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On the night of 23/24 February, in accordance with General Norman Schwarzkopf's plan for the ground assault
called "Operation Desert Sabre", VII Corps raced east
from Saudi Arabia into Iraq in a maneuver later nicknamed the Hail Mary. The Corps had two goals: to
cut o Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and to destroy ve elite
Republican Guard divisions near the IraqKuwait border
that might attack the Arab and Marine units moving into
Kuwait to the south. Initial Iraqi resistance was light and
scattered after the breach, and the 2nd ACR fought only
minor engagements until 25 February.
The primary battle was conducted by 2nd ACRs three
squadrons of about 4,000 soldiers, along with the 1st
Infantry Divisions two leading brigades(2nd Armored
Division(FWD)),[12] who attacked and destroyed the Iraqi
18th Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade
of the Tawakalna Division, each consisting of between
2,500 and 3,000 personnel.[9]
The main U.S. unit in the battle was the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), a 4,500 man reconnaissance and security element assigned to VII Corps. It consisted of three ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an
aviation (attack helicopter) squadron (4th), and a support
squadron. Each ground squadron was made up of three
cavalry troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer
battery, and a headquarters troop. Each troop comprised
120 soldiers, 1213 M3 Bradley ghting vehicles and
nine M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks.[9] Task Force 1-41
Infantry breached the berm on the borders between Saudi
Arabia and Iraq which was the initial Iraqi defensive positions and performed reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance missions prior to the 2nd ACRs actions.[10]
This generally includes destroying or repelling the Iraqis
reconnaissance elements and denying their commander
any observation of friendly forces. The corps' main body
consisted of the American 3rd Armored Division (3rd
AD) and 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) and 2nd Armored
Division (Forward) and 1st Armored Division (1st AD),
and the British 1st Armoured Division (1 AD).
1 Plan
The 2nd ACR was to advance east, locate and engage
the enemy and determine his dispositions and then allow
the mechanized brigades of the 1st ID to pass through
to nish destroying the Iraqis. The 2nd ACRs limit of
advance changed during the operation. VII Corps Fragmentary Plan Seven, issued during the night of February 2526, made the 60 Easting the Regiments initial
limit of advance. After 2ACR made contact with the Republican Guards security zone, Corps changed the limit
to the 70 Easting. Along that line, the 1st ID would
pass through the Regiment and push on to objectives further east. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,
the commander of the VII Corps, ordered Colonel Don
Holder, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment commander, to locate the enemy and to avoid becoming decisively
engaged.[13]
The job of the 2nd ACR was to cross the border and
advance east as a forward scouting element, led by cavalry scouts in lightly armored M3A1 Bradleys with highly
advanced thermals to detect enemy positions. Following
closely behind were M1A1 Abrams tanks covering them
from the rear, ready at a moments notice to move forward and engage the enemy. Originally advancing ahead
of the 3rd Armored Division until late on February 25th,
they would shift to the east and be ahead of the advancing 1st Infantry Division as it moved north from its initial
objectives. The Regiments mission was to strip away enemy security forces, clear the way of signicant defenses
and locate the Republican Guards defensive positions so
they could be engaged by the full weight of the armored
73 Easting
The Regiment moved from the 60 Easting with eight of south of those E Troop had just destroyed. With initial
its nine cavalry troops generally abreast of each other. support from Captain Mac Haszards K Troop, Millers
4.1
Battle of Norfolk
5
toon. From the perspective of the tank gunners looking
through the thermal sights of the approaching M1 tanks,
these ashes appeared to be T-55 tanks shooting at them.
The young and exhausted American gunners, convinced
they were ghting against a determined enemy, opened
re and hit three more Bradleys. The brigade commander, Colonel David Weisman, decided to pull the battalions back, consolidate, and use his artillery to destroy the
aggressive Iraqi infantry.
Task Force 1-41 Infantry would spearhead the American assault into Objective Norfolk. The Iraqis had halted
the 1st Infantry Divisions initial push into their sector
only temporarily. By 00:30, 27 February, the two attacking brigades of the 1st Infantry Division were positioned
along the 75 Easting, 2,000 meters east of 73 Easting. In
what has since been dubbed the Battle of Norfolk, they
Wrecked Bradley IFV K-12 burns after being hit by Iraqi tank crossed the remaining ten kilometers to their objective,
Objective Norfolk, over the next three hours. By dawn,
re during the rst stages of the battle
the 1st Infantry Division had taken Objective Norfolk and
the ght shifted away from the 73 Easting area to 1st Aralry squadrons, the Iraqi 18th and 37th Armored Brigades mored Divisions attack to the north, started at 20:00 on
faced six heavy battalions of American tanks and infantry 26 February, and the 3rd Armored Division attack just to
ghting vehicles and another six battalions of 155 mm the south of the 1st Division.
eld artillery. At approximately 23:30, yet another en- The British 1st Armoured division was responsible for
counter took place: Lt Colonel Taylor Joness 3rd Battal- protecting the right ank of VII Corps. It was assumed
ion, 66th Armor, ran into an Iraqi tank battalion equipped by the corps planners the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division
with T-55s. As before, the Iraqis did not run or surren- would counterattack 7th Corps once their penetration into
der, but manned their vehicles and weapons to face the Iraqi defenses was discovered. The British 1st Armoured
advancing Americans. Initially, many American units ad- Division had two brigades which participated in Operavanced past Iraqi tanks and crews, who were in shelters or tion Desert Storm. The 4th and 7th Brigades. They would
had not yet turned on their engines and so did not appear both rotate responsibilities as the lead brigade. The 1st
to be threats in the American crews thermal sights.
Armoured was equipped with the Challenger main batA slightly disoriented Bradley platoon, attempting to follow the M1 tanks, moved across the front of these Iraqi
positions, illuminated by burning vehicles behind them.
The Iraqis took advantage of this excellent target and
opened re from three directions. The initial volley hit
a Bradley, killing three American soldiers.[31] An American tank company trailing the lead units observed the
Iraqi re and joined the melee, quickly destroying three
T-55s before they could get o another shot. At the same
time, several small antitank rockets hit the Bradley pla-
tle tank. With a 120mm ried main gun, thermal optics, and Chobham armor, its only rival in theatre was
the American M1A1 Abrams tank. British infantry rode
into battle on the Warrior infantry ghting vehicle. It had
reasonable armor protection and a 30-mm gun. Modied versions of the vehicle included mortar carriers, Milan antitank systems, and command and control vehicles;
and the British possessed a variety of excellent light armored vehicles built on their Scorpion chassis. British artillery was primarily American made M-109s (155mm),
6 NOTES
M110s (203mm), and MLRS systems which were compatible with American systems. Their air support consisted of Gazelle helicopters, used for reconnaissance,
and the Lynx helicopter. The British had their full contingent of engineer, logistics, and medical units.[35]
This division was commanded by forty-seven-year-old
Maj. General Rupert Smith. He was a member of the
British Parachute Regiment and he was an expert on Soviet armor and tank tactics. His division had two brigades
at its disposal. The 4th Brigade, reinforced with extra
engineers and artillery, was used for breakout operations
and to clear the ground at the breach. The armor heavy
7th Brigade was used for tank on tank engagements.[36]
On 25 February 1991 the 1st Armoured Division would
smash into the western ank of the Iraqi 48th Infantry
Division which was commanded by Brig. General Saheb Mohammed Alaw. That night the 48th Infantry Division was destroyed and General Alaw was captured by the
British. That same night the British cleared two lines of
enemy positions during close combat engagements. The
British also destroyed several Iraqi companies of T-55
tanks.[37] That same night other elements of the division
were engaging the Iraqi 31st Infantry Division.[38]
eration the Regiment covered the advance of three different U.S. divisions in turn, moved 120 miles in eightytwo hours and fought elements of ve Iraqi Divisions.[44]
The violent battle at 73 Easting xed the southern forces
of the Iraqi Republican Guard Corps and permitted the
Corps Commander to launch First Infantry Division into
the depths of the Iraqi defenses and on into Kuwait.
6 Notes
[1] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque, p.43
[2] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque P.247
[3] Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by
Bourque P.164
[15] Michael D. Krause, The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991, A Joint Center of Military History and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Project, 24
May 1991
[16] Extract of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiments Operations Log, Second Armored Cavalry, ca. April 1991
[17] Houlahan, Thomas (1999). Gulf War: the complete history. Schrenker Military Publishing, p 325. ISBN 09668456-0-9
[18] Bourque. Jayhawk!. p. 310.
7 References
8
Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War,
Stephen A. Borque, Center of Military History Publication 70-73-1, Washington, DC, 2002.
Second Armored Cavalry Regiment: Operation
Desert Storm, Major Steve Gravlin, Troop Information Paper, Headquarters 2d ACR, April 1991
Gulf War, The Complete History, Thomas Houlahan,
Schrenker Military Publishing, New London, NH,
1999
Summary of Fire Missions, 25 and 26 February
1991, Major John Klemencic, Second Armored
Cavalry Regiment, February 1991
Memorandum for Record, Operation DESERT
STORM, Lt. Colonel Scott Marcy, Headquarters 3d
Squadron, 2d ACR, 8 March 1991
Conference Papers from 73 Easting: Lessons
Learned from Desert Storm via Advanced Distributed Simulation Technology, 2729 August
1991, J. Orlansky and J Thorpe, editors, IDA Doc
D-1110, IDA, Alexandria VA, April 1992. (Including presentations by Major General Paul Funk,
3rd Armored Division, Keynote Address"; Colonel
Mike Krause, Center for Military History, Presentation of the 73 Easting Battle"; Colonel (ret.) Gary
Bloedorn, Institute for Defense Analysis, Data Collection Methodology"; Major Douglas Lute, Headquarters Department of the Army, The Battle of 73
Easting: The Regiments Perspective)
Extract of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiments Operations Log, Headquarters Second Armored Cavalry, ca. April 1991
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
Congress. United States. Dept. of Defense. 1992.
External links
Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells
Us About the Future of Conict, by Stephen Biddle. From International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2
(Fall 1996)
An account of Ghost Troops ght, by Stars and
Stripes
Douglas MacGregors presentation on Warriors
Rage: the Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting at the
Pritzker Military Library
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