states, to
take further measures within an agreed time­frame towards the
21
creation of a nuclear weapons­free world.”
However, the CTBT did not contain provisions to ban laboratory or computer
simulated nuclear testing. It thereby allowed NPT nuclear weapon States,
with advanced nuclear technology protected by the NPT and acquired over
decades of nuclear testing, to continue to develop their nuclear arsenals.
India refused to sign the CTBT. Ironically, the US, which had pushed for the
CTBT, failed to ratify the treaty – its Congress remaining reluctant to commit
to a ban on testing. But, this has not stopped the US from condemning
India’s principled refusal to accede to the CTBT or the NPT.
3.10 Three years after the CTBT was adopted, India openly tested five nuclear
weapons in May 1998 to worldwide condemnation. Unlike 1974, India
refused to enter into further negotiations to join either the NPT or the CTBT.
It simply declared itself a nuclear weapon State, reiterated the redundancy of
the NPT and publicly declared the existence of an active nuclear weapons
Page 13
13
programme. Faced with a country largely unaffected by international
criticism or economic sanctions, the international nuclear community has
explored other efforts to bring India within the mainstream of international
nuclear proliferation regulation. Both the US and the IAEA have applauded
the nuclear agreement as an important step in bringing India’s civilian
nuclear facilities under some degree of international safeguards. It is in this
light that nuclear agreement must be considered.
IV.
N
EGOTIATING THE
N
UCLEAR
A
GREEMENT
(A)
The Joint Statement
22
4.1
In July 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the US upon the
invitation of US President George W. Bush. On 18 July 2005, the two leaders
adopted a Joint Statement resolving to cooperate closely on a number of
issues including nuclear energy. According to the Joint Statement, on the part
of the US –
“The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve
full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals
of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The
President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S.
laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear
energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear
reactors…”
On India’s part –
“India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the
same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and
practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a
declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily
its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and
adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities; continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment
and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and
Page 14
14
23
supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that
the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and
technology through comprehensive export control legislation and
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.”
4.2
It must be noted that at the time of resolving the Joint Statement, India was
already in material compliance with several conditions of the agreement.
These are –
(a)
“…continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing”: India
announced a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing on
13 May 1998 that was announced by the then Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee to Parliament on 27 May 1998, which has been
reaffirmed on various occasions thereafter;
(b)
“…working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty”: Indian support for a ban on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was articulated to
the United Nations [“UN”] as far back as 16 December 1993 when
India co­sponsored General Assembly Resolution 48/75 (1993) that
called for disarmament generally and the prohibition of fissile material
production specifically. India is also a member of the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva where it supports the consensus to establish
an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty to prohibit the production
of fissile materials;
(c)
“…refraining from transferring nuclear enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to States…”: India’s position on non­proliferation of
nuclear technologies has been consistent as it has been unambiguous
in opposing the proliferation of nuclear technologies to other States.
India’s demonstrated record of non­proliferation has been recognised
24
by the UN and by the both Houses of the US Congress. An
acknowledgement of this performance is also contained in the Joint
Statement itself.
(d)
“…adopting comprehensive legislation to secure nuclear materials an
technologies”: Parliament enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act,
2005 [the “WMD Act”] that went into force on 6 June 2005. This is an
overarching and integrated legislation to prohibit unlawful activities
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
technologies.
Page 15
15
(e)
“…harmonising India's export controls with the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group [“NSG”] and the Missile Technology Control Regime [“MTCR”]
guidelines even though India is not a member of either group.”:
Indian law relating to the control of exports of nuclear and other
WMD technologies was, with the enactment of the WMD Act, made
consistent with the international standards that are called for in UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004. At the time
of the Joint Statement, Indian law was in harmony with the guidelines
of the NSG and MTCR.
4.3
With India already in compliance with five out of the nine conditions of the
agreement on 18 July 2005, there were four remaining conditions to be
fulfilled. These were broadly concerned with (a) separating Indian civil and
military nuclear facilities; and, (b) placing Indian civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. At the same time, the US was yet to fulfill even one
of its five commitments under the Joint Statement. Between 18 July 2005 and
31 July 2007, both countries took steps to further comply with the terms of
the Joint Statement:

25
(i)
India announced a scheme to separate civilian and military nuclear
facilities on 7 March 2006;
(ii)
the US Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States–India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 that was signed into
law by the US President on 18 December 2006; and,
(iii)
India joined the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
[“ITER”] project on 21 November 2006, presumably after the US
persuaded the nuclear powers to admit Indian scientists.
(B)
India’s ‘Separation Plan’
4.4
On 7 March 2006, after consultations with the nuclear establishment, the
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced in Parliament a scheme to
separate India’s civilian and military nuclear reactors. The separation
exercise, which is predicated on India’s requirement not to use civilian
nuclear energy cooperation for military purposes, fulfils the first Indian
commitment of the Joint Statement. According to the Separation Plan,
“…facilities identified as civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered
for safeguards in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the
facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security
significance of materials and the location of the facilities are factors
Page 16
16
taken into account in undertaking the separation process. This is
solely an Indian determination.”
According to the rationale that is to inform the separation exercise, India is to
identify civilian nuclear facilities solely on the basis of their importance to
India’s strategic nuclear programme. Once a nuclear reactor has been
designated as civilian and offered for international safeguards, it will cease to
26
engage in activities of military significance. However, civilian nuclear
reactors within a larger complex of military significance will not be offered
for international safeguards. According to the Separation Plan, “(t)he
overarching criterion would be a judgment whether subjecting a facility to
IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India's national security.” These
are sovereign decisions to be made by the Indian government.
Thermal Power Nuclear Reactors
4.5
At present, India’s nuclear programme – both civilian and military – is
dominated by thermal power nuclear reactors [“TPRs”], most of which utilise
generic pressurised heavy water reactor [“PWHR”] technology. There are 22
TPRs in operation or under construction in India. Under the dispensation of
the Separation Plan, 14 of these TPRs are to be designated as civilian
between 2006 and 2014, and, concomitantly, submitted to an independently
negotiated regime of IAEA inspections and safeguards. Of the 14 TPRs to be
designated as civilian, 6 have already been identified by the Separation Plan:
2 reactors of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station at Tarapur, Maharashtra;
2 reactors of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station at Rawatbhata,
Rajasthan; and,
2 reactors of the Kudankulam Atomic Power Project at Kudankulam,
Tamil Nadu that are still under construction.
It must be noted that all of these 6 reactors are already subject to some form
of IAEA safeguards independent of the current nuclear agreement. In relation
to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, all nuclear material is under IAEA
safeguards [See, INFCIRC/433
2

(1 March 1994) and INFCIRC/433/Mod.1 (12
September 1994)] following India’s voluntary invitation of IAEA safeguards
after the termination in 1993 of the India­United States Bilateral Agreement
of 1963 [See, INFCIRC/154/Pt.1 (3 September 1971)] that related to the
supply of US nuclear fuel and materials to the Station. In relation to the
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, IAEA safeguards extended to the supply of

27
‘heavy water’ for the nuclear reactors from the Soviet Union [See,
2

IAEA safeguards agreements are usually contained in Informational Circulars known as INFCIRCs
with the relevant number attached. A list of INFCIRC’s pertinent to India can be viewed at the
website of the IAEA – http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/ Countries/india.shtml.
Page 17
17
INFCIRC/260 (17 November 1977)]. Finally, in relation to the supply by the
Soviet Union of a nuclear power station with nuclear reactors to the
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project that is under construction, India agreed
to IAEA safeguards on the entire station [See, INFCIRC/360 (27 September
1988)].
This leaves 8 reactors that have not been specifically designated as
civilian by the Separation Plan. These will be identified in phases between
2006 and 2014 from among both existing and future reactors that will be
built.
Breeder Nuclear Reactors
4.6
India is also building Fast Breeder Reactors [“FBRs”] that generate nuclear
weapons grade material quicker than TPRs to make them significant to
India’s strategic nuclear programme. According to the Separation Plan, all
current Indian FBRs will remain outside the civilian list and thereby outside
the safeguards jurisdiction of the IAEA. However, future FBRs that India may
build and specifically designate as civilian may be offered for international
safeguards. In this regard,
“…the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such
reactors as civilian.”
(C)
‘Adjusting’ US Laws
4.7
In June 2006, the US moved to fulfil its commitment of seeking
Congressional approval to “adjust its laws and policies” to implement the
nuclear agreement with India. Why is this ‘adjustment’ necessary?
28
In 1954, the US Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act to govern
inter alia, the transfer of US nuclear material and technologies to other
countries. Sections 54, 64 and 82 of the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954
permit the transfer nuclear materials
3

to foreign countries such as India.
However, such a transfer cannot take place without a specific agreement
with the foreign country that is made pursuant to section 123 of that Act.
Section 123 is a large and complex provision that enables the US to
conclude agreements to cooperate with other nations on matters related to
nuclear materials and resources, including their transfer, subject to some
conditions. These conditions are contained in a dichotomous scheme where
3

Sections 54, 64 and 82 of the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954 govern the transfer of “special
nuclear material”, “source material” and “byproduct material” respectively. Special nuclear material
and source materials are defined in sections 11(aa) and 11(z) respectively of that Act.
Page 18
18
different conditions apply to nuclear weapon States and non­nuclear weapon
States.
4

Hence, an agreement between the US and India to cooperate under
section 123 would first categorise India on the basis of its nuclear weapons
status and, accordingly, apply various conditions.
4.8
However, India has long rejected the traditional international formulation
that divides countries into nuclear weapons States and non­nuclear weapons
States. In 1970, the Treaty on the Non­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
[“NPT”] entered into force to permit nuclear weapons States to maintain their
nuclear weapons stockpiles but prohibit non­nuclear weapons States from
acquiring such weapons. Only those countries that had openly tested a
nuclear weapon were understood to be nuclear weapon States and permitted
to retain their weapons and continue their military nuclear programme.
5

29
India and three other countries rejected the discriminatory scheme of the
NPT that allowed only five countries to build nuclear weapons and
prevented others from doing so. In 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon, but
was still refused treatment in accordance with its nuclear weapons status.
India has thereafter remained a strong and vocal critic of the NPT, going so
far as to condemn the treaty’s creation of “nuclear apartheid”.
6

After the
second round of nuclear tests in May 1998, India proclaimed itself a nuclear
weapons State
7

despite continued international opposition.
8

At the last
review of the NPT, the five NPT nuclear weapon States, including the US,
issued a Joint Statement on 1 May 2000, that stated,
“Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have
the status of nuclear­weapon States”
4.9
In this background, section 123 of the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954
presents some problems for both India and the US since it enacts a scheme
of permissible nuclear cooperation that is based on the status of the foreign
country as a nuclear or non­nuclear weapons State. It has long been US
policy to treat India as a non­nuclear weapon State. But for India, any
treatment that does not recognise its status as a nuclear weapons State is
unacceptable. For the US, while it has now implicitly recognised India’s
4

See, section 123(a) of the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
5

NPT nuclear weapon States are the US, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now the Russian
Federation), China and France.
6

See, inter alia, Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid” in Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1998.
7

See, for example, the Preamble to the WMD Act, 2005 that states, “…India is determined to protect
its national security as a Nuclear Weapon State;…”.
8

30
In May 2000, the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT decided that:
“Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear­weapon
States” [See, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I) at p. 18]. At the same Review Conference, the five nuclear
weapons States issued a Joint Statement that, inter alia, denied India similar status [See,
NPT/CONF.2000/21 at pr. 3].
Page 19
19
nuclear weapons status
9

, officially according India nuclear weapons status
would undermine decades of its foreign policy related to disarmament and
devalue the NPT. Therefore, the two countries resolved to evolve a new
framework of nuclear cooperation, free from the sensitivities of nuclear
weaponisation. To do so, the US undertook to enact a new legislation by
Congress to waive the proposed section 123 agreement with India from
some of the conditions contained in the same provision that India objects to.
(D)
The ‘Hyde Act’
(a)
Legislative Background
4.10 On 26 June 2006, the US Congress began the legislative process of enacting
a law to exempt the proposed agreement with India from some of the
requirements of section 123 of the (US) Atomic Energy Act. The US Congress
is a bicameral legislature with a lower chamber House of Representatives
and an upper chamber Senate. Both chambers exercise influential authority
over legislation and other matters that relate to US foreign policy. Both
chambers also have specialised standing committees to exercise the
legislature’s jurisdiction over foreign policy. In the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Foreign Affairs [“HCFA”]
10

made the first legislative
proposal by passing, with 37 votes for and 5 against, the ‘United States and
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006’ by way of House
Resolution [“HR”] 5682. This resolution, containing the Bill, was then
31
reported to the full House of Representatives for a vote on the floor. On 26
July 2006, HR 5682 was passed by the House of Representatives with 359
votes for and 68 votes against; 6 members did not vote.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee [“SFRC”] passed its own legislative proposal – with 16 votes for
and 2 against – the ‘United States and India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act’ by way of motion S. 3709. On 20 July 2006, S. 3709 was
reported to the full Senate for further action. Meanwhile, the US held
elections to its Congress which saw major political changes as the
Republican Party of incumbent President George W. Bush lost their
legislative majority to the Democratic Party. On 16 November 2006, in a
lame duck session, the Senate passed S. 3709 with 85 votes for and 12
against; 3 members did not vote.
4.11 With the House of Representatives and the Senate adopting different versions
of the same legislative proposal and with persistent differences between the
two chambers of Congress, a conference committee was appointed on 8
9

Infra, note 15.
10

Known until January 2007 as the Committee on International Relations.
Page 20
20
December 2006 to reconcile the differences in the two drafts. The committee
incorporated changes in HR 5682 as per the Senate’s proposal in S. 3709.
The revised and reconciled HR 5682 was then cleared by both chambers by
9 December 2006 and cleared for Presidential assent the same day. On 18
December 2006, HR 5682, being the Henry J. Hyde United States–India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 [“Hyde Act”], was signed
by the US President to become enacted law.
(b)
Provisions of the Hyde Act
4.12 The Hyde Act was received in India with dismay and resentment. The
government, which was looking to promote the nuclear agreement as its
greatest foreign policy achievement, instead faced political opposition and
32
criticism from the nuclear and scientific community. The Indian government
tried to rebut the criticism relating to the perceived intrusiveness of the Hyde
Act by pointing out that most of the offensive provisions of the law were
merely symbolic in nature. So, what does the Hyde Act really say and how
must it be judged?
(i)
The Symbolism of the Hyde Act
4.13 Legislation is enacted for both symbolic and instrumental reasons.
11

There is
hence a need to study legislation critically, unmindful of the political flourish
that accompanies it. US legislation contains both positive law and positive
assertions of policy and sentiment reflecting American political and moral
values. In the Hyde Act, this symbolism is flaunted in the form of a ‘sense of
Congress’ clause and a ‘statement of policy’ clause that, while not technically
binding, express congressional opinion for a variety of reasons. Yet, these are
more than preambular statements or ‘directive principles of state policy’ (as
some Indian commentators have described them). They are intended to
inform Presidential decisions. ‘Sense of Congress’ resolutions are adopted for
political reasons to publicly demonstrate the political opinions of US
legislators; to induce the US executive to do or not do something; or, to
communicate the views of the US people, through Congress, to a foreign
nation.
12

‘Sense of Congress’ resolutions are not legally binding since they
are not presented to the US President for his signature; even where a ‘sense
11

This is so of Indian mining legislation which demonstrates the symbolism of Parliament’s concerns
regarding social welfare but retains various compromises to facilitate the continuing activity of
mining companies. See further, Rajeev Dhavan, “Mining Policy in India: Patronage or Control?”, 34
JILI 218 (1990).
12

See for example, S. Con. Res. 2, 110th Congress, 1st Session (17 January 2007) expressing the
sense of Congress in opposition to the US President’s intention to deploy US troops in Iraq. Since
such resolutions are not enacted law and not binding on the executive, the deployment of troops
took place anyway, but amidst the publicly demonstrated knowledge that Congress opposed the US
President.
33
 Page 21
21
of Congress’ resolution is incorporated into a Bill that is signed by the US
President, that provision has no formal effect on public policy.
13

However,
foreign countries heed ‘sense of Congress’ resolutions as indicators of US
foreign policy because US diplomacy makes use of such provisions as
negotiating tools with foreign countries.
14

Section 102
4.14 Section 102 of the Hyde Act states the “sense of Congress” on nuclear
commerce with India –
“It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the
means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign
policy;
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and
compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the
acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable
international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and
remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential challenge to
the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation,
because those countries have not undertaken the NPT obligation to
prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent
possible to ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the
NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they
develop;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an
34
agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country
that has never been a State Party to the NPT if —
(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behaviour
with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is
congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the
13

See, Paul S. Rundquist, “”Sense of” Resolutions and Provisions”, Congressional Research Service
paper, July 2003, available at – http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98­825.pdf.
14

See, http://www.c­span.org/questions/week140.asp.
Page 22
22
United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to
nonproliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate
and implement substantially improved protections against the
proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the
means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would
further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give
greater political and material support to the achievement of
United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives,
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if
necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor
terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a
nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass
destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national
interest of the United States;
35
(9) the United States and India share common democratic
values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic
engagement;
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries has the potential to benefit the
people of all countries;
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change in
United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not
States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the
international nonproliferation regime;
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that
minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and
maximizes India’s adherence to international nonproliferation
regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG); and
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other
party if such exports are terminated under United States law.”
4.15 Sections 102(1)–102(5) and 102(12) establish the concerns of the US
Congress on nuclear non­proliferation. There is some tension underlying
these provisions that must be reiterated. Non­proliferation has long been an
overarching concern of US foreign policy to limit the spread of nuclear
material and knowledge to countries that are not signatories of the NPT.
Page 23
23
However, India, whose foreign policy has also stressed nuclear non­
proliferation, has consistently rejected the NPT for creating a discriminatory
scheme of nuclear haves and have­nots based on crude exercises of power.
To recall, in 1970, when the NPT came into force, only the five States that
had openly tested a nuclear weapon were recognised as nuclear weapon
States allowing them to maintain nuclear weapons while non­nuclear
weapon States were prohibited from receiving, manufacturing or acquiring
36
nuclear weapons [See, Article II of the NPT] and compelled to accept
international safeguards on civilian nuclear facilities to ensure that no
diversion of such facilities for military use took place [See, Article III of the
NPT]. In 1974, India openly tested a nuclear weapon but was refused
recognition as an NPT nuclear weapon State. Thereafter, India has refused to
validate the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear regime. In 1996, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [“CTBT”], proposing a ban on all nuclear
explosions, was opened for signature. 177 countries signed the CTBT but not
India. Arguing that while NPT nuclear weapon States had repeatedly tested
nuclear weapons prior to 1996 to sufficiently advance their military
technology to discontinue the need for further testing, India, as an NPT non­
nuclear weapon State, was denied the same opportunity and hence retained
the right to equivalent testing.
4.16 In this background, Section 102(11) is important as it displays Congress’
recognition that the nuclear agreement with India is a significant departure
from US non­proliferation and foreign policy objectives as it allows nuclear
commerce with an NPT non­nuclear weapon State, namely India. In any
other situation, such an agreement would amount simply to nuclear
proliferation since NPT nuclear weapon States are prohibited from
“inducing” NPT non­nuclear weapon States to manufacture or acquire
nuclear weapons. US critics and other NPT adherents argue that nuclear
supplies to India will free existing Indian nuclear facilities solely for military
use thereby expediting the manufacture of Indian nuclear weapons to
dismantle the NPT non­proliferation regime. On the other hand, US officials
and even members of Congress reply that India already has nuclear weapons
and will continue to exercise its sovereign right to build more, with or
without any nuclear agreement with the US.
15

Thus, India is a de facto
nuclear weapons State. Indeed, in India itself, the Prime Minister has
15

See, the statement of Representative Gary L. Ackerman at hearing before the House Committee on
International Relations [“HIRC”] on “The US–India ‘Global Partnership’: Legislative Options”, 109th
Cong., 2d Sess. (11 May 2006): “And lastly there is a great deal of complaint that the agreement
does not constrain India’s nuclear weapons program. I would simply say that the purpose of the
37
agreement wasn’t to stop, or to roll back, or to convince India to abandon its nuclear program. They
would not have engaged us on those terms. As I said earlier, we sanctioned, we lectured, we
pleaded, but India has made a strategic sovereign decision on this question, and I think it is
incumbent on us to deal with that set of realities.”
Page 24
24
repeatedly stated that the nuclear agreement will not prevent India from
continuing with its strategic nuclear programme.
4.17 Section 102(6) of this “sense of Congress” clause places non binding
conditions upon which the US may enter into nuclear cooperation with a
country that has never signed the NPT, such as India. Predictably, the
provision is concerned with non­proliferation. Unacceptably, it requires India
to meet the following diplomatic and military conditions –
(a)
have “a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States”
[See, Section 102(5)(B)];
(b)
work “with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives related
to non­proliferation” [See, Section 102(5)(B)];
(c)
“give greater political and material support to the achievement of
United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives,
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary,
sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism” [See,
Section 102(5)(D)]; and,
(d)
“refrain from actions that would further the development of its
nuclear weapons program” [See, Section 102(5)(C)].
These conditions reflect the two broad concerns of the US Congress when
the Hyde Act was being drafted – firstly, restricting Iran’s nuclear ambitions;
and, secondly, containing India’s military nuclear programme.
4.18 On 25 September 2005, India voted, along with the US and Europe, to refer
Iran’s covert nuclear programme to the United Nations Security Council for
punitive action. Russia, China and ten other developing countries abstained
38
from voting. The vote against Iran was the result of protracted US pressure on
Iran, the IAEA and the UN to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme. It seems clear
that India too came under, and succumbed, to this pressure from the US.
However, India claimed that the vote against Iran had nothing to do with its
developing relationship with the US nor was it the result of diplomatic
pressure in anticipation of the nuclear agreement. Whatever the political
controversy, the anti­Iran vote marked a clear change in India’s foreign policy
towards Iran. For instance, just three weeks before the IAEA vote, on 3
September 2005, India’s then External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh had
visited Tehran and stated: “We support the pursuit by Iran of its peaceful
nuclear energy programme in keeping with Iran's international obligation.”
16

This support was obviously belied by US pressure. A few days after the
16

See, Sujit Chatterjee, “India commits support to Iran’s peaceful nuke programme”, Press Trust of
India (PTI) News (3 September 2005) can be viewed at http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/ sep/
03nuke1.htm.
Page 25
25
External Affairs Minister’s comments, he was crudely criticised by
Representative Tom Lantos in the US Congress on 8 September 2005 –
“To have the Indian foreign minister – and I will find the quote here
with respect to his recent meeting with the Iranians – saying, ‘‘They
really don’t care what we think.’’ To have the Indian foreign minister
say this and expect support from the United States for…legislative
changes with respect to the nuclear issue that we are discussing,
shows a degree of denseness that occasionally very intelligent people
are burdened with. They are brilliant and they are dense. They are
brilliant, which is obvious, but they are simply dense, because they
are incapable of comprehending that other countries have very
important concerns.”
17

Clearly, the US had put considerable pressure on New Delhi to bring certain
aspects of Indian foreign policy in congruence with Washington’s. The anti­
Iran IAEA vote was welcomed in Washington
18
39
and US Under Secretary of
State Nicholas Burns was candid enough to admit that India had succumbed
to US pressure,
19

even though the Hyde Act had not been enacted yet. On 4
February 2006, India repeated itself – voting again against Iran at the IAEA,
presumably under US pressure.
4.19 In the debates in the US Congress leading up to the Hyde Act, several
commentators warned against placing legislative conditionalities in the
operative and enforceable parts of the statute. On 11 May 2006, Ashley
Tellis, in his deposition before the HIRC, stated –
“In this connection, Congress should particularly resist the temptation
to trying to shape India’s foreign policy choices through legislative
conditionality. There are some areas where India’s foreign policy
priorities are not entirely congruent with those of the United States.
This is not a situation unique to India; rather, it describes
circumstances common in international politics. I understand the
sentiment in Congress to attach amendments to the President’s
legislation, which would push Indo­Iranian relations in a different
direction: I hope Congress will desist from pursuing such a course,
not because I necessarily disagree with this goal but because I think
legislative conditionality is a blunt instrument that could end up
subverting its intended objectives. There are some goals that are best
17

See, the statement of Representative Tom Lantos at a hearing before the HIRC on “The US and
India: an Emerging Entente?”, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (8 September 2005)
18

See, Aziz Hanifa, “Lantos hails India’s vote on Iran”, Rediff.com News (26 September 2005) can be
viewed at http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/26aziz.htm.
19

See, news item, “India's IAEA vote to garner support for nuke deal: Burns”, Press Trust of India (19
October 2005) can be viewed at http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/19iran.htm.
Page 26
26
pursued through quiet diplomacy, perhaps supplemented by a ‘‘sense
of Congress’’ resolution, rather than through formal and exacting

40
legislative mandates: shaping India’s relations with Iran is one such
goal.”
20

(emphasis supplied)
However, there is no clarity about whether the ‘sense of Congress’ clause is
informal and hence incapable of exacting action from India. If it is merely
declamatory, does Section 102(5) of the Hyde Act really go beyond
offending Indian sensitivity, to actually infringing the sovereignty of Indian
foreign policy? The answer may lie in between. But, it is important to
appreciate that the conditions of Section 102(5) were deliberately placed in
the Hyde Act after substantive debate; and, as such, reflect the determination
of US legislators to expect and, perhaps, exact diplomatic and other action
from India. Whether India will be forthcoming on US expectations is
immaterial, what is at issue is the manner in which Indian foreign policy
seeks to be compromised. The ‘sense of Congress’ clause may be merely
symbolic; but, even a symbolic surrender of Indian sovereignty is
demeaning. Surprisingly, the most realistic assessment of the independence
of India’s relations with Iran came from the US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice in a deposition before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on 5 April 2006:
“I would note that they (India) are not the only country in the world,
of course, that has relations with Iran. Italy is Iran's largest trading
partner. Japan is a very large trading partner of Iran. The truth of the
matter is that we are the ones that have no relationship with Iran.
Most of the world does have relations with Iran. As Iran's behavior
has become clearer and clearer, especially under the more
transparent regime of Ahmadinejad, I think you see a lot of countries
assessing and reassessing their relationship with Iran. And I would
expect that that will continue. To be fair, the Indians have a long
relationship with Iran. They will tell you that it goes back thousands
of years… I do not want to single out India here, because there are a
lot of countries in the world that have relations with Iran.”
4.20 Sections 102(7)–102(10) are generally concerned with the benefits of

41
bilateral relations between India and the US. Section 102(12) calls for
minimising non proliferation by securing India’s adherence to the guidelines
of the NSG. As discussed earlier, with the enactment of the WMD Act in
2005, Indian law was made consistent with NSG guidelines.
20

See, the written statement of Ashley Tellis at hearing before the HIRC on “The US–India ‘Global
Partnership’: Legislative Options”, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (11 May 2006).
Page 27
27
The importance of Section 102(13), however, must be highlighted.
The provisions calls on the US government to discourage third country
nuclear exports to India if similar US exports are stopped. This is a sensitive
issue in India. In 1963, India and US entered into an agreement under
Section 123 of the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for enriched uranium fuel
supplies to India, for specific use at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.
However, under President Jimmy Carter, US non proliferation strategy
concerned itself with “the risk that components of the nuclear power process
will be turned to providing atomic weapons.”
21

In 1978, US non
proliferation objectives coalesced in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act, that
required India, as a recipient of US nuclear exports, to maintain stringent
international safeguards on all Indian nuclear facilities irrespective of their
relation to the US exports. India refused and the US terminated the 1963
bilateral agreement arguing that their domestic legislation precluded further
cooperation until the new conditions were met. India maintained that the
1963 agreement was an international treaty requiring compliance
irrespective of subsequent national laws. In 1983, the US, under a new
President Reagan, concluded a tripartite agreement with India and France for
supply of French uranium to India under Tarapur­specific IAEA safeguards.
After this experience, Indian distrust of US fuel security guarantees will most
certainly be further offended by Section 102(12).
Section 103
4.21 Section 103 of the Hyde Act lists the policies of the US in respect of nuclear

42
commerce with India. The section reads –
“(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies of the United
States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non­nuclear weapon state, within or outside
of the NPT.
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to
‘‘develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes’’, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that
applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and
purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear
cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT
obligations, including its safeguards obligations.
21

The nuclear power policy statement of President Jimmy Carter (7 April 1977) cited from P. R.
Chari, “An Indian Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy”, International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2
(1978) at pp. 57.
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28
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for
Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear­Related
Dual­Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology
developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those guidelines,
and the rules and practices regarding NSG decision making.
(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning
consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and
recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and
coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations,
including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient,
that discourages individual NSG members from continuing
cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus
regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
43
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies
related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members
of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the
transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear
equipment, materials, or technology from other participating
governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers
to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title, the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other
United States law.
(b) WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following shall be the
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the
production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India,
Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and
implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India
become parties.
(3) Secure India’s –
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles of such Initiative;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform its
export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria,
and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
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29
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
44
(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at
Vienna on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United States
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a
nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or
reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass
destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in
South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian nuclear
power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant
to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f.
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium
described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph (2),
encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional
Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably
safeguard any export or re­export to India of any nuclear materials
and equipment.
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement
for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements
set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section.
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the
Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities
should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.”
4.22 Sections 103(a)(1)–103(a)(2) relate to the NPT whereas Sections 103(a)(3) –
103(a)(6) relate to the NSG. The provisions relating to the NPT are
45
problematic for India, as India has refused to accede to the NPT or
acknowledge it as the basis of international nuclear non­proliferation policy.
Section 103(a)(1) makes it US policy to oppose the development of a nuclear
weapon by a non­nuclear weapon State, whether it has signed the NPT or
not. Since the US and most of the western world has refused to acknowledge
India’s nuclear weapon status despite it twice openly testing nuclear
weapons, this provision places US foreign policy in direct confrontation with
India’s military nuclear programme. In many ways, Section 103(a)(1)
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30
demonstrates a clumsy US intransigence to acknowledge the changed
realities of the world from when the NPT was adopted in 1968. India
undoubtedly possesses nuclear weapons and openly declares its continuing
nuclear weapons programme. In this sense, India is undeniably a nuclear
weapons State even though the NPT nuclear clique refuses to acknowledge it
as such.
22

After investing considerable effort in its military nuclear
programme, India cannot now accept backdoor US attempts to restrict its
nuclear programme. Section 103(a)(1) is not binding. But if it is a statement
of US policy, then India is most certainly going to contradict it.
If, on the other hand, Section 103(a)(1) is directed at Iran, then it must
be read with Section 103(a)(2) and located in the current context of the
controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran claims it is
developing peaceful nuclear technology to invoke the protection of Article
IV of the NPT that permits nuclear research for peaceful use. The US disputes
this claim and wants other countries including India to join its efforts to
contain the Iranian nuclear programme. At one point, India, together with
Russia and China, upheld Iran’s right to use nuclear technology for peaceful
use and opposed US interference in Iran’s affairs. However, in the build up
to the passage of the Hyde Act, India appears to have been coerced into
changing its policy and twice voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council
for punitive measures. This strained India­Iran bilateral relations and

46
unsettled negotiations for Iranian natural gas which is vital for India’s
growing economy.
4.23 Sections 103(a)(5) and 103(a)(6), pertaining to India’s relations with the NSG,
are also contentious. Section 103(a)(5) states US policy to discourage NSG
countries from supplying India with materials and knowledge regarding
sensitive nuclear processes, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
Both these processes are essential processes in the production of nuclear
weapons. No doubt, India already possesses this knowledge to enable it to
make nuclear weapons. But, this provision is an unwarranted intrusion into
India’s nuclear programme. The US is concerned that the nuclear agreement
will indirectly advance India’s military nuclear programme. But, there must
be a consistent approach. If it is a US endeavour to restrict the nuclear
agreement to civil projects only, then the Hyde Act cannot venture policy
statements on India’s military programme. Arguendo, the attempt to curtail
India’s military programme by foreclosing third country options is difficult to
swallow in one gulp. Similarly, Section 103(a)(6) seeks to prevent third
countries from nuclear cooperation with India if US cooperation is
terminated under the Hyde Act or other US law. This provision must be read
with Section 102(13) of the “sense of Congress” clause which seeks similar
22

See, the statement of Representative Gary L. Ackerman in the House Committee on International
Relations [“HIRC”] on 11 May 2006, supra note 14.
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31
restrictions. Together, the two provisions arrogate to the US the
determination of whether third countries may engage in nuclear cooperation
or commerce with India.
4.24 Sub­section (b) of Section 103 lays down US policy in respect of South Asia.
Mostly, the Sub­section is concerned with curtailing India’s military nuclear
programme, but there are also provisions relating to nuclear non­
proliferation, India’s foreign policy in respect of Iran and the reprocessing of
nuclear fuel exported by the US to India. Sections 103(b)(1)–103(b)(2),
103(b)(5) and 103(b)(7) relate to India’s nuclear weapons programme.
Clauses (1), (2) and (7) seek a unilateral Indian moratorium on the production
47
of fissile material crucial to the production of nuclear weapons and the
conclusion of a fissile material cut­off treaty with the US. However, India is
already an active participant at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
where it seeks a worldwide ban on the production of fissile materials. In
addition, India also sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75
(1993) that called for disarmament generally and the prohibition of fissile
material production specifically. India has never declared its opposition to
any worldwide fissile material cut­off; but, it does oppose any specific
attempt to stop India from producing fissile materials while its two nuclear
neighbours, China and Pakistan, remain unaffected. Clause (5) seeks to halt
India’s nuclear weapons programme. In this regard, the Prime Minister
expressly rejected, in a statement to the Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006, any
attempt to interfere with India’s military nuclear programme.
4.25 The most unambiguous provision in the Hyde Act regarding Iran is Section
103(b)(4) that requires India’s “full and active participation” in opposing
Iran’s nuclear programme. The provision, although technically non­binding,
represents a serious intrusion into the independence of Indian foreign policy
regarding Iran. The basis of the US’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme
lies in Iran’s alleged violations of the NPT regime regarding proliferation and
peaceful use of nuclear knowledge. India, which rejects the NPT wholesale,
is placed in the awkward situation of being called upon to oppose Iran on
the basis of an international agreement that it has consistently refused to sign.
The unyielding US pressure on India to sharpen its criticism of Iran resulted
in India abandoning its friendly relations with Iran to vote against it in the
IAEA Board to refer its nuclear programme to the UN Security Council for
possible economic sanctions. This situation is further complicated by India’s
reliance on Iranian natural gas to feed its growing energy requirements. The
nuclear agreement with the US, too, is about meeting Indian energy
demands. But, without clear guarantees of uninterrupted US energy supplies,
India cannot afford to anger the Iranians. The dignity of India’s sovereignty
and foreign policy is also in issue. India cannot accept the US dictating
foreign policy terms to India.
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32
4.26 It may be argued that Sections 102 and 103 are merely symbolic and have
no non­binding value. But, this is misleading. If these provisions represent
the political compulsions of US legislators, then they cannot be ignored. The
symbolism of US interference in sovereign Indian affairs cannot be dismissed
lightly. For it will symbolically reduce India to a posture of supplication at a
time when India’s stature is growing internationally. When the US President
signed HR 5682 into law, he also released a statement on 18 December
2006 to address Indian concerns on some of the Hyde Act’s provisions –
“Section 103 of the Act purports to establish U.S. policy with respect
to various international affairs matters. My approval of the Act does
not constitute my adoption of the statements of policy as U.S. foreign
policy. Given the Constitution's commitment to the presidency of the
authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch
shall construe such policy statements as advisory.”
However, no mention is made of Section 102 – the “sense of Congress”
clause that also generated significant Indian anger. Furthermore, even if
President George W. Bush has decided to treat some of the provisions of the
Hyde Act as merely advisory without influencing the nuclear agreement with
India, there is no guarantee that future US Presidents will do the same. These
clauses will continue to influence foreign policy. It is wishful thinking to
think that these clauses should be read as saying; “America’s foreign policy
will ignore these prescriptions.” The status of these declarations cannot be
diluted by appeasing statements to assuage India’s feelings. True, they are
not instructions – but they are as close to being just that without saying so.
(ii)
Important Operational Provisions of the Hyde Act
Section 104
4.27 Whereas Sections 102 and 103 are not binding, the remaining provisions of
the Hyde Act. And, once again, indirect reference is made to Iran – in
Section 104(b)(5). The provision relates to the conditions that India must fulfil
for the US President to be satisfied to exempt the nuclear agreement from the
requirements of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 –
49
“(5) India is working with and supporting United States and
international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess
full­scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.”
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33
On the one hand, India is irritated by the significant nuclear proliferation that
emanated from Pakistan under auspices of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the chief
scientist behind the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. With Khan’s
knowledge, Pakistan is alleged to have proliferated nuclear technology and
materials to, inter alia, Iran and North Korea. India is reported to have
pointed this out to the US, demanding condemnation and action. On the
other hand, Section 104(b)(5) may be used to force India to take a more
hardline position on Iran – something that the Indian Government has been
reluctant to do for both strategic and sovereign reasons. Similarly, Section
104(g)(2)(E) requires the US President to keep the US Congress informed of
whether India
“…is fully and actively participating in United States and international
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a
nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich
uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons
of mass destruction, including a description of the specific measures
that India has taken in this regard”.
The latter is a clear attempt, in the operative portions of the Hyde Act, to
force India to change its foreign policy in respect of Iran.
4.28 On the part of the US executive, there is concern that Section 104(d)(2) will
restrict the scope and content of US nuclear commerce with India to
disadvantage US nuclear exporters. The section restricts US nuclear exports
and transfers to India if they violate NSG guidelines. The section reads –
“(2) NSG TRANSFER GUIDELINES. – Notwithstanding the entry into
force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant
to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)
50
and pursuant to this title, no item subject to such agreement or
subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions
related thereto, may be transferred to India if such transfer would be
inconsistent with the transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the
date of the transfer.”
The US President decided, in his statement of 18 December 2006, to treat
Section 104(d)(2) as advisory with no binding implications on the nuclear
deal. It is not clear how he will do this, since the section is an operational
part of the Hyde Act.
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34
Section 106
4.29 Section 106 is also a significant hurdle to India accepting the Hyde Act. The
provision states –
“A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be
effective if the President determines that India has detonated a
nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.”
Hence, US nuclear cooperation to India will halt if India tests a nuclear
weapon. This provision has generated much controversy in India. But, this
principle of US law is not new. The bar to cooperation in the event of
nuclear testing is contained in Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of
1954, from which no country, including India, has been exempted. Simply
put, under US non­proliferation law, nuclear commerce with another country
must halt if a nuclear test is conducted. India has not been singled out.
However, the concern in India about the sovereign right to conduct a nuclear
test remains. India announced a voluntary unilateral moratorium on further
nuclear testing on 13 May 1998 after the nuclear tests of 1998. But, India has
provided no guarantees that it will abide by its moratorium in perpetuity.
One way of looking at Section 106 is – India has the right to test a nuclear
device, the US has the right to react to it by suspending cooperation.
Certainly nothing in US law prohibits India from testing a nuclear weapon.
On the other hand, India has never had a dependant security relationship
with any world power. It has fought five wars with its neighbours, both of
51
whom are armed with nuclear weapons. It may be, at some future point,
compelling for India to test a nuclear weapon. The US must recognise these
realities of South Asian geopolitics.
4.30 The Hyde Act enabled the US to enter into an agreement for nuclear
cooperation with India outside of the requirements of some provisions of
Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. But, the other provisions
of Section 123 that permit the US executive to enter into nuclear agreements
remain. These are popularly known as ‘123 Agreements;.
V.
T
HE
‘123 A
GREEMENT
’
5.1
Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act establishes an agreement for
cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the US and any other
nation. Over the years, the US has signed a number of 123 agreements with
various countries, including with China. The text of the 123 Agreement
between India and the US was released on 1 August 2007. The Indian 123
Agreement must be considered in terms of:
Page 35
35
(a)
control over India’s military nuclear programme;
(b)
independence of Indian foreign policy;
(c)
India’s right to test nuclear weapons; and,
(d)
security of nuclear fuel supplies and the right to reprocess nuclear
material.
(A)

52
Control Over India’s Military Nuclear Programme
5.2
In light of the Hyde Act’s attempts to restrict India’s nuclear programme,
concerns were voiced in India about the autonomy of India’s military nuclear
programme. While announcing the Separation Plan in Parliament on 7
March 2006 to distinguish between civilian and military nuclear facilities to
enable civil nuclear cooperation with the US, the Prime Minister was at pains
to explain that the purpose of the nuclear agreement was “not to constrain
India's strategic programme”. Accordingly, India’s Separation Plan was
premised on the following principles:
(i)
Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for
safeguards that, after separation, will no longer be engaged in
activities of strategic significance.
(ii)
The overarching criterion would be a judgment whether
subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact
adversely on India's national security.
(iii)
However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is
located in a larger hub of strategic significance,
notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally engaged
in activities of strategic significance.
(iv)
A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that India has
determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme.
In a later statement to the Rajya Sabha on 17 August 2006, the Prime
Minister reiterated the independence of India’s military nuclear programme:
“We will not accept interference by other countries vis­à­vis the
development of our strategic programme. We will not allow external
scrutiny of our strategic programme in any manner… We are very
firm in our determination that agreement with United States on Civil
Nuclear Energy in no way affects the requirements of our strategic
53
programme… Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national
security and will remain so, pending the global elimination of all
nuclear weapons
and universal
non­discriminatory
nuclear
disarmament. Our freedom of action with regard to our strategic
programmes remains unrestricted. The nuclear agreement will not be
Page 36
36
allowed to be used as a backdoor method of introducing NPT type
restrictions on India.”
Some commentators noted the timing of the Prime Minister’s statement in
Parliament as the US Congress was settling down to discuss what became the
Hyde Act. Nonetheless, despite the Prime Minister’s attempt to present the
US with fait accompli regarding the independence of India’s military nuclear
programme, the Hyde Act included restrictive provisions [See, Sections
103(a)(1), 103(a)(5), 103(b)(2) and 103(b)(7) of the Hyde Act]. Responding to
criticism of the interference in India’s nuclear programme, the Indian
Government urged patience till the conclusion of the 123 Agreement.
5.3
Unlike the Hyde Act, the 123 Agreement does not contain any restrictive
provisions regarding India’s nuclear weapons programme. Instead, it is
preambled with the following assurance:
“WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect for sovereignty, non­interference in each other’s internal
affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for
each other’s nuclear programmes” (emphasis supplied)
Further, Article 2(4) of the Agreement makes it clear that:
“The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide
for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded
nuclear activities of either Party. …This Agreement shall be
implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere
54
with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non­
nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology
and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by
them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.”
However, even though the 123 Agreement may steer clear of India’s military
nuclear programme, the provisions of the Hyde Act that make it US policy to
restrict the military programme remain. If the 123 Agreement and the Hyde
Act are read together, the US will cooperate with India on civilian and not
nuclear issues according to the former; but will, independent of the 123
Agreement, work to control India’s military nuclear programme according to
the latter. Similarly, although the 123 Agreement enables the transfer of
reprocessing and other advanced nuclear technologies, Section 103(a)(5) of
the Hyde Act declares that it is US policy to prevent the transfer of advanced
and sensitive nuclear technology, including those related to enrichment and
reprocessing of nuclear material and fuel which are critical to the
development of nuclear weapons, to India, even from third countries. Since
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37
the Hyde Act exempts the 123 Agreement from the restrictive provisions of
the (US) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the US might deny advanced nuclear
cooperation to India to the level consistent with the Hyde Act’s restrictions in
order for the exemption to operate. Thus, if the Hyde Act and 123
Agreement are read together, the US can stop supplies of advanced nuclear
material to India and also attempt to intervene in India’s military nuclear
programme.
(B)
Independence of Indian Foreign Policy
5.4
The harshest criticism of the Hyde Act by India’s political opposition and
public opinion was targeted at the provisions that require India to have a
foreign policy that is congruent to that of the US. No doubt, the US is
interested in inducting India into its global circle of ‘allies’, to support its
foreign policy imperatives across the world. But, US foreign policy often
55
masks essentially imperialistic ambitions and India must guard against being
used as a pawn in such exercises. Since Independence, India has maintained
an independent foreign policy, refusing to join any of the Cold War defence
pacts and instead leading the Non­Aligned Movement. The moral values that
bound early Indian foreign policy have slowly receded to yield a more
practical foreign policy informed by India’s interests and national security.
This has often placed India at odds with the US on major international
events, including the US invasion of Iraq and its enmity with Iran.
5.5
Sections 102(6)(B) and 102(6)(D) of the Hyde Act declares the “sense of
Congress” to permit nuclear cooperation with India if its “foreign policy…is
congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States
on key foreign policy initiatives related to nonproliferation” in return for
“political and material support to the achievement of United States global
and regional nonproliferation objectives”. These are broad general
requirements, but they represent a significant attempt to influence Indian
foreign policy, even though Section 102 is technically non­bonding. The
Hyde Act also contains specific provisions in Section 104(g)(2)(E) requiring
India to fully and actively support US efforts to “…dissuade, isolate, and, if
necessary, sanction and contain Iran…” in order to convince the US
President to exempt the 123 Agreement from the restrictions of the (US)
Atomic Energy Act. The provision, by specifically mentioning Iran, attempts
to tie Indian foreign policy firmly with US priorities. Since the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979, the US and Iran have shared a bitter and hostile
relationship. India, on the hand, shares a valuable relationship with Iran that
both countries have encouraged for the past decade. Iran’s reserves of oil and
natural gas and its convenient geo­strategic location have caught India’s
attention at a time when Indian needs energy to feed its economic growth.
However, Section 103(b)(4) requires “India’s full and active participation in
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38
United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction…”
56
5.6
The 123 Agreement makes no mention of Indian foreign policy or Iran. The
agreement restricts itself mostly to technical issues concerning nuclear trade
and commerce. However, the Preamble of the Agreement commits that both
India and the US to,
“…develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for
sovereignty…”
This is hardly a sufficient safeguard to assuage India’s discomfort with the
intrusiveness of the Hyde Act. In the absence of specific safeguards in the
123 Agreement for the independence of India’s foreign policy, the provisions
of the Hyde Act will inform the nuclear agreement to enable the US to bring
pressure to bear upon India to ally itself with US interests across the world
and especially in relation to Iran. This is because the Hyde Act is a
controlling statute to exempt the 123 Agreement from other US law. If the
conditions of the Hyde Act are not met, the exemption granted to the 123
Agreement may collapse. Even if the exemption power is not used to induce
a change in Indian foreign policy, the Hyde Act has the broader effect of
codifying US determination to manipulate Indian foreign relations. This is, in
itself, unacceptable.
(C)
Right to Test Nuclear Weapons
5.7
Section 106 of the Hyde Act, which is binding, terminates nuclear
cooperation if the US President is satisfied that India “has detonated a
nuclear explosive device”. The US has officially conducted 1054 nuclear
tests, whereas India has officially conducted 6 tests. There is an obvious
incongruity in suggesting that a country with over one thousand official
nuclear explosive tests can have the moral authority to demand other
countries stop testing. But, the exigencies of international power make such a
situation possible. Nevertheless, India’s basic argument in favour of an
untrammelled right to test nuclear weapons lies not in the asymmetrical
numbers of tests conducted, but in India’s geo­strategic location. Surrounded
by two neighbours armed with nuclear weapons, against whom India has
57
fought five wars, India maintains that its strategic national security concerns
may make it necessary to test a nuclear weapon at some future point. The US
must understand India’s concerns, instead of ignoring the views of South
Asia’s only credible democracy. While the 123 Agreement makes no
mention of nuclear testing, it does provide a consultative mechanism to sort
out differences in case there are breaches of the nuclear agreement. Article
14(2) states:
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39
“Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and
promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the
reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking
termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this
Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of
outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved
through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the
circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of
cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the
circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from
a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as
a response to similar actions by other States which could impact
national security.” (emphasis supplied)
However, provisions to enable to pre­termination consultations are simply
not enough to safeguard India’s sovereign right to test nuclear weapons if it
chooses to do so. Some Indian commentators argue that this issue is
redundant in light of India’s voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing
announced by the BJP­led government in 1998. But, this is not entirely
accurate. The issue is not whether India will test a nuclear weapon; instead,
it is about the sovereignty of India’s nuclear programme. India has never
accepted foreign interference in its strategic nuclear programme. By not
including explicit and adequate provisions to reiterate that autonomy of the
right to nuclear testing in the 123 Agreement, India is fettering its freedom to
58
test a nuclear device.
(D)
Fuel Security and the Right to Reprocess
5.8
In the run up to the nuclear agreement, Indian nuclear scientists remained
apprehensive about the security of continued fuel supplies from the US. In
respect of nuclear fuel, this apprehension arises from India’s bad experience
of unreliable US fuel supplies to the Tarapur reactors. As discussed earlier, in
1963 the US and India entered into a bilateral agreement for the supply for
US uranium under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In
1968, the NPT was adopted but India refused to sign. In 1974, India tested a
nuclear weapon, but was refused recognition as a nuclear weapons State,
resulting in its total rejection of the NPT. Meanwhile, the US enacted a Non
Proliferation Act of 1978 that required India to place all its nuclear facilities
under international safeguards whether or not those facilities received
supplies under the 1963 bilateral agreement. India refused and the US cut off
fuel supplies to Tarapur crippling India’s nuclear programme. Ultimately,
India received fuel for the Tarapur reactors from France and, more recently,
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40
from China; but, it has not forgotten the betrayal of the 1963 agreement by
the US. For India’s civil nuclear programme to progress, there must be an
uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel. Any agreement that India makes in
respect of its nuclear reactors must address this basic concern.
5.9
The 123 Agreement elaborately provides for a nuclear fuel security scheme
in Article 5(6):
“(a)
The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable
supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint
Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance
to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured
and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its
59
implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the
United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S.
Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends
and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain
full access to the international fuel market, including reliable,
uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms
in several nations.
(b)
To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the
United States is prepared to take the following additional
steps:
i)
The United States is willing to incorporate assurances
regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.­India
agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which
would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.
ii)
The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate
with the IAEA an India­specific fuel supply agreement.
iii)
The United States will support an Indian effort to
develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard
against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of
India's reactors.
iv)
If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel
supplies to India occurs, the United States and India
would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier
countries to include countries such as Russia, France
and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as
would restore fuel supply to India.”
60
 Page 41
41
Hence, not only does the 123 Agreement commit the US to a constant
supply of nuclear fuel, it also supports an Indian strategic nuclear fuel reserve
and binds the US to facilitate the sourcing of fuel from third countries in the
event of a disruption. These comprehensive safeguards no doubt represent
the outcome of tenacious Indian negotiations. However, it must be noted
that the Hyde Act insists, albeit in a non­binding clause, that the US
Government discourage third countries from supplying India with nuclear
fuel if US supplies are discontinued [See, Section 103(a)(6) of the Hyde Act].
Hence, there is a clear conflict between the provisions of the Hyde Act and
the 123 Agreement in respect of supply of nuclear fuel to India from third
countries. Since the 123 Agreement contains explicit provisions for fuel
security that are binding on the US upon the ratification of the 123
Agreement by the US Congress, the provisions of the 123 Agreement will
prevail to the extent permitted by the ratification.
5.10 Another contentious technical issue concerned the right of India to reprocess.

President Bush Confirms Civilian Nuclear Deal With India 

NEW DELHI, India, March 2, 2006 (ENS) - During his state visit to India today, President George W. Bush
concluded what he called a "necessary" nuclear power agreement with Indian Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh. The agreement will require legislative action by the U.S. Congress because India is not a
signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Congressmen of both parties and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency expressed support for
the deal, but critics in the United States warned that it does not hold India to a nonproliferation regime,
making it more difficult to control nuclear activities in Iran and North Korea.

The two leaders laid the groundwork for their nuclear agreement during the visit of Prime Minister Singh to
Washington last July.

India agreed to separate its civilian nuclear program from its military nuclear program. As part of the
agreement, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities and programs under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards and adhere to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime.

61
President George W. Bush and India's Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh exchange handshakes Thursday, March 2, 2006, after their press
availability at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi. (Photo by Paul Morse
courtesy The White House)

"I have conveyed to the President that India has finalized the
identification of civilian facilities to which we had committed,"
said Prime Minister Singh at a joint news conference
Wednesday. "I was also happy to hear from the President that
he now intended to approach the U.S. Congress to amend U.S.
laws and the Nuclear Supplier Group to adjust its guideline."
"We will discuss with the International Atomic Energy Agency
in regard to fashioning an appropriate India-specific safeguards
agreement. You will appreciate I cannot say more now, while
our parliament is in session," the Prime Minister said.
President Bush told reporters, "It's not an easy job for the
Prime Minister to achieve this [nuclear] agreement, I
understand. It's not easy for the American President to achieve this agreement. But it's a necessary
agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples."
India had been denied civilian nuclear trade for three decades because of its misuse of past civil nuclear
imports to explode a nuclear device in 1974. New Delhi has since built up a nuclear arsenal of 50-100
nuclear arms and conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998.
Today, India operates 15 nuclear power plants, and seven more are scheduled to come online within the next
two years.
In response to a question from an Indian reporter, the President said he would attempt to convince the non-
proliferation advocates in Congress who oppose the Indian nuclear agreement by saying that the relationship
between the two countries is "changing to the better."
"Sometimes it's hard to get rid of history, and short-term history shows that the United States and India were
divided. We didn't have much of a relationship. And as a result, there are laws on the books that reflect that,"
said President Bush. "Now the relationship is changing dramatically. People in the United States have got to
understand that trade with India is in our interests, that diplomatic relations with India is in our interests, that
cultural exchanges with India are in our interest."

Bush called nuclear power "a renewable source of energy," and said development of nuclear power in India
would take the pressure off non-renewable sources of energy, like fossil fuels.

"Increasing demand for oil from America, from India and China, relative to a supply that's not keeping up
with demand, causes our fuel prices to go up. And so, to the extent that we can reduce demand for fossil
fuels, it will help the American consumer," the President said.

India's Rajasthan nuclear power plant operated by the

state-owned Nuclear Power Corp of India Ltd. (Photo
courtesy Nuclear Power Corp of India Ltd.)

All the new India-U.S. cooperative moves are possible

because of "common values," said President Bush. "Our two
democracies respect religious pluralism and the rule of law.
We seek to foster economic development through trade and
advancing the entrepreneurial spirit in both countries."

62
"India and America both suffered from terrorist attacks on our home soil," the President said. "We're sharing
information to protect each other. We're cooperating on the military front. We are committed to promoting
democracy worldwide," Bush said.

U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde, an Illinois Republican who chairs the House International Relations
Committee, speaking in Washington today expressed support for a stronger U.S.-India relationship but said
his committee would put all aspects of the nuclear deal under the microscope.
"Implementing this agreement will require legislative approval," said Hyde. "It is the responsibility of this
Committee to thoroughly examine the specific provisions of this agreement and its potential consequences
for U.S. interests and those of the international community."
U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos of California, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations
Committee, said today that he supports the administration’s initiative to increase U.S. cooperation with India
"across the board. A reliable and dependable strategic partnership is in the interest of both our great
countries, and this agreement could herald an even closer relationship between the United States and India."
"Given the unprecedented nature of this agreement, the Congress will have to carefully examine the details
of the separation plan to assure ourselves and our international partners that this agreement will indeed
support our shared political and security objectives," Lantos said.
Praising the Indian-Americans who are "making important contributions to our country," the President said,
"Congress has got to understand, that it's in our economic interests that India have a civilian nuclear power
industry to help take the pressure off of the global demand for energy."
The Arms Control Association, an American nonprofit organization that promotes support for effective arms
control policies, was critical of the proposed nuclear agreement, saying the deal "bows to the Indian nuclear
bomb lobby's desire to reserve significant segments of the Indian nuclear complex for making nuclear
weapons."
President George W. Bush leans in to listen to India's
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during meetings today in
New Delhi. (Photo by Eric Draper courtesy The White
House)
"In the rush to meet an artificial summit deadline, the White
House sold out core American nonproliferation values and
positions. The so-called civil-military separation plan
announced today is clearly not credible from a nonproliferation
standpoint as the Bush administration had promised it would
be," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms
Control Association, and one of a group of two dozen leading
experts skeptical of the proposal.

"Congress and members of the voluntary 45 member Nuclear

Suppliers Group should not accept the deal as proposed and
should press India to halt its production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons," Kimball urged.

Last July, Kimball said, Bush pledged to work toward relaxing U.S. laws and international guidelines to
permit India increased civil nuclear trade. In return, Singh pledged to open India's largely closed nuclear
establishment to international oversight.

But Kimball says Wednesday's agreement would permit India to keep major existing, as well as future,
elements of its nuclear sector "shrouded in secrecy and devoted to manufacturing nuclear weapons."

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IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said he "welcomes the announcement of the nuclear
cooperation agreement" between India and the United States.

"This agreement is an important step towards satisfying India´s growing need for energy, including nuclear
technology and fuel, as an engine for development. It would also bring India closer as an important partner
in the non-proliferation regime," said Dr. ElBaradei. "It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to
consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety."

"The agreement would assure India of reliable access to nuclear technology and nuclear fuel. It would also
be a step forward towards universalization of the international safeguards regime," Dr. ElBaradei said. "This
agreement would serve the interests of both India and the international community."

But the Arms Control Association warned that India will only subject 14 of its 20-some nuclear power
reactors to IAEA supervision.

"Moreover, India is designating its fast breeder reactors, which can produce large quantities of the nuclear
bomb material plutonium, as military facilities that will be outside the IAEA's purview," warned Kimball.

In December, India joined six other countries in the consortium building the world's first nuclear fusion
reactor, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is being constructed in
France. India joined the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
China as an ITER member. Nuclear fusion is the type of energy that powers the Sun and other stars.

Serched By:­ Rahul Shrivastava

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