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Tahafut Al Falasifah The Incoherence of Philosophers Imam Al Ghazali Text
Tahafut Al Falasifah The Incoherence of Philosophers Imam Al Ghazali Text
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Al-Ghazali
AL-GHAZALI'S
TAHAFUT AL-FALASIFAH
[INCOHERENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS]
1963
-?
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
Copyrigth
work began
Ml
and reproduction
present
Thehensive
plan
in 1948
as part of a compre-
than the
first
lation continued.
in 1953 I came to study at the Institute of Islamic
McGilfUniversity, Montreal, Canada, the first draft
organised a Ghazall
of this work was complete. The Institute
first draft served a
that
from
readings
my
Seminar, at which
When
Studies,
Prinisd by
Photo
offset process at
Nawa-i-Waqt Printers
Publish** by
B. A. Dar, Secretary (Publications)
Translator's Preface
originally undertaken outside McGill should have been accepted as a Thesis, or that I should have so compelety revised
it as to make of it quite a new thing, is due to the interest
taken in this work by Prof. W.C. Smith, Director of the
Institute of Islamic Studies. Prof. Smith has also kindly
tried to help me to find a publisher. It is through his good
offices that the work has been accepted for publication by the
Pakistan Philosophical Congress. It is a great honour for
me thus to be connected with, and sponsored by the Congress,
even as the sense in which that organisation has connected
itself with Gahzall does honour to it. Nor is it a mere coincidence that this honour should have been done to me by the
Philosophical Congress of Pakistan upon the recommendation
guide,
of its President, Prof. M. M. Sharif, who had been
and was one of the architects of the great plan once entertained by the Muslim Educational Conference at Aligrah.
my
Sabih
Ahmad Kamall
CONTENTS
Page
Translator's Preface
Introduction
Problems
Refutation of the philosophers' belief in the
Eternity of the world
II. Refutation of their belief in the everlasting
nature of the world, time and motion
III. Of their dishonesty in saying that God is the
agent and the maker of the world which is His
action or product and the explanation of the
fact that these words have only a metaphorical,
not real, significance to them
IV. To show their inability to prove the existence
of the creator of the world
V. Of their inability to prove by rational arguments
that God is one, and that it is not possible to
suppose two necessary beings each of which is
I.
13
54
Montreal ;
March 11, 1958
uncaused
63
89
96
109
125
Vll
132
136
140
Contents
Page
Problems
possible for
XX
of
Refutation of their denial of the resurrection
229
bodies
249
251
257
261
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
vi 11
INTRODUCTION
In
\.
the
Name
WE
transcends
Introduction
Tahafut al-Falasijah
"^K^
o^
only in an .uncritol
Chnstians-o^atever
Jews and the
T.hey couia n
around
or sees all
its basis
ianciful notions
ancestors had
un^slamicatmosphere^an
born into an
In the^sfco V
pursued no better ways.
theorettoal
from
Results
stumbling-sceptically,
by
"XSwh-aSd
s"^y
effect
intellectual
powers
stupidly-upon
^^^
Tolght
awe-inspiring
P^f^f^f
sciences
excellent
extraordinary
they have discovered
atical^ logical physica
.
are tne most
th
XU^epHnciPs
that the P[^
by
their
intel
that their
deductive
profound
inmg by
the Hidden "fhings
y
bold attempts to discover
methods and that'J.
they repud^ted
the
and the originality of thar
rf the validity of
demeo
religious laws
a il
the authority of
u
fito
h
o
contents
positive
and trivialities.
sanctimomous tos ana
struck
Such things are only
nn^
fto
times
When such stuff w
Qur
e h
their hearts trie
a responsive chord in
U
a
faith
thought that it w ould .^h ?h
U nciaton of their
which
for
, e of the
of gat thinkers
them Edition o,
devated status
would prepare
F
t0
out to hem the
refus
learned
,
level gomroon
ancestors,
far above the general
religion followed by
would do
be content with the
:
^^Sments
^R^.
^q,^
'
"^S^
"
f
^pany
tewm
pw ^
h4
fc^J*
They flattered
accept even
them honour not to
begun to accqrt Jais
they had actually
a change "om o
that
They failed to see
But
uncritically
uncritically,
*^
fi
bondage to another
is
o{
^j,
stnpidity
than that oi
rSt^t^d^chSst^a matter
saw
bS
a er
a ||e r ations to the
that tne
are unquestionable:
deveped
and metaphysical
among these
this vein of folly pulsating
refute the
to
order
in
book
this
idiotsl decided to write
incoherence of their
the
expose
will
It
Lnrient philosophers.
metaphysical theories.
and the inconsistency of their
the obscurest, elements
and
flimsiest
the
Tt will bring to light
for
which will provide some amusement
of Ther
mean
(I
men
intelligent
and serve as a warning to, the
to beliefs and opinions,
Sose things which the/ contributed
thought they could be dis-
When
of
by
They have been deceived
that the an
fa
^ outcome
l&W^^Effi'*.
etc.
^r
slromothts
for
of blind faith.
or
mfd^
ft&f&&fr%*
is
twotnlamental
The
conflict
^melyord^ned
persons
gUe
persons having ir
performed It was only a few
denied these principles
who
views and perverted minds
can be attached
But in serious discussions no importance taken of them.
to
be
ought
to such persons; and no notice
Perversity^and
AnI the? nmst be branded with diabolical
be a deterrent
may
example
stuoid contumacy, so that their
conversion
onous
vaing
a
that
who tend to think
of intelligence
indication
an
be
would
to Siginal heresy
to demonstrate that the
and eood sense. This book is going
the.atheists in our day
followers
ancie^haSophers, whose
what is imputed
with
untainted
really
claim to be. were
of the religious
validity
the
to them. They never denied
God and did
believe
did
laws. On the contrary, they
the
r^ardto
in
have faith in His messengers; although
.and
astray
went
and
faltered
minor details, they sometimes
path. We propose
caused others to go astray, from the even
We
Tahaful al-Falasifah
Introduction
to show how they slipped into error and falsehood. But our
examination will not obscure their solid achievements which
Let God
lie beneath the repulsive facade of their thought.
be the sustainer and the helper in the investigations we have
undertaken.
Now to begin the book, we proceed to the Prefaces
which will presage the general trend of the discussion in
further commentaries
and changes, which have necessitated
translations are as
and interpretations. As a result, the
this book.
Preface One
much
in dispute
among
works are. However, the most faithful as Aristotle's translatorsand the most original as his commentators among
Abu Nasr, and Ibn
the philosophising Muslims are al-Farabl
attention to what these
Sina. Therefore, we will confine our
views
two have taken to be the authentic expression of the
discarded and refused
they
what
For
mis-leaders.
their
of
have been utterly useless, and
to follow must undoubtedly
refutation.
elaborate
for
an
call
should not
Therefore, let it be known that we propose to concenas it emerges
trate on the refutation of philosophical thought
the
otherwise,
For
persons.
two
of
these
writings
from the
scattered character of the philosophical theories should have
loose arrangement of our
to be reflected in a proportionately
subject-matter.
Preface
Two
is
threefold.
Tahafut al-Falasifak
Introduction
on whether
it is
(may God
bless
them
all).
An example
is
their
theory that the lunar eclipse occurs when the light of the
Moon disappears as a consequence of the interposition of the
Earth between the Moon and the Sun. For the Moon derives
round body
its light from the Sun, and the Earth is a
surrounded by Heaven on all the sides. Therefore, when the
Moon falls under the shadow of the Earth, the light of
the Sun is cut off from it. Another example is their theory
that the solar eclipse means the interposition of the body
occurs
of the Moon between the Sun and the observer, which
intersection
the
at
stationed
are
Moon
the
when the Sun and
of their
We
The Prophet (may God bless him) has said: "The Sun
Their
and the Moon are two signs among the signs of God.
6
When
How
reconciled with
we will answer
this tradition to contradict the philoonly denies that an eclipse has anything to
Further, it enjoins
do with the life or the death of a man.
Sacred Law enThe
eclipse.
of
an
time
the
at
prayer
joins prayer at the time of sunrise or sunset or during
the day what is unusual if, with a view to finding greater
favour (with God), it also enjoins prayer at the time of an
There is nothing in
It
sophers.
eclipse ?
// it
is said
At the end
"When God
we will answer
This addition is spurious. We must condemn its author
The Prophet's words are only those which have
liar.
been reported above. However, if this addition were authentic, would it not be easier to interpret it than to reject the
evidence (of astronomical and mathematical sciences) which
People have interpreted many a
is conclusive and definite ?
plain text by rational arguments which never attained to
such clarity and cogency (as the astronomical and mathematical arguments in this case have done).
The atheists would have the greatest satisfaction if the
supporter of religion made a positive assertion that things
For then it would be
of this kind are contrary to religion.
easier for them to refute religion which stood or fell with its
(It is, therefore, necessary for
opposition to these things.
the supporter of religion not to commit himself on these
questions,) because the fundamental question at issue
between him and the philosophers is only whether the world
as a
Introduction
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Preface Four
of the most artful methods employed by the philosophers is that, when in discussion they come up against
a difficulty, they say: "The science of metaphysics is
extremely subtle. Of all the sciences it is the most difficult
even for a sharp intelligence to grasp." Those who follow
the philosophers employ a similar trick in order to get rid
When they are unable to explain someof their difficulties.
thing in the work of their masters, they still glorify them
and say : "Undoubtedly, a solution can be found somewhere
in the sciences developed by the ancient masters. Perhaps
our failure is the result of our inability to consult Logic and
Mathematics on this question."
One
To
who
common enemy ;
private quarrels.
for at
critical juncture,
we
Preface Three
Let
these suggestions,
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Introduction
to
an intelligent mind.
As regards their contention that reference to Logic
And
it is right.
But Logic is not their monopoly.
Fundamentally, it is the same thing as in the Art of Scholastic Reasoning we call the Book of Theoretical Inquiry.
The philosophers have changed its name to Logic to make it
We
look formidable.
often call it the Book of Disputation,
or the Data of the Intellects. Wheil a gullible enthusiast
hears the word 'Logic,' he thinks that it is a new subject,
unknown to the Mutakallimun and cultivated by the philosophers alone. In order to remove this misunderstanding,
we propose to discuss the Data of the Intellects in a separate
work, where we will avoid the phraseology used by the
Mutakallimun and the Jurists, adopting for the time being
the terms used by the Logicians, so that the whole thing
might be cast into a different mould, and the methods of the
Logicians might be followed in the minutest detail. In that
book, we will speak to them in their language I mean their
logical terminology.
will show there that
neither the conditions for the material validity of Syllogism laid down by them in the section of Logic devoted
to Demonstration nor those for its formal validity in
the Book of Syllogism nor the postulates which they have
formulated in the Isagoge and Categories, and which form
the parts and preliminaries of Logic
(vi)
butes.
is
Himself.
(xii)
(xiii)
Heaven's movement.
(xvi)
(xvii)
(xviii)
10
is
unavoidable,
We
Tahafut al-Falasifah
a substance which exists in itself, and which is
body nor an accident.
(xix) Refutation of their belief in the impossibility of
is
neither
their metaphysical
and
physical sciences wherein we propose to expose the contradiction involved in their views. As regards Mathematics,
there is no point in denying or opposing it ; for Mathematics
includes Arithmetic and Geometry, and these two sciences
are not in dispute here. As regards Logic, it is just an
investigation into the instruments of reflection over the
intelligibles.
And as such, it involves no contradictions
which might deserve our consideration. And in the book
called The Standard of Knowledge, we are going to introduce
as much of this subject as may be helpful towards the understanding of the contents of this book.
PROBLEM
baffles all
minds.
far between.
The
con*-
that as a rule
beginning
it is inconceivable that something which has a
in time should proceed from the eternal without there being
any intermediary.
sensus of opinion
is
12
13
Prob. I]
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
it
are three.
of
(i)
In
say
from an eternal
we suppose the
Their discussion
their most clever argument.
metaphysical problems is less substantial than
the discussion of this one. For here they have access to a
This
is
of all other
15
14
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
it
may
be said
is
open
to objection
on two points.
How
came
when
actualised.
it
What can
it
is
is said :
object of will emerge as something new? And what prevented it from emerging before it actually did ? The state
of its new-emergence cannot be distinguished from the pre-
16
factor or any
ceding states in respect of any thing or any
any relation whatsoever for all things remain as
remaining the same, the
they were. If, in spite of all things
first, but comes into being
at
produced
is
not
will
of
object
exceedingly contradictory.
later, the whole affair must be
not only in case of
arises
kind
this
of
And contradiction
of
evident and essential causes and effects, but also in case
instance,
For
qualified.
those which are conventional and
pronounces divorce to his wife, and if separation is
if a man
result of the pronouncement, it is inconimmediate
the
not
For, in
ceivable that it should take effect afterwards.
pronouncethe
usage,
legal
and
convention
with
accordance
ment is made the cause of the judgment. Therefore, the
postponement of the effect is unintelligible, unless the enforcement of the divorce should be bound up with, say,
house. Only
the coming of the next day, or entering into the
coming of
the
of
time
the
at
effect
take
divorce
then will the
and not
house,
the
into
entering
the
or
day,
next
the
cause
of
made
a
is
immediately; for the pronouncement
awaited.
yet
is
which
something
to
divorce in relation
is not
Since the condition, i.e., the morrow or the entry,
state or
until
present at the moment, the effect must be held over
effect,
the
So
present.
become
should
condition
the absent
will not appear unless a
i.e., the enforcement of the divorce,
emerges. But if the
entry,
new factor, viz., the morrow or the
effect with the appearance of something which is not present at the moment--to
postpone the effect, it would not be an intelligible thing,
notwithstanding the fact that he has the right to make
the pronouncement, and is at liberty to choose whatever
Since it is not possible for us to arrange
details he likes.
things as we like, and since our capriconventional
these
cious determinations are bound to be unintelligible, it follows
that an arbitrary arrangement should be still less intelligible
in the sphere of essential, rational and self-evident causation.
Even in the case of morals, the object of our intention is
not posterior to the intention, if the intention exists, and
there is no hindrance. Therefore, with intention being
coupled with power, and with all obstacles having been
removed, it is unintelligible that the intended thing should
be delayed. Such a thing is conceivable only in the case
of inclination; for inclination by itself is not sufficient to
17
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
precedes an action.
So if the eternal will is to be likened to our intention, it
is inconceivable that its object should be posterior to it.
Unless there is a hindrance, there cannot be a gap between
the intention and its object. It makes no sense to have
an intention to-day that one would stand up to-morrow.
One may only have an inclination to do so. But if the
eternal will is like our inclination, it shall not by itself
be sufficient to bring about the object of inclination. For
it is indispensable that something else viz., the inner
agitation that is intentionshould emerge to supplement
inclination, so that the object of inclination may be produced.
But the emergence of such a thing means a change in the
Eternal.
why
The answer
to the foregoing
may be
stated as follows
ment,
//
it
is
is
not enough.
said
reason.
we will answer
But, then, what is the difference between you and your
opponents who said to you
:
19
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
was
How
even the addition of one would make the even odd.
If you
one
just
lacked
?
infinite
is
which
that
that
could it be
make the
say that it is odd, again the addition of one would
lacked
infinite
which
is
that
that
be
odd even. How could it
It follows that
it even?
made
have
would
which
just one
nor
you are bound to hold that the number is neither odd
an objection as follows
even.
How will
if
they say
For it leads to
impossible
the affirmation of spherical revolutions which are infinite
in
of
is
innumerable units.
The
that, in spite of the fact that the revolutions of Saturn are one-thirtieth of the Sun, they are equalNay, you would assert that the revolutions of
ly infinite.
the Stellar Sphere, each of which takes thirty-six thousand
years, are as infinite as the East-West movement of the Sun,
which takes only a day and night. If someone says that
this is an impossible thing, and that its impossibility is selfevident, how will you silence his criticism?
Even so, one might ask whether the number of these
revolutions is odd or even, or both, or neither. If you say
that it is both odd and even, or that it is neither odd nor even,
it will be an evidently absurd thing. But if you say that it is
20
it is
said
The
finite
s infinite
we
alone
is
That which
cannot be so described.
will answer
is
composed of
which
How
will
you answer
this criticism?
fact is
You maintain
//
If
it is
said :
of units."
Error lies in your words: "A totality composed
are nonsphere
the
of
revolutions
As a matter of fact, the
gone;
are
past
the
in
place
took
which
Those
existent.
to be
yet
are
future
while those which will take place in the
which
beings
to
points
The word "Totality"
produced.
in this case no such being
are present here and now. But
is to be found.
we
will answer:
or even. It is
is bound to be either odd
categoriestwo
these
outside
fall
should
it
that
impossible
is a being
thing
numbered
regardless of the fact whether the
if we suppose
instance
For
perished.
which exists, or has
it is either
a number of horses, we are bound to believe that
A number
whether
an odd or an even number. It makes no difference
existing.
be
to
not
or
existing,
be
to
horses
we suppose the
this judgment
Or, if the horses perished after having existed,
21
Tahafut al-Fal&sifdh
Prob. I]
Even according
to
your
own
How will
man who
you disprove a
it is
If
is said
it
The true opinion about the souls is the one held by Plato.
Plato thought that the soul is eternal that, although one
by nature, it gets divided when it is related to bodies and
that, afteritsseparationfrombodies.it returns to its original
:
character, and
is reunified.
to the ocean.
ed into streams and rivers, and then returns
divided
?
be
quantity
no
has
which
But how can that
they cannot
that
show
to
is
this
all
of
purpose
The
believe in the
render it untenable for their opponents to
they claim
unless
will,
eternal
the
by
origination of the world
But when
necessity
rational
to
contrary
is
thing
a
such
that
own
their
refute
to
critics
a similar claim is. made by their
.
beliefs
it
cism. 'And
//
it is
said
might be
This may be turned against you. For, it
creation of the
the
before
power,
the
have
God
asked: Did
than he did >
world, to create it one year or.two years earlier
He held Himself
Since His power is infinite, it appears that
when at last
But
world.
the
create
not
did
and
in patience,
He
created
it,
are
we
we will answer
we will answer
why
22
We believe
tion).
If
it is
said
How
will
from rational
namely, that all the
the world) from another point of view
moments being equal with respect to the possibility of the
be anything
relation of the eternal will to them, there cannot
before
those
all
from
moment
particular
one
to distinguish
and
after it
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. 1]
We
Why
we
will
answer
The
it
is,
is
said
to speak
It is unintelligible rather, self-contradictory
an attribute of which the function is to distinguish something from its like. For by likeness is meant that there is no
and by distinction is meant that there is no
distinction
It is not proper to imagine that two black things
likeness.
in two different places are like each other in all respects.
For 'This* is in one place, and 'That' is in another place
hence the necessity for the distinction between the two. Nor
can two black things in the same place but at different times
be absolutely like each other. For 'This' is separated from
'That' in time how, therefore, can the two be equal in all
'Two black things like each other,
respects ? When we say
of
'
'
We
word
(eternal) will
and whatever
// it
it
is
like.
it is,
As regards the
wherever
will, it is
24
25
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
26
(ii)
From
Here you
will
of volitional action
whether with reference to empirical
facts, or on theoretical grounds will have to affirm an attribute of which the function should be to distinguish some-
thing from
In
its like.
may
be stated as follows
Why
If you say
Prob. I]
produced.
Tahafut al-Falastfah
description
we
will answer
28
i.e.,
is
stars.
If it is said:
we
will answer
in
movement.
As regards the
Rarticularly
If
29
Prob. J]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Belief in the Eternity of the World
own
principles.
The nature of heaven is simple for heaven is not heterogeneous, but homogeneous. And the simplest shape is
the round shape. For four sided, or six-sided, etc., figures
require angularity and the difference (of parts), which
requirements cannot be met, unless something should be
added to simple nature.
;
Now, even
instances.
//
it is
said
we will answer
//
it
is
said
The two
traries.
How
this difficulty.
we
The second point on which
of the spheres
will answer
**
3o
31
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
to the
Original Argument
may
be said
You reject
Now,
phenomena.
it is
it is
said
we
some other
will answer
first
originated.
// it is said
Matters, which receive forms, accidents and qualities,
temporal at all. And the temporal qualities are the
not
are
movement of the spheres i.e., rotatory motion and the
relative attributes of that movement which emerge in course
of time. (Such attributes are the three-fold, six-fold, fourfold, etc. relations of some parts of the sphere or the stars
to each othet or to the Earth e.g., the consequences of
sunrise, or daylight, or the decline of a star from the
highest point of elevation, or its distance from the Earth
because of its being at the Apogee or its nearness to the
Earth because of its being at the Perigee or its tending
away from some regions because of its being in north or
south.) So, evidently, these relations inevitably belong to
rotatory motion for it is that motion itself which necessi-
fundamental principles.
//
We
32
tates them.
33
Prob. I]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
living things which play the same part as our souls do in reIt, therefore,
lation to our bodies. And they are eternal.
follows that rotatory motion, which is caused by the souls of
heavens, must be eternal as well. The states of the souls
being similarbecause of their eternity the states of the
these move-
we
will say
These lengthy details will not avail you. For the question remains: Is this rotatory motion, which is the source
of temporal events, temporal or eternal ? If eternal, how did
If
it become the principle of the first temporal being?
temporal, it should stand in need of another temporal being,
and therefore an infinite regress should follow. You say
that it resembles the Eternal in one respect, and the temporal in another. That is to say, it is something permanent
which, nevertheless, emerges and re-emerges in course of
time. In other words, it is permanently renewable, or renewably permanent. Now, let us ask Is it the principle
of temporal phenomena by virtue of its being permanent, or
by virtue of its being renewable ? If by virtue of its being
permanent, how was it that something proceeded from a
permanent being, whose states were similar, at a particular
moment, as set over against all other moments? But if (it
is the principle of temporal phenomena) by virtue of its
:
W
In
their second
assert
34
35
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
movement
before the existence of the world and time, there was a time
when the world did not exist. For in that (pre-existing)
time, the world must have been non-existent, as its nonexistence preceded its existence. And, therefore, God must
have preceded the world during a period which came to an
end, but which had never begun. On this view, accordingly,
there must be an infinite time before time. But that is selfcontradictory. And for/this reason it is impossible to believe
Finally, the eternity of time
in the origination of time.
being necessary, it follows
motion
of
measure
i.e., the
that the eternity of motion is also necessary. And hence the
eternity of that which is in motion, and' the perpetuity of
whose motion makes time itself perpetual.
Objection
may
//
it
we say that God was and the world was not, there
be a third thing implied in the statement, besides
If
will
"... He
36
is said
imagination(s).
we
will answer
The original sense of the two words 'Was' and 'Will be'
in this case includes only the existence of one being and the
non-existence of another. The third thing in respect of which
they differ is only a relation, which is, however, necessary
from our point of view. This can be proved as follows :
If we suppose the future non-existence of the world, and
then suppose our own existence as subsequent to it, then
we
And
so, regardless of
37
Prob. I)
Tahafut al-Falasifah
38
'after'
and spatial extension which is described, in terms
of its relations, as 'above' and 'below.'
If it is possible to
have an 'above'-less 'above,' it should also be possible to
have a 'before'-less 'before.' (No doubt, the pre-existing
'before' may be, as the 'above' unrelated to body is, an
imaginary and unreal thing.) This comparison is inevitable,
and it should be considered carefully; for the philosophers
are all agreed that beyond the world there is neither occupied nor empty space.
If it
is
said:
39
Taha/ut al-Falasifak
Prob. I]
what
'before'
and
'after' signify.
we will say
There is no difference between 'before' and 'after' on the
one hand, and 'above' and 'below' on the other. But,
since it will serve no purpose to stick to the words 'above*
and 'below,' let us use such words as 'beyond' or 'outside'
Thus, we will say
The world does have an
instead.
inside and an outside. Now, is there any occupied or empty
space outside the world? Their answer will be: "There
is neither an occupied nor an empty space beyond the world.
If you .mean by the 'outside' (of the world) the uppermost
surface* of the world itself, the world has an 'outside.'
"
But if you mean anything else, the world has no 'outside.'
Similarly, when we are asked whether the world has a
'before,' we may answer: If that means whether the existence of the world has a beginning i.e., one of its own
limits at which it began it has a 'before.* And this is
analogous to the theory that the world has an 'outside,'
if the 'outside' is interpreted to mean an uncovered limit
:
while the world was not with Him. This much does not
What proves
necessitate the affirmation of anything else.
that such an affirmation would be an act of the Imagination
(Alis that it is related to space and time in particular.
though our opponent believes in the eternity of body, yet
his Imagination is sometimes agreeable to the supposition of
And although we believe in the temits temporal origin.
poral origin of body, yet our Imagination is sometimes
agreeable to the supposition of its eternity. But this is
so only in the case of body.) CWhen we resume the discussion of time, the opponent is unable to suppose the
beginning of time which had no 'before^ The contrary
of what is believed can be posited in the Imagination,
as a hypothesis or a supposition; but this, like space,
is something which cannot be posited (even) in the Imagination. Both he who does and he who does not believe in
the finitude of body are unable to suppose a body beyond
which there is neither a plenum nor a void. Indeed, the
Imagination cannot accept such an idea. But it is said
"The clear evidence of reason does not disallow demonLet no heed be
stratively the existence of finite body.
paid to the Imagination." Similarly, therefore, (it may
be said that) the clear evidence of reason does not disallow an existence which opened up, and yet had nothIf the Imagination is unable to suppose
ing before it.
such an existence, let no need be paid to the Imagination. For, in the case of space, the Imagination having found
no finite body which did not have by its side some other
body or air (which was imagined to be void space) assumed that the same thing would be true of non-empirical
Similarly, in the case of time, when it^found
reality.
that every event followed another event, it refused to accept*
an Event which had no 'before' viz., an existing thing
which might have run its course before that Event.
This, then, is the cause of error. And the comparison
drawn here has enabled us to refute the philosohave
we
phers,
40
4i
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
the necessity of
time upwards),"
then the quantity of one possibility will be double that
And there must be yet another possibility
which is double the whole. And this quantitatively determined or measurable possibility, some parts of which are
longer than others to an ascertainable extent, can in reality
be nothing other than time. For these hypothetical quanwhich
tities cannot form an attribute of the Divine essence,
they
can
Nor
determinations.
stands above all quantitative
nonFor
world.
the
of
non-existence
of
the
attribute
be an
existence is Nothing hence the possibility of any quantitaBut quantity is an attribute,
tive determination of it.
of which it is the quantity.
something
presupposes
which
This something is motion. And the quantity is time,
which is the measure of motion. Therefore, on your view,
there must have been before the existence of the world
something whose quantities should vary that is, there
must have been time. So you must believe that there was
time before the existence of the world.
of another.
'
'
'
?
would have made eleven hundred revolutions by this time
Eternal
the
change
of
If you say No, then it would mean a
from
from inability to power, or a change of the world
But
if you say Yes (which
possibility.
to
impossibility
case), the next question
is an unavoidable answer in this
to create a third world
power
the
have
He
Did
will be
this
which would have made twelve hundred revolutions by
us
let
Now,
Yes.
be
must
time? Again, the answer
call it so
(we
world
third
the
call
we
what
ask Could
although
because that is its position in our hypothesis,
we
what
with
together
created
be
it is the earliest one)
it still be possible for
would
And
?
world
second
the
call
and eleven
the two worlds to have made twelve hundred
to have
supposed
are
(they
respectively
hundred revolutions
an equal
started at the same time, and to have moved at
If the answer is Yes, it will be an absurdity
speed) ?
for two movements, which have an equal
impossible
for it is
number.
speed and terminate at the same time, to differ in
But if you say
'
The Objection
The aptest
All this is the work of the Imagination.
So,
space.
and
time
compare
to
is
it
counteracting
way of
we will say Did God have the power to create the highest
as larger by a cubit than the size He has actually
sphere
created?
inability.
If they say No, that will show God's
they say Yes, then two cubits will be equally adWill follow.
missible, then three, and an infinite regress
But
And
if
in this,
we
which
tension beyond the world which has a quantity, and
largerthe
by
occupied
which
is
that
For
can be measured.
by-two-cubits is not the same thing as that which is
occupied by the larger-by-one. Accordingly, there must
be Quantity beyond the world. And quantity presupposes
something of which it is the quantity viz., body or empty
Therefore, there must be occupied or empty space
space.
"The
43
42
Tahafut al-Valasifah
Prob. /]
ence.
If
it is
said
potent,
And
power.
and that
this
much
(3)
44
45
assertion.
Secondly,
if
Prob. I)
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Belief in the Eternity of the World
(4)
follows
The
Objection
The
Undoubtedly,
incongruent with
And
it.
is
cannot be specified,"
But the
46
47
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
when
To
this, objection
may be taken
as follows
possibility should
be related.
Thirdly, they think that the souls of men are self-subimpresssisting substances which are not body, or Matter, or
some
and
Sina
to
Ibn
according
And,
Matter.
ed upon
other great thinkers, these souls are originated, and are
possible before they have been originated. But before the
And
existence of these souls, there is no essence or Matter.
this
yet their possibility is a relative attribute. Now, if
a
of
power
the
of
terms
in
attribute cannot be explained
all ?
at
explained
it
be
can
then
how
or
agent,
being
powerful
So
// it
is
said
intellectual
It is not possible to reduce possibility to an
(in this
nothing
means
judgment
intellectual
For
judgment.
Now, possibility,
case) but the knowledge of possibility.
the
to which they occur (so that one might say: What
that
it is
means
is
whiteness
or
blackness
of
possibility
possible for this body to become white or black), then
qua an object of knowledge, cannot be identical with knowFor knowledge only encompasses its object, follows
ledge.
may be. When
it, and is related to it whatever the object
the object of
supposed,
is
knowledge
the non-existence of
of
annihilation
the
with
but
;
disappear
not
does
knowledge
the object of knowledge, knowledge will be annihilated.
For knowledge and its object are two things one of which is
the follower, and the other is that which is followed. So,
even if we suppose that all intelligent men have failed to
suppose the possibility, or that they are unaware of it, still
we will say that the possibility nay, even the possible
things themselves - will remain undisturbed. The intellects
may be unaware of the possible things. But, obviously, the
possible things remain, regardless of the fact whether any
Nay, they will
intellect is aware or unaware of them.
the intellectual
all
and
intellects
the
remain, even if all
48
49
this contention.
Firstly, if possibility required an existing thing to
which it might be related, and whose possibility it might be
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. I]
For
The Answer:
apply.
either.
51
50
Prob. I]
And
tell.
Tahafut al-Falasifah
it
their thought.
As regards
// it
by
is
said
have
tried to
You have
by
meet
difficulties
necessity.
52
we
will answer
is definitely
known.
53
PROBLEM
II
of the
et
it
The
?L
taken before^
^
^ ^^
&&
nine
th
(of
Tthi
This
is
the
first line of
we
contrary,
corollary of the
be known that this problem is a
consider the
philosophers
preceding one. For as the
MI
in timebeginning
a
without
world to be eternal-i.e.
never coming to
everlasting-i.e.
be
it
to
so do they consider
annihilation is
(They say that) its corruption or
an end
be, as it is.
will
ever
and
was,
impossible; and that it always
to prove the eternity
advanced
they
arguments
four
thought
investigation.]
we
Their fourth argument is allied to the third one which
passes
world
the
considered above. For they say When
remain,
away, the possibility of the existence must still
impossible.
become
never
can
possible
is
which
for that
claim)
But possibility is a relative attribute. And (they
hence
Matter
preceding
a
needs
time
in
everything which is
of
out
Matter
a
need
also
must
away
passes
which
everything
and
Matters
the
that
which to pass away. This shows
Forms and the
the Roots do not perish; it is only .the
perish.
which
them
in
subsisting
Accidents
The reply to all this has been stated earlier. However,
we put this problem in a separate place, because they
:
if
it will
aftef
away, its non-being
affirmation of time.
the
lies
wherein
have an 'after'
that the possibility of
say
Irf the third place, they
that the
;
it is proper
existence never ceases. Therefore,
in agreement with
(unceasing)
be
should
Sssibk being
not cogent. For
is
argument
[But this
^St
the Dossibilitv.
* *
"gg^
eternity of tie^world
nature-if God (exalted be He) grants
everlasting
but not its
It is not necessary for something
it an everlasing existence.
time to have an end; while it
in
has a^beginning
whkh
h
rs neLX
nine in
world
down as a necessary condition that the
infinite number of sphere
an
As
he
Said
end.
to an
future.
is impossible so is it in
cal revolutions in the past
not enter
does
future
the
of
whole
the
But this is wrong ; for
Sil
Sme
54
Said
argument is the one adopted by Galen.
in
decay
of
signs
annihilation,
liable
to
were
Sun
he If the
But the astronomical
it would be visible in course of time.
The
first
The
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
This
is
syllogistic
form
of this
argument would be
If
what they
call
is
befall
it.
impossible.
Tahajut
Prob. IT]
al-Falasifah
Here the conclusion does not follow for the antecedent is not
true unless a new condition were added to it, viz., the
assertion that if the Sun were corruptible, decay would
be inevitable. So this consequent does not follow from this
In
by them.
(2)
their second argument for the impossibility of the annihilation of the world, the philosophers say
The substances
of this change.
be the will of the Eternal. But this is imposnonif not having been the Wilier of the
existence of the world, He becomes one, He undergoes a
change. Or it will lead to the conclusion that the Eternal and
His will continue uniform in all states, but the object of
the will nevertheless changes first from non-existence to
existence, and then from existence to non-existence.
will either
sible.
For
we had advanced
But if a
are, therefore, liable to corruption.
senses
will
not
the
years,
hundred
for
a
kept
sapphire is
be able to perceive the diminution it has suffered. Therefore,
the loss suffered by the Sun during the entire history of
as. jnomical observation may be compared to that suffered by a sapphire in a century. In neither case is the loss or
Hence the utter unsoundness
decay apparent to the senses.
of Galen s argument
We have ignored many other arguments of this kind
This one was
for intelligent people laugh at such things.
we have
what
of
example
an
serve
as
only
to
mentioned here
passed over. And this is the reason why we proposed to confine our attention to the four arguments which, as already
has been seen, require some ingenuity in order that we may
56
57
tell
and
'
Prob. II]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
the
This difficulty (claim the philosophers) has divided
imposthe
attempting
each
groups,
Mutakallimun into four
by trying to solve it
which proceeds
(a) The Mu'tazilah say: The action
which is created
Annihilation,
viz.,
from Him is an existent
world will
whole
the
So
substratum.
a
in
not
by Him
the
power. To affirm any thing else besides will, power and
unintel-is
world
the
viz.,
extends
power
being to which
ligible.
sible
itself
perish all of a sudden. And the created Annihilation
Annihilaanother
for
need
no
will
be
will perish, so that there
tion, which would start an infinite regress.
But this is false for several reasons. Firstly, Annihilacould be suption is no intelligible existent whose creation
not perish
posed. Secondly, if it were an existent, it would
themselves,
by
itself,
Thirdly even on
For
if
Annihila-
therefore
that which subsists in it come into contact, and,
world
coexist though only for an instant. If, therefore, the
would
they
coexist,
to
and Annihilation could be supposed
not be
not be mutually exclusive and then the world would
But if Annihilation is created neither within the
annihilated.
exisworld nor in any other substratum, how then can the
other
?
the
of
that
exclude
tence of the one
reason.
Further, this view is obnoxious for another
some
annihilate
to
power
the
It implies that God has not
survive.
to
others
allow
and
world,
the
of
of the substances
any
Nay, it is implied here that He has not the power to do
the
annihilate
is
to
which
thing except to create Annihilation
subparticular
in
a
being
not
for
once
whole world at
stratum, it is brought to bear upon the whole simultaneously
:
and indiscriminately.
Destruction is an action ot
(b) The Karramiyah say:
God which (action) signifies an existent originated within
is said of
the Divine essence (may He be exalted above what
this
through
non-existent
becomes
world
the
Him) Thus,
proof
act
of
an
action. Similarly, existence is the result
which
duction which occurs in His assence, and because of
existent.
an
becomes
existent
the
.
place,
makes the
58
it
is
immortality for
to their being. So when God does not create
the absence of
of
because
perish
them, the Substances will
that which would
This
is
also false
because
'
it
of the world.
59
Prob. II]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
by them
The
annihilation of anything
whether eternal
or originated in time which exists in itself, not in a substratum, is impossible. If one says to them: "When fire
burns under water, water is destroyed," they will answer:
It is not destroyed.
It only changes into steam.
Later on,
steam will change into water once again. Matter, i.e., the
Hayuli, persists in Air.
It is the same Matter as was there
beneath the Form of water. Now the Hayuli has put on the
Form of Air, having divested itself of the Form of water.
When the air is cooled, it will condense, and water will reappear. Matter does not emerge anew (during these changes).
On the contrary, the Matters are common to all the Elements. It is only the Forms passing over them in succession
which change.
is
we will answer
Being nothing, how did it happen at all? Its proceedGod only means that that which happens is^ to
from
ing
If its happening is intelligible
be related to His power.
not be intelligible ? And
power
retation~to
why should its
and one who absolutely
them
between
difference
the
is
what
to Accidents and
non-existence
the occurrence of
denies
cannot
Forms, saying that since non-existence is nothing, it
cannot be predicated
occur, and occurrence and emergence
For our part, we never doubt that the occurrence
of it?
that
conceivable. Therefore,
of non-existence to Accidents is
predicated can also intelliof which the occurrence can be
it is called a thing, or
whether
of
gibly happen, regardless
intelligible occurrent to
this
of
relation
the
finally,
not. And,
intelligible.
power of the Omnipotent is also
the
// it
The answer:
is
said
who
We
would
This objection
called upon to
tence is possible, Such an one might be
view it is
our
in
But
occurs.
that
is
explain what it
To us,
impossible that any existent should cease to exist.
their
of
occurrence
the
means
the non-existence of Accidents
It does not
existents.
themselves
are
which
contraries,
is
mean the occurrence of abstract non-existence which
which
that
of
predicated
be
How can occurrence
Nothing
which
If the hair whitens, it is whiteness
is nothing?
existent.
occurs. And that is all. And whiteness is an
not say that that which has occurred is the non-
existence of blackness.
This
is false for
two reasons
the
Firstly, does the occurrence of whiteness include
they
No,
say
they
not?
If
or
blackness,
non-existence of
If they say Yes,
will be opposed to intelligible reality.
is
// you say
Non-existence
is
nothing.
60
How
can
it
proceed
if
it is
other, then
61
is
Pr ob. II)
Tahaful al-Falasifah
?
If they say No, we will answer How, then, do you
The judgment about its being
that it is included ?
included is an admission of its being intelligible. But if they
say Yes, then is this intelligible included one namely, the
non-existence of blackness eternal, or originated in time ?
But if they call
If they call it eternal, it will be absurd.
it originated, how can that of which a temporal origin is
If they say that it is neither
affirmed not be intelligible?
For if
eternal nor originated in time, it will be absurd.
before the occurrence of whiteness it were to be said that
blackness is non-existent, it would be false. If after the
occurrence of whiteness it is said to be non-existent, it is
And this occurrent is
true. So, obviously, it has occurred.
Therefore, it is reasonable to ascribe it to the
intelligible.
or not
know
of the Omnipotent.
Secondly, there are some accidents which, even according to them, perish wo^-by-their-contraries. Thus, motion
has no contrary. The antithesis between motion and rest is
the antithesis between possession, and non-possession, i.e.,
Rest means the non-existence of
being and non-being.
motion. So when motion is non-existent, it is not a contrary,
viz., rest, which has occurred, but pure non-existence.
The same is true of attributes which are to be classed
as perfection, e.g the impression of the image of sensible
objects on the vitreous humour of the eye or the impression
AU these
of the Form of the intelligibles on the soul.
represent the commencement of a being, without the disappearance of a contrary. And their becoming non-existent
means the loss of a being to which no contrary succeeds.
So their disappearance does mean pure non-existence. Hence
non-existence comes to occur. And the happening of this
occurrent non-existence is intelligible. And that of which the
occurrence is in itself intelligible can intelligibly be related to
the power of the Omnipotent, even if it were not a 'thing.'
From this it is clear that if the happening of any
thing because of the eternal will is conceivable, it makes no
difference whether that which happens is existence or non-
power
PROBLEM
III
GOD IS
? thftr DISHONESTY IN SAYING THAT
WORLD
THE
OF
MAKER
AGENT AND THE
AND
WHICH IS HIS ACTION OROFPRODUCT
FACT
THE
THE EXPLANATION HAVE ONLY A
THAT THESE WORDS
METAPHORICAL, NOT REAL,
SIGNIFICANCE TO THEM
Tm
P^f^**
^^
1
the Atheists, all the
MaKer
the
is
God
that
that the world has a maker
is His action
world
the
that
and
hfAgent of the world,
prma dishonest distortion of thr
or proSucK But this is
their
to
according
why,
There are three reasons
rinleV
of
product
the action or the
nriacioles the world's being
foun^n
be
to
s
reasons
Sodif nconce^ble. One ol these the nature of the action
^nature of the agent another in between the action and
relationship
and the third one in the
Barring
<
the agent.
of the agent is that
to be found in the nature
for-the actionwi
agent to have the
it is necessary for an
But, accord
wills.
he
what
know
to have free choice, and to
The reason
has no
God
ing to the philosophers,
proceeds
Whatever
all.
no attribute at
Ce
Nay ." e .
Him is a
will.
from
t^Tso
must have
action is
found in the nature of the
But the
time.
in
a beginning
that an action
eternal.
be
to
consider the world
philosophers
hptween
b
P
" tW
h
tue re at
Thirdly, the reason found
God
j
n
he
.them,
tc
that, according
the action and the agent is
But
one
from
proceeds
one
only
is one in all respects, and
proit
can
How
things.
the world is composed of different
Him
?
ceed from
^7
^3
existence.
see
how fallSs
63
is the
Agent
Tahnjut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
is
(i)
We
say
//
it is
said
We
64
choice, it
a specification. Again, when we say 'action by free
be: on
would
man'
'animal
words
is not a tautology, as the
species of action,
of
a
description
the
only
is
it
contrary,
the
the word 'action
like the words 'action by instrument.' If
to action, qua
essential
were
will
if
were to include will, and
be contrawould
nature'
by
'action
words
the
then
action,
are.
'non-action'
dictory, even as the words 'action' and
:
we will answer
call every
This terminology is false. It is not proper to
It it were
agendum.
an
effect
every
and
agent,
an
cause
the inproper to do so, it would not be right to say that
to an
belongs
action
an
that
and
action,
no
has
organic Matter
most
the
of
one
But this proposition is
animal alone.
sometimes,
If
dicta.
true
widely accepted and, therefore,
metaphoriinorganic Matter is called an agent, it is purely
or
For instance, inorganic Matter is called an aspirant,
cal
or
desires
it
because
incline,
to
wilier e g. a stone is said
is something which
seeking
or
will
But
Centre.
seeks the
by the knowledge of the
is inconceivable, if not accompanied
.t cannot conceivtherefore,
And,
object willed or sought.
an animal.
than
other
thing
of
any
in
case
applied
ably be
which can
thing
general
assertion that action is a
(
Your
will
be divided into actions by nature and actions by
is in-
a general
admissible. It is like one's saying that will is
is accomwill
which
in
thing which can be divided into cases
those
and
willed
object
of
the
panied by the knowledge
include
which it is not. That is false, for will must needs
action must
the knowledge of the object willed. Similarly,
that the
statement
your
regards
As
needs include will.
nrst
words 'action by nature' are not contradictory to the
contradictory,
are
They
term; i.e., 'action,' this is not so.
But the contradiction does
as far as reality is concerned.
65
Tahafut al-Falctsifah
Prob. Ill]
//
it is
&
the
When we
say: 'strikes,'
we mean:
'does
'cuts,'
If
the
non-willing cause in the same way (not in the sense that
so),
metaphorically,
was
other
the
while
one was originally,
at
then language, convention and reason would not all be
the
to
murder
the
for
responsibility
one in attributing the
fire was the
willing cause notwithstanding the fact that the
threw the
nearer cause of murder, and that the man, who
victim
the
putting
besides
victim into the fire did nothing
which
action
volitional
the
that
Seeing
and fire together.
the involuntary
consists in putting together the victim and
Following
is
66
Him
an agent or a
in a metaphorical sense.
If it is said
that He is
that He
the Cause
existence
sustains the world that if He had not been, the
and that if His
of the world would have been inconceivable ;
non-existence could be supposed, the world should cease
non-existence of
to exist, as with the supposition of the
is
So this is what we
the Sun' light should cease to exist.
refuses to use
opponent
the
If
agent.
the
being
His
mean by
dispute
the word 'action' in this case, let there be no
clear,
made
been
has
meaning
over words, once the
we
The answer
contention.
maker only
depends on
Agent
proceeds.
nor free choice of action, they can call
said
phorical,
is the
will
answer
67
Tahajut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
philosophers' principles,
self-contradictory to believe that the world is an action
of God is to be found in a condition for an action. Namely,
an action must have a beginning in time. But in their view!
the world is eternal, not temporal. An action means causing
something to come out of non-existence into existence, by
giving it a temporal origin.
This is inconceivable in the case
of an eternal thing. For that which eternally exists cannot
be
it is
If it
is
said
68
World
more enduring.
no influence.
Your statement that the production of an existent is
not possible is true, if you mean that no existence which has
been preceded by non-existence begins to run its course.
But if you mean that in the state of being an existent, it
cannot be the object of production, then it must be borne in
mind, as has been shown by us, that it is produced in the
state of being an existent, not in that of being a non-existent.
For something is produced, when the agent is able to produce, not in the state of the non-existence of the object of
production, but in the state of its existence (because of the
agent).
Production is coincident with the agent's being
able to produce, and the object's being able to be produce.
For production is only the relationship between the producer
and the object of production. And all this is together with
Thus, it is clear that nothing but
existence, not before it.
69
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
existence.
If this relation is perpetual, the existence will
also be perpetual if the relation is severed, existence will
cease.
This is not the same thing as you imagine it to be
is
namely, that the world can remain even when the Creator is
supposed not to exist. To you, He is like the builder in
relation to the building the latter remains even when the
former has perished. The continuity of the building is not
owing to the builder it is the result of the structural system
which holds all the components of the building together.
If such a power of cohesion
e.g., that provided by water
is not there, mere action of an agent will not be successful
in keeping any edifice intact.
:
The answer:
//
it is
If
said
for
70
it is
we
will
answer
7i
Prob. Ill]
Tahafttt al-Falasifah
If it
is
said:
you will
relation.
we will answer
(3)
view. They say that only one proceeds from one. But the
Principle is one in all respects ; while the world is composed
of different things.
Therefore, according to their fundamental principles, it is inconceivable that the world should be an
action of God.
If it' is said:
The world as a whole does not proceed from God without intermediaries.
What proceeds from Him is one, it
is the first creature which is a pure intelligence: a selfsubsisting substance which is unextended: knows itself:
knows its Principle, and in theological language is called
an angel. From it proceeds the second intelligence ; from
the second, the third: from the third, the fourth: and
thus through intermediaries, the beings multiply. Now,
the difference and multiplicity in an action may result from
(i) the difference of efficient faculties.
For instance, by
the faculty of desire we do something which is different
from what we do by the faculty of anger.
(ii) or from the difference of Matters.
For instance,
the Sun whitens the washed clothes, but blackens the
face of a man ; and melts some substances, but hardens
others.
72
73
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
instance,
or from the difference of instruments. For
the axe,
with
hews
saw,
the
with
saws
the same carpenter
and bores with the awl.
u
result from the
(iv) or the multiplicity in action may
Something is done; it
multiplicity of intermediaries.
multiplies.
gives rise to another ; and thus the action
(iii)
As
All these kinds are inapplicable to the first Principle.
we will see in the arguments for Divine unity, there is neither
Nor
being.
difference, nor duality, nor multiplicity in His
we
Principle;
first
the
in
Matters
of
is there any difference
us
have yet to discuss the origin of the first effect i.e., let
difference of instru-
we
will answer
From
this it
it will refute
If the answer is in the affirmative,
Or, does a
one.
their assertion that only one proceeds from
case, the
that
In
cause?
composite
composite thing have a
of the
character
composite
the
to
directed
be
inquiry will
composite necescause, until the point is reached where the
cause?
74
is the
Agent
// it
is
said
The
difficulty will
is
under-
stood.
(a)
are three:
(b)
highest rank.
Souls, which stand midway between the two ex(c)
tremes. They are related to bodies, inasmuch as they
Standing midway in the
influence and activate them.
order of worth, they receive influences from the intelligences, and impart influences to bodies.
Bodies are ten in number the nine heavens, and Matter which
The
is the stuff filling the concave of the sphere of the Moon.
nine heavens are living beings, composed of bodies and souls.
Let us now describe the order of existence among them.
:
75
Prob. Ill]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
From
of the highest sphere which is the ninth heaven, and the body
From the second intelligence followed the
of that sphere.
third intelligence, the soul of the stellar sphere, and the body
From the third intelligence followed the
of that sphere.
fourth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Saturn, and the
body of that sphere. From the fourth intelligence followed
the fifth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Jupiter, and
the body of that sphere. And so on, till there was an intelligence from which followed the last intelligence, the soul of
the sphere of the Moon, and the body of that sphere. This
followlast intelligence is called the Agent Intellect. From it
Matter
the
Moonviz.,
the
of
sphere
the
ed the stuff of
which receives generation and corruption and the constitutions of the spheres. The Matters combine, because of the
movement of stars, into different combinations which produce
minerals, vegetables, and animals. It is not necessary that
from each intelligence follows another intelligence, and that
the series thus become infinite. For the intelligences have
necessarily
specific differences what is true of one does not
:
hold of others.
It
must have been seen that, apart from the first Principle,
are
the intelligences are ten in number. And the spheres
first
the
from
apart
principles
The total of these noble
nine.
Also, it must be clear that
Principle, comes to nineteen.
each intelligence has under it three things an intelligence,
Obviously
the soul of a sphere, and the body of that sphere
Now,
principle.
in
its
threefoldness
for
ground
be
there must
an
plurality in the first effect is inconceivable. But there is
principle,
its
knows
effect
first
exception to the rule. The
,
derives
itself, and is possible in itself inasmuch as it
the necessity of its existence from someone other than itself.
These are three different meanings. It is proper that the
noblest meaning should belong to the noblest of all the three
aspects of the first effect. Thus, an intelligence proceeds
from it, because it knows its principle the soul of a sphere
knows
is the
Agent
& the
the body of a
proceeds from it, because it knows itself and
We
itself.
possible
sphere proceeds from it, because it is
the
in
threefoldness
of
source
the
must now ask What is
the
From
is
anwer
The
?
one
is
Principle
whose
first effect
first
the
of
essence
the
proceeds i.e.,
first Principle only one
;
Now,
its
knowledgeof
character to
the first intelligence owes its possible
us, it is not ^probable
To
Principle.
first
the
to
not
itself!
from one, the first effect
that while only one should proceed
some evidentPrinciple
first
the
from
may still acquire-not
or no relarelation,
express some
ly necessary things, which
it the
make
will
This
plurality.
tion, and wlich give rise to
itself
we shall answer :
To be more
All you have said here is arbitrary reasoning.
If someone says
darkness.
upon
piled
darkness
exact it is
in a dream, it will be inthat he saw things of this kind'
some disease. Or it such
from
ferred that he was suffering
of the problems
discussion
the
in
introduced
things are
is the ultimate
conjecture
of Fiqh the only place where
guess-work
wild
are
things
these
that
end-it will be said
its validity.
to
as
presumption
a
even
raise
not
which does
to these
The points from which objection can be taken
with
content
be
however,
us,
Let
things are innumerable.
find this theory to be
we
which
for
reasons
the
of
few
only a
unsatisfactory.
of the
will say : You have asserted that one
posis
it
that
is
effect
first
meanings of plurality in the
its
with
identical
possible
being
its
Is
ask:
Now, let us
sible.
plurality
no
If it is identical,
being, or other than it?
do
If it is other than its being, then why
will arise from it.
first Principle?
the
in
plurality
is
there
that
you not say
and at the same time He is necessary.
For
He
We
is
a being,
77
Tahajut
Prob. Ill]
al-Falasifah
The
// it
is
said
be the same?
tical
except
If they
His self-knowledge
we
is
^st
nature,
y [nits
ted
the two, then
for He too
Princ
&
assert
^tTthatHe j*"*^.
is
will anwer
is identical
first effect's self-knowledge
5
thenntjaws*
intelligence
is
s
^stMce^u
with its essence. For by ite
**
And *"*>
hence its self-knowledge
unitv Its
1
1
+u
Similarly,
o-
iWn^^l*^ ^
object of
the knowledge and the
its
essence,
V.^
it
knows
Swiedge being
itself
can
be
exist in the
wnole thing
w
^^
But, then, how can the necessity of being be idenwith existence either ? It is possible to deny the neces-
The
sity of being, affirming existence at the same time.
the
and
affirmation
the
of
absolutely true one does not admit
denial of the same thing at the same time. It is not possible
to say that it is being and non-being or that it is necessary
and not-necessary. But one might say that it is a being, and
that it is not necessary just as one could say that some-
The second
objection:
we
will
say:
Is the first
Iftnity
fs
// it
said
is
B.
^r^ g^m
>*$&*
there will oe
is identical, then
knows
^
*^
*^"
^ ^i^
effect's
it
the
Agent
The
we
is the
it-
Sf
fircf
premie
does not
His^el ^knowledgeisthesamethingasHisessence.
ottJ^'tSS^
is
79
78
of plural.ty.
it.
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
of the
They were
Agent
They say
The
is the
had
recoiled in
From
but natural that they have found themselves constrained to admit as the sum and substance of their intellectual
investigations something which would surprise one who
came to hear of it even in a dream.
It is
The second
objection
He who would say that the first Principle does not know
any thing except Himself does thereby succeed in avoiding
(For, if he were to believe in His knowledge
plurality.
of other beings, it would follow that self-knowledge is not
identical with the knowledge of other beingsin the case
But
of the first Principle, as in that of the first effect.)
then the first effect must not be considered to have knowledge of any thing other than itself for if it were to have
the knowledge of the first Principle or of any thing other
than itself, such knowledge would not be identical with
itself, and therefore would need a cause other than the
cause of its own being. Since there is no cause other than the
cause of its beingviz. the first Principle it follows that the
And thus
first effect cannot know any thing other than itself.
;
the plurality
rebutted.
I fit
is
made
said:
Once the
know
itself, it
first effect
Principle.
who
who
who
things
and
we
will answer
81
80
Prob. Ill]
Takafut al-Falasifah
The
third objection
Is the self-knowledge possessed by the first effect idenwith its essence, or other than it ? It is impossible to say
that it is identical, for knowledge cannot be the same thing
as that which is known.
But if it is other than the essence,
the same difference should obtain in case of the first PrinciFrom Him, therefore, will plurality follow.
ple.
tical
is the
Agent
That
The fourth
objection
have
7/
it
is said
we
will answer
83
system
sufficient reason
Prob.
HI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
is
said
// it
The plurality
But
it is
first effect,
We
If
intermediaries.
Agent
Perhaps the
we
is the
you admit
this,
do say that
84
all
we
will answer
To say
resulting from the first Cause- then how can we retreat, and
what will be our criterion? What is there to prevent us
85
Tahajut
Prob. Ill]
al-Falasifah
same place
Form
its
Matter
its definite
and
distinct adaptation to
The fifth
is the
Agent
// one were
to
say
Now that you have refuted the theories of the philosophers, what do you yourself say ? Do you assert that from
the absolutely One two different things may proceed? If so,
you will be opposed to the intelligible reality. Or do you say
that there is plurality in the first Principle ? That will be a
renunciation of the doctrine of Divine unity. Or do you say that
That will be a denial of
there is no plurality in the world ?
Or do you say that plurality follows from the
sensible fact.
That will perforce
first Principle through intermediaries?
bring you round to the position the philosophers had taken.
we would answer
Ours was not the point
of
view of a system-builder.
On
objection:
86
87
Tahajut al-Falasifah
Prob. Ill]
PROBLEM IV
TO SHOW THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD
E SAY
All
men can be
rational
self-contradictory.
therefore, even in its original formulation,
it.
of
refutation
a
for
need
no
There is
If
it is
said
not
say that the world has a creator, we do
not
after
voluntarily
acts
who
agent
mean thereby an
with so many
having acted, as we observe to be the case
builder. On
kinds of agents, e.g., a tailor, or a weaver, or a
the world,
of
cause
the
thereby
mean
the contrary, we
His own
that
sense
the First Principle, in the
When we
whom we
call
is
89
88
>
Prob. IV]
Tahafut al-Falasi/ah
Their Inability
to
is
said
Among
the souls,
there
is
by nature, or by
believe in the impossibility of an unlimited
number of beings which have an order, either by position
e.g., bodies, some of which are arranged above others
But this is not so
or by nature
e.g., causes and effects.
in the case of the souls.
to another.
position.
We
we will answer
This judgment about (the order by) position cannot
90
91
Prob. IV]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
by
If it
is
said:
The
we
will answer:
The words
'possible'
unless 'necessary'
for
92
Their Inability
to
Prove
the Existence
of the Creator
cause
to the point, and say that each individual
which is
possible in the sense that it has another cause
possible i.e.
additional to itself, and that the Whole is not
If the word
itself.
to
external
or
additional
it has no cause
we have given
possible' meansany thing other than the sense
to it, that meaning cannot be recognised.
come back
is
is said:
If
it
be
can
This leads to the conclusion that a necessary being
absurd.
is
conclusion
the
made of possible things. But
we
will answer
what we have
If by 'possible' and 'necessary' you mean
seek.
suggested, then this conclusion is exactly what we
is
absurd
call
it
To
absurd.
is
And we do not admit that it
tempoof
made
up
eternal
something
that
saying
like one's
eterral events is impossible. To the philosophers, Time ts
temporal.
are
revolutions
spherical
nal ; whereas individual
And each individual revolution has a beginning whereas the
aggregate of those revolutions has no beginning. Therefore,
have.
that which has no beginning is made of those which
And the predicate of having a beginning in time is truly applicable to individual revolutions, but not to their aggregate.
their
Similarly, therefore, (in the case of the causes and
but
aggregate) it will be said that each cause has a cause,
can
that
For
all
cause.
no
has
the aggregate of these causes
of
said
be
similarly
cannot
individuals
the
of
said
be truly
can be
their aggregate. For instance, of each individual it
or a
said that it is one (of many), or that it is a fraction,
But no such thing can be said of the aggrepart (of a whole)
Any spot we can specify on the Earth is brightened by
gate.
;
every
the Sun in daytime, and becomes dark by night. And
temporal event originates after not having been i.e. it has a.
beginning in time. But the philosophers would not admit that
the aggregate of temporal events can have a beginning.
From this it will be seen that if one admits the possithe four
bility of originated thingsviz., the forms of
elements and the changeable things which have no beginning
then it does not behove one to say that an infinite series of
causes is impossible. And this further shows that because
,
93
Prob. IV]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
// it
is
said
The revolutions of the sphere do not (all) exist at preNor do the forms of the elements so exist. What
actually exists is only one form. And that which has no
sent.
existence cannot be called finite or infinite unless its existence should be supposed in the Imagination. That which
is supposed in the Imagination is not impossible,
even though
some of the supposed things are causes of others. For man
often supposes these things in his imagination. But here
it
is the thing existing in reality, not in mind,
which we are
discussing.
came
their connection with the bodies, all the souls are one from
eternity, and that, after their separation from the bodies,
their unity is restored.
So there is no number let alone the
possibility of calling them finite or infinite.
Some other
:
The answer
95
94
by
this time,
of such
there should have accumulated an infinite number
For even if a circular movement were transitory,
beings
being should not
still the appearance in it of an everlasting
difficulty is rethe
supposition
this
So
by
impossible.
be
everlasting
this
whether
enforced. It is irrelevant here
an angel
or
devil,
a
or
jin,
a
or
man,
thing is the soul of a
difficulty will
or any other being you may suppose. For the
taken. And it
arise, whatever point of view they may have
revolutions
spherical
posited
have
they
will arise because
which are infinite in number.
Their Inability
We will
PROBLEM V
this point in
two ways
is
One
say
is
We
Why
impossible that there should be two beings which are uncaused and do not cause each other ? Your statement that
that which is uncaused is uncaused per se or per causam is a
wrong division. One does not seek a cause of the absence of
What meanor of the freedom of a being from a cause.
ing can be conveyed by the words that the uncaused thing is
uncaused per se or per causam ? When we say that something has no cause, the meaning is a pure negation; and
pure negation itself has no cause, and one cannot ask whether
it is per se or per causam.
(i)
In
to
Now, a being
senses
assert)
essential to
humanity.
The same
96
97
1.
Their Inability
Prob. V]
The answer
necessity.
(a)
In
to
is
One
Tahafut al-Falasifah
say:
the case of two black things and if time and place are the
same, numerical dissimilarity is not intelligible. If it were
possible to speak of two black things in the same place and
at the same time, it would be possible to say that each
person is two persons, and that the distinction between the
two is generally overlooked for it is not very striking.
Now,
being impossible,
taken for granted.
necessity
in that case, neither existence, nor the
entity
self-subsisting
a
of existence, no reach one's being
them.
to
common
be
will
subject,
independent of a
common to them, while they ditter
For
them.
But
if
something
is
which
is
common
that
in respect of something else, then
which distinguishes
that
with
identical
be
to them will not
composition in the
be
will
there
that
means
This
them.
formula will
definitory
their
beings, and that
necessary
there can be no
be analysable into several parts. But
is it divisible
Neither
composition in the necessary being.
of divisiconsist
formula
definitory
in quantity, nor can its
is not combeing
necessary
the
of
essence
The
ble parts.
indicated by the
posed of those things whose multiplicity is
For informula.
definitory
the)
of
(divisibility of the parts
constitutes the
what
express
'rational'
and
'animal'
stance,
and he is also
quiddity of man. For man is an animal,
word 'animal
the
to
corresponds
man
What in a
rational.
to the word
corresponds
him)
(in
what
from
is different
which are
parts
of
composed
rational.' Therefore, man is
meanwords
the
by
man
of
definition
the
ioined together in
Whole
the
to
applied
'man' is
ing those parts. And the name
inconceivable in the case of the
(of those parts). But this is
duality is inconceivable.
necessary being. And without this
The answer
there be
Granted that duality is inconceivable, unless
and
something
of
respect
in
distinction between two things
are
which
things
two
between
distinction
that there is no
of
kind
this
that
your assertion
alike in all respects. But
;
>
For it is the
detail.
(Let us consider this question in
the First Principle
that
position
well-known
philosophers'
definitory formula, even as
cannot be analysed through the
to Him. And it is on this
inapplicable
quantitative division is
of Divine unity.)
doctrine
own
their
base
Assertion that they
Even
98
The
belief in
Divine unity
99
is
imperfect, unless
it
is
Prob. V]
Their Inability
Tahafut al-Falastfah
nor Matter can conceivably exist without the other, still they
are two different things, by definition and in reality. This,
too, ought to be denied in the case of God
For it is not proper
that the Creator should be either a Form in a body, or Matter
in a body, or the combination of the two.
There are two
reasons why He cannot be a combination of Form and Matter.
In the first place, such a combination is divisible actually or
in the Imagination as it is analysed into different parts.
Secondly, this combination is also divisible conceptually into
Form and Matter. Next, God cannot be Matter for Matter
depends on Form. And the necessary being is independent
in all respects, and it is not possible to connect its existence
with any cause beyond itself. Finally, God cannot be Form
for Form depends on Matter.
Thirdly, plurality comes in by way of attributes e.g.,
when knowledge, power and will are supposed to be the attributes of God. If these attributes are supposed to be necessary, necessity of existence would be common to them and to
the (Divine) essence. In this way, plurality would arise in the
Necessary Being, and unity would consequently disappear.
Fourthly, there is plurality which results from the composition of genus and species.
For instance, a black thing
is 'black' and 'colour.'
And to the Intellect, blackness is
not identical with colouredness. On the contrary, colouredness is a genus, and blackness a difference. Therefore, a black
thing is composed of a genus and a difference. Similarly,
animality is not identical with humanityfrom the Intellect's
point of view. So man is an animal and a rational being
and 'animal' being the genus and 'rational' the difference,
.
ioo
man
is
to
is
One
difference
and
this is
assert) ought
plurality of another kind. And this, too, (they
to be denied of the First Principle.
supposition of a quiaFifthly plurality follows from the
existence of that quiddity and, then, the supposition of the
prior to his existence
quiddity
For instance, man has a
dity
in terms ol,
explained
and
to,
related
is
And his existence
viz.,
quiddity
Similarly, a triangle has a
his quiddity.
existence
the
And
sides.
three
that it is a figure enclosed by
essence of its quiddity ; nor
of a triangle is no part of the
For this reason, it is
does existence constitute the quiddity.
of a man or a
quiddity
the
know
possible for a man to
does or does not exist
triangle, without knowing whether it
the quiddity of a
constitute
If existence were to
in reality.
Intellect, before
in
the
quiddity
the
of
triangle, the existence
inconceivable.
its actualisation, would be
related to the quiddity, regardless of
So existence
is
in existence e.g.,
the fact whether the quiddity is always
into existence after
comes
Heaven-or
the
of
case
the
in
humanity iniZaad
not having been-e.g., the quiddity, i.e.,
temporal forms.
and
accidents
of
quiddity
the
and 'Amr? or
is agam to be
plurality
(And they assert:) This kind of
said that in
be
must
It
Principle.
denied of the First
existence should be
which
to
quiddity
no
is
there
His case
what quidfor His necessary existence is to Him
related
is a
existence
necessary
His
So
being.
dity is to any other
just as mannature,
real
or
a
reality,
universal
a
quiddity
If we were
quiddity.
ness or tree-ness, or heaven-ness is a
existence,
His
from
separate
as
quiddity
to affirm His
to be regarded as a conhave
would
existence
necessary
then
of that quiddity.
sequence, not as a constitutive principle,
effect. Theretore
an
or
subordinate,
is
a
And a consequence
an effect and that
necessary existence would in that case be
:
would be contradictory to
necessity.
(a)
knower
(an)
(an)
intelligence:
(a) creator
agent
generous, and pure
pleasant pleased
(a) beloved (one)
and the
Good And they assert that all these words mean one
strange
a
is
This
plurality.
no
same thing wherein there is
:
IOI
Tahajut al-Falasijah
Prob. V]
Their Inability
notion.
Before we take objection to it, let us elucidate this
doctrine further, so that it may be understood. For before
complete understanding is gained, an objection to a doctrine
is like an arrow shot in the dark.]
The best way to understand their doctrine is to consider
the explanation, wherein they say :
The essence of the First Principle is one. But a plurality
of names for this one essence arises either from the relation of
things to it, or from its own relation to things, or from the
negation of things as its predicates. The negation of something as a predicate does not necessitate plurality in the
subject.
Nor does a relation indicate any plurality. (So
they do not deny the plurality of negations and relations
but the contribution to this problem they would make consists
in the attempt to explain all the attributes in terms of negation and relation.)
They say
To
call
Him
the First
is
to
show His
'
102
to
is
One
Matter, is an
other than itself. So this, i.e., being free from
*s an intelligence
He
Therefore,
being.
attributeoftheDivine
And being an intelligence and being free from Matter both
mean the same thing.
To call Him an intelligent means that He, being an
or an intelligible,
intelligence, has an object of intelligence,
of Hjmself,
conscious
is
He
For
which is His own essence.
is the Intelligible, the
essence
His
So
Himself.
and knows
And all these three are
Intelligent, and the Intelligence.
really one f or
,
,
TT
He is also called the Intelligible inasmuch as His quidobscure to, or hidden
dity, which is divested of Matter, is not
the sense that it is
in
intelligence
is
uhich
from, His essence
hidden and
a non-material quiddity from which nothing is
to Himknown
being
Himself
to which nothing is obscure.
not being
self-knowledge
His
And
Intelligible.
self, He is the
And it is
additional to His essence, He is the Intelligence
.
intelligence and
not impossible that an intelligent and his
intelligent person
an
when
For
one.
be
should
the intelligible
ot
knows himself as an intelligent person, he does so because
and
intelligent
the
thus
And
person.
his being an intelligent
of that
the intelligible become one -r whatever the manner
in
different
be
will
union
union may be. Undeniably, this
is
intelligence
Divine
of
object
the
For
the case of God.
potential,
perpetually actual: whereas ours is sometimes
sometimes actual.
To call Him a maker, or an agent, or a creator, or any
means
other thing which possesses the attribute of action
uniwhich
from
existence
noble
that His existence is the
proinevitable
of
manner
the
in
proceeds
versal being
of the
103
Their Inability
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
Prob. V]
to
One
And He who
one.
105
104
is
Tahafut al-Fatasifak
Prob. V]
is
To
call
Him
Himnot
One
perfection-
and His
'
But
106
107
Prob. V]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
the angels. And the state of the angels is nobler than ours. If
the satisfaction of physical and sexual appetite were the only
cause of pleasure, the condition of an ass or a pig could be nobler
than that of the angels. For the angels i.e. the Principles or
the beings divested of Matter have no other pleasure than that
of a joyful consciousness of the perfection and beauty which
specially belongs to them, and which is not liable to decrease.
That which belongs to the First Principle is superior to
that which belongs to the angels. For the existence of the
angels, who are pure intelligences, is possible in itself, and
necessary by virtue of something other than itself. And
possibility of non-existence is a kind of evil or imperfection.
No one except the First Principle being absolutely free from
all evil, He alone is the pure Good, and His alone is the perfect beauty and grandeur.
Further, He is a beloved one,
regardless of whether anyone loves Him, or not as He is
the Intelligent and the Intelligible, regardless of whether any
other intellect knows Him, or not. And all these meanings
are resolved into His essence, and into His self-consciousness
and self-knowledge. For His self-knowledge is identical with
His essence. He being a pure intelligence, all the names (we
have given to Him) mean one and the same thing.
Now
And we
PROBLEM
VI
They
assert
is
they
all
viz.,
It should be said to
them :
do you know that plurality of this kind is imposare opposed to all the Muslims, except the
Mu'tazilah. What is the argument to prove that this oppoIf one says that the essence (which
sition is justified?
would bear the attributes) being one, plurality in the
Necessary Being is impossible, then all he means is that
How
sible
You
108
thing,
109
is
the point
by
rational
Tahajut
Prob. VI]
necessity.
And
al-Falasifah
to prove
it.
It
to
say
else
cannot be a neces-
sary being.
(i)
To
Firstly, they say
answer should be
Why
Necessary
impossible to say that, just as the essence of the
so are
cause,
efficient
an
of
independent
Being is eternal and
efficient cause ? It
an
of
independent
and
eternal
attributes
His
by the necessary being you mean a being without a receptive
that sense.
cause, then the attributes are not necessary in
cause.
Nonetheless, they are eternal and have no efficient
view
?
this
in
What is the contradiction involved
// it
may
be taken as follows
is said
An
Objection to this
this, the
absolutely necessary
things.
we
will
answer
To
call
claim.
subject.
no
neither an effiyou admit that the attriadmit that they are caused
being has
If
cient nor a receptive cause.
butes have a receptive cause, you
in
Tahafut al-FalasiJah
Just as the series of efficient causes must stop somewhere, so must the series of receptive causes stop. For if
every being needs a substratum in which to exist, and if the
substratum itself were to need another substratum, an infinite
as would be the case if every being needregress would follow
ed an efficient cause, and the cause itself needed another.
Prob. VI)
If
it is
said
we
will
say
words.)
This
is
true.
series to
an end by
and that the Divine essence does not depend on any thing
this is like the position of our own attributes.
For instance, the substratum of our knowledge is our essence,
but our essence itself is not in another substratum. So in the
Divine essence the series of the efficient causes of the attributes reaches its end ; for neither the essence nor the attrielse.
And
We
will answer:
by
its
and
still
Our knowledge or power does not enter into the quiddity of our essence for it is only an accident. Therefore, if
112
113
ing there
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VI)
is
no impossibility involved
in
is
essentially imperfect.
To
If it
ts
will answer:
To say that
composition
eternity to eternity.
As far as body is concerned, it cannot be the First
And it has a
Principle, for it has a temporal character.
temporal character, for it is never free from changes. But he
who does not believe in the temporal character of body
to admit the possibility
is bound as we will show later
that the First Cause should be body.
It must be clear now that all the methods of demonstration adopted by the philosophers are fantastic.
Moreover, they have failed to show how all the positive
statements they make about God can be reduced to His
For instance, they affirm that He is a knower. But
essence.
they must admit that being a knower is additional to existence.
One should ask them Do you admit that the First
said:
(c)
we
it.
all
is like
Taking
we
Is
God's knowledge of
whose number
essence
is
this statement
ii5
114
will say
must be a
fool.
Prob. VI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
To him
is
Since it is not
to exist at the same time.
impossible to suppose in the Imagination a man's selfknowledge, without supposing his knowledge of things other
than himself, it is said that his self-knowledge is not identical
with his knowledge of things other than himself. If the two
cognitions were identical, the denial of one would deny the
It
other, and the affirmation of one would affirm the other.
is impossible that Zaid should be and not be at the same
time.
But such a thing is not true of the two cognitions
Simiviz., self-knowledge and the knowledge of the other.
larly, God's self-knowledge and the knowledge of the Other
cannot be identical. For it is possible to imagine the existence of one of them, without imagining the existence of the
other.
They are two different things. It is not possible to
exist
and not
it is
said
several points
essence is one).
Secondly, their statement that the Universe is known to
Him by a second intention is rational. For if His knowledge
encompasses the Other, as it encompasses His own essence,
then there will be two distinct objects of His knowledge.
And the number and distinction of known things will necesSince it is
sitate the numerical increase of knowledge.
knowledge
the
objects
of
keep
to
Imagination
possible in the
apart from each other, the knowledge of one cannot be identiIf it were not, it would
cal with the knowledge of another.
existence
of one without the
the
the
to
suppose
possible
not be
other. If all the cognitions were one, there would be no
*
other ' : and variation in phraseology by using the words
116
H7
'
a second intention
I
wish
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VI]
'
could understand
says
a relation
He knows Himself
is
And
//
it
ts said
If it is established that
He knows Himself as
118
Hereafter.
by way
a principle
impossible.
we
will answer
119
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VI]
of plurality
lity
// it is said
qUld
of 'son,' or
any other
relative
Himself
the
know (a)
;
ledge will require that He should
His relationJo the
Genera and Species, one by one and (c)
being the Principle of
Genera and Species-by virtue of His
it would be unuitellithe Genera and Species. Otherwise,
of His knowledge.
object
an
to say that the relation is
tjble
S
who knows somehe
that
statement
As regards their
this very knowledge (whieh
thing knows his knowledge by
of the objects of
multiplicity
shows how, in spite of the
true. One who
not
is
it
one),
remains
knowledge
knowledge^
know!
his'
Sowledfe
of something,
knows
(b)
by anther
it
knowledge by a third
knowledge (and knows the second
comes to an end at a
series
the
till
on,
knowledie), and so
thereknowledge
to
which he
is
inattentive,
and which
is
inattentive to
to him. So he is (ultimately
For inknowledge
of
object
the
to
not
know edge but
time
the^
at
is
soul
his
state when one knows a black thing,
he
therefore,
and,
object
this
;
absorbed into
fore
not
known
of
knowing
inXntive
objection may
their statement that our
Divine knowledge
of
objects
aeainst us in the case of the
although Divine
number
in
we insider to be infinite
ours is not the
: In this book,
say
will
we
knowledge is one),
of those who
that
only
but
of view oUsystem-) builders,
we have
reason
this
For
them.
or criticise
turn
As regards
?S
dStroy
y XSgs,
The Philosophers not
caned the book The Destruction Of
are not bound
An "introduction To Truth," Therefore, we
120
we
will say
the people
etc.,
about God
who
You
121
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VI]
// it
is
said
removed.
we will answer
We
If you say
were not extremely obnoxious, the latter philosophers would not refuse
to support it. Let us explain what makes it so disgraceful.
It implies that the effects of God are worthier than God.
For an angel, or a man, or any intelligent being, knows
If God
(a) itself; (b) its principle; and (c) other beings.
does not know any thing other than Himself, He must be
imperfect in comparison with man (not to speak of the
angels), or even the beasts (who, in addition to self-conObviously, knowledge
sciousness, know many other things)
is a cause of worth, and its absence is an imperfection.
Beware
this
infamous doctrine!
If
it
Where
is
now
He
is
a lover
Man
is
him afterwards.
other than himself,
ever, occurs to
ledge
we
is
will answer
is not determined by occurrence or coexisidentity of a thing does not occur to it. And that
which is other than something does not become that thing
i.e., it does not cease to be other than that thing-because of
coexistence with it. Therefore, if God has never ceased to
be a knower of Himself, it does not follow that His selfknowledge is His essence. The Imagination admits the
supposition of an essence, and then the occurrence of consciousness.
If consciousness were identical with the essence,
Otherness
tence.
The
would not be
this imagining
If it
is
said
possible.
'
'
122
123
Tahajut
Prob. VI]
we
will say
al-Falasifah
Knowledge is an attribute or
evidently stupid.
an accident which requires a subject. To say that in Himthat He is
self, He is intelligence or knowledge is like saying
to saying
amount
will
statement
latter
The
power or will.
that power or will exists in itself. And if it is seriously
maintained, it will be like saying that blackness, or whiteness, or Quantity, or threefoldness, or fourfoldness, or any
other accident exists in itself. The argument which proves
the impossibility of attributes existing, not in bodies (which
aTe other than the attributes), but in themselves, is also the
argument to prove that the attributes of living beings -e.g.,
knowledge, life, power, will, etc.exist, not in themselves,
This
PROBLEM
VII
is
TIA;
APPLICABLE TO HIM
it
the con-
a generic
of a
virtue
by
Him
from
different
be
can
factor nothing
Hence He cannot be defined. For definition
differential one.
consists of genus and differentia; and that wherein there
a kind of
is no composition cannot be defined, as this is
,
composition.
And
they assert
124
125
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VII]
Further, they assert
the cosharing of genus, which consequently requires distincby virtue of differentia. And God has not quiddity other
than necessary existence. Hence necessary existence is the
real nature, the quiddity-in -itself which belongs to Him, and
to no one else. And because necessity of existence belongs to
Him alone and to no one else, no one can be cosharer with
Him. Therefore, no one can be differentiated from Him by
a specific difference. Therefore, He is indefinable.
(This much was necessary by way of the exposition of
Now, we proceed to criticise it from two
their doctrine.
points of view first that of a questioner, and the second that
tion
is
of one
who
refutes.)
This
is
so,
because he
the questioning, it
may
be said
Now, how
This, then, is the summary of the doctrine.
do you know the impossibility of this, in regard to God so
as to base upon it the denial of duality (cf your position that
the second necessary being must coshare with Him something,
being differentiated in respect of another and that he who
has one thing to be shared and another not to be shared is
.
as an attribute of God
Let us say
to you the knowledge that this kind of
impossible? There is no proof of it, except
what you were reported to say in denial of the attributes
namely, that the composition of genus and differentia produces an aggregate of parts that if the existence of a part
or the whole is valid independently of the other, then it will
be necessary of existence, as set over against the other and
that if the existence of the parts is not valid independently
of the aggregate, nor that of the aggregate independently of
the parts, then each will be an effect or a dependent.
We have considered this argument in connection with
the attributes, and have shown in connection with the
question of the termination of the series of causes that this
What can be rationally proved is only
is not impossible.
the termination of regress. As regards those grand things
which have been invented by them so as to form inseparable
Whence comes
composition
is
its defi-
126
In
127
Tahafut aUFalasifah
Prob. VII]
there
is
no ar pmen .for
them.
that
in it
namely, that there is no composition
^f
itself lor its
than
other
anyone
on
depend
fore it does not
SnstUuUon-then Siere is no
for is only the te rmina
being. What there is an argument
dealt
With this (argument) we have already
W^ toXSeteSS
;
tionof regress.
attributes.
..
...
in connection with the
this section For
Our contention is all the more valid in
-like
genus and differentia no
to divide something into
and
essence
dividing a bearer of attributes into
and the essence is
An attribute is other than the essence,species is not other
But the
other than the attribute.
When we speak of the
respects.
all
in
genus
than the
an additional factor
plus
|enus
spede we* only mean the
Animal plus the
Thus when we speak of Man, we mean whether man-ness
To ask
addftiona\ factor of rationality.
whether manof animality is like asking
else is
of itself, when something
rfess can be ^dependent
plurality
***
i
^StodJpSXnt
removed from
added to it. It is, therefore, further
be.
can
than an attribute and its bearer
series of causes and
Why should it be impossible for the
causes-one being the cause of the
effects to stop at two
elements: or one the
havens and the other that of the
of all bodies? Why
ca^L of the heavens, and the other that
conceptually to
causes
Sould it be impossible for the two
redness
between
instance,
for
b^oarate distinct -as,
is conceptual distmcthere
place
same
and heat eve^in the
ionwlUufour supposing* any
Nay, tnere
it analysable ?
tion in redness so as to make
be repugnant
not
will
plurality
of
sort
in it, this
s plurality
P
why this
reason
So what is the
i
+Vri ift of essence
shows
this
And
causes
?
case of
S^"?^
noSd
SX^e
in
ihe
the possibility of
fflfto defend their denial of
gods or creators.
Jf it is said
the two beings
impossible, because that wherein
b
n
each
in
differ must be present
win
eVVwill
f
u then there
But
existence.
condition for the necessity of
is
it
if
contrary,
the
the two. On
^% ^|"^
is
be no difference between
128
we will answer
This is the same as what you had to say in connection
with the attributes. We have already dealt with it. In all
this the source of confusion is the terra necessary being.'
This term should, therefore, be discarded. We do not concede that rational arguments prove the necessary being it
the term does not mean an eternal existent who has no
efficient cause.
But if this meaning is adopted, then the
term necessary being should be dismissed, and you must
prove that in an existent which has no cause or agent, number
or composition is impossible. But that just cannot be proved.
There remains their question whether the necessary
being's uncausedness is conditioned by that which is supposed to be common to the two necessary beings. This is
silly, for we have shown that something which is uncaused
is not caused to be so, wherefore its condition should be
sought out. It is like one's asking whether blackness is a
condition for colour's being colour: and, if it were, why
should redness be colour. To this question, the answer will
be: As regards its reality viz., the reality of colouredness
as realised in the Intellect neither blackness nor redness is
a condition. But as far as its existence is concerned, each one
may be a condition, although not the only one. That is, no
genus can possibly exist without some difference. Similarly, therefore, he who affirms two causes, thereby putting an
end to the causal series, might say They are distinguishable from each other by differences one of which is of necessity a condition for existencenot in an exhaustive way.
'
'
'
two
how they
This
If it is said:
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VII]
common character of being intellithe cosharing of this character will be the cosharing of the generic reality. For, according to those who
believe in God's knowledge of what is other than Himself,
God has self-knowledge and the knowledge of the Other
by virtue of His being intelligence divested of Matter. And
the first effect viz., the first intelligence, whom God has
already caused forth does share this character with God.
The argument for this is that the intelligences, which are
the primary effects, are different species sharing the character of being intelligences, but separated from each other by
certain differentiae.
And God will share with all of them
the character of being an intelligence. So here the philosophers have two alternatives: either the rule laid down by
them will be broken, or they should revert to the position
that being an intelligence does not constitute the essence of
God. And for them each alternative is impossible.
and
existence of
colouredness. but only a condition for the
proper that
is
it
similarly
coiouredness which is caused,
be a condinot
should
being
necessary
the
the differentia of
necessary existence
tion for the necessity of existence. For
colouredness is to colour-is to the Necessary Being what
thing which is related to
coloured
a
of
existence
unlike the
colouredness.
we will say
This cannot be allowed. The necessary being must have
will be
a reality to which existence is attributed. The point
assertion
philosophers'
The
explained in the next problem.
is unthat the necessary being has no quiddity but existence
The upshot of the whole discussion is that they
intelligible.
compobase the denial of quality on that of genus-differentia
as set
quiddity
of
denial
the
on
base
they
this
And
sition.
last
the
destroyed
have
over against existence. So when we
strucwhole
the
foundation,
of
foundation
one which is the
structure like the
ture will collapse. For verily, it is a shaky
gent.
And
spider's web.
We
say
principle
is
Even
if
no genus
gences
His
first effect.
For the
simple, having no
accidents.
composition in it, except by way of its inseparable
The two will, therefore, stand on par, inasmuch as each is
And this is a generic realintelligence divested of Matter.
is not one of the inseparable
intelligence
pure
being
for
ity
So this quiddity
of being, but the very quiddity.
accidents
will
God
130
131
is
Simple Being
if
PROBLEM
VIII
e will
criticise this
If it
let it
be said to
them:
by
He had
tion in terms.
is said:
Firstly,
If it
will answer
we
will answer
By
'effect'
efficient
132
But
it.
But
133
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. VIII)
Simple Being
will answer
oneness.
we
is
will say:
when
existence is particularised
it have that particular oneness
which will be the conceptual basis for its distinction from
anyone else unless it had a reality? To deny quiddity is
to deny reality. And if the reality of a being is denied, its
existence will be unintelligible. What the philosophers say
'Existence, but no existent.
And that is a
is like saying
contradiction in terms. To prove the point, if existence
without an existent were intelligible, existence without
reality could be found among the effects as well. Such existence would be a cosharer with God in the character of
having no reality or quiddity ; and would be distinguishable
from Him in that it had a cause while God had none. Now,
why is not such a thing among the effects conceivable? Is
there any other reason for its being inconceivable than that
Specially,
definite essence.
into one essence, how can
Besides,
comes
in.
if
If it is
which
is
in itself unintelli-
cause is denied.
intelligible does not cease to be so, if
if its
And
it is
that which is
supposed to depend on a cause.
By going to this extent, the philosophers show how
miserably they grope in the dark. They thought that they
had arrived at a pure idea of God but, in fact, the ultimate
result of their investigations is pure negation. The denial of
quiddity is the denial of reality. When reality is denied,
nothing remains but the word 'existence,' to which no object
corresponds, unless it be related to quiddity.
;
is said:
If it
His reality
is
that
He
is
necessary.
So this
is
the quid-
dity.
134
135
is
not
Body
PROBLEM IX
OF THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE BY RATIONAL
ARGUMENTS THAT GOD IS NOT BODY
theory
If it
is
said
If
body
is
efficient cause.
B WILL SAY
But
be
its
we
will answer :
cause.
it is
// it
is
Our
you)
If
it is
said
The
said
reason
can be divided
is
is
that body
is
bound
to be composed.
two parts
(b)
It
we will answer
136
will answer
con-
ceptually, into Form and Matter, and (c) into those qualities
which specially belong to a body so as to distinguish it
from other bodies from which, qua body, it is, however, not
different. But the Necessary Being is one, and indivisible
with respect to all these things.
We
we
of soul
// it
is
said
we will answer
Why
is it
*37
among
Their Inability
Prob.
IX]
which
soul
If it is said:
to
Prove
Tahafut al-Falasifah
will answer
that
God
is not
Body
'
How
'It is
will
that
does possess.
It could not have a bigger or a smaller quantity than the
present one. This is like your own explanation. You
have said 'The body of the highest sphere emanated from
the first effect
This body possesses a certain quantity. In
relation to the first effect, all the quantities are equal.
But one of them has been specifiedby virtue of its relation
to the universal system to be the quantity of the body
of the first sphere. Therefore, the quantity which actually
exists is ^ necessary, and any thing different from it is
rejected. '
So the same explanation may be extended to
that which is not an effect."?
\
this
it
139
138
PROBLEM X
we
E WILL say:
it is.
It has no
cause is required by that which
originates in time.
No one of the bodies in the world
originates in time; nor does it perish.
It is only the
Forms and Accidents which originate in time. The bodies
i.e.,
the heavens are eternal. And the four elements, which are the stuff of the sphere of the Moon, and
their bodies and Matter(s) are eternal.
On these pass in
succession the Forms resulting from combination and
transformation. Further, the human soul and the vegetative soul originate in time. And the series of the causes
of all those things which originate in time comes to an end
at rotatory motion. And rotatory motion is eternal, its
source being the eternal soul of the sphere. All this shows
that the world has no cause, and that the bodies in the
world have no creator. The world is as it has always
been. Similarly, the bodies in the world are, and have
been, eternally uncaused."?
eternity, the
cause or creator.
will answer
why body
World
So he who
reflects
we have mentioned
will see the inability of all those who believe in the eternity
These people are
of bodies to claim that they have a cause.
in consistency bound to accept Materialism and Atheism
as some thinkers, who gave clear expression to the presuppositions of the philosophers' theory have actually done.
// it
is
said
we will answer
140
141
What do
7/ it
is
said
eternal
That which
is
uncaused
We
Why
is
Prob.
fl
Tahafut al-Falasifah
k not P0881
for ^y to ^ necessary,
Yht^UF
It
*
they make a groundless
and arbitrary assumption.
that
If it
is said
PROBLEM XI
c +; + ,
?*?
le
*2^$?
w*
net*//
-"^y
answer
Let
'J-
P^as
'
whS
,n,
d^
This makes
it
sswsa&r
E SAY
To Muslims, the
eternal being
is
the Universe
is
its origin
forftort
the Muslims'
(1)
In
142
is
says:
Prob. XI]
Refutation of Philosophers
Tahafut al-Falasifah
it; for it is the relation to Matter, and the occupation with it which is the impediment in the way of the apprehension of things. Man's soul is occupied with the direction of
Matter i.e., body. When death brings its occupation to an
end, and if it has not been contaminated by carnal appetites
and ignoble attributes (which might come to it like an infection
from the physical things), the realities of all the intelligibles are
laid bare unto it as well. For the same reason, it is so decreed
that all the angels know all the intelligibles, without a single exception; because they also are pure intelligences not-in-Matter.
is
who hold
that
God knows
the Other
is
a hypo-
thetical syllogism,
We will
it is
Therefore,
it
knows
things.
This
follow necessarily.
It is like one's
saying
But
He
But
If this
say
If
that
If this
is
this is not
If
Therefore,
it is
not daytime.
of daytime.
If it is said:
(2)
we
may be
stated as follows:)
will answer:
We
is
it
145
144
Prob.
XI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
to emphasise
never ceased to possess the quality which characSo He never ceased to be an agent. But
terises agents.
beyond this much, we do not disagree with others. And as
far as the fundamental question {whether the world is an action
of God) is concerned, there is absolutely no disagreement.
Since it is agreed on all hands that an agent must have knowledge of his action (we believe in God's knowledge of the universe) , for we do consider the universe as His action.
is
that
He
But it is not
it is necessary in the arts of man.)
necessary in the case of natural action. But according to you
instance,
The world
is
is said
be produced which
from the Sun.
is
we will answer
Between the two things, there is a difference. The universe proceeds from His essence, because of His knowledge of
the universe. The ideal representation of the universal system
The principle
is the cause of the emanation of the universe.
And His
of the universe is His knowledge of the universe.
knowledge of the universe is identical with Himself. If He did
not have the knowledge of the universe, the universe could not
146
//
it
is said
Were we
to judge that
He knows
H7
it
Prob. XI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Him
in order of nobility.
we
will answer
part
it
And
this is like
said
concerning hearing, seeing and the knowledge of the particulars which fall under Time. You agree with all other
philosophers in saying that God is free from these things
that the changeable things (which fall under Time, and which
are divided into 'Was' and 'Will be') are not known to
Him and that the knowledge of the changeable things if
it were possible in His case
would necessitate mutability
and receptivity in Him. Now, the denial of this in His case
does not prove imperfection, but perfection. Imperfection
lies only in the senses, and in the need for them
If man were
not imperfect, he would not need the senses in order to guard
himself against what makes him amenable to changes. Similarly, you assert, the knowledge of particular temporal
events indicates imperfection. So if we know all the temporal
events, and perceive all the sensible things, while God knows
no particulars, and perceives no sensible things, and if His
not knowing the particulars proves no imperfection on His
;
148
149
Their Inability
Prove
that
is
that everyone
PROBLEM XII
to
E SAY,
If they revert to the position that all that is divested of Matter is essentially intelligence, and thus knows itself,
we have made it clear that this is an arbitrary assumption
for
which no argument
If
it is
said
is
available.
God Who
If
it
is said :
somebody were
Everyone who does not know himself
like the dead ?
is
dead.
to say
How can
God be
we
is
what
those
who
and the
see or
know
are worthier,
will answer
This
And
150
then
it
also see, as
He knows
Tah a jut
Prob. XII]
al-Falasi/ah
that they
their
knowledge
PROBLEM
AND
TS'
Other
the
(by Ibn Slna who represents the latter) that "nothing not
even as much as a particle of dust, in the heavens, or on the
earth is hidden from His knowledge" only that He knows
the particulars in a universal manner
First of all, we must understand their position and then
we will proceed to criticise it.
in fact,
152
XIII
153
He knows
hidden from His knowledge. But His knowledge of these things remains the same before an eclipse, or
For nothing
is
during
it
God
does not
Know
the Particulars
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob. XIII]
154
He knows that they are the effects of certain causes, and that
the causes have some other causes, and so on, till the series
stops at the rotatory motion of the Heaven. And He knows
that the cause of celestial movement is the Soul of Heaven, the
cause of whose movement is the desire for assimilation with
God and with the Favourite Angels. Thus, All is known to
Him i.e., is laid bare to Him in a single discovery which is
homogeneous, and uninfluenced by Time. However, at the
time of an eclipse, it cannot be said that He knows that it
exists now.
Nor, after the eclipse, can it be said that He
knows that now it has cleared away. For nothing which is
necessarily defined in relation to Time can conceivably be
known to Him, for such knowledge would necessitate a change
in the knower.
This much in regard to what is divisible into periods of
Time. The same line of thought is taken by them in regard
to what is divisible into Matter and Space e.g., individual men or animals. They say that he does not know
the accidents of Zaid or 'Amr or Khalid; but knows the
Man-in-general, and his accidents and properties by a
universal knowledge. Thus, He knows that Man should
have a body comprising various organs which are used to
grasp, or walk, or apprehend, etc., and some of which are
and that his faculties
single, while others are in pairs
should be distributed among his physical parts, and so on,
and so forth, to every attribute inside man: everything
which belongs to his appurtenances, qualities, and inseparable
accidents.
So nothing is hidden from His knowledge, and
He knows every thing universally. As far as the person of
Zaid is concerned, it is distinguishable from that of 'Amr
only for the senses, not for the Intellect. For the basis of
distinction is the designation of a particular dimension;
whereas the Intellect apprehends only the absolute and the
universal dimension, or the universal space. When we say
'This, and this,' we allude to a relation which is possessed
by the perceptible object vis-a-vis the percipient because of its
being near to, or far from, him, or being situated in a particular direction. And this is impossible in the case of God.
This, then, is the basic principle in which they believe
and by which they have contrived the total destruction of
religious laws.
It implies that, for instance, whether Zaid
obeys God or disobeys Him, God cannot know his newly
155
Prob.
XIII]
Taha/ut al-Falasifak
emerging states, since He does not know Zaid as an individual i.e., as a person whose actions come to be after they
had not been. So if He does not know the person, He
cannot know his states and actions. Nor can He know of
Zaid's infidelity or Islam, since He knows only the infidelity
or Islam of Man-in-general in the absolute and universal
manner, not in specific relation to individuals. Even so,
they are bound to say that Muhammad (may God bless him
and grant him peace) proclaimed his prophecy, while God
did not know that he had done so. And the same will be
true of every other prophet, for God only knows that among
men there are some who proclaim prophecy, and that such and
such are their attributes but He cannot know a particular
prophet as an individual, for that is to be known by the senses
alone.
Nor can He know the circumstances arising out of an
individual's particular character.
For such circumstances
are divisible in Time which measures his particular person.
;
And
Their fallacy
lies in
They
Know
by saying
the Particulars
that
The
which
is
undergo a change.
who
did not
157
Prob. XIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
how
will
only one knowledge of an eclipse at a partiBefore the eclipse, this knowledge is the
knowledge of 'Will Be' at the time of the eclipse, this
very knowledge is the knowledge of 'Is'; and after the
clearance, it is the knowledge of the expiry of the eclipse.
All these differences can be considered as relations which
do not replace the essence of knowledge; and which, therefore, do not necessitate a change in the cognisant being. For
such differences must be ranked as pure relations. If a
person on your right comes in front of you, and then to the
left, it is the relations which pass over you in succession
and he who changes accordingly is the moving person,
not you. The same is true of Divine knowlege."?
;
having come.
And
"God has
the Particulars
cular time.
able.
Know
Besides, these Species and Genera, and the universal Accidents, whose number is unlimited, are different things.
How
can the different cognitions of these different things be compressed into one knowledge? And how can that one knowledge be identical with the essence of the Knower, without any
thing being added to it ?
Would that I could understand how any intelligent person
can allow himself to disbelieve the oneness of the knowledge
of a thing whose states are divisible into the Past, the Present, and the Future; while he would not disbelieve the oneness of knowledge which relates to all the different Genera
and Species. Verily, the difference and the disparity among
the diverse Genera and Species is more marked than the
difference which may actually be found to exist among the
states of a thing divisible in accordance with the division of
time. If that difference does not necessitate multiplicity and
difference, how can this do so either ?
Since it can be proved
by a rational argument that the difference of the periods of
Time is less significant than the difference of the Genera and
Species and because it has been maintained that the difference
of the Genera and Species does not necessitate. multiplicity
and difference, it must be recognised that the difference of
the periods of Time cannot do so either. And since it does
not necessitate difference, it follows that All can be encom'
The
Now, we
will
say If this
:
is true,
foot-
that
passed
is
Prob.
XIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
The second
objection
may be
stated as follows:
//
it is
said
Know the
Partitulars
We find
God's knowledge, if in
either originate from God, or from
false to say that it can originate from
someone else. It is
Him. For we have shown that from the Eternal nothing
which is temporal can proceed, and that he does not become
an agent after not having been one (for that would necessitate change). (This we have conclusively shown in the problem of the creation of the world.)
But if knowledge originates in Him from someone else, how can the Other be the
cause of influence over Him or change within Him ?
If we
admit such a thing, His states will change under compulsion
or constraint emanating from the Other.
we
will answer:
On
is
impos-
sible :
As regards the opinion that it is impossible for an originated thing to proceed from the. Eternal, we have refuted
it in the problem of the creation of the world.
Why do you
160
your
principles.
161
Prob. XIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
If
you
PROBLEM XIV
TO SHOW THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE THAT THE
HEAVEN IS LIVING, AND OBEYS GOD THROUGH
ITS ROTATORY MOTION
ry\HEY SAY:
If it %s said:
we will answer
In
their
162
163
Prob.
XIV]
straint
If
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability
a body
is
itself,
then either
movement
volitional
and psychic.
to
Prove
that the
Heaven
is
Living
either
kind of movement
From
The
viz.
volitional
may
movement.
be stated as follows
is
164
In addition to your theory, we can lay down three hypotheses which you will find no argument to disprove
Firstly, the movement of Heaven may be supposed to be
the result of the constraint exercised by another body which
wills its movement, and causes it to revolve perpetually. This
motive body may be neither a round body nor a circumference.
So it will not be a heavenly body at all. This will refute the
:
movement is volitional,
suggestion of ours is
This
living.
is
Heaven
and that the
possible; and nothing but the mere assumption of improba-
bility
We
165
Prob.
XIV]
Tahafut aUFalastjah
Their Inability
to
Living
What
is
there to disprove
a distinguishing attribute.
Thirdly, it may be granted that the Heaven is
specifically determined to have an attribute which is the
principle of its movement, as they believe with respect to
the downward tendency of a stone. But, then, possibly,
like the stone, the Heaven will not be conscious of the
movement. The philosophers' statement that that which is
sought by nature cannot be that which is avoided for the
same reason is a deliberate misrepresentation. For there are
no numerically disparate places, even according to them.
On the contrary, the body is one, and its rotatory motion is
one. Neither the body nor its movements actually have
parts it is only in the Imagination that it can be divided.
So this movement is neither a seeking after a place, nor a
running away from another
It is possible that there should
be created a body which has within itself an aptitude which
demands circular motion. So the movement itself will fulfil
the requirement not that the aptitude will demand the seeking after a place to attain which movement is to be made.
When you say that every movement is made either
because a place is sought, or another avoided, and if you
think that this relation is necessary, then you make the
'seeking after' the end of nature, and make movement itself
a secondary factor which is desired not in itself, but as a
;
166
is
167
the
Heaven
which
PROBLEM XV
REFUTATION OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE
THE PURPOSE WHICH MOVES THE HEAVEN
rr\HEY SAY
punishment.
168
its
primary intention.
Secondly, the cumulative
Even
169
something to
Tahajut
XV]
al-Falasifah
way
possible for
Being in
combine
by
him
all
If
he says
the places
all of
species.
tion
the
sided or four-sided formations, etc. The same applies to
all
For
positions.
and
places
the
all
complete occupation of
that is possible for the Heaven is that it should move from
one place to another. What, then, has happened to it to
prevent it from moving now from one side, now from another
of
(so that it could uitilise all that is possible if the utilisation
?
perfection)
of
index
all that is possible were an
All this points to the conclusion that such theories are
170
Heaven
Some
lower world.
[But this
Firstly,
the
is
if
171
PROBLEM XVI
REFUTATION OF THEIR THEORY THAT THE SOULS
OF THE HEAVENS ARE AWARE OF ALL THE PARTICULARS WHICH ORIGINATE IN THE WORLD
HEY SAY:
And
it
by saying:
172
173
It
possible.
ated
They
by a finite number
of lines.
assert that:
who
'
volitional.
versal will
XVI]
Prob.
Tahafut al-Falasijah
The Souls of the Heavens
Thus the
cause,
the senes.
For
are
Aware of all
the Particulars
therefore,
the
of
science
the
interpretation
of
dreams
branches out.
And
they assert
when
And
they assert
(So this
much we
desired to reproduce to
theorv understandable.)
174
175
make
their
Prob.
XVI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
How
will
to
for criticism.
The
Heaven
first is
is
The answer
We
volitional.
movement
But
one direction
Since a
also
e.g..
177
176
i.e.,
his relation
This
the Particulars
Tahafut al-Falasifah
XVI]
is
// it
is said
we
they know
will
all things.
answer
178
Prob.
XVI]
ment
This
Tahafut al-Falfisifah
much we
The
sciences called
by them
'physical' are
many.
We
will
sciences.
sion of all
The
(i)
The
(i.e.,
discusdivision,
are
Aware of all
the Particulars
181
Prob.
XVI]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
fication of the
dead
and the
who
and
Thus the
assert
When
this
faculty becomes
if
awakening is self-determined.
need some stimulus, however
the Particulars
light
upon
light.'
'
(")
reason.
I&5
Say
183
Prob.
XVI)
Tahafut aUFalasijah
fall.
And this is so, because the bodies and the bodily faculties are created to be the servants and the subordinates of the soul.
And the service differs according as the
soul is more or less pure and powerful. Therefore, it is not
improbable that the power of a soul should be so great
that the physical forces outside its own body should have
to serve it. For the soul is not impressed upon body ; it
has only a certain inclination towards, or interest in,
directing it, the inclination or the interest having been
created to be part of its nature.
If, therefore, the physical parts of its own body can obey the soul, it will not be
impossible for such parts outside the body to do the same.
This is the reason why
not
which are
all natural phenomena whose occurrence depends on the appearance of Heat or Cold or Motion in
the Air
any two
is
things.
This is not That ; nor can That be This.
The
affirmation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other
phenomena
of the
PROBLEM XVII
184
We
185
Prob.
XVII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
How
time of contact with fire. But observation only shows that one
with the other not that it is by it and has no other cause than
it.
To take another example, it cannot be contradicted that
the advent of the spirit and of the motive and cognitive faculties into the sperm of animals is not a development out of the
natures which are pent up in heat and cold and moisture
and dryness. By the act of procreation, the father is not the
agent of the son or of the son's life, vision, and hearing, or
of any other thing he may have. Obviously, all these things
are observed to exist with some other conditions. But we
On the contrary, they
cannot say that they exist by them.
derive their existence from God either directly, or through
the intermediacy of angels to whom these temporal events
are entrusted.
(This argument is valid against the philosophers who believe in God and it is they whom we address
here.) So it is clear that existence with a thing does not prove
being by it.
Suppose there is a blind man whose
Let us illustrate.
eyes are diseased, and who has not heard from anyone of the
If one day his disease is
difference between night and day.
cured, and he can consequently see colours, he will guess
that the agent of the perception of the forms of colours which
has now been acquired by his eyes is the opening of the eyes.
This will not be absolutely untrue, inasmuch as given the
soundness of the eyes and their being open and the obstruction being removed and the object before him having colour,
it follows that he must be able to see, and it would be unBut when the Sun is set, and the
intelligible if he were not.
atmosphere is dark, he will acquire the knowledge that the
light of the Sun was the cause of the impression of colours
is
'
186
upon his
and so on
187
Prob.
XVII]
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
Impossibility of a Departure from Natural Course
of Events
43 ef
SS
K
tS ar e dive
nf
r.
mal
Krito
" nsparingly a
t
subjects.
"
e . because of different
^
**"
ngdggiy
ny
^^^ whate^
mUSt be
t h e reciplets
hlS bei ng so whe never
we suppose fire with all its
*
iTJ
S a
S
Se tW similar
f cottoTtVck are
exposed
a io
to tire
re in the same way, how can
we conreivp thaf
one of them should burn,
and
no alternative
is
P--
the other
hlS idea
when
en Ahi!
brah
shouTdX >
'
>
was
There
ere
Wch
someS
that
To
this,
our answer
is
'
'
possible.)
is
twofold
W U Say
e d0 not a S ree tha t^
Prindpl iZltf^y"
act b
cl
hoice or that God does not act
bv
wm
If
.
7
L
W.1I. The refutation of
this assertion of the
'
?S
ag
o the^ori!
Hi, win ti^'K
at
1A"d n
J""
philosophers has
ll
rf
tiSSStal
P roved
//
it
is
my hesitation."
In visualising possibilities of this kind one might go to
Hence
any
length.
In reply
However,
let this
to the foregoing,
we
much
suffice here.
will say
said
188
to
If
189
Prob.
XVII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Impossibility of a Departure from Natural Course of Events
fault-finding.
We
agree that
// it
is said
pieces of cotton
we
will answer:
When you
190
191
Prob.
XVII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
the emanation from Him does not take place, until the
need for the
existence of the emanant operates as the determinant
and it
becomes a specific condition for the establishment'
of the
System of Good. And it cannot be such a condition
unless
a prophet stands in need of it to prove his prophecy in
order
to bring about the propagation of Good.
Ail this fits very well into their theory. In
fact thev
are bound to draw such conclusions, since they
have opened
the door to the special character of a prophet by
means of
a property which is contrary to the ordinary qualities
of men
The degrees of this special character cannot be exhausted
by
intellectual comprehension.
Why should it be necessary for
one, who believes in any degree of this special
character
to disbelieve an account of it which has been handed
down on
the strength of uninterrupted testimony, and which
finds its
confirmation in the Sacred Law ?
In fine, from the facts
(a) that only the sperm receives the form
of an animal
(b) that the animal faculties flow on to it
from the
angels who areaccording to the philosophers the
Princi
ples of Being
192
its
own
If it
is
said:
And you
193
Prob.
XVII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
same
194
195
No
into gold.
And many
The answer
No one
What
the Im-
is
within power.
for
Prab.
XVII]
Tahafut al-Falasifa,.
PROBLEM XVIII
As regards
When
of the
movement
which
other alternative.
OF THEIR INABILITY TO GIVE A RATIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR THEORY THAT THE HUMAM
SOUL IS A SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH EXISTS
IN ITSELF; IS NOT SPACE-FILLING; IS NOT BODY,
OR IMPRESSED UPON BODY AND IS NEITHER CONNECTED NOR DISCONNECTED WITH BODY AS GOD
IS NEITHER INSIDE THE WORLD NOR OUTSIDE IT,
OR AS THE ANGELS ARE
;
bodies.
(i)
fore-
196
197
Prob.
XV111]
7'ahaJut al-Falasi/ah
Their Inability
ceives the shape and colour of its mother, then her kindliness
and agreeableness. Therefore, it runs away from the wolf,
but follows its mother. Unlike colour or shape, it is not
necessary for kindliness or enmity to be in bodies, although
accidentally they may be.
Thus the estimative faculty is distinguished from the
preceding one and it is located in the hindmost ventricle of
the brain.
(iii) The third internal perceptive faculty is called sensitive imagination in the case of animals, and cogitation in
the case of man. Its function is to compose sensible forms
with one another, or to superimpose meanings upon forms.
It is in the middle ventricle of the brain, between the faculties of retention and memory.
It enables a man to imagine
a flying horse or any other combination which he may never
have observed. This faculty could, as will be seen present;
to
The
Human
Rational Soul
it is
called 'retention.'
five.
The motive
198
199
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability
must
to
be indivisible. But all bodies are divisible. Theresubstratum of the rational cognitions is not body.
This can be put in accordance with the conditions of the logical figures.
To do that in the aptest way, one might say
(i) If the substratum of knowledge were a divisible body,
then the knowledge subsisting in it would be divisible.
(ii) But the knowledge subsisting in it is not divisible.
(iii) Therefore, the substratum is not body.
This is a hypothetical syllogism in which the contrary of the
antecedent follows as an indisputable conclusion from the
interpellation of the contrary of the consequent.
There can
be no doubt about the validity of the figure of the syllogism,
or about the two premises. For in the first premiss it is
stated that every thing which subsists in a divisible substra-
Virtues.
(This
tum
tum
is
brief
summary
also
fore, the
is divisible and that if the divisibility of the substraof knowledge is supposed, then the divisibility of knowledge will be axiomatic and unquestionable. In the second
;
premiss
in
it is
man is
indivisible.
'
'
'
200
201
And
:)
(i)
In
say:
Firstly,
who
Prob.
XVIII]
Taha/ut al-Falasifah
much
of Matter.
jectivity.
of this point.
For the question of the indivisible part
has been discussed at very great length, and the philosophers
have a number of mathematical arguments for it which if
we will answer
If
one of
is
its two sides come into contact with the same thing
as the other does, or are the two things different? It
is
impossible that the two should be identical; for then the
two sides of the atom would coincide. For if A touches
B, and B touches C, then A will be in touch with
C.
If,
on the other hand, things in contact with the two sides of
the atom are different, that only proves multiplicity
J and
division.
Such a
cussion.
difficulty cannot
However,
to consider
it.
In
we will say
be
in Matter.
If it
is
said:
//
it is
said
This means that there is self-contradiction in the inBut the intelligibles are irrefragable. Since it
has not been possible for you to doubt the two premises
namely, that the 'one' knowledge is indivisible; and that
that which is indivisible cannot subsist in a divisible bodyit is not possible for you to doubt the conclusion.
telligibles.
The answer
Prob.
XVIII)
Tahafut al-Falasifah
We
(2)
In
Matterobject
the same way
204
Their Inability
to
From this it will be seen that the sense data impressed upon
the five senses are nothing but representations of particular
and divisible forms ; for perception means the appearance of
the image of the percept in the percipient's soul. And
each part of the sensible image has a relation with a part of
the bodily organ.
205
Prob. XJ'III]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability
to
Objection;
(3)
Our objection to this argument is the same as to the preceding one. For the substitution of the word 'relation' for
'impression* does not remove the doubt about the impression
of the wolf's enmity upon the goat's estimative faculty
(as
described by them). Obviously, the goat has a perception
and the perception is related to it, and the relation is determined in the same way as you have mentioned. For enmity
is not a measurable and quantified thing whose
image could
be impressed upon a quantified body, and whose parts would
bear a relation to the parts of that body. The measurableness of wolf's figure is not enough. For the goat perceives
something else besides the figure, and that 'something' is
enmity or hostility, or unkindliness. And this enmity which
is additional to figure has no quantity or measure.
Nonetheless, it is perceived by a quantified body.
Therefore, in
this way, the present argument is rendered problematical, no
less than the preceding one.
,
In
taster.
For
And
the whole.)
(4)
In
we would answer
The theory of the individual atom belongs to Mathematics ; and the explanation of the individual atom requires
a lengthy discourse. Moreover, even that theory does not
remove all the difficulties. For it would follow that power
and will should also be in the individual atom. Man's action
is inconceivable without power and will.
And will is inconceivable without knowledge. The power of writing is in the
hand and the fingers. But the knowledge of it is not in the
hand for in case the hand should be cut off, knowledge would
not disappear. Nor is the will in the hand for one can be
willing to write, even when the hand is paralysed.
If in
such a case, one fails to write, the failure is to be attributed
to the absence of power, not to the absence of will.
;
206
say
is
the antithesis
207
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability
it
actually
to
is.
(5)
In
say:
We
will say:
you prove
will
If it
is
it ?
said:
The argument
Objection
and
is
will.
208
we will answer
209
Their Inability
Prob.
XVIII]
(6)
their sixth
on
impossibility of self-perception in the case of the senses. But
why is it that something which is inapplicable to some of the
senses is considered to be inapplicable to all of them ? What
is the difficulty in believing that, in spite of the common corporeality of all the senses, the judgment about the senses
with respect to perception may differ from one case to another? In fact, sight and touch do differinasmuch as the
tactual perception is not acquired until there is contact between the object and the organ of touch (and the same applies
to taste), whereas the case with sight is just the reverse.
The removal of contact is a prerequisite for visual perception,
so much so that if the eyes are closed, the colour of the eyelids cannot be seen just because of their contact with the
organ of sight. This difference between sight and touch does
not make the two differ with respect to dependence upon
body. Why, then, is it improbable that that which is called
the Intellect should be one of the bodily senses, differing from
the other senses insofar as it perceives itself ?
In
to
Tahafut al-Falasifah
If the Intellect
sense of sight does,
If it
Our objection
to this
It is not
argument
is
the
improbable that sight should perceive its own substratum although here the question of what
Again, we might say (as we
is the usual thing comes up.
did in the preceding argument) Why should it be impossible
for the senses to differ in this respect, even though all are
alike impressed upon bodies ? Whv do you say that nothing
which exists in body can perceive its physical substratum ?
Why do you make a universal judgment based upon a few
particulars ? That is a procedure whose invalidity is agreed
preceding one.
210
all
is said;
We rely,
sometimes, not.
The
211
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
because of the relation between the two. And it is inconceivable that perception should bear any other relation to the
substratum than that of subsisting in it.
Therefore, it will
always perceive the substratum.
If, however, this relation
is not sufficient, it will never perceive the substratum, insofar as it can bear no other relation to the substratum than
that of subsisting in it just as if it were to know itself, it
would know for ever, not being inattentive at any time.
we
will answer
(7)
In
their seventh
<8)
by
212
In
their eighth
The
faculties
which reside
in parts of the
213
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability to Give a Rational Demonstration
214
Our
The
the animals.
strong
215
Prob.
XVJ II]
In
their ninth
replaced.
of the
Their Inability
Tahafut al-Falasifah
to
it
be
We
Objection:
(10)
In
216
217
their tenth
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Inability
Objection :
is
to
all
So if having seen a
to the same genus is one and the same.
man, one sees another man, no new form will come into being
as it would if he were to see a horse after having seen a man
whereby two different forms would have come into being).
Such a thing happens even in the case of bare sensations.
When one sees water, a form comes into being in his fantasy.
When, afterwards, he sees blood, another form comes into
being.
But if he sees another water, no new form will arise.
On
the contrary, the form which has been impressed upon his
fantasy will represent every individual water. Therefore, in
this sense such forms have often been assumed to be universal.
Similarly, when one sees a hand, there arises in his fantasy
and in the Intellect the form of the position of the parts of the
hand as related to one another namely, the expansion at the
palm, the division into fingers, the end of the fingers at the
So when
nails, even the size of the hand, and its colour, etc.
he sees another hand exactly similar to the first one, no new
Rather, the second observation will be inform will arise.
capable of giving anything new to the fantasy, just as the
observation of another water in the same vessel and of the
same quantity will not give anything new. But when he sees
another hand which differs from the first one in colour or
measure, then he will have a new form viz. , that of the different colour or measure. But there will be no new form of a
hand for the smaller and black hand is as much of a hand
as the larger and white hand. The two differ only in colour
and measure, etc. So that which is common to the two hands
will not produce a new form ; because that form is identical
Only that in which the second hand differs from
with this.
the first one will produce a new form.
This, then, is the meaning of the universal in relation to
the Intellect as well as to the senses. When the Intellect
apprehends the form of body in an animal, it does not acquire a
new form of corporeality from that of the tree as the fantasy
does not acquire a new form from the precept ion of two waters
at two different times, or in general no new form is acquired
The universal posited by you as subsisting in the IntelOnly that which subsists in the senses
comes to subsist in the Intellect.
The difference, however,
lect is inadmissible.
218
other things
same way.
219
Prob.
XVIII]
Tahaful al-Falasifah
PROBLEM XIX
REFUTATION OF THEIR THESIS THAT, HAVING COME
INTO BEING, THE HUMAN SOULS CANNOT BE
DESTROYED AND THAT THEIR EVERLASTING NATURE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR
US TO CONCEIVE OF THEIR DESTRUCTION
;
And they
(i)
In
their first
The souls can perish (if they perish at all) because of the
following things
(i) The death of the body
or
(ii) the occurrence of the contrary of the soul which comes
to replace it or
(iii) the power of a powerful agent,
Now, it is false to say that the soul might perish because
of the death of the body. For the body is not the substratum
of the soul, but only an instrument used by the soul with the
intermediation of the faculties which subsist in the body.
The corruption of the instrument does not necessitate the
corruption of one who uses it unless the latter were subsisting in, or impressed upon, it, as the animal souls or the bodily
Because the soul has two actions one with
faculties are.
and the other without the help of this instrument, therefore
the action performed with the help of the instrument (namely,
imagination, or sensation, or desire, or anger) will undoubtedly undergo corruption or destruction, when the body is corrupted or destroyed. But the other action of the soul (viz., the
cognition of the intelligibles divested of Matter) is performed
without the help of the body. As far as the soul is cognisant
On the
of the intelligibles, it does not need the body at all.
contrary, its preoccupation with the body diverts its attenAnd since now it is clear that
tion from the intelligibles.
:
220
221
Prob.
Tahajut
XIX]
its
in-
The form
same substratum.
agent might
Therefore,
may
In the first place, it is based upon the theory that the death
of the body does not cause the death of the soul, because the
soul does not subsist in body. That theory is based upon
the position taken by the philosophers in the preceding problem. And that position is unacceptable.
Secondly, although they do not consider the soul as subsisting in body, yet it is evident that there is a connection between the soul and body, wherefore a soul does not come into
This view has been adopted by
existence unless a body exists.
Ibn Slna and some other thinkers who searched after the
truth through independent inquiry, and who rejected Plato's
thesis that the soul is eternal and that its relation to body
The position taken by these thinkers in their
is accidental.
independent inquiry is as follows
,
did
cannot be Destroyed
tude or quantity
its
depend on body.
Finally,
Human Souls
al-Falasifah
"If the soul was one before the existence of bodies, how
get divided ? The division of that which has no magni-
it
222
Since
it is
that the soul comes into existence when the sperm enters
the womb
that because of its physical constitution the sperm is prepared to receive the soul (which will be its director); and
that it does not receive the soul merely because it is just
a soul. For two sperm-drops begetting twins may be within the same womb and at the same time equally prepared
to receive souls.
Then two
souls
emanate
directly
or
through intermediaries from the First Principle to be reThus the soul of this body
lated to the embryonic bodies.
cannot be the director of thatbody, nor the soul of that body
the director of this body. This special relation can arise
only from a special affinity between a particular soul and a
particular body. For otherwise, the body of one of the twins
would not be more apt than that of the other to receive this
particular soul because there were two souls which came
into existence simultaneously, and there were two spermdrops equally prepared to be directed by souls.
;
223
Prob.
XIX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
What
is
// it
is
said
224
Human
this cannot shake our belief in the fundamental need for the
cause of a definite relation. Nor will it be harmful to our
assertion that the soul does not die because of the death of
the body.
we
will answer
it
is
this
it is therefore not improbable that this unascertainable mutual fitness should be of such a kind as to
make the immortality of the soul dependent upon the continuance of the body, wherefore the corruption of the body
should cause the corruption of the soul. That which is unascertainable affords no ground for the judgment as to
whether it demands a necessary interrelation between the
soul and body, or not. Maybe, the relation between the soul
and body is necessary for the existence of the soul ; and the
soul will therefore perish when this relation is severed. It is
therefore clear that no reliance can be placed upon the argument which has been advanced by the philosophers.
The third objection is that it is not unreasonable to maintain that the destruction of the souls may be caused by the
power of God (exalted be He) as we have conclusively shown
in the problem of the indestructibility of the world.
The fourth objection is that we do not admit that tlje^
three ways of destruction mentioned by you exhaust all the
How will you prove that destruction in any
possibilities.
other way besides these three is inconceivable ? Since the
division made by you does not revolve between affirmation
and negation, it is possible to add a fourth one to the three
Therefore, perhaps destruction will take place
possibilities.
a fourth or even a fifth way other than the three mentioned
by you. To limit the number to three is not supported by
an argument.
(2)
In
their second
argument, which
is their
The
225
Prob.
XIX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
absolutely indestructible.
In this argument, the first thing to be proved is that the
death of the body does not necessitate the extinction of the
soul.
The reason for this has been considered above. Next,
it is to be maintained that it is impossible for the soul to
perish because of anything else than the death of the body
either.
For when something perishes by any cause whatsoever, it follows that it had the potentiality for corruption
before its corruption actually took place. That is, the possibility of extinction precedes actual extinction, just as in case
of a temporal event, the possibility of existence precedes existence.
The possibility of existence is called the potentiality
of existence and the possibility of extinction is called the
potentiality for corruption.
Just as the possibility of existence is a relative attribute which requires something in
which to exist (so as to be a possibility in relation to it), so
does the possibility of extinction require something in relation to which it could be a possibility.
This is the reason
why it is said that (as shown in the problem of the eternity
of the world) every temporal existence needs a preceding
Matter in which the possibility of the existence of that temporal existent, or its potentiality, should reside.
So Matter
in which the potentiality of existence resides is the recipient
of .the existence which occurs.
And that which receives is
other than that which is received.
Therefore, the recipient
and that which is received (and which is other than the recipient) exist together at the time when that which is received
occurs. Similarly, therefore, it is necessary that the recipient
of non-existence should exist at the time when non-existence
occurs so that something passes out of it into non-existence,
just as something in it had come to exist. Now, that which
passes out of it into non-existence is other than that which
remains. And that which remains is that in which the potentiality for, or the receptivity to, or the possibility of nonexistence resides just as that which remains at the time of
the occurrence of existence is not that which occurs, but that
in which the potentiality for the reception of the occurrent
resided.
From this it follows that anything to which nonexistence occurs is composed, on the one hand, of that which
passes into non-existence; and, on the other hand, of that
which receives non-existence, and which remains at the time
of the occurrence of non-existence (because it was the bearer
;
226
Human
occurrence of
of the potentiality for non-existence before the
Matter ; and
is
potentiality
non-existence). This bearer of
Form.
is
non-existence
into
it
that which passes out of
It is a non-composite Form diBut the soul is simple.
Matter
vested of Matter. If in it the composition of Form and
discussion
the
into
reintroduce
thereby
is supposed, we shall
be
Matter which is the primary Root or Stuff for it will
fundaa
such
at
end
to
necessary for the series thus started
mental principle. Thus we shall arrive at the impossibihty
that is called
of the extinction of this primary principle, and
of the
impossibility
the
seen
the soul as we have already
Matter
case,
either
in
For
bodies.
of
Matter
extinction of the
it,
Forms come into existence
is eternal and everlasting.
potentiality
the
has
It
it.
out
of
and pass into non-existence
potentiality for the
for the occurrence of forms to it, and the
receptive to
equally
For it is
of it.
;
If
premiss having been proved, we proceed to say:
possibility of perishing
the
perish,
to
were
thing
a simple
before actually
should have been possessed by that thing
And, further,
means.
potentiality
what
perishing, for that is
TWs
For
also possessed the possibility of existence.
necessary.
be
cannot
possible
that whose non-existence is
and by the potenTherefore it must be possible of existence
possibility of existence.
the
mean
only
we
existence
tiality of
ft
must have
227
Prob.
XIX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
PROBLEM XX
REFUTATION OF THEIR DENIAL OF
THE RESURRECTION OF BODIES
deny the return of souls to bodies the existence of a
They
physical Paradise and Hell the Htir with large eyes, and
:
man by
God.
They say:
After the death of the body, the soul continues to have
in the state of indescribably
great pleasure, or in the state of indescribably great pain.
In some cases, the pain or pleasure will be everlasting in
others, it will pass away in the course of time.
As regards
its degrees, men have different ranks which are marked by as
great a variety as characterises their mundane ranks. Thus
(i)
(ii)
and
(iii)
transient pain
is for
And
the soul can attain absolute bliss only by means of perand purity or cleanliness. Perfection is derived from
knowledge, and purity from virtuous action.
Knowledge is required because the rational faculty derives
nourishment and pleasure from the cognition of the intelligibles, as the faculty of desire finds pleasure in the satisfaction
of a desire ; or the faculty of sight finds pleasure in looking
at beautiful forms, and so on to all other faculties. It is the
fection
228
229
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
child by
of sexual intercourse, we must represent it to the
a child,
to
thing
pleasant
reference to play which is the most
enjoyed
meal
wholesome
a
to
reference
by
and to the eunuch
will
from an intense appetite. So the child or the eunuch
although
pleasure
the
of
realise the fundamental character
Prob.
body the
:
230
does not
(m
symbol
the
constitute the pleasure of sexual intercourse, for
taste.
of
organ
the
only
by
the case of the eunuch) is perceived
There are two arguments to prove that intellectual pleasures are worthier than physical pleasures
that ot
Firstly/ the state of the angels is nobler than
sensuous
experience
not
angels
do
the
Now,
swine.
beasts and
pleasure
pleasures like those of mating and eating. Their
beauty
and
perfection
the
of
consists in the consciousness
into the
insight
their
of
because
them
characterise
which
the Lord ot
realities of things, and their approximation to
Since
beings).
of
order
in
the
but
the Universe (not in space,
interthrough
and
order
in
God
from
emanate
beings
all
to Him
mediaries, it is obvious that the intermediaries nearer
rank.
should possess a higher
Secondly man himself often prefers intellectual pleasures
seeks victory
to sensuous pleasures. For instance, one who
of home
comfort
the
sake
its
for
renounces
over an enemy
of
and hearth. Nav, even for the sake of victory in a game
Al^ng.
day
the
all
meal
a
chess or dice one'goes without
though such a victory is but a trifle, he would not mind the
in the
pain caused by hunger. Similarly, one who is interested
with
deal
to
hesitates
prestige
and
maintenance of his dignity
itself
At last,
his mistress in such a way as to be known to others.
passions,
his
restrains
he decides to preserve his dignity, and
231
Prob,
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
And
fort of the
232
satisfied, then,
while
it is
its
connection
233
Tahafut al-Fatasifah
XX]
He
will be absolute bliss.
greatness is the unmoral
not
but
who has
to him will last a long
religious Scholar. Punishment awarded
all his soul had
after
for
perpetual,
time but it will not be
contrariety to
in
been perfected by knowledge. Although
tainted him
had
accidents
the substance of his soul, physical
the course
in
effaced
be
can
impurity
with impurity, yet this
intellectual,
existence, the
timef because in that stage of the soul's
He who
renewed.
be
not
will
accidental causes of impurity
will exand
saved,
be
yet
will
knowledge
has virtue but no
bliss.
perfect
perience no pain. But he will not attain
one dies
Moreover (assert the philosophers), as soon as
expressions used
the
regards
As
him.
for
begins
Doomsday
to serve as an allegory
in the Sacred Law, they are intended
these spiritual
apprehend
to
fails
for man's understanding
things have been desthese
Therefore,
pains.
and
pleasures
same time it has been
cribed through symbols; but at the
are far above what
pleasures
spiritual
pointed out that really
is found in the description.
of
(This, then,
We
is
shall answer
We do
Most of these things are not opposed to religion.
to
superior
are
Hereafter
not deny that the pleasures in the
234
sensible pleasures.
Nor do we deny the immortality of the
soul separated from the body. But we know these things on
the authority of religion, as expressed in the doctrine of Resurrection.
No doubt, the Resurrection will not be comprehensible, if the immortality of soul is not taken for granted.
But we take objection, as we did before, to ,their assertion
that mere reason gives them final knowledge of these things.
Moreover, there are elements in this theory which do come
Such are the denial of the reviviinto conflict with religion.
fication of bodies the denial of physical pains and pleasures
in hell and paradise, and the denial of the existence of paraWhat is there to
dise and- hell as described in the Qur'an.
prevent one from assenting to the possibility of the combination of physical and spiritual pains or pleasures? The
verse "No soul knows what lies concealed in store for them"
Similarly,
only means that no soul knows all those things.
:
from the words: "I have reserved for My virtuous worshippers what no eye ever saw" the existence of things of supreme worth can be inferred, but the negation of any other
thing besides them does not necessarily follow. Rather,- the
combination of the two will be conducive to greater perfection.
And that which has been promised to us is the most
Hence it follows that the combination of the
perfect thing.
two is possible ; and therefore it is necessary to assent to this
possibility in accordance with religion.
If it
is
said:
What we find in the sacred texts is only an allegory proportioned to the limitations of common understanding, just
as the verses and traditions with an anthropomorphic import
are allegories used to facilitate understanding (since the popular imagination is too coarse for the Divine, attributes).
The answer
It is arbitrary to equate the latter instance to the former. There are two reasons why the two instances should
be kept apart
Firstly, the words in the verses and traditions which
have an anthropomorphic import bear interpretation on the
same principle as governs conventional metaphors in Arabic,
235
Prob.
XX]
But the
it
If it is said
Or
perished.
it
may be
body
alte
place,
it
^t
not
it. implies
what had been. But return, as we understand well as the
thing as
one
of
continuity
the
of
the supposition
one is said to reemergence of another. For instance, when
person congenerous
the
that
is
meaning
sume generosity, the
to it
returns
he
generosity
tinues, but that having given up
the
genetically
is
which
to something
That
same
is,
he returns
from it in number
as what he originally had, but differs
original thing itself but
Therefore, the return is not to the
is said to return to^a
one
when
Again,
to something like it.
to exist elsewhere,
continued
he
that
is
city the meaning
,
(i)
In
Bodies
Their Denial of the Resurrection of the
Tahafut al-Falasifah
say:
236
237
Prob.
XX\
Tahafut aUFalasifah
Hence
its impossibility.
we will reply
This being
so, it will
after life
returning entity
is
dust
returning
to the attribute of
life.
a horse often becomes man s food, which goes to the making of a sperm-drop, which begets another man. But one
cannot say that a horse has become a man ; for it is the form
of horse, not the Matter of it, which makes a horse what it is.
And (in the present instance) the form of a horse has perished,
and nothing but the Matter of it remains.
Now, to consider the second alternative viz., the supposition of the continuity of the soul, and its return to the
original body. If such a thing could be conceived, it would be
'return' properly so called; it would mean the resumption by
the soul of its function of directing the body, after having
been separated from it by death.
But this is impossible. The body of a man is reduced to
of
238
239
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
native, and believes that the soul is immortal, and is a selfsubsisting substance ? And this does not come into conflict
with religion. On the contrary, the verse: "Think not of
those who are slain in the way of Allah as dead. Nay,
they are living. With their Lord they have provision,"
Prob.
when animals
are eaten
:
for
two reasons
the souls.
Secondly, dust as long as it remains dust cannot receive
direction from the soul. In order for such reception to take
place, it is necessary that the elements should mix together,
Mere
so that the mixture resemble the composition of sperm.
Nor
soul.
the
from
direction
receive
not
wood or iron does
or iron.
is it possible to cause man to reappear out of wood
There can be no man until there is an organism composed of
And whenever the body and
flesh and bones and humours.
the reception of a soul, they
for
prepared
are
constitution
its
are entitled to the origination of a soul from the principles
which are the Givers of Souls. Consequently, according to
the hypothesis under consideration, two souls will simultaneously come to belong to one body. This is impossible and
the refutation of such an hypothesis will also refute Metempsychosis. For this hypothesis is exactly the same as that
doctrine, since it is based on the assumption that after its
deliverance from body, the soul will resume the control of a
body which will not be the original one. So the same argument is valid against this hypothesis as against the doctrine
;
of
Metempsychosis.
The
How
may
240
be stated as follows
who
are in the crops of green birds hangThere are other traditions which
Throne."
ing below the
speak of the consciousness possessed by spirits of charities and
alms offered in their behalf, of the questions asked by Munkir
and Nakir, and of the punishment in the grave. All these
things point to the immortality of the soul. At the same
time, however, religion teaches us to believe in resurrection
which will be accompanied by the resurgence of life. And
by resurrection is meant the resurrection of bodies. And it
restoring the soul to a
is possible to effect resurrection by
as the original one
Matter
same
the
of
made
whether
body
was or made of the Matter of any other body, or of a Matter
body,
created for the first time. For it is the soul, not the
are
body
parts
of
our
All
the
are.
we
what
us
makes
which
leanof
because
age
old
to
continually changing from infancy
by food.
ness and fatness, and because of the changes caused
differ from one part
constitution
our
make
changes
these
And
Still we continue to be the same as we
of our life to another.
object for Divine omnipotence.
proper
ever were. So this is a
Having been deprivsoul.
the
of
return
the
be
will
And this
prevented from exwas
ed of its instrument (i.e., body), it
Now, that a simipleasures.
and
pains
periencing physical
instrument is given to it again, this is return in the truest
spirits of virtuous
men
lar
,
sense of the word.
the
Their contention that the infinity of the souls and
impossible is absurd
finitude of Matters make resurrection
of the world, and
eternity
and groundless. It is based on the
But one who
motion.
rotatory
of
the perpetual succession
considers the
world
the
of
eternity
the
in
believe
does not
and comfinite
be
to
bodies
number of souls departed from
Even if it
Matters
existing
of
number
the
mensurable with
souls
is larger God has the
of
number
the
that
is granted
Matters. To deny such
rx>wer to create anew any number of
anything into existence.
bring
can
He
that
Eower is to deny
the problem of the
refuted
been
has
position
And that
m
241
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
As regards the next cause of impossibility -viz., similarity to the doctrine of Metempsychosis let there be no dispute over words. Whatever religion teaches us we must believe, even if it is the doctrine of Metempsychosis.
However, we reject that doctrine as far as this world is concerned.
But resurrection we cannot reject, whether it is or is not the
Why,
then, did
prepared
(for
to elements. The causes which govern iron should first reduce it to simple elements. The elements should be recombined and passed through various phases of development so
as to acquire the form of cotton. Cotton should acquire the
form of yarn. Yarn should acquire a definite texture viz.,
the texture of the particular piece of cloth. It is absurd to
say that iron can become a turban made of cotton, without
The answer
will be: Perhaps departed souls require preparations of a different kind, and the causes of such preparations are not complete until the time of resurrection.
And
it is not improbable that the preparation required by the
perfect souls which have departed from bodies should be
different from the one required by souls which have come into existence for the first time, and which have not derived
perfection from directing the body for a while. And God
(exalted be He) best knows such requirements their causes,
and the times of their presence. Since religion introduced
these things, and because these things are possible, it is
necessary for us to assent to them.
:
(2)
In
say
242
'
243
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Prob.
;
Objection ;
say to him
244
will rain,
245
Prob.
XX]
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Their Denial of the Resurrection of the Bodies
(3)
If it
is
said:
and
effects.
So if you admit the possibility of the perpetuity of development and procreation on the basis of what is observed at
present, or admit the possibility of the return of this pattern,
after however long a time, according to the law of recurrence
and revolution, then you will have precluded the Judgment,
the Hereafter, and any other thing of the same kind which
follows from the letter of the Sacred Law.
For this admission will imply that this existence of ours has been preceded
by many a resurrection, as it is to return for many a time
afterwards, and this order of precedence and succession will
tend to
make
the series
infinite.
But if you say that the Divine modus operandi can change
into something generically different that the changed modus
:
246
tion of possibility to
an end.
then this view will exclude all uniformity and system ; for it
makes the Divine modus changeable. But that is impossible.
It may be possible in the case of a will which changes through
But the eternal will has one invariable
a variety of states.
course. The Divine action partakes of the nature of the
Divine will, which has a uniform mode of operation, so that it
does not change because of different temporal relations. This
(they further assert) is not incompatible with our affirmation
We do say that He has the power
that God is omnipotent.
to effect resurrection, resurgence of life, and all other possible things in the sense that if He would, He could do them.
In order for our statement to be true, it is not a condition
that
He
This
is
This statement is true, in the sense that the personcould do so, if he so would. But we know that he neither
And when we say that he neither wills
wills it, nor does it.
nor does it, we do not contradict the earlier statement that
he has the power in the sense that he could do it, if he so
would. As logic explains, the categorical propositions do not
contradict the hypothetical. Our statement " He could do
it, if he would," is a hypothetical affirmative proposition.
And our statement: "lie never willed, nor did," contains
two categorical negative propositions. The negative categorical propositions do not contradict the affirmative
belly."
hypothetical.
So the argument which proves that His will is eternal
unerring
also proves that the course of His action must
and
be systematic, and that if sometimes it varies, the variation
itself must be systematic and uniform, so as to recur and
For no other basis for this variation is
return perpetually.
possible.
The answer:
This
is
247
world
XX)
Prob.
viz., that
Tahnfut al-Falasifah
must be
eternal.
is
eternal,
We have refuted
CONCLUSION
F SOMEONE SAYS:
which
sophers, will
(i)
(ii)
Now
that you have analysed the theories of the philoyou conclude by saying that one who believes
in them ought to be branded with infidelity and punished with
death ?
we
is
and punishment
hell.
in paradise
and
hell will
This problem, however formulated, is based on two ques(a) the origin of the world, and the possibility of the
emanation of the temporal from the Eternal ; and (b) departure from the regular course of events, either through the
creation of effects independent of causes, or through the origination of causes along lines different from the regular course
of events.
And we have settled both these questions.
tions
shall answer
To brand
far as three
compass individual
(iii)
objects.
their denial of the resurrection of bodies.
248
249
TahaJut
al-Falasifah
NOTES
P.
The End
13-16
I. II.
To initiate
by the imagination.
us ...
imagination (s).
18-20
//.
heart of man."
*J1
J^ljj
^ ~m ^>
- Jt^JI kJbklt
lj* fc-Jl
ffijsft)
^*
jka.
*jfj
'
(Cairo,
c***~ oil
P. 3,
/.
/.
5:
sterile genins.
Literally
I.
/.
tailless genius.
Literally
P. 4,
(these)
two
poles.
manner.
U.
4, p. 8 in
Bouyges.
. .
Aristotle's words are : ' We had perhaps better consider the universal
good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is
made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends
of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our
duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us
closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom ; for, while both are
dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.' (Section 6, p. 1096 a:
Ethica Nicomackea, tr. by D. W. Ross.)
prayer.
ti*Xll(, n ) UtsfjmA.
251
250
OyJ
~-ZJ\
J~&J ^
r)
Apostolic tradition
P.
7,
16-17
//.
When
27-30
tt.
S)^H
C*
*"
P.
p. 270 in Vol. I of Krehl's ed.
I.
Demonstration.
jU_^!|
P. 11.
v dr"
Sections
P. I*,
, ,
Posterior Analytics.
xiii
Reading
P. 17,
JQ,j!
/.
18
^UJIj^
Reading
I should
Lit. trans.
have
. .
7, p.
problem.
an enormous number
of leaves
Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a becoming
with the universe, the universe according to him having had a becoming. * Physica, p. 251 b, 11. 13-18.
Aristotle
had
in
by
P- 15.
'
?)'s
Reading
-**JI
^ J& j &*
J"** Cx*
translation.
an inner agitation
tt.
37-28
Literally
P. 19,
an agitation
37-39
. .
.'an action.
the beginning
. .
imagined.
Or, to use
term
6-8
tt.
P. 53,
26
1.
This
in j\J\
P. 54.
is
untrue.
Principles of Belief.
jU
35
The
'
I of
the IhyU'
Ab Hudhayl al-'Allaf.
a general summary
reference embodies
of
al-'Allaf's
well-known
position.
P. tf,
If.
33-3*
' '
Lit. trans,
P. 80,
tt.
31-33
do* strike,'
does burn,*
would be : does
1 did not
. . .
(i e.,
creation.
P. 88,
tt
: XLVIII, 6.
essence.
Think .
34 : Qur*an
27-28
does cut.*
with O, footnote 6
p. 25 in
"The
(in
his
available
(See al-Fihrist, p. 45.)
*"ta M, O, footnote
do not
. .
252
man
inside a
3-4
tt.
of j2rf-
intention expressed in the First Preface (pp. 4-5) does not seem to
in the present instance.
effects.
of
'
and
P. 25,
30 in Bygs.
The
obU-
4 p. 19 y in Bouyges.
47, p. 20 j
with E, G, L, M. N, O, V, footnote
is
choice
Usually, the word *'j* means resolve or determination. The
the word inclination ' to translate it is somewhat arbitrary : but that is the
way to express the unusual sense Ghazali (or the author quoted by him) Has
given to the word.
defy
text
II,
3a. p. 19
of its
morals.
Standard of Knowledge.
P* 14. 3*-33>
36
G, N, O,
P. ia,
t,
Literally:
action.
with G, H. O, R, footnote
F, P, V,
23-94
tt.
P. 18,
fa Aristotle's
vii, viii,
most clever.
Ghacall does not find the argument contemptible, as the Arabic words
l^l or jLil would suggest. The translation adopted here takes its cue from
Is
30
it.
etc
Lit. trans : I will make their position appear to be impure. It will be cut to
pieces through various objections. Sometimes my objections will force them into
the position of . .
P. 10,
15,
(?).
s*iaJI
Him.
Apostolic tradition
P. 8.
Notes
al- Fa last/ ah
Tdhafut
Byg.
;i
253
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Notes
j>ji . >j| *^i . ji^j, lyujt
f
&Jz) uj^
-
P. 9>,
ix : definitory formula.
Following is the definition of
(rr
<ju
-
U*
uy
tj
1
iyi
4, ia.-^
1^**
P. lis,
4*Ja* - gf^l
99
I.
//.
Lit.
I.
^} \^\
J^jjj
fl^ *j|
^1 ^
f
ego.
Literally: 'he-ness.'
ao-3
trans.
But
the definition of
if
'man'
P. 23a,
included
is
from
it
(as
it
is in
mere j jy 7
P. 109.
x : Problem VI.
*.
x,
oU^JI Ji
P. 34,
/.
This
J^-x6
Qor*In
P. 17a.
II.
1.
30).
Thus '
VIH.
" nothing
. . .
JUT V
6-18
29
knowledge."
LXXXV,
. .
Qorln : XCVI,
22.
pen.*
4.
I.
The
P. aoi,
//.
Muhammad
respecIr
1 asbestos.
:
set
up
XXV.
45
XLV,
. .
stunteth
"
He
is
XCI,
XXXII,
15.
have
. . .
if
'
amianthus.'
. .
it
"
235,1. 15:
//.
ij~i8
saw.
jJjS
body.
II.
3-s
Qur'an
tt.
Tafslr
7-9
Think
provision."
III, 163.
"The
spirits
Throne."
A slightly
different version
is
to be found in Baidawl's
is
ljjl
^J
P.
22.
9, 10 (Pickthall's trans.).
Apostolic tradition.
This
god.
. .
given in
II.
tively.
P. 191*
Lord."
of the quotation
Pp. I8l-i8a,
He
72.
fact that Ghazali regards a passage from the Bible ("But as it is written, c>e
hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the
things whi;h God hath prepated for them that love him."
I. Corinthians, ii, 9)
as a Quranic verse. (See D. B. Macdonald's The Life of al-Gkazttt ...
p. 76- in
The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. XX, 1899.)
Preserved Tablet
Qur'an
I.
" Every
XIX,
them."
Jl
This paragraph forms the heading in the Arabic text. The present
arrangement was found preferable for reasons of proportion and balance.
/.
XXXIV, 3.
15-16
Qur'an
5 il
No soul
XXXII, 17.
xo-xi
II.
Qur'an
footnote
Qur'an
is
i^^iUI
II.
I,
Interpellation.
P. 153,
B.
II,
P. 145,
-.
P. 33. U. 19-^0
Byg.
p. 163 in
i- a
11.
Qur'an
Qura'n
Reading
MS,
xx-xa
For
Lit. trans.
It.
if
. .
with
254
(itself)
a meet-er.
(<u>!
J^-j)
JU
All
fa*
^j
^U ^1 tfjj L j
"
oVJfc J
Hani? 'Iraqi has (in his notes on the traditions about Paradise quoted by
Ghazali towards the end of Ihya*) brought out the two different versions of this
255
Tahafut al-Falasifah
One has been given here (see note on 11. 18-20 of p.
by AbQ Hurairah, occurs in Ibn Majah (Sunan, p. 11,
tradition.
1).
related
p. 589)
In both these sources, the Prophet's words (reproducing those of God) are supple*
to the Quranic verse 1 XXXII, 17. Following is Muslim's
mented by a reference
version
BIBLIOGRAPHY
*ftl
Jli
JU
S^,* ^1 j* -y* VI *
Ajjl* 4.1
J* ^-Jl ,y
Vj O**- Oil Vj Olj (ij* V U poJUJI
,A-j
->U))I
^1
61s*"
^UJ cojuI J j 3*
*>SaJI Oljill
tr-
[(I'T
O*
tf-l*l
V^u^W *>*M
Hyderabad (On
(*"*"
LXXIX,
"Thoo
4_^Jljb
*jix+
eye."
^I^U^x.-^!
(*irr.
'
<Ss&l
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God."
? (b)
11.
irf^-JI
Sale London,
1938.
2.
),
^*3
_,
XLVIII, a3
publie par
1862.
(References to the Qur'an in these notes use the numbers given in Byg.]
Dictionaries
t.
H.
C.
Wyld, London,
1933.
ed.
by J,G. Hava
SjukJt.^i'i
256
lj
Mt
^J-tt
S. J. Beirut, 195 1.
_aJ|
<?>y*i
&
JUj >jJ|
257
JUjsJ
k~*J\ ay-UJI 6
Tahafut al-Falasifah
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iitll
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jli-Vl
jli- VI
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,y
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* irn-A .r** - f?-^'
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j&}\
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*i]
&$
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'
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liiJI
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v^ >')
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o^r
^^
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oW'ill
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V^ -r
r.r (oy^J b
UiJI
vW
-
Brockelmann
Supplementband
I,
p. 755.)
258
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RahmanOxford U.P,
(OU.JJI
(j^ljb
1951.
259
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tAA^/ir.r
Tahafut al-Falasifah
cd.
in-* lo5^)
by Maurice BouygesBeyrouth.
>l*T
- jut;
x 9 i 9.
^| jJLy
INDEX
_r
B
1932,
Abraham.
(See Brockelmann
JUJI J^i
_8
t.
Metaphysicstr. W. D. Boss.
2.
Categories
34-
56.
7.
9.
10.
11.
1313.
14.
W.
D.
Row-Oxford
JW
Ed*hill
g
Analytic*
a -tr. A.J. Jenkinson.
Analytic* Posterior*tr. R. G.
Mure
Toptca & D* Sophistic* EUnckistr.
W. A. ftBtan|
Pickarrfr*
k -a
-Ca mbridge.
Phystca-tT. R. P. Hardie ft R. K.
Gave
7
# Coeto-tt. J. L. Stocks
f
a '* * Corr#w_tr. H.
H. J
08 ""
Joachim
2?J
*f
MeteorohgtcaXx,
E. W. Webster.
De Mundott. E, S. Porster
De Animatr. J. A. Smith.
5/wrttetr.J.P. Oobson.
Problemaiatr. E. S. Forster
Ethica Nicomacheatr. W. D.
Ross.
>
2.
Phaedrus.
Pkaedo.
3-
Republic.
4*
Timaeus.
1.
by B. Jowett-Oxford UP..
Impression of
and
volitional,
Contrary on
nature
of,
27,
nature
favourite, 168
by A. E. Taylor-OKford U.P..
,928)
74* 136
as First Teacher, 4
criticism by, of Plato, 4
defective
translation
on
soul, 22,
infinite, 172
of
of, 4, 3
,
Botany, 180
as the servant of the soul, 184
, changes in, 216
, composed
of form and matter,
108
28. 33
works
uncaused, 82
Aristotle, 2
Plato's Tinuseus
pure, 13a
r,
Apogee,
prime, 142
Annihilation, 58
Vol. I
Vol. It
Vol. Ill
Vol. IV
of,
140, 162
67,
Agent Intellect, 38
Alchemy, 181
AUIf, Abu Hudhayl, 54
1931)
163, 164
146. 151
movement of,
no. in,
natural, 169
(A
eternal, 143
tence, 130
differentia of, 78
-,
D* Interpretationstt. E. M.
and existence, 78
,
-,
207, 208
Works of Aristotle
(Tr. into
Baghdad,
188. 190
94
Arithmetic, 9, 12
Ash'ariyya, 59
Astrology, 181, 185
Categories, 10
Atheism, 141
Cause, 88. 93
Atheist, 63
Atom,
206
and
effect,
73
260
26l
Index
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Cause, Efficient, hi,
m.
113,
129, 131,
*37.
,
Earth, roundness
39
strength
Effect, 72, 82
93
Faith, conflict
effectless, 74, 91
plurality in, 85
Second, 86
181, 185
flf.
Casuality, efficient, 75
Causation, necessary, 64
Celestial motion, rotatory, 33, 74, 140,
141, 155, i6i, 163
,
ff.,
Elements,
as source of temporal
, criticism of
nature
purpose
of,
164
of,
168
104,
cause
of,
self-knowledge of God,
, as above quantitative
determination, 43, 58
Cherubim, 172
Cognition, 198, 200
Form,
Eternal, relation
Contingent, 113
Eternal
Contraries, 62
of,
De generation*
Heaven
corruption*. 180
to temporal, 31
ff.,
as uncaused, 112
necessary, 132
necessity of, 96,
in
of,
no,
100,
of Particulars, 182
of stars, 86
Earth, as a globe, 39
262
80
knowledge
intellect,
56
space
and
time,
116
ff.,
143,
<
ff-.
of.
about particulars,
59
action, 104
Generosity. 106
38,
knowledge
153
as direct
agent
of
knows only
122, 133
ff.
temporary
ff.
of angels, 199
as Infinite Power. 23
Grammar, 232
Gravitation, 64
and human,
197
memory,
17a, 198
ff.
and causal,
35
as Cause of causes, 44
as eternal will, 16
of
with
Genera,
Faculty, animal
ff.
identical
of,
Geometry, 9, 12
God, as Agent, 67,, 103, 105
175
as eternal, 143
of,
attributes
109
events, 186
124, 130
104
attributes
38
and
Duality,
will-less, 63,
ity,
196
objects, 179
Dream symbols,
as
Galen,
97,
39
Knowledge, relation
as wilier, 143
intelligible,
as undefinable, 123
80
Extension, infinite, 38
**>l
as uncaused Cause, 89
132, 249
5, toi,
of colouredness, 51
ff.
Diversion, 199
Divine
102
as, 90
Devil. 95
ff.
as substance.
79, 222
ff.
Coelo, 180
as Perfect, 107
Be
as One, 96
as intention, 18, 19
nature of, 26
as Creator, 89. 90
as God, 109, 136, 139,
103,
104'.
of
161, 169
104
114,
the theory
ff.
108, 113
,
,
and commentator
80
events, 33
64
Aristole, 15
of,
God. as
147
oj, 146
and
216
with knowledge. 3
translator
Emanation (s),
of,
weakness
of
Fantasy, 219
Farabi, on soul, 94
84
uncaused, 74, 91
Casual relation, not a necessary one,
cause
Faculties,
of, 6, 9,
nations, 104
263
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Index
Intelligence, 151
Intelligence, fourfold
Hayuli, 60
Heavenfs).
1, 3, 118,
147, 231,
234.
236.
of, 1, 2,
self-knowledge
82
Jahm, the
Mu'tarilite, 160
Jesus. 36
Norm
possibility as
Prime, 74
an attribute
226, 237
190
of,
of, 233,
Paradise,
234
and commentator
Karramiyya,
on soul, 22, 94
on knowledge
Knowledge,
First
between,
and
of
God,
143,
relation with
Mathema-
9
Middle Term. 182
Metempsychosis, 242
Perigee, 33
Philology, 232
by primary inten
148
tion, 116
by second
225,
235,
241
will. 105,
Impossibility, 50, 52
115
-,
knowledge,
49, 79,
to objects of
115 ff
I54# , 5?(
Intention, 17
prophetic
La St Judgment, 246
come,
1,
Logic, 211
Lunar
264
of
Physics, 180
ff.
Moses, 182
Physiogonomy, 181
voluntary, 194, 96
Multiplicity,
eclipse,
t,
Plato, 2, 4, 13
ff
believed
that
the
world
was
created in time, 13
156
73,
74. 77
criticism of,
on
by
Aristotle,
Plenum, 38
109
109
differences of, with Ghazall,
8
Mutakallimtn, 58,60, 195. x99.aol.ai7.
100
causes
of,
236
ff.
Movement, 3
Life to
and nature
3,
Munkir, 841
,
of, 197
ideas, 3
possibility of,
Muhammad,
without
Moon.
158, 159
17
inten-
i 46
ff.
in relation
and intention,
88, 119
Particular, 133
171
conflict
faith, 3
soul,
160
Kingdom of Heaven,
of the
on knowledge
8, 58,
t,
of Aristotle, 5
guidance, 81
inorganic, 195
tics,
.translator
Intellect, helpless
Mean, doctrine
Ibn Sjna, 40
Inclination
Non-Being, 78
Jupiter, 20, 76
Immortality of
soul,
47
Jin, 95
God refuted,
as unoriginated, 47
bearer of potentiality, 227
Jurist, 152
of
Necessity, 96, 97
and
Horoscope, 193
162
50
as impediment, 144, 145
Hvr, 220
I 97, 199,
Intelligible Existent, 58
Materialism, 141
178, 181
-,
Mathematics, 207
of,
Pure or
246
82,
83
75,
Hereafter,
aspect of,
84
265
Tahafut al-Falasifah
Index
Plurality, implied in the second effect,
86
Poetry, 232
Possibility,
"9.
55.77/78.
Si,
85.
Revelation, 163
86,
as an
ff.
*43
82,
intellectual
jadg.
235,
ff.,
248
ment, 49
182
75 , ig 2 , 183, 100
Sacred Law,
19T
1, 5, 7, 35,
matters
nature of experience
'
155
communicative, 109
director of matter, 51
230
human,
121.
nature
.,
Time.
of.
and space, 43
science, 6, 7, 180 S.
of
in relation to
God, 37
, relative,
38
Tradition, in conflict with facts
to be
rejected, 7
232,
related to matter, 50
death, 95
before birth, 222
of, after
of,
177
movement,
of, 37,
67
165, 168
the
Plato on, 22
unity
50
not subsisting in body, 222
unity
as created, 23, 36
before the existence
224, 225
Believed, 13
193
22, 40, 94
181, 231,
judgment, 211
of, 22,
related to body,
53
world, 43
as mental, 31
Being, 83
Virtues, 200
Thing, kinds
Wkrt Gmlen
as simple, 227
God's knowledge
39, 43
as cognisant of intelligibles, ai
47 tUt I3 s,
,
Psychology, 197
Quiddity, 101,
empty,
of, 175,
Socrates, 2
33, 43,
Syllogism, 122
Quantity,
as eternal. 34
, as related to human
soul, 34
.contact with, cause of dream
symbols, 175
Space, 38, 39, 43, 135, 180, 199,
236
X76, 182
ff.
Substratum, 75,
Saturn, 20, 76
Principles of Belief,
53
1
266
267
-,
,
of, 54,
33