‫בס"ד‬
Shavuot-Parashat Naso 6-9 Sivan 5770
Megillat Rut: A Story of Chesed
by Yaakov Schiff
Every year on Shavuot Ashkenazic Jews read Megillat Rut. We
read about Elimelech and Naomi, about Rut and Orpah, about Rut’s
active choice to follow her widowed mother-in-law, and about her
eventual reward by way of the benevolent Go’el, Boaz.
This is a beautiful episode, but every year, we are faced with a
perplexing difficulty: Megillat Rut seems to be puzzlingly simplistic.
One may easily read the four Perakim of this Sefer and understand
the Peshat more or less completely, yet come away with little to no
understanding as to the purpose of this Sefer in Tanach, let alone
why it is read every year on Shavuot. What is Megillat Rut but a nice
story about the lives of a few obscure characters? What real relevance
does this narrative bear to the rest of Tanach other than its mention of
the lineage of David HaMelech at the very end of the sefer? What
special message lies in this Megillah that has any special significance
relative to Zeman Matan Torateinu? There seems to be nothing
extraordinary detailed in these Pesukim; there is only a tale of
essentially ordinary people acting in a just and proper manner.
Indeed, Rav Zeira, as quoted in the Midrash Rabbah on Megillat Rut,
states that this Megillah contains neither purity nor impurity and
teaches neither about any Issur nor Heter, neither prohibition nor
permission; in fact, the only reason why this Megillah was even
written, he claims, was to teach about the reward given to Gomlei
Chasadim, those who do acts of kindness. Can this truly be all that
Megillat Rut is about? Is this really reason enough to include it as one
of the Sifrei Kodesh of Tanach—and to feature it prominently as a
special part of our Shavuot experience?
In order to arrive at an answer to these questions, one need not
look any further than this week’s Parashah, Parashat Naso. There are
several important topics discussed in Naso, from the laws pertaining
to Sotah to the special priestly blessing, the Birkat Kohanim. Yet,
among all of these topics, there is one topic that stands out, one that
takes up a very large part of the Parashah. This, of course, is the
section detailing the Korbanot brought by the Nissi’im, the heads of
each tribe, at the Chanukat HaMishkan, the dedication of the
Mishkan. The reason why this portion is so lengthy is because the
Torah details every single Korban individually, despite the fact that
every Korban is exactly the same as the others. The question has often
been asked why this might be; why should the Torah go out of its
way to mention the same gift twelve times over? We know that the
Torah does not waste words. One celebrated answer that has been
given is that every Nassi purposely chooses to make the same exact
contribution as all the others who had come before him. Why?
Simply because they all understand that if one Nassi is to offer more
than the Nassi who came before him, he would compel all of the
Nissi’im after him to continue raising the standard, thereby forcing
the final Nassi to contribute an enormous amount of money!
Therefore, out of regard for his fellow leaders, each Nassi chooses to
give the same exact offering as the Nassi before him. Now, one might
vru, kue May 19-22, 2010 Vol. 19 No. 31
easily remark, was that really so special an occurrence that the Torah
should have to spend so many seemingly extra words on it?’
Answers HaKadosh Boruch Hu: ‘Why, absolutely!’ The Torah
mentions every single Nassi’s Korban individually just to teach us the
extraordinary value of simple, everyday Chesed.
Keeping this in mind, one may now respond with resounding
certainty to the questions raised earlier about the significance of
Megillat Rut. The fundamental objective of Megillat Rut is indeed no
more or less than teaching the value of, and the reward given for,
Gemilut Chasadim; the primary theme of this Sefer, central and
crucial to its message, is simply normal, everyday Chesed. For all its
seeming simplicity, Megillat Rut conveys a remarkable lesson about
the power of everyday actions, and of the importance and
significance of acting “Lifnim MeShurat HaDin”, above and beyond
the letter of the law. What emerges from this story is a message not
only worthy in and of itself, but essential to all of Torah and Yahadut.
The reader of this Megillah is left with an inspiring, astounding
message that these everyday righteous actions are in fact the essence
of Torah and Yahadut. As Rabbi Chaneles explained in the name of
Rav Taragin of Yeshivat Har Etzion, the ideals that we as Jews pursue
do not require us to act as “superhumans,” but rather as “super-
humans,” acting in a just and proper manner.
Specifically on Chag Shavuot, when we celebrate the anniversary
of Matan Torah, it is important that we hear Megillat Rut to remind
us that Yahadut is not all about Ma’amad Har Sinai and Gilui
Shechina, but about regular, everyday Midat Chasidut and Chesed.
Our job is Chesed and Ma’asim Tovim; in the merit of our actions,
Hashem will provide the Nissim and Niflaot.
The Ultimate Berachah
by Jonathan K arp
In Parashat Naso, Hashem presents three blessings, known as
Birkot HaKohanim, that the Kohanim recite every day during
Davening. The individual Berachot are (BeMidbar 6:24-26),
“Yevarechecha Hashem VeYishmerecha; Ya’eir Hashem Panav
EilechaViChunekah; Yisa Hashem Panav Eilecha VeYaseim Lecha
Shalom.” “Hashem will bless you and watch over you, Hashem will
shine his face upon you and give you grace, Hashem will lift up his
face to you and give you peace .” The number of words in each Pasuk
and Berachah increases progressively from three to five to seven. The
same progression can be seen in the content of the Brachot, as each
Berachah adds an additional element of Hashem’s blessing.
The first Berachah, as explained by Abarbanel, is focused entirely
on practical needs. The word “VeYishmerecha” refers to the material
possessions that Hashem will provide for us. The second Berachah, in
direct contrast to the first one, is a completely spiritual Berachah. As
Sforno explains, this Berachah refers to the idea that Hashem will
grant us understanding of the Torah. The third Berachah is the
ultimate blessing, a combination of the first two, granting both
physical and spiritual gain. However, the beginning of the third
Berachah seems problematic. How is “Yisa Hashem Panav Eilecha”
any better, if not any different from, “Ya’eir Hashem Panav
Eilecha”? Rashi (ad loc., “Yisa Hashem Panav Eilecha”), quoting
BeMidbar Rabbah, explains that “Hashem lifting his face” means
that He is suppressing His anger. The word “Panav” in this context
represents a face of wrath.
However, this explanation still poses a problem. If the
Berachah refers to Hashem suppressing his anger, it would have
negative connotations, as opposed to the Berachah before it, which
has positive connotations. Rashbah explains that “Panav” does not
always have to imply anger, but it can imply any emotion, either
positive or negative. Therefore, the third Berachah is not necessarily
negative.
The word ‘Panav’ can also be explained as showing favor. In
Masechet Rosh Hashanah (17b), a Giyoret is quoted as asking
Raban Gamliel about an apparent contradiction between two
phrases. In Birkot HaKohanim, “Yisa Hashem Panav Eilecha”
means that Hashem will show you favor, while elsewhere “Asher
Lo Yisa Panim VeLo Yikach Shochad” refers to the prohibition
against showing favor in judgment. Rabi Yosei HaKohein explains
to her that “Lo Yisah Panim” involves transgressions between
people while “Yisa Hashem Panav Eilecha” involves transgressions
between us and Hashem. This seems to imply that Hashem cares
more about man’s honor than His own honor.
There is a similar discussion in a Midrash in BeMidbar Rabbah.
The Midrash also asks why the Torah contradicts itself, and the
Midrash answers that the word ‘Panim’ refers to partiality.
Although partiality is forbidden in court, Bnei Yisrael do show
Hashem partiality, and in return, Hashem shows them partiality. In
what way do Bnei Yisrael show Hashem partiality? The answer lies
in something we do every day: Birkat HaMazon. Although the
Torah states (Devarim 8:10) “VeAchalta VeSavata UVeirachta”
“And you shall eat and be satisfied, and you shall bless Hashem,”
we show partiality towards Hashem by thanking Him after eating
even if we are not fully satisfied. Since Bnei Yisrael act beyond the
letter of the law, Hashem goes beyond the letter of His law by
granting Bnei Yisrael undeserved forgiveness. Therefore, the third
Berachah, in which Hashem acts to a further extent to show favor
towards Bnei Yisrael, is greater than the second Berachah.
Rav Shimshon Rephael Hirsch explains that the third Berachah
represents the climax of all of the Berachot. The physical and
spiritual gains of the first two Berachot lead to the third Berachah.
This Berachah speaks of the nearness of Hashem to us, the ultimate
blessing. Hopefully, we will all be Zocheh to recognize these
blessings in our lives this Shavuot and in the future.
Milk or Meat?
by Chaim G artenberg
On Shavuot, one of the most celebrated and well known
Minhagim is that of eating dairy products on the Chag. Less known
are the reasons behind this practice.
The Ramah explains that it is a custom to eat dairy on Shavuot,
as the Mishnah Berurah cites the famed explanation that Bnei
Yisrael did not have the time to Kasher their utensils and prepare
meat according to Halacha, and therefore they ate dairy.
However, the concept of Simchat Yom Tov is also key to the
discussion of milk or meat on Yom Tov. The Meshech Chochmah
goes as far as to say that a Jewish Holiday without explicit Simchah
on it is like learning Torah without intent to apply it. Furthermore,
meat is noted in several sources, most prominently by the Alshich,
as being a direct correlation to this Simchah. A question that then
arises is, how can we have a concept of dairy on Shavuot when we
are told that meat is a food for facilitating Simchat Yom Tov?
The most noted source for this concept of meat on Yom Tov is
found in the Gemara (Pesachim 109a), where Rabi Yehuda ben
Beteira comments that in the time of the Beit HaMikdash, there was
no Simcha without meat, but that in today’s time, we are forced to
use wine. This source supports the concept of dairy meals, as meat is
seen to be optional for our current unfortunate circumstance.
The Yam Shel Shlomoh agrees with this, commenting that while
meat is still the preferred method for Simcha, meat was obligatory on
Yom Tov only during the time of the Beit HaMikdash, where not only
did we have meat but also Korbanot to Hashem. Furthermore, he
explains that unlike in today’s time, there was no wine at the meals,
and therefore our drinking of wine replaces the mandate of meat.
This too supports our practice of eating dairy.
However, the Torah Temimah offers an alternate interpretation
of the Gemara noted above. He states that based on the wording of
the Gemara, which uses the word Basar, meat in general, and not
specifically Shelamim, meat of a Korban, the Gemara’s intent is to
include all meat, even Chullin, in a time in which one is unable to
give Korbanot, such as today.
Considering this, our original question still stands. However, the
Beit HaLevi offers a compromise that would solve this dilemma. He
explains that on Shavuot, one should make sure to have a meal of
dairy as well as one of meat. He explains that according to the
Midrash, when Hashem gave Bnei Yisrael the Torah, the Malachim
complained about giving such an epitome of holiness to mankind.
Hashem responded to them that Bnei Yisrael were indeed worthy of
the Torah over the Malachim, citing the Malachims’ visit to Avraham,
where they ate milk and meat together - a practice from which Bnei
Yisrael are stringent in abstaining - and are therefore deserving of the
Torah. Therefore, on Shavuot, we eat both milk and meat to fulfill the
Zeicher aspects of milk, the Simcha of meat, and the bridging of the
two through the impetus of Matan Torah.
May we all be able to learn from this lesson and commemorate
this Simcha of Yom Tov and the receiving of the Torah this Shavuot
and all Yamim Tovim to come.
Bittul Geirut (Nullification of a Conversion)
– Part Two
by R abbi Chaim Jachter
With great trepidation we begin to present the great debate of
2008 between two of the greatest Dayyanim (rabbinic judges), Rav
Shlomo Dichovsky and Rav Avraham Sherman, regarding
nullification of conversions. The trepidation stems from not only the
great respect owed to these outstanding Rabbanim but also from the
profound implications of this debate. In this column, we have
presented quite a number of debates between Rav Dichovsky and
Rav Sherman on issues of major importance. Nonetheless, this
particular debate does not impact only the Jewish status of a mother
and her children in the Ashdod area but also thousands of
individuals who have converted through the special conversion
courts established by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate. Thus we begin our
discussion of this matter with full awareness of sensitivities to the
variety of opinions regarding an issue that has great impact not only
on our generation but on generations to come.
The Special Conversion Courts
The great immigration from the former Soviet Union to Israel
beginning in the late 1980’s has given rise to an enormous social and
Halachic problem. A great number of these immigrants are either not
Jewish or only possibly Jewish. They were granted Israeli citizenship though he/she did not observe Mitzvot either before or after the
under Israel’s Law of Return, which grants automatic eligibility for conversion. Rav Dichovsky writes, “Anyone who has been present
citizenship even to one who is married to a Jew and even to one who at one time at a conversion is aware that it is a very emotional
has only one Jewish great-grandparent. The situation of these experience for all those in attendance, especially, of course, for the
immigrants is particularly difficult, given that Israel is a Jewish State, convert. It is very likely that in that emotion of the moment of
and, therefore, they wish to convert to Judaism. Many also regard immersion that indeed she was fully committed to Torah observance
themselves, out of sheer ignorance of Torah, as “Jewish” before they and only later did she veer from the [Torah] path.”
moved to Israel, and they very much wish to be regarded as Jewish Rav Dichovsky (following Rav Kook, Teshuvot Da’at Kohein
by mainstream Israeli society. The problem is that most of these number 153, cited in last week’s essay) even proves his argument
people do not wish to be observant of Torah law, which creates a from the fact that the entire Jewish People converted at Mount Sinai,
serious Halachic problem. as stated by the Rambam (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:1-3). This
We noted in an essay archived at www.koltorah.org that the conversion was recognized as valid by none other than Hashem,
overwhelming majority of classic and modern Halachic authorities even though we (or at least some of us) worshipped the Eigel
view Kabbalat Mitzvot, acceptance of Mitzvot, as a non-negotiable HaZahav only forty days after that great moment!
component of conversion. Thus, converting people who are not
Rav Sherman’s Criticism
committed to observing the Torah and its commandments constitutes
Rav Avraham Sherman strongly rejects Rav Dichovsky’s
a very serious problem. In an attempt to ameliorate this difficult
approach. He argues, “The test of Kabbalat Mitzvot is not measured
situation, Israel’s chief rabbinate established special rabbinic courts
by that moment he makes the oral declaration that she accepts the
for conversion. According to media reports, the goal of these courts
Mitzvot, as Rav Dichovsky states. The true test is the factual
was to facilitate large-scale conversion of non-Jewish citizens of the
circumstances, the lifestyle of the convert before the moment of
State of Israel by somewhat relaxing the requirements of Kabbalat
immersion. Her shared life
Mitzvot.
with a man who is removed
The Ashdod Case of 2007
Remez HaShavua by Neil Bodner from Torah and Mitzvah
According to media The Mishnah (Avot 6:2) states, “ ‫שאין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק‬ observance and her living in a
reports, a convert and her ‫בתלמוד תורה‬,” “A man is truly free only if he is involved in Torah society that does not observe
Jewish-born husband were study.” The Sefat Emet explains that Judaism’s set of laws is not Torah and Mitzvot, reflect
divorced according to a set of restrictions but a release from the physical inclinations what occurred at the moment
Halachah but were denied a of the material world, and that is true freedom. The Sefer of acceptance of Mitzvot.
rabbinic court ruling that the HaChinuch (Mitzvah 306) explains that during the Sefirah period, There is no logic and one
couple were divorced. The we count the days until Shavuot like a slave waiting to be freed, cannot even consider removing
rabbinic court is reported to as we are waiting to be freed through Kabbalat HaTorah. The that specific moment from the
have ruled that it is highly Jews who came out of Mitzrayim were amazed at the tremendous continuum of a secular lifestyle
questionable if the woman amount of freedom they just received. Hashem then gave them devoid of a religious life of
(and her children) was Jewish, the Torah, as if to remind them what true freedom is. Torah and Mitzvot and declare
and, therefore, they were not The Remez: The phrase ‫שאין לך בן חורין אלא מי שעוסק בתלמוד תורה‬ that at that moment there was a
granted the document. The has the Gematria (numerical value) of 2448, the exact year revolutionary movement of
rabbinic court went as far as to (counting from the creation of the world) our Jewish nation was entering the Jewish religion, its
call into question all of the freed from Mitzrayim and immediately given the Torah. principles, beliefs and Mitzvot,
conversions administered by when a moment after the
the special conversion authority due to the claimed lack of Kabbalat conversion there is no expression and actualization of the religious
Mitzvot of the majority of those whom they converted. The ruling movement that occurred as it were in her heart.”
went even further, arguing that the Dayyanim who sat on these
Rav Moshe Feinstein’s Ruling
rabbinic courts were disqualified to serve as rabbinic judges due to
Interestingly, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Even
their adopting a lenient standard regarding Kabbalat Mitzvot. Thus
HaEzer 3:4) grappled with this issue in a 1968 ruling regarding a
the Ashdod Beit Din called into question the validity of a conversion
situation in Winnipeg, Canada. A non-Jewish man was converted,
in which the individual, in fact, did commit to a Torah observant life
apparently by an Orthodox rabbi, and married a Jewish woman in
and indeed lived as an observant Jew since the conversion. The basis
an apparently Orthodox ceremony. The rabbi, however, did not
of this ruling is the requirement for the presence of a Beit Din during
require a Berit Milah, since the man had already been circumcised.
a conversion (Yevamot 46b and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3).
This stands in contradiction to Halachah, which regards this as an
Rav Dichovsky’s Approach unresolved matter of dispute and thus requires ritual removal of
The woman appealed the Ashdod Beit Din’s ruling to the blood (Hatafat Dam Berit) in order to avoid the dispute (Tosafot
rabbinic court of appeals in Jerusalem. Rav Shlomo Dichovsky, a Shabbat 135a s.v. Lo Nechleku and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1). The
long time member of this special Beit Din, ruled in a number cases couple divorced civilly, and the husband disappeared and could not
such as these (one such ruling appears in Techumin 29:267-280) that be located in order for him to give his wife a Get. Since the local
although he would not necessarily have administered many of these rabbis felt that it was impossible to obtain a Get for the wife, they
conversions, one cannot nullify the conversions BeDiEved (post asked Rav Feinstein if it was possible to invalidate the marriage by
facto). While he agrees that Kabbalat Mitzvot constitutes an absolute declaring the conversion null and void due to the man’s lack of
requirement, Rav Dichovsky focuses on the fact that it is quite Kabbalat Mitzvot.
possible that during the actual moment of conversion, the immersion Rav Moshe writes that if an Orthodox rabbi administered the
in the Mikvah, the convert sincerely accepted the yoke of Torah, even conversion, one should assume that he properly performed the
ceremony in accordance with Halachah, even though the fact that he
did not require Hatafat Dam Berit reflects poorly on his fidelity to
Halachah. Nonetheless, since in this case, “We saw that he did not
refrain from the Torah’s prohibitions even one day,” it appears that
he never accepted the observance of Torah and Mitzvot. Rav Moshe,
though, raises the possibility that perhaps, at the moment of
immersion, he sincerely accepted Mitzvot, an argument similar to
Rav Dichovsky’s.
Rav Moshe seriously considers this as a possibility, as we find
cases in Halachah in which we are concerned that a person
experiences an immediate change of ideology. Rav Moshe cites the
ruling of the Shach (Y.D. 1:8) validating the Kashrut of an animal
slaughtered by a Shocheit who subsequently converted to another
religion later that very day. The Shach assumes that the fact that he
converted later that day does not reflect that the slaughterer was an
apostate earlier in the day at the time of the slaughter (which would
invalidate it). Rav Moshe, however, notes that the Shach rules
accordingly only because before the slaughter, the Shocheit was a
Torah-observant Jew. Thus, in a conflict between the Chazakah
(status quo) prior to the slaughter and after the slaughter, the Shach
rules we follow the prior Chazakah (Chazakah DeMeiIkara).
Accordingly, Rav Moshe suggests that since the husband was
not observant either before or after the conversion, one may assume
that at the time of conversion, he remained the same as he was before
and after that moment, and that it is obvious that the husband’s
acceptance was insincere and therefore invalid, an argument similar
to Rav Sherman’s. Rav Moshe was inclined to invalidate the
conversion but noted opinions that apply a current status quo
retroactively (Chazakah DeHashta) only in a case in which the status
quo was bolstered by a Rov (behavioral assumption created by what
occurs in a majority of cases). Thus, since no such Rov exists in
regards to the case of the husband’s conversion one might not be able
to project the husband’s non-observance of Halachah post conversion
to what occurred at the time of conversion.
Rav Moshe, however, permitted the woman in question to
remarry without a Get due to a Sefek Sefeika, a double doubt –
perhaps the conversion is invalid due his insincere acceptance of
Mitzvot, and perhaps the conversion is invalid due to the failure to
perform a Hatafat Dam Berit. Most relevant to our discussion is that
Rav Moshe considers Rav Dichovsky’s argument and regards it as a
Safeik (unresolved question). Thus, Rav Moshe grants some validity
to both Rav Dichovsky’s and Rav Sherman’s arguments. In practice,
it would seem that one should regard a case of a conversion
administered by Orthodox rabbis in which the convert engaged in
wholesale violations of Halachah both before and after the
conversion as a Safeik, possibly invalid, following Rav Moshe
Feinstein.
Invalidating the Rabbinic Courts
However, Rav Sherman’s arguments invalidating the members
of the special conversion Batei Din appears to be incorrect. Rav
Sherman does not cite Rav Moshe Feisntein’s (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe
1:60) “limited justification” of those rabbis who adopt a lenient
approach to conversion. Even though Rav Moshe does not endorse
the lenient approach, he does not even consider ruling that those
rabbis who adopt the lenient approach are disqualified from serving
as Dayyanim. Moreover, in Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Y.D. 1:159, Rav
Moshe refrains from counseling a practicing rabbi to spurn the
lenient approach to conversion, “since there are many rabbis who
accept converts such as these and thus I do not pronounce a
prohibition [to perform such a conversion]….You should use your
best judgment on how to act in this situation”.
Rav Moshe understood the pressure faced by Orthodox rabbis
serving less-than-Orthodox congregants, and while he does not
endorse converting someone who, in all likelihood, will not observe
Mitzvot, he does not condemn it either. Orthodox rabbis are faced
with the same quandary as to how to service the great numbers of
non-observant Jews in the State of Israel. While there are certainly
different approaches to this issue, and the majority opinion favors the
strict approach, those rabbis who adopt the lenient approach are
nonetheless following a legitimate minority opinion in Halachah and
should not be condemned as disqualified from service as a Dayyan.
Moreover, even Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvot
Minchat Shlomo 1:35), who strongly advocates the strict approach to
Geirut and criticizes those who adopt the lenient approach as
violating Lifnei Iveir (causing others to sin), does not state that those
who adopt the lenient approach are invalidated as rabbinic judges.
Moreover, the Dayyanim of the special conversion courts, to a great
extent, are following in the footsteps of Rav Uzziel (cited in last
week’s essay), who famously advocated a lenient approach to
conversions. It is shocking to find Rav Sherman condemning the
rabbis of the special conversion courts as rejecting “all Halachic
authorities.” Rav Sherman himself considers Rav Uzziel as a
legitimate Halachic authority, as he cites him on page 43 of his
lengthy responsum. Even Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Teshuvot
VeHanhagot 1:611 and 4:230) does not rule decisively that the lenient
rabbinic court judges are disqualified, since “they believe they are
performing a Mitzvah.” Indeed, Rav Gedalia Axelrod, a Rabbinic
court judge in Haifa who adopts a very strict stance towards
conversion standards (see his essay in Shurat HaDin volume three),
rules that the lenient rabbis are not disqualified from service. Rav
Sherman adopts the harshest stance towards these lenient rabbis and
seems to adopt a position that is beyond mainstream Halachic
thought.
Conclusion
The debate as to whether to recognize a conversion conducted by
Orthodox rabbis for a convert who did not observe Torah either
before or after conversion is regarded by Rav Moshe Feinstein as
Safeik, possibly invalid. However, conversions performed by
Orthodox rabbis who adopt the lenient approach conversion are not
automatically disqualified. If one converted by a panel of rabbis who
adopt the lenient approach observed Torah before and after the
conversion, Rav Moshe Feinstein deems the conversion as
unquestionably valid.
To view an additional article on the topic of Shavuot by
Gavi Berger, please visit our website: www.koltorah.org
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