Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
June 9, 1999
G.R. No. 121462
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CIPRIANO DE VERA, SR., @ "AMBOS", accused-appellant.
Vitug, J.:
It was a celebration which started with revelry and ended in tragedy. The fatalities were 13-year old
Gerardo Valdez y Torres and 29-year old Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno. Accused of having killed the two
victims was Cipriano De Vera, Sr., an uncle of Gerardo, who was charged in three separate informations,
inclusive of a charge for illegal possession of firearm, hereinbelow recited:
In Criminal Case No. U-7809 That at past 12:00 o'clock midnight of December 31, 1993 and at dawn on the 1st day of January, 1994,
or thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan, municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Perlita Ferrer y
Mamorno, inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds in the head, which directly caused her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.1
In Criminal Case No. U-7810 That at dawn on the 1st day of January, 1994 and past 12:00 o'clock midnight of December 31, 1993, or
thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan, municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a firearm, taking advantage of
nighttime and the sporadic burst of firecrackers on New Year's day, with evident premeditation, treachery
and deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Gerardo Valdez y Torres, a 13-year old boy, inflicting upon him fatal wounds in the head, which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.2

In Criminal Case No. U-7811That at dawn on the 1st day of January, 1994 and past 12:00 o'clock midnight of December 31, 1993, or
thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control one (1) firearm with ammunitions without authority of law; which
firearm he used in shooting Gerardo Valdez y Torres, a 13-year old boy, and Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno, on
the above-cited date, time and place.
That accused is indicted in two (2) separate Informations for the crime of Murder for the fatal shooting of
Gerardo Valdez y Torres and Homicide for the fatal shooting of Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno, before this
Honorable Court.
Contrary to P.D. No. 1866.3
After a joint trial that followed the arraignment and the plea of "not guilty" entered by the accused with the
assistance of counsel, Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 38, found the accused guilty as charged and so sentenced him, thusly:
Wherefore, in the light of the considerations discussed above, the court hereby, renders judgment in the
above-entitled cases as follows:
In Criminal Cases Nos. U-7809 and U-7810, the court finds the accused Cipriano de Vera, Sr. alias
Ambos, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Homicide defined and
penalized by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the costs.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Valdez, the sum of
P20,285.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity and moral damages of P20,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The court likewise orders the accused to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Perlita Ferrer the sum of P35,000.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and P2,040,000.00 as loss of earning capacity of the late Perlita Ferrer without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. U-7811, the court likewise finds and holds the accused, Cipriano de Vera, Sr. alias
Ambos, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions,
penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended, and conformable thereto,
pursuant to law, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term of twelve (12)
years ofprision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.4
The trial judge briefly narrated the evidence successively presented by the prosecution and the defense.
Evidence For the Prosecution. Neil Valdez, brother of Gerardo, recalled that at around midnight of 31 December 1993, he and Gerardo
were exploding firecrackers when he noticed his uncle, Cipriano De Vera, Sr., go under a mango tree.
Minutes later, he was startled by a gunshot, followed by the falling body of his brother, Gerardo, to the
ground. When he looked around, he saw the accused, whom he clearly recognized, holding a longbarrelled gun, about one meter long, also locally known as "sumpak". The accused was about 8 to 9
meters away from him. Just as he started to assist his brother, Neil heard shouts, about 40 to 50 meters
away, that Perlita was also dead ("aynatay metten ni Perlita"). He learned moments later that Perlita was
shot on the left side of the forehead above the left eye. The accused tried to flee from the scene. Neil
proceeded to give chase but he was not able to overtake the accused. He speculated that the shooting
was an offshoot of the land dispute between his father and the accused.
Samuel Nicer testified that a few days before the incident, he saw the accused sporting a gun. Around
midnight of 31 December 1993, he, together with Rodrigo Gallardo, Raffy Bustamante and some other
friends, again chanced upon the accused holding the accused holding the same one-meter long gun,
which the latter, in fact, pointed at them. At about 12:10 a.m. of 01 January 1994, while on his way home,
the witness saw the accused walking towards the east, in front of the Dominguez ricemill, still carrying his
"sumpak."
Jesusa Valdez, sister of Gerardo, stated that at about 10:45 p.m. of 31 December 1993, she and Gerardo
were invited by Mary Ann, daughter of the accused, to partake of the New Year's meal at the latter's
house. While thereat, they were warned by the accused not to go out of their house that night because
there would be a traitor (judas) in the vicinity. Later, at their own house, she was at the terrace watching
Neil and Gerardo explode firecrackers when she saw the accused, then under a mango tree, shoot
Gerardo, using a firearm about 2-1/2 feet long. While she went to succor her brother, she saw the
accused going eastward. She attested to the existence of a feud between her father and the accused.
SPO1 Asterio Dismaya, a member of the Philippine National Police and duty investigator, said that their
office received in the morning of 01 January 1994 a report on the shooting incident. He proceeded to
Cayambanan, Urdaneta, with one Sgt. Reyes and conducted a "spot investigation." A sketch of the
surroundings showed that the bullet traveled from the east to the west direction and that there was no
obstruction between Gerardo and Perlita, the fence along the road being only about one meter high. The
accused was fingered to be the culprit responsible for the shooting incident. The latter's wife told the
police officers that the accused had already left for Manila at midnight of 31 December 1993. SPO1
Dismaya was later to learn that the accused had "surrendered" to Sgt. Prudencio Cawagan of the
Urdaneta Police.

Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Rural Health Officer of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, declared having conducted an
autopsy examination on 01 January 1994 and 03 January 1994, respectively, on the remains of Gerardo
Valdez and Perlita Ferrer. Gerardo had sustained three gunshot wounds; viz: The first wound, on the right
parietal region, behind the right ear, was rounded, about 8 mm. x 7 mm., directed inwards with a point of
entry but no point of exit; the pellet was found on the muscle liner at the left temple of the victim. The
second wound, 17 mm. x 12 mm., at the mid-parietal region, middle part of the lower neck just above the
nape, also indicated a point of entry but no point of exit; the slug was found in the right occipital of the
brain. The third wound, 15 mm. x 9 mm., in the mid-occipital region, at the back of the neck above the
second wound, likewise had a point of entry and no point of exit; the slug was found in the cranial cavity.
Dr. Gonzales testified that the distance between the first and second wounds was approximately two
inches and about an inch between the second and third wounds. The first slug went through the brain and
stopped at the left temple; the second went through the brain and caused bleeding; and the third
penetrated the skull and entered the brain. According to him, all the wounds were fatal. The slugs were
kept in his office since he was not asked to turn them over to the police. The autopsy on Perlita revealed
that she had suffered a gunshot wound on the left eyebrow. It had a point of entry but no point of exit, and
the slug was found at the right parietal lobe of the brain. The wound was fatal. He said that the slugs he
recovered from Gerardo Valdez were similar to the slugs he recovered from Perlita Ferrer which he also
kept in his office.
Angelita Ferrer, the mother of Perlita, upon learning that the latter had been shot, repaired at once to the
hospital but Perlita had already expired by the time she arrived. At the time of her death, Perlita was 29
years old, single, and earning P8,000.00 a month as the manager of a restaurant in Quezon City. The
witness said that she spent P16,995.00 for her daughter's night vigils and P15,000.00 for the funeral.
Dalia Ferrer stated that she and her sister Perlita were in Cayambanan for the New Year's celebration at
the invitation of Julito De Vera. The house of Gerardo was about 40 to 50 meters from where her sister
was standing when shot. Perlita was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital where Neil Valdez informed her
that the assailant was the accused.
Renato Valdez, the father of Gerardo, confirmed that he and the accused, a cousin, had a dispute over
the land given to Renato's father by their grandfather of which the accused wanted a share. At about
12:05 in the morning of 01 January 1994, he was at the house of his friend Meni in Nancalabasaan,
Urdaneta, when informed by his son Neil that Gerardo had been shot by the accused. He promptly
proceeded to the Sacred Heart Hospital but he was unable to reach his son alive. He spent P2,375.30 for
Gerardo's hospitalization, P4,200.00 for the vigil, P4,000.00 for the lompos, P3,000.00 for the tomb,
P300.00 for the lapida, P200.00 for the church rites, P10.00 for the burial permit and P5,000.00 for the
funeral expenses. Gerardo was in first year of high school when he died.
Evidence For the Defense. Cipriano De Vera, Jr., a son of the accused, claimed that around 9:00 p.m. of 31 December 1993, he was
on guard duty at the Iglesia ni Cristo Chapel in Cayambanan with Neil Valdez, Jovito Opinion and Julius

De Vera. Neil left at around 10:00 p.m. after being informed that his brother Gerardo had been shot. Neil
returned at 12:15 a.m. of 01 January 1994 and stayed with the group until 2:00 a.m. The witness said that
Neil used to be a member of the church until he was expelled therefrom.
Glenda De Vera testified that on the eve of 31 December 1993, she celebrated the coming of the New
Year with her family, relatives and some guests. It was her father, the accused, who prepared the food for
them. Her father, as well as some of the visitors, left the house at around 10:00 p.m. When her father
failed to return, her sister looked for him in Barangay Paurido where she was informed by relatives that he
already had left for Manila. She testified that the accused had worked in Manila and would go home to
Urdaneta only thrice a year. At around 1:00 a.m. of 01 January 1994, she learned that one of their
neighbors had been hit by a stray bullet. When she and her sister Grace were informed that their father
was being sought by the police, Grace went to Manila to apprise the accused about it. Her father was not
able to return to Pangasinan immediately but later he "surrendered" to the police authorities.
Romeo Barcelona, a relative of the wife of the accused, stated that in the evening of 31 December 1993,
at about 11:00 p.m., the accused was at their house in Barangay Paurido, where he helped prepare the
food they would partake for the evening celebration. The accused finished cooking at 1:00 a.m. of 01
January 1994. After eating, they went to bed and woke up at around 6:00 a.m. Shortly thereafter, the
accused left for Manila.
The accused, Cipriano De Vera, Sr., asserted that he arrived in Urdaneta from Manila on 27 December
1993. In the evening of 31 December 1993, he cooked the food for his family. After taking their supper at
about 8:15 p.m., his children went to the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel while he departed for Barangay Paurido,
Urdaneta, to cook for his cousin, Felicidad Barcelona. He arrived in Barangay Paurido at 10:30 p.m.,
celebrated with his relatives and there spent the night. He woke up at 6:00 a.m., and left for Manila after
taking a bath and having his breakfast. He arrived in Manila in the afternoon of 01 January 1994 and
proceeded to work the next day. When he returned from his work that day, he was surprised to find his
daughter, Grace, who went to see him about a pending warrant for his arrest. He was able to return to
Urdaneta only on 06 January 1994. After attending a religious service at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel, he
proceeded to Barangay Paurido. He went to the Urdaneta police station on 08 January 1994 to inquire
about a warrant of arrest issued against him on a pending rape charge but he was promptly put to jail.
The accused sought to discredit the testimony of Neil Valdez and surmised that the latter had testified
against him for his having given previously a warning against Neil's visits to his daughter and also
because the Valdez family would want him to vacate the lot which he and his family were occupying. On
the other hand, prosecution witness Samuel Nicer, the accused claimed, also held grudges against him
(the accused). Nicer suspected that Glenda and Grace, daughters of the accused, to be the persons
responsible for the expulsion of Nicer from the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Neil Valdez and Samuel Nicer were presented on rebuttal. Neil said that neither Cipriano De Vera, Jr., nor
the accused was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo, either in Cayambanan or in Nancalabasaan,
Urdaneta. Nicer, for his part, denied having been expelled from the Iglesia ni Cristo. Also presented at the

witness stand was Isagani Pagaduan, Cayambanan Secretary of the Iglesia Ni Cristo from 1985 to 1993
who attested that Neil Valdez had never been expelled from the church. He also declared that on 31
December 1993, Neil Valdez stayed at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel only until 10:00 p.m., and that the latter
did not come back that night after leaving the place.
As aforesaid, the court a quo, presided over by Judge Antonio M. Belen, found for the prosecution and
convicted the accused. Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7659 on account of the imposition by the trial court of the death penalty.
In challenging the decision that has convicted him of all the charges, accused-appellant contends that I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESSES
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT LIABLE FOR PERLITA FERRER'S
DEATH.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT AND JURISPRUDENCE.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF A COMPLEX CRIME
CONSTITUTING CRIMES ALLEGED IN SEPARATE INFORMATIONS.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING MOTIVE AS IMPORTANT FOR CASES IN
WHICH THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED IS DOUBTFUL.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 1866.
G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF SEPARATE OFFENSES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS IT
RESOLVED ALL DOUBTS AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF THE APPELLANT TO A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.

V. THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

PENALTY AND THUS VOID.
A. MURDER AS DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7659 IS NOT A HEINOUS CRIME.
B. THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO REIMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER.
C. THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. ECHEGARAY DESERVES REEXAMINATION.5
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of, including particularly the assessment on the credibility
of witnesses made by, a trial court are accorded a great degree of cogent reasons, be disturbed on
appeal. In this instance, the Court sees no justification to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the trail
court and its holding that accused-appellant indeed is responsible for the death of the two victims.
Neil Valdez, testifying before the trial court, categorically pointed to the accused to be the perpetrator of
the killings. Neil stated:
Q. Do you know Gerardo Valdez y Torres, the victim in Criminal Case No. U-7810?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is he now?
A Already dead, sir.
Q What age when your brother, Gerardo Valdez, died?
A He was 13 years old, sir.
Q Do you know also the accused in these three (3) cases, Cipriano de Vera?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know Cipriano de Vera?
A He is my uncle and a neighbor, sir.
Q Why is he your uncle?
A Because the father of Cipriano de Vera and the father of my father are brothers, sir.
Q How is Cipriano de Vera properly called in your place?
A Alias "Ambos," sir.

Q You said you are neighbors, how far is your house to his house?
A It is around fifteen (15) meters away, sir.
Q Now, during the midnight of December 31, 1993, do you know where you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you? at about midnight of December 31, 1993?
A I was beside my brother, Gerardo Valdez, lighting firecrackers, sir.
Q Why were you lighting firecrackers?
A It was eve of New Year or New Year's eve, sir.
Q At what particular place were you near your brother, Gerardo Valdez, at that time?
A Infront of our house, sir.
Q What barangay?
A Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir.
Q Now, as you were infront of your house lighting firecracker near your brother, do you observe any
unusual incident that took place thereat?
A I noticed the accused Ambos went to the road and then returned under the mango tree and thereafter,
he held a shot bang and I saw my brother, Gerardo Valdez fell down and when I looked around I saw
Cipriano de Vera holding a long firearm and pointed to the direction of my brother, Gerardo Valdez, sir.
Q Kindly describe this long firearm which you saw pointed by the accused at your brother?
A One (1) meter long and the barrel is iron pipe, sir.
Q Do you know what is the popular name of that firearm which you saw in the possession, control and
custody of the accused?
A They called "sumpak," sir, or called "Pasoot."
Q What is the ammunition used in that "sumpak" or "palsoot?"
A Gauge 12, sir.
Q What is the gauge 12 bullet called for, what kind of firearm?

A Bullet of a shotgun, sir.

Q What did you see the accused do as he was holding that "sumpak" directed to your brother at the
time?
A When I lighted firecracker there was a big "bang" and I saw the accused pointed direct to my brother
and when I looked at my brother, he fell down, sir.
Q How far were you from the accused when you saw directed the firearm towards your brother and shot
him?
ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
We will object, Your Honor. There is not testimony as to the shooting by the accused to his brother. This
witness testified on he light firecracker and he heard a big "bang" and saw holding iron bar. He did not
say, he shot, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q How far were you when you saw the accused pointing that "sumpak" towards your brother?
WITNESS: A Eight (8) to nine (9) meters away, sir. FISCAL: Q Will you demonstrate how the accused
held the long firearm (sumpak) directed to your brother and heard this loud sound "bang?" WITNESS: A
Like this, sir (Witness now demonstrating to the Court extending his right hand at the right side and the
left is extended forward as if holding something). Q What further action did the accused, if any, while he
was holding that firearm? A I saw the accused pushed something on the "sumpak" and my brother was
hit, sir. Q As the accused has made that motion pushing forward with his right hand, what did you see as
a result of that action made by the accused on the gun, if any? A The gun fired, sir. Q Now, when you
saw your brother hit by the action of the accused firing the gun, what more, if any, did you observe? ATTY.
EVANGELISTA: We object, Your Honor. There is no such fired the gun. What he said, he pushed
something. He did not fire any trigger, Your Honor. COURT: The accused pushed something. Q What
else did you observe, if any? WITNESS: A After the gun fired, I saw my brother fell down and when I
embraced him he was injured on his head, sir. FISCAL: Q Simultaneously, when you saw your brother
was hit, what more did you observe in the surroundings, if any? WITNESS: A Then, I also heard shouts
because somebody was hit nearby, sir. Q Can you tell where did these shouts originate in relation to the
place of your brother, Gerardo Valdez was? A On the West direction, sir. Q About how many meters did
you hear the shout to the place where you were? A Forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away, sir. Q Can you
tell us what were the shouts about? A They said Perlita died, sir. Q Did you come to know why Perlita
died? A He was also hit on the left side of the forehead just above the left eye, sir. Q Do you know the
reason why this Perlita was hit on her left forehead? A According to the information, I heard that Perlita
was facing towards our direction and perhaps an extra bullet hit her, sir. ATTY. EVANGELISTA: We move
to strike out the answer of the witness on the ground that it is hearsay. Aside from being hearsay, it is

based on conjection. COURT: As part of narration, the answer stay on the record. FISCAL: Q How many
times did you see the accused made this motion firing the long firearm (sumpak)? WITNESS: A Only
once, sir. Q Now, what happened next when you saw your brother, Gerardo Valdez hit and nearby he fell
down? A Yes, sir. My brother was hit and fell down and embraced him and I saw the accused ran, sir.
COURT: Q Where? WITNESS: A Towards the East direction, sir. When I tried to chase him he ran
farther, so, I did not continue chasing him. FISCAL: Q How far in meters have you gone in chasing the
accused Eastward? WITNESS: A When I saw him he was around seventy (70) meters around because it
was bright, so, I recognized him because there was moonlight and it was bright, sir. Q How many meters
did you take this chase to the accused? A I chased the accused up to the place where he entered there
were concrete fence, so, we lighted the place with flashlight and thickly populated and there were thick
grasses, sir. Q How many meters from the place where you chased the accused to the place where you
stopped when the accused entered in that place? A A distance of One Hundred (100) meters, sir, from
the place where we were. Q Now, after you were not able to chase the accused, what transpired next? A
After he went to the East direction, sir. Q By the way, who were your companions in chasing this
accused as you said earlier "we?" A My uncle Victorino Valdez and no more, sir. Q What more
transpired when you went Eastward? A I called for my father and told him that my brother died, sir. Q
Can you point this Cipriano de Vera, alias "Ambos" whom you saw that night carrying that "sumpak"
aimed at your brother and hit on his back of his head? A He is there, sir (Witness pointing to the
accused).6 The witness did not waver during the cross-examination. He went on to respond to questions
thusly: ATTY. EVANGELISTA: Q Mr. Witness, at the time of the incident you testified to here, were you
facing your brother? FISCAL At what particular time? ATTY. EVANGELISTA: The alleged shooting.
FISCAL: We object, that is misleading. COURT: Answer. WITNESS: A I was not facing him directly, sir.
He was on my side, sir. COURT: Q What side? WITNESS: On my left side, sir. Q To what direction? A
North direction, sir. Q So, your brother was North of you at the time he was shot, correct? A Yes, sir. Q
How far was he from you? A Around three (3) meters away, sir. COURT: Go ahead. ATTY.
EVANGELISTA: Q And where was he facing at that time? WITNESS: A He was facing North towards
the road, sir. Q And you say that the accused was allegedly on the Eastern side of the place where you
were? A Yes, sir. Q At that moment therefore, Mr. Witness, you were facing towards the Northeast,
direction? FISCAL: What moment? ATTY. EVANGELISTA: At that time of the shooting. COURT: Answer.
WITNESS: A I was facing the suspect, sir. ATTY. EVANGELISTA: Q Mr. Witness, why are you facing
the East direction the suspect? WITNESS: A I was facing the firecrackers, sir. Q You mean to say, you
are throwing the firecrackers infront of the accused? A No, sir, within our compound. Q But it is towards
its direction? A It is far from him and those are just small firecrackers, sir. Q How far is it from him the
firecrackers being thrown to you? A Six (6) meters away, sir. Q Will you point to any particular point that
is six (6) meters away? A From here up to the place of the accused where he was sitted, sir. (Estimated
to be five (5) meters). Q Mr. Witness, and how far were you throwing of your firecrackers? A About two
(2) meters away from me, sir. Q And how far was it from the place of you are standing? A From here up
to the stenographer, sir. Q Mr. Witness, do you have to throw the firecrackers towards the direction of the
accused? A At the time we throw those firecrackers the accused was not yet there. There were no
persons before he shot my brother, sir. Q When you saw your brother allegedly shot, were you lighting a

firecracker at that time? A I was waiting the last firecracker which I lighted to exploid, sir. Q In other
words, your attention was towards the firecracker which you have just thrown? FISCAL: Misleading, Your
Honor. COURT: Answer. WITNESS: A At the time, I was waiting for the firecracker to exploid. My
attention was on that direction and I saw the accused fire his gun, sir.7
The above testimony of Neil Valdez was bolstered by an account of the incident given by Jesusa Valdez.
Jesusa declared:
Q Now, at about 12:05 in the early morning of January 1994, do you still recall where you were? A Yes,
sir. I was in our terrace and I was watching my brothers, Gerardo Valdez, and Neil Valdez lighting
firecrackers infront of our house, sir. Q while you were there in your terrace watching your brothers
lighting firecrackers, do you remember having noticed unusual incident that happened at that time? A I
saw the accused shot my brother, Gerardo Valdez, while the accused was under the mango tree, sir. Q
Now, can you describe that weapon used by the accused in shooting your brother, Gerardo Valdez? A It
is a long firearm about 2 and 1/2 foot long, sir, and it is adjustable and bullet is like a pipe. Q Can you
demonstrate how the accused shot your brother? A The accused pointed his gun towards my brother
with his right hand lower and his left hand about 45 degree by the gun with his right 45 degree by the gun
with his right 45 degrees, sir. FISCAL: To make the demonstration better, this witness be given a long
object to represent. WITNESS: (continuing) A First, the accused held the butt of the gun with his right
hand as if pulling something while the left hand holding the middle extended forward pulled then pushed
the gun, sir, the mechanism of the gun. FISCAL: Q How far were you from the accused when you saw
him shot your brother? WITNESS: A More or less, eight (8) meters away, sir. Q What transpired next
after that? A After the shooting, I approached my brother and I went near him while there I heard shouts
coming from the West direction saying that someone was shot in that place, sir. Q When you went near
your brother, Gerardo, who fell down after he was shot, what did you do? A I embraced my brother and I
saw the accused going towards the East direction, sir. 8
Cipriano De Vera, Jr., the son of the accused, tried hard to discredit Neil Valdez by asserting that the latter
was with him on the night of the incident and left only after he had learned of the death of his brother. This
assertion, however, was convincingly rebutted by Isagani Pagaduan, a former secretary of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, who attested to the fact that Neil had left the chapel at around 10:00 p.m. and never returned that
evening. The Court cannot look with favor at the alibi proffered by the accused for not only is it considered
one of the weakest defenses, obviously due to its being capable of easy fabrication,9 but also because it
may not prevail over witnesses' positive identification that points to him as the perpetrator of the crime.10
At all events, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his being at
another place at the time of its commission; it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility
for him to be at the locus delicti.11 Appellant himself has averred that Paurido, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, is
just about eight to nine kilometers away from Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and could be reached
by a tricycle in just about twenty to thirty minutes. Neither can the Court agree with appellant that the
witnesses for the prosecution have been goaded by improper motives in testifying against him. Nothing of
substance has here been presented to convince the Court that the prosecution witnesses would

deliberately lie, send the wrong man to jail or even to the gallows, and set the real malefactor scot-free.
The trial court has correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against appellant.
Treachery exists when the means of execution employed by the accused gives the victim no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate, and the means of execution are deliberately or consciously adopted.12 It
has been amply shown in this instance that the victims have been totally unprepared for the sudden and
unexpected attack. It is also evident that appellant has placed himself at a safe distance in firing at his
victims, indeed hiding behind the noise and merriment of the New Year's celebration, to avoid any risk to
himself and then to cover up his nefarious deed. The contention of the defense that the trial court has
erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant has no
merit. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up
and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt, or (2)
he would wish to save the State of having to itself effect his capture and arrest pertinent to the crime with
which he is charged and in regard to which that mitigating circumstance is invoked.13 Voluntary surrender
is not a mitigating circumstance where it appears that the purpose of the accused in going to the
authorities is for an entirely different matter. In the case at bar, appellant himself said that he had gone to
the police station in Urdaneta merely to inquire about a warrant of arrest in connection with a pending
case against him for rape. Thus:
Q And Mr. witness, in Manila, do you know what happened? A When I arrived, I worked as a masonry,
sir. COURT Q Cementing what? A I worked as a masonry in a construction of a house, sir. ATTY.
EVANGELISTA Q After working, what did you do? A I went home to the house of my elder sister in
Makati, sir. Q And what did you find out when you went home? A I came upon my daughter, Grace, sir.
Q What day was that? A January 1, 1994 in the afternoon and asked why was she there, sir. She told
me that I had a warrant of arrest, sir. Q What else did you inquire regarding the warrant of arrest from
your daughter, Grace? A It was a warrant of arrest regarding my pending case for Rape, sir. Q And
what did you tell her, if any? A I told her to go home ahead because I will follow since I still have work to
do, sir. Q Mr. witness, you said you were to follow Grace, where were you to follow her? A Here in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir. Q Did you follow Grace in Urdaneta, Pangasinan? A Yes, sir. Q What day
did you follow her? A It was in January 6, 1994, sir. Q And where did you proceed that day? A I
dropped by the chapel, sir. Q What chapel are you referring to? A The Church of Christ (INK), sir. Q
What time was that? A I arrived at the INK chapel 2:30 in the afternoon, sir. Q And what did you do
there? A I attended the religious service, sir. Q And how long did you stay there? A After the church
service, I proceeded to Paurido, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir, to sleep there. Q The following day, January
7, 1994, what did you do next, if any? A I still helped working in Paurido, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir. Q
Did you not inquire on the reported warrant of arrest against you, Mr. witness? A I asked them about it
but I was the one who personally went to the police station of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir, on January 8,
1994. Q Upon reaching the police station of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, what happened there? A They
informed me that I have a pending case in the police station and told me that I will be incarcerated, sir. Q
And you were incarcerated? A Yes, sir. Q And do you know why you were incarcerated that day? A
Because of the Rape case filed against me, sir. Q Mr. witness, did you come to know that incident that

transpired in Brgy. Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan about 12:05 of January 1, 1994? A I was only
informed when I was already jailed, sir.14
Appellant brings up the alleged violation of his right to preliminary investigation. The right to preliminary
investigation, however, may be waived, and it will be deemed to have been waived by failing to invoke it
prior to, or at least at the time of, the arraignment.15 The question of whether there has been a
preliminary investigation, or whether it has been properly conducted, should be interposed prior to the
plea of the accused.16 The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in contending that it would now be
late in the day for appellant to raise the issue for the first time in this appeal before the Court. Anent the
allegation that appellant could not have been responsible likewise for the death of Perlita Ferrer, the Court
agrees with the observations of the trial court that (1) the slug extracted from the right parietal lobe of Perlita's brain is similar to the pellets extracted from
the head of Gerardo; (2) the wounds sustained by the two victims were caused by gunshot and the
ammunitions used are pellets, like the ones used in a shotgun; (3) Perlita was standing on the same line
of direction as Gerardo when accused-appellant fired his sumpak along with the fact that Perlita would appear to have fallen at just about the same time as Gerardo did
after the shot was delivered, are circumstances that all point just to the contrary. The trial court erred,
however, in convicting appellant for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions. In People vs.
Valdez,17 the Court, citing People vs. Molina 18 and People vs. Feloteo19 held that there could be no
separate conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 and that the illegal possession of firearms should
thenceforth be taken as an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Section 1 of the amendatory law.
Nevertheless, the alleged use of an unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal
Case No. U-7809 and Criminal Case No. U-7810 would be improper. While it was established by the
testimonies of Neil and Jesusa Valdez that appellant used a sumpak in shooting the victims, it was not
equally established that appellant had no license to possess it. The fact that the firearm appeared to be a
homemade gun or illegally manufactured would not dispense with the requirement of proof that it was
unlicensed.20 Besides, Republic Act No. 8294 took effect only on 06 July 1997 and could only be given
retroactive effect if favorable to the accused, such as in its application to Criminal Case No. U-7811, but
not when it would aggravate the criminal liability of the accused. Finally, appellant raises the issue of
whether or not the trial court has acted rightly or has erred in convicting him for the complex crime of
murder with homicide. Here, the Court finds for accused-appellant and quotes with approval the
observation made by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz.:
The record of the case will show that three separate informations were filed against appellant, one for the
murder of Gerardo Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer, and the third for illegal
possession of firearms. This Honorable Court has held that "while the trial court can hold a joint trial of
two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a
complex crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the two informations" (People vs. Legaspi, 246

SCRA 206, 213). Thus, appellant cannot be held liable for the complex crime of murder with homicide but
should be held liable separately for these crimes.21
In People vs. Legaspi,22 abovecited by the Solicitor General, the appellants were charged with two
separate informations, one for double murder (Criminal Case No. C-28760 [87] and the other for violation
of R.A. No. 6539 (Criminal Case No. C-28761 [87]). The Court there held:
. . . Their conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in
the separate informations. What controls is the description of the offense, as alleged in the information
(Santos vs. People, 181 SCRA 487 [1990]). While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more
criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime
constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two informations. Thus, the accused were deprived of
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2]).23
There is, nevertheless, a need to modify the award of damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of
the victims. In People vs. Alberto Nullan, et al.,24 the Court had occasion to restate the rules; viz.:
With respect to damages, the recovery of actual damages must be premised upon competent proof and
best evidence obtainable by the injured party showing the actual expenses incurred in connection with the
death, wake or burial of the victim. Courts cannot simply assume that damages are sustained by the
injured party, nor can it rely on speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.
In the case at bench, the Court accepts as having been incurred the amount of P52,851.96 for doctor
fees, hospital bills, funeral cremation, burial services and the cost of the tomb of the victim for which
supporting receipts are on record. The alleged reasonable miscellaneous expenses of P40,000.00 are
disallowed for not having been sufficiently proved. The actual damages awarded by the trial court should
be thus reduced to only P52,851.96. Relative to the amount of damages for loss of earnings, the trial
court has fixed the amount of P1,000,000.00 based on the victim's life expectancy of 65 years. This Court
has consistently used the formula: [2/3 x (80 - age of victim at time of death)] in determining life
expectancy. The victim in this case therefore can be said to have had a life expectancy of [2/3 x (80 - 46)]
23 years. The trial court has aptly estimated his annual income to be close to P120,000.00 from which
amount should be deducted the necessary and incidental expenses which the victim would have incurred
if he were alive, estimated at 50%, to about a balance of P60,000.00 net annual income. In computing the
loss of earning capacity of the victim, several factors are considered besides the mathematical
computation of annual income times life expectancy. Allowances are also made for circumstances which
could reduce the computed life expectancy of the victim like the nature of his work, his lifestyle, age and
state of health prior to his death, and the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the victim. All taken, the
sum of P1,000,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim awarded by the trial court must
be increased to P1,380,000.00. The award of moral damages of P100,000.00 arising from the mental
anguish suffered by the surviving spouse, Julie Gotanci, and testified to by her, is reasonable.

Angelita Ferrer, mother of Perlita, said that she had spent a total of P31,995.00 for the vigil and funeral
expenses of her daughter. The trial court awarded her the sum of P35,000.00. Only the amount of
P15,000.00 for funeral expenses, however, was duly receipted. Renato Valdez, father of Gerardo, stated
that the family had spent a total of P19,085.30 for Gerardo's wake and funeral. The trial court awarded
him P20,285.00 but the receipted amount, however, totaled only P7,785.30. The awards made by the
courta quo must thus be reduced correspondingly. Relative to the award of damages for loss of earning
capacity to the heirs of Perlita Ferrer, using the formula in People vs. Nullan, the entitlement thereto
should be modified by reducing it to the amount of P1,632,000.00 from P2,040,000.00. The award of
moral damages by the trial court in favor of the heirs of Gerardo, being justified, can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated 20 April 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 38, is MODIFIED thusly: In Criminal Case No. U-7809, accused-appellant Cipriano De Vera, Sr.,
is found GUILTY of Homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment term of from nine (9) years and one (1) day of prison mayor to fifteen (15)
years and six (6) months of reclusion temporal and ordered to pay the heirs of Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno
civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, actual damages of P15,000.00, and P1,632,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity. In Criminal Case No. U-7810, accused-appellant Cipriano De Vera, Sr., is found GUILTY
of Murder for the death of Gerardo Valdez y Torres and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of Gerardo Valdez y Torres civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00
and actual damages of P7,785.30. The award of moral damages decreed by the trial is affirmed. Criminal
Case No. U-7811 is DISMISSED. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Puno and Panganiban, JJ., are on leave.

[G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM,

KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE

VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between
the two?
Statement of the Case

These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal, which
assails the March 12, 1997 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 57) in Criminal
Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged with
murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons who were
subsequently identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The crime was allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
[and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by
then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069
with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use
of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Frederick Capulong y Dizon.[2]
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the Information
to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong. The trial court granted the
Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
[and] confederating [with] and helping xxx two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by
then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal. with trade mark Paspar Armas bearing SN-29069
with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him
between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon. [3]
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera[4] and Roderick Garcia[5] pleaded not guilty. The other
two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and Garcia. Thereafter,
the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA and
RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and they
are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, including all its accessory penalties; to
indemnify the heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;

c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;

d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information until full
payment; and,
f) Costs of suit.[6]
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.[7]
The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts: [9]
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino Cacao, a resident
of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before he moved to No. 58 Elisa Street, Caloocan City.
He was residing at Filinvest II, together with his wife and children, at the time of the incident on June 28,
1992 in the house owned by David Lim. He was then employed at a Kodak branch in Caloocan City, while
his wife served as secretary of the homeowners association.
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a car
passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers. He knew the
victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers
as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then he heard
unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road
whose entrance and exit were through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His curiosity taking [the] better part of
him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already parked. Moments
later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was
holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim,
hitting him between the eyes. After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a sketch of the
crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative position at the time of the incident.
While testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the companions of
Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation Division, Station 5,
Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the shooting incident from a security guard of
the subdivision. The officer immediately dispatched a team to Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando
Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, to investigate and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5,
September 13, 1993). A security guard guided the team to the corner of Denver and Doa Justina Streets,
site of the shooting, where they discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard
informed them that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security guards.
The policemen then found a color red sports car with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its
doors opened. They recovered inside the car several class cards and a license belonging to one Ric
Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came upon a person
wearing muddied maong pants and white t-shirt standing and walking around near the clubhouse of the
subdivision. When asked his name, the person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant.
Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious
[of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for
investigation.

Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989, was assigned to
investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by SPO4 Pablito Selvido, SPO2
Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3 Danilo Castro and other police
officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving medical treatment. The victim was
unconscious. After conferring with the victims parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5.
On his arrival, the desk officer referred appellant to him for questioning. He was told that appellant was
picked up near the crime scene acting suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his participation in
the shooting, he was reluctant at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his
conscience would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated the crime, and
implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group of policemen to the residence
of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doa Justina Street, Filinvest II Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home,
SPO3 Guspid informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in] the crime. He was then invited to the
station to shed light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the interview, Garcia
revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and black cap. According to Garcia,
Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With the revelation, SPO3 Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3
Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together with the suspects, went back to the subdivision and proceeded to a
grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek and
about 50 meters away from the residence of Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the
policemen recovered a .22 caliber revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993).
While there, SPO3 Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect the
explanations and answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As identifying
marks, SPO3 Gacute placed his initials OG (acronym for his first name and family name) between the
handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining of the black
cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where SPO3 Guspid asked
them if they were willing to give their written statements, to which they assented. Consequently, they were
brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon
City. They were then introduced to Atty. Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal Aid of the
IBP. Also, present at that time were appellants relatives, including his mother and sisters, and other
lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty. Sansano, a competent
lawyer. They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two conferred with Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the suspects [i]n his
office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step outside the building in order to assure
that no pressure would be exerted on the suspects even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6,
1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of
their rights under the constitution and inquiring from them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary
statements. To the query, the suspects answered positively. They also affirmed their earlier declaration
that they were willing to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during
the investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which they thought would incriminate them, but
they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty. Sansano requested the
suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to determine any telltale signs of torture or bodily
harm. Finding no such signs, he then summoned the policemen to re-enter the building. The investigators
readied two typewriters and each suspect was assigned to an investigator. He served as the lawyer of the
suspects, cautioning them against answering questions that they did not understand, and to seek xxx a
clarification, if needed.

According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single separate room from where
his five staff members were visible. He sat between the two tables used by the investigators for typing the
questions and answers, involving himself from beginning to end of the investigation until the signing of the
statements. He never left the office to attend to anything else, consistent with [the] standing policy of the
IBP to properly safeguard the rights of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then informed the suspects
before starting the investigation about their rights under the constitution, specifically, the right of the
suspects to have a lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police would provide them with one who would
assist them; that they could answer or refuse to answer the questions. The investigators also asked him if
he was willing to serve as counsel of the suspects. They also asked the suspects if they were willing to
accept him as their counsel. They agreed expressly by saying: Oho.
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They conducted the
question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of appellant was marked as Exhibit O and
that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking the statements of the
suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of appellant in the presence of Atty. Sansano.
Before proceeding, he reminded appellant of the constitutional warnings, consisting of four (4) questions
under the heading Paunawa, to which the latter gave positive answers. The statement was signed by
appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking down the statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: both hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia @ Boy/Bong gave
positive results [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates while both hands of Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @
Deo gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates.
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the victim to get her own
statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared a referral to the Quezon City Prosecution
Office which was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief of the Station Investigation Division.
During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects some clarificatory questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his other companion, Elmer
Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought to trial.
Version of the Defense

Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had shot the
victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and Florendo, who was his
friend, upon the latters request. A few hours after the shooting incident, appellant was picked up by the
police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him into signing his Statement regarding the incident. The
trial court summarized appellants evidence in this wise: [10]
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already close friends for
about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latters house at No 106 Kamias Road, Quezon City. His own
residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2, Quezon City. That was also the address of
Elmer Castro, his and Kenneths friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneths house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went home at 7:00
am of June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by Edwins house to invite him back to [the
formers] house that morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo,
who were then with him, would be going somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another friend of
Kenneths.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneths house at 11:00 am. Kenneth, his girlfriend, and
Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After lunch, Kenneth asked Edwin to go with
him to Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a
friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the four

of them Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneths car. Edwin sat at the
back seat. The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of them alighted
in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to
wait near the car because they were going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,]
whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name, never having met him personally before then. From his
conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing (x x x x parang
nagtatalo sila). The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not before long, Edwin also
heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he
was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His singular
thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 pm when he was already outside of Filinvest subdivision in
front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4) persons in civilian attire tortured him by
forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying his feet together and binding his hands from his back with
handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth into which water was poured little by little
into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25
minutes, because they wanted him to admit something and to name my companions but he refused to
admit or to name anyone. They next took him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for
30 minutes. At one point during the torture, a policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his
temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not escape because he could see that
they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could xxx get a lawyer[;] instead, one of them, whose name he
[did] not know, told him that I should listen only to them and not to anyone else. He claimed that he saw
one [of] his tormentors in court, and he identified him as police officer Rivera. Guspid did not participate in
his torture, because he merely took down his statement. His tormentors were not drunk or under the
influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be under the influence of drugs when he took his statement
because of his troubled appearance.
Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his request to contact his
relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation continued (x x x x puro pananakot and ginawa nila
sa akin). After his torture at the mango tree, he was returned inside and thrown into a cell, where he
remained until the following day (June 9th). During the night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him once in
the upper body upon instruction of a policeman. He was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and brought to the IBP
office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were Deo Garcia and two other police officers.
At the IBP office, the officers talked with one of the lawyers there, whom Edwin came to know to be Atty.
Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced (present) to him and Deo. That was the first he met and
saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk or not. Edwin could
not make any comment because wala po ako sa sarili ko. Then, Atty. Sansano warned Edwin
substantially that: Alam nyo ba na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo sumpaan, referring to the
statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8 pm until 9 pm on the day before (June 8,
1992) at the police station. He was not assisted by counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid
appeared to be like drunk or tipsy, when he took down Edwins statement that night.
At the IBP office, Edwins and Deos statement were taken separately by Guspid and Selvido, respectively.
At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from each other, but he could hear what was being
asked of Deo. Guspid asked the questions and typed both the questions and his answers, which were
given in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was inside his office, which was about seven (7) meters
away from where he and Guspid were situated. The office of Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so

that he could not see what Atty. Sansano was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper
which he was not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
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On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng sinumpaang salaysay, which he
swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of recanting his statements given at the
precinct in the evening of June 8, 1992 and at the IBP office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they
were given under coercion, intimidation, and in violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court

Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was indeed
Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted appellant as a
principal, however, because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and
substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four [accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo,
Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia.[11]
The Issues

Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS BERNARDO
CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY TO
KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO- CONSPIRATOR;
III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT O, ALLEGED STATEMENT OF APPELLANT; AND
IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC
MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH
VIOLATED THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT
PROVED THE APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
APPELLANT.[12]
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2)
the admissibility of appellants extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his liability.
The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as a
principal.
First and Third Issues:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellants Liability

Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be discussed
jointly.
Eyewitness Account

In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera, the trial
court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its conclusions on the
following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the victims car; the victim was clearly
struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by
himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendos dark
design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.[13] In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the victim
in the head moments later.
Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was
inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. [14] Indeed,
the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably
indicating a common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not
on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacaos testimony does not establish appellants culpability.
Appellants Extrajudicial Statement

Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Veras extrajudicial
statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendos malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang
maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[15]
Second, appellants companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan of
the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,] sina
Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang
baril niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself at a
certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear from the following
portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw ng June
08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw
po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at
may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan
siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na
kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila
umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai

[magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay xxx lalakad na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay
sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na
itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa
kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon
ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo
malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa
lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni
Deo. P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan
nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang tignan kung mayroong darating na tao . Samantalang si
Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si
Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si
Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na
kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba
sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at
kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na
po kami, pero ako po ay nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli
naman sa kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli. [16]
Appellant an Accomplice, Not a Conspirator

In other words, appellants presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the
victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for
passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an
accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [17] To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) that two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the
felony [was] decided upon.[18] Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that
the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.[19] The Court has held that in most
instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. [20]
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being
included in Article 17,[21] cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. [22]The
Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates
knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed
just the same.[23] To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the
community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that
are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. [24]
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on appellants
penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The act of one of them is
deemed the act of all.[25] In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a
principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision,
and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.

Thus, in People v. Castro,[26] the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that their concerted action in going
armed and together to their victims house, and there, while one stayed as a lookout, the other two
entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together afterwards, admits no other rational
explanation but conspiracy. It may be noted further that Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three
of them, together with some others, had planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,[27] the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for conspiring with
two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their arrest, they disclosed that they had
intended to rob the victims store and that they did so in accordance with their plan. In that case, it was
clear that all three of them, including the lookout, were the authors of the crime.
In People v. Loreno,[28] the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because they had
acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the other conspirators,
and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crime of robbery and
rape.
Upon the other hand, in People v. Corbes,[29] the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the criminal
design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the vehicle to and from
the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a conspirator, the Court observed that he
was merely approached by one of the robbers who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not
with the robbers when they resolved to commit a robbery. When his services were requested, the decision
to commit the crime had already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,[30] the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some appellants who
knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and distracting his attention. The Court
ruled that they were accomplices and not co-conspirators, [i]n the absence of clear proof that the killing
was in fact envisaged by them.
In People v. Suarez et al.,[31] Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was merely an
accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he took part in the planning or
execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts
indicative of confederacy on his part.
In People v. Balili,[32] the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that in going with them,
knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside
the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him
guilty as an accompliance. The Court noted that there was no evidence that he had conspired with the
malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the crime.
In People v. Doble,[33] the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when he
looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: Neither would it appear that
Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more
than just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men, all with arms and weapons to
perpetrate the crime, the commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full
mutual confidence of each other, which [was] not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were
asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at
the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill
Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the
decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na. This is clear from
his statement, which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang
maging kasapakat nito?

S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na
lamang at napilitan akong sumama.[34]
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further
that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the conspiracy
to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made, after the decision to kill
was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as principals or
accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by
holding x x x that they were guilty of the milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilty as mere accomplices. [35]
Second Issue:

Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement

Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was
given freely -- without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was
consistent with the normal experience of mankind. [36]
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made in the
presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid Committee
purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial Statements, appellant
asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time. Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellants claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police insofar as
custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the rights of the
accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire interrogation. [37]
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera, and
Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were doing.

Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself that no
pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers during my
personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of people brought
before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing and sight of any
police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to interview the two
accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?
A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.
Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their own
statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against them for a [sic]
in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they were never
threatened by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements. Casually I
asked the two boys to raise their upper clothes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm committed on
the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal] assurances xxx, verbal
assurance that they were never hurt.[38]
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the use of
duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. [39] In the present case, the Court
is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this constitutional mandate. Moreover,
appellants allegations of torture must be disregarded for being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to
facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof
whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence
of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. [40] The defense has the burden of
proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. [41] Appellant failed to
overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that [a]n extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. In
the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti:

(a) a certain result has been proven for example, a man has died; and (b) some person is criminally
responsible.[42] It is indubitable that a crime has been committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution
evidence clearly show that appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He
himself does not deny that he was at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness
in the company of the gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to the
voluntariness of his confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that
there should be some other evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession. [43]
Criminal and Civil Liability

In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify the
crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower court
explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with deliberate
forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also
proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of
the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the
attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because
treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. [44] Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot
impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty
Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a
principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as compensatory damages
was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented, moral damages is also warranted,
but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the
payment of interest.[45] However, the grant of P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis.
Such indemnification partakes of the nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. [46] In this
case, the trial court merely presumed the amount of Capulongs earnings. Since the prosecution did not
present evidence of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an
accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000 indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory
damages and (c) interest of six percent per annum on these two amounts. The award of moral damages
is however REDUCED to P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity isDELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:
I share the ponencia of my colleagues in its affirmance of the conviction of appellants except, with all
due respect, insofar as it has concluded that appellant De Vera is guilty merely as an accomplice.

There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised penal Code when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy of, course, by
itself is legally inconsequential unless the criminal plot is, in fact, carried out. Once the offense is
perpetrated, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render, all of them
equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be
the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony. An accomplice, under Article 18 of the
same Code, is one who, not being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in the execution of the act, (b)
directly forces or induces others to commit, (c) cooperates in the commission of the offense by another
act without which the offense would not have been accomplished (per Article 17 of the Code),
collaborates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
In the case at bar, De Vera, knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three coaccused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an
innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime
(ponencia).
I cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms to decide, on the one hand,
and to concur or to assent, on the other hand, in defining, i.e., whether as a conspirator or as an
accomplice, the specific criminal liability of the criminal offender. Where there is concurrence or assent by
one to a plan, even when previously hatched by another or others, to commit a felony which concurrence
or assent is made prior to the actual perpetration of the offense, and he then actually participates in its
commission, regardless of the extent of such participation, his liability should be deemed, in my view, that
of a conspirator rather than that of an accomplice. I would equate the liability of an accomplice to one
who, knowing of the criminal design, but neither concurring nor assenting to it, cooperates in the
execution of the crime short of taking a direct part in, and short of taking an indispensable act for, the
commission of the offense. In the last two instances (taking a direct part in, or taking an indispensable act
for, the commission of the felony), his participation would be that of a principal under Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code.
When appellant De Vera, aware of the plan to kill the victim, agreed to be lookout during the
commission of the crime which, in fact, so took place as planned, he rendered himself liable no less than
that incurred by his co-accused.