Eminent Domain and Due Process

Masikip vs. City of Pasig

The taking is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and
recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away,
such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid.

Power of eminent domain - the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonable compensation therefor. It has also been described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent
in government.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the
exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only
to Constitutional limitations.
Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly
authorized by statute.
[Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)]

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern:
(a) The adequacy of the compensation,
(b) The necessity of the taking, and
(c) The public use character of the purpose of the taking

Ruling: There is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and
the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not
mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit
to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit.

Brgy. Sindalan vs. CA

Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals without due process
of law.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions:
(1) That private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 9 (2) That no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due
process of law

“Public use” is defined as whatever is beneficially employed for the community

- The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use, provided
the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals

Requisites for a valid exercise of Eminent domain:

1. Expropriation is for a public use
2. The payment of just compensation to the property owner.
a. it must be real, substantial, full, and ample
b. should be made within a “reasonable time” from the taking of the property
c. any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum.

On the matter of due process

The property owner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public
use and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on them

Taking of property for a private use or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due
process of law

Issues:
Whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use.
Whether private property can be taken by law from one person and given to another in the guise of public
purpose.

Ruling: NO
1.) The expropriation will actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his
commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and
license to sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own
funds for a right-of-way. The expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.
2.) The residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of
compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of
eminent domain and is patently illegal.

3.) Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation, government funds
would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring.

Estate of Heirs of the late Ex-justice JBL Reyes vs. City of Manila

During the pendency of the two ejectment cases [filed by JBL reyes] against respondents Abiog and
Maglonso [former’s tenants], respondent City filed on April 25, 1995 a complaint for eminent domain
(expropriation) of the properties of petitioners.
The complaint was based on Ordinance No. 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the City
Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land. According to the ordinance, the said properties were
to be distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were “the occupants of the said parcels of land who
(had) been occupying the said lands as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years.”

Issues:
Whether or not Ordinance 7818 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution and for abridging the “contracts” between petitioners and prospective buyers of the subject
parcels of land;

Whether or not respondent City’s act of expropriation is illegal because it did not comply with Sections 9
and 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 (The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)

Ruling:
Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must
not violate any law. Being a mere creation of the legislature, a local government unit can only exercise
powers granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of the constitutional power of control of
Congress over local government units, the latter being mere creations of the former.

When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied on its powers granted by Section 19
of the Local Government Code of 1991 and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its
urban land reform and housing program.

Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the conditions and standards prescribed by RA
7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the expropriation of property
for urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:

Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land – Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum
Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. – The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include xxx and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted: xxxx

Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted.

Respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
Respondent City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court
that it complied with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, respondent City in its pleadings
failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this specific
jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners.
Didipio Earh-savers’Multi-purpose Assoc. vs. Gozun

Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

Issues:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and
unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution.

Public respondent’s contention:

1.) Petitioners’ eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC
has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or
are in danger on account of CAMC’s FTAA.

The court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual
and ripe for judicial intervention. Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for
this Court to intervene.

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation
of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty

2.) The issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can take
cognizance of.

The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will
have a bearing on the country’s economy which is to a greater extent dependent upon the mining
industry. Also affected by the resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the
mining contract areas as well as the social existence of indigenous peoples which are threatened. Based
on these considerations, this Court deems it proper to take cognizance of the instant petition.

The 4 conditions of judicial review are present.

Ruling: NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

While the Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is
unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public
use and the payment of just compensation.

Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the
government’s thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit.

It is contended that Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 encroach on the power of the trial
courts to determine just compensation in eminent domain cases inasmuch as the same determination of
proper compensation are cognizable only by the Panel of Arbitrators.

Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as the
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over
the court’s findings.

There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected
landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of
just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary determination made by the administrative
agency. The jurisdiction of the Court is not any less "original and exclusive" as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative determination.

Taking in Eminent Domain vs Regulation in Police Power

Taking under Police Power Taking under Eminent domain

A property interest is merely restricted because the
continued use thereof would be injurious to public
welfare, or where property is destroyed because its
continued existence would be injurious to public
interest
The entering upon private property is for more than
a momentary period, and, under the warrant or
color of legal authority, devoting it to a public
use,

Use of the property by the owner was limited, but
no aspect of the property is used by or for the
public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total
and it will not constitute compensable taking if
nobody else acquires use of the property or any
interest therein.
Informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as to substantially oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. The
deprivation is with compensation

Property rights of private individuals are subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
Taking may include trespass without actual eviction
of the owner, material impairment of the value of
the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for
which the property was intended such as the
establishment of an easement.

NAPOCOR vs. Aurellano S. Tianco, Lourdes S. Tianco and Nestor S. Tianco

Issue:
With respect to the amount of just compensation that must be paid the respondents for the expropriated
portion (19,423 square meters) of their property:

1. Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?

2. Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for
under P.D. 938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or the assessor
(whichever is lower), considering that the purpose for which the property is being taken is merely for the
establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead transmission lines?

Ruling: Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct.

(1) In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual
taking prior thereto.
Hence, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990
should be considered in determining the just compensation.

For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time
of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the property.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of the filing of
the complaint, or "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

(2) True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the
respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such
easement is not gratis (free). If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the
owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with
the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by
their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property
found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the
land .

NAPOCOR vs. Bongbong

Issue: Whether the procedure laid down in Rule 67 should be followed in determining just compensation

Ruling:

The trial court erred in the determination of just compensation at P300.00 per sq m based on the fact that
it paid a similar rate to the other landowners whose properties were likewise acquired by petitioner. The
nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the landowner. The subject property is "agricultural."

Rule 67 need not be followed where the expropriator has violated procedural requirements . When a
government agency itself violates procedural requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed in
Rule 67. The present case is not an action for expropriation. Respondent’s complaint is an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of possession of the Property or its value, and damages. Under these
circumstances, a trial before commissioners is not necessary

No expropriation proceeding was filed, there is no need for appointment of commissioners [who would
examine and evaluate the subject property for the determination of just compensation.]

Heirs of Pidacan vs. ATO

Private property converted into airport. Actual taking preceeded the filing of the expropriation proceeding
[years later]

Issue: When should the subject property be valued for the determination of just compensation

Ruling:
As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of
taking.
In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had
been using petitioners’ property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation
proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential
increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the
ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of
the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.

The appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners’ property is when the trial court made its
order of expropriation in 2001.

Nepomuceno vs. City of Surigao

Property taken used as City road.

Petitioners claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity demand that the value at the
time of actual payment should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA
held.

Ruling:
Where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks
recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value
of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation

Reason for such rule:

The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is taken. Thus, the value of petitioners' property must be
ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss
may fairly be adjudged.

Phil. Nat’l Oil Company vs. Maglasang

Expropriation proceeding filed first before actual taking

Subject properties to be used in the construction and operation of geothermal plant project.
Petitioner insists that contrary to the findings of the two courts below, the determination of just
compensation should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
According to petitioner in Civil Case No. 3267-O, petitioner took possession of the land on January 1, 1992
when PNOC leased the same from its administrator as evidenced by a Lease Agreement for the period of
January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. Thus, taking, for purposes of computing just compensation, should
have been reckoned from January 1, 1992.

Ruling:
we rejected the State’s contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right
to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, ceases upon the day
fixed, without need of a demand. Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised
by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Where, as here, the owner was compensated and not
deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its being diverted to public use, there is no
taking within the constitutional sense.

The time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994. For Lot 11900, on October 24, 1994, the date of the
filing of the complaint although the plaintiff took possession of the property in 1991 due to a lease contract
executed between plaintiff and defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only upon the
filing of the complaint

NAPOCOR vs Co

Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint

Petitioner filed a complaint for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots belonging
to respondent, in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected
Transmission Line Project (Lahar Project).

Issues:
Is Republic Act No. 8974 (2000), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-
Way, site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for other purposes," applicable
to actions for eminent domain filed by the Napocor pursuant to its charter (Rep. Act. No. 6395, as
amended) for the purpose of constructing power transmission lines on the properties subject of said
actions? YES

Petitioner expropriated respondent’s property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use. R.A. No.
8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects

R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a
national government project.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the
scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. At the
same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on
procedural aspects.

Whether what should be paid is the full fair market value of the property or a mere easement
fee.

When petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full
market value upon proper determination by the courts. Construction of the transmission lines will definitely
have limitations and will indefinitely deprive the owners of the land of their normal use. Petitioner is thus
liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property.

Reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.

Petitioner contends that the computation should be made as of 27 June 2001, the date when it filed the
expropriation complaint, as provided in Rule 67. We agree.

Rule 67
The value of just compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first.” [GENERAL RULE]
 Exceptions:
Grave injustice to the property owner
The taking did not have color of legal authority,
The taking of the property was not initially for expropriation
The owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the expropriation.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate its own determination shall prevail over
the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.

Forfom vs Phil Nat’l Railways

President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly
known as the Carmona Project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the
installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances.

During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private
individuals/corporations were traversed as right-of-way.

Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages.

Defendant neither commenced an expropriation proceedings nor paid just compensation prior to its
occupation and construction of railroad lines on the subject property.

Issue: Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property because respondent PNR failed to file any
expropriation case and to pay just compensation?

Ruling: NO

Plaintiff's prayer to recover the property cannot be granted.

Forfom accepted the fact of the taking of its land when it negotiated with PNR for just compensation,
knowing fully well that there was no expropriation case filed at all. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen
(18) years to question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how
much petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning the PNR's power to expropriate or
the public purpose for which the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right and is
estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case for expropriation
that was commenced by PNR.

The primary reason for thus denying to the owner the remedies usually afforded to him against usurpers is
the irremedial injury which would result to the railroad company and to the public in general. It will readily
be seen that the interruption of the transportation service at any point on the right of way impedes the
entire service of the company and causes loss and inconvenience to all passengers and shippers using the
line. Public policy, if not public necessity, demands that the owner of the land be denied the ordinarily
remedies of ejectment and injunction.

The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can
not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his
apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such a case there
can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.

The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner.

When just compensation should be fixed. Is it at the time of the taking or, as Forfom
maintains, at the time when the price is actually paid?

Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought
recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has
invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation.

Admittedly, the PNR's occupation of Forfom's property for almost eighteen (18) years entitles the latter to
payment of interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent on the value of the land at the time of taking until
full payment is made by the PNR